ML112212229

Scenario Guide 20, Hydraulic Lock ATWS-Unisolable Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel-Failed HPCI Isolation.

ML112212229
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	08/13/1990
From:	IES Utilities, (Formerly Iowa Electric Light & Power Co)
To:
Shared Package
ML112212226	List: ML112212225 ML112212227 ML112212228 ML112212229
References
NUDOCS 9011050031, PROC-900813-02
Download: ML112212229 (17)

Text

Attachment 4 NG-90-2548 Rev. 0, 08/10/90 DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER NRC REQUALIFICATION EXAM SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO GUIDE NUMBER 20 TITLE: Hydraulic Lock ATWS-Unisolable Steam Leak in Steam Tunnel-Failed HPCI Isolation DEVELOPED BY:

Name Date OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:

Name Date TRAINING SUPERVISOR APPROVAL:

Name Date 901024 90150-: 5- 0osoooast, o 0*i::_

,1 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 OBJECTIVES A. TERMINAL OBJECTIVE:

The operator, acting as a member of a shift operating crew, must demonstrate competence in performance of license duties required to protect the public health and safety while operating the plant in accordance with approved instructions and procedures.

B. ENABLING OBJECTIVES:

1. Following a pre-shift brief, each crew member will be able to provide a detailed plant status report to include:

a. Status of safety-related systems, running equipment, and inoperable equipment.

b. STPs in progress and any existing LCOs.

c. Pertinent night orders and planned evolutions.

2. Using plant installed instrumentation and plant procedures, as well as information obtained by operating personnel outside the Control Room, the operating crew will correctly diagnose plant problems.

3. The OSS will be able to use appropriate plant procedures to ensure completion of immediate actions and direct subsequent actions as required.

4. When using plant procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will be able to:

a. Locate the proper section of the procedure.

b. Follow the procedure correctly.

c. Locate and observe installed instrumentation.

d. Analyze system response.

e. Direct plant operators (Second ANSOE and Auxiliary Operators).

f. Inform the OSS when complete.

5. While operating in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the OSS will:

a. Identify all EOP entry conditions.

b. Direct the NSOE/ANSOE to perform required actions for control of reactor power, level, pressure, or containment parameters.

c. Specify the plant systems to be used to control plant parameters.

d. Evaluate changes in plant conditions against current actions being taken and make corrections as necessary.

6. When directed by the OSS to perform actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures, the NSOE/ANSOE will:

a. Utilize the systems designated by the OSS.

Evaluation Scenario Guide 20

Rev. 0, 08/10/90

b. Monitor system performance; i.e., pressure flow, etc.

c. Inform the OSS immediately when a system becomes unavailable for further use.

d. Inform the OSS of plant trends in response to actions taken.

7. Given a set of plant conditions, the OSS will be able to comply with the requirements of Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedures.

8. The OSS will be able to utilize the Emergency Plan to properly:

a. Evaluate plant conditions and determine the emergency classification.

b. Ensure requisite notifications are made.

9. The STA will assist the operating crew as required to:

a. Ascertain that plant response is as predicted in the UFSAR during transients, accidents, and plant emergencies and report abnormalities to the OSS.

b. Provide technical assistance and perform whatever activities are deemed necessary by the OSS because of specific plant conditions.

c. Review the status of inoperable equipment to determine whether the loss of the equipment is a situation addressed by Technical Specifications requiring specific action by the plant staff.

10. The crew members will demonstrate effective communications, exchanging complete and relevant information in order to make team decisions in a timely manner.

11. The NSOE/ANSOE will be able to perform the following operator actions, in response to plant events:

a. Conducts all rod movement IAW pull sheet.

b. Diagnoses failed Group 1 isolation.

c. Recognize failure to successfully insert all rods on the scram.

d. Restores and maintains RPV level 170-211.

e. Control reactor pressure using .LLS, HPCI, RCIC.

f. Insert rods per EOP-C's.

g. Recognize failed HPCI isolation.

Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 2

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 75% power with the "A" CRD pump inop for motor bearing replacement.

Shortly after assuming the watch, the crew will have indications of a loss of continuity for the "B" squib valve in the Standby Liquid Control system. This will require the crew to enter a 7-day LCO per section 3.4 of Tech Specs.

A steam leak will then develop on the HPCI steam line in the tunnel. As steam tunnel temperatures increase a Group 1 isolation will occur with a failure of the "A" Main Steam Line to isolate. A reactor scram will occur with only partial rod insertion due to a hydraulic lock in the Scram Discharge Volume. The crew will enter EOP ATWS and EOP-3. Manually closing the MSIV's will result in the closure of the outbd MSIV only.

During attempts to insert rods, a HPCI steam supply line break will occur in the HPCI room, causing temperatures to rise. A HPCI isolation will fail to close the steam supply isolation valves (MO-2238, MO-2239) requiring the operators to manually close the valves and continue with efforts to shutdown the reactor.

Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 3

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 SIMULATOR SETUP

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

a. Reset to I.C. 36 (75% power)

b. Verify rod pull sheet correct and IPOI-3 in progress

2. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS Type RMF ESG20 Time Malf. Description ET Delay SF. Ramp. I. Sev.

O RP05F ATWS Hydraulic Lock 0 MS05A CV4412 Disc Failure 100%

0 MS20B CV4413 Group 1 Isolation Fail 0 MS31C Group 6 Isol. Value Fail to Close (2238) 0 MS31D Group 6 Isol. Value Fail to Close (2239) 0 RDIIA CRD Pump Trip (A pump) 5 SLO3B Squib Valve Loss of Continuity 15 SW35 Steam Tunnel Coolers 100%

GSW Flow Blockage 15 MS08 HPCI Steam Line Break 0.4% 4 min 0%

in Tunnel 15 SW35 Steam tunnel cooler 100% 60 sec. 0%

blockage 20 MS08 HPCI Steam Line Break 20% 10 0.4%

in Tunnel mm 30 HPO5 HPCI Steam Supply Line 0.15% 4 min 0%

Break

3. Remote Functions Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 4

Rev. 0, 08/10/90

4. LIST OF OVERRIDES (t= 0, type ROR ESG20)

TAG ET DEL OR VALUE RDHS 1807A (Green) OFF RDIIS 1807A (White) OFF RDIS 1807A (Red) OFF RDHS 1830 NORM Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 5

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 LIST OF CRITICAL TASKS CRITICAL TASKS RO/SRO

1. Declare 7 day LCO per Tech Spec. 3.4.B.1 A OSS

2. Recognize failure of the "A" Main Steam Line to isolate on a Group NSOE 1 isolation.

3. Manually isolate the "A" Main Steam line (outbd valve only). NSOE

4. Recognize that all rods did not fully insert. ANSOE

5. Perform Alternate Rod Insertion procedures per EOP-C section 5.0 as ANSOE directed.

6. Recognize failure of HPCI steam supply to isolate. NSOE

7. Manually isolate the HPCI steam supply line. NSOE

8. Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation A OSS Temperature.

9. Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation ANSOE Temperature, when directed.

10. Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. A OSS Direct level be maintained in accordance with ATWS Level/Power Criteria.

11. Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed. ANSOE

12. Direct Torus Cooling be maximized if Torus temperature > 95oF. A OSS

13. Maximize Torus Cooling when directed. NSOE

14. Declare an Alert. A OSS

15. Notify State/County within 15 minutes, and NRC within I hour. B OSS

16. Evacuate the plant if an Alert or above is declared. B OSS Note: Specific Critical Tasks may be assigned to specific individuals; however, any crew member may perform the task without causing a failure of the assigned individual.

Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 6

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 SHIFT TURNOVER PLANT CONDITIONS: Reactor at 75% power. No evolutions currently in progress.

EQUIPMENT STATUS: "A" CRD pump inop for motor bearing replacement.

Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 7

TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR 0 T = 5 min When the crew has completed the Crew investigates squib valve continuity problem. 0 0

C,, shift brief insert malfunction SL03B. ARP ICO5A (B-2) 0 tb 0

0

• Investigate power supplies '0 0 0 0

• A OSS: Declare 7 day LCO per Tech Spec. 3.4.B.1 tJ 0

Respond as SANSOE/AUX.

Operator, report all power supplies operable.

T~z 15 min Insert malfunction SW35 at 100%. Crew responds to Hi Steam Leak and/or Hi AT alarm.

Insert malfunction MS08 at 0% and . Check temperature indications at IC21 ramp to 0.4% over 4 minutes. . OSS enters EOP-3 on high steam tunnel temperatures.

0 TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVI EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR 0

0 Tz 15 min SANSOE: If requested, report steam Crew responds to Group 1 isolatin and Partial ATWS (continued) tunnel temperatures by using monitored parameter HVTMSLAR tine 0 to isolate on a Group I isolation.

C

• NSOE: Manually isolate isolate the "A" Main Steam line (Note: only the outbd valve will close using the 0

When a Group 1 isolation occurs handswitch) modify malfunction MSO8 to ramp ANSOE: Recognize that all rods did not fully insert to 2 0% over 10 minutes.

A OSS: Enters EOP ATWS and directs the following:

C Reactor level maintained + 15" - + 211".

• Pressure controlled using HPCI, RCIC or SRV's.

• Manual scram inserted using pushbuttons.

Mode switch taken to 'Shutdown".

When requested, insert EOP-C a Verify Recirc pump runback and insert ARI trip Defeat 3 (RMF Defeat3) N Lockout ADS a Bypass CV-4371A

- Alternate Rod Insertion per EOP-C's.

• ANSOE: Perform Alternate Rod Insertion procedures per EOP-C section 5.0 as directed.

" Reset scram, drain SDV, and scram reactor.

" Manually drive rods NSOE: Control pressure using HPCI, RCIC or LLS.

'0

TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR C T 15 min

• A OSS: Direct Torus Cooling be maximized if Torus 0

'I, (continued) Water temperature > 950F. 0 00 TNSOE: Maximizes Torus Cooling when directed. 0 0 'C 0

C The following actions will be required if Torus Water temperature approaches 1100 F:

0 A OSS: Direct Boron injection prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature curve.

ANSOE: Inject Boron prior to reaching the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature curve, when directed.

A OSS: Direct injection into the vessel be secured except CRD and SBLC. Direct level be maintained LAW ATWS Power/Level criteria

• ANSOE: Secure injection into the vessel and maintain RPV level as directed.

NSOE: Control Pressure using HPCI, RCIC, or SRV's.

T~z 30 min (or Insert malfunction HP05 at 0 /B and Crew responds to rising temperatures in HPCI room and if HPCI ramp to 0.15% over 4 minutes HPCI LOGIC AUTO ISOLATION INITIATED alarms started) (lCO3C, D-3,4)

• NSOE: Recognize failure of HPCI steam supply line to isolate SANSOE/AUX. Operator: IfTu re n ed requested to investigate HPCI room AOS: Manually isolate the HPCI steam supply line status following isolation, report the Use handswitches to close MO-2238,2239 room is steamy but indications are such that the leak appears to be stopped.

0

. I . .

TIME/NOTES INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY EXPECTED ACTIONS/BEHAVIOR

• A OSS: Declare an Alert 0 0

roj

• B OSS: Notify State/County within 15 minutes, and 00 NRC within I hour. 0 0

• B OSS: Evacuate the plant Crew continues to re-scram and drain SDV until all rods are m.

• When all rods are in, EOP-ATWS is exited and EOP-1 is entered.

T 50 mi When the reactor is shutdown with all rods inserted and reactor level and pressure are under control, containment parameters are stable, and the OSS has addressed the Emergency Plan, place the simulator in freeze.

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 REFERENCES PROCEDURE SECTION PROCEDURE REVISION Annunicator Response Procedures

- ARP IC05A X-B-2 11

" ARP ICO4B B-4, D-4 11

" ARP ICO3C D-3, D-4 12 Integrated Plant Operating Instructions IPOI 5 3.1,3.2 4 Emergency Operating Procedures EOP 1 All 0 EOP 2 All 0 EOP3 All 0 EOP ATWS All 0 EOP C's 5.0 11 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EPIPs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 60 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 12

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Placing Second Reactor Feed Pump in Operation K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 259001 Reactor Feedwater Al.01 3.3/3.3 A1.03 2.8/2.8 A4.01 3.6/3.5 A4.02 3.9/3.7 A4.04 3.1/2.9 A4.05 4.0/3.9 A4.07 3.3/3.2 A4.08 3.3/3.3 SG #9 3.7/3.5 SG #10 3.2/3.3 SG #13 3.6/3.4 259002 Reactor Water Level Control A1.01 3.8/3.8 A 1.02 3.6/3.5 A1.04 3.6/3.6 A1.05 2.9/2.9 A3.02 3.4/3.4 A3.04 3.2/3.2 A4.01 3.8/3.6 A4.02 3.7/3.6 A4.03 3.8/3.6 SG #9 3.8/3.6 SG #13 3.8/3.5 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Placing Second Reactor Feed Pump in Operation DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.

Feedwater (BB) BB.0018 BB0018 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 13

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 ENTRY CONDITION: Any Auto Reactor Scram Signal - Full Scram K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 212000 RPS Al.06 4.2/4.2 A 1.07 3.4/3.4 A 1.08 3.4/3.4 A1.11 3.4/3.3 A2.20 4.1/4.2 A3.01 4.4/4.4 A3.03 4.2/4.2 A3.04 3.9/3.8 A3.05 3.9/3.9 A3.07 3.6/3.6 SG #13 4.1/4.1 SG #14 4.3/4.4 295006 Scram Abnormal Plant Evolution AA1.01 4.2/4.2 AA1.02 3.9/3.8 AAl.03 3.7/3.7 AA 1.04 3.1/3.2 AA1.05 4.2/4.2 AA1.06 3.5/3.6 AA1.07 4.1/4.1 AA2.01 4.5/4.6 AA2.02 4.3/4.4 AA2.03 4.0/4.2 AA2.04 4.1/4.1 AA2.05 4.6/4.6 AA2.06 3.5/3.8 SG #6 4.1/4.2 SG #10 4.1/4.2 SG #11 4.3/4.5 SG #12 3.8/4.4 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: Any Auto Reactor Scram Signal DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.

IPOI (SSS) **SSS.004 **SSS.004 UUU.018 Admin (UUU) UUU.027 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 14

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 ENTRY CONDITION: MALF MSO4A - MSL "A" Rupture Inside Primary Containment/W MSIV Failure K/A System/ Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System A2.04 3.5/3.6 A2.07 3.8/3.9 A2.11 4.1/4.3 A2.12 4.2/4.3 A3.01 4.2/4.1 A4.03 3.5/3.5 A4.04 3.8/3.7 A4.05 2.7/2.7 A4.06 3.6/3.8 A4.07 3.3/3.3 A4.08 3.7/3.7 A4.09 3.9/3.9 A4.10 3.8/3.8 SG #15 4.2/4.3 223002 PCIS/NSSS A2.09 3.6/3.7 A3.01 3.4/3.4 A3.02 3.5/3.5 SG #15 4.1/4.3 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 15

Rev. 0, 08/10/90 ENTRY CONDITION:

K/A System/Evolution Ability No. RO/SRO 295033 HIGH Secondary Containment Temp. EKl.01 3.6/3.8 EK 1.02 3.6/4.0 EK3.01 3.5/3.8 EA1.05 3.7/3.9 SG #1 3.1/4.0 SG #2 2.9/4.4 SG #6 3.8/3.7 SG #10 3.8/3.6 SG #11 4.1/4.2 SG #12 3.6/4.4 DAEC TASKS ENTRY CONDITION: MALF MSO4A - MSL "A" Rupture Inside Primary Containment/W MSIV Failure DAEC System RO Task No. SRO Task No.

EOP's (TTT) TTT.0011 TTT.0011 TTT.0020 TTT.0020 Administrative (UUU) UUU.0050 UUU.0051 UUU.0052 UUU.0053 Evaluation Scenario Guide 20 16