ML11291A130
| ML11291A130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/2011 |
| From: | Anton Vegel Division of Reactor Safety IV |
| To: | Olson E Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EA-11-159 | |
| Download: ML11291A130 (4) | |
Text
EA-11-159 Eric W. Olson Site Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station 5485 US Hi9hway 61 St. Francisville, LA 70775 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 October 14, 2011
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION-NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2010-064
Dear Mr. Olson:
This letter refers to an investigation completed by the NRCs Office of Investigations, Region IV, on May 20,2011, to determine, in part, if licensed operators at the River Bend Station willfully failed to follow Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure EN-OP-11S-02, "Control Room Conduct and Access Controls.~ This investigation was initiated after the NRC was informed that River Bend Station's management had determined that At-the-Controls reactor operators had willfully violated a facility procedure. Specifically, River Bend Station's management determined that a number of the At-the-Controls reactor operators violated Entergy Nuclear Fleet Procedure EN-OP-115-02, "Control Room Conduct and Access Controls,~ by accessing internet sites while standing watch in the At-the-Controls area of the control room.
Based on the information developed during the investigation and the subsequent in-office review of the information, an apparent violation has been identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at lNWW.nrc.gov/about-nrclregulatory/
enforcemenVenforce-pol.html.
This apparent violation involves numerous instances of licensed operators accessing the internet from the At-the-Controls area of the control room while standing watch as At-the-Controls reactor operators. Based on our investigation, it appears that operators remained attentive to reactor operations, indications, and alarms, and that the types of websites accessed were limited to news, sports, hobbies, and finance (the types of websites that workplaces often allow for limited personal use). The NRC understands that you identified the issue and took prompt disciplinary actions against the operators involved. However, because the operators involved appear to have known and understood the station prohibitions on internet access, the NRC is concerned that willfulness, in the form of deliberate misconduct, was associated with the
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station numerous instances of licensed operators violating the station procedure prohibiting accessing the internet from the At-the-Controls area of the control room. As a result, the NRC is also considering separate enforcement action against the individual licensed operators for their actions.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to request (1) a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEG), or (2) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference; however, the conference will be closed to public observation since information related to an Office of Investigations' report will be discussed. If you decide to participate in a conference or pursue ADR, please contact Ms. Christi Maier at 817-860-8217 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on the apparent violation and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned to be taken.
In presenting your corrective actions, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing a civil penalty, if any, for the apparent violation. Since you identified the violation, and based on our understanding of your corrective action to date, a civil penalty may not be warranted in accordance with Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement Policy.
In lieu of a PEC, you may request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a third party neutral. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the "mediator") works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use alternative dispute resolution, they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions.
Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's ADR program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcemenlladr. html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact the Institute on Conflict Resolution at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through alternative dispute resolution.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed factual summary may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection or the enclosed Factual Summary, please contact Ms. Maier at (817) 860-8217.
Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47
Enclosure:
Factual Summary - Office of Investigations Report 4-2010-064 cc w/enclosure: Distribution via ListselV SiJ;jL--=,;t./<-__
Anton Vegel, Dire t r Division of Reacto afety
FACTUAL
SUMMARY
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2010-064 An investigation was initiated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations, Region IV, on July 8, 2010, to determine if licensed operators at River Bend Station (RBS) willfully failed to follow the Conduct of Operations procedure and whether RBS personnel failed to report inappropriate computer use.
Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, it was preliminarily determined that nine licensed operators at RBS deliberately violated station procedure, EN-OP-11S-02, "Control Room Conduct and Access Controls", by accessing the internet on the At-the-Controls (ATe) computer (which is in the ATe area of the control room) while standing watch as the ATC operator.
The ATC operator at RBS is directly responsible for monitoring the reactor and other important reactor support systems. The ATC operator, for example, monitors reactor power, the feedwater level control system, and the main turbine generator. Due to the importance of monitoring the reactor, station management has attempted to minimize potential ATC distractions by procedurally prohibiting specific activities such as accessing the internet in the ATC area of the control room per the ~ Control Room Conduct and Access Controls" procedure.
To further reinforce the ban on accessing the internet, unrestricted internet access on the ATC computer was removed several years ago. However, at some point before January 22, 2010, unrestricted internet access was inadvertently restored to the ATC computer.
On April 18, 2010, ATC computer access to the Internet was discovered by a Shift Manager and reported to the Operations Manager. Upon discovery, internet access restrictions were reinstalled on April 18, 2010. A review of the Internet Activity Analysis detailing ATC internet activities from January 22 through April 18, 2010, indicated that licensed operators assigned to the ATC position had accessed the internet. The extent of internet use, duration of use, and types of web sites accessed varied among the operators. During the interviews conducted during the 01 investigation, aU of the interviewed operators testified that they had read the procedure containing the ban on accessing the internet while assigned to the ATC watch station ; however, nine of the operators appear to have deliberately accessed the internet. In addition, a few of those operators employed techniques that would prevent their internet use from being discovered by other watchstanders in the control room.
Based on our review of these facts, the NRC has made a preliminary conclusion that nine licensed reactor operators deliberately violated RBS station procedure EN-OP-115-02, ~ Control Room Conduct and Access Controls," Revision 0, by accessing the internet in the ATC area of the control room while standing watch as the ATC operator. Enclosure