ML112660544
| ML112660544 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/2011 |
| From: | Joel Munday Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Franke J Florida Power Corp, Progress Energy Florida |
| References | |
| EA-11-208 IR-11-501 | |
| Download: ML112660544 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000302/2011501
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
September 23, 2011
Mr. Jon A. Franke
Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)
15760 W. Power Line Street
Crystal River, FL 34428-6708
SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - NRC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
INSPECTION REPORT 05000302/2011501; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
Dear Mr. Franke:
On August 4, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Emergency
Preparedness inspection at your Crystal River Unit 3. The inspection included on-site
inspection on June 27, 2011, through July 1, 2011, and periodic in-office inspection through
August 4, 2011. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were
discussed on August 4, 2011, and September 14, 2011, with you and other members of your
staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents a licensee-identified finding that has preliminarily been determined to be
White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance. As described in Section 1EP4 of this
report, a finding was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically on June
27, 2011, you identified that Crystal River Unit 3s emergency plan emergency action level
(EAL) 1.4 (General Emergency - Gaseous Effluents) contained instrument classification
threshold values that were beyond the specified effluent radiation monitors capabilities to
accurately indicate. The inability to classify a general emergency using these instruments is an
apparent violation of the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) associated with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). This finding was assessed based on the best information available, using the
Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (SDP).
In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, we intend to complete our evaluation
using the best available information and issue our final determination of safety significance
within 90 days of the date of this letter. The Significance Determination Process encourages an
open dialogue between NRC and licensee staff, however, the dialogue should not impact the
timeliness of the NRCs final determination. Before we make a final decision on this matter, we
are providing you an opportunity to: (1) present your perspectives on the facts and assumptions
used by the NRC to arrive at the findings and their significance at a regulatory conference; or (2)
submit your position on the findings to the NRC in writing. If you request a regulatory
conference, it should be held within approximately 30 days of the receipt of this letter, and we
FPC 2
encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in
an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a regulatory conference is held,
it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press release to announce the
conference. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to
the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a regulatory
conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final
Significance Determination Process conclusion, in that by not doing either, you fail to meet the
appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation sections of Attachment 2 of
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.
Please contact Mr. Brian Bonser at (404) 997-4653 within 10 days of the date of this letter to
notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue
with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you will be advised by
separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no notice of violation is being
issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and
characterization of the apparent violation described in the enclosed inspection report may
change as a result of further NRC review.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/ RA / H. Christensen for J. Munday
Joel Munday, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.: 50-302
License No.: DPR-72
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000302/2011501
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl.: (See page 3)
ML112660544 X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE X FORM 665 ATTACHED
OFFICE RII: DRS/PSB1 RII: DRS/PSB1 RII: DRP/BR3 RII: EICS RII: DRS
SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA/HC For JM
NAME M. SPECK B. BONSER D. RICH S. SPARKS J. MUNDAY
DATE 09/20/2011 09/20/2011 09/20/2011 09/22/2011 09/23/2011
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
FPC 3
cc w/encl:
Kelvin Henderson Daniel R. Westcott
General Manager Supervisor
Nuclear Fleet Operations Licensing & Regulatory Programs
Progress Energy Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Brian C. McCabe Joseph W. Donahue
Manager, Nuclear Oversight Vice President
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Oversight
Progress Energy Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Terry D. Hobbs Jack E. Huegel
(Acting) Plant General Manager Manager, Nuclear Oversight
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Crystal River Nuclear Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution
Stephen J. Cahill David T. Conley
Director - Engineering Nuclear Senior Counsel
Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Legal Department
Electronic Mail Distribution Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
R. Alexander Glenn
General Counsel Mark Rigsby
Progress Energy Manager, Support Services - Nuclear
Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C)
Electronic Mail Distribution
Jeffrey R. Swartz
Director Site Operations Senior Resident Inspector
Crystal River Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant
U.S. NRC
Donna B. Alexander 6745 N Tallahassee Rd
Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Crystal River, FL 34428
(interim)
Progress Energy Attorney General
Electronic Mail Distribution Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol PL-01
Thomas Sapporito Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Consulting Associate
(Public Correspondence Only) Bryan Koon
Post Office Box 8413 Director
Jupiter, FL 33468 Florida Division of Emergency Management
Electronic Mail Distribution
William A. Passetti
Chief Chairman
Florida Bureau of Radiation Control Board of County Commissioners
Department of Health Citrus County
Electronic Mail Distribution 110 N. Apopka Avenue
Inverness, FL 36250
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 05000302
License Nos.: DPR-72
Report No.: 05000302/2011501
Licensee: Progress Energy (Florida Power Corporation)
Facility: Crystal River Unit 3
Location: Crystal River, FL
Dates: June 27, 2011, through August 4, 2011
Inspectors: M. Speck, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved by: B. Bonser, Chief
Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000302/2011501; 06/27/2011 - 08/04/2011; Crystal River Unit 3; Baseline Inspection.
The report covered an announced inspection by a regional emergency preparedness inspector
and additional in-office inspection. One Apparent Violation (AV) item with potential White safety
significance was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,
White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- TBD. An AV was identified for failure to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans
which use a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically,
the licensee's emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4, General Emergency -
Gaseous Effluent, specified instrument values that were beyond the limits of the effluent
radiation monitors capabilities to accurately measure.
This finding was considered more than minor because the licensee is required to be
capable of implementing adequate measures to protect public health and safety in the
event of a radiological emergency. Regulations require a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme, the bases which include facility system and
effluent parameters, in use by the licensee and State and local response plans call for
reliance on information provided by the licensee for determination of minimum initial
offsite response measures. As a result of having General Emergency EAL threshold
values that were beyond the range of the associated effluent radiation monitors, Crystal
River Unit 3 personnel may not have been able to perform timely and accurate
classification of an emergency based upon an effluent radioactive material release.
Emergency response actions directed by the State and local emergency response plans,
which rely on information provided by the licensee, could have potentially been delayed.
The cause of the finding is related to the human performance cross-cutting element of
Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a
systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews. (Section 1EP4)
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector evaluated the adequacy of licensees methods for testing the Alert and
Notification System (ANS) in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation.
The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5), and its related
requirements, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D, were used as reference
criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear
Power Plants, Revision 1, was also used as a reference.
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this
report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ANS on a biennial
basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)
augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the
readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The
qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO
qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or
system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the
effectiveness of corrective actions.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
Attachment 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation
System. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and its related
requirements, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this
report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and
augmentation system on a biennial basis.
Enclosure
4
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, revision 30 of the Emergency Plan
was implemented. The licensee determined that in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q),
the changes resulted in no decrease in the effectiveness of the Plan, and that the
revised Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50. The inspector conducted a review of the Emergency Action Level
changes and a sampling of the implementing procedure changes made between
October 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011, to evaluate for potential decreases in effectiveness
of the Plan. However, this review was not documented in a Safety Evaluation Report
and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes
remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
Attachment 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The
applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and its related requirements, 10 CFR
50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
The inspector reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this
report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action
level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
Introduction: An apparent violation (AV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)
was identified for the failure to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which use
a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the
licensee's emergency plan General Emergency action level (EAL) 1.4 -Gaseous Effluent
- specified mid-range effluent radiation monitor threshold values that were beyond the
instruments indicated ranges. This finding has been preliminarily evaluated as having
low to moderate (White) safety significance.
Description: On June 27, 2011, Crystal River 3 determined that General Emergency
EAL 1.4, Gaseous Effluent incorporated classification threshold values of 1700 mrem/hr
as read on the mid-range RM-A1 (Auxiliary building), or RM-A2 (Reactor building)
radiation monitors, which were greater than the maximum available indication of the
instrument (1000 mrem/hr). Licensee immediate actions were to document the issue in
their CAP, change the EAL threshold to the previously used value of 1000 mrem/hr, and
inform Operations staff and emergency response organization members of the issue and
threshold value changes.
Further research by the licensee, using a cross-discipline analysis, determined that the
instrument was unusable for accurate effluent monitoring and dose assessment for
values greater than approximately 2/3 of full-scale (i.e. 600-700 mrem/hr). This
Enclosure
5
condition appears to have been in existence to some extent since the EAL threshold was
established in 1999. There have been at least two revisions to the threshold values,
including one as recent as June 2010, which provided the licensee opportunities to
identify the discrepant thresholds. The last revision established some of the threshold
values above the radiation monitors maximum indicated value. The licensee has since
changed the EAL criteria to a different effluent radiation monitor.
These discrepant threshold values degraded the licensees ability to make timely and
accurate General Emergency classifications based on gaseous effluent parameters, in
that decision-makers would have to rely on other means to classify the event (dose
assessments or field monitoring data). The monitors inaccuracy would also inhibit the
licensees ability to determine the magnitude and to continually assess the impact of the
release of radioactive materials.
The cause of the finding is related to the human performance cross-cutting element of
Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a
systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.
Analysis: The inspector concluded that the failure to maintain in effect emergency plans
which meet the regulations and standards, and have a standardized EAL scheme in use
based on facility system and effluent parameters for several years prior to June 2011,
was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more
than minor because it was associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
attribute of Emergency Response Organization Performance. It impacted the
cornerstone objective because it was associated with a program element not meeting
50.47(b) planning standards to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of
a radiological emergency. Specifically, the licensees ability to declare a General
Emergency based on effluent radiation monitor values was degraded. The finding was
assessed for significance in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0609, using the
Phase I SDP worksheets for emergency preparedness. It was determined that Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination
Process should be used to provide a deterministic SDP result.
This finding was evaluated in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, and is
preliminarily determined to be a finding of low to moderate safety significance (White)
because there was a degraded risk-significant planning standard function.
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B states, FAILURE TO COMPLY means that a
program is noncompliant with a REGULATORY REQUIREMENT. The inspector
determined the licensee was noncompliant with 10 CFR 50.54(q), 50.47(b)(4), and App.
E, section IV.B in that the Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent Emergency Action
Level contained General Emergency classification threshold values for the Auxiliary
Building and Reactor Building effluent radiation monitors, which were greater than what
the monitor could accurately read. This would require use of other means to determine
whether a General Emergency threshold had been exceeded (dose assessment or
actual field readings) which could delay the declaration. It also appears that the inability
to use the specified mid-range effluent radiation monitors conflicts with the requirements
in Appendix E, which include EALs to be based on in-plant conditions and
instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. Since the licensee retained
the ability to perform procedurally-driven dose assessments and field surveys, the
Enclosure
6
inspector determined that the inability of the licensee to have all specified means of
evaluating whether a General Emergency EAL threshold was exceeded constituted a
degraded rather than a failed risk-significant planning standard (RSPS). Using Sheet 1,
Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process - Failure To Comply
flow chart, a White significance resulted from a degraded, risk-significant planning
standard.
Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50.54(q), requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor
operating license under this part, shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans
which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and the requirements in appendix E of
this part.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires a standard emergency classification and action level
scheme, the bases of which include facility and system effluent parameters is in use by
the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response calls for reliance on
information by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response
measures.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B., Assessment Actions, requires that means to
be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continuously assessing the impact of,
the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action
levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and
participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies.
The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation
in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring.
Contrary to the above, for several years prior to June 2011, the licensee failed to
maintain in effect, a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility
effluent parameters. Specifically, the General Emergency classification 1.4 specified
effluent radiation monitors (RM-A1 and RM-A2) values greater than that which the
instruments could accurately measure. Those monitors were being relied upon to
determine the magnitude and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of
radioactive materials, as well as providing criteria for determining the need for
notification and participation of local and State agencies. Pending final determination of
safety significance, this finding was identified as an apparent violation (AV)05000302/2011501-01, Failure to Maintain a Standard Emergency Action Level
Scheme.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions identified through the Emergency
Preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues and to determine if
repeat problems were occurring. The facilitys self-assessments and audits were
reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency
and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. In addition, the inspector
reviewed licensee self-assessments and audits to assess the completeness and
effectiveness of all emergency preparedness related corrective actions.
Enclosure
7
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114,
Attachment 05, Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses. The applicable
planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E
requirements were used as reference criteria.
The inspector reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This
inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the correction of emergency
preparedness weaknesses on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector sampled licensee submittals relative to the Performance Indicators (PIs)
listed below for the period July 1, 2010, through March 31, 2011. To verify the accuracy
of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI
99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, was used
to confirm the reporting basis for each data element.
Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
- Emergency Response Organization Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
- Emergency Response Organization Readiness (ERO)
- Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71151, Performance
Indicator Verification. For the specified review period, the inspector examined data
reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used
by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences. The inspector verified the accuracy
of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance through review of a sample of drill and
event records. The inspector reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of
the PI for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO.
The inspector verified the accuracy of the PI for alert and notification system reliability
through review of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The
inspector also interviewed the licensee personnel who were responsible for collecting
and evaluating the PI data. Licensee procedures, records, and other documents
reviewed within this inspection area are listed in the Attachment to this report.
This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample each for the Drill/Exercise
Performance, ERO Drill Participation, and Alert and Notification System as defined in IP
71151-05.
Enclosure
8
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
On July 1, 2011, the inspector presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. J.
Franke and other members of licensee management who acknowledged the issue
presented. Following completion of additional reviews in the Region II office, another
exit meeting was held by teleconference on August 4, 2011, with Mr. B. Wunderly and
again on September 14, 2011, with Mr. J. Franke and other members of licensee
management. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or
examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
S. Cahill, Manager, Engineering
P. Dixon, Manager, Training
J. Franke, Vice President, Crystal River Nuclear Plant
D. Herrin, Lead Licensing Engineer
J. Huegel, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
C. Poliseno, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
M. Rigsby, Manager, Site Support Services
J. Stephenson, Manager, Fleet Emergency Preparedness
B. Wunderly, Manager, Operations
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000302/2011501-01 AV Failure to Maintain a Standard EAL Scheme
Closed and Discussed
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Testing
Procedures and Manual
Citrus County Radiological Emergency Response Procedure REP SOP-11, Operation of the
Emergency Sirens, Rev. June 2011
Whelen Siren Control System Operating Guide, February 8, 2007
Emergency Preparedness Staff Guidance (EPSG)-020, Alert and Notification System, Rev. 2
Records and Data
Crystal River Unit 3 Siren log 6/14/10-6/24/11
Documentation of weekly silent and full-volume ANS tests
Selected ANS repair and annual preventive maintenance records, 2010-2011
Attachment
2
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation
Procedures
EM-206, Emergency Plan Roster Notification, Rev. 107
TPP-219, Emergency Response Organization Training Program, Rev. 5
AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency
Response Plan Maintenance, Rev. 12
AI-400H, Severe Accident Management Program and Guidelines, Rev.0
AI-4001, Conduct of Drills and Exercises Supporting the Radiological Emergency Response
Plan, Rev. 3
Records and Data
Radiological Emergency Response Plan 8/14/2010 Unannounced Staffing Drill Report
Radiological Emergency Response Plan 5/3/2011 Training Drill Report
Radiological Emergency Response Plan 3/1/2011 Training Drill Report
Dose Assessment Team Tabletop 3/23/2011 Training Drill Report
Radiologic Emergency Response Plan Exercise Critique 10/6/2010
Emergency Preparedness Staff Augmentation Training drill report January 12, 2011
2010/2011 ERO Pager tests
2010, and 2011, Augmentation Drill packages
Review of ERO position qualifications for selected individuals
Emergency Preparedness logbooks for 2010, 2011
Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures
REG-NGGC-0010, 10 CFR 50.59 and Selected Regulatory Reviews, Rev. 15
Personnel Qualification Data - CR3 50.59 Qualified Evaluator listing
Change Packages for Plans and Procedures
Radiological Emergency Plan, Rev. 29 and 30
EAL Bases Manual, Rev. 9 and 10
EM-225, Duties of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 23
EM-913A, Large Area Fire Resulting in Loss of Control Room Command and Control Functions,
Rev. 2
EM-102, Operation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 51
EM-104, Operation of the Operational Support Center, Rev. 13
EM-402, Emergency Operations Facility Technical Support Team, Rev. 4
AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency
Response Plan Maintenance, Rev. 12
EM-400, Operation of the EOF, Rev. 12
EM-206, Emergency Response Organization Notification, Rev 107
EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator, Rev. 89, 90, 91, 92, and 93
Attachment
3
Section 1EP5: Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies
Procedures
CAP-NGGC-0201, Self-Assessment/Benchmark Programs, Rev. 16
Audits and Self-Assessments
C-EP-11-01, Emergency Preparedness Assessment, February 22, 2011
C-EP-FR-10-01, Emergency Preparedness Program Mid-Cycle Review, February 8, 2010
431502, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 08/30-09/17/2010
442313, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 01/10-14/2011
457573, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 04/13-20/2011
470156, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/23/2011
470159, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/13-20/2011
470161, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/09-12/2011
470167, Quick Hit Self-Assessment Report, 06/23/2011
434294, Bench Mark Report, Drill and Exercise Critiques, 10/1/2010, and 11/17/2010
NCR Action Request Documents
384495, Inaccurate Notification
428726, Inaccurate Notification
441995, Ineffective Corrective Actions in Drill/Exercise Performance
447238, PA not functioning
449241, Comm equipment replaced without prior warning
451364, Inaccurate info provided to dose assessment team
454187, RM-A2G(H) cannot receive high alarm
456477, Tornado Watch notification not timely
456658, Plant configuration may affect RM-A2 accuracy
463117, PA speaker has low volume
470640, Annual EPIP review late
472419, EM-202 mode definition misleading
444203, PA announcements not heard
438833, EM-220 does not support FSAR statement
439708, ERO on-call telephone list discrepancies
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Procedures
REG-NGGC-0009, NRC Performance Indicators and Monthly Operating Report Data, Rev. 10
Records and Data
DEP opportunities documentation from 3rd Quarter 2010, through 1st Quarter 2011
Drill and exercise participation records of ERO personnel from 3rd Quarter 2010, through 1st
Quarter 2011
Siren test data from 2nd Quarter 2010, through 1st Quarter 2011
Various ERO Personnel Qualification and Participation records
Attachment
4
Corrective Actions Resulting From Inspection
474103: Revise REG-NGGC-0010
474428: E-Plan definition incomplete
474475: Rollup of NRC comments
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANS Alert and Notification System
AV Apparent Violation
CAP Corrective Action Program
DEP Drill/Exercise Performance
EAL Emergency Action Level
ERO Emergency Response Organization
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PI Performance Indicator
PS Planning Standard
RSPS Risk Significant Planning Standard
SDP Significance Determination Process
Attachment