ML111640463

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Summary of Category 1 Public Meeting with TVA, Browns Ferry to Present Annual Assessment
ML111640463
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/13/2011
From: Eugene Guthrie
Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To: Krich R
Tennessee Valley Authority
References
Download: ML111640463 (48)
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 13, 2011 Mr. R. M. Krich Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

- CATEGORY 1 PUBLIC MEETING, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

Dear Mr. Krich:

This refers to the meeting conducted at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on May 31, 2011 at 1:00 p.m. (CDT). The meetings purpose was to present the annual assessment of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant performance and to provide opportunities to discuss with the public the NRC Reactor Oversight Process. Enclosed are a list of attendees, responses to some of the questions received by the NRC staff at the meeting, and the presentation handouts.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4662.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eugene F. Guthrie, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos.: DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68

Enclosures:

1. Attendee List
2. NRC Response to Questions
3. Handouts cc w/encl.: (See page 2)

________ML111640463____

G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE JDH /RA/

EFG /RA/

NAME JHamman EGuthrie DATE 06/13/2011 06/13/2011 E-MAIL COPY?

YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

TVA 2

cc w/encl:

K. J. Polson Site Vice President Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution C.J. Gannon General Manager Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution J. E. Emens Manager, Licensing Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution T. C. Matthews Manager, Corporate Nuclear Licensing -

BFN Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution State Health Officer Alabama Dept. of Public Health RSA Tower - Administration Suite 1552 P.O. Box 30317 Montgomery, AL 36130-3017 E. J. Vigluicci Assistant General Counsel Tennessee Valley Authority Electronic Mail Distribution Chairman Limestone County Commission 310 West Washington Street Athens, AL 35611 James L. McNees, CHP Director Office of Radiation Control Alabama Dept. of Public Health P. O. Box 303017 Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

TVA 3

Letter to R. M. Krich from Eugene Guthrie dated June 13, 2011

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

- CATEGORY 1 PUBLIC MEETING, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296 Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry Resource

2

NRC Response to Questions Received During the Public Meeting on May 31, 2011

1. What is the design basis tornado that BFN was designed to withstand?

Response - The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is designed to withstand the effects of a tornado that produces 300 mile per hour winds. In addition to wind effects on structures, the plant is also evaluated to withstand missiles generated from the tornado, such as:

A 2-inch x 4-inch x 12-foot board of considerable weight, end on.

A cross-tie, 7 inches x 9 inches x 8-1/2 feet of considerable weight, end on.

A compact car weighing 1800 pounds with a large impact area.

Pieces of concrete 6-1/2 inches x 12 inches x 2 inches thick, end on.

Each missile is assumed to be traveling 300 mph at impact.

2. What if a tornado sucked water out of a cooling pool or flung radioactive fuel rods into our neighborhoods? Is this tested, analyzed or evaluated in some way?

Response - Fuel rods that have been removed from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant reactor are stored in spent fuel pools that are built into the plant structure. The structure around the pool is designed to withstand seismic events and high winds from tornados.

The water in the pool is greater than 20 feet deep, in order to provide shielding and cooling to the spent fuel. Part of the reactor building structure provides blowout panels used to equalize pressure between the refueling room and the atmosphere. Equalizing pressure, along with the depth of the pool, and the length and weight of the fuel rods, ensures that the fuel will remain in the pool during a tornado. Some damage may occur to the building peripheral structures; however, the integrity of the fuel pool is designed to be maintained. Additionally, water can be added to the spent fuel pools through several redundant means, including the normal supply from the condensate storage system, and backup supply from the emergency equipment cooling water system and manual fire hose connections. The spent fuel pools are analyzed in the plants Final Safety Analysis Report and fuel pool operation is monitored via routine plant inspections by the NRC resident inspectors.

3. What would happen if a commercial plane flew into the reactor building sheet metal roof that encloses the SFPs?

Response - After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC first issued Advisories and then Orders that required nuclear power plant licensees to provide specific enhanced capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack. The NRC then began an accelerated security and engineering review based on the September 11 events. The review looked at what could possibly happen if terrorists used an aircraft to attack a nuclear power plant. Additionally, NRC reviews assessed the potential consequences of other types of terrorist attacks. The NRC analyzed what might happen as a result of such attacks and what other factors might affect the possibility or magnitude of a radiation release.

2 As part of this security review, the NRC conducted detailed engineering studies of a number of nuclear power plants. These studies assessed the capabilities of these plants to withstand deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft. The NRC studies included national experts from Department of Energy laboratories, who used state-of-the-art experiments, structural analyses, and fire analyses. The studies at the specific facilities confirmed that the plants are robust. In addition, the studies found that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to a terrorist attack, there would be time to implement the required offsite planning strategies already in place to protect public health and safety.

In a series of three phases (namely, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3), the NRC and the nuclear industry have analyzed the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand damage to or loss of large areas of the plant. This damage may be caused by a range of deliberate attacks that result in large fires and explosions (e.g. aircraft crash).

Congress asked the National Academy of Science (NAS) to independently assess the nations nuclear power plant spent fuel pools vulnerability to an aircraft attack. The NRC worked with the NAS to develop a public version of the report. The NRC believes this is very important. The NRC is giving the results and recommendations of the study serious consideration and is continuing to work with the NAS on this subject. In March 2005, the NRC provided Congress with a report on actions the NRC has taken to ensure the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel storage. The report also responds to the recommendations contained in the NAS study. The NRCs Phase 1 and Phase 2 efforts address a number of issues raised by the NAS study. This report is available at the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2005/domenici-03142005.pdf The NRC ordered nuclear power plant licensees to develop specific plans and strategies to respond to a wide range of events, including the impact of an aircraft. Licensees have taken actions as a result of the NRC Advisories and Orders to mitigate the effects of a September 11-type aircraft attack. The NRC considers the list of specific actions taken to be information that potentially would benefit terrorists if released publically. More information on this subject is available for public review, and can be found at the following link: http://www.nrc.gov/security/faq-security-assess-nuc-pwr-plants.html#2

4. What are the specific emergency plans/evacuation routes for residents in the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) surrounding BFN?

Response - Federal regulations require that primary evacuation routes within a ten mile radius of an NRC licensed nuclear reactor be identified, and made known to the general public. These routes, for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station, have been identified for planning purposes and are explicitly specified in the State and local government Radiological Emergency Response Plans, which have been approved by the U. S.

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Evacuation information is available on line at the following link:

http://www.tva.gov/power/nuclear/pdf/bfn_2011_emergencyinfo.pdf

1 Browns Ferry Nuclear Annual Performance Assessment Meeting Assessment Period 2010 Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Athens, AL May 31, 2011

2 2

Agenda

  • Introduction
  • Overview of NRC Mission
  • Review of Reactor Oversight Process
  • National Summary of Plant Performance
  • Discussion of Plant Performance Results
  • NRC Closing Remarks
  • NRC available to address public questions

3 3

Region II Organization Victor McCree Regional Administrator Len Wert Deputy Regional Administrator Division of Reactor Projects Rick Croteau, Director William Jones, Deputy Director Projects Branch 6 Eugene Guthrie, Chief (404) 997-4662 Resident Inspectors (RI)

Thierry Ross, Senior RI Charles Stancil, RI Phillip Niebaum, RI Lundy Pressley, RI RI Office: (256) 729-6196 Project Engineers (PE)

Craig Kontz, Senior PE Jeff Hamman, PE Division of Reactor Safety Joel Munday, Director Harold Christensen, Deputy Director Regional Specialist Inspectors

4 4

Our Mission

  • License and regulate:

- Civilian Reactors

- Radioactive Materials (e.g.

medical and industrial)

- Byproducts

  • Protect public health and safety
  • Promote the common defense and security
  • Protect the environment

5 5

What NRC Regulates

  • Nuclear reactors - commercial power reactors, research and test reactors, new reactor designs
  • Nuclear materials - nuclear reactor fuel, radioactive materials for medical, industrial, and academic use
  • Nuclear waste - transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear material and waste, decommissioning of nuclear facilities
  • Nuclear security - physical security of nuclear facilities and materials from sabotage or attacks

6 6

What We Do - Nuclear Waste NRC regulates:

- Storage of spent reactor fuel in fuel pools or dry storage casks

- National spent fuel storage sites and reprocessing facilities

7 7

What We Do - Nuclear Security NRC Requires:

- Well-armed and well-trained security forces,

- Surveillance and perimeter patrols,

- State-of-the-art site access equipment and

controls,

- Physical barriers and detection zones, and

- Intrusion detection systems and alarm stations.

8 8

What NRC Doesnt Do

  • Regulate nuclear weapons, military reactors, or space vehicle reactors
  • Own or operate nuclear power plants
  • Regulate some radioactive materials, such as X-rays and naturally occurring radon

9 9

How NRC Regulates

  • Establish rules and regulations
  • Issue licenses
  • Provide oversight through inspection, enforcement, and evaluation of operational experience
  • Conduct research to provide support for regulatory decisions
  • Respond to events and emergencies

10 10 Some Nuclear Facts 104 nuclear power plants supply about 20 percent of the electricity in the U.S.

Nuclear materials are used in medicine for diagnosis and cancer treatment Nuclear materials are widely used in industry, such as in density gauges, flow measurement devices, radiography devices, and irradiators

11 11 NRC Performance Goals

  • Safety: Ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and protect the environment.
  • Security: Ensure adequate protection in the secure use and management of radioactive materials.

12 12 Reactor Oversight Process Safety Cornerstones Baseline Inspection Results Significance Threshold Action Matrix Significance Threshold Performance Indicator Results Regulatory Response Strategic Performance Areas Safety Cornerstones Baseline Inspection Results Significance Threshold Action Matrix Significance Threshold Performance Indicator Results Regulatory Response Strategic Performance Areas

13 13 Examples of Baseline Inspections

  • Equipment Alignment

~80 hrs/yr

  • Triennial Fire Protection

~250 hrs (every 3 yrs)

  • Operator Response

~125 hrs/yr

~80 hrs/yr

  • Rad Release Controls

~110 hrs (every 2 yrs)

  • Worker Radiation Protection ~95 hrs/yr
  • Corrective Action Program

~250 hrs (every 2 yrs)

  • Corrective Action Case Reviews ~60 hrs/yr
  • Browns Ferry Total

~9000 hrs (2010)

14 14 Significance Threshold Performance Indicators Green:

Only Baseline Inspection White:

Increases NRC oversight Yellow:

Increases NRC oversight Red:

Increases NRC oversight Inspection Findings Green:

Very low safety issue White:

Low to moderate safety issue Yellow:

Substantial safety issue Red:

High safety issue

15 15 National Summary of Plant Performance As of 5/31/2011 Licensee Response 93 Regulatory Response 6

Degraded Cornerstone 4

Multiple/Repetitive Deg. Cornerstone 1

Unacceptable 0

Total 104

16 16 Action Matrix Concept Increasing Safety Significance Increasing NRC Inspection Efforts Increasing NRC/Licensee Management Involvement Increasing Regulatory Actions Licensee

Response

Regulatory

Response

(95001)

Degraded Cornerstone (95002)

Multiple/Rep Degraded Cornerstone (95003)

Unacceptable Performance

17 Assessment Results - Units 1,2 & 3 1st, 2nd & 3rd Quarters within Degraded Cornerstone Column of the Action Matrix One Yellow Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone One White Violation in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone 4th Quarter Unit 2 and 3 Follow-up inspection per IP 95002 was completed in October 2010 Assessment following closure of One Yellow Violation and one White Finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone determined that performance returned to the Licensee Response Column as of November 2010.

4th Quarter Unit 1 Finding of Red risk significance identified on October 23, 2010 Assessment for a red finding is Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone on the NRC Action Matrix Supplemental Inspection is warranted 17

18 Operating Assessment for Browns Ferry Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 Q4 2010 Unit 1 Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Multiple Repetitive/

Degraded Cornerstone Finding Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Valve Failure Unit 2 Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Licensee

Response

Finding Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R II.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Unit 3 Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Degraded Cornerstone Licensee

Response

Finding Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 Yellow Violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.1 & III.G.2 18

19 Finding of Red Risk Significance What Happened?

- would not pass flow when the subsystem was attempted to be placed in service for core cooling at the beginning of a refueling outage on October 23, 2010

- the flow control portion of the valve, called the disc, was found stuck in the seat of the valve

- the disc had become separated from the stem and could no longer be controlled by the valve motor operator

20 74-66 valve 20 RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Overview

21 Flow Control Valve Cross Sectional View Stem Weld Locations Disc Skirt Skirt to Disc Threaded Connection

22 Finding of Red Significance Why is it significant?

  • A failure of this specific valve would normally effect only one of the two loops
  • Automatic valve functions were lost
  • including the ability of plant operators to manually use this loop of the subsystem
  • TVAs fire mitigation strategy resulted in a significant increase in the core damage frequency
  • This strategy limits the availability of alternative sources of reactor coolant inventory makeup 22

23 Finding of Red Significance Why is it significant?

  • TVA failed to implement an In-Service Testing program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
  • this precluded the timely identification that the RHR loop II subsystem was unable to fulfill its safety function
  • the NRC concluded that an adequate testing program would have identified this failure
  • NRC characterized this finding as Red, a finding of high safety significance
  • thoroughly considered all available information when analyzing the risk significance 23

24 Finding of Red Significance What happens next?

  • Red significance will warrant further NRC inspection

- Supplemental Inspection Procedure 95003, Supplemental Inspection For Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs Or One Red Input

  • Most comprehensive, diagnostic supplemental inspection conducted
  • Review of programs and processes not inspected as part of the baseline inspection program 24

25 Finding of Red Significance

  • Results aid the NRC in deciding whether additional regulatory actions are necessary
  • Assessment of safety culture

- Validation of TVAs root cause evaluation

- Validation of TVAs third party safety culture assessment 25

26 Safety Culture Assessment

  • Safety Culture is assessed semi-annually at all licensees
  • Integrated into the ROP
  • Each finding documents related safety culture issues
  • Three areas manifest themselves as root causes of performance problems (cross-cutting):
  • Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R)
  • Human Performance (HU)
  • Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) 26

27 Safety Culture Assessment

  • Cross-Cutting Theme

- four or more findings are assigned the same cross-cutting aspect within the past 12 months

- Only one aspect is required to have a theme in SCWE

  • Substantive Cross-Cutting Issue (SCCI)

- cross-cutting theme(s) in the cross-cutting areas exists

- and the staff has concerns with the licensees scope of efforts or progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme(s) 27

28 Safety Culture Assessment Browns Ferry Performance in 2010

1. Problem Identification and Resolution (opened on March 3, 2010)
a. Cross-cutting aspect of :

"thorough evaluation of identified problems"

2. Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Cross-Cutting aspect of:

appropriate and timely corrective actions 28

29 Safety Culture Assessment Detailed Information on Open SCCI #1 Problem Identification and Resolution (opened on March 3, 2010)

Cross-cutting aspect of "thorough evaluation of identified problems Basis for SCCI remaining open:

Cross-cutting theme was identified based on four Green inspection findings for the 2009 assessment period Dec 2010, an inspection was performed to assess the progress in addressing the SCCI TVA root cause actions have proven to be ineffective over the long term history of unsustainable corrective actions to address weaknesses in the Problem Identification and Resolution area not able to conclude whether actions will achieve sustainable and effective corrective actions.

29

30 Safety Culture Assessment Detailed Information on Open SCCI #2 Problem Identification and Resolution Aspect of appropriate and timely corrective actions Basis for opening SCCI:

Cross-cutting theme identified for four Green inspection findings during the 2010 assessment period Concern with the scope of effort and progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme TVA identified and implemented a range of actions to address the cross-cutting theme TVA actions had not yet proven effective in substantially mitigating the cross-cutting theme, even though a reasonable duration of time had passed Unable to assess the effectiveness of the completed and open corrective actions due to the number of open corrective actions and the limited time since implementation of the completed corrective actions 30

31 Safety Culture Assessment Browns Ferry Performance in 2010

  • One Cross-Cutting Theme was not determined to be SCCI
1. Human Performance
a. cutting aspect of :

Human Performance & Error Prevention

  • SCWE Theme continued followup 31

32 Safety Culture Assessment Detailed Information on Cross-Cutting Theme

  • Cross-Cutting Theme Human Performance Cross-cutting aspect of :

Human Performance & Error Prevention

  • Basis:

Theme established based on four Green findings for the 2010 assessment period Did not have a concern with the scope of effort and progress in addressing the cross-cutting theme TVAs common cause, root cause analysis implementing a range of actions to address the cross-cutting theme Scope and content of actions were reasonable and a reasonable time had not passed to implement the corrective actions 32

33 Safety Culture Assessment

  • Cross-cutting theme in the area of Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)

- Based on Confirmatory Order for Office of Investigation report numbers 2-2006-025 and 2-2009-003 involving two instances of discrimination.

- The NRC conducted follow up inspections in accordance with IP 92702, Follow up On Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, And Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders as necessary.

33

34 34 Browns Ferry Nuclear Annual Performance Assessment Summary

  • Overall performance for Unit 1

- Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone of the NRCs Action Matrix, beginning the 4th Qtr CY 2010

  • Overall performance for Units 2 and 3

- Licensee Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix for Units 2 and 3

35 TVA Comments

  • TVA Management Comments 35

36 Fukushima - NRC Response NRC Response to Fukushima Event Direct technical support to the Japanese

- Additional inspection of US reactors

- Comprehensive NRC review of the event (Task Force)

- NRC Fukushima FAQs:

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1110/ML11103A063.pdf 36

37 37 Open to the Public

  • NRC places a high priority on keeping the public and stakeholders informed of its activities.
  • At www.nrc.gov, you can:

- Find public meeting dates and transcripts;

- Read NRC testimony, speeches, press releases, and policy decisions; and

- Access the agencys Electronic Reading Room to find NRC publications and documents.

38 38 Contacting the NRC

  • Report an emergency

- (301) 816-5100 (call collect)

  • Report a safety concern

- (800) 695-7403

- Allegation@nrc.gov

  • General information or questions

- www.nrc.gov

- Select What We Do for Public Affairs

39 39 NRC Representatives

  • Victor McCree, RII, Regional Administrator
  • Thierry Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Charles Stancil, Resident Inspector
  • Phillip Niebaum, Resident Inspector

40 40 Reference Sources

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