ML11178A018

Issuance of Amendments Regarding Cyber Security Plan

ML11178A018
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	07/28/2011
From:	Martin R Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Ajluni M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Martin R, NRR/DORL/LPLII-1, 415-1493
References
TAC ME4357, TAC ME4358, TAC ME4359, TAC ME4360, TAC ME4361, TAC ME4356
Download: ML11178A018 (41)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 July 28, 2011 Mr. M. J. Ajluni Nuclear Licensing Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 1295 Bin - 038 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 SUB~IECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2; EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2; AND VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING CYBER SECURITY PLAN (TAC NOS. FARLEY ME4356IME4357, HATCH ME4358/ME4359, VOGTLE ME4360/ME4361)

Dear Mr. Ajluni:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 186 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 181 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively; Amendment No. 265 to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-57 and Amendment No. 209 to Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively; and Amendment No. 162 to Facility Operating License NPF-68 and Amendment No. 144 to Facility Operating License NPF-81 for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively.

The amendments revise the facility operating licenses to reflect approval of the Cyber Security Plan and associated Implementation Schedule in response to your application dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011.

M. Ajluni

- 2 A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, 12~/Jl~v v Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364, 50-321,50-366, 50-424, AND 50-425

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 186 to NPF-2

2. Amendment No. 181 to NPF-8

3. Amendment No. 265 to DPR-57

4. Amendment No. 209 to NPF-5

5. Amendment No. 162 to NPF-68

6. Amendment No. 144 to NPF-81

7. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 186 Renewed License No. NPF-2

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing License Condition 2.0. to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 186.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with these license amendments. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the License Date of Issuance: July 28, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 186 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKET NO. 50-348 Replace the following page of the License with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page Insert Page License License License No. NPF-2, page 6 License No. NPF-2, page 6

-6 the test procedures and reporting requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. Any changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule, including spare capsules, must be approved by the NRC prior to implementation. All capsules placed in storage must be maintained for future insertion.

D. Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plan, which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," submitted May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 186.

E. This renewed license is subject to the following additional conditions for the protection of the environment:

(1)

Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility within applicable Federal and State air and water quality standards and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B).

(2)

Before engaging in an operational activity not evaluated by the Commission, Southern Nuclear will prepare and record an environmental evaluation of such activity. When the evaluation indicates that such activity may result in a significant adverse environmental impact that was not evaluated, or that is significantly greater than evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement, Southern Nuclear shall provide a written evaluation of such activities and obtain prior approval of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, for the activities.

F. Alabama Power Company shall meet the following antitrust conditions:

(1) Alabama Power Company shall recognize and accord to Alabama Electric Cooperative (AEC) the status of a competing electric utility in central and southern Alabama.

(2) Alabama Power Company shall offer to sell to AEC an undivided ownership interest in Units 1 and 2 of the Farley Nuclear Plant. The percentage of ownership interest to be so offered shall be an amount based on the relative sizes of the respective peak loads of AEC and the Alabama Power Company (excluding from the Alabama Power Company's peak load that amount imposed by members of AEC upon the electric system of Alabama Power Company) occurring in 1976. The Farley Unit 1 Renewed License No. NPF-2 Amendment No. 186

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 181 Renewed License No. NPF-8

1.

The Nuclear RegUlatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing License Condition 2.0. to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 181.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11,2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C CC'-'.-....-__

Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the License Date of Issuance: July 28, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 181 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following page of the License with the enclosed page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page Insert Page License License License No. NPF-8, page 5 License No. NPF-8, page 5

- 5 (22)

Additional Conditions The Additional conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No. 137, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the additional conditions.

(23)

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4) following issuance of this renewed license. Until that update is complete, Southern Nuclear may make changes to the programs and activities described in the supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that Southern Nuclear evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements of that section.

The Southern Nuclear Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement, submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21 (d), describes certain future activities to be completed prior to the period of extended operation. Southern Nuclear shall complete these activities no later than June 25,2017, and shall notify the NRC in writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

(24)

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsules All capsules in the reactor vessel that are removed and tested must meet the test procedures and reporting requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. Any changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule, including spare capsules, must be approved by the NRC prior to implementation. All capsules placed in storage must be maintained for future insertion.

D.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plan,which contain Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," submitted May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 181.

E.

Deleted per Amendment 144 Farley - Unit 2 Renewed License No. NPF-8 Amendment No. 181

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 265 Renewed License No. DPR-57

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No.1 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating license No. DPR-57 is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing license Condition 2.C.(4.a). to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by license Amendment No. 265.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP). including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11. 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Crc........___

Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 Date of Issuance: July 28, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 265 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following page of the License with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page Insert Page License License License No. DPR-57, page 5 License 1\\10. DPR-57, page 5

- 5 would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

(4.a) Physical Protection Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans, including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plan is entitled: "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 265.

(4. b)

Mitigation Strategy License Condition Develop and maintain strategies for addreSSing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

(a)

Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:

1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance

2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets

3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials

4. Command and control

5. Training of response personnel (b)

Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:

1. Protection and use of personnel assets

2. Communications

3. Minimizing fire spread

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy

5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment

6. Training on integrated fire response strategy

7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures (c)

Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:

1. Water spray scrubbing

2. Dose to onsite responders (4.c)

The licensee shall implement and maintain all Actions required by Attachment 2 to NRC Order EA-06-137, issued June 20,2006, except the last action that requires incorporation of the strategies into the site security plan, contingency plan, emergency plan and/or guard training and qualification plan, as appropriate.

Renewed License No. DPR-57 Amendment No. 265

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO.2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 209 Renewed License No. NPF-5

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No.2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11,2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-S is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing License Condition 2.C.(3)(b.1). to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR SO.90 and 10 CFR SO.S4(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 209.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR SO.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facililty Operating License No. NPF-S Date of Issuance: July 28, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 209 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following page of the License with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Page Insert Page License License License No. NPF-5, page 5 License No. NPF-5, page 5

- 5 in the updated Fire Hazards Analysis and Fire Protection Program for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, which was originally submitted by letter from GPC to the Commission dated July 22, 1986. Southern Nuclear may make changes to the fire protection program without prior Commission approval only if the changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

(b.1)

Physical Protection Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans, including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plan is entitled "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP),

including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 209.

(b.2)

Mitigation Strategy License Condition Develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions and that include the following key areas:

(a)

Fire fighting response strategy with the following elements:

1. Pre-defined coordinated fire response strategy and guidance

2. Assessment of mutual aid fire fighting assets

3. Designated staging areas for equipment and materials

4. Command and control

5. Training of response personnel (b)

Operations to mitigate fuel damage considering the following:

1. Protection and use of personnel assets

2. Communications

3. Minimizing fire spread

4. Procedures for implementing integrated fire response strategy

5. Identification of readily-available pre-staged equipment

6. Training on integrated fire response strategy

7. Spent fuel pool mitigation measures Renewed License No. NPF-5 Amendment No. 209

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-424 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 162 Renewed License No. NPF-68

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the VogUe Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

-2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-68 is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing License Condition 2.E. to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 162.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~{C.

Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. NPF-68 Date of Issuance: July 28, 2011

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-425 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 144 Renewed License No. NPF-81

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 filed by the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated July 16, 2010, as supplemented March 28 and April 11, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

-2

2.

Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-81 is hereby amended by adding the following paragraph to existing License Condition 2.E. to read as follows:

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 144.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance. The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee by letter dated April 11, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION G(e..

Gloria Kulesa, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to License No. NPF-81 Date of Issuance:

July 28, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 162 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68 DOCKET NO. 50-424 AND TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 144 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81 DOCKET NO. 50-425 Replace the following pages of the Licenses with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License License No. NPF-68, page 5 License No. NPF-68, page 5 License No. NPF-81, page 5 License No. NPF-81, page 5 License No. NPF-81, page 6 License No. NPF-81, page 6

7.

Spent fuel pool mitigation measures (c) Actions to minimize release to include consideration of:

1.

Water spray scrubbing

2.

Dose to onsite responders (11) Additional Conditions The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix D, as revised through Amendment No. 154, are hereby incorporated into this license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.

D. The facility requires exemptions from certain requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 70. These include (a) an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for two criticality monitors around the fuel storage area, and (b) an exemption from the requirements of Paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix J of 10 CFR 50, the testing of containment air locks at times when containment integrity is not required.

The special circumstances regarding exemption b are identified in Section 6.2.6 of SSER 5.

An exemption was previously granted pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24. The exemption was granted with NRC materials license No. SNM-1967, issued August 21, 1986, and relieved GPC from the requirement of having a criticality alarm system. GPC and Southern Nuclear are hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provision of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license.

These exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. The exemptions in item band c above are granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

E. Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The plan, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 162.

F. GPC shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.

Renewed Operating License No. NPF-68 Amendment No. 162

-5 An exemption was previously granted pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24. The exemption was granted with NRC materials license No. SNM-1981, issued July 13,1988, and relieved GPC from the requirement of having a criticality alarm system. GPC and Southern Nuclear are hereby exempted from the criticality alarm system provision of 10 CFR 70.24 so far as this section applies to the storage of fuel assemblies held under this license.

These exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security.

The exemption in item b above is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.

E.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The plan, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Southern Nuclear Operating Company Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan," with revisions submitted through May 15, 2006.

Southern Nuclear shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The Southern Nuclear CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 144.

F.

GPC shall comply with the antitrust conditions delineated in Appendix C to this license.

G.

Southern Nuclear shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility, as approved in the SER (NUREG-1137) through Supplement 9 subject to the following provision:

Southern Nuclear may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission, only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

H.

Deleted.

I.

The Owners shall have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Commission shall require in accordance with Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to cover public liability claims.

Renewed Operating License NPF-81 Amendment No. 144

-6 J.

The Updated Safety Analysis Report supplement, as revised, submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(d), shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4) following the issuance of this renewed operating license. Until that update is complete, Southern Nuclear may make changes to the programs and activities described in the supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that Southern Nuclear evaluates such changes pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements in that section.

K.

The Updated Safety Analysis Report supplement, as revised, submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21 (d), describes certain future activities to be completed prior to the period of extended operation. Southern Nuclear shall complete these activities no later than February 9, 2029, and shall notify the NRC in writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

L.

All capsules in the reactor vessel that are removed and tested must meet the test procedures and reporting requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. Any changes to the capsule withdrawal schedule, including spare capsules, must be approved by the NRC prior to implementation.

All capsules placed in storage must be maintained for future insertion. Any changes to storage requirements must be approved by the NRC, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H.

M.

This license is effective as of the date of issuance and shall expire at midnight on February 9, 2049.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/ORIGINAL SIGNED BY/

Eric J. Leeds, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Appendix A - Technical Specifications

2. Appendix B - Environmental Protection Plan

3. Appendix C - Antitrust Conditions

4. Appendix D - Additional Conditions Date of Issuance: June 3, 2009 Renewed Operating License NPF-81 Amendment No. 144

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555"()001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 186 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AMENDMENT NO. 181 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 AMENDMENT NO. 265 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 AMENDMENT NO. 209 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 AMENDMENT NO. 162 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-68 AMENDMENT NO. 144 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-81 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-424 AND 50-425

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 16, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), Accession No. ML102000162). supplemented by letters dated March 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110880218), and April 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111020258), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR). Included in that LAR was a request for approval of the licensee's Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and Implementation Schedule for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley 1 and 2), Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Hatch 1 and 2), and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Vogtle 1and 2) as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 73, Section 73.54 (Reference 1). On March 28, 2011, the licensee supplemented their CSP, to address: 1) the scope of systems in response to the October 21,2010, Commission decision (Reference 5); 2) records retention; and

-2

3) the implementation schedule. The licensee provided a revised implementation schedule in its submittal ofApril 11,2011. The licensee submitted a Revision 0 of the CSP incorporating all of the changes and/or additional information.

The March 28, 2011, and April 11, 2011, supplements provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed and did not change the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 General Requirements Consistent with 10 CFR 73.54(a), the licensee must provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems, and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design basis threat (OST), as described in 10 CFR 73.1. The licensee shall protect digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with: (i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions. The rule specifies that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with these functions must be protected from cyber attacks that would adversely impact the integrity or confidentiality of data and software; deny access to systems, services, or data; or provide an adverse impact to the operations of systems, networks, and associated equipment.

In the October 21,2010, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM)-COMWCO-10-0001 (Reference 5), the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the balance of plant (SOP) that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The staff determined that SSCs in the SOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of a nuclear power plant (NPP), and are therefore within the scope of important-to-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

2.2 Elements of a CSP As stated in 10 CFR 73.54(e), the licensee must establish, implement, and maintain a CSP that satisfies the Cyber Security Program requirements of this regulation. In addition, the CSP must describe how the licensee will implement the requirements of the regulation and must account for the site-specific conditions that affect implementation. One method of complying with this regulation is to describe within the CSP how the licensee will achieve high assurance that all SSEP functions are protected from cyber attacks.

2.3 Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71 and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6 RG 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities," (Reference 2) describes a regulatory position that promotes a defensive strategy consisting of a defensive architecture and a set of security controls based on standards provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, "Recommended Security Controls for

- 3 Federal Information Systems and Organizations" and NIST SP 800-82, "Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security," dated September 29,2008. NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-82 are based on well-understood cyber threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, coupled with equally well-understood countermeasures and protective techniques. RG 5.71 divides the above-noted security controls into three broad categories: technical, operational, and management.

The organization of RG 5.71 reflects the steps necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Section C.3 of RG 5.71 describes an acceptable method for implementing the security controls, as detailed in Appendix B, "Technical Controls," and Appendix C, "Operational and Management Controls." Section C.4 of RG 5.71 discusses the need to maintain the established cyber security program, including comprehensive monitoring of the CDAs and the effectiveness of their security protection measures, ensuring that changes to the CDAs or the environment are controlled, coordinated, and periodically reviewed for continued protection from cyber attacks. Section C.5 of RG 5.71 provides licensees and applicants with guidance for retaining records associated with their cyber security programs. Appendix A to RG 5.71 provides a template for a generic cyber security plan which licensees may use to comply with the licensing requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Appendices Band C provide an acceptable set of security controls, which are based on well-understood threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks, coupled with equally well-understood and vetted countermeasures and protective techniques.

NEI 08-09, Revision 6 closely maps with RG 5.71; Appendix A of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains a cyber security plan template that is comparable to Appendix A of RG 5.71. Appendix D of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains technical cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix B of RG 5.71. Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6 contains operational and management cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix C of RG 5.71.

RG 5.71 provides a framework to aid in the identification of those digital assets that licensees must protect from cyber attacks. These identified digital assets are referred to as "critical digital assets" (CDAs). Licensees should address the potential cyber security risks to CDAs by applying the defensive architecture and addressing the collection of security controls identified in RG 5.71. RG 5.71 includes a CSP template that provides one method for preparing an acceptable CSP.

The NRC staff stated in a letter (

Subject:

Nuclear Energy Institute [NEil 08-09, "Cyber Security Plan Template, Revision 6), dated May 5,2010 (Reference 4), that the licensee may use the template in NEI 08-09, Revision 6 (Reference 3), to prepare an acceptable CSP, with the exception of the definition of "cyber attack." The NRC staff subsequently reviewed and approved by letter dated June 7,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101550052), a definition for "cyber attack" to be used in submissions based on NEI 08-09, Revision 6 (Reference 4). The licensee submitted a CSP for the Farley 1 and 2, Hatch 1 and 2, and Vogtle 1 and 2 that was based on the template provided in NEI 08-09, Revision 6 and included a definition of cyber attack acceptable to the NRC staff in the deviation table referenced in ADAMS Accession No. ML101550052, within the CSP.

Additionally, the licensee submitted a supplement to their CSP on March 28, 2011, to include information on SSCs in the BOP that, if compromised, could affect NPP reactivity.

RG 5.71 and NEI 08-09, Revision 6, are comparable documents; both are based on essentially the same general approach and same set of technical, operational, and management security controls. The submitted CSP was reviewed against the corresponding sections in RG 5.71.

-4

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff performed a technical evaluation of the licensee's submittal. The licensee's submittal, with the exception of deviations described in Section 3.23 below, generally conformed to the guidance in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which was found to be acceptable by the NRC staff and comparable to RG 5.71 to satisfy the requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.54. The staff reviewed the licensee's submittal against the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 following the guidance contained in RG 5.71. The staffs evaluation of each section of their submittal is discussed below.

3.1 Scope and Purpose The licensee's CSP establishes a means to achieve high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with the following functions are adequately protected against cyber attacks up to and including the DBT:

1.

Safety-related and important-to-safety functions;

2.

Security functions;

3.

Emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and

4.

Support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

The submitted CSP describes achievement of high assurance of adequate protection of systems associated with the above functions from cyber attacks by:

Implementing and documenting the "baseline" security controls as described in Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 described in RG 5.71; and Implementing and documenting a Cyber Security Program to maintain the established cyber security controls through a comprehensive life cycle approach as described in Section 4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71.

Thus, the licensee's CSP, as originally submitted, is comparable to the CSP in NEI-08-09, Revision 6. However, in its submittal dated March 28, 2011, the licensee clarified its original submission and indicated that the scope of systems includes those BOP SSCs that have an impact on NPP reactivity if compromised. This is in response to and consistent with SRM-COMWCO-1 0-0001, "Regulation of Cyber Security at Nuclear Power Plants," October 21, 2010 (Reference 5), in which the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include SSCs in the BOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The NRC staff determined that those systems that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of an NPP, and are therefore within the scope of important-to-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

The NRC staff reviewed the CSP and the supplemental information provided by the licensee and found no deviation from Regulatory Position C.3.3 in RG 5.71 and Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71. The NRC staff finds that the licensee established adequate measures to implement and document the Cyber Security Program, including baseline security controls.

~ 5 Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately establishes the Cyber Security Program, including baseline security controls.

3.2 Analyzing Digital Computer Systems and Networks and Applying Cyber Security Controls The licensee's CSP describes that the Cyber Security Program is established, implemented, and maintained as described in Section 3.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 described in RG 5.71 to:

Analyze digital computer and communications systems and networks; and Identify those assets that must be protected against cyber attacks to satisfy 10 CFR 73.54(a).

The submitted CSP describes how the cyber security controls in Appendices 0 and E of NEI 08~09, Revision 6, which are comparable to Appendices Band C in RG 5.71, are addressed to protect CDAs from cyber attacks. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately addresses security controls.

3.3 Cyber Security Assessment and Authorization The licensee provided information addressing the creation of a formal, documented, cyber security assessment and authorization policy. This included a description concerning the creation of a formal, documented procedure comparable to Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

The NRC staff finds that the licensee established adequate measures to define and address the purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and coordination, and facilitates the implementation of the cyber security assessment and authorization policy.

The NRC staff reviewed the above information and found no deviation from Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section A.3.1.1 in RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately established controls to develop, disseminate, and periodically update the cyber security assessment and authorization policy and implementing procedure.

3.4 Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT)

The CSA T responsibilities include conducting the cyber security assessment, documenting key findings during the assessment, and evaluating assumptions and conclusions about cyber security threats. The submitted CSP outlines the requirements, roles and responsibilities of the CSAT comparable to Section 3.1.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. It also describes that the CSAT has the authority to conduct an independent assessment.

The submitted CSP describes that the CSAT will consist of individuals with knowledge about information and digital systems technology; NPP operations, engineering, and plant technical specifications; and physical security and emergency preparedness systems and programs. The CSAT description in the CSP is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71.

- 6 The submitted CSP lists the roles and responsibilities for the CSA T which included performing and overseeing the cyber security assessment process; documenting key observations; evaluating information about cyber security threats and vulnerabilities; confirming information obtained during tabletop reviews, walk-downs, or electronic validation of CDAs; and identifying potential new cyber security controls. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately establishes the requirements, roles and responsibilities of the CSAT.

3.5 Identification of CDAs The submitted CSP describes that the licensee will identify and document CDAs and critical systems {CSs}, including a general description, the overall function, the overall consequences if a compromise were to occur, and the security functional requirements or specifications as described in Section 3.1.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the process to identify CDAs.

3.6 Examination of Cyber Security Practices The submitted CSP describes how the CSA T will examine and document the existing cyber security policies, procedures, and practices; existing cyber security controls; detailed descriptions of network and communication architectures {or network/communication architecture drawings};

information on security devices; and any other information that may be helpful during the cyber security assessment process as described in Section 3.1.4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 of RG 5.71. The examinations will include an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing Cyber Security Program and cyber security controls. The CSA T will document the collected cyber security information and the results of their examination of the collected information. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the examination of cyber security practices.

3.7 Tabletop Reviews and Validation Testing The submitted CSP describes tabletop reviews and validation testing, which confirm the direct and indirect connectivity of each CDA and identify direct and indirect pathways to CDAs. The CSP states that validation testing will be performed electronically or by physical walkdowns. The licensee's plan for tabletop reviews and validation testing is comparable to Section 3.1.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.4 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes tabletop reviews and validation testing.

-7 3.8 Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls The submitted CSP describes the use of information collected during the cyber security assessment process (e.g., disposition of cyber security controls, defensive models, defensive strategy measures, site and corporate network architectures) to implement security controls in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 and Appendix A.3.1.6 to RG 5.71. The CSP describes the process that will be applied in cases where security controls cannot be implemented.

The submitted CSP notes that before the licensee can implement security controls on a CDA, it will assess the potential for adverse impact in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes mitigation of vulnerabilities and application of security controls.

3.9 Incorporating the Cyber Security Program into the Physical Protection Program The submitted CSP states that the Cyber Security Program will be reviewed as a component of the Physical Security Program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(m). This is comparable to Section 4.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.4 of RG 5.71. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.3.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes review of the CSP as a component of the physical security program.

3.10 Cyber Security Controls The submitted CSP describes how the technical, operational and management cyber security controls contained in Appendices D and E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, that are comparable to Appendices Band C in RG 5.71, are evaluated and dispositioned based on site-specific conditions during all phases of the Cyber Security Program. The CSP describes that many security controls have actions that are required to be performed on specific frequencies and that the frequency of a security control is satisfied if the action is performed within 1.25 times the frequency specified in the control, as applied, and as measured from the previous performance of the action as described in Section 4.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.3.1.6 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes implementation of cyber security controls.

3.11 Defense-in-Depth Protective Strategies The submitted CSP describes the implementation of defensive strategies that ensure the capability to detect, respond to, and recover from a cyber attack. The CSP specifies that the defensive strategies consist of security controls, defense-in-depth measures, and the defensive architecture. The submitted CSP notes that the defensive architecture establishes the logical and physical boundaries to control the data transfer between these boundaries. The licensee

- 8 established defense-in-depth strategies by: implementing and documenting a defensive architecture as described in Section 4.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.2 in RG 5.71; a physical security program, including physical barriers; the operational and management controls described in Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C to RG 5.71; and the technical controls described in Appendix D of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix B to RG 5.71.

In the SNC CSP, Section 4.3.2.2, "Telecommunication Interfaces," there are several telecommunication interfaces listed. SNC reviewed the defensive strategy explained in Section 4.3 of the proposed Southern Nuclear CSP submitted by letter dated July 16, 2010, and determined that it: (1) described in excessive detail beyond that necessary to assure protection of CDSs; and (2) that the additional detail was a source of potential confusion regarding the intent and application of the SNC CSP. Accordingly, the SNC in its March 28,2011, letter has revised the defensive strategy contained in Section 4.3.2.2 that is now comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.2 and Appendix A, Section A.3.1.5 in RG5.71 without deviation.

In the SNC CSP, Section 4.3.2.3, "Interfaces to Field Sensors, Actuators, and Other Field Devices," there are several telecommunication interfaces listed which SNC claimed were not subject to security controls. SNC revised the defensive strategy contained in Section 4.3.2.3 so that it is now comparable to Regulatory Position C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes implementation of defense-in-depth protective strategies.

3.12 Ongoing Monitoring and Assessment The submitted CSP describes how ongoing monitoring of cyber security controls to support CDAs is implemented comparable to Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71. The ongoing monitoring program includes configuration management and change control; cyber security impact analysis of changes and changed environments; ongoing assessments of cyber security controls; effectiveness analysis (to monitor and confirm that the cyber security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and achieving the desired outcome) and vulnerability scans to identify new vulnerabilities that could affect the security posture of CDAs. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes ongoing monitoring and assessment.

3.13 Modification of Digital Assets The submitted CSP describes how cyber security controls are established, implemented, and maintained to protect CDAs. These security controls ensure that modifications to CDAs are evaluated before implementation, that the cyber security performance objectives are maintained, and that acquired CDAs have cyber security requirements in place to achieve the site's Cyber Security Program objectives. This is comparable to Section 4.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendices A.4.2.5 and A.4.2.6 of RG 5.71.

- 9 Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes modification of digital assets.

3.14 Attack Mitigation and Incident Response The submitted CSP describes the process to ensure that SSEP functions are not adversely impacted due to cyber attacks in accordance with Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71. The CSP includes a discussion about creating incident response policy and procedures, and addresses training, testing and drills, incident handling, incident monitoring, and incident response assistance. It also describes identification, detection, response, containment, eradication, and recovery activities comparable to Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes attack mitigation and incident response.

3.15 Cyber Security Contingency Plan The submitted CSP describes creation of a Cyber Security Contingency Plan and policy that protects CDAs from the adverse impacts of a cyber attack described in Section 4.7 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 and Appendix C.9 of RG 5.71.

The licensee describes the Cyber Security Contingency Plan that would include the response to events. The plan includes procedures for operating CDAs in a contingency, roles and responsibilities of responders, processes and procedures for backup and storage of information, logical diagrams of network connectivity, current configuration information, and personnel lists for authorized access to CDAs. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the cyber security contingency plan.

3.16 Cyber Security Training and Awareness The submitted CSP describes a program that establishes the training requirements necessary for the licensee's personnel and contractors to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities in implementing the Cyber Security Program in accordance with Section 4.8 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG 5.71.

The CSP states that individuals will be trained with a level of cyber security knowledge commensurate with their assigned responsibilities in order to provide high assurance that individuals are able to perform their job functions in accordance with Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG 5.71 and describes three levels of training: awareness training, technical training, and specialized cyber security training.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the cyber security training and awareness.

- 10 3.17 Evaluate and Manage Cyber Risk The submitted CSP describes how cyber risk is evaluated and managed utilizing site programs and procedures comparable to Section 4.9 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71. The CSP describes the Threat and Vulnerability Management Program, Risk Mitigation, Operational Experience Program; and the Corrective Action Program and how each will be used to evaluate and manage risk. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes evaluation and management of cyber risk.

3.18 Policies and Implementing Procedures The CSP describes development and implementation of policies and procedures to meet security control objectives in accordance with Section 4.10 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5 and Appendix A, Section A.3.3 of RG 5.71. This includes the process to document, review, approve, issue, use, and revise policies and procedures.

The CSP also describes the licensee's procedures to establish specific responsibilities for positions described in Section 4.11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5, Appendix A, Section A.3.3, and Appendix C, Section C.1 0.1 0 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes cyber security policies and implementing procedures.

3.19 Roles and Responsibilities The submitted CSP describes the roles and responsibilities for the qualified and experienced personnel, including the Cyber Security Program Sponsor, the Cyber Security Program Manager, Cyber Security Specialists, the Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), and other positions as needed. The CSIRT initiates in accordance with the Incident Response Plan and initiates emergency action when required to safeguard CDAs from cyber security compromise and to assist with the eventual recovery of compromised systems. Implementing procedures establish roles and responsibilities for each of the cyber security roles in accordance with Section 4.11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2, Appendix A, Section A.3.1.2, and Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes cyber security roles and responsibilities.

3.20 Cyber Security Program Review The submitted CSP describes how the Cyber Security Program establishes the necessary procedures to implement reviews of applicable program elements in accordance with Section 4.12

- 11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4.3 and Appendix A, Section A4.3 of RG 5.71.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the CSP adequately describes the Cyber Security Program review.

3.21 Document Control and Records Retention and Handling The submitted CSP describes that the licensee has established the necessary measures and governing procedures to ensure that sufficient records of items and activities affecting cyber security are developed, reviewed, approved, issued, used, and revised to reflect completed work.

The CSP described that superseded portions of certain records will be retained for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, while audit records will be retained for no less than 12 months in accordance with Section 4.13 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

In a letter dated February 28,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600204), NEI sent to the NRC proposed language for the generic records retention issue, to which the NRC had no technical objection (

Reference:

Letter from NRC dated March 1, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110490337). In a letter dated March 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110880218), the licensee responded to the records retention issue using the language proposed by NEI in its letter dated February 28, 2011. The proposed language clarified the requirement by providing examples (without providing an all-inclusive list) of the records and supporting technical documentation that are needed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. All records will be retained until the Commission terminates the license, and the licensee shall maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, unless otherwise specified by the Commission. By retaining accurate and complete records and technical documentation until the license is terminated, inspectors, auditors, or assessors will have the ability to evaluate incidents, events, and other activities that are related to any of the cyber security elements described, referenced, and contained within the licensee's NRC-approved CSP. It will also allow the licensee to maintain the ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks in a timely manner, in the case of an event.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the language the licensee proposes to adopt provides for adequate records retention and will support the licensee's ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks. The NRC staff further finds that this section is comparable to Regulatory Position C.5 and Appendix A, Section A5 of RG 5.71 without deviation. Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's CSP adequately describes cyber security document control and records retention and handling.

3.22 Implementation Schedule The submitted CSP provides a proposed implementation schedule for the Cyber Security Program.

In a letter dated February 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600206), NEI sent to the NRC a template for licensees to use to submit their CSP implementation schedules, to which the !\\IRC had no technical objection (

Reference:

Letter from NRC dated March 1, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110070348). These key milestones include:

Establish the Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT);

Identify CSs and CDAs;

- 12 Install a deterministic one-way device between lower level devices and higher level devices; Implement the security control "Access Control For Portable And Mobile Devices";

Implement observation and identification of obvious cyber related tampering to existing insider mitigation rounds by incorporating the appropriate elements; Identify, document, and implement cyber security controls as per "Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls" for CDAs that could adversely impact the design function of physical security target set equipment; and Commence ongoing monitoring and assessment activities for those target set CDAs whose security controls have been implemented.

In a letter dated April 11, 2011, the licensee provided a revised implementation schedule using the NEI template, with the exception of Milestone 6. The licensee deviated from the template for Milestone 6 to address only the f\\lEI 08-09, Rev. 6, Appendix D technical controls, excluding the operational and management controls, on the basis that implementing the technical controls for target set CDAs provides a high degree of protection against cyber related attacks that could lead to radiological sabotage. Furthermore, the licensee's programs that are currently in place (e.g.,

physical protection, maintenance and work management, configuration management, operational experience, etc) provide a high degree of protection during the interim period until such time that the full cyber security program is implemented.

The NRC staff considers this April 11, 2011, supplement the approved schedule as required by 10 CFR 73.54. Based on the provided schedule ensuring timely implementation of those protective measures that provide a higher degree of protection against radiological sabotage, the NRC staff finds that the Cyber Security Program implementation schedule is satisfactory.

3.23 Differences From NEI 08-09, Revision 6 The NRC staff notes the following additional differences between the licensee's submission and NEI 08-09, Revision 6:

In Section 3.1, "Scope and Purpose," the licensee clarified the definition of important-to-safety functions, consistent with SRM-COMWCO-1 0-0001.

In Section 3.21, "Document Control and Records Retention and Handling," the licensee clarified the definition of records and supporting documentation that will be retained to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54.

In Section 3.22, "Implementation Schedule," the licensee submitted a revised implementation schedule, specifying the interim milestones and the final implementation date, including supporting rationale. The licensee deviated from the template for Milestone 6 to address only the NEI 08-09, Revision 6, Appendix D technical controls.

The NRC staff finds all of these deviations to be acceptable as discussed in respective sections.

3.24 Summary The NRC staff's review and evaluation of the licensee's CSP was conducted using the staff positions established in the relevant sections of RG 5.71. Based on the NRC staff's review, the NRC finds that the licensee addressed the relevant information necessary to satisfy the

- 13 requirements of 10 CFR 73.54,10 CFR 73.55(a)(1), 10 CFR 73.55(b)(8), and 10 CFR 73.55(m),

as applicable and that the licensee's Cyber Security Program provides high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the DBT as described in 10 CFR 73.1. This includes protecting digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with:

(i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds the information contained in this CSP to be acceptable and upon successful implementation of this program, operation of Farley 1 and 2; Hatch 1 and 2; and Vogtle 1 and 2 will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments for Farley 1 and 2 and the State of Georgia official was notified for Hatch 1 and 2 and Vogtle 1 and 2. The State officials had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments, by incorporation of the NRC-approved CSP and the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule into the licensing bases, involve (1) changes in a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, (2) changes in record keeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements, and (3) solely related to safeguards matters (protection against sabotage) involving (a) Organizational and Procedural matters, (b) Modifications to systems used for security, and (c)

Administrative Changes. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any eftluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (76 FR 20381, April 12, 2011). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), (10), and (12). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

- 14

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

Section 73.54 of 10 CFR, "Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, March 27, 2009.

2.

RG 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, January 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090340159).

3.

Letter from Jack Roe, Nuclear Energy Institute, to Scott Morris, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NEI 08-09, Revision 6, 'Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors; April 2010,'" April 28, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101180434).

4.

Letter from Richard Correia, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Jack Roe, Nuclear Energy Institute, "Nuclear Energy Institute 08-09, 'Cyber Security Plan Template, Revision 6,'" May 5,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101190371).

5.

SRM-COMWCO-1 0-0001, "Regulation of Cyber Security at Nuclear Power Plants,"

October 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102940009).

Principal Contributors: Robert Harren, NSIR Perry Pederson, NSIR Date: July 28,2011

M. Ajluni

- 2 A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, IRA!

Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364, 50-321, 50-366, 50-424, AND 50-425

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 186 to NPF-2

2. Amendment No. 181 to NPF-8

3. Amendment No. 265 to DPR-57

4. Amendment No. 209 to NPF-5

5. Amendment No. 162 to NPF-68

6. Amendment No. 144 to NPF-81

7. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

Public CErlanger, NSIR LPL2-1 RlF RidsNrrPMFarley Resource (hard copy)

RidsNrrPMHatch Resource RidsNrrPMVogtle RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrLAMO'Brien Resource(hard copy)

RidsNrrDirsltsb Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl2-1 Resource PPederson, NSIR A A SA D M ccesslon N 0.: ML11178A018

• b memo d t d 6/15/11 ae OFFICE NRR/LPL2-1/PM NRRlLPL2-1/PM NRR/LPL2-1/LA NSIR

• OGC NRR/LPL2-1/BC NRRlLPL2-'IIPM NAME RMartin PBoyle MO'Brien CErlanQer DRoth GKulesa RMartin DATE 07/21/11 07/26/11 07/21/11 6/15111 06/23/11 07/27/11 07/27/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy