ML112660263

Initial Exam 2011-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML112660263
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Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/22/2011
From:	NRC/RGN-II
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05-400/11-301
Download: ML112660263 (222)

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I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400/2011301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: lC-27, MOL, 4% power

. Plant startup to full power on HOLD

. GP-005, Power Operation, step 95, MODE 2

. B NSW pump is under clearance.

Turnover:

. The Startup crew must attend a briefing with Reactor Engineering to discuss changes to the Reactivity plan based on a recent review of core design analysis data

. Maintain stable conditions until the briefing is completed and the Startup crew returns Critical Tasks:

. Manually Start CSIP B prior to transition to PATH-i, entry point C.

. Close at least one Phase A Isolation Valve in each open line by the completion of scenario.

Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 Id xd2i085 C BOP/SRO Control Room Air Handler AH-15 trip requiring standby startup TSSRO 2 TT:144 I RO/SRO Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to JTB143B bypass demineralizers 3 Z1975TD1 C BOP/SRO Spurious start of the TDAFW pump (MS-70 Opens)

TS SRO 4 RcslO C RO/SRO Reactor Vessel Flange Leak TS-SRO 5 RCSO9B C RO/SRO RCP B rising vibration requires pump trip TS SRO 6 CFW16A C BOP/SRO Running MEW Pump trips X811155 TS SRO Standby MEW Pump fails to start Both MDAFW Pump AUTO start failure 7 CVCO5A C ROISRO CSIP A breaker trips 8 RCSO1A M ALL Small Break LOCA 9 DSGO4A C ROISRO Sequencer B skips CSIP load block 10 ZRPK63OA C BOP/SRO Same slave relay in each train fails to actuate respective Phase ZRPK63OB A Isolation Valves (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-Dij HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO I

SUMMARY

The crew will assume the watch while the Startup crew is attending a briefing by Reactor Engineering about changes identified in the reactivity plan due to a recent review of core design data (some data was found to be erroneous). The candidates are to maintain current plant conditions with Reactor Power 4%. The plant in on hold in MODE 2.

Event 1: Control Room Air Handler AH-1 5A-SA trips. Annunciator ALB-030-6-4, Control Room HVAC Normal Supply Fans AH-1 5A-SA Low Flow O/L will alarm. The HVAC dampers will automatically reposition and all Control Room Ventilation will secure. lAW the APP the operator will be directed to start the standby fan using OP-i 73, Control Room Area HVAC Systems. The CRS will enter Tech Spec 3.7.6 and determine the LCD.

• With one Control Room Emergency Filtration System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

The CRS should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 2: Letdown Temperature Controller failure. This failure will cause temperature controller TK-i44 output to decrease to zero. Without cooling to the letdown heat exchanger, temperatures observed on Tl-143 will increase. At 135°F annunciator ALB-07-3-2, Demin Flow Diversion High Temp will alarm. The crew should respond lAW the alarm procedure. The RD will discover that the divert valve to the VCT has failed to respond. The RO should report the failure to the SRO and should manually bypass the CVCS Demineralizers. The directions should be to restore letdown temperature to normal in MANUAL control. The SRO should provide a temperature band lAW OMM-00i for operation of components in manual. OP-107 page 25 with TK-144 controller in auto directions are to maintain temperature from 110 120°F.

The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an engineering evaluation for continued resin use.

Event 3: Is a spurious start of the TDAFW Pump by the inadvertent opening of MS-70. The BOP should respond to annunciator ALB-1 7-7-i, Aux Feedwater Pump Turbine Disch Or Suct Low Press. The crew should recognize increasing SG levels. The crew should dispatch an AD to investigate the cause of the pump start. The crew should determine that MS-70 needs to be shut. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 action a.

• With one Auxiliary Feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required Auxiliary Feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The CRS should also prepare 0MM-aOl, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO I

SUMMARY

(continued)

Event 4: Reactor Vessel Flange leak of 5 gpm. Annunciator ALB-10-5-5, Reactor vessel flange leakoff high temp will alarm when MCB temperature indicator Tl-401 reaches 140°F (approximately 1 minute after leak starts). The crew may also notice Pressurizer level slowly decreasing or an increase in Charging flow. Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to shut I RC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-01 6. Actions IF AOP 016 were entered are included for the response. The SRO should review Tech Spec 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System operational leakage for the time the leak exceeded 1 gpm (Identified leakage) and apply action b.

• With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than anyone of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Event 5: RCP B vibration will begin and continue to increase. The crew will respond to ALB 010-2-5, RCP-B Trouble and identify the B RCP vibration probe readings are increasing and in alarm. The crew should enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions and perform the immediate actions. Vibrations will continue to increase and exceed AOP-018 RCP trip criteria. Since power is <P-8, the crew should secure the B RCP and shut I RC-1 03, PZR Spray valve, without performing a manual Reactor trip. The SRO should review Tech Spec 3.4.1.1

• Reactor must be placed in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. (All Reactor Coolant loops must be in operation in Modes 1 and 2).

If the crew appears to be ready to manually trip the Reactor the MSO will direct the crew to maintain current conditions until a Containment entry is made and a visual check of the RCP is completed.

Event 6: Trip of the running MFW Pump. The BOP should report the loss of the pump and/or respond to alarms. The crew should enter AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions and perform the immediate actions. The crew should identify that the AFW pumps should have auto started but did not. If the crew allows SC levels to decrease to < 30% they will be required to perform a manual Reactor Trip. If a Reactor Trip is initiated then Event 7 will be inserted after the immediate actions of PATH-i are completed.

By maintaining all SG levels > 30% and Reactor power above POAH the crew should start AFW pumps and initiate flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52% and 62%. They should also be aware that any increase in power could produce a Mode change (5% is Mode I).

lAW AOP-Oi 0 Section 3.0 step 7 RNO they may insert rods to reduce power to maintain Steam Generator levels.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO I

SUMMARY

(continued)

Event 7: CSIP A breaker trip. The crew should enter AOP-0i8 (IF the Reactor was not tripped during the loss of Feedwater event) and perform the immediate actions. During the actions of AOP-018 they should identify decreasing Pressurizer level and pressure. They should identify that RCS leakage is present and enter AOP-01 6 where they will determine that leakage exceeds CVCS makeup capability and perform a Manual Reactor Trip and initiate a Manual Safety Injection signal.

Event 8: Major Small Break LOCA caused by a Loop I Cold Leg break resulting in either a Manual OR Automatic SI initiation.

Event 9: During the Safety Injection activation the B Load Sequencer will skip the CSIP B load block.

• The crew should manually start CSIP B to establish HHSI prior to transitioning to PATH-i entry point C. (Critical)

• After PATH-i foldout RCP trip criteria is met the crew has 5 minutes to manually trip the operating RCPs. (Critical)

Event 10: The BOP should close at least one isolation valve in any unisolated Phase A line in the process of performing GUIDE-i, Attachment 6 (Critical) and prior to the end of the scenario.

The crew will continue in PATH-i until the transition to EPP-009, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, is made. The scenario ends in EPP-009 after the first RCS pressure reduction has been completed.

CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Manually Start CSIP B prior to transition to PATH-i, entry point C.

Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-0, H: Manually start at least one high head ECCS pump before transition out of E-0 (PATH-i for HNP). In this scenario the A CSIP has tripped and the B CSIP has did not automatically start from sequencer actuation. The operator must manually start the B CSIP which was currently in standby.

2. Close at least one Phase A Isolation Valve in each open line by the completion of scenario.

Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-0, 0: Close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical phase-A penetration before the end of the scenario.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: j[ Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Control Room Air Handler AH-15 trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to Run.

After the crew has taken the shift and when appropriate Lead Evaluator: inform the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger I Trip of AH-15 Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger I Trip of AH-15 ALB-030-6-4, Control Room HVAC Normal Supply Fans AH-15 Low Flow O/L Indications Available Control Room ventilation damper re-alignment White Overload light lit on AH-15 MCB switch BOP Responds to annunciator and reviews APP Reports to CRS lAW the APP the standby fan should be BOP started lAW OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC Systems Directs BOP to start Control Room ventilation alignment lAW SRO OP-173 Directs AO to investigate breaker 1A-36-SA Cubical 5A and fan Crew motor When contacted to investigate fan failure report back in 2 Communicator: minutes that breaker IA-36-SA Cubical 5A is tripped on overload and no problems are noted locally at the fan unit.

Enters Tech Spec 3.7.6.a.1

. With one Control Room Emergency Filtration System SRO inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN_within_the_following_30_hours.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jj Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page of 49 Event

Description:

Control Room Air Handler AH-15 trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of AH-1 5.

Directs crew to review OWP-HVAC-07 Directs BOP to start B Chiller lAW OP-148 SRO (Evaluator: DO NOT wait for crew to start Chiller prior to proceeding with scenario)

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Contacts Work Week Manager requesting Train Swap.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 2 Letdown Temperature Control failure after Tech Spec call and request for support has been completed

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 2 Letdown Temperature control failure Indications Available TK-144 output decreases to 0 TI-I 43 increasing ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALB-007-3-2.

RO CONFIRM alarm using TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

RO VERIFY Automatic Functions:

. Manually positions ICS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT.

RO PERFORM Corrective actions:

VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers.

PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature:

• VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

• LOWER letdown flow. (N/A CCW Problem)

IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:

. TAKE manual control of TK-144.

. OPEN ICC-337, to raise CCW flow.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jjj Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page of Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Provide a temperature band lAW OMM-001 for operation of components in manual. OP-107 page 25 with TK-144 controller in auto directions is to maintain temperature from 1 10 120°F. (NOTE this is not the only procedure that provides temperature guidance)

SRO The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an engineering evaluation.

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.

Communicator: If contacted as WCC, System Engineer or Chemistry:

maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is completed.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 3 (Spurious start of the TDAFW pump) when letdown temperature is under control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 12 of 4 Event

Description:

Spurious Start of the TD AFW Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from Lead Evaluator Actuate Trigger 3 Spurious start of TDAFW Indications Available ALB-O1 7-7-I AFW TURB DISCHARGE LOW SUCTION!LOW PRESSURE (flashes in on start)

• Increasing power

. Rising SG Levels

. Open indication on MS-70 BOP Identifies the indications of a spurious start of the TDAFW BOP Refers to APP-ALB-17-7-1 CREW Determines TDAFW pump should not be running The crew may stop the reactivity impact by securing the TDAFW pump different ways. These differences are Evaluator Note: acceptable. They may close I MS-70 or throttle shut the TDAFW flow control valves. Both will render the pump inoperable and require entry into Tech Specs.

CREW Dispatches an AC to investigate Communicator IF I When contacted, wait 2-3 minutes then report TD AFW Pump is running. No indications locally as to the cause.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Spurious Start of the TD AFW Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew may opt to refer to OP-i 37, Auxiliary Feedwater, section 7.2, Normal Shutdown of the TD AFW pump

. Verify 1MS-70 SA SHUT (NO) o Shuts 1MS-70

. Verify 1MS-72 SB Shut (YES)

. Verify AFW FCV and Isolations indicate OPEN (YES)

. Set AFW FCVs Output Demand to 100% for 1AF-129, 1AF-130, 1AF-131. (YES)

BOP

. Verify TDAFW Speed Controller in AUTO and set per Curve F-X-i0. (YES)

Procedure Note: The following step makes the TD AFW pump operable, and aligns TD AFW pump to a standby alignment.

Complete Attachment 7, TD AFW Restoration.

(Evaluator: See Attachment 1 at end of scenario the crew will not be afforded time to perform these actions and this is NOT required to be completed to continue with the scenario)

Evaluator Note: SRO may also reference OWP-MS-05, but this OWP has no actions.

Evaluates Tech specs from APP and OWP T.S. 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 function 6.b Action 21. (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)

SRO T.S. 3.6.3, Containment Isolation valves Action a. (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />)

T.S. 3.7.1.2, AFW pumps and flow paths Action a. (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />)

T.S. 3.9.4. Containment Building penetrations (Not applicable)

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.

Communicator Acknowledge SRO requests Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 4 (Reactor Vessel Flange Leak) when the TD AFW pump is secured and the TS evaluation has been corn pleted.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # I Event # 4 Page j4 of 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger-4 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak (RCSO9B)

Indications Available ALB-1O-5-5, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff High Temp Tl-401, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Temp increasing Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to Evaluator Note: shut IRC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-016.

Responds to alarm ALB-010-5-5

. Confirms alarm by reading Tl-401

. No auto actions

. Checks Containment temp trend for high Containment RD temp resulting from a nearby steam/RCS leak o Does not see any increase in Containment temperatures and rules out nearby steam/RCS leakage Shuts 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal Leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from inner Reactor head seal Monitors Tl-401 indications and identifies temperature is RD decreasing RD Informs SRO Reactor Vessel Flange leakage is isolated Evaluates Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 Action b SRO

. Reduce leakage to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Evaluator Note: The following write up is if AOP-016 is used for the response to the Reactor Vessel Flange Leak.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 14- Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: i Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page j of 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies entry conditions met for AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Crew Plant Leakage NOTE- AOP-016 contains NO Immediate Actions SRO Enters AOP-01 6 CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability (YES)

MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5% (YES)

Radiation monitors normal (YES)

PERFORM a qualitative RCS flow balance (flow to RCDT)

Evaluate Tech Specs 3.4.6.2 SRO Leak location identified from MCB indications

. From RV Flange Consult with Operation Management to determine leak isolation and recovery actions Exit AOP-01 6 Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Lead Evaluator After Tech Spec evaluation is performed cue Event 5 B RCP high vibration Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page j. of 4 Event

Description:

B RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger-5 B RCP high vibration Indications Available ALB-O1O-2-5, RCP-B TROUBLE B RCP vibration monitors increasing and red high vibration lights lit RO Responds to alarm ALB-0i0-2-5.

Evaluators Note: Crew may review ALB-O1O-2-5 but will likely go directly to AOP-O18 when high vibration is recognized.

Enters and directs actions of AOP-01 8, REACTOR COOLANT SRO PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS.

Immediate Action RO Perform Immediate Action

. Check any CSIP running. (YES)

SRO Inform SM to refer to PEP-i 10 and enter the EAL Matrix.

SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration.

The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a continuous action step that should be implemented when Evaluator Note: the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read.

Attachment I is on next 2 pages for evaluator use.

Check all RCPs operating within limits of Attachment 1.

SRO (YES/NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page j of 4 Event

Description:

B RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS I Attachment 1 Sheet I of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Limits NOTE False indications such as step changes or spikes on both the upper and lower thrust bearings are signs that the instrumentation transient may not he valid.

Validation of the temperatures should he performed by observing positive indications of any of the following:

• Simultaneous temperature increases in upper and lower thrust bearing and upper guide bearing (may indicate loss of CCW cooling or oil viscosity problems common to the upper reservoir)

• Vibration levels increasing along with increasing bearing temperatures.

• High or low RCP oil level alarms along with increasing bearing temperatures.

01. ANY of the following Motor Bearing temperatures exceeding 19QF: [A.1]

ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Mtr Upper Thrust Brg Temp TRCO41 7A TRCO427A TRCO437A Mtr Lower Thrust Brg Temp TRCO4I 7B TRCO427B TRCO437B Mtr Upper Radial Brg Temp TRCO418A TRCQ428A TRCO438A MW Lower Radial Brg Temp TRCO41 9 TRC0429 TRC0439

02. ANY of the following Pump temperatures exceeding 230F: [A.1]

ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Pump Radial Brg Temp TRC131 TRCOI 28 TRCO 125 Seal Water Inlet Temp TRCO 132 TRCO1 29 TROC 126

03. RCP Stator Winding temperature exceeding 300F:

ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motor Stator Windg Temp TRCO41 8B TRCO428B TRCO438B AOP-018 Rev. I Page 27 of 58 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I - 17- Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiQ Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page j of 4 Event

Description:

B RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS Attachment I Sheet 2 of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Limits NOTE

• ALB-511-2B. RCP THERM BAR HDR LOW FLOW, indicates loss of CCW to all RCP Thermal bamers.

• The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes and 45 seconds from timer initiation. If 2 minutes and 45 seconds have not elapsed WAIT for initiation

04. Loss of all RCP seal injection (including ASI) when ANY of the following conditions exist

• CCW flow is lost to the associated RCP Thermal Barrier FIX

• RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 400°F AND CCW HX outlet temperature is greater than 105°F

• RCS temperature is less than 400°F AND CCW HX outlet temperature is greater than 125°F

05. RCP vibration in excess of the following: tA.11

• 20milsshaft

• 15 mils shaft and increasing greater than 1 mu/hr 5milsframe

• ForA and C RCPs ONLY: 3 mils frame and increasing greaterthan 0.2 millhr

• For B RCP ONLY: 3.5 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 milslhr

06. RCP Motor current fluctuations of 40 amps peak-to-peak:

ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motor Current IRCOI6O IRCO161 IRCOI62 Q7. Loss of CCW to an RCP or RCP Motor when:

• An RCP has operated for 10 minutes without CCW flow to either motor oil cooler IA.21

• Isolation of CCW to an RCP is necessary to stop excessive CCW System leakage

..-ENDOFAUACHMENT1 AOP-018 Rev. 39 I Page 28 of 58 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 19 of 49 Event

Description:

B RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Check reactor power> P-8. (NO)

RO Check more than one RCP affected. (NO)

Evaluator Note: The SRO may conduct a brief on Attachment 7 before the RCP is stopped.

RO Perform the following:

. STOP the affected RCP. (RCP B)

SRO REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.

GO TO Step 11.

RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO)

PERFORM the following:

IF RCPA is secured, then shut 1RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A (N/A)

IF RCP B is secured, then shut IRC-103, PRZ Spray Loop B (shuts IRC-103)

BOP VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52% and 62%.

MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve from RO Curve Book)

INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:

• GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power SRO Operation to Hot Standby

• AOP-038, Rapid Downpower CONFIRM the vibration alarm VALID by checking BOTH of the following:

a. The Green vibration monitor OK light is LIT.

RO b. Either of the following conditions exist:

• Shaft AND frame vibration are proportionally rising

• Vertical AND Horizontal vibration are proportionally rising Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 19- Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page ,Q of 4 Event

Description:

B RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK the following parameters normal for the affected RCP (reference OSI P1 for AOP-018):

All parameters listed in Attachment 6, ERFIS Points for Reactor Coolant Pumps RO

. Seal EP Upper

. Oil Reservoir level

. Lower Oil Reservoir level

. RCS Loop Flow CONSULT with the Responsible Engineer for recommended follow-up actions.

SRO Contacts WCC for assistance I generation of Work Request Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist REFER TO the following Tech Specs SRO TS 3.4.1.1 is the most limiting

. Be in at least HSB within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Lead Evaluator Cue Event 6 (MFW Pump trip) after the TS declaration.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # I Event # 6 Page j of 4 Event

Description:

Trip of Main Feed Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6 Trip of MFW Pump A Indications Available ALB-016-2-2, Loss of Both MFW Pumps ALB-016-1-4, FW Pump NB OIC Trip Gnd Or Bkr Fail To Close Responds to indication of running Main Feedwater (MEW)

BOP Pump trip and/or multiple alarms BOP Reports MFW Pump tripped and standby pump also tripped Enters AOP-010, FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Performs immediate actions of AOP-010 Immediate . CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Action BOP

. CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (YES)

. CHECK initial Reactor power less than 80%. (YES)

Turbine runback will automatically terminate at approximately 50% power with DEH in AUTO Procedure Note: Turbine runbacks are quickly identified by ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACKOPERATIVE, in alarm and RUNBACK OPER light LIT as long as the initiating signal is present on DEH Panel A.

BOP/RO CHECK initial Reactor power less than 60%. (YES)

BOP/SRO CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (YES)

MAINTAIN ALL of the following:

BOP

. At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Trip of Main Feed Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may perform different options depending on the Evaluator Note: state of the TDAFW pump. They may start one or both MDAFW Pumps or could start flow from the TDAFW Pump.

PERFORM the following:

. IF ANY SG level drops to 30% THEN TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP Path-i.

BOP IF Above POAH AND Reactor power is LESS THAN 10%, THEN:

o INITIATE AFW flow to maintain Steam Generator levels between 52 and 62%

BOP Contacts AOs and/or WC to investigate cause of pump trip When contacted report back 2-3 minutes later that the Communicator breakers have tripped on overload. There is no damage at the pumps.

Procedure Note: Mode change occurs at 5% Reactor power REDUCE power as necessary to maintain SG level RO Adjust power using MANUAL Rod Control and/or boration (IF needed) and as directed by the SRO.

Evaluates TS for failure of MD AFW Pump auto start failure TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 6.f action 15 ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL SRO OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Reviews/prepares OMM-OOi, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Be prepared to actuate Event 7 (A CSIP trip and Small Simulator Operator:

Break LOCA) if the SRO directs a MANUAL Reactor trip.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 22 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Trip of Main Feed Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Allow the crew time to stabilize the plant and determine AFW needs. IF the crew loses control of SG levels and trips the Reactor cue the Simulator Operator to initiate Event 7 A CSIP Trip and Small Break LOCA coincident when the Reactor trip is performed.

Evaluator Note:

IF the crew lost control of SG levels and tripped the Reactor then the SRO can be asked an end of scenario follow-up question about the Tech Spec associated with the auto start failure of the MD AFW pumps.

Lead Evaluator: Cue Event 7 (LOCAICSIP Trip) when the plant is in a stable condition with power matched to AFW capability.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 23 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 4 of 4 Event

Description:

Trip of A CSIP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On Cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7 Simulator Operator:

A CSIP trip and Small Break LOCA ALB-06-1-3, CHRG PUMPS A TRIP OR CLOSE CKT TROU BLE Indications Available RCS Low Pressure alarms Rapidly Decreasing RCS Pressure and Pressurizer Level Depending on which indications the crew notices first they may take the Immediate Actions for AOP-018 first due to the trip of the running CSIP. However, shortly into AOP 018 they should recognize the SB LOCA is in progress and Evaluator Note: transition to AOP-016 then to PATH-I when the leak exceeds Makeup capability OR pressure is approaching a Reactor TripIESF setpoint.

The crew may also initiate a MANUAL SI before the AUTO setpoint is reached.

RO Respond to alarm for trip of A CSIP Enter AOP-O1 8, RCP Abnormal conditions SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Immediate Action RO Check any CSIP running (NO)

Isolate Letdown by SHUTTING Immediate

• 1CS7 (SHUT)

Action RO

• 1 CS-8 (SHUT)

. 1CS-9 (Verify SHUT)

By the time the immediate actions are complete the crew Evaluator Note: should identify the indications that a SB LOCA is in progress.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I - 24 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # I Event # 7 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Trip of A CSIP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters AOP-01 6 SRO No Immediate Actions Check RHR in operation (NO)

SRO Procedure Note: An RCS Leak Rate> i2Ogpm with letdown isolated is an indication of a potential loss of the RCS Fission Product Barrier.

SRO Directs SM to refer to PEP-I 10 and enter the EAL Matrix Procedure Note: This step is a qualitative check for leakage obviously in excess of Make Up capability. Isolation of letdown may be necessary. A formal calculation to determine the leakrate is performed in Step 16.

CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability (NO)

SRO TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP PATH-i.

Procedure Note: If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine should be verified tripped in PATH-i before manually actuating SI.

MANUALLY INITIATE Safety Injection then exit this procedure.

Manually actuates Reactor Trip and after Reactor and Turbine RO trip is verified manually actuates Safety Injection Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 25 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters PATH-i VERIFY Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful CHECK for any of the following:

Immediate Action RO

• Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES) OR

• Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

• ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

• NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERIFY Turbine Trip Immediate CHECK for any of the following:

Action BOP

. ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES)

. ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses Immediate Action BOP . 1A-SA AND lB-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs. (YES)

CHECK SI Actuation CHECK for any of the following LIT

. SI Actuated bypass permissive light (YES)

Immediate Action RO . ALB-l 1 2

. ALB-11-5-1

. ALB-1 1-5-3

. ALB-12-1-4 Perform The Following:

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status SRO Trees

• Directs SM to evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-i 10)

SRO Informs Crew Foldout A applies (next page)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 26 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 8 Page Z of 49 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA continued Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-I GUIDE FOLDOUT A

• RCP TRIP CRITERIA tF both of the toflowing occur, THEN stop all RCPs:

• SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM

• RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRIIERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1.

• RHR RESTART CRITERIA IF RCS pressure decreases to less Itian 230 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, IL!I restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS.

• ALTERNATE MINIFLOW OPENJSHUT CRfFER1A

• IF RCS pressure decreases to less hiss 1800 PSIG, ]verify alternate miniflow isolation OR miniflow block valves SHUT

• IF RCS pressure increases to greater than 2200 PSIG, ThEN verify alternate miniflow Isolation AND mbilfiow block valves OPEN EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 30 Page 5 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 27 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 1 Event# 9 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Sequencer Skips B CSIP start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions should be taken lAW PATH-I Foldout A criteria during the scenario:

. Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure Evaluator Note: lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.

. When RCP trip criteria is met per Foldout A the crew should have the B CSIP running, identify the condition and then trip all running RCPs (A and C RCP)

Verify ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING. (NO)

Manually start CSIP B prior to transition to PATH-I, entry point C.

Critical Task RD Starts B CSIP Reports to SRO (at appropriate time) B CSIP was manually started Reports RHR Pumps running (YES)

Check SI Flow:

RD SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES)

RD Verifies CSIP miniflow valves closed (YES)

RD RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG. (NO)

Both RHR HX header flows GREATER THAN 1000 GPM RD -

(NO)

Locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction Crew AND discharge cross-connect valves:

(Refer to Attachment 1 1.)

Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves per PATH-I Attachment II Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 28 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Sequencer Skips B CSIP start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Run APPcvc\Path-I Att. 6 CSIP suction valve power Simulator Operator: when the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-I Attachment II is complete.

The crew may manually initiate Main Steam Isolation Evaluator Note: because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint.

Check Main Steam Isolation:

RO/BOP Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) ACTUATED. (NO)

NOTE: MSLI will be required when Cnmt Pressure Evaluator Note: increases to> 3 psig. The SRO should direct either the RO or BOP to actuate MSLI prior to reaching 3 psig.

Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG. (YES)

Evaluator Note: MS-70 will not automatically open due to the previous relay failure.

Check AFW Status:

RO/BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES)

Identifies Foldout A RCP Trip Criteria is MET SI flow> 200 GPM RO RCS pressure < 1400 psig Informs SRO that RCP trip criteria is met Secures A and C RCP Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 29 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 9 Page P of 4 Event

Description:

Sequencer Skips B CSIP start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW PATH-I Attachment 6 without Evaluator Note: SRO approval.

The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components:

BOP Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9)

ACTUATED (YES)

Energize AC buses 1AI AND IB1 BOP Shuts Breaker Al A-SA and Bl A-SB Verify Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation BOP Verification, While Continuing with this Procedure.

(See end of this scenario Attachment 2 and Attachment 3)

Directs AO to place 1A and lB Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per PATH-l Attachment 6 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place IA and lB Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-I Attachment 6 step 22 When directed to place the IA and lB Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode:

Run APPairacs_to_local When the APP for IA and lB Air Compressor has Communicator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page of 49 Event

Description:

Identify/Shut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies valves mispositioned and closes at least one of the valves in each of the following combinations (Critical to close valves before the end of the scenario) e 1SP-948/1SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT Critical ISOL

. 1ED-94/IED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AND closes at least one set of the following:

. 1SP-16/1SP-939, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL

. 1SP-91611SP-918, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL Control RCS Temperature:

Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

TALLE I: RCS TEN?EBATUiE CONTROL UTDRtINES FOLLOWING EX T.IP

. Gui4nc fe appliefl untfl auver pEccedure dire,cte othrwiet

• O Rcr nixining uee wi rge ol l eratur RCS TENPERATURN TREMD LEES TRM GREI.TER TRAN G7ABLE AT OR 57! AND 557P AND TIENDI1IG TO FECRRASINC INCRA]NC 557 P

. tnp Iiifn8

• j nnr

• Cnntrnl f1 BOP/RO aveflable flow and etee K trrngfpr itimp tO

. Contzol feed teem dmnp to egtablib an flow STEAK PRESSURK itaintain RCS moce using temperature

• Maintain totel OP-12. between 55P feed flo, Sectict 5. ND 559°!

OPERkTO Rreater then MID duap eteam ACTION IO KPPK to condeneer until level 6reater than - OR -

5% I4O% in Ct least one

• Duap eteam on intact SG using intact SC PORVs

. iF ccoldown continues.

• Coetro] feed j shut flow to MSIV AND niaintain SC BYPASS vslve levels Identifies RCS cooldown continues and shuts MSIVs CREW NOTE: MSIVs may have been shut from MSLI Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 31 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page of 49 Event

Description:

Identify/Shut Phase A valves not aligned Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

Check PZR PORV block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RO (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves SHUT. (YES)

RO/BOP Identify any faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

. Any SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

. Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)

Identify any ruptured SG:

Check for all of the following:

• Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation CREW NORMAL. (YES)

• SG Blowdown radiation NORMAL. (YES)

• Main Steam line radiation NORMAL. (YES)

BOP/RO Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO)

Check RCS Intact Check for all of the following:

SRO

• CNMT pressure NORMAL (NO)

Proceeds TO Entry Point C Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

SRO (None required)

SRO Foldouts A and B Apply Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Aclion Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page of 4 Event

Description:

IdentifylShut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew should review foldout criteria. Foldout A actions should be complete. No Foldout B actions apply.

Evaluator Note: The crew identify and use Adverse Values identified in brackets in the EOP procedures ( ) when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG Maintain RCP Seal Injection flow between 8 GPM AND RO 13 GPM.

Check Intact SG Levels:

Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES)

BOP Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25%

AND 50% [40% AND 50%].

BOP Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 ENERGIZED. (YES)

Check PZR PORV block valves:

Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1BI Energized (YES)

RO Check PORVs Shut (YES)

Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES)

CONTINUOUS ACTION: IF a PRZ PORV opens on high SRO pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint.

RO Check SI Termination Criteria:

RCS subcooling GREATER THAN (YES/NO) - dependant on timing same results

. 10°F [40°F] C

. 20°F [50°F] M Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 33 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # Event# 10 Page 34 of 49 Event

Description:

IdentifylShut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (IF Subcooling> 10°F then check if not N/A)

Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

• Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25%

BOP

[40%] (YES)

• Total feed flow to intact SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)

WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO SRO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.

Check CNMT Spray Status:

RD Check any CNMT Spray Pump RUNNING. (NO)

Check Source Range Detector Status:

• Intermediate range flux LESS THAN 5x10 11 AMPS RD

• Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED

. Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale Check RHR Pump status:

• RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)

RD

• RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES/NO)

- Yes Stop RHR pumps, ND leave RHR pumps on.

Dependant on timing The evaluationltrend of RCS pressure in the next several steps is dependent on how long it took the crew to reach Evaluators Note these steps (Decay HeatlBreak FIowIECCS flow). Pressure should be considered stable or decreasing at this point.

Check RCS And SG Pressures:

Check for both of the following:

RD

• All SG Pressures STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)

• RCS pressure STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Identify/Shut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

Verify both CCW Pumps running (YES)

Open the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX Trains RO A and

. 1CC-147 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)

. 1CC-167 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)

RO Verify CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES)

Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems: (SHUTS one Train of valves listed below)

Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

. 1CC-99 RO

. 1CC-128 Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:

. 1CC-113

. ICC-127 Check EDG status:

Check AC emergency buses IA-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)

. Check Bus voltages (Normal)

. Verify breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)

BOP/RO Check any EDG running unloaded (YES)

Reset SI (takes both SI reset switches to RESET and observes RO status light change from SI active to SI reset)

Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-I 55, Diesel BOP Generator Emergency Power System, Section 7.0 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 35 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Q Scenario # I Event # 10 Page of 4 Event

Description:

IdentifylShut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status:

RHR system CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SRO (YES)

Check Auxiliary AND Radwaste Processing Building radiaton NORMAL (YES)

Check RCS Status Check for both of the following:

RO RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

Any RHR HX header flow GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)

GO TO EPP-009, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND SRO DEPRESSURIZATION, Step I Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 10 Page of 4 Event

Description:

ldentify!Shut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO EPP-009, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization PROCEDURE NOTE: Foldout applies SRO Reviews FOLDOUT Criteria (None will require action)

RD Reset SI (already performed)

Manually realign safeguards equipment if a loss of off-site SRO power occurs.

Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals RD Locates MCB Phase A switch and resets Phase A (no need to reset Phase B it was not actuated)

Establish Instrument Air and Nitrogen to CNMT Open the following valves:

RO

. 1 IA-81 9 (locates MCB switches and opens valve)

. 1 Sl-287(locates MCB switches and opens valve)

Monitor AC Buses:

Check AC emergency buses IA-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:

. Check bus voltages

. Check breakers 105 AND 125 CLOSED (YES)

SRO GO TO Step 5e BOP/RO Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES)

PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water Procedure Caution level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: j Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page 38 of 4 Event

Description:

IdentifylShut Phase A valves not aligned Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Secure PRZ Heaters:

. Place backup heaters in the OFF position

. Verify control heaters OFF RO . Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered. (Refer to ERG Executive Volume, Generic Issue: Evaluations by the Plant Engineering Staff.)

Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

. Check RHR pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION RO ALIGNED TO RWST (Secured)

. RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Check Intact SG Levels:

. Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

BOP -

. Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%j After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Check PRZ Pressure:

. Pressure less than 2000 PSIG (YES)

RO . Block low steam pressure SI Locates Low Steam Line Pressure SI MCB block switch and olaces switch to block verifies block on status liahts Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

SRO Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs LESS THAN 100 CF/HR Check RHR system OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING RO -

MODE (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 38 - Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Scenario# 1 Event# 10 Page of 4 Event

Description:

Identify/Shut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO GOTO Step lOf Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

Check any intact SG MSIV OPEN (NO)

BOP Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

. SGPORVs SRO GotoStepil Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:

(SRO should circle this step and move one)

a. Coordinate with plant operations staff AND chemistry to perform the following to obtain primary and secondary samples:

1) Operate the primaty AND secondary sample panels.

2) Open CCW to sample HX valves:

• ICC-114

• ICC-115

3) Open CCW to GFFD valves:

• I CC-304 SRO/BOP a ICC-305

4) Align AND obtain activity AND boron samples of the following:

(Refer to OP-lOl, SAMPLING SYSTEM, Section 5.0.)

• RCS hot legs

• AIISGs

b. Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated RCS temperatures. (Refer to OST-1036, SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATlON)

c. Check RCS loop boron GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN Check RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 10 F [40 FJ C RO -

(YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I - 39 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # I Event # 10 Page 4Q of 4 Event

Description:

IdentifylShut Phase A valves not aligned Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Status:

RO SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

SRO Observe NOTE prior to Step 14 AND GO TO Step 14.

Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressurization. This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.

Procedure Note:

RCS depressurization should NOT be stopped if RCS subcooling is lost. Subcooling should be restored as the cooldown continues.

Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZ:

. PRZ level LESS THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

. Depressurize using normal spray (not available)

. OPEN 1 PRZ PORV locates PORV switch and opens RO 1 PORV then monitors PRZ level increase

. PRZ level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

. WHEN level is greater than 25% [40%], THEN stop RCS depressurization.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the Lead Evaluator: crew demonstrates the ability to depressurize the RCS or when the depressurization is secured.

• Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment I OP-i 37 Attachment 7, TDAFW Restoration from Operation Lineup Checklist REFERENCE USE Attachment 7 TDAFW Restoration from Operation Lineup Checklist Sheet 1 ot2 Person(s) Performing Checklist Initials Name (Print) Initials Name (Print)

Remarks Indicate arty component not in the prescribed position.

Checklist Started Time Date Checklist Completed Time Date Approved by Date ORS Atter receiving the linal review s[gnature, this OP Attachment becomes a QA RECORD.

I DP-137 Rev30 Page74of7 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment I - -

OP-i 37 Attachment 7, TDAFW Restoration from Operation Lineup Checklist REFERENCE USE Attachment 7 TDAFW Restoration from Operation Lineup Checklist Sheet2of2 DOMPONENT NUMBER COMPONENT D[SCRIPTION POSITION CI ICK VRIY FCV-2071A Aux FW Wotor Priip Flow CuritiulVlv GA IAF-129 OEN FCV-2fl71R Anx FW Wotnr Pnip Flow Control VI, Sf3 B IAF-130 cPEN FCV-2071C Aux FW Wotor PnIp Flow ODEN Control Vlv Sf3 C 1AF-131 PDK-218ft1 SB PUX FW TURBINE sm Stpt= $ i)

AUTO NOTE: Te demand cutpul signal ncicatcr accuracy is 2% for the followr controllers:

• FK-271Al SB, AUX FWAREGULKDR IAF-120 FK-2D71 Bi $5, AUX FW B REGULAOR TAF-1 30

• FK-2D71 Cl SE, ?UX FW C REGULATCR 1 AF-1 31 FK-2071A1 55 .UX FW A REGULATOR, I AF-1 29 Dmand s a: lflfl%

FK-2071B1 SB ALIX FyI B REGULATOR, IAF 130 Dmanc1 se: a: 100%

FK-2071C1 SB AUX FW C REGULATOR, IAF- 131 DDrnand Sc: a: 100%

1AT-137 3TMTUR3 AUX FWA ODEN SOLJ ION 1AF-l43 TMTLJR ALJX FW A SOl TlON OEN IAF-I49 STMTUR AUX FV C SOLIIcJN ODEN I MS T AUX FW TURBINE TRIP &

ODEN fl-ROTTLE VLI (1) Value prcviea in the iperatlons (urve booK, CUIVé l--X-1U.

OP-i 37 30 Pag75 of 76 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment 2 PATH-i Guide Attachment 1 GUIDE PATh-I Attachment I Sheet 1 of I SI EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT

• charging line isolation valves SHUT:

I CS-235 1CS-238

• CSIP suction from RWST valves OPEN: -

1CS-291 (LCV-115B 1CS-292 (LCV-i 151)

• VCT outlet valves SHUT:

1CS-IGS (LGV-115C ICS166 (LCV-115E)

• BIT ouflet valves OPEN:

IS 1-3 IS 1-4

• CSIP alternate miniflow isoation valves SI-jUT (IF RCS PRESSURE LESS TI-lAN 1800 PSIG) OPEN (IF RCS PRESSURE GREATER THAN 2200 PSIG):

1CS-746 I CS-752

• CSIP alternate miniflow block valves OPEN (UNLESS SHUT TO ISOLATE AN ALTERNATE MINIFLOW ISOLATION VALVE) 1CS745 ICS-753

• CSIP nounal miniflow valves SHUT:

1CS-214 I CS-182 1CS-196 ICS-210

• Low head SI to cdd leg valves OPEN:-

IS 1-340 iSl-341

• Low head SI to hot leg crossover valves OPEN:

IS 1-326 IS 1-327

• Low head SI to hot leg valve SHUT:

151-359

. RWST to RHR pump suction valves OPEN: -

ISI-322 ISI-323 EOP-GUIDE-I I Rev. 30 I Page 70 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 43 - Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO I Attachment 3 PATH-i Attachment 6 I PATH-I GUIDE Attachment 6 Sheet I of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification U I. Verify Two CSIPs RUNNING U 2. Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING U 3. Verily Two CCW Pumps RUNNING U 4. Verify PJI ESWNi ESW Booster Pumps- RUNNING U 5. Verify SI Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment 1.)

U 6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT (Referto OMM-004, POST TRIP!SAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 4.)

EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 30 I Paqe 76 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I - 44 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment 3 PATH-i Attachment 6 PATH-i GUIDE Attachment £ Sheet 2 of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification

[]7. Verify SG Bbwdown SG Sample Isolation Valves In TaNe 1 SI-IUT -

Table 1: SQ Wlowdown And Saiiple Isolation Valves Proes Outside UNNI In9ide CN!T lAne KLB-1A-SA) (Mr..B-IB-oa) 5Q A Saiple 1SP-fl7 15P214/216 SQ B Saaple 1SP-222 1SP-219/221 SQ C Sasple iSP 227 ISP 24I2Z6 SQ A Blowdown lED-li 1BDl SQ B Blcvdevn 1ED-O 1BD20 SQ C Blewdown 1ED-49 1BD39

8. IF Main Steam line Isolation Actuated OR Is Required By My Cf The Fdlowfriq.

11IEN VerThi MSWs ANt) MSIV Brpass Vaives SHUT

[]* Steam line pressue LESS THAN 601 PSIG D

• CNF pressure GREATER ThAN 3.0 PSIG

9. !E GNMT Spray Actuation Sig1aJ Actuated OR Is Required, THEN Verily The Followinq:

(Refer b OMM-004. POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW. Attachment 9.)

C

• CNF spay pumps RUNNING C

• CNMT spray valves PROPERLY AUGMED

[:)

• Phase [5 isoIion aIves - SHUT U

• MRGPs-SIOPHzU EOP-GUIDE-l I Rev. 30 I Pane 76 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario I - 45 - Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment 3 PATH-I Attachment 6 PATh-I GUIDE Attachment 6 Sheet 3 of 5 Safeguards Actuation Verification D 10. Verify Both Main FW Pumps TRIPPED 0 11. VerifyFWlsolationValves-SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEtdr, Attachment 6.)

El 12. Verify both MDAFW puns RUNNING

13. iF any of the following conditions exist, ThEN verify the TDAFW pvmp -

RUN NING El

• Undervoftage on either 59 KV emergency bus E]

• Level in two SGs LESS ThAN 25%

El

• Manual actuation to control SG level El 14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED El 15. Verify Both EDGs RUNNING El 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED El 17. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves- SHUT (Refer to OMM-.004, POST TRIP!SAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 7.)

E] 18. Verify Control Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIP!SAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 5.)

EOP-GUIDE-i I Rev. 30 I Paqe 77 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 46 -

Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Aflarimnt3 PATH-i Attachment 6 PATH-i GUIDE AttathmentG Sheet 4 of S Safequards Actuation Veri1icatior

19. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:

D

• Verify both WC-2 chillers FJNNlNG D

• VerifybothP-4pumps-RUNNING U (Refer to AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for loss of any WC-2 chiller)

20. Verify CSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING D AH-9ASA IJ AH-9 B SB c AH-1)ASA Q AH-l)BSB 0 21. Verify AC buses IAI IBI ENERGIZED 0 22. Place air ccpressor IA AND 15 in the LOCAL CDNTROL Mode.

(Refer to Atachment 5)

EOP-GUIOE-i I Rev. 3) I Paqe 78 of 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 47 - Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO I Attachment 3 -

PATH-I Attachment 6 PATH-I GUiDE Attachment 6 Sheet of Safeguards Actuation Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity ci MCC iA35-SA and MCC1 35-S5 is between 10 MREWHR and 1 5) MREMI-1R.

E] 23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valves (Refer to Attachment 11 MCC 1A35-SA [ 14CC 1B35SB VALVE CLIBICLE VALVE CURICLE 1GS-17 4A 1CE-171 4D 1CS-16 th ICS-168 7I3 1C5-21 14D 1CS-220 9D 1CS-219 14E 1GS2I7 12C NOW jf conrol room ventilation was provicusly aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident qerions, THEN folkw-upactioris will be required to restore the alignment

24. Ccnsult Plant Operations Staff Regardng Alignmer4 Of The Conrol Room Ventilation System:

D Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room D

• Site Emcrgcncy Co ordinator Tcdinical Support Centar iRe1i to PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM DPERATION3)

- END -

EOP-3UIDE-1 I Rev. 30 I Paqe 79 ol 91 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 - 48 - Revision 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Revion Summary Rev. I Page 1, Critical tasks identified in scenario guide and revised per the ERG-Based Critical Task list and NuReg 1021 Appendix D.

Page 4, developed the justifications for each critical task.

Archie Lucky 5-18-2011 Rev. 2 Increased RCS malfunction rcs0la (RSC Small Break LOCA Loop 1 Cold Leg) leak size during SB LOCA from 0.09% to 0.2% with a 2 minute ramp. This allows the crew to have time to enter AOP-01 6 and evaluate leak size and then later have PZR level at the level that would meet the requirements of PATH-I to EOP-009 transition.

Archie Lucky 5-23-2011 Rev. 3 Page 1, Event 7 split out to identify component failure for RO/SRO and Event 8 is major event. Renumbered scenario guide from event 7 on to incorporate new numbers.

Page 4, Listed events 7 10 separately to make identification the same as on page 1.

Archie Lucky 5-24-2011 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 3

rApendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Facility: SHEARON-HARRI S Scenario No.: 2 OpTestNo.: 05000400/2011301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: IC-19: 100%, MOL

• A MD AFW Pump under clearance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago for motor overhaul, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, TS 3.7.1.272 hour0.00315 days <br />0.0756 hours <br />4.497354e-4 weeks <br />1.03496e-4 months <br /> LCO

• B NSW pump under clearance for motor replacement, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

• PZR PORV PCV-444B leakage required shutting PORV isol 1 RC-1 13 Turnover: There are high motor vibrations on the A Circulating Water Pump and indications of a tear in the expansion joint. The leakage is increasing. Directions from the Operations Manager are to reduce power lAW GP-006 at 4 DEH units/mm to 90% then remove A Circ Water Pump from service.

Critical Tasks:

• Initiate a MANUAL Turbine trip (Prior to the receipt of the Low Steam Line Pressure SI signal)

• Establish feed to at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed criteria is reached Event MaIf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 N/A R RO/SRO Lower power to stop A CW Pump N BOP/SRO 2 CRFOO8 I RO/SRO T-ref Controller fails low 3 LT:486 I BOP/SRO SG B Controlling Level Channel fails LO TS SRO-4 LT-115 I RO/SRO VCT Level Channel 115 fails LOW 5 SISO3C C ROISRO C Accumulator nitrogen leak TS SRO-6 lDl C BOP/SRO EHC pump trip with standby auto start failure XB2I1 30 7 CFW16A M ALL MFW Pump A trip CFW16B MEW Pump B trip (2 minute delay)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 1 Revision I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Event Maif. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 8 TURO2 C RO/SRO AUTO Turbine Trip fails (manual successful) 9 CFWO1 B C BOP/SRO MD AFW Pump B breaker trips when started 10 CFWO1C C BOPISRO TD AFW Pump trips when running (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

Event 1: The first evolution for the crew is to commence a power reduction at 4 DEH Units I mm. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate as necessary to lower power, and the BOP will operate the DEH Main Turbine controls as necessary to reduce turbine load. During the downpower to 90%, when Reactor power reaches approximately 95% power the Outside AO will radio in an emergency request to immediately secure the A Circ Water Pump due to increasing problems with the pump. Event 2 can be inserted after the Circ Water pump is secured.

Event 2: Failure of the Tref Processor (fails low). The crew should enter AOP-001 and carry out the immediate actions. Once Rod Control is in MANUAL and AOP-001 actions have been observed to the extent necessary, then cue Event 3.

Event 3: SG B controlling level transmitter LT-486 fails low. The BOP should report and respond to annunciator ALB-014-5-3A Steam Gen B NR Low Level. The BOP should take manual control of the B SG flow control valve and restore level to 57%

Narrow Range. The SRO should provide trip limits and level bands lAW OMM-001 3. The SRO directs the implementation of OWP-RP-06. The SRO should also evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1 Items 13 Steam Generator Water Level Low Low and item 14 SG Water Level Low Coincident With Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch, Action 6 for both and Tech Spec 3.3.2, ESF Instrumentation, Table 3.3-3 Item 5b, Action 19 and Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring.

Event 4: Failure of VCT level transmitter LT-1 15 (low). This failure will cause an automatic make up to the VCT to initiate. The crew should enter AOP-003, identify the failed level transmitter, and secure the makeup. Once AOP-003 actions have been completed then Event 5 can be inserted.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision I

rAppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

(continued)

Event 5: C Accumulator nitrogen leak causes pressure to decrease until annunciator ALB 01-9-1 alarms. The crew should respond to the low pressure condition and restore the Accumulator pressure to normal. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.5.1 for Accumulator pressure if pressure gets below Tech Spec operability limit.

3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open with power supply circuit breaker open,

b. A contained borated water volume of between 66 and 96% indicated level,

c. A boron concentration of between 2400 and 2600 ppm, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 665 psig ACTION:a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Event 6: DEH pump trip with auto start failure of the standby DEH pump. The crew should respond to annunciator ALB-020-4-5A EH Fluid Pumps O/L. The standby pump should auto start at 1500 psig but a relay failure prevents the pump from auto starting.

Event 7: Main Feedwater Pump A trips with Reactor Power> 90%. The crew should respond to ALB-016-1-4, FW Pump A/B 0/C Trip Gnd or Bkr Fail to Close and AOP 010, Feedwater Malfunctions and perform the immediate actions. The crew should manually trip the Reactor lAW AOP-01 0 actions for loss of a Feed Water pump with initial Reactor power above 90%.

Two minutes after the A MFW pump trips the B MFW pump will trip. The crew should recognize that the second pump has tripped by MCB annunciators, pump indications and Steam Generator level changes.

Event 8: Main Turbine fails to automatically trip, lAW PATH-I immediate actions the BOP should identify the automatic trip failure of the Main Turbine and manually trip the Turbine using the MCB Turbine trip switch.

Event 9: MD AFW Pump B trips immediately upon starting. The BOP should identify that the pump has tripped by annunciator ALB01 7-6-4, Aux Feedwater Pump B Trip or Close Ckt Trouble alarm. At this time IF the TD AFW pump has not started on SG low levels the crew should determine that starting the TD AFW pump is required and open both MS-70 and MS-72 steam supply valves to the TD AFW pump to maintain AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision I

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

(continued)

Event 10: TDAFW Pump trips (timing controlled by Lead Evaluator) when crew is implementing EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response. The crew should identify the failure by annunciator ALB-01 7-7-4, Aux Feedwater Pump Turbine Trip.

EPP-004 has now been implemented with the first step to Implement Function Restoration Procedures as required. A RED path will exist for FRP-H.1, Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink as soon as all Feedwater flow to the SGs is lost (<210 KPPH) and Narrow Range Levels in ALL SGs is less than 25%. Once the condition is identified the crew should make an immediate transition to FRP-H.1. Attempts to restore AFW flow will not be successful. They will secure ALL RCPs and attempt to restore AFW flow. Attempts to restore either Main Feedwater or AFW flow will not be successful. They will then have to depressurize the RCS to block SI signals then depressurize one SG to < 500 psig to establish Condensate system flow to the SGs.

The scenario ends when Condensate flow is established and verified to one SG.

CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Initiate a MANUAL Turbine trip (Prior to the receipt of the Low Steam Line Pressure SI signal)

Justification is based on the crews inaction would result in adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. Taking actions will prevent the actuation of the ECCS. If the ECCS is allowed to actuate it will fill the RCS and challenge the RCS pressure boundary by challenging the Pressurizer PORVs and code Safety valves. Also, WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-0, Q: Manually trip the main turbine before a severe (orange path) challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1 (HNP procedure is EPP-015, Uncontrolled Depressurization of ALL Steam Generators) whichever happens first. The task is measurable by control manipulation actions.

2. Establish feed to at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed criteria is reached Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task FRP-H.1, A: Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 62 Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to Run.

When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change Cue Event 2 T-ref controller failure.

Lead Evaluator:

It is not desired to reach 90% power or the crew will not trip the Reactor with a loss of Main FW.

The crew has been directed to shutdown the unit using GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to A Circ Water Pump problems.

Evaluator Note:

The crew may elect to manually throttle open a PRZ Spray Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZIRCS boron concentrations within limits.

SRO GP-006, Step 52.4.

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:

pressure.

. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Evaluator Note: Crew may refer to OP-i 00 Section 8.15 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 -8 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NJ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters.

OP-100, Reactor Coolant System, Precaution and Limitations:

4.0.31. When energizing the Pressurizer Backup Heaters RO Groups A or B, the following sequence should minimize the pressure increase and subsequent power transient. Place PK 444A in manual and raise the output to between 40% and 45%

and then place PK-444A back in AUTO. Then promptly turn on the backup heaters.

The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering Evaluator Note: turbine load. Turbine load reduction begins on page 13 of this guide.

Procedure Note: Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

RO OP-107.O1, Section 5.2 and then 5.1

. DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

• DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration RO increase required.

• DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.

FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Evaluator Note:

position.

If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid

. and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, Procedure Caution:

located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 62 Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SET FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity.

SRO Directs boration Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in Procedure Note:

service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

• SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RD the STOP position.

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

. PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:

pressure.

. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tJfl Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.

o MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

Procedure Note: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

START the makeup system as follows:

TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.

VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

• Verifies proper valve and pump alignment The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

. IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.

RO . VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but not all will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic.

Evaluator Note:

The only steps included here are the ones associated with switch manipulations.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 -11 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 1 Page 12 of Z Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

o Is in the STOP position.

o The GREEN light is LIT.

• PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO

• START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarHy.

o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

• Reports to CRS that boration is complete and Makeup is back in AUTO The following steps will initiate turbine load reduction lAW Evaluator Note:

GP-006.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEc. Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page i of Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INFORMS Load Dispatcher that a load reduction to 90% will SRO begin. (N/A, per Initial Conditions)

A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:

. If OSl-Pl is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant

. Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a point for Procedure Caution:

DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this point will not be updating.

. If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

SRO discretion will determine when the boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the Evaluator Note: . . . .

boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO. The boration steps are located on page 11 of this guide.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Mm.

SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N5 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page of 62 Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

. ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

BOP

• DEPRESS the REF push-button.

. ENTER the desired load (per CRS) in the DEMAND display.

• DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load Procedure Note:

reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Shift Update Turbine in GO.

. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases.

BOP

• VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

• WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP 136, Section 7.2 Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions Communicator:

are required.

After crew has reduced power approximately 5% or the evaluators are satisfied with observation of the power Lead Evaluator: reduction, contact Communicator to call MCR to secure the A Circ Water Pump. No further power reduction will take place after the pump is secured.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: t4Q Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page j of Event

Description:

Reduce power to secure A Circ Water Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Contact MCR on phone and report that the System Communicator: Engineer monitoring the vibrations on the A Circ Water pump requests that the pump be immediately secured.

Directs BOP to secure the A Circ Water Pump lAW OP SRO 138.01, Circulating Water, Section 7.1 Locates MCB switch for A Circ Water Pump and places it to STOP Verifies that the discharge valve goes fully shut BOP Reports to SRO that the A Circ Water Pump is secured Monitors Condenser Vacuum (should see some degradation)

Crew may reference AOP-012 for degraded vacuum.

Ensure that Event 2 is inserted prior to the crew lowering Lead Evaluator:

power to below 90% (AOP-010 immediate actions of Tripping the Reactor will not apply < 90% power).

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2 (T-ref processer Lead Evaluator: failure low) after the crew has secured the A Circ Water pump and Condenser vacuum has stablilized.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4fl Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 62 Event

Description:

T-Ret Processor Failure LOW -

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 2 Simulator Operator:

T-ref processor failure low Uncontrolled rod motion Indications Available Tave Tref MCB digital indication reads Tref at 557°F RD RESPONDS to uncontrolled rod motion.

ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-001.

SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry RO PERFORMS immediate actions.

Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.

Action RD (YES)

Immediate Action RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Immediate Action RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

READS immediate actions and proceeds to Section 3.2.

SRO Directs BOP to place Turbine to HOLD BOP Places Turbine to HOLD CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:

RO

. RCS Tavg (YES)

. RCS Tref (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 1Z of Event

Description:

T-Ret Processor Failure LOW -

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following:

. IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)

RD

• IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete.

• IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN BYPASS the failed channel using OWP-RP. (N/A)

MANUALLY OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:

• EQUILIBRIUM power and temperature conditions RD

• RODS above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

VERIFY proper operation of the following:

• CVCS demineralizers (YES)

RD

• BTRS(N/A)

• REACTOR Makeup Control System (YES)

CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks SRO MOVING OUT. (NO)

CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED:

RD

• Unexplained RCS boration (YES)

• Unplanned RCS dilution (YES)

CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction SRO OCCURRED. (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 17 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 62 Event

Description:

T-Ref Processor Failure LOW -

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior MAINTAIN manual rod control until appropriate corrective action is complete.

Reviews/prepares OMM-O01, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO/RO Problem Checklist.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

SRO Exits AOP-OO1 When Tavg is restored and AOP-OO1 exited, cue initiation Evaluators Note:

of Event 3 SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 18- Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiQ Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 62 Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3 Simulator Operator:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

ALB-14-2-1B SG B NR LVLJSP HI/LO DEV Indications Available ALB-14-5-4B STEAM GEN B LOW-LOW LVL RO RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS ALB-014-2-1B and 5-4B.

The APP-ALB-014-2-1B and 14-5-4B actions are similar.

Evaluator Note: lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure or the SRO.

. CONFIRM alarm using LI-484 SA, LI-485 SB, or LI-486 SA, Steam Generator B level indicators.

o Reports Ll-486 reading or failed high.

. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE

. PERFORM Corrective Actions:

BOP o CHECK Steam Flow (FI-484, Fl-485) AND Feed Flow (Fl 486, 487) for deviation. (YES) o IF FCV-488, SG B auto level controller, is NOT sufficiently correcting level, THEN: (YES)

• SWITCH to MANUAL.

• RESTORE level to normal (57% NR).

Should provide guidance to maintain B SG level to be maintained between 52 to 62%, Trip limit of 30% Low and 73%

High (lAW OMM-O01, Attachment 13)

SRO Refer to OWP-RP-06 to remove channel from service.

(See Attachment 1 at end of scenario)

Contacts l&C to have channel removed from service.

Dispatch AO to investigate Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 62 Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service Evaluators Note:

to continue the scenario.

Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 13, 14 Action 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance tesfing of other SRO channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 3.3.2 Functional Unit 5.b, 6.c Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

BOP Place turbine in HOLD (IF not already in HOLD)

Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation Direct operator and l&C to perform OWP-RP-06 SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-0O1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 20 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. IF an extra operator is requested say that one will be sent when Communicator: available. NO one is available right now.

IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWPRP-06 state that you will report as soon as possible.

DO NOT RUN APP for failure. Not required to continue Simulator Operator:

with scenario.

Cue Event 4 (VCT level Channel 115 fails low) after SG level is under control, TSs have been identified and RMU control in AUTO.

Evaluator Note:

With RMU control in AUTO an automatic VCT makeup will be generated from VCT level channel 115 (<20% causes auto makeup).

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

VCT Level Channel failure low

. Auto Makeup initiates Indications Available

• ALB-007-4-3, VCT HIGH-LOW LEVEL

. ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-007-4-3.

Crew may immediately secure auto makeup based on SRO OPS-NGGC-1000 guidance since the makeup is due solely to the instrument failure.

RO ENTERS and performs APP-ALB-007-4-3.

The SRO is likely to go directly to AOP-003, Evaluator Note: MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL, while the RO references the APP.

CONFIRM alarm using LI-i 15-i, Vol Control Tank Level RO (MCB-i A2).

RO DETERMINES LT-1 15 failed LOW.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Automatic Functions:

AT 5% VCT level, the following occurs: (N/A)

. 1 CS-291, Suction from RWST (LCV-1 1 5B) opens.

. 1 CS-292, Suction from RWST (LCV-1 1 5D) opens

. 1 CS-i 65, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-i 1 SC) shuts RD

• 1 CS-i 66, VCT Outlet/Dilution (LCV-1 1 5E) shuts

. AT 20% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System starts. (YES)

. AT 40% VCT level, auto makeup from the Reactor Makeup System stops. (N/A)

• AT 80% VCT level, 1 CS-i 20, VCT Level Control Vlv, fully diverts letdown flow to the RHT. (N/A)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

• MATCH charging and letdown flows.

RD

• IF charging flow is lost, (NO) THEN GO TO AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions.

Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIP5.

Procedure Note: If either LT-112 or LT-115 fails high, the automatic CSIP suction swapover from the VCT to the RWST will not function if required.

IF EITHER of the following occurs:

• VCT level is less than 20% AND automatic makeup is NOT in progress SRO

• VCT level is greater than 40% AND automatic makeup is still in progress THEN GO TO AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page ?4 of Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-003.

SRO No immediate actions Makes PA announcement for AOP entry CREW CHECK instrument air available. (YES)

RO CHECK BOTH LT-1 12 and LT-1 15 functioning properly. (NO)

SRO GO TO Section 3.1, LT-112 or LT-115 Malfunction.

REFER TO Attachment 1, VCT Level Control Channels SRO Operation, as necessary to assess the effects of an LT-1 12 or LT-1 15 malfunction.

Evaluator Note: Crew may brief on Attachment 1.

An instrument malfunction may manifest itself as a slow drift rather than a full high or full low failure. Until the Procedure Note: instrument has failed fully high or fully low, all steps should be reviewed for applicability periodically, even if not continuously applicable.

RO CHECK that LT-115 is FAILING. (YES)

MONITOR VCT level using either of the following:

RO

• ERFIS point LCSO112

• Ll-112 (local)

RO CHECK LT-115 FAILING LOW. (YES)

PLACE RMW CONTROL Switch in STOP.

RO (May already have been performed.)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f!HQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of 62 Event

Description:

VCT Level Channel 115 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Normally, VCT level is maintained between 20 and 40% by Procedure Note:

auto makeup.

CONTROL VCT level as follows:

RO . MAINTAIN level BELOW 70%

. MAINTAIN level ABOVE 20% OR DESIRED MINIMUM RO MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5%.

Lifting leads in the following step will simulate a low-low level signal from the failed instrument. This is to allow a Procedure Note:

valid low-low level signal one instrument to initiate emergency makeup.

RO CHECK the malfunctioning instrument FAILING LOW. (YES)

DIRECT Maintenance to investigate and repair the instrument SRO malfunction.

SRO CHECK that the instrument malfunction has been repaired.

WAIT until repairs are complete before proceeding.

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Communicator: Respond to crew requests.

NOTE: Do not run the APP file to lift leads for this event prior to continuing with Event 5. If questioned later report back that your working on it.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 5 C Accumulator Evaluator Note: nitrogen leak when the crew is waiting for the instrument repair.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 25 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page of Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator:

C Accumulator nitrogen leak Indications Available Alarm ALB-O1-9-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK C HIGH-LOW PRESSURE Responds to alarm ALB-1 1, ACCUMULATOR TANK C RO HIGH-LOW PRESSURE.

RO Enters APP-ALB-O1 1 CONFIRM alarm using SI Accumulator pressure indicators PC P1-929 and P1-93 1

. No automatic actions associated with this alarm PERFORM Corrective Actions:

RO

• IF SI Accumulator pressure has risen AND NO rise in level has occurred, THEN... (N/A)

N2 through 1SI-287 is the primary source of motive power to the PRZ PORVs, with Instrument Air as backup. If Procedure Note: lSl-287 is shut in a mode where LTOPS is required operable, and Instrument Air is not available to PORV accumulators, LTOPS must be declared inoperable.

IF SI Accumulator pressure has risen AND is accompanied by RO a rise in level, THEN.. (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 26 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 62 Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF SI Accumulator pressure has dropped, THEN: (YES)

. IF pressure drop is accompanied by a drop in level, THEN: (NO)

• STOP any accumulator draining in progress RO

• MONITOR leakage into CNMT Sump.

. DISPATCH an operator to CNMT to locate and isolate leakage as soon as possible.

. REFER TO OP-i 10, Safety Injection AND Raise Accumulator pressure.

Directs RO to pressurize C Accumulator lAW OP-i 10, Safety Injection to maintain pressure within Tech Spec range SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-00i, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

The following TS must be entered if Accumulator pressure Evaluator Note: lowers to less than 585 PSIG andlor when it is connected to the N2 System.

Refer to Technical Specification 3.5.1 .d Action a With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration not within SRO limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Enters OP-HO, Section 8.2 Pressurizing the SI RO Accumulators.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 27 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page of 62 Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verifies Initial Conditions

• The Nitrogen System is available per OP-152.01

. Accumulator level is greater than 66%

RO If the Accumulators are depressurized, the Accumulator metal temperature must be greater than 70°F before pressurization. (Contact pyrometer can be used or containment ambient temperature) [N/Al To minimize any potential sluicing between Accumulators through leaking valves, Accumulator pressures should be Procedure Note: approximately equal (within 4 psid between lowest and highest ERFIS indications) at the completion of this Section.

Perform the following Steps on only one Accumulator at a time.

. At the MCB, verify open 1S1-287, ACCUMULATORS &

PRZ PORV N2 SUPPLY.

RO . Declare the associated Accumulator inoperable per Tech Spec 3.5.1, due to being connected to Non-Safety piping (a one hour action statement in Modes 1 through 3 above 1000 psicj).

To prevent exceeding the capacity of the N2 System and Procedure Note: maintain train separation for the Accumulators, only one Accumulator should be pressurized at a time.

At the MCB, open the ACCUM N2 SUPPLYNENT for the RO Accumulator to be pressurized: 1 Sl-297 for ACCUMULATOR A N2 Supply & Vent.

The Accumulator should not be pressurized to the upper Procedure Note: Technical Specification limit (665 psig) to allow for thermal expansion of the Accumulator gas during plant heatup.

Pressurize the Accumulator to the desired pressure indicated RO by the associated pressure indicators: P1-929, 931, ACCUMULATOR TK A PRESS.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 28 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 62 Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior At the MCB, shut the ACCUMULATOR N2 SUPPLY & VENT AC valve for the Accumulator that was pressurized: 1 Sl-295 for ACCUMULATOR A N2 Supply & Vent.

RD Complete Attachment 6. (see next 2 pages)

IF the Accumulator parameters are within the Tech Spec requirements, THEN DECLARE the Accumulator that was pressurized operable.

RD Informs SRO that the C Accumulator pressure is within Tech Spec requirements and the C Accumulator can be considered operable.

SRO Acknowledges AC information Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 29 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page Q of Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Attachment 6 Accumulator PressurizationNenting Restoration Checklist Sheet I of 2 Person(s) Performing Checkhst Initials Name (Print) Initials Name (Print)

Remarks Indicate any component not in the prescribed position.

Checklist Started Time Date Checklist Completed Time Date Approved by Date CR5 After receiving the final review signature, this OP Attachment becomes a QA RECORD I OP-i 10 I Rev. 35 Page 99 of 111 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 31 of 62 Event

Description:

C Accumulator Nitrogen Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Attchm.n G Acumilator PrswrizticnfV.nting Restoration Chacklist Sh&I2if2 COMPONE\IT NUMBER COMPONENT DE3CiPT1ON POSflON CHECK VERIFY f1in contwL Scat U ISI-295 ACCUMULATOR A N 2 SUFPLY &

VFNT SHUT ISI-296 ACCUMULATORS N 2 SUFPLY &

VENT SHUT 151-297 ACCUMULATOR C 2 N 3UPPLY &

VCNT SI IUT 181-287 ACCUMLILATORS & PPZ PORV N 2 SUPPLY DPEN 151-298 .4CC VENT PRESS CNTL (HC-96) POT DEMAND Al 0 OP-f 10 I Page 100 of 111 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 32 of 62 Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip I Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger-6 Simulator Operator:

EHC Pump trip with standby auto start failure Indications Available ALB-20-4-2B, EH FLUID LOW PRESS Responds to ALB-20-4-2B or indication of degrading EHC BOP pressure on P1-4221.

BOP Enters APP-ALB-20-4-2B.

BOP Confirms alarm using P1-4221.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

BOP

• Standby DEH Pump starts at 1500 psig, as sensed by PS-01 TA-4223V.

Evaluator Note: The BOP may immediately start the standby pump or wait until after reading the APP.

Starts EHC Pump B and observes pressure returning to BOP normal on P1-4221.

Dispatches AC to investigate cause of EHC Pump failure.

When dispatched to investigate, report pump is off, no Communicator:

signs of problems locally.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N6.Q Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page of Z Event

Description:

EHC Pump Trip I Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:

a. IF the Reactor is tripped, THEN GO TO EOP-PATH-1.

(NO)

b. START the standby DEH Pump.

c. DISPATCH an operator to perform the following:

1) MONITOR DEH Pump and PCV operation.

d. VERIFY OPEN the following:

BOP

1) 1 EH-1, A EH Pump Suction Vlv

2) 1 EH-8, B EH Pump Suction Vlv

3) 1 EH-31, Main Hdr Press Switch Isol Vlv

4) INVESTIGATE system for leaks.

5) IF a leak is found, THEN ISOLATE the leak AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Control Room.

Reviews/prepares OMM-O01, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.

SRO/RO Contacts support personnel for repairs.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 (Main FW Pump A Evaluator Note:

Trip)

After actuating Trigger 7 (A MEW Pump Trip)

. B MEW pump will also trip after a 2 minute delay.

. The Main Turbine will NOT receive an AUTO TRIP signal from Reactor Protection and must be tripped manually by the BOP during the PATH-i immediate action response.

. B MD AEW pump will also trip immediately upon Evaluator Note: starting (either auto or manual start signal).

When the crew is working through EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response, the Lead Evaluator will direct the Simulator Operator to actuate Trigger 10 which will trip the TD AFW pump. The combination of Narrow Range SG levels in ALL SGs < 25% and Total Feed Flow to SG < 210 KPPH will cause the CSEST for Heat Sink to change to RED. The crew will immediately transition to FRP-H.1 on the RED path condition.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 33 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 4 of g Event

Description:

Main Feedwater Pump A Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 7 Trip of A MFW Pump ALB-016-1-4, FW Pump NB 0/C Trip Gnd or Bkr Fail to Indications Available Close Multiple FW flow alarms BOP RESPOND to multiple alarms/indications.

BOP REPORTS MEW Pump A tripped.

Identifies entry conditions met for AOP-O1 0, Feedwater Crew Malfunctions.

Immediate Action BOP CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Immediate CHECK initial Reactor power less than 90%. (NO)

Action RO TRIP the Reactor and GO TO PATH-i RO INITIATES a MANUAL Reactor Trip.

IF contacted by MCR to investigate the causes of the A and later the B MFW pump trip report that both breakers have tripped on overcurrent. No signs of damage at the pumps.

Communicator:

WHEN / IF WCC is contacted then report that Electrical Maintenance is investigating the problems with the breakers and that repairs will be made as quickly as possible.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 34 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page of 62 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Fails to Auto Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO ENTERS PATH-i.

RO Verify Reactor Trip:

AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful Check for any of the following:

. Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

. Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

Rod Bottom lights LIT (YES)

Neutron flux decreasin (YES)

Verify Turbine Trip Check for any of the following:

Critical . All turbine throttle valves SHUT (NO)

Task BOP

. All turbine governor valves SHUT (NO)

Critical to manually trip turbine from MCB prior to the receipt of the Low Steam Line Pressure SI signal Verify power to AC Emergency Buses BOP 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs (YES 1 A-SA from Off-Site, 1 B-SB by EDG)

Check SI Actuation:

Check for any of the following LIT: (NO)

. SI Actuated bypass permissive light RO . ALB-i 1 2

. ALB-1i-5-1

. ALB-1 1-5-3

• ALB-12-1-4 RO SI actuation REQUIRED (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page of Event

Description:

B MD AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The B Main Feedwater Pump will trip 2 minutes after the A Main Feedwater Pump trip occurred. The crew should identify the trip by the following annunciator:

ALB-016-1-4, FW Pump A/B 0/C Trip-Gnd or Dkr Fail to Evaluator Note: Close ALB-016-2-2, Loss of BOTH Main FW Pumps AND the B MD AFW pump will trip when it starts ALB-017-6-4, Aux Feedwater Pump B Trip or Close Ckt Trouble IF contacted by MCR to investigate the cause of the B AFW pump trip report that the breaker is tripped on overcurrent. No signs of damage at the pumps.

WHEN I IF WCC is contacted then report that Electrical Communicator: Maintenance is investigating the problems with the breaker and that repairs will be made as quickly as possible.

IF asked about the A MD AFW pump status report that it is still torn down and waiting on parts to complete the motor overhaul.

SRO GO TO EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response SRO IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required.

SRO Informs SM to EVALUATE EAL Matrix BOP CHECK RCS Temperature:

. CHECK SG Blowdown isolation valves SHUT. (YES)

SG (MLB-1A-SA) (MLB-1B-SB)

A 1BD-11 1BD-1 B 1 BD-30 1 BD-20 C 1 BD-49 1 BD-39 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 36 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 37 of 62 Event

Description:

B MD AFW Pump Trip Time Position Appflcants Actions or Behavior STABILIZE AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TENPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES FOlLOWThG RE TRIP

. Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise..

• no ROPs running. use wine range cold leg temperuture.

RCS TEN?ERATIJRE TREND LESS TEAK GREATER THAN STABLE AT OR 557J AND F AND TRENDING TO DECREASING INCREASING

. Stop dumping

• I. condenser

• Control feed steam available flew and Steam BOP Thea transfer dump to

• Control feed steam dump to establish and flow STEAK PRESSURE maintain RCS mode using temperature

• Kaintain total OP-i26 between 555F feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559CP OPERATOR greater than AND dump steam AcTION 210 KPPK to condenser until level greater than - OR -

25 at least one intact

• Dump steam SG using intact SG PORV

• IF cooldowu continues.

• Control feed

. abut flow to NSIVe AND iaaintain SG BYPASS valves levels CHECK RCP Status:

RO

. CHECK RCPs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING. (YES)

Crew CHECK Feed System Status:

RO . RCS Temperature LESS THAN 564°F. (YES)

BOP

• VERIFY feed reg valves SHUT. (YES)

• CHECK feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.

BOP (YES may_report_only_TD_AFW_Pump_running)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 37 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 38 of 62 Event

Description:

B MD AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK Control Rod Status:

. CHECK DRPI AVAILABLE. (YES)

. VERIFY all control rods FULL INSERTED. (YES)

RO CHECK PRZ level - GREATER THAN 17%. (YES)

CREW Contacts AOs to investigate failures During the remainder of the scenario any communications to restore MFW or AFW Report that Maintenance is Communicator looking at situation and will make repairs as soon as they can. When any pump is available WCC will contact the MCR.

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 10 Lead Evaluator:

Trip of the TD AFW pump On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 10 Simulator Operator Trip of the TD AFW pump Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page of Event

Description:

B MD AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• Identifies TD AFW Pump has tripped Crew Identifies RED PATH on CSFST for Heat Sink when:

. NR Level in ALL SGs < 25%

. Total Feed Flow to SGs < 210 KPPH HEAT SiNK CSF3 Lc 1H1 ZW . . .

REQ LN WLLOW FP-12 Fz_H.3 U4i P YELLOW ESS.4M7%

YFLLW c4

• H 25% / GREEN SAT Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4 of

. . . TO AFW Pump Trip Event Description.

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO TRANSITIONS to FRP-H.1 after verification of RED Path.

SRO Reads Caution prior to step 1 CAUTION

. This procedure should NOT be performed if total feed flow capability of 210 KPPH is available AND total feed flow has been reduced due to operator action as directed by the EOPs. (The following EOPs direct feed flow to be reduced below 210 KPPH:

EPP-015, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS FRP-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FRP-P.2, RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FRP-J.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE)

. Feed flow should NOT be established to any faulted SG while a non-faulted SG is available.

PERFORM the following:

. IMPLEMENT function restoration procedures as SRO required

. Informs SM to EVALUATE EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-110)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 40 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 41 of 62

. . TO AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time U Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK Secondary Heat Sink Requirements:

. RCS pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE. (YES)

. RCS temperature GREATER THAN 350°F [330°F].

(YES)

. STOP any running RHR pumps. (N/A)

Foldout applies:

ROLDOUT o EQS BLEED AND FEED INITIATION CRITERIA i any of the follosIng occurs, flM Immediately perfots Steps 12 through 21 for RCS bleed and feed.

o SG wide range level - ANY TWO LESS THAN 1511 3O%1 u PHI prescore - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2335 PSIG DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK o RCS cemperatere flD pressure INCREASING DUE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK S RO o COLD LEG RECIRCIILATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA SR (INST level decreases to less than 234% (2/5 Low-Low alarm). THEN GO TO EP?-0I0. TRAiISRER TO COLD LEG REClRCULATION. Step 1.

o AEW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA i CST level decroasea to less than 10%. flI switch the ASH water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.

Section 81.

o RHR RESTART CRITERIA (P RCS uressure iacreaees to less than 230 PSIG in an ,ncontrol)d canner. ThEN restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS.

CHECK SG Blowdown and SG Sample Valves shut (YES)

BOP (COMPLETED IN EPP-004)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 41 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4 of

. . TO AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ESTABLISH AFW Flow to at least ONE SG:

. OBSERVE MCB indications to determine cause of AFW failure:

o CST level (NO) o MDAFW pump power supplies (YES) o TDAFW pump steam supply valves (YES) o TDAFW pump speed controller (NO)

BOP/SRO o TDAFW pump control power (NO) o AFW valve alignment (NO)

. TRY to restore AFW flow at the MCB. (Refer to Attachment 1 for guidance of rate of feed flow.)

(Refer to OP-i 37, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for guidance regarding AFW pump operations, precautions and limitations and valve operation.)

. TOTAL feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.

(NO)

Check IF AFW Flow Established:

BOP

• TOTAL feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.

(NO)

PERFORM the following:

BOP/SRO

• CONTINUE attempts to restore AFW flow at the MCB and locally.

SRO OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 6 AND continue with Step 6.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 42 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jfl Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4 of TD AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After stopping all RCPs and placing steam dump in the steam pressure mode, RCS pressure and temperature will increase as natural circulation is established. A large ioop Procedure Note:

zT prior to PRZ PORV opening confirms natural circulation. This must be considered while evaluating bleed and feed criteria.

STOP Heat Input from RCP Operations:

RO

• Stops ALL RCPs CHECK all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:

• CHECK any intact SG MSIV OPEN. (YES)

BOP

• CHECK condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) LIT.

(YES)

• STEAM dump control system AVAILABLE. (YES)

Evaluators Note: The following three substeps may VERIFY actions completed in EPP-004.

. PLACE steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.

BOP

• PLACE steam dump mode select switch in STEAM PRESS.

• ADJUST steam dump controller setpoint to 84%

(1092 PSIG) AND place in AUTO.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 43 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 44 of

. . TD AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: The crew should NOT attempt to start either MFW Pump until the reasons for the original trips are known and corrected.

The crew may answer POWER to at least ONE main FW pump AVAILABLE as YES but they will still end up being directed to continue ESTABLISH Main FW Flow to at least ONE SG:

. CHECK condensate system IN SERVICE. (YES)

BOP

• SUPPORT condition for FW startup AVAILABLE.

(YES)

. POWER to at least ONE main FW pump AVAILABLE.

(YES but both are tripped)

SRO WHEN support conditions met, THEN do Step s 7c and d.

SRO OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 9.

Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual SI actuation may be required if conditions degrade.

Procedure Caution: (Examples of degraded conditions are the inability to maintain or restore PRZ level, RVLIS indication or RCS subcooling.)

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steam line isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

RO DEPRESSURIZE RCS and block Low Steam Pressure SI:

. CHECK SI IN SERVICE. (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 44 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ji5Q Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 45 of 62

. . . TD AFW Pump Trip Event Description.

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DEPRESSURIZE RCS AND BLOCK Low Steam Pressure SI:

• CHECK SI IN SERVICE (NO)

. GO TO Step 9e DEPRESSURIZE RCS to between 1900 PSIG AND 1950 PSIG

. CHECK letdown IN SERVICE (YES)

• DEPRESSURIZE using auxiliary spray RO BLOCK SI Signals:

. Low PRZ pressure

. Low steam pressure MAINTAIN pressure less than 1950 PSIG Evaluators Note: RCS pressure will need to be monitored or it will continue to decrease with AUX spray until noticed. This may also result in letdown isolation. If VCT level drops <5%, CSIP suction will swap the RWST.

. Depressurizing only one SG minimizes the likelihood of reaching the bleed and feed criteria (due to lowering SG level) AND the likelihood of the appearance of degraded plant conditions that might Procedure Notes: require manual SI actuation.

• The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the highest indicated wide range level.

. A second SG may be depressurized if condensate flow cannot be established to the first SG depressurized.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 45 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 46 of 62

. . TD AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DEPRESSURIZE One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG AND ESTABLISH Condensate Flow:

. IDENTIFY the SG to be depressurized.

. SHUT the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

. MSIVs (A & B, 1 MS-80 & 1 MS-82)

BOP

• MSIV bypass valves

• SG main Steam drain isolation before MSIV (A & B, 1 MS-.231 & 1 MS-266)

DUMP steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified to SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

• Condenser steam dump ESTABLISH condensate flow using Attachment 3.

SRO ESTABLISH condensate flow using Attachment 3

, Alignment actions will commence while the SG is being Evaluator s Note:

depressurized.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 46 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 47 of

. . TD AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior See Scenario Attachment 2 for copy of FRP-H.1 Evaluator Note:

Attachments 1 and 3.

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3

. This attachment provides instructions for establishing condensate flow to one SG to restore secondary heat sink. It may also be used as a reference for establishing condensate flow to SGs while implementing other EOPs.

Procedure Note:

. The low steam pressure SI blocked, main steam line isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

. If an action or its contingency in this attachment can NOT be accomplished, the operator should return to the step in effect, while continuing efforts to establish condensate flow.

CHECK Primary and Secondary Conditions To Allow Establishing Condensate Flow:

• CHECK low steam SG pressure SI BLOCKED (YES)

BOP

• CHECK SG pressure for SG to which condensate flow is to be established LESS THAN 500 (NO)

• GOToStep2.

The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the Procedure Note:

highest indicated wide range level.

Main steam isolation may actuate during this action. If so, Evaluators Note: the depressurization should be continued using the respective SG PORV.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 47 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 48 of 62

. . TD AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG:

. Identify the SG to be depressurized.

• Shut the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.

o MSIVs o MSIV bypass valves o SG main steam drain isolations before MSIV:

• SG A: 1 MS-231 SG B: 1 MS-266

• SG C: 1 MS-301

. Dump steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified SG BOP to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

o Condenser steam dump o SG PORVs o Locally operate SG PORVs using OP126, MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS, Section 8.2.

o TDAFW pump CHECK Condensate System Status:

. At least one condensate RUNNING (YES)

. At least one condensate booster pump RUNNING (YES)

The MAX rate depressurization may cause the MSIVs to auto close on Steam Pressure Rate. IF this occurs the Evaluator Note .

crew should continue the depressurization using the SG PORVs.

The Main FW pump discharge valve control switches must Procedure Note: be held in the OPEN position to open the valves with the Main FW pumps stopped.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 48 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 49 of 62 TO AFW Pump Trip Event

Description:

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OPEN The Following Valves:

. Low pressure FW heater bypass valves:

BOP (1 CE-330/i CE-359)

. High pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 FW-1 10)

. Main FW pump discharge valves: (1 FW-2911 FW-60)

RO RESET SI. (Not active)

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of CREW Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.)(NA)

RESET FW Isolation. (NOT ACTIVE)

PLACE Feed Reg Bypass Controllers In Manual AND Set Output To Zero.

RESET AND open main FW isolation valve(s): (All open already)

• 1FW-159(ASG)

BOP

• 1 FW-277 (B SG)

• 1FW-217(CSG)

SHUT Main FW Pump Recirc Valves: (1 FW-81i FW-39)

(Already SHUT)

PLACE Condensate Booster Pump Controllers In Manual AND Control Discharge Pressure At 600 PSIG.

Procedure Note: Local checks for flow noise may be used to confirm the presence of flow.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 49 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 50 of 62

. . . TD AFW Pump Trip Event Description.

LOSS OF HEAT SINK Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to go to desired FRV Bypass valve, wait 2 minutes, then report that you are standing by as requested.

To monitor for flow on simulator observe flow indicators in Communicator: the CFW drawing or open the monitored parameter file -

Plant Status Monitor CFW and check the status of flow using:

. Line 21: wcfw479(1) FRV Bypass Valve A flow

. Line 22: wcfw479(2) FRV Bypass Valve B flow

. Line 23: wcfw479(3) FRV Bypass Valve C flow ESTABLISH Feed Flow to SG(s):

BOP (Refer to Attachment 1 while performing actions that restore feed flow.)

ESTABLISH feed flow using a. Locally establish feed flow using the feed reg bypass valves from the MCB.

Critical Task BOP Feed flow to at least one SG ESTABLISHED (Critical to establish Feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required)

Terminate the scenario after feed flow has been Lead Evaluator: established and Wide Range level increase or Feed Water Flow can be identified in at least one SG.

Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 50 Revision 2

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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page of V Scenario Guide Attachment 1 Event

Description:

OWP-RP-06 Reactor Protection B SG Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Li1 Co:nert V

_ jV_

V T3 EVTL POTCTtTN D:IiEt I  : 4O

I+/-: Te- Jwi:ch r to ET I:zt reord -o r in EST Tearin ti tch opratin the ad ua Etc :iThoct:tt tninI sz&:Em flcuztn err e.:cn is pre+/-rre whi t:i;pIg biszbZes.

(/4S4I) 1asTr Siih S:r i/4:34 3T I PI oi Crd Ci 2D; ThC (Th!

O 4 $D t; for Mrtacth X TrLpi TEST for -i Co TSL3-2 Chor): rh: oi1irt 00 LVI. LE 44A 3 0 IYL LE VIE DEEGIIED so .: t: n (Wiodcw L fl3LZED DEE!OI2ED /_____

OWP-nr fle. 15 Poge3SoI 104 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 52 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page of 62 Scenario Guide Attachment 1 Event

Description:

OWP-RP-06 Reactor Protection B SG Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 5

-h! T

- c::oo f:

nn.n -

- ncpr&iatv it1lVf B G lBiL PcTEc:ID! C NE2 r: (nI-485

2 on CBrd C2-$81 NOT3; ..c]i t .u 5T ron.bJso:tncn, ft not reuro n i ST Tcn 5pc. Dn:ating ti3 SnitCh frr :pe:at1ng the 9witzr. ici in trcth horen b n annng sren nr1raonrL n5 h-r.

. Cflc.vr rifcato r:eferrd ti t:iotin4 nLStabia5.

cwC L0/G5D) irr tt twltoh for 03/35 tE5t QEc-I.L Ii FtC 2 L>LCnd Cft2S:

331 (LB/485A 2w low evei Pit Crip) tEST TOPiV.L 332 i.3/4db3 low toE ES/Ft &natch PX Irip) tEST WOP4.L 35 (1.3<4350 f 3-li) tEST TQPi4kL On 031.32 c1e:)c the 5:i1o-1nE)

BTO1OiJC.t mnow SI) E1ERCITE0 / DEECiZ0 5 3 20 LVI 23 4SE (Si-r<,w 72) /_____

ht b Mi hi h (Window 82) ENERGI23D IEE23R01350 On eIn Ctncrol 3ord:

lTfnI/

p1ii 33 1.VL ATWS pi Lve wi<.J -r1< v:i0 A ano 3 oreln trbie L:;rits and tire ann 3 roe_n r:tp ..zonts are not on

SAc pane.

5 LiL W23 PAIEL EY?AS3 SYPiS3 .TCPiiZ.L CWP-RP I Rev. 15 ag37ofiO4 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 53 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 54 of 62 Scenario Guide Attachment 1 Event

Description:

OWP-RP-06 Reactor Protection B SG Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior cwpp f Sheet 4 cf 5 Bsteb2eStatus Lichz Ltnet Co.porect )

... ci.n fcr stored V

IcnsrsbL..iry Pc.ticn or Ia:/rfiea inisiJVsrI+/-id B SO LEVEL P.OTECTi0N CA1cNEL III LI-436 in rIo 3 fl Card CTPi NOTE: The astez Test tch ray oe positiotco to TEST rcr biestoctitg. is nct rectirad cc ta in DEBT cc ceet Tern specs. Operatrng this wrtch kedcre cperatinq the biecabie switches aids in trc.ubieehcrticg by maintaining svsten conthttocs the came as they were when the tro.thle ccc:rred.

Ccnctrreit verificeton is craferced tchls :.ripcicg bIsbe.

wc  :/4 wt fDr ISf48 NOPMZ.1 Th Pit Vfl 2

Card c32g; 531 1B/4A Low Low Level P.M Trip) / NDPMAL R2 /4i Pi )

O 1315-2 SO B 10 LO IVL L 8A (1indc.v 53) ENIPOIZED / DE-ENERGIZEO R 9 tVT T (Window P-3) EN1OIZED DZEEPGiZE0 Di 5ciJ; F348 (:.ain SW Peg. Valve B Controller) MANUAL / ?dJIO/MANTThL Ww4O. I i Valve -ntrollr) MiUL CWP-P I Rev. 15 Page 38 of 04 V

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page of  ?

Scenario Guide Attachment 1 Event

Description:

OWP-RP-06 Reactor Protection B SG Level Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Eistablefftatus Lioht Lrneun C:cntonent

=* Poattion for Restored S.

or uniber

..n,sraoiccy _oe1tion errzied nital/Veriried 3 SG LEVEL PROTEcTION CHAIcNEL IV L1-483) nPIC4onCrdC4f3 NOTE - The lester esc Switch may be positioned to EST for troubleshooting. It ca not required to be in TEST to neat Tech Specs. Derating this switch before creratang the histable wttches aids in troubleshooting by mazntaining system conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred.

- Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables.

SWZ LS/4S3B) Master Test Switch for LS/433 TEST NDPNAL To PlC 4 20 Card C4-84f:

351 tLB/483 for ?-14) :EST On SLB2 (Check the following)

SG B lI HI LVL LB 483A l1indow 84) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGI TED OWP-RP I Rev 16 Page 39 of 104 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 55 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 56 of 62 Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ttachment 3 Sheet 1 of 5 ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SCs I INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE NOT OTAINEO NOTE

• This attachment provkles instructions for establishinq condensate low to one SG to restore seconday heat sink It may also be used as a reference for establishing conaensate now to 5(35 wflhie Implementing otner EOPs.

• The 1cm steam pressure SI blocked, man stean me isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpcnt is exceeded.

• If n acticn r it rritingency in this attachment can NC)! he accomplished. [he operator shoild return to the step in effect, whrle continuing efforts to establish condensate flow,

1. UnecK Fnrnary ana SecKIary Coathtrons To i\lIow Establiing Condensate Flow:

Q a. Check low steani SG piessure SI - WHEN RCS pressure is less Liarl 8LOCKED 2000 PSIG, THEN block Si signals:

[3

• Low PRZ pressure El

• Low steam pressure O ii Check Sc pressure for SC to 0 b, COToStep2.

vPich condensate flow is to be estabtished LESS ThAN 500 SIG U c. GOTOStep3.

EOP-FRP-I-tl I Fev 26 I Page 55 of 60 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N.Q Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 57 of Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I Attaciment 3 Sheet 2 of 5 ESTA&ISHING CONDENSATE FLOW To SGs I INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE The preferred SO to clepressuaze is the intact SO with the highest indicated wide range level.

Z Depressurize One SC To Less Than 500 P310:

C kieiiury the SG Li be depressurized.

b. Shut the following valves for the b Shut the folbwing valves br [he SGs that are NOT to be SC to be depressunzed.

depressurized C. MSIV C

• MSIVs C

• MSIV bypass vve

[]

• MS[V bypass valves

. SG main steam drain isolation Sc main sicarn drain isoiatons bcorc MSIV:

before MSIV:

C SGA: 1MS-231 C SG A 1MS-231 C SO . IMS-26 C SOB: IMS-266 C SCC: IMS301 C SGC: 1MS-301 C. Diinp steam at maimum rate to depressunze identifed SG to 500 P310 using any of the iolbwlng (listed In oreer 01 preference):

U 1) Condenser steam cunp fl 2) SG PORVs C 3) Locally operate SG PORVs using OP-126, MAIN STEAld1, EXTRCTICN STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS, Section 8.2.

C 4) TCAFW pump EOP-FRPl-I.1 I Rev. 26 I Paqe 35 of 60 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 57 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page of 2 Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I

A1tcirnteot 3 She1 of 5 ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SGs I INSTRUCTIONS I I RESPONSF NOT ORTAII4D

3. Check Condensate System Status:

U a. At east one condensate pump - U a. Place one condensate pump in RUNNING senice.

Refer to CP-134, CONDENSATE SYSTEMS, Section 5.3.>

El b. At least one concensate booster El b. Place one condensate boosler pump RUNNING

- pump in service.

Refer to CP-134

• CONDENSATE SYSTEM, Section 5.5.)

NOTE Tne main FW pump alscharge valve COfltrDI switches must be held in Ilie OPEN pot1on to open the valves with the main FW pumps stopped.

4. Open The Followinq Vaties:

• Low pressure FW heater bypass valves:

U 1CE-330 U 1CE-35D

• High pressure FW heater bypass valves.

o 1FW-110

• Main FV pump discharge valves:

0 1FW-29 0 IFW-60 EOP-FP-H.1 I Rev. 26 I Dace 51 of 60 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 58 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page of Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time L Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I

4ttachment 3 Sneet4of5 ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SGs I iNSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED El 5. ResetSL El 5 IE any train of SI will NOT reset at MCfl, flj reset at SSPS using PATH-i GUIDE, Attacriment 12.

El 6. Manually Realign Safegiards Equipment Folloin A Loss 0! Offsite Power.

Re1er to PA I h-i GUIUh, Attachment 2,)

El 7. ResetFW Isolation.

El 8. Plat.e Feed Re ypsCunbulleis hi El 8. Veiify feed teti bypiiss valves SHUT Manual AND Set Ouput To Zero.

9. Reset AND open roan FW isolation valve(s):

El lrw-159(ASG)

El IFW-277(BSG) fl IFW-217(CSG) 1 U. SFrnt Main I-W Pump Reclrc valves: iii Locly snut main l-W pump recwc manual isolatori valves):

El IFW8 fl iFw-aq El 1FW.5 (FW pump )

El IFW-36(FWpumpB)

El ii. Place CurideriuLe Buosiem Putuli Controlles ki Manual AND Control Discharge Pressure At 600 PSIG.

FOP-FPP-H I I Fv 26 I Pqe 58n1 60 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 59 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4Q Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 60 of 62 Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Attachment 3 Stieet5of5 ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SGs II RESPONSE NOT OBTAID

12. L3tabhsh feed flow To SGs):

(Refer to Attachment I whIe performing actions that restore feed flow.)

LI a. hStlISfl ieeo iow U51fl9 ire teed a. Locally establisfl ieee how using req bypass valves tram ilie MG8. me leed reg ypass vaive&

(Refer to Op 134.01, PN SYSTEM, Section 8.4.>

LI b. Feed flow to SG(s) - b. Perform the follow nq ESTABLISHED

1) Verify main FW bock valve(s) -

OPEN.

LI IFW-130 (A SC)

LI IFW-246(BSG)

LI 1FW-18B(CSG)

LI 2) Locally establish teed flow using the feed req vaIve(s.

(RefertoOP-134O1, FW SYSTEM, SectKxI 5.3.)

- END -

FOP-FP-H 1 I Rev 26 I Pr 59 of 61)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 60 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 61 of 62 Scenario Guide Attachment 2 Event

Description:

FRP-H.1 Attachment 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESPONSE To LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK AttachmenT 1 Sheet I nf I GUIDANCE ON RESTORATION OF FEED FLOVV

1. Before RCS Bleed nd Feed Using AFW:

1-eed at least one intact SG, wnose wiae range level is greater than I t% [34J%J, with total feed fow to SGs greater than 210 KPPH -

2. Before RCS Bleed And Feed Using MFW:

i-eeo at least one intact SG, wnose wioe range level is greater than 1 b% [3{J%],

without restriction en rate.

3 Before RCS Bleed And Feed Using Condensate

IF wtde range RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to the saturation temperature corresponding to the depressurized SC pressure, THEN reed the depressurzed SG witlout restriction on rate.

4 After RCS Bleed And Feed Us ng Any Feed flow Method:

a. IF core exit TCs arc stable OR decrcaaing, IllN feed one intact SC at 50 KPPH (for AFW1 OR the lowesl controllable rate (for main FW OR condensate). WHEN wide range level inc.eases to greater than 15% 3O%]

TH feed flow may be increased to maximum rate.

b IF core exit TCs are increasing, fl feed one intact 5(3 at maximum rate until Sc narrow range Feve is greater than 25% [4O%. Co NOT reduce teed how if core exit TCs become stable OR decreasing.

c. WHEN RCS hot leg temperatures arc decreasing, check the SC being fed (active SG) for symptoms indicating a faulted CR ruptured condition.

d. IF the active SG is faulted OR ruptured, THEN perForm the fdloing:

I) Establish feed few to other intact 50.

2) an intact SG does NOT exist, THEN a decision should be mace to use the best available G, which may be the currently active 30.

3) WHEN the heat load has been transferred to a backup SG, IHN isolate the faulted OR ruptured SO to preverrt further radiation reeasea.

e. Unless required by Step 4d, feed Vow should NQ:1 be established to another dry 30 except as direced by the plant operations staff.

-END EOP-FRP-Hi I Rev. 26 I Paqe5I of 60 Harris 201 1 NRC Scenario 2 - 61 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iQ Scenario # 2 Event # N/A Page 62 of 62 Event

Description:

Scenario Guide Revision Summary Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Rev. 1 Page 1, Critical Task #1 was reworded to remove the one minute time limit and to provide a means of measurable evaluation. Critical Task #2 was removed (Stop RCPs) there is no justification to call this a critical task during the performance of FRP-H.1 Page 4, developed justifications for each critical task based on request from NRC Chief Examiner.

Outline submittal review recommendation from Chief. NRC Examiner was to move event

1. 3 (EHC pump trip with standby auto start failure) to just prior to events that would cause a Reactor Trip. Based on this recommendation the events have been reordered placing the EHC pump trip down in order to event number 6. Original events 4, 5, and 6 were moved up and are now events 3, 4, and 5. A new snap of the scenario will be made and a validated by Operations with the events in the current order will be performed.

Archie Lucky 5-18-2011 Rev. 2 Page 1, Event 5 should have been identified as a Component failure for the RO/SRO not an Instrument failure.

Page 7, CAEP revised increased C Accumulator nitrogen leak size to ensure Tech Spec evaluation should be made based on low pressure.

Archie Lucky 5-23-201 1 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 2 - 62 - Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 05000400/2011301 Examiners: Operators:

nitial Conditions: lC-5, MOL, 52.5% power

. A MD AFW Pump under clearance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago for motor overhaul, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, TS 3.7.1.2 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

• B NSW pump under clearance for motor replacement, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

. PZR PORV PCV-444B leakage required shutting PORV isol IRC-113 Turnover: Plant is at approximately 52% power. Plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005 step 1 36.e. After taking shift continue plant startup.

Critical Tasks:

. Isolate AFW flow to the ruptured B Steam Generator prior to entering EPP-020, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery

. Isolate 1MS-70 Prior to exiting EPP-014, Faulted SG Isolation

. Shut A and C MSIVs prior to exiting EPP-014, Faulted SG Isolation Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Raise power R-RO/SRO 2 NISO3A I-RO/SRO Nl-31 high voltage block failure and energization at power iBOP/SRO 3 PT:308A SG A PORV Pressure Instrument fails high CCWO1A C RO/SRO Trip of A CCW Pump with standby pump failure to auto 4

CCWO47 TS SRO start 5 B0 5

5 0 HVAOO9 Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start 6 PT:446 Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter Failure 7 SGNO5B M ALL B Steam Generator tube rupture (420 gpm) 8 MSS1 1 Main Steam Header break outside Containment M ALL (downstream of MSIV5)

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails 9 ZRPK5O4A C BOP/SRO MSSO5B B MSIV fails to shut (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 1 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

Event I: Power increase the first evolution for the crew is to commence a power increase at 4 DEH Units I mm. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will dilute and increase Control Bank D rod height lAW the reactivity plan. The BOP will operate the DEH Main Turbine controls as necessary to increase turbine load. Once the power increase has been observed to the extent desired by the Lead Evaluator Event 2 can be inserted.

Event 2: Sudden energization of NI-31. The high voltage block on NI-31 will fail and cause the Source Range to energize and the audio count rate. The crew should respond to the failure by implementing OP-I 05, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, Section 8.2 Inadvertent Source Range Detector Energization at Power. They will promptly de-energize NI-31 by removing the I 18V 5A instrument power fuse. The SRO should refer to TS 3.3.1 (no action required above P-6) and direct the implementation of OWP-RP-19.

Event 3: Steam Generator A PORV Pressure transmitter PT-308 fails high causing the A SG PORV to open in automatic. The crew should identify this failure by annunciator ALB-014-8-5, Computer Alarm Steam Generators alarming and status light indications for the A SG PORV.

The BOP will be directed by the SRO to take manual control of the PORV and shut it. While the PORV is in manual the SRO should provide pressure control bands lAW OMM-001. The SRO will evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Event 4: A CCW Pump trips. The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transmitter failure (instrument is isolated therefore pressure decrease is not sensed). The crew should recognize the loss and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. AOP-014 will direct the restoration of the CCW system. The RO will be directed by the SRO to manually start the B CCW (or will have started it lAW OMM-00I when it did not auto start). The SRO should also evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System.

TS 3.7.3 At least two component cooling water (CCW) pumps heat exchangers and essential flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

ACTION: With only one component cooling water flow path OPERABLE. restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Event 5: Diesel Generator electrical equipment room supply fan AH-85 1A-SA trips. This trip will identified by annunciator ALB-027-1-4, Diesel Gen Elec Equip Rm Sup Fans AH-85 Low Flow O/L. The BOP should respond using the directions from the APP. The BOP should identify that the auto start feature of the standby AH-85B has failed. The standby fan operation should be directed by the SRO and can be started manually by the BOP from the MCB. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, AC Sources Operating, and 3.3.3.5.b, Remote Shutdown System.

OWP-HVAC Attachment 1, HVAC Support System Requirements, lists AH-85 IA-SA TS 3.3.3.5.b since ONLY AH-85 IA-SA can be credited for supported system operability, since AH 85 1 B-SA does not start automatically during an accident.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-17 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

(continued)

Event 6: Main Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, PT-446 fails low. The failure will cause a Rod Control circuitry mismatch between Reactor and Turbine power. Rods will begin to step in to reduce temperature down to no-load Tavg. The crew should recognize that rod motion is not required and enter AOP-0O1, Malfunction of Rod Control and Instrumentation System. The crew should carry out the immediate actions of AOP-001 and place Rod Control system in Manual. While Rod Control is in manual the SRO should provide control bands and trip limits lAW 0MM-CO 1. The SR0 should direct the implementation of 0WP-RP-1 1 and evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

Table 3.3-1 item 1 9.e Reactor Trip System Interlocks turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P

13. Action 7 applies.

ACTION 7 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

Event 7: B Steam Generator (SGTR) one tube sheared with design break flow of 420 gpm.

The crew should recognize the presence of a large leak in the primary and announce entry into AOP-016. Due to the leak size the crew will promptly recognize that the leak is beyond CVCS makeup capability and the RCS pressure is being rapidly reduced. Prior to reaching the Reactor trip setpoint on Pressurizer Low Pressure (1960 psig) they should manually trip the Reactor, carry out the immediate actions of PATH-i and time permitting manually initiate Safety Injection (an automatic Safety Injection may occur if actions are not promptly taken).

Event 8: Five minutes after the Reactor is tripped a Main Steam line break on the main steam header outside Containment will occur. It is expected that the crew transition from PATH-i to PATH-2 to address the ruptured Steam Generator. While in PATH-2 the faulted Steam Generator will become apparent.

Event 9: The automatic Main Steam Line Isolation will fail to actuate. Only A and C MSIV can be manually shut. B MSIV will not shut from the MCB or locally. The crew should use the Secondary Integrity Foldout Criteria to address the faulted B Steam Generator and transition to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, (if isolation attempts were not performed by PATH-2). After entry into EPP-0i4 for B Steam Generator isolation the crew will return to PATH-2.

The scenario will end after the crew transitions to EPP-020, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery and initiates an RCS Cooldown.

CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-3, A: Isolate feedwater flow into the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 (EPP-020).

2. Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-3, A: Failure to isolate 1MS-70 could result in the inability to terminate primary-to-secondary leakage.

3. Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-2, A: Shut A and C MSIVs prior to exiting EPP-0i4.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 50 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed tore-commence a power escalation from 50% to 100% power. The power increase is on hold for turnover. The SRO is expected to conduct a Lead Evaluator:

reactivity brief prior to commencing the power escalation.

This brief may be conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario.

Simulator Operator: I When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to Run.

SRO.. .GP-OQ5,tép136e. f SRO/BOP Direct BOP to depress the GO button The crew should monitor diverse indications of power during the power escalation (Nis, Core AT, Turbine First Stage Pressure, Main Generator Output, ERRS Continuous Evaluators Note: Calorimetric)

Crew may determine to allow rods to withdraw in automatic instead of diluting per reactivity plan. If so, ramp will continue without makeup.

• Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control

. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the power BOP escalation and informs crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO.

. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display increases.

. VERIFY Generator load is increasing.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # I Page 8 of 50 Event

Description:

Raise Power I

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1

. MONITORS primary systems response.

. At 55 to 60% Reactor power, CHECK the following:

o ALB-1315-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

RO o ALB-1315-4, POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

. IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for appropriate action. (NO)

RO OP-10701 CVCS Boration, Dilution,. and ChemisfryContról If Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution) Operation is for RCS temperature adjustments during steady state power Procedure Note:. operations, Steps 5.3.2.1 through 5.3.2.3 are not applicable. Operator experience will dictate the required amount of makeup water needed.

. DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR Main Control Room status board.

RO . DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration reduction required.

. DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added.

FIS-114 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by ICS-151 shutting results in Procedure Note:

FIS-114 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would not be unexpected.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Page 9 of 507 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid Procedure Caution: and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-1 14, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

Dilution of the RCS will be dependent on charging and Procedure Note: letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase dilution rate of the RCS.

Setting RMUW flow controller for a desired flow rate greater than 90 gpm when performing a dilution in the normal dilute mode will result

. Procedure Caution: in a flow deviation alarm.

The reduced flow in this configuration is due to the additional back pressure from the spray nozzles and letdown flow to the VCT.

• SET total makeup flow as follows:

. IF performing DIL in Step 5.3.2.8, THEN SET controller I CS-I 51, FK-I 14 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to9Ogpm.

RO

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

• PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 -9 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 1 Page 10 of 507 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:

pressure

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron Concentration to less than 10 ppm.

At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before sample Procedure Note:

is taken.

. START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

RO o VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

. VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 561 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

RD . IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping out to the desired height.

RD PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

RD . Is in the STOP position

. The green light is lit.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RD momentarily.

. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

Once the power change has been observed to the extent desired the Lead Evaluator can cue Event 2, Nuclear Evaluator Note:

Instrument 31 voltage block failure and energization at power.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 11 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 12 of 50 Event

Description:

NI-31 High Voltage Block Failure And Energization At Power Time I Position I Acolicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 2 Nl-31 High Voltage Block Failure Available Indications Scaler Timer produces audible rapid count rate Nl-31 indicating, with voftage on drawer Diagnosis that the SR Nl-3I high voltage off block has failed Crew and the channel is energized Directs RO to Refer to OP-I 05 section 8 2, Inadvertent Source

.SRO RaneDetctor Energization at Power (see next 2paés)

RO Removes the instrument fuses to de-energize the channel Refers to OWP-RP-19 to insure channel is removed from SRO service Ensure crew peer checks implementation of OWP Applies T.S. 3.3.1 Above P-6 no actions are required SRO When below P-6 then restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or open reactor trip breakers, and verify compliance with the shutdown margin requirements of 3.1.1.2 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter Reviews/prepares OMM-00I, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of Nl-31.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Crew will probably place the Turbine on HOLD.

Lead Evaluator: Once the crew completes implementation of OWP-RP-19 and Tech Specs have been evaluated, cue Event 3, SG PORV Pressure Instrument fails high Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 p 1esf No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 2 - Page 13 of 50 Event

Description:

Nl-31 High Voltage Block Failure And Energization At Power Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REFERENCE USE 8.2. Inadvertent Source Range Detector Energization at Power R (Reference OEF 310) 8.2.1. Initial Conditions

1. Reactor operating in the power range and either Source Range detector energizes.

8.2.2. Procedure Steps NOTE: Normally the affected Source Range channel will be de-energized by the removal of instrument power fuses. However, above the P.6 setpoint, control power fuses can be removed if required for troubleshooting or repair.

CAUTION Removal of control power fuses will disable the level trip bypass function of the affected Source Range channel. If power is reduced below P-C with the control power fuses removed, a Reactor trip signal will be generated by the affected Source Range channel.

1. PROMPTLY DE-ENERGIZE the affected Source Range channel by removing the 11 8V 5A INST POWER fuses.

NOTE: The affected channel should only be re-energized after consultation with maintenance and System Engineer to prevent damage to the affected detector.

2. During the next shutdown, PERFORM the following:

a. Immediately after Source Range detector high voltage is unblocked, RECORD signals from both Source Range detectors on N R-45.

b. OBSERVE tile decay of neutron count rate on both channels.

OP-i 05 Rev. 25 Page 15 of 45 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 13 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 14 of 50 Event

Description:

NI-31 High Voltage Block Failure And Energization At Power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REFERENCE USE 8.2.2 Procedure Steps (continued)

c. IF any erratic indications, such as disagreement between signal decay or excessive noise, are observed, THEN INITIATE corrective action.

d. IF one or both Source Range channels are found inoperable, THEN REFER to Tech Spec 3.3.1.

OP-i05 I Rev. 25 Page 16 of 45 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNa.: NRcDE Scenari# 3 EVnt# 2 Page 1 of f Event

Description:

Nl-31 High Voltage Block Failure And Energization At Power j Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior cwpap-S Sht 2 2 3istbi!S.tu Ligit Linup itin fcr Conpon.n I: or Inoperbility Initia1/VrifLd Initi1/Vrifid On SOURCE RAlGE Drawer 3i LEVEL IPIP Switch BYPASS Dtrnin required poiion p GP in progress nd cir1 position e1ectd -

HiGH FLUX AT SHUTDOWN NO-L Switoh 3LOCK BLOCK On 3PASS PEPISSIVE LIGHTS P.ns1 (Chsc th fo11owino SOUPCE PJiZCE TPIP BYPASS N313 (Window 1-1 ENERGIZEt DR-ENERGIZED ON AUDIO COUNT PJtTE CHANNEL DRAWER Citc1 osition 1ted

• &Na1 CHANNEL SELECTOR Switoh or N32 N22 OWP-RP I Rev. 15 Page 81 of 104 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

ADDendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 17 of 51 Event

Description:

SG A PORV Pressure Instrument fails high Time Position Arxlicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 3 SG PORV Pressure Instrument, PT-308, fails HIGH This event is a Steam Generator PORV Pressure Instrument failing high. This will require the BOP to take EVALUATOR NOTE: manual control of the PORV to shut it. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Available ALB-014-8-5, Computer Alarm Steam Generators Indications:

SRO ENTERS APP-ALB-01 4-8-5 BOP IDENTIFIES A SG PORV is OPEN DEPRESS Manual Pushbuffon for PK-308 to take manual BOP control of A SG PORV BOP LOWER output for PK-308 to SHUT A SG PORV Provide pressure band for PORV manual control (maintain < 1 170 psig).

REFER to Tech Specs for failure of A SG PORV

. T.S. 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System o Restore to operable within 7 days or be in HSD within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SRO

. T.S. 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Actions a, c and d o Restore to operable status within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 -17 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 3 Page 18 of 51 Event

Description:

SG A PORV Pressure Instrument fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of PT-308.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been Lead Ev a i u ator evaluated, cue Event 4, (Trip of Running CCW Pump, A)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 19 of 50 Event

Description:

Trip of Running A CCW Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 4 Trip of the A CCW Pump Evaluator Note: This event is a trip of the running A CCW Pump. The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transmitter failure. The B CCW will start manually when operated from the MCB. The crew should recognize the loss and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. AOP-014 will direct the restoration of the CCW system.

Available Indications Multiple CCW alarms on ALB-005 ENTER AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO NolmmediateActions Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions. Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

Directs SM to REFER TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification SRO And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matirx.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section. (Section 3.3, Loss of a CCW Pump)

Procedure Note: The standby CCW pump starts at 52 psig discharge pressure.

CHECK the standby CCW pump has STARTED. (NO)

RO Dispatch an operator to investigate Communicator: If dispatched to the field to investigate report back after 2-3 minutes that A CCW Pump breaker is tripped on overcurrent.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 20 of 51 Event

Description:

Trip of Running A CCW Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO START the standby CCW pump.

CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1.

RO (YES)

RO CHECK CCW header pressure greater than 52 psig. (YES)

VERIFY adequate ESW cooling water flow to the associated RO CCW heat exchanger. (YES)

RO CHECK RHR operating. (NO)

REFER TO Technical Specification 3.7.3

• With only one component cooling water flow path SRO OPERABLE. restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CONTACT Maintenance to determine the cause of the CCW SRO pump failure, AND INITIATE corrective action.

CHECK with Operations Staff to determine the desirability of SRO using the swing CCW pump.

SRO CHECK CCW flow RESTORED to the affected train.

Crew may implement OWP-CC at this point. This OWP will Evaluator Note: have the crew verify the ESF Status Light Boxes. Not required to continue with scenario.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been Lead Evaluator:

evaluated, cue Event 5, (Trip of Running AH-85A Fan)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 20 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 21 of 51 Event

Description:

Trip of running AH-85A fan, standby fails to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert Trigger 5 Trip of the Running AH-85A Fan Evaluator Note: This trip should auto start the standby AH-85 fan, however the auto start relay has failed. The standby fan will have to be started manually from the MCB.

BOP ENTERS APP-ALB-027-1 -4 BOP IDENTIFIES the tripped fan, AH-85A BOP REPORTS failure of the AH-85B standby fan to start STARTS standby AH-85B BOP Contacts AOs to investigate breaker failure REFER to Tech Specs

• T.S 3.8.1 .1, AC Sources Operating (Perform OST 1023, Offsite Power Verification within one hour)

Requests BOP to contact ACs to perform OST-1023 SRO

. T.S. 3.3.3.5.b, Remote Shutdown System (7 days)

OWP-HVAC Attachment 1, Only AH-85 1A-SA can be credited for supported system operability, since AH-85 1 B-SA does not start automatically during an accident.

Communicator Replay to MCR requests call back appropriately with OST 1023 completion.

Breaker failure was overcurrent IF requested to take breaker to OFF acknowledge the request.

Simulator Operator do not take breaker off not required to continue with scenario Lead Evaluator: Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been evaluated, cue Event 6, (PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 21 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 22 of 51 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time Position AoDlicants Actions or Behaor Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert Trigger 6 PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Evaluator Note: PT-446 fails low causing the Rod Control circuitry to believe power is lowering. Rods will begin to step in to reduce temperature down to no-load Tavg.

Available

. Rods begin to step Indications:

. Tavg)Tref mismatch off-scale high RO REPORTS rods stepping in IDENTIFIES that rod motion is due to an instrument CREW malfunction ENTERS AOP-0O1, Malfunction of Rod Control and SRO Instrumentation System Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are droppecL Action RD (YES)

Immediate Action RD POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Immediate Action RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

RD GO TO Section 3.2, Continuous Spurious Control Rod Motion CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:

• RCS Tavg (YES)

RO

. RCS Tref (YES)

• Power Range NI channels (YES)

• Turbine first stage pressure (NO failure has occurred)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 23 of 51 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM the following:

IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (ND)

RD IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete. (YES)

IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN BYPASS the failed channel using OWP-RP. (ND)

Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:

Equilibrium power and temperature conditions RD Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP 106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core OperatinQ Limits Report.

VERIFY proper operation of the following:

CVCS demineralizers RD BTRS Reactor Makeup Control System CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks RD MOVING OUT. (NO)

CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED: (ND)

RD Unexplained RCS boration Unplanned RCS dilution CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction RD OCCURRED. (NO)

EXIT this procedure.

RD Contacts I&C for DWP implementation Implement OWP-RP-1 1 (see next pages) (includes Steam SRD Dumps to Steam Pressure Mode and PT-447 input selected).

REFER to Tech Spec 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System SRO Instrumentation (Within one hour check interlock)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # ver1t# Page 24 of 50 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW fl Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge any requests for OWP support Communicator NOT required to be implemented prior to continuouation of scenario The OWP sections are included in this guide to follow as Evaluator crew performs MCR actions.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Page of Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OWPRP- 11 Sheet 1 of 7 TIR Number W/O Number:

1. OWP ppli CIearanc Number:

2. System: Reactor Protection

3. Component: 1st STAGE PRESS

4. Scope tCO action reouired due to inoperable conponents in turbine let Stage Press 1+/-1 (PT4461 or IV CPT447

5. Applicable Requirements: 3.3.1 (Mode ii

6. Precautions: Reset C7A/ C7B as

7. Component lineup completed per attached I sheet(s) Signature Date

8. Testinq required on redundant eouipnent while the comDonent is inoperable. None 0 Testing/Action required to restore operability. (N/A if tracked on ETA)

. MST10068 for Chan III or /

. MST10067 for Chan IV I Channel Check Signature Date

10. Component lineups restored per attached /

sheet(s). Signature Date

11. Remarks

12. Reviewed By:

Euperintendent - Shift Operations Date After receiving the final review signature, this OWP becomes a OR RECORD and should be submitted, to Document Services.

OWP-RP I Rev. 15 Page 51 of 104 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test Ne.: NRC Seenaric, # 3 Event 6 Page 26 of 5&

Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, faNs LOW Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior OWPRP11 Sheet 2 of 7 Bistable/Status Licrht Lineuo Position for Restored Component ID Inoperability Position or Number Initial/Verified Initial/Verified PROTECTION CHANNEL III (PT-446 Failure)

On Main Control Board:

51W Dump Mode Selector Switch Scm Press TAVG 44C or 447 PS446Z 1st Stage Press (circle Control Selec: Switch position 447 / selected(

CAUTION Prior to piecing the SG LVL ATWS pane.1 bypass switch to normal, verify the A and B train trouble lights and the A end B train trip lights are not lit on the AJ4SAC panel.

SG LVI ATWS PANEL BYPASS Switch BYPASS NORMAL On TSLB 2

• Dc-energized if less than 10% power, energized if greater then 10%

power. Circle the atpropriate condition.

lURE PHR ?13 PB 446A

• ENERGIZED!

(Window 133) DEENERGIZED DEENERGIZED/

On BYPASS-PEPWISSIVE LIGETS

• • Energized if lees than 10% power, dcenergized if greater than 10%

power. Circle the appropriate condition.

LOW TURBINE IMPULSE PRESS PEP1 P13 ** ENERGIZED? ** ENERGIZED!

(Window 45) DEENERGIZED /_____ DEENERGIZED /

OWP-RP Rev. 15 Page 52 of 104 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 27 of 50 Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmifter, fails LOW Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OWP-RP-1 1 Sheet 3 of 7 Bistable/Status Light Lineup PROTECTION CHANNEL III (PT-446 Failure) (continued)

Lineup for Maintenance NOTE: The purpose of the following Steps is to allow for a controlled shutdown in the event that PB 446A input to P13 is not clear. The performance of the following steps will dcenergize TSLB2 window 13-3, TURB PWR PiS PB 446A when the jumpers have been installed. If Turbine power is less than 10%, this action is required to place P13 in the reuized state. If Turbine power is greater than 10%, this action is required to ensure P13 will he in the required state when power is reduced below 10%

Direct Maintenance to perform the following: (Concurrent verification is preferred)

CAUTION If Reactor power is less than 10%, pulling the NCT1 card while one of the following conditions exist will generate a Reactor trip due to the loss of power to Pl3 bistable:

Turbine Trip RCP Undervoltage (2 of 3)

P.CP Underfrequency (2 of 3)

Reactor Coolant Low Flow (2 of 3 in 2 of 3 loops)

Pressurizer Low Pressure (2 of 3)

Pressurizer High Water Level (2 of 3)

1. Pull NCTI card C3OS31 in PlcS.

2. Pull card C3-0334 in FIC-3.

CAUTION Do not allow the jumpers installed in the next two Steps to contact ground potential, or other pins installed by the step. Ensure the jumpers are secure, and will not slip off of th pin connection.

3. Install an extender board in place of Card C3-03l.

4. Connect a fused jumper, with a 0.5 rp fuse, from pin 1 to pin 20 on the extender hoard.

5. Connect a jumper from pin 42 to pin 21 on the extender board.

I Rev. 15 Page 53 of 104 Harris. 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 27 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # S Event # Pe 28 of 50 rf Event

Description:

PT-446, First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails LOW Time Position F Applicants Actions or Behavior OWP-RP- 11 Sheet 4 of 7 Sistable/Status Light Lineup PROThCTICU CHANNEL XII (PT-44 Failure) (continued)

Restoration LiOcup Direct Maintenance to perform the following: (Concurrent verification is preferred)

CrUTION If Reactor power is less than IOi, pulling the NCTI card while one of the following conditions exist will generate a Reactor trip due to the loss of power to P13 bistable:

Turbine Trip RCP Undervoltace (2 of 3)

RCP Undexfrequency (2 of 3)

Reactor Coolant Low Flow (2 of 3 in 2 of 3 loops)

. Pressurizer Low Pressure (2 of 3)

. Pressurizer RIgh Water Level (2 of 3)

1. Remove the jumper from pin 1 to pin 20 on the extender board located at C3-083l in PIC-3.

/_____

2. Remove the jumper from pin 42 to pin 21 on the extender board.

3. Remove the extender board in C3083l.

4. Install the NCT1 card in C30831.

5. Install the NAL1 card in C30334.

NOTt: The applicable section of MST-IO0ES must be performed to verify proper bistable operation prior to channel operability.

OWP-RP Rev. 15 Page 54 of 104 Evaluator Note: Once the plant has stabilized then cue Event 7 Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator, B SO at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 28 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test 1o.: NRC Scenario # 3 Evenf# 7, S Page 29 of 5tJ Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate Trigger 7 SGTRon B SG at420 gpm I

Evaluator Note: This is the first major event, a tube rupture in the B SG (SGTR) at 420 gpm. The crew should recognize the presence ofa large leak in the primary. After determining that this leak is greater than makeup capability they should trip the Reactor, manually initiate Safety Injection, and carry out actions per PATH-I.

Once the Reactor is tripped a Main Steam Line break outside Containment will occur. The crew will transition from PATH-I to PATH-2 to address the ruptured SG. At some point the Faulted SG will become apparent and the crew is expected to isolate the B SG in EPP-014.

Depending on crews pace through the procedure they may isolate the B SG prior to entering PATH-2. The Scenario Guide is written to support either implementation.

Available

• Charging Flow increasing Indications:

• VCT Level decreasing

• Pressurizer Level and Pressure decreasing

• B MSL Rad monitor SRO ENTERS AOP-016, Excessive Pnmary Plant Leakage

• This procedure contains no immediate actions.

• Throughout this procedure, as well as all AOPs, actions are based on valid alarms and instrumentation. Actions based on invalid indication are not applicable.

• When possible (except in the cases of rapidly Procedure Note propagating leaks and leaks approaching Action Level 3), leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration of an action level. Leakage is qualitatively confirmed when two different indications (such as grab samples or radiation monitors) trend in the same direction with the same approximate order of magnitude.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 29 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 30 of 51]

Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time 1 Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RD CHECK RHR in operation. (NO)

Direct SM to REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification SRO And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

RD CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

Five minutes after the Reactor Trip Trigger 8 will Evaluator Note: automatically insert, Main Steam Line Break Outside of Containment.

PERFORM the following:

CREW TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP PATH-i after Rx is verified tripped then perform a Manual Safety Injection.

(Perform RNO substeps 4.b. and 4.c as time permits)

If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine should Procedure Note:

be verified tripped in PATH-i before manually actuating SI.

RD MANUALLY INITIATE Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.

EXIT this procedure.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 30 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNa. NRO Scenario# Evetit# 7,8 Page 31 of O Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position I ADolicants Actions or Behavior SRO Enters PATH-I VERIFY Reactor Trip AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

. CHECK for any of the following:

mrnediate

• Action RO o Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES) o Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)

. ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)

. NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERIFY Turbine Trip Immediate CHECK for any of the following:

Action BOP

. ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES)

. ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (YES)

VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses Immediate BOP

Action . IA-SA AND 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs. (YES)

CHECK SI Actuation:

Immediate Action RO CHECK for any of the following LIT

. SI Actuated bypass permissive light (YES)

Perform the following:

SRO

• Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees

. Evaluate EAL Matrix CREW Foldout A Applies. (see next page)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 31 -

Revision 2

• Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 32 of 57 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior GUIDE PATH-I FOLDOUT A

• RCP TRIP CRiTERIA IF both of the following occur, THEN stop all RCPs:

SI flow GREATER ThAN 2CM) GPM RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 81.

• RHR RESTART CRITERIA IF RCS pressure decreases to less than. 230 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS

• ALTERNATE MINIFLOW OPENJSHUT CRITERIA

• IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 P81G. THEN verify alternate minitlow isolation OR miniflow block vaives SHUT

• IF RCS pressure increases to greater than 2200 PS 1G. THEN verify alternate miniflow isolation AND miniflow black valves OPEN EOP-GU IDE-i Rev. 30 Page 42 of gi Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 33 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING (YES)

Check SI Flow:

RO . SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

BOP Check Main Steam Isolation:

Main Steam Isolation ACTUATED (NO)

Check Main Steam Isolation actuation criteria:

• Steam line pressure LESS THAN 601 PSIG (NO)

. CNMT pressure GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG (NO)

. Manual closure of all MSIVs AND bypass valves is desired.

Dependent upon the time it takes for the crew to reach this point the Steam Break could be occurring therefore it is possible that the crew may identify the presence of a steam line break (delayed for 5 mm); however during Evaluator Note:

validation the indications of the break were not yet apparent. If the break is identified at this point then a Main Steam Isolation would be appropriate based on OMM-OO1, Conduct of Operations guidance.

Main Steam Isolation REQUIRED (YES after steam line BOP break occurs)

Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG (YES)

Check AFW Status:

BOP

. AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 33 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 34 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

{ Time N Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

Directs AC to place 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22 BOP Directs RAB AC to locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction AND discharqe cross-connect valves Acknowledge the request to place 1 A and 1 B Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22 When directed to place the iA and lB Air Compressor in the local control mode:

Run APP\airacs_to_Iocal Simulator Operator When directed to unlock and turn on breakers for CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves Run APP\cvc\Path-1 Att. 6 CSIP suction valve power when the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-i Attachment 11 is complete.

When the APP for 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor and CSIP Communicator cross-connect valves have completed running call the MCR.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 34 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 35 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (GB SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Control RCS Temperature:

• Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1 1 RCS TE4P!RATIJRK ONTRDt 4 G1flDL.fl4ES tOLLOI$G RZ rRrp

. Cui4ance is applicable until anothet procedure directs otberwine,

• if no RCP running, use wide rangs cold leg te*peretwre.

acs riiwniu TRANI LESS ThAN CREKfER THAN STA3Lg AT OR 7F AND AND TRENDINS TO DECItEA$ INS ENCHAASING 557F

. Stop dumping

• I condenser Control feed Steam available flow and $teaa RO/BOP transfer dump to

. Control feed steam dump to eutabljh and flom STEAN PRESSURE maintain RCS mode ning temperature

• aintaIn total OP-l26. between 55P feed flow Section 5. AND 559F OPERATOR greater than AND dump steam ACTION 210 RPfa to eondener until level greater than - OR -

25 t40%1 1-n at least one . Dump steam o intact 55 u*ing intact SC PORVa

• il cooldowe continues

• Control feed Thli. shut flow to StVe AND maintain SC BYPASS valves levels If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PRZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand.

(With the spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure Procedure Note:

controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.)

Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

. Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 ENERGIZED RO/BOP

• Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

. Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

• PRZ spray valves SHUT (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 35 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRt Serfati6 # 3 Event # 7, S Page 36 of 50 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During validation it was found that the SG Tube Rupture, Reactor trip, and Safety Injection were masking the indications for the Steam Line break, If the crew identifies Evaluator Note: the fault at this point then they will transition to EPP-014 now to isolate B SG. If not then later in the scenario Foldout Criteria in PATH-2 will send them to EPP-014.

EPP-014 steps are included in this Guide.

Identify Any Faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

RO/BOP . Any SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

. Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Identify Any Ruptured SG:

Check for all of the following:

RO/BOP

. Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation NORMAL

. SG blowdown radiation NORMAL

. Main steamline radiation NORMAL (NO)

SRO Ruptured SG IDENTIFIED (YES, B)

RO/BOP Ruptured SG level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Critical Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW AND TDAFW isolation Task RO/BOP valves to ruptured SG. (B SG) Critical to isolate feed flow prior to transitioning to EPP-020.

SRO :GOTOPATH-2GUIDE,Stepl. f SRO Foldout C Applies. (see next page)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 36 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 37 of 501 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-2 GUIDE FOLDOUT C

• ALTERNATE MINIFLOW OPENISHUT CRITERIA

• IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 PSIG, ThEN verify alternate minitlow isolation OR miniflow block valves SHUT

• if RCS pressure increases to greater than 2200 PSIG, fliN verify alternate minitlow isolation miniflow block valves OPEN

• SI REINIT1ATION CRITERIA IF any of the following occurs:

• RCS subcooling LESS THAN 10° F [40° Fl C 20°F [50°F1-M a PRZ level CAN [ BE MA1NTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [30%]

THEN perform the following:

a. IF CSIP suction aligned to VCT, THEN realign to RWST.

b. Shut charging line isolation valves AND open BIT valves.

c. Verify normal miniflow isolation valves SHUT-

d. if necessary to restore conditions, IH4 restart standby CSIP.

e. IF reinitiation occurs after entry point S (Step 28), THEN GO TO EPP-020 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: StJBCOOLED RECOVEIY, 1

Step 1.

• SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA if any of the following occurs JJN GO TO EPP-014. FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step I (unless laulted SG is needed for CS cooldown).

• Any SG pressure DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER AND THAT SG HAS NOT BEEN ISOLATED

• Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED AND THAT SG HAS j BEEN ISOLATED

• COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 23A% (214 Low-Low alarm) THEN GO TO PP-010, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCKOVER CRITERIA if CST level decreases to less than 10% fl4 switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILlARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 81.

• RHR RESTART CRITERIA if RCS_pressure decreases to less than 230 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, flffi restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS.

• MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA if any intact SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner any intact SG has abnormal radiation levels, fli stop RCS depressurization and cooldown AND GO RETURN TO Step 1.

EOP-GUIDE-2 I Rev. 23 Page 5 of 70 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OTét No.: NRC Scenario # 3 vent # 7, 8 Page 38 of 50 Event

Description:

Time Position Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on Applicants Actions or Behavior trip)1 SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. I Procedure Note: The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

RO Check RCP Trip Criteria:

. Any RCP RUNNING (YES)

Check all of the following:

. SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (YES)

. Stop all RCPs (Secures ALL RCPs)

BOP Identify Any Ruptured SG:

Check for any of the following:

. SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

. SG activity sample - HIGH RADIATION

. Main steamline radiation HIGH RADIATION (YES)

. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: . If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG:

BOP Adjust ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1 145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

Check ruptured SG PORV SHUT (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 38 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 39 of Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Shut ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

Critical . SG B: IMS-70 (Critical Task to SHUT IMS-70 prior to Task BOP exiting EPP-014))

. SGC:1MS-72 BOP Verify blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG SHUT Shut ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

BOP . SGA:IMS-231

. SG B: IMS-266

. SGC:IMS-301 Shut ruptured SG MSIV AND bypass valve. (NO, B MSIV fails BOP to SHUT)

Indications of the Main Steámline Break should become Evaluator Note: identifiable and the crew should transition to.EPP-014 using Foldout C, Secondary Integrity Criteria. PATH-2 continues later in this guide.

SRO EPP-014, Step 1

. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution:

• Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 39 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 O Tht lf.: RC Scenario # 3 vent 7, 8 Page 40 of - 50 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior d

Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

• Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO, Shuts A AND C MSIV but B MSIV fails to SHUT)

Critical to shut A and C MSIV (will not automatically shut

. from ESF Main Steam Line Isolation signal, critical to shut Critical prior to exiting EPP-014)

Task BOP/RO Perform the following: (to attempt to isolate B MSIV)

. Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1 IA-814 (north of AH-19 IA-SA)

. Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 1 lA-i 876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)

Acknowledge request to vent air stall if later asked what is taking you so long to get the air vented. Say you are Communicator: working on it and if the MCR persists, state that you broke off the valve handwheel on IIA-814 and you are going for pliers to close the valve.

Simulator Operator: DO NOT vent Instrument Air no actions are desired BOP/RO Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES)

Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

BOP/RO

• Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Identify Any Faulted SG:

. Check for any of the following:

BOP/RO

• Any SG pressure DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

• Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 -40 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OptestNo.: NR cenar[o# 3 Event# 7,8 Page 41 of 50 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time H Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Faulted SG(s):

. Verify fauted SG(s) PORV SHUT BOP/RO . Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT

. Verify FyIIDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted p(s) SHUT

. Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT

. SG,1MS-7O (SHUT)

. S9/: IMS-72 (SHUT)

. Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs -

SHUT:

• SG A: IMS-231 (SHUT)

. SG B: 1MS-266 (SHUT)

. SG C: 1MS-301 (SHUT)

. Verify SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT -

. Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves SHUT -

BOP/RO Check CST Level GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 42 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

• Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation NORMAL -

• SG blowdown radiation NORMAL (NO)

. Main steamline radiation NORMAL (NO)

• SG activity sample NORMAL (WHEN AVAILABLE)

SRO GO TO PATH-2, entry point J.

SRO Foldout C Applies.

SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is Procedure Note:

initiated.

RO CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

. Any RCP RUNNING (NO)

CHECK all of the following:

. SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (YES)

- should have been secured earlier BOP IDENTIFY Any Ruptured SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

• SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

• SG activity sample - HIGH RADIATION

• Main steamline radiation - HIGH RADIATION (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 42 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 43 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: . If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG:

BOP ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

BOP CHECK ruptured SG PORV SHUT (YES)

SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

. SO B: 1 MS-70 (NOTE: Shutting 1 MS-70 was BOP previously identified as a critical task occurring in the first pass through PATH-2)

. SGC:1MS-72 BOP VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG SHUT -

Shut ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

BOP

• SO A: 1MS-231

. SO B: 1MS-266

. SO C: 1 MS-301 Shut ruptured SG MSIV AND bypass valve. (NO, B MSIV fails BOP to SHUT)

Isolate Intact SG(s) From Ruptured SG AND Minimize Steam Flow From Ruptured SG:

• Shut all remaining MSIV AND bypass valves.

. Place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to BOP OFF/RESET.

• Use intact SG(s) PORV for all further steam dumping

. Isolate steam release path from ruptured SO using Attachment 1.

. Any intact SG MSIV AND bypass valve SHUT (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 43 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-.2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 44 of Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

RESPONSE

Attachment 1 Sheet I oft GUIDANCE ON: RESTORATION OF FEED FIOW I Before RCS Bleed And Feed Using AFW:

Feed at feast one intact SG, whose wide range level is greater than 15% [30%J, with total feed flow to SGs greater than 210 KPPH.

2. Before RCS Bleed And Feed Using MFW:

Feed at [east one intact 5G. whose wide range level :15 greater than 15% [30%},

without restriction on rate.

I Before RCS Bleed And Feed Using Condensate:

it wide range RCS Tcold is stable at OR trending to the saturatlon temperature corresponding to the depressurized SO pressure, THEN feed the depressurized SG without restriction on rate.

4. After RCS Bleed And Feed Using Any Feed Flow Method:

a. care exit TCs are stable OR decreasing, JJIEN feed one intact SG at 50 KPPH (for AEW) OR the lowest controllable rate (for math FW OR condensate). WHEN wide range level increases to greater than 15% [30%],

THEN feed flow may be increased to maximum rate.

I,. IF core exit TCs are increasing, THEN feed one intact SG at maximum rate until SO narrow range level is greater than 25% [40%1. Do !4QI reduce feed flow if core exit TCs become stable OR decreasing.

c. WHEN RCS hot leg temperatures are decreasing, THEN check the SO beIng fed (active SO) for symptoms indicating a faulted OR ruptured condition.

d. IF the actIve SO is faulted OR ruptured, THEN perfoim the following:

1) Establish feed flow to another intact 5G.

2) IF an intact SO does NOT exist, THEN a decision should be made to use the best available SG, which may be the currently active SG.

3) WHEN the heat load has been transferred to a backup SO, flf4 isolate the faulted OR ruptured SO to prevent further radiation releases.

e. Unless required by Step 4d, feed flow should NOT be established to another dry SO except as directed by the plant operations staff.

-END EOP-FRP-H.i I Rev. 26 I Page 51 otGO Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 45 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT need for RCS Procedure Caution: cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

BOP Monitor Ruptured SG Level:

. Ruptured SG FAULTED (YES)

. Ruptured SG NEED FOR RCS COOLDOWN (NO)

• Level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW AND TDAFW isolation valves to ruptured SG.

The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before Procedure Caution:

continuing (unless this prevents feeding SGs to be used for cooldown).

Check Ruptured SG(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 260 PSIG BOP -

[350 PSIG] (NO/YES) If NO, then goto EPP-020.

Depending on the crews pace through the procedures B SG pressure may not be less than 260 psig at this point. If Evaluator Note:

thats the case then the crew will continue in PATH-2 until step 22 and THEN transition to EPP-020.

EPP-020, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SRO SUBCOOLED RECOVERY, Step 1 SRO Foldout applies (see next page)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 45 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 46 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

L Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUBCOOLED RECOVERY FOLDOUT SI REINITIATION CRITERIA IF any of the following occurs:

• RCS subcooling LESS THAN 1 OG F [40° F]- C 20°F 50°F]-M

• PRZ level CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% [30%]

THEN perform the following:

a. Shut charging line isolation valves AND open BIT valves.

b. Verify normal minrflow isolation valves SHUT

c. iF necessary to restore conditions, THEN restart standby CSIP.

• SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any of the following occurs, THEN GO TO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step I (unless faulted SG is needed for RCS cooldown).

• Any SG pressure DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Mf THAT SG HAS NOT BEEN ISOLATED

• Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED AND THAT SG HAS NOT BEEN iSOLATED

• PATH-2 TRANSON CRITERIA IF any intact SQ level increases in an uncontrolled manner OR any intact SQ has abnormal radiation levels, THEN stop RCS depressurization and cooldown AND GO TO PATH-2.

entry point 3.

• COLD LEG RECIRCUL TION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF RWST level decreases to less than 23.4% (2/4 Low-Low alarm), THEN GO TO EPP-010, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULAT1ON, Step 1.

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, TI-lEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 81.

• RHR RESTART CRITERIA IF RCS pressure decreases to less than 230 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS.

EOP-EPP-020 I Rev. 23 Page 3 of 74 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 47 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Reset SI.

Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of BOP Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals (Phase B has RO not actuated).

RO Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

Open the following valves:

. 1 lA-81 9 (locates MCB control switch and opens valve)

. 1S1-287 (locates MCB control switch and opens valve)

BOP Monitor AC Buses:

Check AC emergency buses iA-SA AND 1 B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:

. Check bus voltages

• Check breakers 105 AND 125 CLOSED -

BOP Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES)

Check Ruptured SG(s) Level LESS THAN 78% [60%] (High-BOP -

High alarm) (YES)

PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water Procedure Caution: level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 48 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RD Secure PRZ Heaters:

• Place backup heaters in the OFF position.

. Verify control heaters OFF

. Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered. (Refer to ERG Executive Volume, Generic Issue: Evaluations by the Plant Engineering Staff.)

RD Check CNMT Spray Status:

. Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING (NO)

Procedure Caution: IF ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT need for RCS cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated BOP Monitor Ruptured SG Level:

. Ruptured SG FAULTED (YES)

. Ruptured SG NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN (NO) o Verify feed flow isolated to ruptured SG (YES)

Check RHR Pump Status:

• Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RD . RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES) o Stop RHR pumps (locates MCB controls and stops both RHR pumps)

NOTE: Should opt to circle this step and move on SRO Coordinate With Plant Operations Staff AND Chemistry To Perform The Following To Obtain Primary And Secondary Samples:

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 48 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 49 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Aøolicants Actions or Behavior RO Operate the primary AND secondary sample panels.

Open CCW to sample HX valves:

RD . 1CC-114

. 1CC-115 Open CCW to GFFD valves:

RD . 1 CC-304

. 1CC-305 Align AND obtain activity, hydrogen AND boron samples of the following:

RO . RCS hot legs

• PRZ liquid space

• AIISGs SRO Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:

Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL Consult plant operations staff to evaluate plant equipment needed for recovery.

Start additional plant equipment needed to assist in recovery as determined by the plant operations staff.

When SG level decreases to 25%, AFW actuation occurs Procedure Note:

and the AFW flow control valves receive a full open signal.

Check Intact SG Levels: Any Level GREATER THAN 25%

BOP -

[40%] (YES)

AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 30% and 50% [40% and 50%]

RD Check PRZ Pressure:

. Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)

. Block low steam pressure SI. (Locates MCB block switches and blocks SI)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 - 49 -

Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 Page 50 of 51 Event

Description:

Ruptured Faulted Steam Generator (B SG at 420 gpm, fault occurs on trip)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If all RCPs are stopped, steps to depressurize the RCS and

. terminate SI should be performed as quickly as possible Procedure Caution:

after the cooldown has started to minimize potential pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel.

Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

BOP

• Maintain RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F/HR (NOTE: Cooldown rate has been 100°F/HR in last hour therefore a Cooldown will not be required.)

Check RHR system OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING RO -

MODE (NO BOP Check if steam dump to condenser AVAILABLE (NO)

Check SG Status For Cooldown:

BOP

• Check SGs AT LEAST ONE INTACT SG AVAILABLE (YES)

Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

• Condenser steam dump (Not Available)

BOP

• SG PORVs

. Checks Cooldown rate in all RCS cold legs and adjusts SG PORV positions to achieve maximum rate while not exceedinq 1 00°F/HR Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:

Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated RCS temperatures.

SRO (Refer to OST-1036, SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION.)

Check RCS boron GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN Lead Evaluator: Terminate the scenario once the crew determines that the cooldown is not required and should not be performed.

Simulator Operator: I When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE. I Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

. HARRIS-2011-NBCSCENARIO3 Revision Summary Rev. 1 Page 1 Critical tasks revised to identify tasks per ERG Based Critical Task List and NuReg 1021 Rev.9 Supplement 1 Appendix D.

Page 3, developed justifications for each critical task based on request from NRC Chief Examiner.

Pages 32, 35 and 36 identified the Critical tasks in the scenario.

Archie Lucky 5-19-2011 Rev. 2 Changed initial power level to start at 52.5% due to not getting the reactivity manipulation response desired going up in power at 90%.

Ended scenario without requiring crew to Cooldown because the 100°F/HR has already been exceeded.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 05000400/2011301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• IC-5, BOL, 51% power

. A MD AFW Pump under clearance 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ago for motor overhaul, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, TS 3.7.1.2 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

. B NSW pump under clearance for motor replacement, due back in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

. PZR PORV PCV-444B excessive seat leakage required shutting PORV isolation valve 1RC-113 Turnover:

• Plant is at approximately 51% power. Plant startup is in progress lAW GP-005 step I 36.e. After taking shift continue plant startup.

Critical Task:

• Isolate AFW flow to B Steam Generator prior to exiting EPP-014

• Shut BIT OuUet valves I Sl-3 and 1S1-4 prior to reaching water relief from PZR SRVs

[ Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event

[ No. Description I N/A R RO/SRO Continue plant startup to 100% power N BOP/SRO 2 RMSOO7 I - BOP/SRO Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment ZCR744 TS SRO

- Purge fails to isolate automatically 3 JFB7579 C - BOP/SRO AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip with back Z2715T1C TS SRO

- up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan) 4 PT:475 I - BOP/SRO Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 TS-SRO to0%

5 CVCO5A C - RO/SRO CSIP Trip 1 available, requiring AOP-018 entry TS.SRO 6 N/A N - RO/SRO Restore letdown 7 PRS14B i - RO/SRO Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444C, fails Open (with Manual Control available)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 8 CFW2I B M All Feedline Break on B SG outside Containment 9 SGNO4 I - BOP/SRO SG Safety Valves fail open on B SG 10 ZRPK61 6A I BOP/SRO Failure of Auto AFW Isolation on. B SG ZRPK61 6B 11 NIS06A ROISRO SR Nuclear Instruments fail to energize post trip due to IR NI-35 undercompensated (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2011 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 The plant is at 51% power in BOL. The crew has been directed to increase power using GP-005, Power Operation Mode 2 to Mode 1, to 100% power at a ramp rate of 4 DEH Units/Minute.

Event 1: Crew performs a power increase of approximately 5%-i 0% power (Lead Examiners discretion). For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will dilute and monitor auto rod withdrawal per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to raise Main Turbine power.

Event 2: Failure of REM-0i LT-3502ASA, CNMT RCS Leak Detection Radiation Monitor. This failure will cause the output to immediately fail high and RM-1 I to go into high alarm. The automatic response to isolate Normal Containment Purge fails to occur due to a failed relay.

The crew should respond to the alarms and enter AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring. AOP-005 Attachment I will direct verifying that the automatic response for this alarm has occurred (other procedure options are available and detailed in exercise guide). This will also require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.2 for the failed Containment Isolation and Tech Spec 3.4.6.1, Leakage Detection Systems.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2011 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 (continued)

Event 2: Continued Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-6 item 1.b.1) Airborne Gaseous Radioactivity RCS leakage Detection Actions 26 and 27

• ACTION 26- Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.

• ACTION 27 With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are maintained closed.

Tech Spec 3.4.6.1 action

• With the Leakage Detection Systems INOPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed for airborne gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the required Airborne Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise. be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

The SRO should also prepare 0MM-CO 1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 3: Trip of AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan with back up auto start failure. The failure will cause annunciator ALB-029 4-5 Containment Fan Coolers AH-39 Low Flow-O/L to alarm. The crew should identify that the standby fan did not auto start and start the standby fan.

This will require the SROto evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.1.5, Containment Systems Air Temperature.

3.6.1.5 Primary Containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F

• Action: With the Containment average air temperature greater than 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-O01, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2011 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 (continued)

Event 4: Failure of A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%. Requires the BOP to place the A SG level control to manual and control level. The SRO should provide level band and trip guidance lAW OMM-001. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-RP-08, Protection channel IV Steam flow. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1 action 6 and Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action a.

TS 3.3.1 Steam Generator Water LevelLow Coincident With Steam! Feedwater Flow Mismatch

• ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and!or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

TS 3.3.3.6 The Accident Monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE

• ACTION a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Harris O11 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

j Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2011 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 (continued)

Event 5: Trip of the running A Charging Pump breaker. The crew will enter AOP-O1 8 and carry out the immediate actions. The crew should isolate letdown and then implement actions to place the B Charging Pump in service. The crew will have to secure the ASI pump after the CSIP is started and evaluate the boration caused by the ASI pump running. The SRO should evaluate the loss of the CSIP in Tech Specs 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 and 3.5.2 TS 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging/safety injection pumps to the RCS.

ACTION: With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), plant procedure PLP-I06 at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.1.24- With only one Charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) plant procedure PLP-106 at 200°F within t he next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s: restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

TS 3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE Charging/safety injection pump

b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger

c. One OPERABLE RHR pump and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and. upon being manually aligned transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

ACTION: a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure.

Event 6: Establish letdown once the B Charging Pump is in service, the crew will restore letdown to establish inventory control. Once letdown has been restored and technical specifications have been evaluated for the loss of the A CSIP, then the next event can be initiated.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2011 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 (continued)

Event 7: Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444C, fails Open (wi Manual Control available). This failure will cause one of the Pressurizer spray valve to fail to 100% open while the other valve closes to 0% open. The crew should respond to multiple alarms and enter AOP-01 9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. The RO should complete the immediate actions by gaining control of the Pressurizer Spray Valves. This may require the SRO to evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5 (If RCS pressure decreases to <2202 psig during the event) 3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:

a. Reactor Coolant System Tavg <594.8°F after addition for instrument uncertainty and

b. Pressurizer Pressure?: 2185 psig after subtraction for instrument uncertainty and

c. RCS total flow rate ?: 293.540 gpm after subtraction for instrument uncertainty

• With any of the above parameters not within its specified limit restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Event 8/9: Once RCS pressure control has been established, a Feed Line Break outside Containment on the B SG will occur. Additionally two safety valves will fail open post trip on the B SG (30 seconds after the Reactor trips). The crew should enter and carry out the immediate actions of PATH-i. The crew should diagnose that there is not a LOCA in progress and transition to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. RCS pressure will continue to reduce as the RCS cools down requiring securing RCPs lAW Foldout A.

Event 10: AFW Auto Isolation for the B SG fails requiring the crew to manually isolate AFW flow.

Event 11: Source Range channels will fail to energize due to under compensation of Intermediate Range channel N-35. The crew will need to identify the failure and then manually energize the SR channels to establish an audio count rate.

The scenario is ended when Safety Injection has been terminated and the crew transitions to EPP-008, SI Termination.

CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Justification is based on WOG ERG-Based Critical task E-2, A Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 (HNP EPP-014) and based on identification of critical task from NuReg 1021 Rev. 9 Appendix D. A critical task is one that involves essential safety actions such as recognizing a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

2. Justification is based on NuReg 1021 Rev. 9 Appendix D Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. Shutting BIT outlet valves I Sl-3 and iS 1-4 prior to water relief through the PZR Safety Relief Valves (SRVs). FSAR Section 15.1.5.2 (page 15.1.5-7) states the operator will secure one of the two CSIPs to facilitate PZR level indication remaining on scale and controllable. At low fluid temperature (like those present in the PZR at this time). SRVs may not reset after fluid operation.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 (SPARE) Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 72 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 50% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to re-commence a power escalation from 50% to 100% power. The power increase is on hold for turnover. The SRO is expected to conduct a Lead Evaluator:

reactivity brief prior to commencing the power escalation.

This brief may be conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario.

Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to Run.

SRO GP-005, Step 136.e SRO/BOP Direct BOP to depress the GO button The crew should monitor diverse indications of power during the power escalation (Nls, Core AT, Turbine First Stage Pressure, Main Generator Output, ERFIS Continuous Evaluators Note: Calorimetric)

Crew may determine to allow rods to withdraw in automatic instead of diluting per reactivity plan. If so, ramp will continue without makeup.

. Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control

. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the power BOP escalation and informs crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO.

. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display increases.

. VERIFY Generator load is increasing.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 10 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page II p 72 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 50% power Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior

. MONITORS primary systems response.

. At 55 to 60% Reactor power, CHECK the following:

o ALB-13/5-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

RD o ALB-13/5-4, POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.

• IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for appropriate action. (NO)

RO OP-i 07.01, CVCS Boration, Dilution, and Chemistry Control If Blender Dilution (Alternate Dilution) Operation is for RCS temperature adjustments during steady state power Procedure Note: operations, Steps 5.3.2.1 through 5.3.2.3 are not applicable. Operator experience will dictate the required amount of makeup water needed.

. DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR Main Control Room status board.

RD

• DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration reduction required.

. DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added.

FIS-1 14 may be set for one gallon less than desired. A pressure transient caused by 1CS-151 shutting results in Procedure Note:

FIS-1 14 normally indicating one gallon more than actual flow but two gallons more would not be unexpected.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 -11 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 12 of 72 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 50% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid Procedure Caution and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-l 14, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity.

Dilution of the RCS will be dependent on charging and Procedure Note: letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase dilution rate of the RCS.

Setting RMUW flow controller for a desired flow rate greater than 90 gpm when performing a dilution in the normal dilute mode will result in a flow deviation alarm.

Procedure Caution: . .

The reduced flow in this configuration is due to the additional back pressure from the spray nozzles and letdown flow to the VCT.

. SET total makeup flow as follows:

. IF performing DIL in Step 5.3.2.8, THEN SET controller 1CS-151, FK-1 14 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal to 90 gpm.

RO

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.

• VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

• PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL OR the ALT DIL position.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 -12 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 72 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 50% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:

• PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:

pressure

• ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure

• Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron Concentration to less than 10 ppm.

At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before sample Procedure Note:

is taken.

• START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

RO o VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

. VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired quantity has been added.

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 14 of 72 Event

Description:

Power escalation from 50% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

RO . IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are stepping out to the desired height.

RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

RO . Is in the STOP position

. The green light is lit.

RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

START the makeup system as follows:

RO . TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

. VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.

Cue Event 2 Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm and Lead Evaluator: Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically, when satisfied with power escalation performance.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 2 Simulator Operator:

Radiation monitor 3502A failure Indications Available ALB-10-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM TROUBLE Responds to ALB-1O-4-5, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM RD TROUBLE. (APP response below)

If HP contacted to validate alarm wait one minute and then report that the monitor has failed.

Communicator: If someone other than HP is dispatched to investigate, wait three minutes and then report REM-3502 Gas Channel failed rio power, no indication.

There are automatic actions associated with the failed channel that have been blocked by malfunction. The BOP Evaluator Note: may take the actions to place equipment in the required position from directions in AOP-005 or do so lAW OWP RM-03.

The first section of this guide is written to the response of the APP and then AOP 005, Radiation Monitoring System. The second part is written as if it will be done in the OWP which provides minor additional actions not contained in the AOP (OWP implementation starts on page 22 of this guide).

APP-ALB-O1 0-4-5 response:

CREW CONFIRM alarm using:

. RM-23, Radiation Monitoring Panel Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 16 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purae fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Automatic Functions:

BOP . Automatic Actions are dependent upon which RM-23 Radiation Monitor is in ALARM PERFORM Corrective Actions:

. IF the alarm is a Fuel Handling Building High Radiation CREW alarm, THEN MANUALLY START the Spent Fuel Pool Purification System, using OP-i 1 6.01, Fuel Pool Cooling Purification System. (NO)

. IF the alarm is RM-21AV-3509-1SA or an Area Monitor in the vicinity of the VCT Valve Gallery and air is being purge from the VCT to the plant vent per OP-120.07, THEN MANUALLY SECURE the air purge from the VCT to the plant vent per OP-120.07. (NO)

. IF any radiation monitor is in alarm condition, THEN GO SRO TO AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System. (YES)

. IF maintenance is to be performed, THEN REFER TO OWP-RM, Radiation Monitoring.

(maintenance will be required)

. Diagnoses as a failure of Channel 3502A (GAS)

(May diagnose early)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action - Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 17 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System SRO Makes PA announcement (No Immediate Actions)

CHECK radiation levels NOT in HIGH ALARM:

• Area Radiation Monitors (YES Not in high Alarm)

. In-Plant Airborne Radiation Monitors (YES Not in high -

Alarm)

SRO

. NOTIFY Health Physics to perform the following:

• a. EVALUATE ANY alarm received using HPP-780, Radiation Monitoring Systems Operators Manual.

• b. IF necessary, THEN SURVEY the affected area.

When notified acknowledge request to investigate alarm Corn municator using HPP-780.

. CHECK ALL Stack Monitor radiation levels NOT in ALARM.

(YES Not in Alarm)

• CHECK ALL Process Monitors NOT in ALARM. (YES Not in Alarm)

. REFER TO the following:

• Tech Spec Section 3.3.3.1 4 hrs to restore or SRO declare monitor inoperable

• Tech Spec Section 3.3.2 Functional Unit 3.c.4 Action 27 With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are maintained closed.

• Tech Spec section 3.4.6.1 .a 30 day Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 -17 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 18 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purcie fails to isolate automatically Time Position A Applicants Actions or Behavior

. REFER TO the applicable attachment based on the SRO affected area or system monitors:

• Containment Monitors Attachment 1 p. 8 AOP-005, Attachment 1

• IF the plant is in Mode 5 or 6, THEN PERFORM the following:

• (N/A plant in Mode 1)

IF Containment Ventilation Isolation has actuated, THEN VERIFY proper equipment alignment using OMM-004, Post-Trip/Safeguards Actuation Review. (NO)

IF REM-Ol LT-3502ASA, Cnmt RCS Leak Detection Monitor, is in HIGH ALARM, THEN VERIFY Normal Containment Purge is ISOLATED, as follows:

SRO

• VERIFY BOTH Cnmt Normal Purge Supply Fans are STOPPED:

• AH-82A

• AH-82B

• VERIFY ALL Cnmt Normal Purge Inlet/Discharge Dampers are SHUT:

• 1CP-5SA

• 1CP-9SA

• 1CP-3SB

• 1CP-6SB Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 19 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• Places AH-82A, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases

. Places AH-82B, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases BOP . Verifies 1 CP-5, Normal Purge Inlet CLOSED

• Verifies 1CP-9, Normal Purge Inlet CLOSED

• Verifies 1CP-3, Normal Purge Discharge CLOSED

. Verifies 1CP-6, Normal Purge Discharge CLOSED

. Notes that no further actions in AOP-005 Att. 1 are applicable. Reviews the remainder of the section and reaches step to EXIT procedure SRO

. Direct BOP to perform Attachment 10, Containment Leak Detection Log for REM-Ol LT-3502A5A Gas (included in following pages)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 19 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 20 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM I Attachment 10 Sheet 1 of 2 Containment Leak Detection Log REM-OILT-3502ASA Gas Person(s) Performing

Attachment:

Initials Name (Print) Initials Name (Print)

Comments:

Attachment Started: Time Date Attachment Completed: Time Date Reviewed By: UNIT SCO (Night Shift)

UNIT SCO (Day Shift)

Approved By Date Unit SCO After receiving the final review signature, this AOP attachment becomes a CA record and should be submitted to Document Services AOP-005 Rev. 27 Page 28 of 32 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 20 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 21 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM I Attachment 10 Sheet 2 of 2 Containment Leak Detection Log REM-OILT-3SO2ASA

- - Gas Date OST-1026 Unidentified Leakage = gpm (1) Higher Sump Leakage (URE9001 or URE9002) at time of OST-1026 apm UNIDENJIFIED LEAKAGE f 2) (3) (4) (5)

Time Monitor Monitor New OST-1 026 Time Between reqinred? Comments Reading Factor Readins (Yes/No)

(I) Determine a new value at each OST-1 026 performance and note in comments.

This value is the INITIAL LEAK RATE used for CURVE H-S.

(2) If new date, then carryover last data entry from previous log sheet.

(3) Monitor Factor current reading previous reading.

(4) Plot the monitor factor versus sump leak rate on CURVE H-S.

• Monitor factors less than or equal to 1005 shall be treated as 10.

• If leak rate s greater than 5 gpm, then treat it as equal to 5 gpm.

(S) Locate the point relative to the curve for the closest time interval beteieen readings.

• If the monitor factor is above the appropriate (time) line on CURVE H-S.

then perform a new OST- 1026.

-- END OF ATTACHMENT 10--

AOP-005 Rev.27 Page2Oof32 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 21 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 22 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purcie fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: The following section is utilized if AOP-005 actions are not utilized:

Implement OWP-RM-03, CONTAINMENT LEAK DETECTION SRO RADIATION MONITORS.

BOP Performs OWP-RM-03 component lineup:

Procedure Caution: The control switches for AH-82A and AH-82B must be taken to STOP momentarily to ensure they will not AUTO start.

. Places AH-82A, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Places AH-82B, Normal Containment Supply Fan, in STOP and releases.

• Verifies 1CP-6, Normal Purge InletCLOSED.

. Verifies 1 CP-9, Normal Purge Inlet CLOSED.

BOP

. Verifies 1CP-3, Normal Purge Discharge CLOSED

. Verifies 1 CP-5, Normal Purge Discharge CLOSED

• Contact AO to place 1D21-2B, AH-82 (1A-NNS) Normal Containment Purge Makeup Air Handler breaker in OFF

• Contact AO to place 1 E21 -2F, AH-82 (1 B-NNS) Normal Containment Purge Makeup Air Handler breaker in OFF Review/prepare OWP-RM-03 LCO Action Log.

SRO Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 22 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 23 of 72 Event

Description:

Radiation Monitor 3502A high alarm, Containment Purge fails to isolate automatically Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters TS 3.3.3.1, Action b

• Table 3.3-6:

o Action 26 Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1 and; o Action 27 With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are maintained closed).

SRO Enters TS 3.4.6.1, Action a With a. and c. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable:

o Can operate up to 30 days o Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> o Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of the radiation monitor.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Evaluator Note: Cue Event 3 (AH-39 Containment Fan trip) after BOP completes alignment and the SRO has identified the Tech Specs.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 23 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 24 of 72 Event

Description:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP coolinci fan)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3 Simulator Operator:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit Fan trip Indications Available ALB-029-4-5 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-39 LOW FLOW O/L -

BOP RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS ALB-029-4-5 CONFIRM alarm using:

o AH-39 fans running indication (NO) o Damper position indication (YES)

. VERIFY Automatic Functions:

o Running fan trips (YES) a Backup fan starts (NO) (BOP starts the standby fan, may utilize OP-i 69 section 5.2))

BOP

. PERFORM Corrective Actions:

a CHECK standby fan STARTS AND lead fan STOPS.

a DISPATCH an operator to check status of the following breakers:

• 1D1-1A, AH-39 (iA-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler

• 1 El -7C, AH-39 (1 B-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler Communicator: Three minutes after being dispatched to check the breaker for 1D1-1A, AH-39 (1A-NNS) CNMT Fan cooler breaker, report that The indications on the Static Trip Unit show that an Overload Condition occurred for AH-39 A fan.

There are no abnormalities on the AH-39B breaker.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 25 of 72 Event

Description:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF any breaker has tripped on OVERLOAD or SHORT CIRCUIT as indicated on the Static Trip Unit, THEN PERFORM the following: (Directs AO to perform based on report from communicator) o DEPRESS the breaker Alarm Reset.

BOP o RACK OUT the breaker using OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution.

o VERIFY cause of the over current trip is determined prior to returning the breaker to service.

Communicator: Acknowledge request to perform directed actions at 1D1-1A Simulator Operator: Rack out breaker 1 Dl -1 A for AH-39 Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of AH-39.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Evaluator Note: The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 4 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

after BOP completes alignment and the Communicator reports breaker conditions as the AO.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 25 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 26 of 72 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Indications Available: . ALB-014-1-2, Loop A Hi Steam Line AP Low-P1

. ALB-014-1-4, Loop A Hi Steam Line Press Rate Alert

. ALB-014-4-2A, Loop A Low Stm Line Press Alert

. P 1-475 SA failing to 0

• SG FF/SF mismatch

• SG level lowering BOP/RO RESPONDS to alarms and evaluates ALB-014.

lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL Evaluator Note: control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure.

• CONFIRM alarm using P1-474.1 SB, P1-484.1 SB, and P1-494 SB, Steam Generator A pressure.

o Reports P1-475 reading or failing low.

. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE

. PERFORM Corrective Actions:

o Dispatch an operator to investigate for feed line BOP break and steam line rupture (NONE) o Check Containment press, temp, and humidity for evidence of a Containment leak (NO) o CHECK for failed instrument (YES) o IF failed instrument identified then remove the failed instrument from service Restores level to normal (57% NR).

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 27 of 72 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. Should provide guidance to maintain A SG level to be maintained between 52 to 62% lAW OMM-OO1, Attachment 13 SRO

. Refer to OWP-ESF-02 to remove channel from service.

. Contacts l&C to have channel removed from service.

. Dispatch AC to investigate Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service Evaluators Note:

to continue the scenario.

Enters Instrumentation TS TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 14 Steam Generator Water Level Low Coincident With Steam! Feedwater Flow Mismatch

• ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and!or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met;

. however, the inoperable channel may be SRO bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

TS 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit item 1 .e and 4.d

. ACTION 19. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the followinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

BOP Place turbine in hold Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 27 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 28 of 72 Event

Description:

Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation Directs operator and l&C to perform OWP-ESF-02 SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-O01, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A SG PT-475

. Acknowledge request to perform OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 Communicator:

failure.

Simulator Operator: Not required to implement OWP prior to continuing with scenario. Run APP-OWP-ESF-02-II I-TST when directed.

OWP-ESF-02 is attached at the end of scenario, see Attachment 1 While the crew is processing OWP-ESF-02 for PT-475 the Evaluator Note: .

scenario may continue.

Cue Event 5 (CSIP A trip) after SG level is under control and the TS has been identified.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 /6 Page 29 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator:

A CSIP trip Indications Available ALB-06-1-1 CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER HIGH-LOW FLOW ALB-06-1-2 CHRG PUMP A TROUBLE ALB-06-1-3 CHRG PUMP A TRIP OR CLOSE CKT TROUBLE ALB-08-2-1 RCP SEAL WATER INJECTION LOW FLOW

. RESPONDS to multiple alarms on ALB-06 (1-1, 1 -2, 1 -3)

RD and ALB-08-2-1.

. REPORTS CSIP A tripped.

Identifies Entry Conditions met for AOP-018, Reactor Coolant CREW Pump Abnormal Conditions PERFORMS immediate actions.

. CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

Immediate

• ISOLATE letdown by verifying the following valves SHUT:

RO Action o 1 CS-7, 45 GPM Letdown Orifice A o 1 CS-8, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice B o 1CS-9, 60 GPM Letdown Orifice C Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6 Page 30 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENTERS AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry BOP Dispatch operators to investigate cause of trip If dispatched to investigate, wait 3-4 minutes then report a breaker overcurrent trip flag on Phase A. Report as Communicator:

second AO that there are no obvious problems at the pump.

Informs SM to REFER to PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification SRO and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

Minimum allowable flow for a CSIP is 60 gpm which is provided by normal miniflow during normal operation and Procedure Note: alternate miniflow during safety injection. Maintaining CSIP flow greater than or equal to 60 gpm also satisfies this requirement.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate SRO section:

MALFUNCTION SECTION PAGE Loss of CCW and/or Seal Injection to 3.1 5 RCPs CHECK ALB-5-i -2A, RCP Thermal Bar HDR High Flow, alarm CLEAR. (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5I6 Page 31 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1.

SRO (YES)

. CHECK ALL RCPs RUNNING. (YES)

• CHECK the following NORMAL for ALL RCPs:

RO o CCW flow (YES) o Seal Injection flow (NO)

SRO RESTORE using the applicable attachment:

MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT Loss of Seal Injection flow only Attachment 4 (Page 33)

The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes and 45 seconds Procedure Note:

from timer initiation.

The ASI system when actuated will provide RCP seal injection of highly borated water. During the time the ASI Evaluator Note: pump is running a negative reactivity addition is being conducted in the form of boration. The sooner the system is shut down the less effect it will have on reactivity.

. CHECK at least one CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

RO

• Dispatch an operator to monitor operation of the ASI System Communicator: Acknowledge request.

Be prepared to STOP the ASI pump when requested to.

Simulator Operator:

RF CVC 195 STOP Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 31 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5I6 Page 32 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Position Time N Applicants Actions or Behavior PLACE controller FK-122.i, Charging Flow in MANUAL AND SHUT.

. SHUT HC-186.i, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

. VERIFY a suction path for the standby CSIP by performing the following:

o VERIFY CSIP suction flowpath from VCT as follows:

RD

• VERIFY greater than 5% level is established in VCT. (YES)

• VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:

. LCV-i 1 5C, VCT Outlet (1 CS-i 65)

(YES)

. LCV-i 1 5E, VCT Outlet (1 CS-i 66)

(YES)

Provide Pressurizer level control bands and trip limits per SRO OMM-0Oi Att. 13 Control band Maintain level within 5% of Reference level trip limits of 10% low and 90% high Procedure Caution: Low VCT level is a precursor to gas binding the CSIPs CHECK VCT level is greater than 5%, AND STABLE OR RD RISING (YES)

RD MAINTAIN CCW HX outlet temperature less than 105°F.

RD START the standby CSIP. (Starts B CSIP)

CHECK seal injection flow being supplied by the ASI System.

RD (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 32 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6 Page 33 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO OPEN HO-i 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow.

DIRECT the operator monitoring the ASI System to STOP the RD ASI Pump by placing CS-210.1, ASI PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in STOP.

(At the ASI System Control Panel)

Communicator: Acknowledge request to secure the ASI pump Secure the ASI pump when communications are complete Simulator Operator:

CVC 195 STOP Communicator: Report back that the ASI pump is secured ADJUST HO-i 86.1, RCP Seal WTR INJ Flow, to establish seal injection flow as necessary to maintain the following:

RD

. Less than 31 gpm total flow to all RCPs.

. Between 8 and 13 gpm to all RCPs.

DIRECT the operator monitoring the ASI System to PLACE RD CS-210.1, ASI PUMP MOTOR CONTROL SWITCH, in AUTO.

(At the ASI System Control Panel)

Communicator: Acknowledge request Place ASI control back to AUTO Simulator Operator:

CVC 195 AUTO report back to MCR when back in AUTO Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5/6 Page 34 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior START CSIP room ventilation per OP-i 72, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC System.

BOP IF B Train is being started, THEN PLACE the following Air Handling Units control switches to START AND VERIFY proper damper and valve operation (if they start):

. CSIP SB AREA FAN COOLER AH-9 B SB RESTORE Charging and Letdown flow per OP-107, Chemical RO and Volume Control System.

OP-i 07, Chemical and Volume Control System is included Evaluator Note:

at the end of this scenario. (See Attachment 3)

Start B Chiller per OP-148, section 5.2.

BOP Contact AC for Chiller pre-start checks (NOTE: At this time the crew may only start Pump P-4 B)

OP-i 48, section 5.2 is included at the end of this scenario.

Evaluator Note: (See Attachment 3) NOT intended to start the Chiller Continue with scenario.

iection has added negative he cause of the loss of the CSIP.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 /6 Page 35 of 72 Event

Description:

A CSIP Trip I Restore Letdown Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm has been RD established to all RCPs.

WHEN seal injection flow has been established between 8 and 13 gpm, THEN PERFORM OST-1 126, Reactor Coolant Pump RD Seals Controlled Leakage Evaluation Monthly Interval Modes 1 -4.

RD CHECK CCW flow is established to the RCPs.

SRO EXIT this procedure. (AOP-O1 8)

Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of the CSIP.

Contacts support personnel for repairs.

ENTERS TS:

. 3.1.2.2, Boron Injection Flowpaths SRO

• 3.1.2.4, CSIPs

. 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems All are 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore action statements.

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 7 (Pressurizer Spray Evaluator Note: Valve PCV-444D fails open) after Tech Spec evaluation is completed.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 35 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 36 of 72 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN (w/manual control available)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 7 Simulator Operator:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails Open When Pressurizer Spray Valve PCV-444D tails open, PZR pressure will decrease and all PZR heaters will energize.

Annunicators for PZR low pressure will alarm. The crew should respond by entering AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Evaluator Note: Pressure Control, and placing the malfunctioning spray valve in manual per the immediate actions. RCS pressure may drop below the DNB limit depending on how fast the operator responds to the failure. If so, the SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.2.5, DNB Parameters.

. ALB-09-3-3 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL Indications Available

• ALB-09-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS

• Pressurizer Pressure decreasing

• Responds to ALB-09 alarms.

no

• Reports malfunction in the RCS Pressure Control system.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

cAppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenailo # 4 Event # 7 Page 37 of 72 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN (w/manual control available)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE SRO CONTROL.

Makes PA announcement Perform AOP-O1 9 Immediate Actions.

. CHECK that a bubble exists in the PRZ. (YES)

. VERIFY ALL PRZ PORVs AND associated block valves Immediate Actions RO properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (YES)

• CHECK Both PRZ spray valves properly positioned for current PRZ pressure and plant conditions. (NO)

The malfunction only affects PCV-444D. It is expected that Evaluator Note: the operator will recognize that only one spray valve is malfunctioning and operate that controller in MANUAL.

• CONTROL PRZ spray valves in MANUAL using ONE of the following (listed in order of preference):

. AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning)

Immediate OR Actions

• PK-444A, Master Pressure Controller OR

• Both individual spray valve controllers Reports lAs complete Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 37 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 38 of 72 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN (w/manual control available)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• GO TO Section 3.1, Pressure Control Malfunctions While Operating With a Pressurizer Bubble.

SRO . Inform SSO to REFER to PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

MONITOR PRZ pressure by observing other reliable RO indications.

SRO CHECK plant in MODE 1 OR 2. (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 38 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 39 of 72 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN (w/manual control available)

Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior

• CHECK PRZ pressure CONTROLLED. (YES)

• CHECK PRZ pressure 2335 PSIG OR LESS. (YES)

• CHECK ALL of the following PRZ PORV block valves OPEN:

o 1 RC-1 17 (for PCV-445A SA) (YES) o 1 RC-1 15 (for PCV-445B) (YES) o 1 RC-1 13 (for PCV-444B SB) (YES)

• CHECK that a malfunction of one or more of the following has occurred:

o PT-444 (NO) o PK-444A (NO) o PRZ heater(s) (NO) o PRZ spray valve(s) or controller(s) (YES 1 RC-1 03 in AUTO)

• CHECK PK-444A controlling properly in AUTO. (YES)

RO

• CONTROL PRZ pressure as follows:

o CHECK BOTH PRZ spray valve controllers in AUTO AND BOTH spray valves operating as desired.

(NO) o VERIFY PRZ Spray Valve controllers in ONE of the following alignments:

AFFECTED Spray Valve controller in MANUAL (if only one is obviously malfunctioning) (YES) o OPERATE Spray Valves as necessary to control PZR pressure.

o CHECK ALL PRZ heaters operating as desired.

(YES)

• CHECK at least one of the following conditions present:

o PRZ pressure is UNCONTROLLED (NO) o Status of a normal spray valve or a PRZ heater bank is UNCONTROLLED (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 40 of 72 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve, PCV-444D, fails OPEN (w/manual control available)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB Parameters) AND IMPLEMENT action where appropriate. (Limit is 2185 psig SRO restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />)

. Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist and contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

The Lead Evaluator can cue Event 8 (Feedline break on B Evaluator Note: SG outside containment) once the plant has stabilized back in its normal pressure band.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 40 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 41 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG Feedline Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A Feedline Break outside Containment from the B SG will occur requiring tripping the Reactor and entry into PATH-i. Thirty seconds after the Reactor is tripped, B SG safety will fail open. The crew will initiate a MSL Isolation.

The crew should diagnose that a LOCA is NOT in progress Evaluator Note: and transition to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

AFW isolation will not occur for the B SG, requiring manual action to isolate the AFW flow to the B SG.

Source Range channel Nl-31 will fail to energize due to lR Nl-35 compensating voltage failure.

On cue from the Lead Evaluator, insert Trigger 8 Simulator Operator:

(Feedline break outside Containment)

Ten seconds after initiating the malfunction, report EXCITEDLY as a NLO that There is big break somewhere in the NORTH end of the turbine building. Cannot see Communicator: anything because the entire Building is full of steam.

IF crew does not manually trip Reactor then call 5555 as Security and report a large pipe is broken in the Turbine building and there is steam everywhere.

. Multiple alarms on ALB-0i4 associated with the B SG Indications Available . Lowering level in the B SG

. B SG FF/STM Flow mismatch

. Identity secondary transient CREW

. Identify feedline rupture

. Direct tripping the Reactor SRO

• Direct Main Steam Line Isolation

• Direct initiation of Safety Injection Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 41 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 42 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG Feedline Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Manually trips the Reactor Enters PATH-i SRO Makes PA announcement for Reactor Trip VERIFY Reactor Trip:

. AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:

. CHECK for any of the following:

Immediate o Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES)

RO Action o Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) o ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) o NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)

VERIFY Turbine Trip:

. CHECK for any of the following:

o ALL turbine throffle valves SHUT (YES)

Immediate BOP o ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (YES)

. VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses o 1A-SA AND 1 B-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs. (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 42 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 43 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Actuation:

• CHECK for any of the following LIT o SI Actuated bypass permissive light (NO) o ALB-1 1 2 (NO) o ALB-1 1 1 (NO) o ALB-1 1 3 (NO)

Immediate ALB-12-1-4 (NO)

RO o Action CHECK SI Actuation criteria:

• CNMT pressure GREATER THAN 3.0 PSIG (NO)

. PRZ pressure LESS THAN 1850 PSIG (NO)

• Steam pressure LESS THAN 601 PSIG (NO)

. SI Actuation REQUIRED (NO manually directed)

Verifies SI actuation One minute after the trip, report as Outside AO that one SG Communicator:

safety is open on the B SG.

Perform the following:

. Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status SRO Trees.

• Evaluate EAL Matrix CREW Foldout A Applies.

When conditions met, trip all RCPs based on Foldout Page A.

RO

. Secures ALL RCPs and reports to SRO when complete Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 44 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING (YES)

Check SI Flow:

RO

. SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

Check Main Steam Isolation:

. Main Steam Isolation ACTUATED (YES)

BOP

. Main Steam Isolation REQUIRED (YES)

. Verify all MSIV5 and bypass valves SHUT (YES)

Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG (YES)

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW PATH-i Attachment 6 without Evaluator Note: SRO approval.

The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable.

Check AFW Status:

. AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

BOP . Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

BOP or Crew may identify that B SG AFW isolation Evaluator Note: should have occurred but did not and isolate AFW to the B SG at any time prior to guidance from the procedure Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 44- Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 45 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Direct RAB AC to locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for BOP the CSIP suction AND discharge cross-connect valves:

(Refer to Attachment 1 1.)

Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves per PATH-i Attachment ii Run APPcvcPath-i Att. 6 CSIP suction valve power Simulator Operator: when the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-i Attachment ii is complete.

Directs AC to place 1A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place 1A and lB Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22 When directed to place the i A and 1 B Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode:

Run APP\air\acs_to_local When the APP for i A and i B Air Compressor has Communicator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 45 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 46 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Control RCS Temperature:

Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1.

TAELE 1: RCS TEMPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINES POLLOWING RI TRIP Guidance is applinable until another procedure directs otLerwise

• j no RCPs running, IliEN se i4e range cold leg temperature ECS TEMPERATURE TREND LESS TRAM GREATER TRAM STASLE AT OR 557P AND 551F AND TRENDING TO DECREASING INCREASING 557?

. Stop dumping

• condenser

• Control feed RO/BOP steam available flow and steam transfer dump to

• ControL feed steam dump to establish and flow STEM PRESSURE maintain RCS mode using temperature

• Majntain total OP-126. between 555F feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559!

OPERATOR greatac than AND dump steam ACTION 210 KPPE tO condenser until Level greater than OR -

25 E4OJ i at least one

• Dump steam on intact SG using intact S PORVe

• I! cooldown contiaue,

• Control feed THEN, abut flow to NSIVs AND maintain SG EYPASS Yalves levels Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 46 - Revision 2

Appendix D - Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 47 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves:

. Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 ENERGIZED

. Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

. Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO/BOP . PRZ spray valves SHUT (YES)

Identify Any Faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

. Any SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES B SG)

Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

The SR nuclear instrumentation will fail to energize due to Evaluator Note: under compensation on NI-35. When recognized, the crew should take action to manually energize the SR NIS.

SR failure: IR Nl-35B MCB Amps i0 amps, IR Nl-36B MCB Amps 10h1 amps When SR instrument failure to energize is recognized, take the CREW following switches to RESET

• SOURCE RANGE TRAIN A TRIP BLOCK

• SOURCE RANGE TRAIN B TRIP BLOCK CHECK that Source Range detector high voltage is energized GO TO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR SRO ISOLATION, Step 1 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 47 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 48 of 72 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION

. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: . Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

. Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

. Verify all MSIVs SHUT (YES)

. Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES)

. Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

BOP/RO

• Identify Any Faulted SG:

• Check for any of the following:

o Any SG pressure DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES) o Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 49 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG AFW Auto Isolation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Faulted SG(s):

o Verify faulted SG(s) PORV SHUT (YES) o Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT (YES) o Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation Critical valves to faulted SG(s) SHUT (NO)

BOP/RO Task

• IF NO, close isolation valves (Shuts isolation valves)

Critical task is to isolate FW to the Faulted SG prior to exiting EPP-014 (Auto AFW isolation is tailed)

. Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT

• SGB:1MS-70

• SGC:1MS-72 o IF Open, close 1 MS-70 (SHUTS)

. Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs SHUT: -

BOP/RO

• SG A: 1 MS-231 (YES)

• SG B: 1 MS-266 (YES)

. SG C: 1 MS-301 (YES)

. Verify SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES)

. Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves SHUT (YES)

Check CST Level GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured it it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 49 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 50 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG AFW Auto Isolation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. Check Secondary Radiation:

. Check for all of the following:

• SG blowdown radiation NORMAL (YES)

BOP/RO

• Main steamline radiation NORMAL (YES)

• Check SG Levels:

. Any level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

. Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

o SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

• Check SI Termination Criteria:

RO/BOP o Check Subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F]

C 20°F [50°F] M (YES)

(Note the C and M above refers to how subcooling is calculated. C is by the Computer, M is Manual)

. Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following:

o Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

BOP/RO o Total feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES or Available) o RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES) o PRZ level GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 50 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 51 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG AFW Auto Isolation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Reset SI SRO Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of directions Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.)

to crew

• Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. (Resets Phase A Phase B not actuated)

• Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

RO/BOP o Open the following valves:

• 1IA-8i9

• iSl-287

. Stop All But One CSIP (Only one running)

. Check RCS Pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Isolate High Head SI Flow:

. Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RO/BOP

• Open normal minif low isolation valves:

• 1CS-i82

• 1CS-i96

• 1CS-2i0

• 1CS-214 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 51 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 52 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG AFW Auto Isolation Failure Time H Position Applicants Actions or vior Shut BIT outlet valves:

. 1 Sl-3 (Critical Task must shut prior to water relief from PZR SRVs)

. 1 SI-4 (Critical Task must shut prior to water relief Critical from PZR SRV5)

RO Task Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT -

. 1SI-52

. lSl-86

. 1SI-107 Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing.

. Establish Charging Lineup:

o Shut charging flow control valve: FK-1 22.1 (ALREADY CLOSED)

RO/BOP

• Open charging line isolation valves:

o 1CS-235 (MUST OPEN) o 1 CS-238 (MUST OPEN)

RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of Procedure Note:

PRZ level trend.

Monitor RCS Hot Leg Temperature:

RO/BOP

. Check RCS hot leg temperature STABLE (YES)

Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution:

damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 10 Page 53 of 72 Event

Description:

B SG AFW Auto Isolation Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

. Control charging using charging flow control valve:

. FK-122.1 RO/BOP

. Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM.

. PRZ Level CAN BE MAINTAINED STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

SRO GO TO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1.

Lead Evaluator On Transition to EPP-008 TERMINATE THE SCENARIO

__Simulator Operator When directed by Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 53 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OW P-ES F-02 Sheet 1 of 8 EIR Number:

W/O Number:

1. OW P-ESF-02 Clearance Number:

2 System: ESFAS

3. Component: SG Steam Pressure Loop I

4. Scope: LCO Action required due to inoperable SG A Pressure Protection Channels II.

Ill, or IV tPT-474, PT-475, or PT-476)

5. Applicable Requirements: 3.3.1, 3.32, 3.3.3.5a and 3.3.3.6

6. Precautions: (1) Ensure only one channel is in TEST at a time, (2) See NOTE on Sheets 3 and 5. (3) The ERRS Continuous calorimetric may be inoperable.

7. Component Iineups completed per attached sheet (s)

Signature Date

8. Testing required on redundant equipment while component is inoperable None

9. Testing/Action required to restore operability. (NIA if tracked on EIR)

MST-l0007 for Channel II MST-10008 for Channel Ill MST-I0009 for Channel IV Signature Date

10. Component lineups restored per attached sheet (s)

Signature Date

11. Remarks:

12. Reviewed by:

Superintendent- Shift Operations Date After receiving the final review signature, this OWP becomes a QA Record and should be submitted to Document Services.

OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page 9 of 51 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 D P-ES F-02 Sheet 2 of 8 Bistable /SLaLus Liuhi Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Positori Component_ID or Number Initial/Verified I nitialNerified Steamline ressure ChinneI II PlC Cahint 2 on Card C2-846 NOT!: Coiicuaieiit veri1iciLioii is piefeiled while tiippng bitebles N

BS1 (PB/474A Lo Steamline Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST NORMAL 652 (PB!474C H Steamline Pressure Rate MSLS) TEST / NORMAL 8S3 (PB/474B1 P1 P2 for AFW Isolatior) TEST / NORMAL BS4 (PB!474B2 P2 > P1 for AFW Isolatior) TEST / NORMAL PLC Cabinet 2 on Card C2-848 BS3 (PB/494B1 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolatior) TEST NORMAL BS4 (PB/494B2 P3 > P110!

AFW lsolatior) TEST / NORMAL Trip Status Light Box-I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 474A (Window 1-2) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED STMLt\ A IP RATE PD 474C (Window 4-2) FNFRGI7Ffl / flF-FNFRGI7Ffl STMLN B HI DIP PB 47481 (Window 7-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN CHI DIFF PB 49481 (Window 9-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERCIZED STMLN AHI 01FF PS 474B2 (Window 10-2) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED STMLN AHI 01FF PB 494B2 (Window 12-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED On ERRS Computer (Using ER Functicn)

PMS0474 Dted 1mm Restored to Processing i Processing OW-ESF I Rev. 21 Page 10 of 51 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 55 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 DWP-ESF-02 Sheet3of 8 Bisteblo /Status L*ciht Lineup Position for Maintna,c.e Rostororl Position Compo9enl ID or Number hitial/Venfied Inifia:Nerifjed Sleamilne Pressure Channel Ill NOTF SG A level channels ossociated with Loop 1 SF/FF Mismatch RPS signals nJst remain OPEflABLE LB47B & LR475B not tripped) and SC A Ieel must be inainthred dbuve kw lvI sluinttv pieclude SFiFF v1isrrwhTh Reclur Trip.

(circ9 position selected)

STM GENI A FW ftQW CHAN 4 lb CONTROL ND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 476 / CHAN 477 (ci de position selected)

STM G[N A STM FLOW CHAN 17l CONTROL AND RECORDER or ShLhCIUR CHAN47% J CHAN475 P C Cahinrt 3 on (od C3-4 NOTE: This switch may ba e-pocitioned for toubIeshooting. It is rot racuired to ba n TEST to moot Tech Spc:cs. Oporting this switch firs: aids in troLbleshooting by maintairing system conditions the same as they were wher the trouble occurred.

SW3 (P-0475 Master Test Switchl TEST / NORMAL PC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-3E1 NOTE: Concurrert verification is preferred while tripping bistab.es.

BSl (PB4TA Lo Starnline Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST / NORMAL /

652 (F647C Hi Sternlire PressureRa:eMSIS) TEST / NORMAL /

6S3 (FB;47EB1 1 > P2 for AFW hueLioii) TEST / NORM:AL /

BS4 (PB47EB2 2 P1 for AFN lso ation) TEST 1 NORMAL /

OWF-ESF Rev 21 Page II oT5l Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet4of8 Bistable !Status Light Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number Initiaif\/erified Initial/Verified Steamline Pressure Channel Ill (continued)

PLC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-855 BS3 (P81495B1 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL BS4 (P8/49582 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL PLC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-845 BS1 (FB1478B SF/FF Mismatch Rx Trip) TEST / NORMAL PLC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-848 ES I (FB1478C SF1FF Alarm) TEST / NORMAL Trip Status Light Box-I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 475A Window 1-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HP RATE PB 475C (Window 4-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN B HI DIFF PB 47581 (Window 7-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN C HI DIFF PB 495B1 (Window 9-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI DIFF PB 475B2 (Window 10-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI DIFF PB 495B2 (Window 12-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED Trip Status Light Box-2 SO A FW <STM FB 4788 (Window 1-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED On ERFIS Computer (IJsing DR Function)

DSflA75 Deleted from Restored to Processing / Processing OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page 12 of 51 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 57 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 OW P-ES F-02 Sheet S of 8 Bistable /Status Liciht Lineup Pos tion for Mairtenance Restored Position Component ID or Numrber InritLil/Ver ilied lrritialVer fled Steamline Pressure Channel IV NOTE: SG A level chanrels assocated with Loop 1 SFIFF Mismatch RPS signals mist ierrin OPERA8_E (LB!4746 & LP14755 riot tripped) nrd SO A level irrusl be maintained above low level Setpoiflt b preclude a SF/FF Misrrat:h Reactor Trip.

circle position selected)

SlM(hNAFW I-LOW Cl-fAN 476 CON RUL AND RhCURULR or SELECTOR CHAN 477 / CHAN 477 (circlo position soloctod)

STM GEN A STM FLOW CHN 474 CON HUL AND HhCORDR or SE.+/-CTOR CHAN 474 / C HAN 475 PlC Cabinet 4 on Curd C4-8$3 NOTE: Iris switch may be re-positioned for :roubleshcotng t is not requred to be n TEST to meet Tech S2ecs Operating this switch first aids in troubeshooting by maintaining system ccnditions the same as they were when the troube occurreth SW3 (P-0476 Maste Test Switch) TEST / NORMAL OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Pe 13 of 51 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 58 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OW P-ES F-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 6 of 8 Bistable /Status Light Lineup Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued)

Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component D or Number Initial/Verified nitialNerified PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 04-834 NOTE: Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables BS (PB/476A Lo Steamline Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST I NORMAL I BS2 (P514760 Hi Steamline Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST / NORMAL CAUTION If BS3 (P5/47651) or BS-4 (PS147GB2) are being placed to TEST (tripped condition) to satisfy Tech Spec Table 3.3-3, Action 19. removal of any ONE of the following cards will remove the channel from the tripped condition; thus no longer meeting the action statement to be in the tripped condition: (Reference NCR 350586)

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 04-548

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 04-834

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 04-848 BS3 (P5/47GB 1 P1 P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL BS4 (PB1476B2 P2> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL /

INSTRUCTION 1, DIRECT l&C to perform continuity testing of BS3 and 5S4 above using the Restoration section of MST-10009:

• 0S3 continuity check complete

• 6S4 continuity check complete OWP-ESP Rev 21 Page 14 oLJ Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 59 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OW P-ESF-02 Sheet7of8 Bistable iStatus Light Lineup Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued>

Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number Initial/Verified Initial/Verified PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-843 CAUTION If BS3 (PB!496B1) or BS-4 (PS1496B2) are being placed to TEST tripped condition) to satisfy Tech Spec Table 3.3-3, Action 19. removal of any ONE of the following cards will remove the channel from the tripped condition; thus no longer meeting the action statement to be in the tripped condition; (Reference NCR 350586)

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-549

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-843

• PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-848 PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-843 BS3 (PB/496B1 P1 P3 for AEW isolation) TEST NORMAL BS4 (PB1496B2 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL /

INSTRUCTION

2. DIRECT I&C to perform continuity testing of BS3 and BS4 above using the Restoration section of MST-10009;

• 8S3 continuity check complete

• BS4 continuity check complete OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page 15of5 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OW P-ES F-02 Sheet 8 of 8 Bistable /Status Light Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number Initial/Verified Initial/Verified Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued)

PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-828 BS1 (FB)478A SFJFF Mismatch Rx Trip) TEST / NORMAL PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-831 851 çPB/478D SF;FP Alarm) TEST NORMAL Trip Status Light Box- I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 47GA (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HP RATE PB 476C (Window 4-4) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN B HI DIFF PB 476B1 (Window 7-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN C HI DIFF PB 49681 (Window 9-4) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI DIFF PB 476B2 (Window 10-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI DIFF PB 496B2 (Window 12-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED Trip Status Light Box-2 SGAFW <STMFB478A (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED On ERFIS Computer (Using DR Function PMS0476 Deleted from Restored to Processing / Processing OWP-ESF Rev 21 Page 16 of 51]

Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 61 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2 OP-i 07, CVCS Restore Letdown 5.4, Initiating Normal Letdown 5.4,1. Initial Conditions

1. Chargng flow has been established per Section E.3.

2. Pressurizer Ieve is greater than I 7%.

3. The following valves are shut:

• lCS-(,4 GPMLLIUOWN ORIFICA

• 1CS-8, 60 GPM LETDOWN ORIFICE B

• ICS-9, 60 GPM LETDOWN ORIFICE C 5.4.2. Procedural Steps CAUTION If Charging flow was stopped or greatly reduced prior to letdown being secured, there s a possibility that the Letdown line contains voids due to insufficient cooling. This is a precursor to water hamrne. and should be evaluated prior to initialing letdown Vow.

1. VERIFY 1CC-337, K-144 LTDN TEMPERATURE, controller is:

a lflAlJTO AND

• Set for 110 to l20F (4.0 to 4.7 on pDtentiometer) normal operation OR

• Set for 90 to 120T (2.67 to 4.7 on pDtentiometer) if opeioting per Section R 11 NOTE: PK-1 45.1 LTDN PRESSURE, ICS-38, may haie to be adjusted to control at bwer pressur9s.

2. VERIFY 1CS-38 CcntroILe, PK- 145.1 LTDN PRESSURE, in MAN with ouut set at 50%

OP-107 Rev. 89 Page 25 of 135 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 62 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2 OP-107, CVCS Restore Letdown

&42 Precedurl Steps (continued

3. VERIFY OPEN the foflewing Letdown Isolation Valves:

1C-2. LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-459 105-1, LETDOWN ISOLATION LCV-4s30

4. VE1FY OPEN 106-11. LETDOWN ISOLATION.

NOTE: Th following table gives the minimum charg.ng flow required to keep the rogonoratve heat exchanger lomporeturo below tho high temperature alarm when letdown is established Letdown fow (to be established) Mirimum Charging Flow necessary when letdown s established 45gpm 2ogpm 50 gpm 2 gpm 05 gpm 46 gpm 20 gpm 63 gprn NOTE: If Pressurizer level is above tIe orogrammed Iee: setpoint, charging flow should be adjusted :o point above the minimum required to reet tegeiieiutve hedi exchanger high leInpeitue Iirrr bul. low eiruuh to reduce pressurizer level. (Reerence ESR 9500066

5. ADJUST controfler 1CS-231, FK-122:l CHARGING FLOW, as required to:

• ViIlLllE ncmal pwssuu.ei level piogiain.

• Keep regenerative heat exchanger temperature below the high temperature alarm when the desired ledown orifice is placed in service.

OP-I07 Pcv ft* Pag2cf 135 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 63 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action --

- Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2 OP-i 07, CVCS Restore Letdown 5.4.2 Procedural Steps (continLec)

NOTE: If CVCS Dernins have cooled frorr norma* oeratn temDerature, an increased reactivity affect may be observed. Consideration may be given to increasing CVCS Donins to operating temperature by flushing thorn to the RHT prior to restoring totdowi 6 IF fIr ishn CVCS flemins to the RHT is dosirad for incrnosing bamperaturia, fl-EN PERFORM the fol owing:

a. NOTIFY Radwaste Control Roorr that leldcwn flv will he diverted to t,e RHT.

PLACE ICS-17{) I FTflOW TC VT/HOl fltlP TANK! CV-il5A to he RHT positio.

NOTE: Changes in Letdown tiowrate wil affect the displayed value for RM-3502A (Channel 2303) due to the detectcrs proximity to the LTDN line.

7. OPEN an Orifice sctation Valve (1CS-7, 105-8, ICS-9) for:he orifice to be placed in service.

8. ADJUST I CS-38 position by adjszing PR- 145.1 outDu: as recessary to control LP LIDN Pressure (P1-145.1) at 340 to 360 sig, to prevent lift.na the LP Leldcwn Relief.

9. WHEN Letdowi pressure has stabi1izd at 340 to 360 psig co °1145 I, LP LTDN PRESS, TlEN PERFORM the rol owing:

a. ADJUST PK-145.1 LTDN PRESSURE setpoint to 58%.

b. PLACE the cntroller in AUTO.

10. VERIFY PK-i4.1 LI UN PRESSURE Controller maintains Letdovn pressure sta1e at 340 to 360 psig.

OP-to? Rev. 89 Paga27of135 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2 OP-i 07, CVCS Restore Letdown S.4,2 Procedural Steps cent nued)

F Step 5.4.2.6 was perfomed AND CVCS Demin temperature is at normal operating lemparature, THEN PERFORM tl- ollowin:

a. PLACE ICS-120. LETDOWN TO VCT1HOLDJP TANK LCV-115A to the AUTO position.

b. NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room that diversion :o tho RHT has been terrniiated.

I NOTE: Cha9gas in Letdown flowrate will affect the displayed value for RM-3502A (Channel 2303) due to the detectors proximty to the LTDN line.

12. OPEN additional oritice isolation valves 1CS-7, ICS-8, 1CS-9) as req uVed.

13. ADJUST charging flaw as necessary to:

• Prevent high temperature alarm (aer tablo above>

• Maintain pressurizar programrred level.

14. ?LACE PRZ level contro Icr, U<450F, in AUTO, as tolbws:

a. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-450F, in MAN to caned any integrated signel.

b. RECORD Tl-122A.I,CHARGING rLcw.

GPM

c. CALCULATE PRZ level controller, LK-459T setpoint. (Ref. 2 7.14)

LK-439 setpeint= (Desired Charging Flow 150 GM) X 100%

2 (Ueslred tlow 0% =

15C gpm Setpoint

)

Veify

d. ADJUST FRZ level controller, _K-459F, to :he calculated setao nt.

e. PLACE PRZ level controller, LK-459r, iriAJTO.

OP-107 Rev. 89 Page 28 of 135 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 65 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 2 OP-i 07, CVCS Restore Letdown 542 Procedural Step5 (continued)

15. WHEN the folbwing occurs:

• Pwgtin prssucii le is riulJi n [he curerItpessuLe1 evei AND

• Lctdown and caI roturn arc bIancod itn seal njcction flow and ch[OIng tlnw THEN place cnntrollcr 1CS-231 EK-122.i CHARGING FLCW, in AUTO.

I C0MPLET Sr.tfrn 43 OP-1J Rev. 89 Fage29of13 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 66 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 3 OP-148 Section 5.2 5.2. Placing Standby Train In Opraticn NOTE: t is necessary to shifi associated :rains of HVAC unils when shifting trains of

ssen:ia Services Chilled Water.

NOTE: iris section is wnt:en tar swapping troni I rain S hSUW !o I rain A hSCN wit conponents for swapp ng torn TraM A ESOIv to Train B ESCW n parentheses.

5,2,1. Initial Conditions

1. Service wate- is being suppler] to the non-operating chller WC-2 lA-GA IWC-2 15-SD).

2. One train cf ESCW is already in oDe ration.

3. Per non-emergercy starts the prostert checks of Machmcnt 5 have been performed and an operator shauld be present Jo observe star of chfier.

4. Sedon 8.12. ManuaL Chiller Reset perfermel if neessary for non-operating ch tier

5. TIre L.D. heaters have been in seM:e for twelve hours (See rreccuton aid LiriiitaUui 3.0.3 rui applicatilily i1 this In tial Coridiliun)

6. 1 desired cue to .Service Water ternpeatures beinc high, a same :rain P8W Pump k ninning 5.2.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: The local alarm indcation for ow chilled water flow and low chilled water

emperature will locK in untIl maniniy reset at the WC-2 control panel NOTE: f start ng tie eille- compressor is delayed follosing the start 01 the P4 5

u rrp in the next Stes, the compresser oil could cool down to the poirt that tie compressor will trip on low cil pressLre.

1. MACP-I, START the non-operating Chiller WC- A-GA (3-3D) Chil:ed nater Pump P-4 A-SA 5-S5) to establish crimea water now In the non-operating Inn

2. At the Lccal Conlred panel, RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm using the Cl IILLED WATER NC PLOW TRIP INDICATCN RE_SET push-button.

IDP-i48 Rev.52 I Pac3el2or54I Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 67 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 3 OP-i 48 Section 5.2 5.2.2 Procedural Steps (continued) 3 IF starting tie chiller for the first time following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater circuit was under clearan:e, THEN PERFORM the following.

a I orally START the oil pi imp on the stanrllv chi ler compressor by ta<ing the confrol switch on the local panel to We MAN positon.

h RUN piirrp for 5 minutes

c. STOP the standlcy chi:ler compressor o pjrnp by tacing the confrol switch on the local panel to the AUTO pnsticn

4. Pt the Lcc Control Panel CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT lit

5. IF any alarm [grt(s) is iii, THEN PERFORM the following:

a IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL position.

THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP push-buttor.

b. IF the Local Select switch is in the MCB HVAC positbn, THEN place the standby chiller corn pressor control switcr on AEP-1 to STOP.

c. IF any alarm light is stil itt, THEN PERFORM the following:

(1) DECLARE ftc :hiIe inoperable.

(2) INITIATE corrective ac:ions.

°- Rev.52 Paqei4or154 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 68 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 3 OP-i 48 Section 5.2 5.2.2 Procedural Steps (continued)

NOTE: OPT-i 512 rotates the Temperature Control Point potentiometer to clean the surfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentiometer to its original position, ft is possible that due to the surface cleaning the characteristics of the potentiometer have changed sufficiently to require a manual temperature adjustment per Section & 14 of this procedure. This will be determined by monitoring temperature after chiller start in the following Step.

NOTE: ALB-0231 1-14 (2-M), WC-2 CH IA US) CNDSR REFRIG HI PRESS, may alarm during startup of the Chillers. High chiller condenser pressure is caused by inadequate cooling of the refrigerant. Causal factors for high condenser pressure include high chiller service water inlet temperature, condenser tube fouling, condenser shell air binding, or reduction of service water flow.

S. START the chiller by performing ONE of the following:

a. At AEP-i, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 A-SA (WC-2 B-SB) control switch to the START position AND RELEASE.

OR

b. DEPRESS the START push-button at the local control panel with

- the local select switch in the LOCAL position.

7. PLACE additional safety related air handlers in service prior to switchover of the nonessential header.

j OP-i48 I Rev.52 I Pagei5ofi54j Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 69 - Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 3 OP-148 Section 5.2 5.2.2 Procadural Staps (ccntnued)

NOTE: SSR g QOi2 has evaluated and determined that long term closure & the supply and retLm valves ta the NhS AM wits will not affect operabiltv of tile Essenlla Services Ciiier system. Tile next two steps will align the NNS AH units tioweer, if t is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valves shut. then steps 5.2.2.8 and 5.2.2.9 nay be skipçed.

8. ISOLATE the suplv aiii ieiurn ves Lu the NNS Al- units [tort the ham that was already operattig ty shutting the following valves:

ICH-1965B{CH-125 SB) CHILLED tftIAER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS iSOL ICH-197 SA (1CH-126 SA) CHI_LED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL ICH-148 55 (1CM-I 15 SA) CHLLED WATER TO NESSR FANS

(.1k ISOL ICH-II9SA(ICH-I16 SB) NATERTO NESSR FAN 1

CHLLED CLRS isa S. ALIGN NNS AM units to tile train tnat will renain opemtirig ty opening the 101 owing valves:

I CR125 SB (ICH- 196 SB) CHLLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS FOOL.

I CH-126 SA (ICH- 197 SA) CHI_LED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS isa.

1CM-i 155A(ICH-148 SO) CHLLEDWATERTO NESSR FANS CLRISOL ICH- 116 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHLLE[) 1 NATERTO NESSR FAN CLES isa 10 IF srifting chillers In support pacing the stnndhy safety ecpipment train in sevice, ThEM PEFFORM Attachnent 8.

jDP-148 Ret52 I PageiSoflS4j Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Attachment 3 OP-i 48 Section 5.2 5.2.2 Procedrcl Step5 (continued)

NO1t Scriicc water :o th chiller Dondcnsr wll ooltc 00 seconds atcr the chiller 1iiissluppetl. SW FROM WC-2 -S IA-SA) COJ DENSER 15W- 1203 SE

( ISVV-1 Utb A) li Close.

1-1 STOP tl-e chiller by erforrning one of the following:

a. At ALP-i, PLACE Water Chiller Corrpressor WC-2 0SD (A-SA) control sv.ttcri to tfle STCP poslon and rlese.

OR b DEPR5S t9e I OP pusrl-button at inc local contro nel ltn tfle Iccat select sitcfl in the LOCAL posion

12. Ai EP 1, STOP the Chiller WC 2 6 SB (A SA) Chiled Water Punp p 4 E-S IA-SA) in the train just secured.

13. NOTIFY the fo.[cwinc to update the protec:ed tra.n plaris:

• 1 Securit

• WCC

• Waintenance Shop

• Operation3 (Blue Hean TurnoveriConference Room) 10P-140 ev.52 I Page l7o 1341 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 - 71 - Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRCSCEIS[ARIO4 Revision Summary Rev. 1 Page 1 Critical tasks revised to identify tasks per ERG Based Critical Task List and NuReg 1021 Rev. 9 Supplement 1 Appendix D.

Page 6, developed justifications for each critical task based on request from NRC Chief Examiner.

Pages 49 and 51 identified the Critical tasks in the scenario.

Archie Lucky 5-19-2011 Rev. 2 Page 1, corrected GP-005 start step number per validation.

Page 46, Added information on MCB indications for failure of Source Range to energize.

Archie Lucky 5-24-201 1 Harris 2011 NRC Scenario 4 Revision 2