ML110450187

FEMA Crystal River Final Exercise Report, After Action Report, Drill Date - October 6, 2010

ML110450187
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/21/2011
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Cecere, Bethanny NSIR/DPR 415-6754
References
Download: ML110450187 (38)

Text

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise AFTER ACTION REPORT (FINAL)

October 6, 2010 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP)

Published January 21, 2011

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise This page is intentionally blank

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. This After Action Report (AAR) for the 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plume Phase Emergency Planning Zone Exercise is to be considered a public document.

2. Points of

Contact:

Federal State of Florida Mr. Randall Hecht Mr. W. Tracy Poole South Section Chief REP Manager FEMA Region IV Florida DEM 3003 Chamblee-Tucker 2555 Shumard Oak Blvd.

Atlanta, Georgia 30341-4122 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 770/220-3147 229/413-2398 randall.hecht@dhs.gov William.Poole@em.myflorida.com Progress Energy:

Mr. Charles Poliseno Emergency Preparedness Supervisor 8200 W. Venable Street NU 47 Crystal River, Florida 34429 352/563-4522 charles.poliseno@pgnmail.com Handling Instructions 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 1

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Administrative Handling Instructions ..............................................................................................1 Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................2 Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................5 Section 1: Exercise Overview .........................................................................................................7 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ...........................................................................................10 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ...............................................................................................15 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results ..................................................................................15 3.2 Evaluation Summaries .................................................................................................15 3.2.1 State Of Florida ................................................................................................15 3.2.1.1 State Management Team................................................................15 3.2.1.2 Emergency News Center................................................................16 3.2.1.3 Dose Assessment ...........................................................................17 3.2.1.4 Field Monitoring Teams ................................................................17 3.2.1.5 Emergency Alert Station ................................................................18 3.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions .............................................................................................18 3.2.2.1 Citrus County .................................................................................18 3.2.2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................18 3.2.2.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools.......................................19 3.2.3.1 Levy County...................................................................................20 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................................20 3.2.3.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools.......................................20 3.2.3.2.3 Backup Route Alerting ..................................................21 3.2.3.2.4 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Decontamination .......21 3.2.3.2.5 Traffic and Access Control ............................................22 Table of Contents 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 2

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Section 4: Conclusion ...................................................................................................................24 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline....................................................................................................26 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluator and Assignments ......................................................................28 Appendix C: Acronyms ................................................................................................................30 Appendix D: Exercise Locations ..................................................................................................34 Appendix E: Exercise Planning Team Leadership .......................................................................35 Table of Contents 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 3

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise This page intentionally left blank 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 4

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On October 6, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant (CRNPP). CRNPP is located approximately 7.5 miles northwest of Crystal River, Florida and is operated by Progress Energy. The emergency planning zone (EPZ) is divided into three emergency response zones encompassing parts of Citrus and Levy Counties with a resident population of approximately 19,370.

FEMAs overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at CRNPP. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMAs policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on April 1, 2008. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted March 10 and 11, 1982.

The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results (identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement) and support development of corrective actions.

The State of Floridas specific objectives for the 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise were as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center (EOC) management including direction and control through the State and counties EOC Multi-Agency Coordination Center System (MACCS).

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and the general public through exercise demonstration and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System through exercise play.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the emergency news center (ENC) for joint (public and private sector) emergency information communications.

Executive Summary 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 5

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise These objectives were developed to meet the REP program requirements, encompass the REP Program evaluation area criteria, and are based on the negotiated Extent of Play Agreement.

FEMA has provided Areas for Improvement to the State of Florida under separate cover as a For Official Use Only (FOUO) document in compliance with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) standards.

Executive Summary 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 6

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)

Evaluated Exercise Type of Exercise Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Out of Sequence/Off Scenario Dates October 4 and 5, 2010 Exercise Date October 6, 2010 Locations See App. D for a complete listing of locations of supported exercise activities.

Sponsors Florida Division of Emergency Management Progress Energy 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard 8200 W. Venable Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 NU 47 Crystal River, Florida 34429 Program FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Mission

Response

Capabilities Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Scenario Type Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plume Phase EPZ Section 1: Exercise Overview 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 7

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership See App. E for a listing of the members of the exercise planning team leadership.

1.3 Participating Organizations The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise.

State of Florida Division of Emergency Management Technological Hazards Radiological Emergency Planning Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control Department of Law Enforcement Florida Highway Patrol Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission Risk Jurisdictions Citrus County, Florida Board of County Commissioners Sheriffs Office Sheriffs Office Emergency Management Public Safety Communications Center (911)

Health Department School Board Transportation Department Public Works Animal Services Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)

Department of Community Services Nature Coast Volunteer Center Levy County, Florida Department of Emergency Management County Administrator Public Safety Communications Center (911)

Sheriffs Office School Board Transportation Department Road Department County Fire Rescue Health Department Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)

Section 1: Exercise Overview 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 8

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise City of Williston Fire Department Non-Governmental Organizations Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)

American Red Cross (ARC), North Central Florida Chapter and Coast to Coast Chapter Progress Energy Salvation Army Seven Rivers Regional Medical System Citrus Memorial Health System Federal Organizations None Section 1: Exercise Overview 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 9

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN

SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design DHS/FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in 44 CFR 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, State, tribal and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise together with review of the radiological emergency response plans and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visits enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final After Action Report to the NRC that State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are; (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency, and (2) capable of being implemented.

The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FLDEM) participated in this exercise as a State Management Team (SMT) simulation cell providing the equivalent response and coordination expected during an actual event. FLDEM previously demonstrated all required criteria during the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise conducted on February 24, 2010, and has been actively involved with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response since the end of April 2010; continually demonstrating all aspects of capabilities and criteria required for managing a CBRN accidental release.

Formal submission of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for CRNPP to FEMA by the State of Florida occurred on August 26, 1983. Formal approval of the State of Floridas RERP was granted on February 14, 1984, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was evaluated on October 6, 2010, and included evaluations of the following out of sequence (OOS) activities held on October 4 and 5, 2010, consisting of the following:

Citrus County: Protective actions for schools on October 4, 2010.

Levy County: Protective actions for schools; emergency worker and vehicle decontamination on October 5, 2010 Section 2: Exercise Design Sum 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 10

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Capabilities Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items that were derived from the Target Capabilities List (TCL). The capabilities listed below form the foundation for the organization of all FEMA Region IV REP Program objectives and observations in this exercise.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management: Is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

Emergency Public Information and Warning: Is the capability that includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place: Is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

Emergency Public Safety and Security Response: Is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination: Is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of Section 2: Exercise Design Sum 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 11

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

Additionally, each capability is linked to several corresponding activities and tasks to provide additional detail. Based upon the identified exercise objectives, the following capabilities and associated activities are:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide EOC management including direction and control through the Counties and State EOC Multi-agency Coordination Center System (MACCS).

Capability: EOC Management - Activate EOC/MACC/IOF; Direct EOC/MACC/IOF Tactical Operations; and Provide EOC/MACC/IOF Connectivity Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Capability: EOC Management - Gather and Provide Information; Identify and Address Issues; and Support and Coordinate Response Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -

Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans and Issue Emergency Warnings Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and Counties emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

Capability: EOC Management - Direct EOC Tactical Operations; Gather and Provide Information; and Identify and Address Issues Capability: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response -

Activate Public Safety and Security Response; Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene; and Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations Capability: Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place - Direct Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Operations; Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection; Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population; Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance Capability: Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination

- Direct Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Tactical Section 2: Exercise Design Sum 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 12

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Operations; Activate Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination; Assess Hazard and Evaluate Risk; and Conduct Decontamination and Clean-up /Recovery Operations Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -

Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings; Activate Emergency Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans; and Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information Center (JIC) for joint (public and private sectors) emergency information communications.

Capability: Emergency Public Information and Warning -

Establish Emergency News Center; Conduct Emergency News Center Operations; Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications; Conduct Media Relations; and Provide Public Rumor Control.

2.3 Scenario Summary The exercise began with the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Simulator in the interactive mode.

At 0730 initial conditions and ground rules are presented to the operating crew in the Simulator Control Room and participants in the shops. Plant is operating at 75% power.

Power had been at approximately 45% for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to repair A MFWP governor. After the governor was repaired power was stabilized at 75% for post maintenance testing of the A MFWP governor. The testing is complete and engineering is analyzing the data.

SP-312A NI calibration check was performed; (check SAT). Both MFW loops and the A MFWP have not been returned to automatic following post maintenance testing of A MFWP governor. During the power assent seal injection flow became erratic.

Manual seal injection flow control has been established using MUV-16 flow controller (MU-15-FIC) in hand operation. I&C is investigating the flow control problem. The cause of the erratic operation has not been identified. The crew is instructed to restore ICS to automatic and maintain current power.

At 0800 there is a turbine failure. When ICS is returned to automatic, a blade tip on the low-pressure turbine breaks off, penetrating the turbine casing. A large steam leak is created, vacuum is lowering rapidly and the turbine is out-of balance causing severe vibrations. The crew trips the turbine and RPS trips the reactor. At 0802 the SPO reports a hole in the low-pressure turbine on the south side. Steam was blowing out, but now it appears to be drawing air in. An Unusual Event is declared at 0825 based on turbine failure penetrating the casing (EAL 3.10). The EC may perform a discretionary staffing Section 2: Exercise Design Sum 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 13

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise of the TSC. A 350gpm RCS leak begins at 0825. Containment radiation monitors and the sump begin slowly rising. The crew enters AP-520 and after several minutes opens injection valve MUV-24 to maintain pressurizer level.

An Alert is declared at 0840 based on a potential loss of RCS. TSC and OSC staffing is initiated and (simulated) in-shop accountability begins. Discretionary EOF staffing is also initiated per EM-400 guidance. The TSC is operational at 0915 (required 60 minutes from the Alert declaration). The RCS leak degrades to a large-break LOCA of 1000gpm at 0935. Pressure in the reactor building increases rapidly. Containment radiation monitors also increase. DCP-1A fails to auto start and must be started manually. DHP-1B shaft seizes and the motor overload fails. The A LPI injection valve DHV-5 fails closed. Attempts to manually control it are not successful.

RB pressure causes the purge exhaust valves to unseat and alarms are received on RM-A8 and RM-A2 low-range gas channel indicating a release to the auxiliary building and the environment.

A Site Area Emergency is declared at 0950 based on loss of sub-cooling margin or an RCS leak requiring one or more injection valves and loss of containment. Required EOF staffing is initiated. The site evacuation alarm is sounded (simulated) initiating protected area evacuation and accountability (simulated). Protected area accountability is complete (simulated) at 1020. The RCS hotleg piping fails completely at 1015. Pressure rises sharply, quickly exceeding the 100R/hr clad loss trigger point. Rm-A2 low-range scale is exceeded. The core is not adequately cooled and superheat develops. PAR was as follows:

Evacuate: Zone 1 Shelter: Zones 2 and 3 Entry into EOP-07 (inadequate core cooling), meets the General Emergency criteria based on the potential loss of the fuel clad fission product barrier and the earlier losses of the RCS and containment barriers. A protective action recommendation would be made to evacuate zone 1 and shelter zones 2 and 3. The EOF is required to be operational by this time 1050 (or 60 minutes from the Site Area Emergency). There is a concern regarding core cooling at 1130. If building spray is running, the BWST may be approaching levels threatening continued HPI. Without LPI, HPI cannot pump water from the RB sump. As a contingency, DHV-5 may need to be returned to the A decay heat train. A power glitch causes the TSC AHFs-60 and 61 to trip at 1220. Temperature in the TSC begins to rise. The breakers can be reset.

The exercise is terminated at approximately 1330 depending on demonstration of exercise objectives.

Section 2: Exercise Design Sum 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 14

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 6, 2010 plume exercise and OOS interviews and demonstrations on October 4 and 5, 2010.

3.2 Evaluation Summaries 3.2.1 State Of Florida 3.2.1.1 State Management Team Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

The State Management Team (SMT) leader arrived on site and organized the SMT deployed team, established communications with the State Emergency Operations Center and the Risk counties of Citrus and Levy. The SMT leader and the County Emergency Management (EM) Directors coordinated activities, protective action decisions (PAD) and information to insure the safety and health of the public.

State Management Team (SMT) simulation cell provided the equivalent response and coordination that would be expected during an actual event. FLDEM previously demonstrated all required criteria during the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant exercise conducted on February 24, 2010, and has been actively involved with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response since the end of April 2010; continually demonstrating all aspects of capabilities and criteria required for managing a CBRN accidental release.

Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The SMT effectively coordinated with Citrus and Levy County EM times for siren soundings and appropriate Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages from their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) to provide accurate and timely emergency notifications to the public without undue delay.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 5.b.1.

Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 15

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.2 Emergency News Center This assessment addresses the interface and interaction among Citrus and Levy Counties, Progress Energy and the public in the Emergency News Center (ENC). The ENC has dedicated space and equipment located in the Progress Energy facility in Crystal River, Florida.

State, local and utility plans call for the activation of the CRNPP ENC following the declaration of SAE. The utility and risk county personnel arrived in accordance with procedures following SAE at 0945 and the utilitys ENC Director declared the ENC operational at 1043. County personnel conducted communications checks with their respective emergency operations centers (EOC) and direct contact with the Emergency Management Directors (EMD).

The close proximity of the EMD facilitated the formal message approval process. The ability to provide timely emergency information and instructions for the public and the media was successfully demonstrated at the ENC. Although the message preparation and coordination was exemplary, it was felt that there was a lack of news releases related to precautionary measures being taken in the counties.

Information was routinely gathered from the EOCs to assist in providing detailed information to be shared with the public through media outlets. Charts posted in the ENC and used by the ENC Director in pre-media briefing coordination focused on utility, State and risk county responsibilities and area of concentration. During the two media briefings, the PIOs were well versed in their local response and were able to fully discuss what actions had been taken by their organizations. The county personnel were exceptionally well prepared and the level of detail provided on actions being taken in the counties to safeguard their citizens was complete and left little room for follow-up queries.

One of the roles of the ENC is to assist in quelling rumors and dispelling inaccurate information. To accomplish this requires ENC representatives being provided input from citizen information lines located in the counties, at the SEOC and the utility corporate headquarters on rumors and trends. The latter was demonstrated by the utility. The negotiated extent of play agreement precluded evaluation of this aspect of ENC operations.

Of note was the performance of the five public information personnel from the risk counties. These personnel were solely and collectively well prepared to execute their responsibilities. They fully understood their countys emergency response plans and were well versed in the flow of response operations and had readily available detailed demographic data to respond to queries. From a utility/risk county perspective this capability was fully met.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, and 5.b.1.

Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 16

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise 3.2.1.3 Dose Assessment Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:

The Progress Energy Emergency Operations facility (EOF) served as the interface between the utility operator and the responding State and local government organizations.

Consistent with Floridas Concept of Operations, as specified in the RERP, the Governors Authorized Representative, i.e., the SMT was deployed directly to the utility EOF and was authorized to make administrative and technical decisions on behalf of the Governor. Similarly, senior Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) staff members were also deployed to the EOF and were responsible for conducting independent accident analyses, to include radiological dose assessment, the development of protective actions to protect public health and safety, providing direction and control for the State radiological field monitoring teams (FMT) and overall, served as the technical advisor to the SMT.

The BRC, in the conduct of performing the independent accident analyses, utilized all the available information and resources to factor into the development of protective actions, to include FMT data, the RASCAL computer model, plant status and associated technical information and recommendations developed and provided by the utility operator.

The utility operator also performed dose modeling utilizing the RASCAL computer model. While there were some variations in the initial plant condition assumption that were input into the dose models by each of the two participating response organizations, these variations in results initially could not be supported by FMT measurements.

Consequently, BRC and the utility operator engaged in a peer review of each others analyses to better understand these differences, which were subsequently reconciled and appropriate PADs were developed and implemented.

The BRC successfully demonstrated its capability to effectively conduct independent accident analyses in a manner consistent with the preservation of public health and safety.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, and 4.a.2.

3.2.1.4 Field Monitoring Teams Three Field Monitoring teams (FMTs) were pre-positioned at the EOF. The FMT equipment, supplies and vehicles were adequate to support radiological monitoring and emergency worker functions. Three communications systems were available, tested and verified operational before deployment. The FMTs were provided an operational and safety briefing by the Mobile Emergency Response Laboratory (MERL) and field team supervisors. The FMTs performed hazard assessment by traversing downwind locations in a strategic manner as directed by the field team director (FTD), to identify and quantify the magnitude of the simulated release. Radiological monitoring equipment was operationally tested prior to use, and used correctly in the field to determine ambient Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 17

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise radiological conditions. Ambient readings and personnel exposures were routinely communicated to the FTD. Airborne radioactivity was assessed using an air sampler fitted with a particulate filter and sample cartridge.

The repeat-back process for radio communications was not used throughout the exercise and a recommendation was made to consistently use repeat-back in all radio communications, and to codify the content to enable efficient and secure transmissions.

Additionally, a recommendation was made to include a waypoint to the CRNPP on the GPS units to provide site orientation for the FMTs in the field.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.2, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, and 4.a.3 3.2.1.5 Emergency Alert Station Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

The SMT, Citrus and Levy Counties coordinated EAS activation during PAR discussions and made timely decisions for siren sounding and EAS activations. Once discussions were complete and all parties were in concurrence with the implementation time and EAS message content decisions, each county manager contacted their deputy EOC manager and provided exact EAS activation times and message numbers.

All decision makers were very familiar with the EAS process and messages. They selected messages appropriate for the situation and achieved group consensus. No delays or issues in the EAS decision making process were observed. The State public information officer did not participate per the extent of play agreement.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 5.b.1 3.2.2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.2.2.1 Citrus County 3.2.2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

A well thought out process for mobilizing the EOC and other county response agencies exists in Citrus County, anchored firmly on the capabilities and use of Code Red automatic dialing and communications system. Once response agencies are in place at the EOC, an initial briefing is conducted providing information on the current and projected status of the public hazard. The EMA Director and his designated EOC Operations Chief demonstrated effective and proactive direction and control of the county response effort, both at the EOC and at the EOF. They both conducted concise, Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 18

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise aggressive proactive briefings of EOC staff while constantly encouraging them to think of future needs and problems. When deployed to the EOF the EMD ensured consistent communications with the EOC Operations Chief sharing decision information. The County EOC staff demonstrated a high degree of competence and the ability to protect the health and safety of the public and emergency workers in the event of an incident at CRNPP is not in question.

The EOC is a new facility and is well equipped to support and sustain operations. There was more than adequate space for all response organizations to assemble and conduct operations. Even when fully staffed and with operations ongoing, there was minimum noise which maintained a pleasant temperature. Information technology infrastructure is robust and designed to be accessible by all. The use of WebEOC software enhanced the response effort.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The County 911 operations center has the primary responsibility for siren activation for both Citrus and Levy Counties. Upon receiving the information from the EOF for the time of siren activation the sirens are activated. A computer screen displays the status of all sirens for operational status, during the course of the exercise, no siren failures were noted.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 5.a.1 3.2.2.1.2 Protective Actions for Schools Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:

All decisions for protective actions would be directed by the office of the school district superintendent. That decision would come from the district representatives at the EOC and would be based on recommendations on decisions made by emergency management at SAE.

The principal, assistant principal and school resource officer from Crystal River High School were interviewed. All were well versed in directing the students and staff and coordinating actions during emergency situations. The staff takes part in monthly training sessions throughout the year and at least two sessions involve radiological situations at CRNPP. The school has several copies of the emergency preparedness plans available with direction and control for school response capable of being carried out by several members of the school administration. Students and families are provided with the school response procedures at the beginning of the school year and if necessary are updated and disseminated if changes are made. In the event of emergency notification a Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 19

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise call system is available to students homes to notify families of school actions.

The time of the school day would be taken into consideration for evacuation or early dismissal. In the event of evacuation, two classes at a time would be loaded on a bus and then transported to the fairground facility near Inverness. Local law enforcement would provide escort for the buses and communications could be maintained on several frequencies. The dose exposure would be obtained from the law enforcement officers dosimetry readings. Once at the fairgrounds, the students would be supervised by teachers and staff until picked up by a responsible adult.

For this capability the following criteria was met: 3.c.2.

3.2.3.1 Levy County 3.2.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Center Management Capability Summary:

The County EOC manager and his staff demonstrated the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating the EOC for this exercise. The EOC Manager demonstrated exemplary direction and control in the response to an event at CRNPP.

The EOC was set up by Emergency Support Function (ESF) groupings and all ESFs were present. The ESF representatives and other staff operating in the EOC demonstrated a clear knowledge and understanding of their agencys roles in decision making and collaboration with other ESFs and off site response organizations. All ESFs were provided with multiple methods for communicating with other agencies, including computers at each desk with electronic mail access, multiple telephones and radios. A RACES operator was available on site if needed. The county warning point was the County 911 Center operated by the Sheriffs Office, which had multiple communication systems and was properly staffed.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3, and 5.b.1 Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

All public information is released through the ENC. The rumor control function was adequately staffed and relevant information was received and evaluated to track trends or referred for action. All siren activation procedures are performed by Citrus County.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 5.b.1 3.2.3.2.2 Protective Actions for Schools Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 20

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Capability Summary:

The principal at Yankeetown Elementary School was interviewed on October 5, 2010 and was well versed in directing the students and staff and coordinating actions during emergency situations. The school has several copies of the emergency preparedness plans available. Direction and control for school response is capable of being carried out by several members of the school administration. Students and families are provided with the school response procedures at the beginning of the school year and if necessary are updated and disseminated if changes are made. Emergency notification concerning school evacuation would be in conjunction with the County Code Red system to notify the families. All PADs would be directed by the office of the school board. Decisions would come from the district representatives at the EOC and would be based on recommendations made by emergency management personnel at SAE.

The school utilizes a standard evacuation policy with no early dismissal. In the event of evacuation, all 197 enrolled students would be loaded on four busses and transported to the reception center at Bronson High School. The necessary busses are on site at the school and if no drivers were readily available, staff members are licensed to drive them.

Law enforcement would provide escort and communications for the busses.

Communications could be maintained on several frequencies. The dose exposure would be obtained from the law enforcement officers dosimetry reading. Once at the reception center, the students would be supervised until picked up by a responsible adult.

For this capability the following criterion were met: 3.c.2.

3.2.3.2.3 Backup Route Alerting Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

Levy County has no responsibility for primary alerting and notification of the public residing in the 10-mile EPZ per the county plan. By mutual agreement and coordination the twelve sirens located in Levy County will be activated from the Citrus County EOC.

The Assistant EOC Director and County Fire Coordinator (FC) stated that when the decision to evacuate the public is made, the sirens, EAS messages and Code Red (activated locally) would be used to notify the public. During the exercise there was no siren failure, however the FC stated that if there had been a failure, Citrus County EOC Director would notify the Levy County EOC Director of the affected coverage area and back up route alerting would be conducted to notify those residents of what protective actions to take. Notification would have been accomplished utilizing police and fire vehicles, including aircraft equipped with public address systems.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 5.a.3 3.2.3.2.4 Emergency Worker and Vehicle Decontamination Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 21

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Capability Summary:

The County demonstrated emergency worker decontamination (EWD) procedures at Lebanon Station located at the intersection of US Highway 19 and State Road 121 on October 5, 2010. The demonstration showed effective cooperation between more than 20 County Fire and Public Safety agencies, both paid and volunteer. The vehicle and EWD station was constructed along the countys major evacuation route and configured to take full advantage of available space and terrain features. The Incident Commander professionally and proactively managed personnel and the mission simultaneously.

Vehicle and personnel monitoring was thorough and effective. When exercise and real-world challenges were encountered, they were effectively overcome by solid management, teamwork, continuous communication and training.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1.

3.2.3.2.5 Traffic and Access Control Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Capability Summary:

The County demonstrated this capability out of sequence on October 5, 2010. Personnel from the County Sheriffs Office, Marion County Sheriffs Office and Levy County Road Department established three traffic control points (TCP) at the junctions of US Highway 19, State Road 121 and County Road 336. Sufficient signs, barricades and vehicles were used to aid in controlling traffic flow. All personnel were knowledgeable of evacuation routes and reception center locations and described procedures for handling impediments to traffic flow. Each worker wore the appropriate dosimetry and was aware of exposure limits and reporting requirements.

For this capability the following criteria were met: 3.d.1, and 3.d.2.

Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 22

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise This page is intentionally blank Section 3: Analysis of Cap 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 23

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION Officials and representatives from the State of Florida, the risk counties of Citrus and Levy, Progress Energy, as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

AAR Appendix A 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 24

This page is intentionally blank AAR Appendix A 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 25

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE TIMELINE Emergency Time Time That Notification Was Received Or Action Was Taken Classification Utility Level or Event Declared SMT ENC CITRUS CO LEVY CO Unusual Event 0810 0821 N/A 0821 0825 Alert 0835 0838 N/A 0843 0847 Site Area Emergency 0945 0959 N/A 1000 1007 General Emergency 1018 1031 1027 1033 1039 Simulated Rad. Release 0945 0959 1118 1000 1007 Started Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 1028 1029 1043 N/A 0918 Declaration of State of Local N/A N/A 1046 N/A N/A Emergency State N/A N/A 1118 1011 0930 Exercise Terminated 1308 N/A 1307 1307 1305 Early Precautionary Actions: N/A N/A 1008 1008 Notification of Special Needs Population 1st Protective Action Decision: Notify the public N/A 1023 1008 1009 Precautionary: Relocate Schools Siren Activation N/A N/A 1015 1015 1st EAS Message N/A N/A 1018 1018 AAR Appendix A 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 26

Emergency Time Time That Notification Was Received Or Action Was Taken Classification Utility Level or Event Declared SMT ENC CITRUS CO LEVY CO 2nd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate: Zone 1 Shelter: Zone 2 & 3 1046 N/A 1048 1048 Ingestion of KI for emergency workers Siren Activation: 1050 N/A 1050 1050 2nd EAS Message 1055 N/A 1055 1055 3rd Protective Action Decision: Evacuate Zones 1, 2

&3 1205 1205 1205 1205 Ingestion of KI for Public Siren Activation 1210 1210 1210 1210 3rd EAS Message 1213 1213 1213 1213 KI for Emergency Workers 1046 1046 1046 1046 KI for General Public 1205 1205 1205 1205 AAR Appendix A 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 27

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear power Plant REP Exercise APPENDIX B: EXERCISE EVALUATOR AND ASSIGNMENTS Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant 2010 REP Exercise Location Evaluator Criterion Capability State of Florida State Management Team Lisa Rink 1.c.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, EOC Management, (SMT) 5.a.1, Lorenzo Lewis 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, Emergency Public 5.b.1 Information and Gerald McLemore Warning Emergency News Center Robert Spence 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, Emergency Public 5.b.1 (Media Information and Willis Larrabee Briefings) Warning (EOF/ENC interface) 5.b.1 (Public Inquiry)

DHEC Dose Assessment Robert Trojanowski 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, HAZMAT 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, Decontamination &

2.b.2, 4.a.2 Response Emergency Operations Robert Trojanowski 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, EOC Management Facility (NRC) 1.e.1, 2.b.1 Field Monitoring Teams Alan Bevan 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, HAZMAT (three teams) Dave Stuenkle 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, Decontamination &

Brad McRee 4.a.3 Response Risk Jurisdictions Citrus County, Florida Emergency Operations Obhie Robinson 1.c.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, EOC Management, Center 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1 John Ackermann 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, Emergency Public John Fill 2.a.1, 2.c.1, 5.a.3 Information and Warning, Protective Actions for Jon Sandberg 3.c.2 Citizen Evacuation Schools & Shelter in Place AAR Appendix B 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 28

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Levy County, Florida Emergency Operations Jon Sandberg 1.c.1, 2.b.2, 3.c.1, EOC Management, Center 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1 Mike Dolder 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, Emergency Public Ron Shaw 2.a.1, 2.c.1, 5.a.3 Information and Warning, Protective Actions for Jon Sandberg 3.c.2 Citizen Evacuation Schools & Shelter in Place Emergency Worker & Obhie Robinson 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1, HAZMAT Vehicle Decontamination John Fill 6.b.1 Decontamination &

Lorenzo Lewis Response Backup Route Alerting Ron Shaw 5.a.3 Emergency Public Safety and Security

Response

Traffic Control Points John Fill 3.d.1, 3.d.2 Emergency Public Safety and Security

Response

AAR Appendix B 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 29

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear power Plant REP Exercise APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS Acronym Meaning AAC After Action Conference AAR After Action Report ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio for Emergency Services CCSO Citrus County Sheriffs Office CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRNPP Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant DEMD Deputy Emergency Management Director DHS Department of Homeland Security DNR Department of Natural Resources DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DPH Department of Public Health DRD Direct-Reading Dosimeter DSS Department of Social Services EAL Emergency Action Level EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEG Exercise Evaluation Guide EMA Emergency Management Agency EMS Emergency Medical Services ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOPA Extent of Play Agreement EMD Emergency Management Director EMITS Emergency Management Information Tracking System EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure AAR Appendix C 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 30

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room ERC Emergency Response Coordinator ERDS Emergency Response Data System ERP Emergency Response Plan ESF Emergency Support Function EW Emergency Worker EWD Emergency Worker Decontamination EXPLAN Exercise Plan FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FMT Field Monitoring Team FOUO For Official Use Only FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center GE General Emergency GIS Geographic Information System GM Geiger-Muller (detector)

GPS Geographic Positioning System HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HO Health Order HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program HQ Headquarters IC Incident Commander ICS Incident Command System IP Improvement Plan IRIS Internet Routed Information System IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide LP-1 Local Primary -1 MOC Mobile Operations Center MOU Memorandum of Understanding mR Milliroentgen AAR Appendix C 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 31

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning mR/h milliroentgen per hour NAWAS National Warning System NGO Non-Governmental Organization NIMS National Incident Management System NOUE Notification of Unusual Event NPP Nuclear Power Plant NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria 0654 for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 OOS Out-of-Sequence ORO Offsite Response Organization PA Public Announcement PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer PPE Personal Protective Equipment PRD Permanent Record Dosimetry R Roentgen RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service REA Radioactive Emergency Area REM Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan R/h Roentgen(s) per hour RO Radiological Officer SAE Site Area Emergency SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SIMCELL Simulation Cell SIP Shelter-in-Place AAR Appendix C 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 32

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise Acronym Meaning SLED State Law Enforcement Division SMRAP Southern Mutual Radiological Assistance Plan SMT State Management Team SOG Standard Operating Guide SOP Standard Operating Procedure SSS Selective Signaling System TCL Target Capabilities List TCP Traffic Control Point THD Technological Hazard Division TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture UTL Universal Task List VFD Volunteer Fire Department AAR Appendix C 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 33

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear power Plant REP Exercise APPENDIX D: EXERCISE LOCATIONS Exercise Locations Out of Sequence Locations Progress Energy Emergency Operations Citrus County School Facility (EOF)/ENC/SMT Crystal River High School 8200 W, Venable Street 1205 NE 8th Avenue Crystal River, Florida 34428 Crystal River, Florida 34428 Citrus County Emergency Operations Levy County Schools Center (EOC) Yankeetown Elementary School 3549 Saunders Way 113 N. Schoolcraft Drive Lecanto, Florida 34461 Inglis, Florida 34449 Levy County Emergency Operations Levy County EWD Center (EOC) Lebanon Station 9010 NE 79th Avenue Intersection of US Highway 19 and CR 336 Bronson, Florida 32621 Tidewater, Florida AAR Appendix D 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 34

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear power Plant REP Exercise APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLANNING TEAM LEADERSHIP Agency Name Email Phone Crystal River Nuclear Power Charles charles.poliseno@pgnmail. 352-563-Plant (CRNPP) Poliseno com 4522 FEMA Region IV Randall Hecht randall.hecht@dhs.gov 770-220-3147 FEMA Region IV Jon Sandberg jon.sandberg@dhs.gov 770-220-3149 Florida Division of Emergency W. Tracy Poole william.poole@em.myflori 229-413-Management da.com 2398 Florida Department of Public Charles Adams charles_adams@doh.state.f 407-297-Health - Bureau of Radiation l.us 2096 Control Citrus County Sheriffs Office Bretlee Jordan bjordan@sheriffcitrus.org 352-249-2704 Levy County Emergency John jmacrep@bellsouth.net 352-486-Management MacDonald 5593 AAR Appendix E 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 35

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

AAR 2010 Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant REP Exercise This page intentionally left blank AAR Appendix E 2010 CRNPP REP Exercise 36