ML113340068
| ML113340068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2011 |
| From: | Armstrong L Dominion Nuclear Connecticut |
| To: | Peter Presby Operations Branch I |
| JACKSON D RGN-I/DRS/OB/610-337-5306 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML102850247 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01834 | |
| Download: ML113340068 (38) | |
Text
RO Administrative JPM Changes jPM-A1.1R Added comments to assist examiner in determining the correct sequence for tagging each component.
Provided better guidance for examiner cues; i.e., when handouts are required.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
jPM-A2R Appropriately annotated which steps are critical and which steps are NOT critical.
Provided guidance to examiners as to why 2 different times are both correct.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
jPM-A3R Appropriately annotated which steps are critical and which steps are NOT critical.
Corrected the stay time based on RWP Dose Alarm.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
jPM-A4R Appropriately annotated which steps are critical and which steps are NOT critical.
Provided a wider band for the correct answer. Examinees that use the Xenon Curve are more likely to pick a higher Xenon concentration than examinees that use the Xenon table.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
SRO Administrative JPM Changes JPM-A1.1S Deleted original JPM-1.1S, Determine Res Leakage Action Level and replaced with JPM-1.3S, Shift Staffing Based on Administrative Requirements (Now labeled as JPM-1.1S) o Revised Operator Responses to ensure each has a different reason for NOT being available.
o Revises Operator Schedule handout to match Operator Responses.
o Inserted the three Questions into the body of the JPM.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
JPM-A1.2S Added cues for examiners Revised to provide examinee with a manual clearance form vs. requiring examinee to fill in a copy of a blank automated form.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
JPM-A2S Added another critical step if examinee incorrectly applies TSAS 3.1.3.3 or 3.0.3.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
JPM-A3S Under the Initiating Cue, Added requirement for examinee to determine the dose each individual will receive. Also included this as a Critical Step.
Revised to show Initial Conditions first and Initiating Cue last. Better for examinees.
JPM-A4S Under the Initiating Cue, added a requirement to complete the attached IRF and identify any PARs.
Added requirement to inform examinee that this is a time critical JPM.
Added examiner cues for when the clock starts and stops.
Provided additional Radiation data for determining whether Federal Release Limits were exceeded.
Modified Critical Plant Parameters.
SRO Administrative JPM Changes JPM-Al.lS Revised Operator Schedule for Student handout to match JPM Operator Schedule.
JPM-Al.2S Determined that SRO should be provided with an automated clearance form versus a manual form.
Development time for a new manual form would be needed and is unnecessary. The SROs are accustomed to reviewing automated forms.
JPM-A4S Changed from non-time critical to time critical.
- y Simulator IPM Changes Note: All JPMs were modified to have the "Initial Conditions" precede the "Initiating Cue".
- 1. JPM-S 1.1, Align Alternate Charging Discharge Path;
- a.
Changed initial setup to start with CH-429 closed.
- b. Changed direction to restore charging flow per AOP-2512, Loss Of All Charging.
- c. Added to Initial Conditions that another operator would deal with non-related alarms.
- 2. JPM-S2.1, Blended Makeup to the VCT;
- a.
Corrected section referred to in OP 2304C from "4.21" to 4.22".
- b. Fixed alignments and selections of Critical "YIN" designations.
- c.
Added PMW and Boric Acid settings to Comments ofstep 11.
- 3. JPM-S3.1, Fill #1 SIT;
- a. Added note to inform examinee of requested PEO in-plant verifications to Cue of steps 6 and 7.
- b. Added to Comments of step 13 that fill process may be terminated at examiner's discretion.
- c. Truncated JPM to eliminate redundant, non-critical steps, of venting all four SIT fill headers to venting just one header.
- 4. JPM-S4s.1, Failure of#2 SG ADV, MS**190B, Controller;
- a. Added the initial required steps for manual operation ofthe ADV controller on C05.
- b. Added Cue to step 4, where ADV fails, for examiner to direct examinee to continue to use both ADVs for the ReS cooldown to force action be taken on ADV failure.
- c. Removed evaluation check of error-prevention, human performance tools.
- 5. JPM-S5.1, CTMT Isolation due to Fuel Handling Accident;
- a. Modified JPM to have examinee notified of the accident in the Initial Conditions.
- b. Added specifics of the ventilation lineup to the simulator setup requirements.
- c. Modified Critical step annotations per NRC comments.
- d. Added additional guidance on Critical step annotations to step 8, ventilation lineup verification.
- e. Added Comment of required action to place CRAC in Recirc.
- f. Added Critical guidance to step 9, requiring at least one train of CRAC be placed in "Recirc".
Simulator JPM Changes
- 6. JPM-S6.1, Restoring Bus 24C to Unit 2 RSST with the "A" DIG Supplying;
- b. Changed initial step to state specific procedure to be given the examinee.
- c. Added actuation of EDG Beaker Trip alarm, COS, A-30, to simulator cue of step 12.
- d. Added JPM step for examinee check ofEDG Beaker Trip alarm, C08, A-30, and renumbered JPM steps accordingly.
- 7. JPM-S7.1, Actuation Test ofESAS Component - Facility 1;
- a. Added notation to the Required Materials to ensure applicable surveillance is pre-authorized and to verify the setup of the PMW & Boric Acid controllers.
- b. Modified Critical step annotations per NRC comments.
- c. Removed evaluation check of error-prevention, human performance tools.
- 8. JPM replacement due to incorrect simulator modeling of the applicable radiation monitor;
- a. JPM-S9.1, Response to Vent Stack Rad Monitor Alarm, was replaced by JPM-S4p.l, Shifting LPSI Pumps During SDC Operation.
f Simulator IPM Changes Note: All JPMs were modified to have the "Initial Conditions" precede the "Initiating Cue".
- 1. JPM-S 1.1, Align Alternate Charging Discharge Path;
- a. Deleted reference to CH-429 closure (As recommended).
- b. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
- 2. JPM-S2.1, Blended Makeup to the VCT;
- a. Corrected section referred to in OP 2304C from "4.21" to 4.22". Op 2304C changed. Added new Section 4.11 so all subsequent sections changed. All referenced to Section 4.21 have been replaced with 4.22.
- b. Changed step 4 from 2500 psia to 2250 psia.
- c. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements and Cues. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM and to ensure the cues are clear.
- 3. JPM-S3.1, Fill #1 SIT;
- a. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
- 4. JPM-S4p.l replacement due to incorrect simulator modeling of the applicable radiation monitor;
- a. New JPM is Shifting LPSI Pumps During SDC Operation (Alt. Path) and is selected as RO ONLY. Original JPM could not be performed on the simulator due to a modeling difference with the plant.
- b. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements of original JPM. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
- 5. JPM-S4s.1, Failure of#2 SG ADV, MS-190B, Controller;
- a. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
- 6. JPM-S5.l, CTMT Isolation due to Fuel Handling Accident;
- a. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
I,
Simulator JPM Changes
- 7. JPM-S6.1, Restoring Bus 24C to Unit 2 RSST with the "A" DIG Supplying;
- a.
Original JPM, Energize Bus 24C from the RSST, replaced due to overlap with Simulator Scenario #3.
- h. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
- 8. JPM-S7.1, Actuation Test of ESAS Component Facility 1;
- a. Minor modifications to Simulator Requirements. To ensure the simulator is properly set up for the JPM.
Simulator Guide Changes Note: The NUREG-1021 ES-D-1 forms for the applicable simulator scenarios were also modified, as necessary, to incorporate the below listed changes.
ESllL11 Added 2 new malfunctions, RP28D and RP28E to prevent an automatic Reactor trip on low SIG level. This ensures the manual Reactor trip is safety significant.
Added new Component malfunction, CH01A, Loss of "A" CAR Fan to ensure the RO would have an adequate number of Instrument or Component malfunctions.
Revised Initial Conditions for the scenario to Beginning of Life. Previously written and validated using an older simulator model.
Provided cues for each event.
Provided cue for event classification for SRCl.
Numerous editorial changes ES11L12 Changed report of "A" Service Water Strainer from 28 psid to 'pegged high'. Maximum reading is 10 psid.
Included actions from AOP 2565, Loss of Service Water. If the crew decides to use the AOP instead of OP 2326S, Service Water System.
Deleted the ramp of the Pressurizer pressure transmitter failure. Crew should be able to address the malfunction in time to prevent a plant trip.
Added cue for the insertion of malfunction ES04F, Actuation Cabinet deenergizes. Unable to insert malfunction automatically due to the need for it to inserted between two events.
Changed the insertion time of the ESD (earlier) to save time. As a result, a critical task was eliminated (Perform a plant cooldown).
Corrected the priorities of Safety Functions based on validation.
Provided cues for each event.
Provided cue for event classification for SRO.
Numerous editorial changes Changed Initial Conditions to include the "A" DIG out of service to allow restoration of Bus 24C from the RSST.
Changed electrical malfunction from a fault on 24C to a fault on 24A to allow for the restoration of 24C.
Modified guide for the changes in crew actions due to the change in above electrical malfunction.
Added events to activate remote components to simplify control of the scenario.
Added explanations to various crew actions to assist the examiners' understanding of the actions taken.
Added specific Alarm Response Procedure actions expected to be taken by the crew.
Modified actuation and severity of the Small-Break LOCA to automate actuation, ensure mitigating actions are required, and that the crew does not start the actions until entry into the event specific procedure.
Simulator Guide Changes Note: The NUREG-1021 ES-D-1 forms for the applicable simulator scenarios were also modified, as necessary, to incorporate the below listed changes.
ESllL11 Corrected typo. Scenario summary listed TS 3.7.1.1 in two places. Now appropriately lists TS 3.7.~.1.
Scenario incorrectly stated that steam flow transmitter failed low. Correct to fail high.
Scenario summary incorrectly stated the reason for swapping RSCCW Pumps as PMs. Corrected to state reason for swap is to allow maintenance to perform vibration analysis.
Originally listed Train 8. as protected facility. Corrected to Train !!.
Malfunction Summary corrected to match the scenario guide (numerous corrections).
Verified all triggers numbers are correct for each scenario.
Corrected Critical Task 1 wording to agree in all locations.
Changed Steam Dumps to Atmospheric Dumps. Steam dumps are not available due to loss of Condenser vacuum.
All turnover parameters are consistent throughout the guide.
Corrections as a result of SST (Validation)
Corrected typo on page 8. 9119D to 6119D.
Corrected typo on page 25. on Condensate to one Condensate.
ESllL12 Added 3rd Critical Task (renumbered as CTl) to manually trip the Reactor following ATWS.
Deleted the word 'develops' from Event 3 on Form D-1.
Malfunction Summary corrected to match the scenario guide (numerous corrections).
Verified all triggers numbers are correct.
Deleted the word 'gradually' from malfunction on Pressurizer pressure transmitter failure. Failure is sudden.
Added better guidance on specifically when to enter the ESD malfunction..
Corrections as a result of SST (Validation)
Page 10, changed malfunction ED06B to I/O to open 24Bto 22B tie Breaker. ED06B is a bus fault and would not allow the bus to be reenergized. I/O allows reenergization.
Changed some event severities from % to actual gpm values.
Deleted remote for closing the disconnect for MS-202. Valve is already closed and does not need to be reenergized.
ESllL13 Turnover sheet has B Train as protected. (Previously omitted)
Turnover sheet show A DIG ODS.
(OK to have 24E aligned to either bus regardless of Protected Facility)
Malfunction Summary corrected to match the scenario guide (numerous corrections).
Verified all triggers numbers are correct.
All references to "A" RCP have been chang~~d to liB" RCP.
Added explanations to various crew actions to assist the examiners' understanding of the actions taken.
1 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam: 03/21/2011 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K
K K
K K
K A A
A A
G Total G*
6 1
\\A2 Totj' 1
2 3
4 5
2 3
4
- 1.
1 3
2 6
2 3
2 18
\\
/6 Emergency &
Abnormal 2
0 2
2 N/A 1
1 N/A 3
9 4
\\
/
Plant Tier Totals 3
4 8
3 4
5 27 10 Evolutions 1\\ /
1 3
2 3
2 1
1 2 4
3 3
4 28 5
J\\
- 2.
Systems 2
2 0
0 1 2 1 0 1 2 1
0 10 V
3 J
\\
Plant Tier Totals 5
2 3
3 3
2 2
5 5
4 4
38 8
/
V/
\\
\\ \\
1 2
3 4
2 3
4 1/
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 3
3 2
2 10
- 1.
Ensure that at least 2 topics from every KlA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO outlines (i.e., except for one Note:
category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KlA category shall not be less than 2).
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match those specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ~1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
I
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KlA statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant specific, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KlA categories.
- 7.
- The generic KlAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KlA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs.
B.
On the following pages, enter the KlA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of column A2 for Tier 2 Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9.
For Tier 3, select topics form Section 2 of the KlA catalog, and enter the KlA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-40103. Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 01 PWR Examination Outline Form E Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 E/APE # 1Name I Safety Function 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02)
Reactor Trip - Stabilization Recovery 11 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 000009 Small Break LOCA 13 000011 Large Break LOCA 13 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions 14 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeupl 2
000025 Loss of RHR System 14 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction 13 000029 A TWS 11 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3
000040 (BW/E05; CElE05; W/E12)
Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer 14 K
K K
A A
G 1
2 3
1 2
X X
X X
X X
X X
KIA Topic(s)
IR EA2.2; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery): Adherence to appropriate procedures and 3.0 1
operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.
AK3.02; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Why PORV or code safety exit 3.6 1
is below RCS or PZR temperature.
EK2.03; Knowledge of the interrelations between the 3.0 1
small break LOCA and the following: S/Gs.
EK3.08; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Large Break LOCA:
3.9 Flowpath for sump recirculation.
AK2.07; Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC 2.9 1
Flow) and the following: RCP seals.
AK1.03; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Relationship between 3.0 flow and PZR leveL AK3.02; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat 3.3 Removal System: Isolation ofRHR low-pressure piping prior to pressure increase above specified level.
AA2.03; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The valve lineups necessary to restart 2.6 1
the CCWS while bypassing the portion of the system the abnormal condition.
AA1.04; Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure 3.9 Control Malfunctions: Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters.
EK1.02; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the A TWS:
2.6 Definition of reactivity.
2.4.18; Emergency Procedures 1Plan: Knowledge of 3.3 the specific bases for EOPs.
EK3.2; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating 3.3 associated with (Excess Steam Demand).
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier 1/Group 1 E/APE # I Name I Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G
KIA Topic(s)
IR 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater 14 X
EK3.4; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater):
RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.
3.2 000055 Station Blackout I 6 Randomly Deselected 000056 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 AA2.32; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:
Transient trend of coolant temperature toward no-load T 4.3 1
000057 Loss of Vital AC I nst.
Bus/6 AA1.03; Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Feedwater pump speed to control and level in S/O.
3.6 1
000058 Loss of DC Power I 6 X
AK3.02; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power.
4.0 1
000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water 14 Randomly Deselected 000065 Loss of Instrument Air 18 2.4.47; Emergency Procedures I Plan: Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
4.2 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances I 6 X
AK1.02; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:
Over-excitation.
3.3 1
ory Totals:
3 Group Point Total:
18 ES-401
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline FORM ES*401*2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions* Tier 1/Group 2
~====~~~~======--~~=r~1 E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 KIA Topic(s)
IR 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal/1 Randomly Deselected 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 X
AA1.03; Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Rod control switches 3.6 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod 11
,~K~.01 ; KHowledge of: t:ke iHfel'l'elafieHs betweeH the IHepel'aole I Col'ltrellers aRd positioeers Rejected; No controllers or positioners are used to diagnose or recover from an inoperable/stuck control rod.
~
.:1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod /1 X
AK2.03; Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable / Metroscope.
3.1 1
000024 Erne Boration /1 Randomly Deselected 000028 Pressurizer bevel Malfunctien I 2 AK3.03; KHowledge ohhe FeaSOHS WI' the fallewiHg "espeHses as the,! appl~! to the Pl'eSSHFiillep l,e~!el bOHtFOI M&lfuHetioHsl False ieaieatioe ofP;.?;&: le',cel,..ffiee PGR1,l or spray valve is opee aad &:C8 satl:lrated.
Rejected; No credible postulated event will cause a false Pressurizer level indication at saturation conditions with an open PORV or spray valve.
.:1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 X
AK3.05; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:
Actions contained in EOP for PZR level 3.7 000032 Loss of Source Range Nil 7 Randomly Deselected 000033 Loss of Intermediate NII7 Randomly Deselected 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident I 8
Randomly Deselected 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 Randomly Deselected 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 14 Randomly Deselected 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. 1 9
2.1.23; Conduct ofOperations: Ability to perfonn specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes ofplant operation.
4.3 1
000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. 19 Randomly Deselected 000061 ARM Alarms /7 Randomly Deselected 000067 Plant Fire On-site 18 X
AK3.04; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Actions contained in EOP for fire on site.
3.3 000068 (
Control Room Evac. I 8 Randomly Deselected 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity /5 Randomly Deselected ES-401
ES-401 5
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2
"',.,.,or,NO"l'lI and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Gro F===~~~~~========~F==r=91 E/APE # I Name I Safety Function 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling 1 4
000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity 19 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natur Circ./4 CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS I 4
CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage 12 x
CE/E09 Functional Recovery Is:
022 KIA Topic(s)
IR 2.4.9; Emergency Procedures / Plan:
Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications 3.8 1
in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) strategies.
2.1.19; Conduct of Operations: Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or 3.9 1
status.
Randomly Deselected AA2.1; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling): Facility conditions and selection 2.9 1
of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
AK2.1; Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Excess RCS Leakage) and the following: Components, and functions of 3.2 1
control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.
Randomly Deselected p Point Total:
ES-401 6
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Form ES-401-2 Plant System # I Name K
K K
K K
1 2
3 4
5 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X
003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X
008 Component Cooling Water X
008 Component Cooling Water X
010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X
012 Reactor Protection X
013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation KIA Topic(s)
K5.02; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: Effects ofRCP coastdown on RCS parameters.
A3.03; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RCPS, including: Seal DIP.
2.1.7; Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
A2.04; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: RHR valve malfunction.
A4.05; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:
Transfer ofECCS flowpaths prior to recirculation.
K1.03; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems: RCS K2.02; Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: CCW pump, including K1.02; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCWS and the following systems: Loads cooled by CCWS.
K4.01; Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Spray valve warm-up.
K6.07; Knowledge ofthe effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Core calculator.
2.4.2; Emergency Procedures / Plan:
Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
IR 2.8 1
3.2 4.4 1
2.9 3.9 1
3.0 1
3.0 1
3.3 2.7 1
2.9 1
4.5 1
ES*401 7
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Form ES-40 1-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 System # I Name K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 KIA Topic{s)
IR 022 Containment Cooling A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans.
3.6 022 Containment Cooling A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Fan motor thermal overload/high-speed operation 2.6 026 Containment Spray X
K3.01; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the
- CCS.
3.9 1
039 Main and Reheat Steam A2.01; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Flow paths ofsteam during a LOCA.
3.1 1
039 Main and Reheat Steam 2.1.32; Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply system limits and 3.8 1
059 Main Feedwater X
K4.08; Knowledge ofMFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Feedwater regulatory valve operation (on basis of steam flow, feed flow mismatch).
2.5 1
061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X
K1.03; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems: Main steam system.
3.5 1
061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X
A 1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including:
S/G leveL 3.9 062 AC Electrical Distribution A2.05; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Methods for a dead bus.
2.9 1
ES-401 8
Form ES-401*2 ES-401 Form ES-401-2 Plant System # I Name K
K K
K K
KIA Topic(s)
IR 1
2 3
4 5
063 DC Electrical K3.01; Knowledge ofthe effect that a Distribution X
loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: ED/G.
064 Emergency Diesel Generator A3.13; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including:
Rpm controller/megawatt load control 3.0 1
(breaker-open! breaker-closed effects).
073 Process Radiation A4.02; Ability to manually operate Monitoring and/or monitor in the control room:
Radiation monitoring system control panel 3.7 1
076 Service Water K3.01; Knowledge of the effect that a X
loss or malfunction of the SWS will have 3.4 1
on the following: Closed cooling water.
076 Service Water K2.04; Knowledge of bus power supplies X
to the following: Reactor building closed 2.5 cooling water.
078 Instrument Air A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the lAS, including: Air 3.1 1
103 Containment A 1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system 3.7 1
controls including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.
103 Containment 2.2.44; Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and 4.2 1
directives affect plant and system conditions.
Cat 2
3 2
1 Group Point Total:
ES-401 9
Form ES-401*2 ES-401 PWR Examination Form ES-401-2
- Tier 2/Group System # / Name K
K K
K K
K KIA Topic(s)
IR 1
2 3
4 5
6 001 Control Rod Drive K4.07; Knowledge of CRDS design X
feature(s) amI/or interlock(s) which 3.7 for the following: Rod 002 Reactor Coolant Randomly Deselected 011 Pressurizer Level Randomly Deselected Control 014 Rod Position Randomly Deselected i Indication 015 Nuclear Randomly Deselected I nstru mentation 016 Non-nuclear A3.02; Ahility to monitor automatic Instrumentation operation of the NNIS, including:
2.9 1
Relationship between meter readings and actual parameter value 017 In-core Temperature K6.01; Knowledge of the effect of a loss X
or malfunction of the following ITM Monitor 2.7 Sensors and detectors.
027 Containment Iodine Randomly Deselected Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner A4.02; Ability to manually operate and Purge Control and/or monitor in the control room:
3.7 1
Location and interpretation of containment indications.
029 Containment Pu Randomly Deselected 033 Spent Fuel Pool K1.05; Knowledge ofthe physical Cooling connections and/or cause-effect X
relationships between the Spent Fuel 2.7 Pool Cooling System and the following systems: RWST.
034 Fuel Handling Randomly Deselected Equipment 035 Steam Generator K5.01; Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as X
the apply to the S/GS: Effect of secondary 3.4 1
parameters, pressure, and temperature on 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Randomly Deselected Control 045 Main Turbine K5.17; Knowledge of the operational Generator implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MTIB X
2.5 System
Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in Res as T/G load increases.
ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 Form ES-401-2 System # I Name K
K K
K K
K KIA Topic(s)
IR 1
2 3
4 5
6 055 Condenser Air A3.03; Ability to monitor automatic Removal operation of the CARS, including:
2.5 1
Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust.
056 Condensate A2.04; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use 2.6 1
procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss ofcondensate pumps.
068 Liquid Radwaste Randomly Deselected 071 Waste Gas Disposal Randomly Deselected 072 Area Radiation Monitoring Randomly Deselected 075 Ciroulating \\lVater 1<:3.07; Kfta'l'l'ledge aUhe effeet that a lass I'll' malHlftetiefts af the eil'eulatiftg 'I'I'otel' system will hOl'le aft the fullawiftgl E8FA8 3.4 4
Rejected; No relationship between Circulating Water and ESF AS.
075 Circulating Water K1.08; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect X
relationships between the circulating 3.2 water system and the following systems:
Emergency/essential SWS 079 Station Air Randomly Deselected 086 Fire Protection Randomly Deselected Category Point Total' Group Point Total:
10 ES-401
ES*401 one Unit 2 Category KIA #
2.1.19
- 1.
2.1.23 Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 SUbtotal 2.2.12
- 2.
2.2.14 Equipment Control 2.2.22 Subtotal
- 3.
Radiation Control 2.3.14 2.3.15 Subtotal 2.4.25
- 4.
Emergency 2.4.35 Procedures and Plan Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 11 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401*3 Date of Exam: 03/21/11 Topic of the process for controlling equipment or status.
Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Knawledge af naialagieal safety prineiples pertaining to lieensed eperatar duties, sueh as eantainment entry ref:Juirements, fuel handling respensibilities, aeeess to leel£ed high radiatian Rreas, aligning filters, ete.
Rejected: This is general employee knowledge; therefore, it does not distinguish between a competent and incompetent licensed "...,...,t......
Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, n"'~Q"nn,,1 monito etc.
Knowledge of fire protection procedures.
Knowledge of local auxiliary (\\""'r"t,,r
..m'...... "..r...v and the resultant (\\n,..r~,h."n..
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam: 03/21/2011 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group
~
K K
K K A A
A A
G A2 G*
Total 1 ~
3 4
5 6
1 2
3 4
- ~
i'...
- 1.
1 18 1
5 6
Emergency &
~
/ k:
,/
Abnormal 2
9 3
1 4
Plant Evolutions Tier Totals
/ )<
27 4
6 10 1
.//
"Q 28 1
4 5
- 2.
Systems 2
10 N/A 2
1 3
//
l'..
Plant
/
V
~
Tier Totals 3
5 8
1-~
1 3
4 3
2
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities l-A--~
l.----'----r----
10 Categories 2
1 2
2 7
~
r----
- 1.
Ensure that at least 2 topics from every KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than 2).
Note:
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match those specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by:t1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant specific, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
- 7.
- The generic KlAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog. but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs.
- 8.
On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the pOint totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of column A2 for Tier 2 Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9.
For Tier 3, select topics form Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-40103. Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline
",,<:,rn'3nr'\\F and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Grou Form ES-401-2 IR 4.7 1
3.5 1
4.0 1
4.7 1
4.2 1
4.2 4
E/APE # 1Name I Safety Function 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02)
Reactor Trip - Stabilization Recovery 11 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 000009 Small Break LOCA 1 3 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions 14 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 1 2
000025 Loss of RHR System 14 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction 1 3 000029 A TWS 11 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture 13 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)
Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer 14 000054 (CElE06) Loss of Main Feedwater 14 000055 Station Blackout I 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus 16 000058 Loss of DC Power I 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water 14 000065 Loss of Instrl;lFTlent Air! 8 G
KIA Topic(s)
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected 2.4.6; Emergency Procedures 1Plan: Knowledge ofEOP mitigation strategies.
AA2.09; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Flow): When to secure Reps on high stator temperatures.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected 2.4.35; Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge oflocal auxiliary operator tasks during an and the resultant effects.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected 2.4.6; Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge ofEOP..
2.4.47; Emergency Procedures I Plan: Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.
Randomly Deselected 2.4.11; Emergency Procedures I Plan: Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
2.1.25; CanEiuet at OpeFlltiaBS! Ability te interpret refereRoe material!!, such as graphs, CHrves, tables, et&.
Rejected: There are NO graphs, curves, or tables associated with the Instrument Air,",v,.t""m ES-401
ES-401 3
Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Form E m""rn"'n~\\1 and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/G E/APE # I Name I Safety Function KKK 1
2 3
A 1
A 2
G KIA Topic(s)
IR 0000e8 Loss of Instrument Air 18 2.1.d2; Canduet af OpeFlltians! ABility to eJtfllaia aRd tlflflly system. limits aad flfeeatitioas.
Rejected: There are NO procedural actions associated with a Loss of Instrument Air that can be evaluated at the SRO level.
4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances I 6 Randomly Deselected Totals:
int Total:
ES-401 4
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO I I~==========~~~~~r=
E/APE # I Name / Safety Function 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1
000003 Dropped Control Rod /1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod 11 000024 t:..... o......'on"\\1 Boration 11 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction
/2 000032 Loss of Source 000033 Loss of Intermedi NII7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident 18 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak I 3
000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum I 4
000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. 19 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. I 9 000061 ARM System Alarms 17 000067 Plant Fire On-site I 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac./8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT 15 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling 14 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity 19 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. I 4 CE/A11; W/E08 RCS OV1src()olirlg PTS/4 CE/A16 Excess RCS KKK KIA Topic{s) 123 Randomly Deselected AA2.04; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Rod motion stops due to dropped rod.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected AA2.15; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:
Requirements for establishing a fire watch.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected EA2.01; Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: Subcooling margin.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected 3.6 1
3 4.9 1
PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO I 1F=-------=======------==--=F=9==T==F==
===========-=====~~~----======~==~~
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function KKK 123 A
1 KIA Topic(s)
IR CE/E09 Functional Recovery 2.2.44; Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation ofa system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
4.4 1
- It""n{,II'v Point Totals:
Group Point Total:
ES-401 6
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outl Form ES-4 11============;===;=-o:=;===;=p=la=n;=t=S",;ys;=t=e=;m=s=-Tier 2/Group 1 (F~""';""===========;====;==~
System # I Name KKK K K K A KIA Topic(s)
IR 1 234 5 6
1 003 Reactor Coolant Pump Randomly Deselected 004 Chemical and Volume A2.27; Ability to (a) predict the Control impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or 4.2 1
mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Improper RWST boron concentration.
005 Residual Heat Removal Randomly Deselected 006 Emergency Core Cool Randomly Deselected 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Randomly Deselected 008 Component Cooling Water Randomly Deselected 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control Randomly Deselected 012 Reactor Protection Randomly Deselected 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 2.2.36; Equipment Control: Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power 4.2 1
sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
022 Containment Coolin Randomly Deselected 026 Containment Spray 2.4.1 ; Emergency Procedures! Plan:
Knowledge ofEOP entry conditions and 4.8 immediate action steps.
039 Main and Reheat Steam Randomly Deselected 059 Main Feedwater Randomly Deselected 061 AUXiliary/Emergency Feedwater Randomly Deselected 062 AC Electrical Distribution Randomly Deselected 063 DC Electrical 2.2.25; Equipment Control: Knowledge Distribution ofthe bascs in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions fori operations 4.2 1
and safety limits.
064 Emergency Diesel Generator Randomly Deselected 073 Process Radiation Monitoring Randomly Deselected 076 Service Water Randomly Deselected ES-401
ES-401 7
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Oulli, ___.....
Form ES-401-2 ms - Tier 2/Gro 1F===================~9==T==~9==9==~
System # I Name KKK KKK KIA Topic(s)
IR 1 234 5 6
078 Instrument Air Randomly Deselected 103 Containment 2.1.23; Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of 4.4 plant operation.
int Totals:
ES-401 5
ES-401 ES-401 System # I Name 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 028 Hydrogen Recombiner
! and Pu Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam DumpITurbine ass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitori KKK K K 1 234 5 8
Form ES-401-2 Form ES-401-2 KIA Topic(s)
IR Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected A2.04; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, 3.9 1
use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Misaligned rod.
Randomly Deselected 2.4.11; Emergency Procedures / Plan:
Knowledge ofabnormal condition 4.2 1
procedures.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected ES-401
ES-401 9
Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 S\\l'~I""lms - Tier 2/Grou p================r=r~==r=T=~=r-==
System # I Name KKK KKK 1 234 5 6
075 Circulating Water r!:l,tcnnr\\J Point Totals:
KIA Topic(s)
A2.02; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Loss of circulating water pumps.
Randomly Deselected Randomly Deselected Group Point Total:
IR 2.7 1
""",....!l1hr Millstone Unit 2 Category KIA #
2.1.32
- 1.
Conduct of 2.1.41 Operations Subtotal 2.2.42
- 2.
Equipment Control 2.3.5
- 3.
Radiation 2.3.11
- Control 2.4.6
- 4.
Emergency 2.4.40 Procedures and Plan Tier 3 Point Total Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401-3 Date of Exam: 03/21/11 Topic RO SRO Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
Knowledge of the refueling process.
.."'rn..t-...." that are entry-level Randomly Deselected Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, npr'<<nl1mpl mo etc.
Ability to control radiation releases
- Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.
SRO responsibilities in emergency plan ES-401
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4
- Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Grou~
Selected KIA RO 112 000005 - AK2.01 No controllers or positioners are used to diagnose or recover from an I
inoperable/stuck control rod.
RO 1/2 000028 - AK3.03 No credible postulated event will cause a false Pressurizer level indication at saturation conditions with an open PORVor spray valve.
R02/2 000075 - K3.07 No relationship between Circulating Water and ESFAS.
R03 2.3 - 2.3.12 This is general employee knowledge; therefore, it does not distinguish between a competent and incompetent licensed operator.
SRO 111 065 -2.1.25 There are NO graphs, curves, or tables associated with the Instrument Air System.
SRO 111 065 - 2.1.32 There are NO procedural actions associated with a Loss ofInstrument Air that can be evaluated at the SRO level.
ES-401, Page 27 of 33
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination: Week of 10/03/2011 Examination Level:
RO ~
SRO D Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Code*
Describe method of evaluation:
Determine a Clearance Boundary [JPM-A1.1R]
Conduct of Operations R,N At the completion of this JPM, the examinee has determined the required configuration of system components to provide boundary isolation for maintenance on 2-FW-8B.
Calculate SPF Heatup Time to 150°F[JPM-A2R]
Equipment Control R,M At the completion of this JPM the examinee will have successfully determined SFP Heatup Rate and time to reach 150°F.
Review an RWP and a Survey Map [JPM-A3R]
Radiation Control R,M At the completion of this JPM, the examinee has determined all of the requested radiological requirements for entering the CLRW filter skid area to assist the Radwaste Coordinator.
Emergency Procedures/Plan R,N Determine Shutdown Margin for a Station Blackout
[JPM-A4R]
At the completion of this..IPM the examinee has successfully determined whether SDM is being satisfied for a postulated SBO event Note: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5...,
ired.
- Type Codes &Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank <</= 3 for ROs; </= 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (>/= 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (<1= 1; randomly selected)
ES-301, Page 22 of 27
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Examination Level:
RO D Administrative Topic Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Procedures/Plan SRO r8J Date of Examination: Week of 10/03/2011 Operating Test Number:
1 Type Code*
Describe method of evaluation:
Shift Staffing Based on Administrative Requirements
[JPM-A1.1S]
R,M At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will determine who is fit for duty and can be called in for shift coverage when the on shift RO becomes incapacitated (cannot perform licensed activities).
Approve a Tagging Clearance [JPM-A1.2S]
R,N At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will determine whether the Tag Clearance can be approved and authorized, and if not, why.
Tech Spec Applicability with Embedded Surveillance
[JPM-A2S]
R,D At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will analyze the given conditions and state the required Tech. Spec. entry and surveillance.
Radiological Assessment and Task Supervision
[JPM-A3S]
R,N At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will analyze the given conditions and designate which PEO should perform each of the two specified tasks, based on the radiological concerns of each.
Determine EAL and PAR [JPM-A4S]
R,M At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will correctly classify the proposed event and provide the appropriate Protective Action Recommendation.
Note: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator. or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (</= 3 for ROs; </= 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (>/= 1)
(P)revious 2 exams <</= 1; randomly selected)
ES-301, Page 22 of 27
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Examination: Week of 10/03/2011 Exam Level:
RO L8j SRO-I L8j SRO-U 0 Operating Test No.: 1 I Control Room Systems @ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / J PM Title Type Code*
Safety Function
- a.
Align Alternate Charging Discharge Path [JPM.S1.1]
A. L, M, S 1
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will determine that the normal Charging flow path is not available and will align Charging to Emergency Borate through the "A" HPSI Header (Alternate Charging Flow Path).
- b.
Failure of #2 ADV, MS-190B, Controller [JPM-S4s.1]
A,L,N,S 4(S)
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will attempt to operate the #2 ADV from C-05 and determine that the controller is failed. The examinee will take manual control of #2 ADV from the Foxboro Controller.
- c.
Containment Isolation due to Fuel Handling Accident L,N,S 5
[JPM-S5.1]
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will take the required actions in the Control Room to isolate Containment due to a Fuel Handling Accident.
- d.
Actuation Test of ESAS Component - Facility 1 [JPM*S7.1]
EN,M,S 7
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will have performed the required actions to test actuation of ESAS component AM-515, per surveillance procedure SP 2604T.
- e.
Blended Makeup to the VCT [JPM*S2.1]
A, MS 2
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will initiate a blended makeup to the VCT, determine that the PMW Flow Control Valve failed open, and terminate the blended makeup to prevent a Boron Dilution event.
- f.
Restoring Bus 24C to Unit 2 RSST with the "A" DIG Supplying A. D, L, P,S 6
[JPM*S6.1]
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee has paralleled the RSST with the "A" DG and then manually tripped "A" DG based on degraded conditions.
- g.
Fill #1 SIT [JPM-S3.1]
M,S 3
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will raise #1 SIT level by 2% using the "An HPSI Pump.
- h.
(RO ONL Y) Shifting LPSI Pumps During SDC Operation [JPM.
A,D,L,P,S 4(P)
S4p.1]
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee has restored SDC flow with one Containment Spray Pump running in place of a LPSI (SDC) Pump.
ES-:301, Page 23 of 27
In-Plant Systems @ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- j.
Starting and paralleling a Second CEDIVI MG [JPM-013]
D, L 1
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee has successfully started the "A" CEDM MG set and paralleled it with the "B" MG set.
- k.
Manual Operation of SW-3.2A, SW Supply to TBCCW D
8
[..IPM-124]
At the completion of this JPM, the examinee will have placed 2-SW-3.2A in manual operation and closed the valve.
- m.
Align Backup Air [JPM-P2.2]
A, E, L, M, 2
At the completion of this "IPM, the examinee will have aligned a R
backup air supply to 2-CH-517, 2-CH-518, and 2-CH-519 per EOP 2541, Appendix 40.
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must sElrve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes:
Actual (RO/SRO-I)
Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate Path 6/5 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room 0
(D)irect from bank 4/3
</=9 / </=8 / </=4 (E)mergency or abnormal in 1
>/=1 / >/=1 / >/=1 plant (EN)gineered safety feature 1
- / - / >/=1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 7/6
>/=1 / >/=1 / >/=1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank 7/7
>/=2/ >/=2/ >/=1 including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams 2/1
</=3/ </=3/ </=2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1
>/=1 / >/=1 / >/=1 (S)imulator 8/7 ES-*301, Page 23 of 27
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES*D*1 Facility:
MP2 Scenario No.: ES11 Ll1 Op-Test No.:_1-=--_
Examiners: ___________ Operators: __________
Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL, Eq. Xe., 1204 ppm Boron SGBD @ 40 gpm per SG, 24E aligned to 24C, "B" RBCCW Pump has just been returned to service following repairs.
Turnover: 100% power, BOL, Eq. Xe., 1204 ppm Boron, blend ratio: 3.89:1, SGBD @ 40 gpm per SG, 24E aligned to 24C, "B" RBCCW Pump has just been returned to service following repairs, no other equipment OOS and no surveillance in progress or due.
Event Malf.
Event Event Description No.
No.
Type*
- 1.
N/A N
Swap from "A" to "B" RBCCW Pump (BOP/S)
- 2.
CH01A C
Loss of "A" Containment Air Recirculation Fan (TS)
(ROfS)
- 3.
RX11D I
- 2 SG Alternate steam flow transmitter failure (BOPfS)
- 4.
RD0368 C
CEA #68 to slip 35 steps into the core. (TS)
(BOP/S)
- 5.
NfA R
Downpower to < 70% power for CEA recovery (All)
(Reactivity)
- 6.
RP24D I
"D" CTMT pressure transmitter failure (TS)
(ROfS)
- 7.
FW33 M
Loss of vacuum with failure of Turbine Low Vacuum Trip TC10A (All)
Manual reactor trip with loss of both Main Feed Pumps RP28D due to low vacuum RP28E Failure of the Reactor to trip on low SIG level
- 8.
FW30A C
Degradationlloss of the "A" AFW Pump FW20A (BOP/S)
Overspeed trip of the Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump FW20C
- 9.
ED05D M
Bus 24D Fault (All)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Append ix D. 38 of 39
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
MP2 Scenario No.: ES11 Ll2 Op-Test NO.:.....;2=--_--t1 Examiners: ____________ Operators: _________
Initial Conditions: 100% power. BOL, Eg. Xe., 1204 ppm Boron SGBD @ 40 gpm. Bus 24E is aligned to Bus 24C. TDAFP is ODS for bearing replacement.
Turnover: 100% power, BDL. Eg. Xe., 1204 ppm Boron, blend ratio: 3.89:1 SGBD @ 40 gpm per S/G, Bus 24E aligned to Bus 24C, TDAFP is ODS for bearing replacement. In TSAS 3.7.1.2a and TRM Table 7.1.15-1, ACTIONS b.1 and b.2 for fire areas R-3, R-11, F~-16 and R-17.
Event Malf.
Event Event Description No.
No.
Type*
1 SW9A C
"A" Service Water Pump degrading performance. (TS).
(BOPfS)
(Swap Service Water Pumps.)
2 RX03B I
Failure of in-service Pressurizer Pressure transmitter (ROfS) 3 CH07 C
Non-Vital Bus 22B is lost due to a seismic event 1/0 (BOPfS) 06A1A3S15 4
RC04 C
Small RCS Leak develops. (TS)
(ROfS) 5 N/A R
Plant shutdown due to RCS leak (All) 6 RC04 M
Small Break LOCA requiring a Reactor trip. Failure of ED06B (All) automatic Reactor trip and manual trip push buttons RP04A, B, Loss of Actuation Cabinet 6 on the trip.
C,D RP27B 7
MS01B C
Excess Steam Demand in Containment on #2 S/G (BOP/S) after the trip 8
RH06A C
Failure of "An Containment Spray Pump to start on (ROtS)
CSAS (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D, 38 of 39
Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:
MP2 Scenario No.: ES11 Ll3 Op-Test NO.:-,3=--_
Examiners: __________ Operators: __________
Initial Conditions: 46% power, BOL, Eq. Xe., 1338 ppm Boron SGBD @ 40 qpm per SG. 24E aligned to 24C, "A" Main Feed Water Pump in service.
Turnover: 45% power. BOL, Eq. Xe.. 1338 ppm Boron, blend ratio: 3.4: 1, SGBD @ 40 gpm per SG, 24E aligned to 24C. "AI! Main Feed Water Pump in service, waiting for 'B' Main Feed Water Pump to come back from Maintenance, "AI! EDG out for PMs, no other equipment ODS and no surveillance in progress or due.
Event Malt.
Event Event Description No.
No.
Type*
I 1
RM0101 IIC CRAC Rad. Monitor failure, Filter Fan "A", F-32A, trips.
CH08C (RO/S)
(TS) 2 CW04C C
Main Condenser tube leak in the "C" water box.
(BOP/S) 3 RX04B I
Ch. 'Y' PZR Level transmitter, LT-110Y (selected), failure.
(RO/S) 4 FW23 C
'A' Condensate Pump Motor Winding Temperature high.
(BOP/S) 5 NIA R
Main Feed Water Pump problem requiring plant (All) shutdown.
6 ED05A M (All)
Loss ot bus 24C requiring a plant trip.
7 RC02B M (All)
"B" RCP Seal Cooler rupture (Intersystem SB-LOCA) 8 SI04C C
'C' HPSI Pump trip (loss of SI flow).
(RO/S)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D. 38 of 39