ML110140227

Initial Exam 2010-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML110140227
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/19/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-390/10-301
Download: ML110140227 (352)

Text

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: NRC Exam 1 August Scenario No.: I OpTestNo.: I 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: 100% power, BOL. RCS boron is iO3i ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover: Train A/Channel I Work Week. Perform a load reduction to 93% to support turbine valve tests and EHC testing. 1A Containment Spray pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. A Severe Thunderstorm Warning has been issued for Rhea, Meigs McMinn Counties for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a N-BOP Reduce power to perform turbine valve testing and EHC calibration using R-RO GO-4, Normal Power Operations, and 1 -TRI-47-3,Main Turbine Steam Inlet Valve Testing.

2 rx02d 1-RO Loop 4 RTD fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires AOl-2, Malfunction TS-SRO of Reactor Control System, entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 rwi4a C-BOP 1A ERCW header breaks in the Intake Pumping Station. Requires AOl TS-SRO 13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water, entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

4 rx2O 1-BOP Steam Pressure transmitter, 1-PT-i -33 fails low, requiring manual control of main feedwater pump speed, and Aol-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, entry.

5 cvi 8c C-RO Number 2 seal failure on #3 RCP. Requires entry into ARI 97-C, RCP 3 STANDPIPE LEVEL HI/LO, and AOI-24, RCP Malfunctions During Pump Operation, for actions.

6 cvii 1-RO 1-LT-62-i29 fails high, requiring entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO, and manual actions to ensure VCT level is maintained properly.

7 rwO9 M-All Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler th04b fails closed. Requires a manual trip of the reactor/turbine due to high stator water temperature. A vapor space break develops 15 seconds after the reactor trip.

8 rpo2b 1-RO Automatic SI fails to actuate, requiring manual initiation.

9 ed0i M-All Loss of offsite power which occurs 10 seconds after the safety injection is manually initiated.

10 si08i C-BOP 1 A-A DG and 1 B-B DG fail to automatically start on a blackout or safety si08j injection signal. Requires an emergency start from panel i-M-i orfrom panel 0-M-26.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario I - Summary Initial Condition 100% power, BOL. RCS boron is 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover Train A/Channel I Work Week. Perform a load reduction to 93% to support turbine valve tests and EHC testing. 1A Containment Spray pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. A Severe Thunderstorm Warning has been issued for Rhea, Meigs McMinn Counties for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Event 1 Reduce power to perform turbine valve test using GO-4, Normal Power Operations, and 1-TRI-47-3,Main Turbine Steam Inlet Valve Testing.

Event 2 Loop 4 RTD fails high causing the Rod Control System to detect a large mismatch between Auctioneered HI Tavg and T-reference and insert rods 72 steps per minute. The SRO enters AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and directs the RO to defeat the Loop 4 temperature functions. The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Specs LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Conditions W, X and V; LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Condition N.

Event 3 1A ERCW header breaks in the Intake Pumping Station (IPS). The BOP will dispatch an AUO to the PS. The SRO will enter and direct actions of AOl-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS. The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Specs LCO 3.0.3, based on the cross-connection of the A and B ERCW trains.

Event 4 Steam Pressure transmitter, 1-PT-i -33 fails low, requiring manual control of the main feedwater pump master controller, 1-PC-46-20. AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.7, Failure of MFW Pump Control will be implemented. Manual control of the main feedwater pump master controller will be required for the remainder of power operations.

Event 5 Alarm 97-C RCP STANDPIPE LEVEL HI/LO is received. The alarm, in addition to a reduction in RCP 3 seal return flow indicates a failure of the Number 2 seal. Based on the ARI, the RO will align primary water to containment and fill RCP 3 standpipe in an attempt to clear the alarm. The alarm will not clear, indicating a failure of the Number 2 seal. The SRO enters and directs actions of AOI-24, RCP Malfunctions during pump operations.

Event 6 i-LT-62-129A VCT LEVEL fails high. VCT level indication is off-scale high. i-LCV-62-i 18 is diverted to the Holdup Tank. CVCS VCT to RWST low-level transfer partial logic is defeated. Auto makeup to the VCT remains operable, but VCT level cannot be maintained without aligning the divert valve to the VCT.

Event 7 Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed.

Requires a manual trip of the reactor/turbine due to high stator water temperature. A PZR vapor space break develops 15 seconds after the reactor trip. Requires manual initiation of safety injection.

Event 8 Automatic SI fails to actuate, requiring manual initiation.

Event 9 Loss of offsite power occurs 10 seconds after the safety injection is manually initiated.

Event 10 iA-A DG and 1 B-B DG fail to automatically start on a blackout or safety injection signal.

Requires an emergency start from panel 1 -M-i or from panel 0-M-26.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 Scenario I - Critical Task Summary Critical Task I Manually actuate at least one train of S/S-actuated safeguards before any of the following:

from WOG ERG

• Transition to any E-1 series, E-2 series, or E-3 series procedure or transition to any Critical Task List, FRG E-O, D

• Completion of step 5.a of ES-U. 1 Critical Task 2 Energize at least one ac emergency bus before transition out of E-U, unless the transition from WOG ERG is to ECA-O.O, in which case the critical task must be performed before placing safeguards Critical Task List, equipment handswitches in the pull-to-lock position.

E-O, C.

Guide/The ECA-O.O is developed and structured to address the condition where all ac emergency power is lost. It is entered on the symptom of all ac emergency busses bemg de-energized. Its objective is to cope with the loss of ac emergency power until at least one ac emergency bus can be energized. ECA-U. U should not be entered if at least one ac emergency bus is energized since the other optimal recovery guidelines and function restoration guidelines contain guidance that accommodates multiple fallures.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 347 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 347.

c. Right click on IC# 347.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 347.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value csrO3 containment spray pump a power R 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 off off hs-72-27a-1 06020 cntmt spray pump a mtr sw(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off hs-72-22a-1 05020 rwst spray hdr a fcv(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-44a-1 05040 cntmt sump hdr a fcv(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-72-34a-1 05060 cs pump a recirc fcv(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-72-39a-1 05080 cs hdr a iso! vlv sw.(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On Page 1 of 8

Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value rpo2b auto si initiation signal failure M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si08i failure of auto si and blackout signals dg 1 a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active siO8j failure of auto si and blackout signals dg 1 b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active edOl total loss of offsite power M 11 00:00:10 00:00:00 Active InActive thu pzrvaporspaceleak)x M 19 00:00:05 00:00:00 24 0 rx02d cold leg 4 rtd 1 failure M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 54.9441 rwr05 valve fcv-67-22 breaker position R 20 00:00:00 00:00:00 close open rwrl2 powertoappendixrvalve67-147 R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 rwr22 power to appendix r valve 67-458 R 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 rwr29 power to 2-fcv-67-22 strainer 2a-a inlet R 23 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rwl4a ercwipsheaderabreak M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 50 0 rx2O main steam header pressure transmitterfails to pospt-i-33 M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 20 76.5349 cvl8c rcp 2 seal failure rcp #3 M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.5 0 cvii vct level transmitter fails to position; 129-a M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 30.787 rwO9 rcw tcv on stator water cooler fails closed M 7 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. Place 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A, in STOP.PULL-TO-LOCK. Place a RED Hold Notice Tag on I-HS-72-27A CNTMT SPRAY PMP A; I-HS-72-22A RWST TO CS-PMP A SUCTION; 1-HS-72-34, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A MINI FLOW; 1-HS-72-44A, CNTMT SUMP TO CS PMP A SUCT; I-HS-72 -39A, CNTMT SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT. ENSURE pink Protected Equipment Tag is placed on I-HS-72-IOA, CNTMT SPRAY PMP B.

8. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30.

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

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Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) BOL (Beginning Of Life) is updated and on the desk, and that the BOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators. ENSURE Reactivity Plan for power maneuver is available to the crew.2.

Item 3

• AFD -2.8  % 0.2  % 3.3  %

Lower Band Target Upper Band 0.0 Actual

• Control Rods Auto Manual 220 steps Control Bank D1/D2 Item 4 Negative Positive None 1-CCPA 1-CCPB CB 1030 ppm Item 5 Current RCS C  :

6 1030 ppm Current fluid inside the blender is:

Acid Water Blended PW flow rate 70 gpm 1-FC-62-142, dial setting 35%

BAflow rate l2gpm 1-FC-62-139 dial setting 30%

6. Boric Acid (BA) and Primary Water (PW) volumes for the following changes:

1°FTavg increase 175 gal PW 1°F Tavg decrease 32 gal BA 10% Downpower@ 5%/hr 130 gal BA 50% Downpower@ 5%/hr 800 gal BA 1000 MW (85%) Runback 200 gal BA 950 MW (80%) Runback 285 gal BA 900 MW (75%) Runback 369 gal BA 790 MW or 800 MW Run back 535 gal PW

11. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page3of8

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No No nla Power reduction to perform 1-TRI-47-3, Main Turbine Steam Valve Testing.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, report that you are standing by to support turbine valve testing.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, acknowledge the request to check 1-PT-I-33 locally. Report back that there are no leaks and everything in the area appears normal.

2 2 Cold leg 4 RTD I failure which results in automatic rod insertion at 72 steps per minute until rod control is taken to MANUAL.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge the report of the failure of Cold Leg 4 RTD failure. If requested, state that a package to troubleshoot the failed circuit will be prepared.

When requested to trip bistable, state that lMl-160.004 will be prepared and that personnel will contact the control room prior to tripping any bistables.

3 3 IA ERCW Header rupture in the Intake Pumping Station.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Outside Routine AUO, acknowledge direction to go to the Intake Pumping Station assist in determination of leak location. Report that there is a large leak, the strainer room is flooded and that it appears to be on the A header near the strainer.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Outside Routine AUO, acknowledge request for lB Strainer zIP. If the leak has been isolated, report that the zIP is 4 psid and dropping.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, acknowledge the request to go to the Reactor MOV boards to close breakers for specific valves. Use iwrO5 to restore power to I-FCV 67-22; use rwrl2 to restore power to I-FCV-67-147; use ,wr22 to restore power to I-FCV-67-458; use rwr29 to restore power to 2-FCV-67-22.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the AUO dispatched to the diesel generator buildings, report ERCW flow to each diesel generator is between 700 and 800 gpm.

Page4of8

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No.

4 4 1A Steam Pressure transmitter, 1-PT-I -33 fails low.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge the report of the failure of 1-PT-1-33 low. When requested, state that a package to trouble shoot and repair the pressure transmitter will be prepared.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, acknowledge the request to check the main feedwater pumps locally.

5 5 Number 2 seal failure on #3 RCP. Requires entry into ARI, AOl-24 for actions.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as System Engineering, acknowledge the report concerning #3 RCP standpipe level response. In form the Unit Supervisor that additional equipment will be installed to monitor Number 2 seal leakoff Recommend that the RCP remain in service.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted to monitor #3 RCP vibrations, report that vibrations are stable at this time and that you will inform the crew of any change observed.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted to monitor RCDT level at O-L-2, use ThunderView to call up the Waste Disposal system drawing, WDI. Local RCDT level indication is displayed. Report values from the ThunderView screen to the operators.

6 6 1-LT-62-129 VCT LEVEL fails high.

ROLE PLAY: If dispatched to the Auxiliary Control Room to monitor 1-LT-62-129C, report level using InSight cvlvct point. Report level as indicated, level will be dropping, until makeup begins or 1-LCV-62-118 is placed to the VCT position.

7 7 Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. Reactor and turbine trip due to high stator water temperature.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, report that the TVC has closed, and that you are unable to open the TCV or the bypass valve at this time.

Page 5of8

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator r Event Event Description/Role Play No.

[__No.

7 7 PZR vapor space break.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, acknowledge the request to shutdown the Upper and Lower Containment Radiation monitors sampling pumps.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, acknowledge the need to perform E-1 Appendix A, B, C and D. Use remote function sirOl to complete E-1 Appendix A (place power on CLA outlet valves). Use remote sirl4 to complete E-1 Appendix C (place power on 1-FCV-63-1. Use remote function sirO6 to complete E-1 Appendix D (place power on 1-FCV-63-22). After remote functions are entered, report that the Appendices are complete.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, acknowledge request to sample steam generators for activity.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Radiation Protection, acknowledge request to survey steam lines and blowdown lines.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge the request to check low analyzer temperature lights. Report back that the lights are NOT LIT.

8 n/a Automatic Safety Injection fails to occur, requiring manual initiation.

ROLE PLAY: None.

Page 6 of 8

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No.

9 n/a Loss of Offsite Power:

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the NEAD, inform the crew that a series of severe thunderstorms have caused severe damage to the grid. The extent of the damage is not known at this poini, but personnel have been dispatched to numerous locations to determine the extent. The duration of the power outage is expected to be no less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

ROLE PLAY: If dispatched as the Outside Routine AUO, report that the DGs are running and all parameters appear to be normal at this time. If asked to determine why the DGs failed to auto start, state that assistance will be needed for the evaluation, and that there are no obvious reasons for the failure to start.

ROLE PLAY: If dispatched as the Turbine Building AUO, report that there are no air compressors currently in service. When requested, state that you will use A 01-10 actions to start the compressors. Start the IA and lB air compressors using the ThunderWew IAI screen for Instrument Air System.

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Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions WBN Lc cf Ess.&tiaI Rw Co<Ii Waler AOl-i 3 Unit I RvOO3B S:ep Ac:DE:c:ed Repcn-e sp:c NDt Dbtai n:

Supply Header Ruplure in PS continued NOTE MOVE :h pcr. rrrJIy reiioed r-iayn ta1 :o MI :bsed

ior ur:er igh cndior; kxa iiertflc cci c isclalion nay :e equird.

CHECK Train A ppty -1E1der PERFORM the f:4Icing:

preiJre at eped es for e:sin pIz: o:cditions.

. URLICii rr CLQE bkr;n c 1

M Bd 1 A2-A c.7B, 1 -FC-ii-2.

b. UNLDCI<, ar CLbkr:n M:D.? Bd 1 A2-.. :. 1 B, 1 -FCV 7.

c. UNLOCK, ar CLOSE bkrcn Rx MDV Bd 1 A2-A nI 1 -FGV-878.

d. UNLOCK, art: CLOSE bkrcn R MDV Bd 2A2-A n7B, 2-F6T-Z2.

e. ENSURE -:-2 Hr 1 B m 2A X-tie, CEN

f. ENSURE2rDV72Z3 ERC r2ATD 15 X-tie, CzEFt

g. OPEM 1-FCV-678, CCS ii. A Sup Frori d 1 5.

aontnuedon ni

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 1 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4, Normal Power Operations, to support valve testing per 1-TRI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from GO-4, Normal Power Operation, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor Power, beginning at Step 12, as indicated in the Shift Turnover.

NOTES

1) Turbine maybe operated in IMP IN above 30% turbine load as long as IMP IN does NOT cause unit instability IMP IN will control turbine load as a percentage of impulse pressure that correlates to % load vs. % of valve opening in IMP OUT. This will allow for a more linear load ascension

2) Turbine load change may be stopped by depressing the HOLD push button, using VPL, or by depressing the MANUAL push button

[12] IF desired to operate in IMP IN, THEN OBTAIN Unit SRO BOP concurrence to operate in IMP IN AND PLACE Turbine in IMP IN.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7, Minor Boration.

NOTES

1) Section 6.7, may be reproduced, laminated, displayed, reused, etc. as desired.

2) Minor Boration is defined as the addition of Boric Acid done several times each shift early in core life, to compensate for burnable poison burn-up, and maintain Tavg on program.

[1] ENSURE 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATER C [1-M-4], is ON, to RO equalize RCS-Pzr CB.

[2] ADJUST 1 -FC-62-1 39, BA TO BLENDER [1 -M-6], for desired RO flow rate.

[3] ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6], for RO required_quantity.

RO [4] PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], in BOR.

[5] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to RO START.

[5.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[6] MONITOR the following parameters:

Instrument Location Parameters 1-Pl-62-122 1-M-6 VCT PRESS 1-LI-62-129A 1-M-6 VCT LEVEL RO 1-FI-62-139 1-M-6 BATO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-139 1-M-6 BA BATCH COUNTER 1-FI-62-142 1-M-6 PW TO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-142 1-M-6 PW BATCH COUNTER 1-LI-62-238 1-M-6 BAT A LEVEL 1-Ll-62-242 1-M-6 BAT C LEVEL

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 1 Page 2 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4, Normal Power Operations, to support valve testing per 1-TRI Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

[7] WHEN Boration is COMPLETE, THEN PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, RO VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

[8] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

RO

[8.1J CHECK Red light is LIT.

[9] RETURN 1-FC-62-139, BATO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired RO flow rate.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from GO-4, Normal Power Operation, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor Power.

[13] INITIATE load reduction by PERFORMING the following on the Turbine EHC panel:

[13.1] IF during any of the following steps the REFERENCE changes in an undesired manner THEN ADJUST VPL to stop turbine load rise.

OR PUSH TURBINE MANUAL to place the turbine control mode in manual mode and proceed to section 5.6.

[13.2] PUSH REFERENCE CONTROL V (lower) button to set desired load in SETTER display.

[13.3] SET LOAD RATE as required.

[13.4] PUSH GO button.

BOP [13.5] MONITOR Generator Megawatts DROPPING.

[13.6] CHECK that load change has STOPPED when reference display equals setter OR IF desired to stop the load change, THEN STOP the load change by DEPRESSING the HOLD pushbutton

[13.7] WHEN desired to resume the load change, THEN PRESS the GO push button and continue to monitor load.

[13.8] ADJUST VALVE POSITION LIMIT to 5% above the Gov Control Indication or as needed.

[13.9] REPEAT Steps 5.3[13.2] to 5.3[13.5] to achieve desired load.

CAUTION Do not exceed load rate of 5%/minute, or 10% step change

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 3 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4, Normal Power Operations, to support valve testing per 1-TRI Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[141 MONITOR the following during the load reduction:

[14.1] TAVG following TREE program.

RO [14.2] All RPIs, Step Counters, Loop tT, and NIS for correct power distribution, quadrant power tilts, rod insertion, rod misalignment, inoperable RPIs, and inoperable rods.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO -

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 4 of 57 Event

Description:

Loop 4 RTD fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires AOl-2 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

93A, RCS LOOP AT DEVIATION 93F, EAGLE PROC PROT CH-IV RTD FAILURE 94A, T AVG-T REF DEVIATION 94B, T AVG TAUCT DEVIATION 1 1OF, PROT SET TROUBLE If in AUTO at the time of the failure, rods inserting at 72 steps per minute, as indicated by GREEN indicating light on 1-M-4 and CERPI indication of rod speed.

RO Diagnoses and announces continuous rod insertion.

RO May place rods in MANUAL to stop the rod insertion.

May place 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL RO CONTROL in MANUAL to control pressurizer level.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Sub Section 3.2, Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Sub Section 3.2, Continuous Rod Withcirawalllnsertion.

RO 1. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO 2. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

3. MAINTAIN T-avg on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

• USE control rods.

RO

• ADJUST turbine load.

RO 4. CHECK loop T-avg channels NORMAL.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DEFEAT failed loop AT and loop T-avg channels by placing 1 -XS 68-2D, AT CHANNEL DEFEAT, and 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT in failed channel position then PULL.

ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to operable channel using.1-XS 2B, AT RCDRTR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

NOTIFY Maintenance to implement IMI-160 for failed channel.

RO WHEN at least 3 minutes have elapsed since failed T-avg channel is defeated, THEN a) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1 °F.

b) ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-41.

c) PLACE rods in AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 2 Page 5 of 57 Event

Description:

Loop 4 RTD fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires AOl-2 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

[ Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 5. CHECK Auct Tavg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

EXAMINER: The SRO may have interpreted this step to be the conditions at the time of the failure. If so, the RNO may be entered.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTROL pzr level in MAN 1 -FCV-62-93. (Reference Attachment 1)

RD 1-HIC-62-93A may have already been placed in MANUAL upon discovery of failure, and actions initiated to control level may be in progress.

RO 6. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

7. CHECK the following:

• Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-Pl-1-73, NORMAL.

RD

• Tref and Auct Tavg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1)

8. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

• Power range channels.

• AFlux Indicators.

RO

• T-avg.

• Loop AT.

• IncoreTCs.

• Feed flow/Steam flow.

SRO 9. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 6 of 57 Event

Description:

Loop 4 RTD fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires AOl-2 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.1 .1, Shutdown Margin Not applicable.

• 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits Not applicable.

• 3.1.6, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits Not applicable.

• 3.1 .7, Control Bank Insertion Limits Not applicable.

• 3.2.1, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Not applicable.

• 3.2.2, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor Not -

applicable.

• 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Not applicable.

• 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference Not applicable.

• 3.3.1-1, RxTripSystem(RTS)

Function 6. Overtemperature AT Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

Function 7. Overpower AT SRO Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7.

Function 13. b. SG Water Level Low-Low Coincident with Vessel AT Equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (Ts and Tm = 0).

Condition V- Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (TS) and (TM) to 0% power within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

• 3.3.2-1, ESFAS Instrumentation.

Function 6. Auxiliary Feedwater

b. 2. SG Water Level Low-Low Coincident with Vessel coincident with Vessel AT equivalent to power> 50% RTP with no time delay (Ts and Tm = 0)

Condition N Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (Ts) and (Tm) to 0% power within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input (i.e., T-avg, T-ref, or NIS) changes and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

11. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than SRO 15% in one hour.

12. IF loop T and loop Tavg channels were defeated due to Tavg channel failure, and Tavg channel has been repaired, THEN PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, z\T CHANNEL DEFEAT, and 1-XS-68-2M, SRO TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and select away from all AT and Tavg channels.

SRO determines that step is N/A since the Tavg channel has not been repaired.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 57 Event

Description:

Loop 4 RTD fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires AOl-2 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1°F.

RD b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1 -M-4].

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

14. WHEN conditions allow auto pzr level control, THEN ENSURE RD pzr level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV-62-93 in AUTO SRO 15. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 8 of 57 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header ruptures in the Intake Pumping Station. AOI-13 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation are required.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

225-E TR A/B ERCW TO C&SS COMPR FLOW HI 223-A ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO 223-B ERCW PMP A-A DISCH PRESS LO 226-B ERCW PMP D-A DISCH PRESS LO 1 70-E IPS VLV & STRNR ROOM A SUMP LEVEL HI Diagnoses and announces the 1A ERCW header rupture in the BOP Intake Pumping Station.

May dispatch the Outside Routine AUO to the Intake Pumping BOP Station to determine location of rupture.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 3, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling SRO Water, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture at IPS.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 223-A, ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO.

BOP [1] CHECK O-PI-67-18A, A ERCW SUP HDR PRESS [O-M-27A].

BOP [2] DISPATCH Operator to check ERCW Train A pumps.

[3] CHECK valve alignment to ERCW Hdr A per SOI-67.O1, SRO ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

[4] REFER TO AOl-i 3, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING SRO WATER.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 3, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water, Sub Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture at IPS.

CAUTION This Section applies to a header break prior to the ERCW Strainer inlet valves or as directed by another section in this procedure.

1. DISPATCH personnel to determine location of rupture.

BOP Report from the field IA strainer room flooded, appears ruptured BOP 2. DISPATCH AUO, with a radio, to the Rx MOV Bds.

NOTE MOVs with power normally removed may not travel to full closed position under high flow conditions; local verification of isolation may be required.

3. CHECK Train A Supply Header pressure at expected values for BOP existing plant conditions.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 3 Page 9 of 57 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header ruptures in the Intake Pumping Station. AOI-13 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation are required.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/7B, 1-FCV-67-22.

b. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MDV Bd 1A2-A c/il B, 1-FCV-67-1 47.

c. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MDV Bd iA2-A c/15E, 1-FCV-67-458.

d. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MDV Bd 2A2-A cI7B, 2-FCV-67-22.

BOP e. ENSURE i-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 1 B To 2A Xtie, OPEN.

f. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 2A To 1 B Xtie, OPEN.

g. OPEN 1-FCV-67-458, CCS Hx A Sup From Hdr 1 B.

h. STOP, and PULL TO LOCK all Tr A ERCW Pumps.

i. CLOSE i-FCV-67-22, Strainer lA-A Inlet.

j. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-22, Strainer 2A-A Inlet.

k. START additional Tr B ERCW Pumps as required.

I. OPEN 1-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 1A.

m. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 2B, is OPEN.

n. GOTOStep5.

NOTE I With ruptured header strainer inlet valves closed, the flow indicators on the isolated supply headers will be off-scale low.

NOTE 2 With ERCW headers cross-tied, evaluate LCD 3.0.3 applicability.

5. CHECK in-service header(s) flow(s) and pressure(s) return to BOP expected values for existing plant conditions.

BOP 6. CHECK pump amps within limits.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 3 Page 10 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header ruptures in the Intake Pumping Station. AOl-13 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation are required.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.0.3, Applicability Since the ERCW headers are cross-connected entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required.

• 3.4.6, RCS Loops-Mode 4 Not applicable.

• 3.7 8, Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ERCW) Entered, but LCO 3.0.3 is most limiting.

Condition A. One ERCW train inoperable, other than for SRO Condition C, 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, 4C Sources Operating, for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ERCW. Restore ERCW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

• 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating Condition C. Two required DGs in Train A inoperable may be entered. Howe ver LCO 3.0.3 is the most limiting and a Safety Function Determination would be required in this situation.

8. EVALUATE ERCW availability to DGs.

SRO SRO may contact Work Control or Shift Manager to perform this evaluation.

SRO 9. INITIATE repair.

10. IF ERCW to in-service CCS heat exchanger was interrupted, SRO THEN NOTIFY Duty System Engineer to initiate evaluation for effect on CCS equipment and piping.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 3 Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header ruptures in the Intake Pumping Station. AOl-13 entry and a Tech Spec evaluation are required.

F Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 12 of 57 Event

Description:

Steam Pressure transmitter, 1-PT-1-33 fails low, requiring manual control of main feedwater pump speed, and AOI-16 entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

63-F.SG LEVEL DEVIATION MFP speed dropping.

Main Feed Reg valves fully open.

All SG levels dropping.

BOP Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-PT-I -33.

May place control rods in MANUAL to stabilize the reactor during the RO feedwater transient.

May place Main Feedwater Pump Master controller, 1-PC-46-20, in BOP MANUAL and raise speed.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Sub Section 3.7, MEW pump speed control circuit failure.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.7, MFW pump speed control circuit failure.

BOP 1. CHECK MFWPT speed controller(s) NORMAL.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTROL MEP speed using MANUAL control of master controller or individual controller(s) as required.

BOP (p) IF MANUAL control of individual MFWPT controller is ineffective, THEN TRIP affected MFWPT, and GO TO Section 3.4 or 3.5 as applicable.

RO 2. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

BOP 3. CHECK MEW pumps recirc valves NORMAL.

RO 4. (p) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 3°.

BOP 5. MAINTAIN MFWP discharge press on PROGRAM.

BOP 6. ENSURE S/G levels return to PROGRAM.

BOP 7. CHECK steam dump mode in T-AVG position.

SRO 8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

9. (p) IF desired to place control rods in AUTO, THEN ENSURE RO T-avg and T-ref within 1° and PLACE control rods in auto.

10. WHEN MEP pump control repairs completed, THEN, PLACE MFP speed control in AUTO.

SRO 1-PT-1-33 will NOT be repaired, so MFP speed control will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario.

SRO 1 1. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 13 of 57 Event

Description:

Steam Pressure transmitter, 1-PT-1-33 fails low, requiring manual control of main feedwater pump speed, and AOl-16 entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

Number 2 seal failure on #3 RCP.

F Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 97-C RCP 3 STANDPIPE LEVEL HI/LO iOO-E RCP SEAL LEAKOFF FLOW LO RD Announces RCP 3 standpipe level high/b alarm.

Enters and directs actions of ARI 97-C RCP 3 STANDPIPE LEVEL SRD HI/LO EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 97-C, RCP 3 STANDPIPE LEVEL HIILO.

Note If this annunciator resets during the performance of Corrective Action Step [1], the standpipe level was low. This indicates a possible #3 seal problem. If the annunciator remains illuminated after one to two minutes, the stand pipe level is high and a #1 or #2 seal failure may exist.

Note A high RCP Standpipe level in conjunction with reduced #1 seal leakoff flow and rising flow to the RCDT is indicative of a failed #2 seal.

[1] ATTEMPT to clear alarm by performing the following:

[a] ENSURE Primary Water Pump running UNLESS in the PWST BYPASS MODE.

[b] OPEN i-FCV-81-12 and-i 5, AND OBSERVE annunciator for reset.

[c] CLOSE 1-FCV-81-12 and -15, promptly after alarm clears, when alarm reflashes (HI), when directed by another instruction, DR after two minutes, from start of fill.

[2] CHECK 1-FR-62-50, RCP Seal Leak Off High Range, OR ICS Point F1022A to determine if any changes occurred in seal return flow.

[3] ENSURE VCT pressure at least 15 psig greater than RCDT pressure.

[4] NOTIFY Radwaste Operator to monitor RCDT level, pressure and temperature for possible rises, Control Panel O-L-2 [el. 692]

[5] IF alarm fails to clear or clears and reoccurs, THEN EVALUATE going to AOl-24, RCP MALFUNCTIONS DURING PUMP OPERATION.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-24, RCP MALFUNCTIONS DURING PUMP OPERATION, Section 3.5, #2 Seal Leakoff Flow High.

NOTE I During plant startup after seal maintenance, the #2 seal may require 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of run time before the seal seats fully and operates normally.

NOTE 2 Normal #2 seal leakoff is less than 0.5 gpm. A leakoff rate of between 0.5 and 1.1 gpm indicates a problem exists but pump operation may continue.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 15 of 57 Event

Description:

Number 2 seal failure on #3 RCP.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. CHECK standpipe level HI

a. OPEN primary water valve, I FCV-81-12.

b. OPEN affected RCP standpipe fill valve.

c. CHECK standpipe level alarm stays LIT.

d. CLOSE primary water valve, 1 FCV-81 -1 2.

e. CLOSE affected RCP standpipe fill valve.

2. CHECK #2 seal leakoff less than 1.1 gpm:

• CONTACT System Engineer for assistance.

• PERFORM 1-SI-68-32 and compare results to last performance.

Applicants may use 1-Sl-68-32 computer program to get a rough estimate of leakage. Determination of leakage will be approximately 0.8 gpm (less than 1.1 gpm.)

3. MONITOR RCP vibration analog reading for affected pump:

• Within normal operating limits.

• STABLE or DROPPING.

4. CONSULT plant staff for recommendations for continued RCP operation When the SRO contacts the plant stafl the Console Operator will inform the SRO that the #3 RCP is to remain in service and will be monitored for analysis and trending of the #2 seal degradation.

5. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 16 of 57 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-129 VCT LEVEL fails high, requiring entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

109-A VCT LEVEL HI/LO 1-LI-62-129A, VCT LEVEL indication is off-scale high.

RO Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-LT-62-129A high.

May place 1-LCV-62-1 18, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT to the VCT RD position SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 109 A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

CAUTION I If either VCT level transmitter fails high, then auto swap over to RWST on low level is disabled.

CAUTION 2 1-LT-62-129A failing high will divert letdown flow but will not prevent auto makeup. 1-Ll-62-129 will indicate offscale high; however, computer point LOll2AwiIl indicate actual level.

CAUTION 3 1-LT-62-130A failing high will divert letdown and prevent auto makeup; however, 1-Ll-62-129 will indicate actual level.

[1] IF high level, THEN

[a] ENSURE 1-LCV-62-118 diverted to HUT and OPEN.

[b] ENSURE NO VCT makeup in progress.

[2] IF low level, THEN

. ENSURE 1 -LCV-62-1 18 aligned to VCT.

. INITIATE makeup in accordance with SOl-62.02, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL.

. ENSURE suction to the Centrifugal Charging Pump swaps over to the RWST at 7% VCT level.

[3] VERIFY letdown and charging in service and that Reactor Coolant Filter is not clogged.

[4] IF 1-LCV-62-1 18 diverted to HUT due to instrument failure, THEN

[a] PLACE 1 -HS-62-1 18 in VCT position until repairs completed.

[b] PLACE 1 -HS-62-1 18 in P-AUTO position when repairs completed.

[5] IF RCS leakage is suspected, THEN GO TO AOl-6, SMALL REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-129 VCT LEVEL fails high, requiring entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HlfLO.

Time N Position i Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 7. The remaining malfunction will enter 10 seconds after the reactor trip initiation.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 18 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

22-E, GEN AUX PNL 1-L-39 ALARM 1-C, STATOR TEMP HI 1 -B, STATOR COOLING FAILURE BOP Diagnoses and announces the loss of Raw Cooling water.

Dispatches an AUO to investigate 22-E, GEN AUX PNL 1-L-39 BOP ALARM.

May direct reactor trip based on stator cooling water alarms, SRO however, an automatic trip may take place before the alarm can be validated using ICS.

EXAMINER: This event will cause a reactor trip after approximately 2 minutes. The operators will dispatch personnel to investigate the reason for the loss of Raw Cooling Water, but will not have time to implement AOl-46, Loss of Raw Cooling Water.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 22-E, GEN AUX PNL 1-L-39 ALARM.

BOP [1] DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of alarm.

[2] REFER TO ARI-1-L-39, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE BOP INSTRUCTION.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 1-C, STATOR TEMP HI.

[1] INITIATE stator temperature monitoring per SOl-35.O1, SRO Generator Hydrogen Cooling System.

BOP [2] ENSURE generator operating within capability curve limits.

[3] CONSIDER load reduction per GO-4, Normal Power Operation, SRO to keep temperature within limits.

[4] DISPATCH Operator to investigate and check proper BOP operation of 1 -TCV-24-52.

[5] IF 1-TCV-24-52 not controlling temperature properly, THEN BOP THROTTLE OPEN 1-BYV-24-926, STATOR COIL HS lA/lB TEMP CNTL VLV BYPASS.

[6] MONITOR stator coil discharge temperature on Plant Computer BOP point, T3098A.

[7] IF alarm is due to loss or partial loss of Raw Cooling Water, SRO THEN REFER TO AOI-46, Loss of Raw Cooling Water.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 1-B, STATOR COOLING FAILURE.

BOP [1] DISPATCH Operator to Panel 1-L-39 to determine cause of

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior alarm and initiate corrective action.

SROIBOP [2] REDUCE unit load to less than 15% of rated power.

[3] IF turbine trips above 50% power, THEN ENSURE reactor trip, SRO and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

[4] IF turbine trips below 50% power, THEN GO TO AOl-i 7, Turbine SRO Trip.

[5] IF alarm is due to loss or partial loss of Raw Cooling Water, SRO THEN REFER TO AOl-46, Loss of Raw Cooling Water.

SRO [6] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE I Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

Critical Task 2 WOG Critical Task List, E-O, C.

Energize at least one ac emergency bus before transition out of E-O, unless the transition is to ECA-O. 0, in which case the critical task must be performed before placing safeguards equipment handswitches in the pull-to-lock position.

Guideline ECA-0.0 is developed and structured to address the condition where all ac emergency power is lost. It is entered on the symptom of all ac emergency busses being de-energized. Its objective is to cope with the loss of ac emergency power until at least one ac emergency bus can be energized. ECA-0.0 should not be entered if at least one ac emergency bus is energized since the other optimal recovery guidelines and function restoration guidelines contain guidance that accommodates multiple failures.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 2 RESTORE power to at least one train of shutdown boards

1) EMERGENCY START DIG [1-M-1]

RD 2) IF both trains shutdown boards remain de-energized, THEN PLACE 6.9kv SD Bd transfer switch in MAN [1-M-1j, and CLOSE supply breaker from energized source. IF power can NOT be restored to at least one train of shutdown boards, THEN GO TO ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RD b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -XX-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D EXAMINER: A PZR vapor space break occurs 10 seconds after the reactor trip, and automatic safety injection actuation fails to occur. Performance of Step 4 RNO actions is expected.

CritIcal Task I from WOG Critical Task List, E-O, D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards before any of the following:

. Transition to any E-1 series, E-2 series, or E-3 series procedure or transition to any FRG

. Completion of step 5.a of ES-O. 1 Cntical 4 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Task I DETERMINE if SI required Manually a IF ANY of the following exists initiate SI SIG press less than 675 psig (Auto SI OR failure).

• RCS press less than 1870 psig, SRO/RO OR

• Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

IF SI NOT required, THEN **

GO TO ES-0.1,

b. ACTUATE SI manually.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-O.O, Loss of Shutdown Power, and will not be used if the DGs are started during the performance of E-0.-

NOTE

• Steps I and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

Status Trees should be monitored for information only. The FRs should NOT be implemented.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE turbine trip:

BOP

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. ENSURE RCPs STOPPED, and Momentarily PLACE RO Handswitches in STOP to break seal-in.

4. ENSURE RCS isolated:

a. CHECK pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. ENSURE letdown orifice valves CLOSED.

c. ENSURE letdown isolation valves CLOSED:

RO

• 1 -FCV-62-69.

• 1 -FCV-62-70.

d. ENSURE excess letdown isolation valves CLOSED:

• 1 -FCV-62-54.

• 1-FCV-62-55.

5. ENSURE TD AFW pump operation:

a. ENSURE flow greater than 410 gpm.

BOP b. IF loss of control air is imminent, THEN DISPATCH operator to locally control S/G levels USING SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

Critical Task 2 WOG Critical Task List, E-O, C.

Energize at least one ac emergency bus before transition out of E-O, unless the transition is to ECA-O. 0, in which case the critical task must be performed before placing safeguards equipment handswitches in the pull-to-lock position.

Guideline ECA-O.O is developed and structured to address the condition where all ac emergency power is lost It is entered on the symptom of all ac emergency busses being de-energized. Its objective is to cope with the loss of ac emergency power until at least one ac emergency bus can be energized. ECA-O. 0 should not be entered if at least one ac emergency bus is energized since the other optimal recovery guidelines and function restoration guidelines contain guidance that accommodates multiple failures.

Critical 6. RESTORE power to shutdown boards:

Task 2

a. ENERGIZE shutdown boards:

1) EMERGENCY START D/G.

BOP 2) ENSURE shutdown boards ENERGIZED.

3) ENSURE ERCW supply to running D/Gs.

b. IF at least one shutdwn board energized, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect, AND IMPLEMENT FRGs as necessary.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 secondsafter the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DG5 fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, since E-0 was the procedure in effect prior to the loss of power.

NOTE I Steps I thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPls at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite),

OR DIG (blackout).

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -X)(-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D EXAMINER: Appendices A and B (E-0) are provided on pages 30 through 44.

5. EVALUATE support systems:

BOP

• REFER TO Appendixes A and B (E-0), Equipment Verification pages 15-28.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F:

• IF any RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-avg trending to 557° F.

RO OR

• IF NO RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-cold trending to 557°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN:

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

RO

• 1 -FCV-62-54

• 1 -FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

EXAMINER: Due to the loss of offsite power, the RCPs are off.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK SIG pressures:

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

15. CHECK for RUPTURED SIG

• All S/Gs narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING.

• Secondary side radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: lB Containment Spray Pump will receive an automatic start signal prior to the loss of offsite power. When power is lost, the Containment Spray pump will be shed, and then reloaded after a 184 second time delay. The BOP will monitor this process during performance of E-O, Appendix A.

16. CHECK cntmt conditions:

Cntmt pressure NORMAL.

• Radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

• Cntmt sump level NORMAL.

• Cntmt temp ann window DARK [104-B].

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

EXAMINER: When the vapor space break occurs, containment temperature and pressure will rise sharply. 265-A UPPER CNTMT RE-2711272 RAD HI and 265-B LOWER CNTMT RE-2731274 are expected to alarm, since testing has shown rad monitor to give unreliable indication for up to 2 minutes following a rapid increase or decrease in containment temperature. The alarms will clear after the initial temperature transient.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RD a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and SRO determination of time for hot leg recirc.

4. CHECK SIG pressures:

RD

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

• All SIGs pressures greater than 120 psig.

5. MAINTAIN Intact SIG NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP

b. CONTROL intact SIG levels between 29% and 50% [39%

and 50% ADVj.

EXAMINER: The status of secondary radiation may have already been reported by the BOP during performance of E-O Appendix A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DG5 fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

• SIG discharge monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-1O].

BOP

• CHECK low flow lights not lit [M-10].

• Locally CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rmj.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

EXAMINER: Containment pressure may not be below 2.0 psig when the operators evaluate this step initially. Since it is a continuous action step, when containment pressure does drop below 2.0 psig, the actions will be performed.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

SRO c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO WHEN cntmt pressure is less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM Sub steps 9b thru e.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

BOP

• 1-HS-77-410.

• 1-HS-77-411.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

RO

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO **

GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. RESET SI and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

13. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

b. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

RO

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

RO 14. CHECK pressure in all SIGs controlled or rising.

RO 15. CHECK RCS pressure stable or dropping.

16. MONITOR electrical board status:

BOP

a. CHECK offsite power available.

EXAMINER: AOI-35, Loss of Offsite Power, steps are provided on Pages 45 through 49.

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP a. RESTORE offsite power USING AOI-35, Loss of Offsite Power.

EXAMINER: AOI-17, Turbine Trip, BOP Realignment steps are provided on pages 50 through 57.

17. INITIATE BOP realignment:

BOP

• REFER TO AOl-i 7, Turbine Trip.

18. INITIATE 480V board room breaker alignments USING the following:

• Appendix A (E-1), CLA Breaker Operation.

BOP

• Appendix B (E-1), Ice Condense AHU Breaker Operation.

• Appendix C (E-1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

• Appendix D (E-1), 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation.

19. DETERMINE if hydrogen igniters should be energized:

a. CHECK hydrogen analyzers in service.

b. CHECK cntmt hydrogen less than 5% {M-10].

BOP

c. ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [M-10J:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.

• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

20. ENSURE RHR available for cntmt sump recirculation:

• Power to at least one operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

RO

• Cntmt sump valve 1-FCV-63-72 or 1-FCV-63-73 to operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

EXAMINER: Appendix E (E-1), Equipment Evaluation is provided on page 47.

21. EVALUATE plant equipment status:

BOP

• REFER TO Appendix E (E-i), Equipment Evaluation.

22. CHECK Aux Bldg radiation for loss of RCS inventory outside cntmt:

a. Area monitor recorders 1 -RR-90-1 and 0-RR-90-i 2A Aux BOP Bldg points NORMAL.

b. Vent monitor recorder 0-RR-90-101 NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

SRO 23. NOTIFY Chemistry of event status and plant conditions.

24. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

SRO

b. ** GO TO ES-i .2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

1. PREPARE for switchover to RHR cntmt sump:

a. RESTORE power to 1 -FCV-63-i, RWST to RHR suction, SRO USING Appendix A, (ES-i .2) i-FCV-63-i Breaker Operation.

b. WHEN RWST level less than 34%, THEN ** GO TO ES-i .3, Transfer to Containment Sum p.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

2. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO 3. RESET Phase A and Phase B.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-b Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [M-15].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [M-1 5]:

BOP

• 1 -FCV-32-80.

• 1-FCV-32-102.

• 1-FCV-32-1 10.

5. MONITOR electrical board status:

BOP

a. CHECK offsite power available.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. RESTORE offsite power USING AOl-35, Loss of Offsite SRO Power.

A 01-35 is already in progress.

NOTE Backup heater C bank may need to be placed in AUX at the breaker compt to ensure it is turned OFF.

6. ENSURE pzr heaters off:

• PLACE Backup heaters A-A OFF.

RD

• PLACE Backup heaters B-B OFF.

• PLACE Backup heaters C OFF.

• PLACE Control heaters D OFF.

7. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

b. CHECK RCS press:

RD

• RCS press greater than 150 psig.

• RCS press stable or rising.

c. STOP RHR pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

d. MONITOR RCS press greater than 150 psig.

8. MONITOR Intact S/G NR levels:

a. At least one intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RD

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50% ADV].

SRO 9. EVALUATE Motor-Driven AFW Pumps recirc flow per FOP.

NOTE The following boration will result in a CB in the ACTIVE portion of the RCS which will be higher than the calculated cold shutdown CB.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # I Event # 7, 8,9 and 10 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

Raw cooling water temperature control valve to the Stator Water Cooler fails closed. 15 seconds after the trip, a PZR vapor space break occurs, requiring a manual safety injection and entry into E-0. 10 seconds after the SI, offsite power is lost, and the DGs fail to auto start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. INITIATE RCS boration to cold shutdown boron concentration:

a. DETERMINE cold shutdown CB:

• REFER TO 1-Sl-0-10, Shutdown Margin, OR REACTINW SRO Computer Program.

b. INITIATE RCS boration:

• REFER TO SOI-62.02, CVCS Boron Concentration Control.

ii. MONITOR shutdown margin during RCS cooldown:

a. NOTIFY Chemistry to monitor RCS boron concentration at SRO the following sample points:

• RCS hot leg.

• CVCS letdown line.

NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

12. INITIATE RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a. WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-i 1), THEN

• BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

SRO

b. MAINTAIN T-cold cooldown rate less than 100°F in one hour.

SRO determines that the RCS has cooled down more than 100

°F in the last how, and that an additional cooldown will not be accomplished at this time.

EXAMINER: When Step 12 is addressed, and the SRO determines that a cooldown cannot be performed, inform the crew that another crew will take over from this point.

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 30 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-D Rev 28 Step I I ActionlExpec:ecl Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-C)

Page I f 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION ENSURE PCBs OPEN: OPEN manually,

• P085084.

• PCB 5088.

2 ENSURE AFV1 pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train

• Both MD AEW pumps RUNNING. AW operation.

• TD,AFWpUmpRUNNING.

• LCVs in AUTO, ur cu1ioIled ri MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolalion: Manually CLOSE valves and

• MEW isoation and bypass STOP puwips. as necessay.

isolation valves CLOSED.

IF any valves can NOT be closed,

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves THEN CLOSED. CLOSE #1 hooter outlet valvos.

• MPP A and B TRIPPED.

Standby MEP STOPFED.

• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cona booster punps TRIPPED.

14o128

j Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 31 of57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENCIXA (E-0)

Poge 2 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging punips RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pLwflpS.

b. Charging pump aUgnment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in

• RVVST outlets I-LCV-62-135 each set aligneth and i-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

VCT outicta 1-LCV-62-1 32 and l-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Chargtrg l-V-2-9U and 1 -ECV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pimps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1-FCY63-25 and aligned, and flow ThrL. BIT.

1 -FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• FbwthruBlT.

f. P05 pressLre f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

greater than l650 psig.

IF RCS press drops tD less than 10 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

15 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 32 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step j Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 3of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 5 CHECK cntrnt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent

a. Phase A isolation: Isolation signal, OR Train A GREEN, JVlanLlally CLOSE valves and Train B GREEN. dampers as necessary.

b. Cntrnt vent isolation:

Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

16 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 33 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-0)

Page4of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

Phase B DARK [MISSP], 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. actuated.

3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OPE.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase 8 actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntmt [AD!]

setpoints where provided.

17 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 34 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-D)

Page 6of 10 ECUIPMENT VERIFICATION CHECK pkrnt radiaticn NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit 8upervisor S,,G blowdown rad recorder IMMEDIATELY 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M1 2J

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-1 19 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12]

• l-RR-9O-lO( and l-RP-cio-112 raciation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M1 2]

• S/G main steamlirie discharge monrs NORMAL {M30].

• Upper and Lower contoinment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL 8 ENSURE all DIGs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs 18 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 35 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step j Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 6 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

9. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• ECO-30-146A.

• FCO-30-146B.

• FCO-30-157A.

• FCO-30-157B.

10. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as RUNNING, one on each shutdown necessary, board preferred.

11. ENSURE EROV/ supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be aligned to OPEN to running D/Gs. running DIG, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

12. ENSURE CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-l52 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, to position A.

0-FCV-67-l 52. is open to position A 1Oct28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 36 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O ov 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Dhtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 7 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 13 CLOSECCSHXC DISCHTOHDRA, O-ECV-67-1 44

14. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans OPEN

• ECTS fans RUNNING. dampers.

• ENSURE dampers OPEN

\/ERIZY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

15. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as

• lA-A CCS pump. necessary,

- 1 B-B CCS pump.

• C-S OR 2B-B CCS pump.

NOTE

• The Upper and Lower Cntmt rad monitors sampling pumps should be shutdown if the sample flowpath is isolated.

The fo lowing equipment is located on 1 -M-9.

16. CHECK CNTIV1T PURGE fans STOP fans and STOPPED: PLACE handswitch in PU LL-TO-LOC K.

20 cf 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 37 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFET( INJECTION Rev 23 Step I ActionExpected ResDonse I Response Nct Ob:ained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 8 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

17. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fais STOP fans and STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading PLACE handswitch in dampers CLOSED: FULL-TO-LOCK, manually CLOSE dampers.

13. ENSURE AB CEN SUPPLY and EXH STOP fans and fans STOPPED. PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOC K.

NOTE

• Diinpers 1-HS-30-158 rJ 2-HS-30-270 [efr1iinupe11 duiiiig .Al.

19. ENSURE AB (+/-N SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED.

20. ENSURE rvlCR& SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.

• FC\-31-4.

21 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 38 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 9 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

21. ENSURE at least one CB EMER Manually START fan.

CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EIvIERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, OR Fan B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-8, OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one OR damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-7, OPEN

22. ENSURE at least one CB EIV1ER PRESS Manually START fan.

fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EM ERG PRESS PAN A-A, OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6. OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one OR damper NOT C)PEN.

FCO-31-5, OPEN.

22 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 10 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

23. ENSURE Control Building tans Manually STOP tans.

STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY and NOTIFY TSC it any EXH FANS AND dampers. damper NOT CLOSED.

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST FAN AND dampers.

24. INITIATE Appendix B.

230128

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 40 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 23 Step Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX B (E-O)

Page 1 of I PHASE B PIPE BREAK CONTINGENCIES

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs; (MiSS P 1-XX-55-6C, -3D)

THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-ECV-32-i10 CLOSED, DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT 61.

[Atrain. window 13]

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (dSP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT 62.

[A -train, window 43]

4. ENSURE i-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (dSP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT 63.

[A -train, window 73]

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP 1-XX-55-6F

- ATTACHMENT 64.

[B -train, window 741 24 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of 57 WSN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEfl INJECTION ev 2 ATTACHMENT Bl (E 3)

PEge o I CONIROL AIR ISOLATION

1. CLOSED- SV 1013- CONTRDL AIR LL 713 AD HDR ISDL

[ABJS EL. 713] (chain operated jehmd Fuel anc V/ate Handing Sd. AL

2. IF D-[SV-32-Oi3 CANNOt BE CLOSED, ThEN:

OPEN aid DISCONNECT C&SS air compressor breakers:

a 0-B KR-32-25 - 4BQV SD B D 1 A2-A, C/3D b 0-BKR-32-2B 4OV SD BD 1 B 1-B, C/3D C) O-DKR-32-27 4)DV AUX DLDG COM DD, C/OG ci 0-BKR-32-EJOOA IBOV

- URB BLDG COM BD, CIGC 25 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ESD-2 Page 42 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION fle 2B Al IAGHIV1ENI 32 (E-C)

Ptige 1 u I ERCW ISOLATION

1. UNLOGK AND CLOSE i-iSV-G7-23D - LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR 10 &1D ERCW SUP ISOL P.2Uf92J U-i penetratIon room Norm oi A pe Cflase Coo er 1 B-B in overhead 26 o 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 43 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION R&s 28 ATTACHI\1ENT 83 (E-O)

Pige 1 of 1 CCS RETURN ISOLATION

1. CLOSE i-ISV-70-700 RCP OIL COOLER CG RETURN ISOLATION A4N EL. 710 U-i Penetration Room] (approximately 10 ft North of Penetration Room Cooler lB-B on mezzanine above RHR Sump Valve Room) 27 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 44 of 57 ATTACHMENT B4 (E-O)

Page of 1 CCS SUPPLY ISOLATiON

1. CLOSE i-SV-70-516 ACTOR BU[LDING CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

[AS?T EL. 737] i:Bchnid Evtor approximotDly 2 . wesi or mozzaninc abovc A COS Heal Ectianger 2 O123

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 45 of 57 AQ[-35 WBM LOSS OF OFFS[TE POWER Revision 37 P3 7 cf 21 3.3 OPERATOR ACTIONS :L Cf &th 161 Kv Power Supples}

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Dperaftn or reaIgnnent of any equipment which s in service (or removed from seniice] as directed by AOl43 series finsirucffor requires Shift Manager approva.

1. CHECK all 6.9 KV Shutdown REFER TO ACl43 series Boards ENERGIZED.

2. ANNOUNCE loss of power over PA.

3. CHECK Station Serce is suied PERFORM the foN owing:

from USSTs.

a. ENSURE Reactor TRIPPED..

b. GO TO E-D Reactor Trip Cr Safety Injection, WHILE continuing with this instruction

4. CHECK duration of the power outage GOTOStep.

wiN he tio hours or nore.

5. CONTACT the Operations Duty CONTACT ODS. or HELP line (4357)

SpecaIiet (DDS} to verj the to dispatch personnel to ensure T&ecommunicatons bac&up DIG D/G to the communications building is supplyinci the teIecommuncations equipment operating properly.

hui!dinci equioment :their alarm should be clear.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 46 of 57 A0k35 WJN L055 CiF QFF&E POWER flt9Ofl 37 pe8c3 13 OPERATOR ACTDNS Los Of Bcth 181 KV Pawer SuNe ACTIONEXPECTE RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

6. PERFORM the fot : for eh bus or bcad i:ed in the tie belaw:

CLEAR it disagrrient ght.

b. PLACE rfer swches

o MANiAL.

BPJSf3OARD BREAKER LD. RANSFER SW.

8: KVComnon ord A 152 1-)S57- [i-M-1]

8: KIComrion 3ord B 12 -X-57-8! [24-1]

Start BsA 1512 START BuS 1 EoB]

StartBjs 1812: SFATBUS2EO8]

ROP S:art Bus A 2512 RC ST US A [ECB]

ROP S:art Bus 2612 RC ST US B [ECB]

7. CHECK CPs CE. GO TO Ster .

a. PLA:CE nomaI sppIy hand with for th RCP ic Sro (pushec i:

pc:ion (spring retirn c rrid-pcEIon PLACE Iternae sppIy sand wich forCP c HJ_red then STOP pci:ion (spring reIjjm tc id-poitoni.

ic. CHECK un: in Moe GO TO KTACHMENT ODmrc Of at Sys:ems Durig LOOP iLcss Of Ofisibe Pcwer, AND GO TO DAUTFON prix o Siep 12.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ]

Page 47 of 57 AC 1-35 WEN LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Resion 37 aeic13 3.3 OPERATOR AC1IONS cs D Bc:h 161 KV Power Su:-rNes ACTIONEXPECTED RE SPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAENED 1 1. SUSPEND core aera:ic CAUTION Deenrgizn9 b1h B.9K cmmn boards will cause ireRSW header pressure t drop quickly IGss of RCW punipsi. deluge type fire prGtection valves may oper.

12. CHECK Ky Corimon Boar A ENERGIZE ih denergLz transfee to aI:rna:e feed :USL 8 Ki C:rimon B]ad rom the as:[a:e: SST I :h ni: no:

tippe:.

13. NOTIFY N rtast Area Dispat:hr

[iAD] :4 lose c 51K Ine:s:I .ard reqest lines re:urne :o ni:e.

14. REFER TO EP P-i. Em ;encv Plan C Ias iica:icin F:rt:

DETERMINE olassif:a:ion o rwt, and b.. INITIATE ria.ning t TSC. b. IF TSC s N0:D e mand, THEN REFER TO 11-128. nd PLACE ERCW srainrs 1re nj re- in c:in:us baDkva pr SDl.7.O1.

CHECK *o: irig w.atr av PERFORM :tIIed ut:rvn t :dary ystns USiNG 30-4, GD-., and GO

(.C,\ Pumps run ngi as appli:ab

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Page 48 of 57 AOI-35 WEN LOSS CF OFFSITE POWER Riin 7 ae 10 of S 3.3 OPERATOR AC1IONS LoE DI Bc:h 101 KV Power SuIies ACTIONEX P ECTED RESPONSE RESPO NSE NOT OBTh!N ED

1. DISPATCH personi c te ftillowing Ic:azions to irpz Dr quiprnen: bncrma iIi:

• Rayrccm.

5:KV CSS swcear hcsii.

St.rt bu witthgear housing.

17. CHECK Dcn:rc air NDR1AL: REFER TO AD-1O, b of Control Air eqired nprecr rnning F4M7OEL Presur beween I 05 psi T4M7C6.

12. C H ECK aux air header pressure REF ER TO AOl-iD.

greater than 7 psig [-M.l5]. CrnroI Air.

1. DISPATCH AUD c DIG Bldg to moni:or D:G condMons J3lNG 3CI-2 series, Aopendix A, for operang paariter.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 49 of 57 AOl 5 WBN LDSS OF OFFsrE POWER Reision CT 11 of S 33 OPERATOR AC11ONS :L Of Bcth 61 Ky Power Suriie)

ACTIONEX P ECTED RESPONSE RESPcINSE NOT O2JAINED NOTE ALa:hment S prAe reference :o .appIia Tech &ecs s we] a recoer aion for Icss of both 161KV I1e9.

20. REFER 10 Atachrren 3 for oDniderici for ry frori los! of bc:h 161kV lines

21. 00 ROT CONTINUE thisructbn UNTL ore 161KV powhie h.m hn rnrH 22.. ENSURE 1oi serio r4ijmed to NORMAL, USING app iie icn from fo Dng:

Bus or 2ard lnt-uctien 6K Str Eue SO2O0.O1 6K CP star SO[*2O0U2 Buses 6Kt Cow,,. dE. SO[2OiD3 A & B YK Un bcls. Q2IJ1 series

&K cP Ed. 30 .202 ees

23. ENSURE 6kV SE Bdsreiumed to NCRMAL viti D!3 rernoied from rvce after iiiyn kii irJ rLnd L LinJLy aIigriei:. USING appIica e seions frDm the bIbwing:

Diesel Gnrtor Instuc1ion 1A- Sfll. fli 1B- SO[-E2i2 2A-. SOI*S2i.3 2B-a 3OI*E24

Ajendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-21 Page 50 of 57 AOl-fl WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page ii of 26 3.3 BOP Realignment ACTION!EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Performance of this instruction should not be allowed to delay or interfere with actions required by applicable emergency procedures or abnormal operating procedures.

NOTE I Control room operators may initiate shutdown of pumps and equipment from the benchboard immediately after a trip. Performance of this instruction v111 subsequently 1

verify proper secondary equipment alignment NOTE 2 Steps in this section and items in Attachment 1 may be performed out of sequence.

DISPATCH turbine building NAUD to perform Attachment 1.

2. NOTIFY condensate demineralizer NAUO prior to Operator initiated press changes in condensate.

3. REMOVE generator excitation from service:

a. PLACE voltage regulator to TEST.

b. ZERO exciter base adjuster.

c. OPEN exciter field breaker.

d. PLACE exciter regulator control to OFF.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 51 of57 Aol-i 7 WBN TURBINETRIP Revision4 Page 12 ot2f3 3.3 BOP Re[ignment (Continued)

ACTION!EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

4. MONITOR main turbine:

a. WHEN less than 1500 rpm, THEN:

ENSURE seal oil backup pump RUNNiNG.

ENSURE turning gear oil pump RUNNING.

b. WHEN less than 600 rpm, THEN ENSURE bearing lift oil pump RUNNING,

c. WHEN turbine is at ZERO RPM THEN ENSURE turbine on turning gear.

d. MAINTAIN MTOT lube ol temp between 95° and 100°F (may require RCW isolation f TCV has excessive leakage).

e. MAINTAIN GENERATOR H2 (Cold Gas) temp 95°F (may require RCW isolation r TCV has excessive leakage).

f. ENSURE Gland Steam Spillover Bypass valve is CLOSED using 1-HS-47-1 91A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-.2 Page 52 of 57 AOl-17 WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 13 of 26 3.3 BOP Realignment (ConJnuecJ)

ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

5. ALIGN MSRs:

a. PUSH RESET on MSR control panel.

b. CLOSE MSR HP steam and bypass isol.

c. ENSURE MSR warming valves CLOSED.

d. OPEN MSR startup vents.

e. CLOSE MSR operating vents.

6. CHECK MSIVs OPEN. IF vacuum is to be maintained, THEN ENSURE auxiliary boiler is aligned for steam seals.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Page 53 of 57 AOl-IT WBM TURBINE TRIP Rviin 43 Page 14 of 26 3.3 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTION!EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

7. ENSURE adequate FW press:

a. ENSURE two hotwell pumps RUNNING.

Li IF FW isolation reset, THEN ENSURE one condensate booster pump RUNNING if needed tor unit conditions.

c. ENSURE CNDS denim pumps OFF.

ci. STOP #3 I-IDT pumps, and CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate heater strings. NotiDy NAUO performing Attachment 1 that #3 HDT pumps are stopped.

a. STOP #7 HDT pumps, and CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate heater strings.

8. SHUTDOWN ny M FW pump NOT required.

SHUTDOWN any RCW pumps NOT required.

10. SHUTDOWN any CCW pumps NOT required.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 54 of 57 AOl-17 WN TURBINE TRIP RviieI 43 Page 15 of 2(3 3.3 BOP Rea[i9nment (Continued)

ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPON SE NOT OETAINED

11. ALIGN extraction steam valves and drain valves:

a CLOSE 1 and 2 Heater extraction steam valves-.

b. ENSURE turbine drain valves OPEN.

c. OPEN 1FW pump turbine drain valves.

12. PERFORM -as required:

a. OBTAIN switching instructions rroITl NEAD. and OPEN main generator PCB(s)

MO Ds.

b. PULL-TO-LOCK bus duct cooling tans.

c. VERIFY MTOT and seal oil temps STABLE and trending to 95F.

12i, IF MFW isolated to steam generators, THEN REQUEST Chem Lab sample condensate and teedwater prior to re-adrnittin water to S/Ga from condensate teedwater syste m

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 55 of 57 AOl-i 7 WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 160126 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTI ONIEXPECTED RESPOMSE RESPONSE NOT OTAlNE D IF EGTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 30 minutes and place in P-AUTO:

REFER TO OI-6D2, Emergency Gas Treatment System, section on Auto EGTS Actuation.

15.. IF AECTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 3D minutes and place in P-AUTO:

REFER TO SO[-3005, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System, section on Auto Start of AEGIS.

CAUTION Rx trip bkrs must be cycled to allow reset of MFW when soIated by SI, HIHI S/G level, or flood level in MS valve vault room. If any SI signal is present with Auto SI blocked, cycling Rx trip bkrs will initiate SI actuation.

1& IF MFW NOT in service, THEN ESTABLISH MFW:

REFER TO Attachment 2, Establishing WFW Following Reactor Trip.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 56 of 57 AOI-17 wVBN 1 TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 17 of 26 3.3 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTIOrVEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPOMSE NOT OBTAINED

17. CHECK S/G NR levels between IF 5/0 level can NOT be 38% and 50% maintained, THEN START M-D AFW pumps.

lB. RETURN TO applicable Instruction.

- END OF SUBSECTION -

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 57 of 57 WBN LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT E-1 Rev 15 APPENDIX E (E-i)

Page 1 of I EQUIPMENT EVALUATION

1. EVALUATE plant equipment and systems needed to support long term cooling and recovery actions, as time and personnel availability permits:

a. Cntmt Isolation Status.

b. Emergency Gas Treatment System:

One train in operation, REFER TO SOl-65.02.

c. Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment:

One train in operation, REFER TO SOI-30.06.

d. Auxiliary Building Isolation alignment:

REFER TO SO 1-30.06.

e. Main Control Room Isolation alignment:

REFER TO SOl-31.0i.

t ERCW System:

Both trains in operation.

g. Component Cooling Water System:

Both trains in operation.

22 of 22

SIIWF TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of flSM US/MCR Unit El UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station U STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shiftlReviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

IA Containment Spray pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. A Severe Thunderstorm Warning has been issued for Rhea, Meigs and McMinn Counties for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) l-TRI-47-3, Main Turbine Steam Inlet Valve Testing.

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, BOL. RCS boron is 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train AlChannel I Work Week.

Perform a load reduction to 93% support turbine valve tests and EHC control calibrations.

Currently in GO-4, Nonnal Power Operation, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor, at Step 12. Reactivity Plan for the power maneuver has been provided by Reactor Engineering.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift Q A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) [] PER review (N/A for AUO5)

El TACFs (N/A for AUOs) El Operator workarounds, burdens El Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift fl A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-1 [08-03-20091

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of SM fl US/MCR Unit -

UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station Q STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1 A Containment Spray pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. A Severe Thunderstorm Warning has been issued for Rhea, Meigs and McMinn Counties for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) l-TRI-47-3, Main Turbine Steam Inlet Valve Testing.

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, BOL. RCS boron is 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train A/Channel I Work Week.

Perform a load reduction to 93% support turbine valve tests and EHC control calibrations.

Currently in GO-4, Normal Power Operation, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor, at Step 12. Reactivity Plan for the power maneuver has been provided by Reactor Engineering.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift Q A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

Q A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

0 Standing Orders 0 LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) 0 PER review (N/A for AUOs)

Q TACFs (N/A for AUOs) Operator workarounds, burdens LI Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift Q A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-1 [08-03-2009]

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar NRC Exam I Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 August 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: Train B/Channel II Work Week. Perform a load reduction to 75% power at 2%/minute to support removing the 1 B MFP from service.

Turnover:100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train B/Channel II Work Week.

lB MD AFW pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. lB MFP turbine and pump vibration alarms are currently lit and Operations Management has directed a plant shutdown to 75% using AOI-39 at 2%/minute to remove the MFP from service.

Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a N-BOP Reduce power to shutdown I B Main Feedwater Pump.

R-RO 2 fwOi 8b C-BOP 1 B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations increase, requiring the pump to be TS-SRO tripped. Entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, is required, and a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference must be conducted.

3 pic-1-13a open C-BOP SG 2 PORV controller fails, causing PORVto open. Entry into AOI-38, TS-SRO Main Steam or Feedwater Line Leak, is required. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

4 ed06a C-RO iA-A CCP trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires entry into AOl-20, TS-SRO Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

5 rci3d 1-RO Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-68-340D opens, requiring transfer of the controller to MANUAL to close of the valve. Requires entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

6 rc02d M-All RCP 4 trips, requiring a reactor trip. Crew enters FR-S.l .Nuclear Power rpOi c Generation/ATWS.

7 rp55a C-BOP 1A Motor Driven and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to rp55c automatically start, requiring manual starts.

8 hs-62-i38a C-BOP i-FCV-62-138 fails closed, requiring local operation to begin boration.

close 9 ms0d M-AIl Steam line break inside containment on SG 4. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation..

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Summary Initial Condition Train B/Channel II Work Week. Perform a load reduction to 75% power at 2%/minute to support removing the 1 B MFP from service.

[

Turnover 100% power, MDL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train B/Channel II Work Week. lB MD AFW pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. lB MFP turbine and pump vibration alarms are currently lit and Operations Management has directed a plant shutdown to 75%

using AOI-39 at 2%/minute to remove the MFP from service Event 1 Reduce power to shutdown 1 B Main Feedwater Pump.

Event 2 As power is reduced, 1 B Main Feedwater Pump and Motor vibrations increase to 10 mils (indicated on the Integrated Computer System (ICS)), requiring the SRO to direct the BOP operator shutdown the pump. The SRO enters and directs the actions of Aol-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater. The SRO enters Tech Spec LCD 3.2.3 Axial Flux Difference Condition A and informs the crew that AFD must be restored within 30 minutes. The SRO directs the RO to perform a boration to restore AFD to within limits. The SRO enters and exits LCD 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and DNB Limits, Condition A.

Event 3 Controller 1-PIC-1-13A, SG 2 PORV PCV-i-12, fails causing the PORV to open. The SOP reports the PORV open. The SRO enters AOl-38, Main Steam or Feedwater Line Break, and directs the BOP to close the PORV. The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Spec 3.7.4, Atmospheric Dump Valves, Condition A.

Event 4 lA-A CCP trips on instantaneous overcurrent. The SRO enters AOl-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, and directs actions for the lA-A CCP. The SRO evaluates conditions and enters LCD 3.5.2.ECCS Operating, Condition A and Tech Requirement 3.1.4, Charging Pumps -Operating.

Event 5 Controller 1-PIC-68-340D, Loop 1 Spray Control fails, causing the spray valve to open.

The RD reports the spray valve open and closes the valve using the controller in MANUAL.

The SRO enters and directs actions of AOl-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. The SRO enters and exits LCD 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and DNB Limits, Condition A.

Event 6 RCP 4 trips, requiring a reactor trip. The reactor does NOT trip. RO and SOP take immediate operator actions associated with FR-Si, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

The SRO enters and directs actions of FR-S.i.

Event 7 1A Motor Driven and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual starts.

Event 8 1-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration. Performance of FR-S.1 steps direct the BOP to contact an AUO to locally attempt to open I-FCV-62-i38.

Report from the field is that 1 -FCV-62-l 38 is mechanically bound. BOP directs 1 -ISV 929 Boration Valve to be closed.

Event 9 Steam line break inside containment. Requires transition from FR-S.l, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and a transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The scenario is terminated upon transition to ES-i .1, SI Termination, from E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, or E-i, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Critical Task Summary Critical Task 1 Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before From WOG completing the immediate-action steps of FR-S. 1:

Critical Task List

• Insert RCCAs for FR-S. 1. C Reactor trip must be verified to ensure that the only heat being added to the RCS is from decay heat and reactor coolant pump heat. The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and pump heat are being added to the RCS. If the reactor cannot be tripped, then the control rods should be manually inserted into the core in order to decrease reactor power.

Critical Task 2 Manually trip the main turbine.

From WOG The turbine is tripped to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow Critical Task List that the turbine would require. For an A TV/S event where a loss of normal feedwater has for FR-S. 1, A occurred, analyses have shown that a turbine trip is necessary (within 30 seconds) to maintain SG inventory.

Critical Task 3 Manually start the AFW pumps.

From WOG The MD AFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal and SG low level to provide feed Critical Task List to the SGs for decay heat removaL If SG levels drop below the appropriate setpoint, the for FR-S. 1, B turbine-driven AFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The A 71/i/S analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to scram provides acceptable results.

Critical Task 4 Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2.

From WOG Isolation of the feedwater to the faulted SG maximizes the cooldown capability of the non Critical Task List faulted loops following a feedline break and minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and for E-2, A energy release following a steamline break. Isolation of steam paths from the faulted SG also minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and energy release to containment. In addition, isolation of these steam paths could isolate the break.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar iucIear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 342 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 342.

c. Right click on IC# 342.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 342.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value rpOlc manual and automatic reactor signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-3-359-2 hs-3-359 indicating lights 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff 00:00:00 rp55c failure of auto start on turbine driven aux feed pump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-3-359-1 hs-3-359 indicating lights 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff 00:00:00 hs-3-128a hs-3-128a auxiliary feedwater pump b-b motor sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 ptlock 00:00:00 hs-62-138a hs-62-138a emergency boration flow control valve sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 Page 1 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-3-359 Intentionally left blank 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 rp55a failure of auto start on motor driven aux feedpump a hs-3-128a-1 01170 aux fw pmp b-b motor sw(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff 00:00:00 fwl8b feed water pump turbine vibration pump b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 20 20 rp5l b reactor trip breaker rtb trip M 20 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rp5l a reactor trip breaker rta trip M 20 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rdr09 rod control mg set #2 load bkr 52-2 0 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 rdr08 rod control mg set #1 load bkr 52-1 0 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 rdr02 rod control mg set #2 bkr 0 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close rdr0l rod control mg set #1 bkr 0 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close cvrl0 emergency boration [62-9291 0 23 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close pic-1-13a 09040 sg 2 main steam hdr press co 0 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 42.2363 cv0la charging pump a trip M, 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rcl3b fail inputto pic-68-340d M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 43.0311 rc02d rcp trip rcp #4 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ms0ld main steam line break inside containmentsg #4 M 7 00:00:00 00:01 :00 10 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. Place RED HOLD NOTICE tags on 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B and 1-HS-3-359, MD AFWP lB RECIRC VALVE handswitches.

Ensure the indicating lights on 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B and l-HS-3-359, MD AFWP lB RECIRC VALVE handswitch are DARK. ENSURE 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B is in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position.

7. Place pink Protected Equipment tag on 1-HS-3-118A, AFW PMP A-A and l-HS-46-56A-S, T-D AFWP T&T VLV handswitches.

8. -

ENSURE the Train B Week Channel II sign is placed on 1-M-30.

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

Page2of5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 20 10-08 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) MOL (Middle of Life) is updated and on the desk, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

Item 3

• AFD -11.8  % -2.3  % 5.8  %

Lower Band Target Upper Band

-2.7 Actual

• Control Rods L1 Auto Manual 220 steps Control Bank D1/D2 Item 4 El Negative Positive None El 1-CCPA CB 748 ppm Item 5 Current RCS C  :

8 748 ppm Current fluid inside the blender is:

Acid Water Blended PW flow rate 70 gpm 1-FC-62-142, dial selling 35%

BA flow rate 8 gpm 1-FC-62-139 dial selling 21%

6. Boric Acid (BA) and Primary Water (PW) volumes for the following changes:

1°FTavg increase 373 gal PW 1°F Tavg decrease 46 gal BA 10% Downpower @ 5%/hr 145 gal BA 50% Downpower @ 5%/hr 440 gal BA 1000 MW (85%) Runback 179 gal BA 950 MW (80%) Runback 262 gal BA 900 MW (75%) Runback 341 gal BA 790 MW or 800 MW Runback 487 gal PW

11. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 3 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

none 1 Reduce power to shutdown I B Main Feedwater Pump.

ROLE PLAY. When requested, as the Turbine Building AUO, report that vibrations are rising on the lB MFP. State that the control room will be notified if vibrations on the pump or turbine rise to 10 mils.

2 none I B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations increase, requiring the pump to be tripped.

ROLE PLAY: Role play as the Turbine Building AUO and state that vibrations are greater than 10 mils on both the lB MFP pump and turbine.

ROLE PLAY. If requested, as the Turbine Building AUO, acknowledge request to reset vibration alarms locally at the Bentley-Nevada panel. Delete malfunction fwl8b, then report back to the control room that the vibration alarms have been reset locally.

3 3 SG 3 PORV controller fails, causing PORV to open.

ROLE PLAY: Information provided is dependent on the position of the hands witch for #3 PORV.

If the handswitch is in the P-AUTO position, report steam from the North Valve Vault Room. If the handswitch has been placed to the CLOSE position, report that there was steam coming from the North Valve Vault Room, but the steam has now stopped.

4 4 lA-A COP trips on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, as Control Building AUO repeat back request to investigate the cause of the IA CCP trip at its breaker. Report back that the breaker tripped on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, as the Auxiliary Building AUO repeat back request to check out the lB-B CCP for a start. Report back that the lB-B CCP is ready for start. After the pump is running, report that all pump parameters are normal.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, as the Auxiliary Building AUO repeat back request to check out the status of the IA-A CCP to determine cause of the trip. Report that there are scorch marks on the IA-A CCP motor, and the motor is extremely hot to the touch.

Page4of5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

5 5 1 Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-68-340D opens, requiring entry into AOl-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer

Pressure Control System.

ROLE PLAY: Role Play as Work Control and state that a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-PCV-68-340D spray valve will be developed.

6 none #4 RCP trips and the reactor fails to trip, requiring entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS..

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as the Control Building AUO to open the Rod Drive MG set breakers and the Reactor Trip breakers, wait 2 minutes then clear malfunction rpOlc, then enter Event 20 (Malfunction rp5la to open Reactor Trip Breaker A, and malfunction rp5lb to open Reactor Trip breaker B.)

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as the Turbine Building AUO to open the Rod Drive MG set supply breakers, wait 2 minutes then enter Remote Functions rdr0l and rdrO2.

7 none 1A Motor Driven and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual starts.

ROLE PLAY: None, BOP can manually start the pumps from their associated control switches on 1-M-4.

8 none 1-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that 1-FCV-62-138 will not open locally. When directed, open 1-IS V-62-929 using Remote Function cvrl0 set to open.

Page 5of5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 1 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to shutdown 1 B Main Feedwater Pump.

Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.2, Power Reduction From Greater than 50% Power.

CAUTION Condenser Backpressure limits are on previous page.

CAUTION TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

CAUTION LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl-i 1 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated.

1. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/mm:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN SRO

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE RO CONTROL.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/rn in.

d. DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal or Tavg lower than desired for at power conditions.

NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for Tavg Control

• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

2. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1)ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow RO rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

4) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on i-FI-62-139.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from SOI-62.02,Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7, Minor Boration.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 2 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to shutdown lB Main Feedwater Pump.

L Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) Section 6.7, may be reproduced, laminated, displayed, reused, etc. as desired.

2) Minor Boration is defined as the addition of Boric Acid done several times each shift early in core life, to compensate for burnable poison burn-up, and maintain Tavg on program.

[1] ENSURE 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATER C [1-M-4], is ON, to RD equalize RCS-Pzr CB.

[2] ADJUST I -FC-62-1 39, BA TO BLENDER [1 -M-6], for desired RO flow rate.

[3] ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6j for RD required_quantity.

RO [4] PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], in BOR.

[51 TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6j, to RD START.

[5.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[61 MONITOR the following parameters Instrument Location Parameters 1-Pl-62-122 -M-6 1 VCT PRESS 1-Ll-62-129A 1-M-6 VCT LEVEL RD 1-Fl-62-139 1-M-6 BATO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-139 1-M-6 BA BATCH COUNTER 1-Fl-62-142 1-M-6 PW TO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-142 1-M-6 PW BATCH COUNTER 1-Ll-62-238 1-M-6 BAT A LEVEL 1-Ll-62-242 l-M-6 BAT C LEVEL

[7J WHEN Boration is COMPLETE THEN RD PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

[8] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

RD

[8.11 CHECK Red light is LIT.

RD

[9] RETURN 1-FC-62-139, BATO BLENDER [l-M-6], to desired flow rate EXAMINER: The following actions are from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.2, Power Reduction From Greater than 50% Power.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

RD

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit AFD within Target Band

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 3 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to shutdown 1 B Main Feedwater Pump.

Time N Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. REFER to EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO EXAMINER: Step is N/A for given conditions.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and SRO expected ramp rate.

NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in Tavg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR Tavg and Tref:

SRO

• Tavg trending to Tref.

RO

• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7 CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions SRO 8 NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns 9 WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour SRO NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate I -SI-68-1 28.

EXAMINER: Further steps of AOI-39, Rapid Power Reduction are not included, since the crew will only reduce power to 85%, and the remainder of AOI-39 steps are power level dependent. Simulator Operator enters Event 2.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to modify the severity of malfunction fwl8b to increase lB MFP vibrations to greater than 10 mils after applicants have decreased power by approximately 5%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 4 of 47 Event

Description:

1 B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations increase, requiring the pump to be tripped.

Entry into AOl-16 is required, and a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference must be conducted.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Main Feedwater Pump 1 B vibrations are sufficiently high at the beginning of the scenario for 53-D, TURBINE VIBRATION HI, and 54-D, PUMP VIBRATION HI to be LIT.

When the severity of the vibration malfunction is raised, the lOS display will indicate 1 B Main Feedwater pump and turbine and bearing vibrations are above the criteria for stopping the MFP.

Diagnoses and announces lB MFP vibrations rising above setpoints BOP for pump removal.

May trip 1 B Main Feedwater pump, to comply with ARI 53-D and 54-BOP D corrective actions and directions provided in the Shift Turnover Instructions.

Enter and direct actions of AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub SRO Section 3.5, MFWP TRIP greater than or equal to 800 MWe (67%

Turbine Load).

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.5, MFWP TRIP greater than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

EXAMINER: During the runback, it is likely that RCS pressure will drop below the DNB limit of Tech Spec LCO 3.4.1 (2214 psig). The RO will notify the SRO of the entry, and report when pressure returns above 2214 psig.

1. (p) IF loss of SIG level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and BOP -*-*

GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

BOP 2. CHECK turbine load less than or equal to 1000 MWe (85%).

3. PLACE tripped MFP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and BOP CLOSE recirc valve.

BOP 4. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%),

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP Since the standby MFWP is running, the portion of the RNO addressing actions to reduce load further are not provided.

BOP 5. ENSURE MFWP speed rising to control SIG tx-P and levels on program.

CAUTION Continued load reductions below 800 MWe should be done using normal turbine controls at less than or equal to 5% mm.

6. ENSURE adequate feed flow for existing conditions:

BOP

• Feed flow greater than or equal to steam flow.

• SIG levels returning to program.

RO 7 ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 3°

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 5 of 47 Event

Description:

1 B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations increase, requiring the pump to be tripped.

Entry into AOl-16 is required, and a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference must be conducted.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION Runback may resultin exceeding Tech Spec 3.2.3 limits on Axial Flux Difference (AFD).

SRO 8. MONITOR AFD within limits of LCO 3.2.3.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

(p) INITIATE boration to return AFD within limits.

After the runback occurs, the SRO will enter Tech Spec LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, Condition A, requiring power to be reduced to less than 50% RTP if AFD is not restored to within limits within 30 minutes. Boration will be in accordance with TI-7.012, approximately 262 gallons of boron.

9. IF feed flow greater than 40%, THEN ENSURE tripped MFWP turbine condenser valves CLOSED:

. Pump A, 1-FCV-2-205 and -210, BOP OR

. Pump B, 1-FCV-2-211 and -216.

Since the lB MFP was tripped, 1-FCV-2-211 and 1-FCV-2-216 will be verified closed.

BOP 10. MONITOR reg valves controlling SIG levels on program.

1 1. LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 to 130°F on running BOP Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948 Report from the field will state that current temperature is 120°F

12. IF C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT [66EJ THEN BOP

a. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand.

b. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch.

13. ENSURE Condensate System Pumps in service as necessary:

SRO

. REFER TO GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

14. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one SRO hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling requirements.

BOP 15. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT LIT.

16. RETURN valve position limiter to normal:

a. ENSURE turbine in IMP OUT BOP b. (p) REDUCE turbine load setpoint using REFERENCE CONTROL V (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT LIGHT not LIT,

c. SET valve position limiter to 95%.

SRO 17. INITIATE repairs on failed pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 47 Event

Description:

1 B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations increase, requiring the pump to be tripped.

Entryinto AOl-16 is required, and a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference must be conducted.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO 18. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 7 of 47 Event

Description:

SG 2 PORV controller fails, causing PORV to open. Tech Spec evaluation.

F Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

RED indicating light on 1-HS-1-12 LIT.

RCS temperature dropping.

Reactor power rising on all power range monitors.

BOP Diagnose and announce failure of SG PORV 1-PCV-1-12 open.

May place 1-PIC-1-13A PORV controller in MANUAL and attempt to BOP close.

BOP May transfer handswitch 1-HS-1-13 from P-AUTO to CLOSE.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-38, Main Steam or Feedwater SRO Line Break.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-38, Main Steam or Feedwater Line Break.

1. IF leak threatens personnel safety, THEN:

a. TRIP Rx.

b. CLOSE the following:

SRO

. MSIVs.

. MSIV bypass valves.

c. GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

BOP 2. CHECK SIG PORVs CLOSED.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP IF SIG press less than 1130 psig THEN CLOSE SIG PORV or local isolation valve BOP 3. CHECK steam dump valves CLOSED.

4. CHECK reactor power less than or equal to 100%:

RO

• Loop AT.

• NIS power range monitors RO 5. ENSURE Tavg and Tref. within 3°F.

NOTE

• It is a normal condition for Turbine load and Rx power to exhibit a nominal mismatch for loads less than 50%.

• Hotwell makeup will rise following a rapid run back. The makeup flow should be allowed to stabilize before making any determination of leak size.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 8 of 47 Event

Description:

SG 2 PORV controller fails, causing PORV to open. Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. MONITOR leak less than 3% of required steam or FW flow:

IF power greater than 50%, THEN COMPARE turbine load to BOP reactor power and zT.

. OBSERVE steam and FW flow recorders.

. OBSERVE hotwell level makeup less than 950 gpm.

BOP 7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gallons.

BOP 8. ENSURE SG levels on program.

CAUTION FW or condensate leaks upstream of the FW isol valves should be promptly dealt with to limit hazards to Turbine Bldg personnel.

9. DISPATCH personnel to perform secondary plant inspection for BOP main steam and feedwater leaks.

10. CHECK Cntmt conditions NORMAL:

. Pressure (1-PDR-30-133 between -0.1 and +0.3 psig).

BOP

• Temperature (Window 104-B DARK).

• Humidity (Window 103-B DARK).

• Sump level (Window 127-E DARK).

RO 1 1. MONITOR Cntmt press stable or dropping.

12. IDENTIFY leak location based upon ANY of the following:

a. FW/Steam flow recorder.

b. SG enclosure temperatures high:

• TlOO2Afor2and3.

• TlOO3Aforl and 4.

BOP . . .

c. Local indication of break in any of the following:

• Main steam lines.

• Main feed lines.

• Other secondary piping.

• S/G safety valves.

BOP 13. ANNOUNCE steam leak and give possible location.

14. ISOLATE leak if possible.

BOP Step 2 RNO isolated the leak.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 9 of 47 Event

Description:

SG 2 PORV controller fails, causing PORV to open. Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. IF operation can continue, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect Evaluates Tech Specs and determines that LCO 3 74, SRO Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) Condition A is applicable Condition A states that with one requiredADVline inoperable restore the required ADV to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time CREW allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

CREW Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 10 of 47 Event

Description:

lA-A Charging Pump trip.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

15-E M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT 108-A CHARGING FLOW HI/LO 1-FI-62-93A CHARGING FLOW indicating a drop in flow.

RCP Seal Supply flow indications indicating a drop in flow.

RO Diagnoses and announces the lA-A CCP trip.

RO May isolate letdown, since charging flow has been lost.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-20 Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Level Control System EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

CAUTION Charging and letdown must be in service together. If letdown isolates or charging is lost, the other must be isolated.

1. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL:

RO

. 1 -LR-68-339 (green pen).

NOTE 1-XS-68-339E selects one channel to control level to program and one backup channel for control interlocks.

2. CHECK if 1-XS-68-339E is selected to FAILED channel (control or backup):

. Ll-68-339, RO OR

. Ll-68-320, OR

. LI-68-335.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF pzr level is low OR dropping, THEN ** GO TO Step 12.

SRO With no charging pump in service the PZR level trend is dropping, so Step 12 will be taken 12 CHECK any charging pump RUNNING EXAMINER: Actions to isolate letdown may have been taken when IA-A CCP tripped.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 11 of 47 Event

Description:

lA-A Charging Pump trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. ISOLATE letdown:

. CLOSE letdown orifice(s).

RO

• CLOSE l-FCV-62-69.

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70 b RESTORE charging and letdown

. REFER TO Attachment 1

c. ** GO TO Step 18.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Attachment 1, Alignment of Charging and Letdown.

1. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-89, CHRG HDR-RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL b ENSURE Charging Pump running RD c OPEN 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CHARGING LINE ISOL

d. ENSURE 1-FCV-62-85, NORM CHARGING TO LOOP 1, or 1-FCV-62-86, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4, OPEN.

e. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-93 to maintain seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

2. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

• 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RD

• 1-FCV-62-70 CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION

• 1-FCV-62-77 CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION 3 PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV RD 192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN.

4. PLACE 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in RD MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice).

5. THROTTLE OPEN 1-FCV-62-89 and ESTABLISH 75 gpm or RD greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using I -FCV-62-93.

6 OPEN letdown orifices as needed

• 1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm)

RD

• 1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).

• 1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

• 1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 12 of 47 Event

Description:

lA-A Charging Pump trip.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for RD desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp), and PLACE in AUTO.

8. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV RD 192 CNTL, in AUTO.

RD 9. RETURN pzr level to program.

10. RETURN 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL RD CONTROL, in AUTO.

EXAMINER: The fol lowing actions return to AOI-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, at Step 18.

SRO 18. NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

19. EVALUATE system alignment/status:

. REVIEW actions performed in this Instruction.

. REFER TO SOI-62.01, CVCS Charging and Letdown SRO evaluates Tech Specs, and determines that the following SRD are applicable:

LCO 3.5.2. ECCS Operating, Condition A restore train(s) to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Tech Requirement 3.1.4, Charging Pumps -Operating. A. A.

One required charging pump inoperable. A. I Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status. In 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

SRD 20. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time CREW allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

CREW Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 13 of 47 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-68-340D controller fails, requiring entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, and manual closure of the spray valve.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON RCSIPZR pressure dropping slowly on all indicators.

Loop 1 Spray valve RED light LIT, when both spray valves should be partially open.

Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-PCV-68-340D, LOOP 1 RO SPRAY VALVE.

May manually close 1-PCV-68-340D, Loop 1 Spray valve using RO 1-PIC-68-340D, LOOP I SPRAY CONTROL.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Pressure Control System.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

NOTE 120 AC VITAL PWR BD i-lV [breaker 2] supplies the plugmold power strip associated with both PZR spray valves and several other instruments required to respond to this event.

1. CHECK pressurizer pressure stable or trending to desired pressure:

. 1 -PI-68-340A, RO

• 1 -P 1-68-334,

. 1-PI-68-323,

• i-PI-68-322.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO PLACE pzr master controller 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal.

2. CHECK 1 -XS-68-340D selected to a failed controlling or backup RO channel.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

R0 IF pzr press is abnormally low THEN **GO TO Step 6

6. CHECK pzr spray valves CLOSED:

Green indicating lights LIT.

RO

• Pzr spray demand meters, 1-PIC-68-340B and 1-PIC-68-340D indicating ZERO [1-M-4].

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CLOSE pzr spray valve(s) manually.

RO RO is successful in closing the PZR spray valve in MANUAL so reactor trip and Safety injection are NOT required.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 14 of 47 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-68-340D controller fails, requiring entry into AOl-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, and manual closure of the spray valve.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. CHECK pzr PORVs CLOSED:

RD

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitor.

8. CHECK pzr Safeties CLOSED:

RD

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitor.

9. ENSURE pzr heaters on as required:

RD

• Control Group on at 2220 psig.

• Backup Groups on at 2210 psig.

RD 10. CHECK aux spray, l-FCV-62-84, CLOSED.

RD 11. CHECK pzr press STABLE or RISING SRO 12. GO TO Step 16.

16. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

RD

• Pzr Master controller,

• Pzr spray controllers,

• All heater groups.

17. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

a. 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation. Not Applicable.

b. 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation Not Applicable

c. 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System. Not Applicable.

d. 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. See note below.

e 3 4 3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits SRO f. 3.4.9, Pressurizer. Not Applicable.

g. 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves. Not Applicable.

h. 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves. Not Applicable.

SRO determines that LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits was entered durIng the initial pressure drop, and was exited when pressure rose above 2214 psig. No other Tech Spec entry is required for the failed spray valve.

SRO 18. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO 19. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time CREW allows prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 15 of 47 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve i-PCV-68-340D controller fails, requiring entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, and manual closure of the spray valve.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

CREW Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Console Operator: When directed, initiate Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 16 of 47 Event

Description:

Anticipated Transient Without Scram, requiring entry into FR-Si.

1A and lB Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual start. 1-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

78-D ONE LOOP FLOW LO (First Out Alarm) 123-B RCS LOOP 4 FLOW LO 1 -Fl-68-71 A, -71 B, -71 D LOOP 4 FLOW all dropping.

Announces the trip of RCP #4, and the Reactor Trip First Out alarm.

RO 78-D.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION of FR-S.l, after attempting to RO initiate a manual reactor trip from panel 1-M-1 and 1-M-6.

RO Announces the ATWS condition.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION of FR-S.1. During rod insertion in MANUAL, the RO may contact multiple AUOs to trip the Rod Drive RO MG supply breakers; the Rod Drive MG set output breakers and/or the reactor trip breakers locally.

BOP Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION of FR-S.1.

Enters and directs performance of FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SRO Generation/ATWS.

EXAMINER: The following steps are from FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

1. ENSURE Reactor Trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

. RPIs at bottom of scale.

. Neutron flux DROPPING.

CRITICAL TASK I WOG Critical Task List for FR-S. 1. C Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing the immediate-action steps of FR-S. 1:

• Insert RCCAs Reactor trip must be verified to ensure that the only heat being added to the RCS is from decay heat and reactor coolant pump heat. The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and pump heat are being added to the RCS. If the reactor cannot be tripped, then the control rods should be manually inserted into the core in order to decrease reactor power.

CRITICAL 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED TASK I RO Manually TRIP reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT control rods.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 17 of 47 Event

Description:

Anticipated Transient Without Scram, requiring entry into FR-Si.

1A and lB Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual start. i-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK 2 WOG Critical Task List for FR-S. 1, A Manually trip the main turbine.

The turbine is tripped to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS due to steam flow that the turbine would require. For an ATWS event where a loss of normal feedwater has occurred, analyses have shown that a turbine trip is necessary (within 30 seconds) to maintain SG inventory.

CRITICAL 2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

TASK 2 BOP .

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK AFW pumps operation:

a. Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

BOP

b. TD AFW pump RUNNING.

c. LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

CRITICAL TASK 3 WOG Critical Task List for FR-S. 1, B Manually start the AFW pumps.

The MD AFW pumps start automatically on an SI signal and SG low level to provide feed to the SGs for decay heat removal. If SG levels drop below the appropriate setpoint, the turbine-driven AFW pump will also automatically start to supplement the MD pumps. The A TWS analyses have shown that actuation of AFW within 60 seconds after the failure to scram provides acceptable results.

CRITICAL 3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

TASK Manually START pumps and open valves as necessary.

BOP The IA and TD AFW Pumps did not automatically start. The BOP must manually start the pumps.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 18 of 47 Event

Description:

Anticipated Transient Without Scram, requiring entry into FR-Si.

1A and 1 B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual start. 1-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. INITIATE RCS Boration:

a. ENSURE at least one centrifugal charging pump RUNNING.

b. OPEN RWST outlet valves i-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136.

c. CLOSE VCT outlet valves I -LCV-62-1 32 and I -LCV-62-1 33.

d. OPEN BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26

e. CHECK BIT flow.

f. PLACE BA pumps in FAST speed.

g. Throttle OPEN emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to BOP maintain boric acid flow greater than 35 gpm.

g. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF BA flow less than or equal to 35 gpm, THEN:

• Locally OPEN emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138

[blender station el 713], OR

• ALIGN manual boration:

1) Locally OPEN alternate boration valve 1-ISV-62-929

[blender station el 713].

2) OPEN blender BA supply 1-FCV-62-140.

3) MONITOR BA flow.

RO 5. CHECK pzr pressure less than 2335 psig.

6. VERIFY Cntmt Vent Isolation:(on 1-.XX-55-6E and 1-XX-55-6F)

RO

• Train A GREEN TrainBGREEN

7. IF AFW flow established, THEN BOP a. PLACE 1-HS-3-45 to LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

b. PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO.

8. IF SI actuated OR required, THEN PERFORM Steps I through 6 SRO of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, as time allows.

9. ENSURE the following trips:

RO

a. Reactor Trip.

EXAMINER: The RO may have already dispatched an AUO to open Rod Drive MG set input breakers at 480 V Unit Boards, and an AUO to open Reactor Trip breakers locally while initially inserting the control rods.

9. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. DISPATCH operator to locally trip reactor:

• OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers RO/BOP

[MG set room].

• OPEN breakers to MG sets [480V unit boards A and B].

b. Turbine Trip.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 19 of 47 Event

Description:

Anticipated Transient Without Scram, requiring entry into FR-Si.

1A and lB Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps fail to automatically start, requiring manual start. i-FCV-62-138 fails to open, requiring local operation to begin boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 10. MAINTAIN rod insertion UNTIL rods fully inserted.

11. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO for ATWS event.

12. MONITOR reactor subcriticality:

a. CHECK Power range channels less than 5%.

SRO

b. CHECK Intermediate range startup rate NEGATIVE.

c. ** GO TO Step 21.

21. TERMINATE emergency boration:

a. PLACE BA transfer pumps in SLOW speed.

RO b. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

c. IF alternate boration opened, THEN Locally CLOSE 1-ISV 929.

NOTE If the reactor is verified to be subcritical, Status Trees may be implemented for other Red or Orange paths

22. IMPLEMENT other Red or Orange paths identified on Status SRO Trees SRO 23. IF SI actuated, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

CAUTION Evaluation of boration requirements should consider subsequent cooldown actions in addition to current conditions.

24. DETERMINE shutdown margin requirements:

a. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample RCS.

b. REFER TO 1-S1-0-10, Shutdown Margin, OR REACTINW Computer Program.

SRO C. INITIATE RCS boration as necessary:

. REFER TO SOl-62.02, CVCS BORON Concentration Control.

d. INITIATE flushing boric acid piping as necessary:

. REFER TO AOI-34, Immediate Boration.

RO 25. CHECK reactor trip breakers OPEN.

26. NOTIFY IMs to check P-4 contacts USING 1-SI-99-4-A and 1-SRO S1-99-4-B, Test of Reactor Trip P-4 ESFAS Interlock.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 20 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Cue Console Operator to enter Event 9, for the steam line break inside containment at this point.

EXAMINER: The SRO will enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, at this point.

NOTE I Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

. RPIs at bottom of scale.

. Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

BOP

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

BOP

• CSST (offsite),

OR

. D/G (blackout).

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

. 1 -XX-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D EXAMINER: Appendices A and B (E-0) are provided on pages 26 through 40.

5. EVALUATE support systems:

BOP

• REFER TO Appendixes A and B (E-0), Equipment Verification pages 15-28.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F:

• IF any RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-avg RO trending to 557°F. OR

• IF NO RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-cold trending to 557°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 21 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED IF cooldown continues, THEN:

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

• CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm RO UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN CLOSE MSIVs.

ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED IF RCS temp greater than 564°F THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or SIG PORVs OPEN 9 ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED RO 1 -FCV-62-54

• I -FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

RO

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO 12 CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED 13 CHECK if RCPs should remain in service RO a Phase B signals DARK [MISSP]

b RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

RO

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF SIG pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

EXAMINER: The SRO will enter E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, at this point.

CAUTION If a faulted SIG is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

BOP 1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event// 6 Page 22 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSVA.

• i-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact SIG:

• Any SIG pressure controlled or rising, BOP OR

• Any SIG pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

4. IDENTIFY Faulted SIG based on ANY of the following:

• Any SIG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR

• Any SIG pressure less than 120 psig, OR

• SIG enclosure temps high:

1)TiOO2Afor2 and 3, BOP 2) Ti 003A for 1 and 4.

OR

• Local indication of break in any of the following:

1) Main steam lines,

2) Main feedwater lines,

3) Other secondary piping CAUTION

• If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one SG.

• RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one SIG.

CRITICAL TASK 4 WOG Cntical Task List for E 2 A Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2.

Isolation of the feedwater to the faulted SG maximizes the cooldown capability of the non-faulted loops following a feed/me break and minimizes the RCS coo/down and mass and energy re/ease following a steamilne break. Isolation of steam paths from the faulted SG a/so minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and energy re/ease to containment. In addition, isolation of these steam paths could iso/ate the break

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 23 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL 5. ISOLATE Faulted SIG:

TASK 4 a ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted SIG b ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted SIG MEW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED BOP

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

• MEPs TRIPPED.

c. ENSURE Faulted SIG PORV CLOSED.

d. ENSURE Faulted SIG blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP 6 ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact SIG BOP 7 MONITOR CST volume greater than 200 000 gal

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted SIG blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact SIG PORV controllers in AUTO to:

RO

• P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

OR

. P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running) 9 CHECK secondary side radiation

• SIG discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

SRO

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

SIG sample results by Chemistry 10 CHECK SI termination criteria a CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADVI

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR SRO

• At least one Intact SIG NR level greater than 29% [39%

ADVJ c CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising d CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV]

e. GO TO ES-i .1 ,SI Termination.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 24 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time Positio Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: It is possible that the crew will get to step 10 of E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and determine that RCS pressure is not stable or rising. If this is the case then the crew will transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. If the transiition to E-1 is made, then the following steps are applicable.

If conditions do allow transition to ES-i .1 without a transition to E-i, then terminate the scenario when ES-I .1 is entered.

c RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RO

• • GOTOStep11 SRO 11. GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

SRO a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

b RCS pressure greater than 1 500 psig SRO 2 REFER TO EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and RO determination of time for hot leg recirc.

4 CHECK S/G pressures All S/G pressures controlled or rising

• All S!Gs pressures greater than 120 psig.

5. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50% ADVJ

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 25 of 47 Event

Description:

Steam line break inside containment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10J.

CHECK low flow lights not lit [M-10].

• Locally CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm}.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72 39.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

• 1-HS-77-410.

• 1-HS-77-411.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADVJ.

e. ** GO TO ES-I .1, SI Termination.

EXAMINER: When the transition is made to ES-I .1, SI Termination, inform the crew that a relief crew will continue from this point.

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

• Page 26 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I Action/Expec:ed Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA Page I Df 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION ENSURE POBsOPEN: OPEN manually.

• P085084.

• PCB 5088.

2 ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESThBLISH at least one train

+ Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING. AEW oporation.

• TLJ ,AFW pump RUNNING.

LCVs iii AUTO, yr cui1iolled ri MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolalion: Manually CLOSE valves and

• MEW isoation anti bypass STOP pumps as necessaEy.

isolation valves CLOSED.

iF any valjes can NOT be closed,

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves THEN CLOSED. CLOSE I hcator outlct valvos.

MFP A arid B TRIPPED.

• Standby MEP STOPFED.

• Cond denrin pumps TRIPPED.

Cond booster punps TRIPPED.

14o128

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 27 of 40 WBN REACTORTRIPOR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev28 Step ActionlExpected Response I Response Not Obtned APPEN CIX A (E-0)

Poge 2 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in

• RNST outlets 1 -LCV-62-1 35 each set alignei.

and i-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

\/CT oulcta 1-LCV62-1 32 and i-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• criarging 1-I-V-2-9U and 1 -FCV-62-91 CLC)SED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1 -FC/-63-25 and aligned, and flow thrL BIT.

1 -FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• FID\v thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

greater than 1650 psig.

IF RCS press drops tD less than 1 co psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

15 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 28 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 3of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 5 CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntrnt Vent

a. Phase A isolation: Iscation signal,

• Train A GREEN. Manually CLOSE valves and

• Train B GREEN dampers as necessary.

b. Cntmt vent isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

16 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 29 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step ActionlExpected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page4oflO EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

• Cntmt Spray DARK IMISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray

• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. actuated.

3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntrnt IAD\]

setpoints where provided.

17 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page 30 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-D)

Page 5of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION CHECK plant radiaticn NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit .upervisor

• S.G blowdown rad recorder IMMEDIATELY.

1-RR-90-120 NOREv1AL prior to isolation [M1 21

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder i-RR-90-1 19 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12],

• 1-RR-qn-1n and 1-RP-ifl-112 raciation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2J.

• S/G main steamline disc[iarge monitors NORMAL [M-30J.

Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

{M-30j.

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL 8 ENSURE all DIGs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START DIGs lBot2B

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 31 of4O WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 6 of IQ EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

9. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• ECO30-i46A.

• ECO-30-146B.

• ECO-30-157A.

• FCQ-30-157B.

10. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as RUNNING, one on each shutdown necessary.

board preferred.

11. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be aligned to OPEN to running D/Gs, running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

12. ENSURE CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-l52 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, to position A.

0-FCV-67-1 52, is open to position A.

19 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 32 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O ov 28 I Step I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Dbtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 7 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 13 CLOSE CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A, 0-PCV-67-144.

14. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans OPEN ECTS fans RUNNING. dampers.

• ENSURE dampers OPEN VERFY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of wateL

15. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START PUflIP5 as

• lA-A CCS pump. necessary lB-B CCS pump.

• C-S OR 2B-B CCS pump.

NOTE

• The Upper and Lower Cntmt rad monitors sampling pumps should be shutdon if the sample flowpath is isolated.

The fo lowing equipment is located on 1 -M-9.

16. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans and STOPPED: PLACE hanclswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20 of 28

rAendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 33 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev2B Step I Action]Expected ResDons Response Nct Ob:ained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 8 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION iT CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fars STOP fans and STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading PLACE handswitch in dampers CLOSED: FULL-TO-LOCK. manually CLOSE dampers.

13. ENSURE AB CEN SUPPLY and EXH STOP fans and fans STOPPED. PLACE hafldsWitch in PULL-TD-LOC K.

NOTE

• Dumpers 1-HS-30-15a ural 2-HS-30-270 ierriiiri open Uuiing Al

19. ENSURE A .hN SUP & XH Manually CLOSE dampers.

darners CLOSED.

20. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

FCV-31-3.

• FC\-31-4.

21 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 34 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 9of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

21. ENSURE at least one CB EMER Manually START fan.

CLEANUP tan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, OR Fan B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-8. OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one OR damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-7. OPEN.

22. ENSURE at least one GB EMER PRESS ManuaII START fan.

fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• GB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6, OPEN.

OR NOTIFY TSC if at least one FGO-31-5, OPEN. damper NOT OPEN.

22 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 35 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 j Step ActioniExpected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 10 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

23. ENSURE Control Building fans Manually STOP fans.

STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY and NOTIFY TSC it any EXH FANS AND dampers. damper NOT CLOSED.

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST FAN AND dampers.

24. INITIATE Appendix B.

23 or 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 36 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX B (E-O)

Page 1 of 1 PHASE B PIPE BREAK CONTINGENCIES CHECK PHASE B actuated WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs; (r.IISSP i-XX-55-3C, -GD)

THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE i-FCV-32-ii0 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP i-XX-55-GE)

ATTACHI\IENT Bi.

[Atrain. 1indov 1 3]

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP i-XX-55-GE)

ATTACHMENT 62.

[A -train window 43]

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUD to perform (dSP i-XX-55-6E)

ATTACHMENT 63.

[A train, window 73]

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-14D CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (dSP 1-XX-55-6F)

ATTACHMENT 64.

[B train, window 74J 24 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 37 of 40 WEN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 2C ATTACHI\1ENI 3 (E 0)

Paje 1 cf 1 CCNTROL AIR ISOLATION CLOSE 0-IS V-32-1O13 - CONTROL AIR EL T13 AB HDR ISOL

[A613 EL. 713] chain operated beind Fuel and Waste Handling Bd A).

2. IF 0-ISV-32-103 CANNOT BE CLOSED.

THEN OPEN and DISCONNECT C&3S air cDmpreor Dreace-s:

a) 0-BKR-32-2a -480V SD ED 1A2-A, CI3D b) 0-BKR-32-26 -480V SD ED 1B1-B, C/3D C) 0-DKR-32-2? -4130V AUXDLDG COM DC, C/GC d) 0-BKR-32-1900A - 180! TURB BLDG COM BD. c;6C 25 Cf 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 38 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rcv2B I\IIACHMzNI h2

E-O Piqe 1 ul I ERCW ISOLATION

1. UNLOCP PND CLOSE 1-ISV-GT-52:30 _OW[ CNTMT \I\JT CLR 10 &1 E EROW SUP 1SIDL [A2U1692J (U-i penetration rcom Norm otAB Pipe Cflase Cooler lB-B in overhead 26 of 2.3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 40 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 ATTACHI\1ENT 63 (E-Q)

Page 1 of 1 CCS RETURN ISOLATIOFI

1. CLOSE i-IS V-70-T00 RCP OIL COOLER 005 RETURN ISOLATION

[MN EL. 710 U-i Penetration Roomj (approximately 10 ft. North of Penetration Room CooI& lB-B on mezzanine above RHR Surnp Valve Roon) 27 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 1 Page 40 of 40 ATTACHIV1ENT B4 (E-O)

Page 1 of 1 CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

1. CLOSE 1-ISV-7C-56 REACTOR EUFLDING CCS SUPPLY ISOLTON

[AI31T EL. 737] (Echind ElcvatorapDroxinlatc{y 2 ft wDston mczzanncabovc A CCS Heat Exchanger) 28 of 28

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of QSM US/MCR Unit Q UO Unit Off-2oing Name AUO Station Q STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1 B MD AEW pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

Tech Spec LCO 3.7.5 Action B was entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train B/Channel II Work Week.

lB MFP turbine and pump vibration alarms 53-D and 54-D are currently lit and Operations Management has directed a plant shutdown to 75% using AOI-39 at 2%/minute to remove the MFP from service. Operations Management has established threshold values of 10 mils vibration on either the pump or turbine as lB MFP trip criteria.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift C A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

Q A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnonnal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

C Standing Orders C LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) C PER review (N/A for AUOs)

C TACFs (N/A for AUOs) C Operator workarounds, burdens U Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift Q A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-20091 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [08-03-2009]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of QSM Q US/MCR Unit UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1 B MD AFW pump out-of-service for pump bearing replacement. Expected return to service in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

Tech Spec LCO 3.7.5 Action B was entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train B/Channel II Work Week.

1 B MFP turbine and pump vibration alarms 53-D and 54-D are currently lit and Operations Management has directed a plant shutdown to 75% using AOI-39 at 2%/minute to remove the MFP from service. Operations Management has established threshold values of 10 mils vibration on either the pump or turbine asIB MFP trip criteria.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift El A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) El PER review (N/A for AUOs)

El TACFs (N/A for AUOs) El Operator workarounds, bunlens [] Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

WA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-l [08-03-20091

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar NRC Exam I Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: I August 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial conditions: Power is stable at 1.66 x 10-4% power Source range channels have been blocked (P-6). RCS boron concentration is 1620 ppm; Control Bank D is at 100 Steps.

Turnover: Continue with reactor startup using GO-2, Reactor Startup, to 1-2% power and then start the 1A main feedwater pump. Train A/Channel I Work Week.

Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a N-BOP Raise power to 1-2%, stabilize power and start 1A main feedwater pump.

R-RO 2 cci0a C-BOP Component Cooling System 1A leak, 1-LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup ccli c valve fails to open. Requires entry into AOl-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling (CCS).

3 lic-3-l46csp C-BOP 1-LIC-3-164 setpoint fails high, causing i-LCV-3-164to open, and SG 1 TS-SRO level to rise. Requires manual control 1-LCV-3-164. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

4 ni04b 0 1-RO Intermediate range channel N136 fails low. Requires entry into AOl-4, TS-SRO Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires Tech Spec evaluation 5 lic-68-339 C-RO i-LIC-68-339, CHARG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL, output signal fails. Requires manual control of 1 -FCV-62-93. Requires entry into AOI-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

6 th03c 15 C-RO RCS leak occurs, requiring entry into AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. Leak progresses, requiring reactor trip and safety injection.

7 th02c 80 M-All Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-1.3.

8 si08c C-BOP I A-A and I B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the si08d safety injection signal.

9 rhO2 1-RO Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position hs-63-72 close RHR pump suction valves from the containment sump are unsuccessful.

hs-63-73 close Requires entry into ECA-i .1 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 Summary Initial Condition Power is stable at 1.66 x 10-4% power Source range channels have been blocked (P-6).

RCS boron concentration is 1620 ppm; Control Bank D is at 100 Steps.

1 Turnover Continue with reactor startup using GO-2, Reactor Startup, to 1-2% power and then start the 1A main feedwater pump. Train A/Channel I Work Week.

Event 1 Raise power to 1-2%, stabilize power and start 1A main feedwater pump.

Event 2 After power is stabilized at 1 x 10 2 to log critical data, a drain valve is found leaking through on Component Cooling System 1A header causing CCS surge tank level to drop.

1 -LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup valve fails to open at the appropriate level. The BOP responds by reporting the level loss, and manually opening 1-LCV-70-63. The SRO enters and directs actions of Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling (CCS).

Event 3 i-LIC-3-i64 setpoint fails high, causing 1-LCV-3-164to open, and SG 1 level to rise. BOP responds to 63-F, SG LEVEL DEVIATION, places 1-LCV-3-i64 in manual and controls SG i level manually.

Event 4 Intermediate range channel N136 fails low. The RD announces the failure to the crew.

The SRO enters and directs actions of AOl-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. The SRD enters Tech Spec LCD 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instwmentation, Function 4, Condition F; 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, Function i, Condition A.

Event 5 1-LIC-68-339, CHARG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL, output signal fails. The output signal failure causes 1 -HIC-62-93A to close. The RD must take manual control of 1 -FCV 62-93 to restore charging and seal injection flows to normal. The SRD enters and directs actions of AOl-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

Event 6 A leak develops on the reactor coolant system. The RD diagnoses the RCS leak and announces it to the crew. RD may increase charging flow in response to PZR level dropping. The SRD enters and directs the actions of ADI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. The SRD enters Tech Spec LCD 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition A. After letdown and charging are isolated by AOl-6, the leak progresses, requiring reactor trip and safety ihjection.

Event 7 Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. The SRD enters and directs the actions of E 0,Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transitions to E-1 ,Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant and then transitions to ES-i .3, Transfer to Containment Sump.

Event 8 lA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Requires manual start of both pumps.

Event 9 Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position RHR pump suction valves from the containment sump are unsuccessful. The SRO enters and directs the actions of ECA-l.1 ,Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 Critical Task Summary Critical Task 1 Establish flow from at least one intermediate head ECCS pump before transition out of E-O, From WOG Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Critical Task List SI provides makeup inventory to the RCS for cooling of the core during accident for E-O, Item J. conditions. Since SI is actuated, all SI pumps have a start signal and the operator should verify that they are running.

Critical Task 2 Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow.

From WOG Makeup is added to the RWST to extend the time the SI pumps and containment spray Critical Task List pumps (if operating) can take suction from the RWST and provide core cooling to the RCS.

for ECA-1. 1, Item

• Containment spray will initially be reduced to conserve RWST level (ECA-1. I Step 4).

• Containment spray will be aligned to recirculate the Containment Sump to the RWST.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9)

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 343 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 343.

c. Right click on lC# 343.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 343.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-63-73a hs-63-73a rhr pump b-b suction from control sump s 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 si08c failure of auto si and blackout signals sip 1 a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si08d failure of auto si and blackout signals sip I b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-63-72a hs-63-72a rhr pump a-a suction from control sump 5 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 rhO2 failure of auto transfer to containment sump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ccI9 failure of auto open signal for fcv-70-63 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 1 of 6

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value ccl0a ccs pump la-a disch hdr line break M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 3.75 0 Iic-3-l64csp 03950 sg 1 remote level cntlr 0 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 31.55857 ni04b irchannelfailureirchnl2 M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0.000185..

Iic-68-339 lic-68-339 pressurizer level controller Iic-68-339 0 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 1 3 th03c loca small leak loop 3 M 7 00:00:00 00:00:00 1.75 0 th02c loca cold leg loop 3 M 8 00:00:00 00:00:00 80 0

6. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

7. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1M-30.

8. Place simulator in FREEZE.

9. ENSURE Reactivity Plan for the continuation of the startup is available to the crew.

Page 2 of 6

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No No I nla Raise power to 1-2%, stabilize power and start IA main feedwater pump.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Reactor Engineer, state that Mode 2 physics testing is NOT required.

2 2 Drain valve leak on the suction of the I B CCS pump, causing CCS surge tank level to drop. I -LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup valve fails to open at the appropriate level.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge request. Wait 10 minutes and report that there is leakage from a drain valve on the suction of the lB-B CCS pump.

The drain valve is now isolated.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, report that there is no apparent cause for 1-LCV-70-63 failing to open on low level.

ROLE PLAY: As Work Control, acknowledge report, and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the leaking drain valve and 1-LCV-70-63 instrument loop.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that the Demin Water Storage Tank level has dropped. If requested, state that makeup to the Demin Water Storage Tank will be started as soon as a copy of SOl-59.01 is located.

3 3 1-LIC-3-164 setpoint fails high, causing 1-LCV-3-164 to open, and SG 1 level to rise.

ROLE PLAY: As Work Control, acknowledge report, and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair 1-LCV-3-164 automatic control loop.

4 4 Intermediate range channel N136 fails low.

ROLE PLAY: As Work Control, acknowledge report, and state that a package to troubleshoot and repair the Intermediate Range Channel N136 will be prepared.

ROLE PLAY: As the Shift Manager, state that you will contact the Operations Duty Manager and Reactor Engineering concerning the failure of Intermediate Range N136.

5 5 1-LIC-68-339, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL output fails, causing a close signal to I-HIC-62-93A ROLE PLAY: As Work Control, acknowledge report, and state that a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-LIC-68-339.

Page 3 of 6

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

6 6 RCS leak occurs, requiring entry into AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

ROLE PLAY: None.

7 19 Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs after the reactor is tripped.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, acknowledge the request to shutdown the Upper and Lower Containment Radiation monitors sampling pumps.

ROLE PLAY: When requested, acknowledge the need to perform E-1 Appendix A, B, C and D. Use remote function sirOl to complete E-1 Appendix A (place power on CLA outlet valves). Use remote sirl4 to complete E-1 Appendix C (place power on 1-FCV-63-1. Use remote function sirO6 to complete E-1 Appendix D (place power on 1-FCV-63-22). After remote functions are entered, report that the Appendices are complete.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, acknowledge request to sample steam generators for activity.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Radiation Protection, acknowledge request to survey steam lines and blowdown lines.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge the request to check low analyzer temperature lights. Report back that the lights are NOT LIT.

8 none lA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Control Building AUO, report that there are no relays made up for either of the SI pumps.

Page 4 of 6

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

9 none Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate and 1 -FCV-63-72 and I -FCV-63-73 fail to open manually.

ROLE PLAY: As Work Control, acknowledge report, and state that a package to troubleshoot and repair the automatic sump swapover circuit is being prepared.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to open 1-FCV-63-72, as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that Radiation Protection is with you and the vault covers have been removed. 1-FCV-63-72 will not open.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to open 1-FCV-63-73, as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that Radiation Protection is with you and the vault covers have been removed. 1-FCV-63-73 will not open.

ROLE PLAY: Inform the crew that the TSC has been manned when RWST level reaches 34%.

When contacted as the Technical Support Center (TSC) report that the method for transferring water to the RWST will require alignment of the containment spray to the RWST via the recirculation lines. Perform ECA-1. 1, Appendix C for Train A of the containment spray system.

When requested use remote csrOT to open 1-IS V-72-502, and remote csrO2 to open 1-IS V-72-503.

Page5of6

WBN LOSS OF RHR SUMP RECIRCULA1ION ECA-1.1 11 APPENDIX C Ep Pgei of2 CNTMT SPRAY RECIRC TO RWST ALIGNMENT (TRAIN A)

IF Trin A cntmn ry is :c be al ; ned b rir: t. :iST.

THEN PERFORM the fcoin:

.. NTFY AcF;T wf allgrint.

RESET Cntii: ray si.aL

c. PLACE cntn pr pump A PULL-TO-I DC(.

. CLOSE 1-CJ-72-22, TO CS PP A SUCTION.

CLOSE 1-CV-72-. CNTW S AY O A IC CNTMT.

f.. PLACE RCi c. Trair A CS Heat Exthnger per Apndix 3.

. OPEN 1-lSV-2-C2 CJTt1T SPAY EST L NE ISO JiQ MU7 1 BIT r14

. OPEN 1-ISV-72-O3. CNThIT SPRAY HDR A TEST LIFcE ISOLATION AV71 BIT rm.

• OPEN 1-FCY-72-44, CNTMT SMP TO CS M P A SUCL START cntn spray pump ..

ENSURE ilcw t: c -FI-?2-S4, C9 PMP ... FLOW.

32 of M Page 6 of 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 1 of 45 Event

Description:

Raise power to 1-2%, stabilize power and start 1A main feedwa ter pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Reactor power is stable at 1.66 x 10-4 % power, after blocking the Source Range Monitors at P-6. The startup continues from this point.

SRO [24] IF TAVG is less than 561°F AND Alarm 94 A, TAVG

-TREF DEVIATION, is LIT, THEN INITIATE 1-Sl-68-34 (SR 3.4.2.1).

RD [25] ADJUST Control Rods and/or boron concentration to RAISE Reactor power, at a rate of less than 1 dpm, to I X 1 02 RD [26] STABILIZE Reactor power at I X 102

[27] RECORD CRITICAL DATA:

Power Level:  %  %

1N192135A 1N192136A RD Rod Position:

RCS C 5 PPM Bank Steps Loop TAVO F F F F I TI 68 2E I TI 68 255 1 TI 68 44E 1 TI 68 678

[28] IF Actual Critical Rod Position is between 500 and 750 pcm SRO from ECP, THEN ENSURE Reactor Engineering evalu ates AND initiates a PER.

[29] IF Mode 2 physics testing required, THEN...

SRO If contacted the Simulator Operator will report as the Reactor Engineer that Mode 2 physics testing is NOT requ ired.

NOTE If AFW is in service, Reactor power must be mainta ined within the capability of AFW to maintain SG levels.

BOP [30] EVALUATE closing AFW Pumps Recirc Valves (refer to SQl-3.02, Section 8.9).

RD [31] ADJUST Control Rods or RCS CB to RAISE Reactor power, at a rate of less than I dpm, to between 1 and 4%.

EXAMINER: Cue Simulator Operator to inser t Event 2 after the power change has been adequately demonstrated.

NOTE TAVG will vary as a function of reactor power until the unit is greater than 15% turbine load (C5) and the Tavg program is maintained by AUTO or manua l rod control. The TAVG-TREF deviation alarm is expected to be initiated as reactor power approaches 7% RTP.

CAUTION IF AFW is controlling levels in one or more SGs

, THEN Reactor power must be maintained within AFW capability (less than 4% power).

RD [32] STABILIZE Reactor power between 1 and 4%:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 2 of 45 Event

Description:

Raise power to 1-2%, stabilize power and start 1A main feedwater pump.

lime Posilion Actions or Behavior BOP [32.11 MAINTAIN RCS Steam Dumps in Pressure Mode, set at 84%

(1092 psig.), or SG PORVs set at 84%.

RO [32.2] FOLLOW Xenon by Rod movement or Boration to maintain control banks ABOVE the LO INSERTION LIMIT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 2 Page 3 of 45 Event

Description:

Component Cooling System 1A leak, 1-LCV-70-63, Surge to open. Tank Makeup valve fails Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 249-A Ui SURGE TANK LEVEL Hl/LO 249-B UI SURGE TANK LEVEL LO MAKEUP 129-E DEMIN WATER & CASK DECON SYS ABNO RMAL BOP Diagnoses and announces the CCS Surge tank level drop.

BOP May open 1-LCV-70-63, UI SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV, since level is less than 60% and valve should have autom atically opened.

BOP May dispatch an operator to perform a system walkdo wn to look for leakage from CCS.

SRO Enters and directs actions of AOI-15 Loss of Com ponent Cooling Water (CCS).

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 249-B, Ui SURGE TANK LEVEL LO MAKEUP.

[1] ENSURE 1-LCV-70-63, Ui SURGE TANK MAKE UP LCV, OPEN.

[2] ENSURE Demin Water Storage Tank has level.

[3] IF Surge Tank level continues to lower, THEN GO TO Window 249-A.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 249-A, Ui SURGE TANK LEVEL HI/LO.

[1] MONITOR Surge Tank level.

[2] IF Lo, THEN

[a] ENSURE 1-LCV-70-63, Ui SURGE TANK MAKE UP LCV, OPEN.

[b] IF Surge Tank level lowers below 52% OR 1-FCV 183, SAMPLE HX CCS OUTLET is CLOSED, THEN NOTIF Y

Chemistry to suspend sampling

[c] IF Surge Tank loss imminent, THEN GO TO AOl-i 5, Loss Of Component Cooling Water (CCS)

[d] IF level is NOT maintained due to loss of makeup, THEN CONSIDER installing ERCW spoolpiece for emer gency source.

[e] IF level is NOT maintained due to loss of air to makeup valve, THEN CONSIDER installing bottled gas on 1-LCV-70-63

[3] IF Hi, THEN

[a] ENSURE i-LCV-70-63, Ui SURGE TANK MAKE UP LCV CLOSED

[b] CHECK CCS Radiation Monitor for rise

[c] CHECK I -TI-70-1 61, CCS HX A OUTLET TEMP

[0-M-27B].

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 4 of 45 Event

Description:

Component Cooling System 1A leak, 1-LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup valve fails to open.

Time I Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF Surge Tank level rising UNCONTROLLED OR CCS Radiation Monitors rising, THEN GO TO AOl-i 5, Loss Of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-i 5, Loss of Compo nent Cooling Water (CCS).

1. CHECK CCS pumps status:

a. CHECK any CCS pump TRIPPED or running pump NOT pumping forward:

BOP

. ERCW/CCS Motor tripout alarm,

. Low header pressure (train A or B),

. Multiple low flow alarms.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP

a. ** GO TO Caution prior to Step 2.

CAUTION A closed surge tank vent valve may cause a positive or negativ e tank pressure, giving an erroneous level indication.

BOP 2. CHECK 1-FCV-70-66, UI Surge Tank Vent, OPEN.

3. IF surge tank level less than 57%, THEN ENSURE i-LCV-70-63, Ui Surge Tank Makeup LCV, OPEN (Refer to SOI-70.01 as required if makeup not available).

BOP BOP must manually open 1-LCV-70-63, due to level switch failure. When the makeup valve is opened, the rate of level decrease slows, allowing for more time to address leak location.

BOP 4 MONITOR A and B side surge tank levels greater than 10%

SRO 5. IF RHR Shutdown Cooling is in service, THEN ** GO TO AOl-i 4, Loss Of RHR Shutdown Cooling CAUTION CCP may survive for only 10 to 12 minutes after loss of CCS to lube oil cooler.

EXAMINER: When dispatched to perform a system walkdown or to look for leaks, after 10 minutes, the AUO reports that the drain valve on the suction of the I B-B CCS pump was leaking and is now isolated.

6. MONITOR the following for Unit 1 CCS Train A:

. U-i CCS Train A level

• ERCW flow to CCS Hx A SRO IF loss of either is imminent, THEN PERFORM the following:

SRO determines that level is dropping, but level loss is NOT imminent and goes to the RNO column.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 5 of 45 Event

Description:

Component Cooling System 1A leak, I-LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup valve fails to open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO **

GO TO Step 7.

7. MONITOR the following for Unit 1 CCS Train B:

. U-I CCS Train B level

. ERCW flow to CCS Hx C SRO IF loss of either is imminent, THEN STOP and LOCKOUT the following Train B equipment:

SRO determines that level is dropping, but level loss is NOT imminent and continues to Step 8.

8. CHECK all RCP upper and lower oil cooler flows NORMAL:

BOP

• Upper Cooler flow: 150-220 gpm

. Lower Cooler flow: 5-10 gpm CAUTION Seal injection water must be maintained to all RCPs following isolation of thermal barriers.

9. CHECK Thermal Barrier Hx flows NORMAL.

BOP

. Thermal Barrier flow 40-50 gpm

10. CHECK 1A ESF Supply Header flow NORMAL, 1-Fl-70-159A.

BOP

• Normal 100 gpm with RHR out of service.

11. CHECK 1 B ESF Supply Header flow NORMAL, 1 -Fl-70-1 65A.

BOP

. Normal 5000-6000 gpm with RHR in service.

12. CHECK SFP Hx A flow NORMAL 0-Fl-70-20.

BOP

• Normal 2700-3500 gpm with SEP Hx A in service

13. CHECK SEP Hx B flow NORMAL, 0-Fl-70-6.

BOP

• Normal top of scale with SEP Hx B in service (may require local observation to determine if leak exists).

14 IF leak location can be isolated THEN RETURN CCS surge tank SRO to normal level (refer to SOI-70.01).

AUO reports that the leak is now stopped.

EXAMINER: The BOP must periodically monitor CCS surge tank level since the initial failure of 1-LCV-70-63A, UI SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV has not been repaired.

SRO 15. EVALUATE affected equipment operation USING Appendix A.

16 WHEN CCS returned normal THEN SRO

• CHECK only one CCS pump per Train.

• CHECK one TBBP running

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 6 of 45 Event

Description:

Component Cooling System 1A leak, 1-LCV-70-63, Surge Tank Makeup valve fails to open.

Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior

17. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS).

SRO SRO determines that the leak has been stopped and that Tech Specs do NOT have to be entered.

SRO 18. INITIATE repairs.

SRO 19. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN:

SRO 20. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 7 of 45 Event

Description:

1-LIC-3-164 setpoint fails high, causing 1-LCV-3-164 to open, and SG 1 level to rise.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION 60-B SG 1 LEVEL HI 1-FI-3-I63AAFWTOSG1 FLOW indicates high flow 1-FI-3-163B AFW TO SG 1 FLOW indicates high flow.

BOP Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-LCV-3-164.

May shift 1-LCV-3-164A SG 1 SUPPLY FRM PMP A-A from AUTO BOP to MANUAL and open 1-LCV-3-164 to recover SG I level to program.

SRO Enters and directs actions contained in ARI 63-F.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION BOlD [1] DETERMINE which SIG has abnormal level.

Determines SG I has abnormal level.

BOP [2] CHECK steam flow/feed flow instrumentation to VERIFY level controls are restoring S/G levels to NORMAL.

[3] IF level controls have malfunctioned, THEN

[a] PLACE FW controls in manual.

[b] RESTORE S/G level to normal and GO TO AOl-i 6, LOSS OF BOP NORMAL FEED WA TER.

SRO determines that there are no actions contained in A 01-16 to address the AFW control problem and continues to the next step.

[4] IF MFPT speed controls have malfunctioned, THEN

[a] PLACE MFPT speed controls in manual.

SRO [b] RESTORE MEW/MS zP to program AND GO TO AOl-i 6, LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER.

SRO determines that this step is not applicable to the current failure and continues to the next step.

[5] INITIATE WO for corrective action, if necessary.

BOP SRO contacts Work Control to troubleshoot and repair 1-LCV 164 automatic circuit.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 60-B, SG I LEVEL HIGH.

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 8 of 45 Event

Description:

1-LIC-3-164 setpoint fails high, causing 1-LCV-3-164to open, and SG 1 level to rise.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[1] If AFW system is in service THEN CHECK AFW operation AND CONTROL level manually if necessary per SOI-3 02 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM BOP BOP depresses the MAN pushbutton on 1-LIC-3-164A, SG I SUPPLY FRM PMP A-A, and operates the slider portion of the controller to control I-LCV-3-164 and restore level in SG I to normaL

[2] PLACE 1-FC-3-35 and/or 1-FC-3-35A in MANUAL AND SRO RESTORE S/G level to program.

SRO [3] REFER TO AOl-i 6, LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER.

[4] DETERMINE cause of Hi Level AND INITIATE corrective action, BOP if necessary.

Evaluate Tech Specs Evaluates effect of the failure on Train A AFW, and determines SRO that LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, Condition B must be entered. Requires that the AFW train be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Crew Brief conduct for this event as time allows prior to the next SRO event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically SRO addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS).

(Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Simulator operator enters Event 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 9 of 45 Event

Description:

Intermediate range channel N136 fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-NR-92-145 NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER indication of N136 fails LOW.

1-NI-92-136A CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR indication off scale LOW.

There are no audible alarms associated with this failure.

Diagnoses and announces failure of Intermediate Range Monitor RO N136 Enters and directs actions of AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation SRO Malfunctions Section 3.3 EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions Section 3.3. Intermediate Range Monitor malfunction.

1. IF greater than P-6 and less then P-1O with BOTH IRM channels SRO failed, THEN STOP positive reactivity changes.

NOTE Placing the affected channel in bypass will cause either window 64B or 65B to alarm.

RO 2. PLACE failed channel LEVEL TRIP switch to BYPASS [1 -M-1 3].

RO 3. ENSURE 1-NR-92-145 recording an operable IRM.

4. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.3.1, Rx Trip System Instrumentation Function 4. (Applicable in Mode I below the P-10 interlocks, and in Mode 2 Above the P-6 Interlocks) Intermediate Range Neutron flux, Condition F: THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-1O, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. F.1 SRO Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OR F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-b within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

3.3.3, PAM Instruments.

Function I Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, Condition A: One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

5. NOTIFY Operations Duty Manager and Rx Engineering of any SRO failed channel.

SRO 6. INITIATE repair of IRM.

SRO 7. DO NOT CONTINUE UNTIL repairs are complete.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 10 of 45 Event

Description:

Intermediate range channel N136 fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 11 of 45 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339, CHARG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL, output signal fails.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO 101-E, RCP SEAL SUPPLY FLOW LO 1-Fl-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW indicates dropping charging flow.

RCP SEAL SUP FLOW indicators for all RCPs indicate dropping seal supply flow.

Diagnoses and announces the drop in charging flow and RCP seal RO injection flows.

May place 1-HIC-62-93A in MANUAL and open to restore charging RO and seal supply flows.

May enter and direct actions of ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW SRO HI/LO.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Level Control System.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

[1] IF ALL the following conditions exist:

. Any RCP Thermal Barrier OutOfService, RO

• InService Charging pump trips,

. RCP seal injection flow required, THEN IMMEDIATELY START available charging pump to restore seal flow.

RO [2] CHECK 1-FI-62-93A [1-M-5] to determine if flow is high or low.

RO [3] CHECK PZR level indication on 1-M-4

[4] IF PZR level control system malfunction, THEN GO TO AOI-20, SRO MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL.

[5] IF charging flow is low, THEN CHECK letdown temperature and SRO CONSIDER increasing charging flow, or ISOLATE letdown.

RO [6] IF charging is lost, THEN IMMEDIATELY ISOLATE letdown.

SRO [7] DETERMINE cause of problem and INITIATE corrective action.

SRO [8] REFER TO SOI-62.01, CVCS CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20,Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

CAUTION Charging and letdown must be in service together. If letdown isolates or charging is lost, the other must be isolated.

1. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL:

RO

• 1-LR-68-339 (green pen).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 12 of 45 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339, CHARG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL, output signal fails.

[ Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE 1-XS-68-339E selects one channel to control level to program and one backup channel for control interlocks

2. CHECK if 1-XS-68339E is selected t FAILED channel (control or backup):

RD

• LI-68-339 OR

. LI-68-320 OR

. LI-68-335

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF pzr level is low OR dropping, THEN GO TO Step 12.

SRO SRO determines from the initial failure that PZR level would be dropping and goes to Step 12.

RD 12. CHECK any charging pump RUNNING.

13. PLACE 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, in MANUAL, and RESTORE pzr level to program RD USING 1-FCV-62-93 and/or 1-FCV-62-89.

RO may have already taken 1-HIC-62-93A to MANUAL and stabilized level.

14. CHECK letdown IN SERVICE:

. 1-FCV-62-69 OPEN.

RD

• 1-FCV-62-70 OPEN.

• 1-FCV-62-77 OPEN.

• Letdown orifice OPEN.

RD 15. CHECK pzr level RETURNING to program.

SRO 16 **GOTOStepl8 SRO 18 NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action if necessary 19 EVALUATE system alignment/status SRO

• REVIEW actions performed in this Instruction.

• REFER TO SOl-62.O1, CVCS Charging and Letdown.

Evaluates Tech Specs and determines that none are applicable to SRD this failure.

SRD 20. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 5 Page 13 of 45 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339, CHARG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL, output signal fails.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 14 of 45 Event

Description:

RCS leak occurs, requiring entry into AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak Leak progresses, requiring reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON 92-A PZR LEVEL HI/LO 144-A ICE COND INLET DOOR OPEN VCT level dropping.

PZR level dropping slowly.

RO Diagnoses and announces RCS leak.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-6,Small Reactor Coolant System SRO Leak.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 92-A, PZR LEVEL HIILO.

[1] CHECK PZR level indication on 1-M-4:

RO

• 1 -Ll-68-320

. 1-Ll-68-335A

. 1-LI-68-339 RO [2] CHECK PZR level and reference level on 1-LR-68-339 [1-M-5].

[3] IF Malfunction Of Pressurizer Level Control System, THEN GO SRO TO AOl-20, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM.

SRO [4] IF level is high, THEN ENSURE letdown in service.

[5] IF level is low AND PZR level control system is attempting to SRO increase level to program THEN REFER TO AOl-6, SMALL REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEMLEAK.

SRO [6] REFER TO Tech Specs.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

NOTE During performance of this instruction the need for a rapid load reduction or Unit trip should be continuously evaluated.

RO 1.CHECK pzrlevel DROPPING.

NOTES

• VCT makeup may have to be manually initiated or makeup rate raised to maintain VCT level.

• Pzr level must be allowed time to change following changes in charging flow.

RO 2. CHECK CCP in service.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 15 of 45 Event

Description:

RCS leak occurs, requiring entry into AOl-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

Leak progresses, requiring reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. MAXIMIZE charging flow:

a. Fully OPEN 1-FCV-62-93.

b. Fully OPEN 1-FCV-62-89.

RO

c. IF letdown at 120 gpm THEN PLACE 1-H1C-62-81A, in MANUAL, AND CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

d. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A as required AND PLACE in AUTO.

4. IF RHR Shutdown Cooling mode in service, THEN **

GO TO AOl SRO 14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling.

5. MAKE plant announcement via PA:

SRO Attention plant personnel. A primary system leak has developed.

Any personnel located either inside containment or in the Auxiliary Building should exit the area immediately. (Repeat)

RO 6. MONITOR pzr level STABLE or RISING.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF loss of pzr level is IMMINENT; THEN:

SRO a TRIPRx

b. INITIATE SI.

c. ** GO TO E-0, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

CAUTION Attempts to quantify leak rate should not delay performance of the remaining steps.

7. IF pzr level STABLE or RISING and time permits, THEN STABILIZE the plant to quantify the leak rate:

. STOP pzr heater/spray operation

. STOP any heatup/cooldown in progress

8. CHECK secondary plant radiation normal:

• Condenser exhaust monitors.

BOP

. S/G blowdown monitors.

• Main steam line monitors.

9. CHECK safety valves CLOSED:

RO

• EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

10. CHECK PORVs CLOSED:

RO

• EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

NOTE Relief valves (pzr PORVs, pzr safeties, CVCS letdown, RHR suction, and SI lines), and Rx head vent isolation valves could be leaking to the PRT. Further investigation will have to be made if PRT conditions become abnormal and leakage path is not readily identifiable.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 16 of 45 Event

Description:

RCS leak occurs, requiring entry into AOl-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

Leak progresses, requiring reactor trip and safety injection.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. MONITOR PRT conditions NORMAL:

• Level.

RD

. Temperature.

. Press.

NOTE Pzr level must be allowed time to stabilize following changes in charging or letdown flow.

12. ISOLATE letdown:

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-73, (75 gpm).

RD

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-74, (75 gpm).

. CLOSE 1-FCV-.62-76, (5 gpm).

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69.

. CLOSE I -FCV-62-70.

13. ISOLATE charging:

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-85.

RD

• CLOSE 1-FCV-.62-86.

. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-90.

• CLOSE 1 -FCV-62-91.

NOTE Normal range of seal injection flow is between 8 and 13 gpm per RCP with a minimum allowed flow of 6 gpm.

14. MINIMIZE RCP seal injection flow (greater than 6 gpm per RD pump), and EVALUATE pzr level trend.

NOTE If leak is on CVCS, pzr level will recover with charging and letdown isolated.

RD 15. CHECK pzr level DROPPING or STABLE.

EXAMINER: Cue Simulator Operator to increase leakage rate, in order for the evaluation of imminent loss of PZR level to be made, and a reactor trip and safety injection signal to be initiated.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 17 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-1.3. lA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time N Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE I Steps I thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite),OR DIG (blackout).

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -XX-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D Critical Task I WOG Critical Task List for E-O, J.

Establish flow from at least one intermediate head ECCS pump before transition out of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

SI provides makeup inventory to the RCS for cooling of the core during accident conditions. Since SI is actuated, all SI pumps have a start signal and the operator should verify that they are running.

Critical 5. EVALUATE support systems:

Task I

• REFER TO Appendixes A and B (E-O), Equipment Verification pages 1 5-28.

BOP BOP discovers that the IA and lB safety injection pumps failed to automatically start when the safety injection was actuated BOP manually starts the safety injection pumps SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADVJ.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 18 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-I .3. lA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. MONITOR RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F:

• IF any RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-avg trending to 557° F.

RD

• IF NO RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-cold trending to 557°F.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

RD

• 1 -FCV-62-54

• I -FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

RD a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RD 11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RD 12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

EXAMINER: The Reactor Coolant Pumps may have been stopped by the BOP during performance of E-O, Appendix A, prior to reaching this step in E-O.

RD 13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1 500 psig.

RO 13. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. STOP all RCPs. ** GO TO Step 14.

RD 14. CHECK SIG pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

RD 15. CHECK for RUPTURED SIG

• All S/Cs narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING.

• Secondary side radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

16. CHECK cntmt conditions:

• Cntmt pressure NORMAL.

RO

• Radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

• Cntmt sump level NORMAL.

• Cntmt temp ann window DARK [1 04-Bj.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 19 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-i, and a transition to ES-i .3. lA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO j **

GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

EXAMINER: When the transition is made for E-O to E-1, the STA will monitor CSF Status Trees. The STA will report that there is a REP PATH condition associated with FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, and the SRO will implement FR-P.1 actions.

RO 1 CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED SRO IF RHR pump injecting greater than 1350 gpm to RCS THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-1,Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

EXAMINER: The Reactor Coolant Pumps may have been stopped by the BOP during performance of E-O, Appendix A, prior to reaching this step in E-1.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP}.

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-i, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and SRO determination of time for hot leg recirc 4 CHECK SIG pressures BOP All SIG pressures controlled or rising All S/Gs pressures greater than 120 psig 5 MAINTAIN Intact SIG NR levels

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP

b. CONTROL intact SIG levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50% ADV].

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

• SIG discharge monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 20 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-1.3. lA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE l.-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

• CHECK low flow lights not lit [M-l0].

BOP

• Locally CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

When dispatched, the AUO will report back that the low analyzer temp lights are NOT LIT.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN:

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

• CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm RO UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

IF copldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564° F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

RO c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves l-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

-+ 10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

BOP

• 1-HS-77-410.

• 1-HS-77-411.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

RO

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 7,8,9 and 10 Page 21 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-i .3. lA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO

a. ** GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

12. RESET SI and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

13. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

RD

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

13. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO

a. ENSURE RHR pumps RUNNING. **

GO TO Step 16.

BOP 14. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs controlled or rising.

RD 15. CHECK RCS pressure stable or dropping.

16. MONITOR electrical board status:

a. CHECK offsite power available.

BOP b. CHECK all shutdown boards ENERGIZED by offsite power.

c. PLACE any unloaded D/G in standby USING SOI-82 Diesel Generators.

17. INITIATE BOP realignment:

BOP

• REFER TO AD 1-17, Turbine Trip.

18. INITIATE 480V board room breaker alignments USING the following:

• Appendix A (E-1), CLA Breaker Operation.

BOP

• Appendix B (E-1), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

• Appendix C (E-1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

• Appendix D (E-1), 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation.

19. DETERMINE if hydrogen igniters should be energized:

a. CHECK hydrogen analyzers in service.

b. CHECK cntmt hydrogen less than 5% [M-10j.

BOP

c. ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [M-10]:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.

• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 22 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-i, and a transition to ES-i .3. 1 A-A and i B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to

. actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

20. ENSURE RHR available for cntmt sump recirculation:

• Power to at least one operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

SRO

• Cntmt sump valve 1-FCV-63-72 or i-FCV-63-73 to operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

21. EVALUATE plant equipment status:

SRO

• REFER TO Appendix E (E-1), Equipment Evaluation.

22. CHECK Aux Bldg radiation for loss of RCS inventory outside cntmt:

a. Area monitor recorders 1 -RR-90-1 and 0-RR-90-1 2A Aux Bldg BOP points NORMAL.

b. Vent monitor recorder 0-RR-90-101 NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

SRO 23. NOTIFY Chemistry of event status and plant conditions.

24. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

SRO

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

24. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO

a. IF RHR pump injecting to RCS, THEN **

GO TO Step 25.

25. PREPARE for switchover to RHR cntmt sump:

a. ENSURE power restored to 1-FCV-63-1 USING Appendix C SRO (E-1), i-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

b. CHECK RWST level less than 34%.

c. ** GO TO ES-I .3, Transfer to Containment Sum p.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ES-I .3,Transfer to Containment Sump.

CAUTION

• ECCS flow to RCS must be maintained at all times to ensure adequate core cooling.

• Transfer to recirculation mode may cause high radiation in the Auxiliary Building.

NOTE

• Performance of this Instruction is a higher priority than performance of the FRs because it maintains ECCS pump suction.

• The transfer sequence should be performed without delay. Implementation of FR5 is delayed UNTIL transfer sequence is completed or transitioned from.

RO 1.ENSURE both RHR pumps RUNNING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 23 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-i, and a transition to ES-i .3. 1 A-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ESTABLISH CCS to RHR heat exchangers [M-27Bj:

a. ENSURE RHR heat exchanger outlet valves 1-FCV-70-153 and 1 -FCV-70-1 56 OPEN.

b. CLOSE SFP heat exchanger A CCS supply O-FCV-70-1 97.

BOP c. ENSURE CCS flow to ESF supply header and greater than 5000 gpm.

. Train A: 1-Fl-70-159

. Train B: 1-FI-70-165

d. MONITOR level in CCS surge tanks.

RO 3. CHECK RWST level less than 34%.

RO 4. CHECK cntmt sump level greater than or equal to 16.1 %.

5. ENSURE automatic switchover complete:

a. ENSURE cntmt sump valves 1-FCV-63-72 and 1-FCV-63-73 RO OPEN.

Report from the field is that 1-FCV-63-72 and 1-FCV-63-73 cannot be opened manually.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF at least one flow path from cntmt sump to the RCS can NOT be established or maintained, THEN ** GO TO ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1,Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

CAUTION IF RWST level drops to 8%, then any ECCS or cntmt spray pump taking suction from the RWST must be stopped.

1. CHECK cntmt sump recirculation equipment AVAILABLE:

• Power to RHR pumps AVAILABLE.

SRO

• RHR pumps AVAILABLE.

• Cntmt sump valves AVAILABLE.

2. IF RHR sump recirculation restored during performance of this SRO Instruction, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

RO 3. MONITOR RWST level greater than 8%.

EXAMINER: Containment pressure is expected to be less than 2.0 psig when this step is reached.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 24 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1 and a transition to ES-i .3. lA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 WOG Critical Task List for ECA-1. 1, B.

Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST oufflow.

Makeup is added to the RWST to extend the time the SI pumps and containment spray pumps (if operating) can take suction from the RWST and provide core cooling to the RCS.

• Containment spray will initially be reduced to conserve RWST level (ECA-1. I Step 4).

• Containment spray will be aligned to recirculate the Containment Sump to the RWST.

Critical 4. DETERMINE cntmt spray pump alignment and operation:

Task 2 a. CHECK cntmt spray pump suction aligned to RWST.

b. MONITOR cntmt press, and DETERMINE number of spray pumps required:

CONTAINMENT PRESS SPRAY PUMPS REQUIRED Greater than 13.5 psig 2 2.0 psig to 13.5 psig 1 Less than 2.0 psig 0

c. CHECK number of spray pumps running equal to number RO required.

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

STOP and PULL TO LOCK any cntmt spray pump NOT required, AND CLOSE discharge valve(s) 1-FCV-72-2 and/or 1-FCV-72-39 for pump(s) stopped.

Manually OPERATE spray pumps as required.

d. DO NOT OPERATE cntmt spray pumps as required by FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure, UNTIL either of the following:

• Cntmt spray pump suction aHgned to cntmt sump.

OR

• RWST makeup sufficient to support cntmt spray pump operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 7,8,9andlO Page 25 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-i .3. iA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time j Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be aligned to cntmt sump:

a. CHECK spray pumps RUNNING.

b. ENSURE ERCW system operating requirements met:

• REFER TO Appendix B (ECA-i .1), ERCW Operation.

c. WHEN cntmt sump level greater than 28% [36% ADV], THEN RO ALIGN suction to cntmt sump:

1) STOP both spray pumps, and PLACE in PULL TO LOCK.

2) CLOSE suction from RWST 1-FCV-72-21 and 1-FCV-72-22.

3) OPEN cntmt spray suction from sump 1-FCV-72-44.

4) OPEN cntmt spray suction from sump 1 -FCV-72-45.

RO 6. MONITOR cntmt press less than 2.0 psig.

RO 7. ENSURE cntmt spray pumps in A-AUTO.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restore ECCS equipment.

8. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

9. RESET SI interlock to RHR sump suction AUTO-swapover:

RO

• 1-HS-63-72D.

• 1-HS-63-73D.

Critical Task 2 WOG Critical Task List for ECA-1. 1, B.

Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow.

Makeup is added to the RWST to extend the time the SI pumps and containment spray pumps (if operating) can take suction from the RWST and provide core cooling to the RCS.

• Containment spray will initially be reduced to conserve RWST level (ECA-1. I Step 4).

• Containment spray will be aligned to recirculate the Containment Sump to the RWST.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 26 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-1.3. lA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 10. INITIATE makeup to RWST:

Task 2 a. NOTIFY Radprot/Chemistry to evaluate radiation level of water in cntmt sump for potential transfer to RWST.

b. NOTIFY TSC to evaluate transferring water to RWST from one of the following:

• Appendix C (ECA-1 .1), Cntmt Spray Recirc to RWST Alignment.

SRO Spent fuel pit.

• Holdup tank.

• Normal RWST fill USING SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control The TSC will report that ECA-1.1, Appendix C will be used to transfer water from the sump to the RWST using Train A containment spray.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1,Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation Appendix C, CNTMT SPRAY RECIRC TO RWST ALIGNMENT.

Critical 1. IF Train A cntmnt spray is to be aligned to recirc to RWST, THEN Task PERFORM the following:

a. NOTIFY RADPROT of RWST alignment.

b. RESET Cntmt Spray signal.

RO

c. PLACE cntmt spray pump A in PULL-TO-LOCK.

d. CLOSE 1 -FCV-72-22, RWST TO CS PMP A SUCTION.

e. CLOSE 1 -FCV-72-39, CNTMT SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT.

f. PLACE ERCW on Train A CS Heat Exchanger per Appendix B.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1,Lossof RHR Sump Recirculation Appendix B, ERCW OPERATION.

BOP 1. ENSURE at least two ERCW pumps running on each train.

2. ALIGN ERCW to Train A cntmt spray:

BOP

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-125 CNTMT SPRAY HX IA INLET.

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-126 CNTMT SPRAY HX 1A RETURN.

3. ALIGN ERCW to Train B cntmt spray:

BOP

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-123 CNTMT SPRAY HX lB INLET.

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-124 CNTMT SPRAY HX lB RETURN.

4. IF supply flow less than 5200 gpm on 1-Fl-67-136 CS HX 1A SUP FLOW and 1-Fl-67-122 CS HX lB SUP FLOW THEN ADJUST SRO CCS heat exchanger outlet valves as necessary, and CONSULT TSC.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 27 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-1.3. IA-A and lB-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1,Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation Appendix C, CNTMT SPRAY RECIRC TO RWST ALIGNMENT and complete the alignment of the containment spray to the RWST alignment.

g. OPEN 1-ISV-72-502, CNTMT SPRAY TEST LINE ISOLATION

[A5U/715 BIT rm].

h. OPEN I -ISV-72-503, CNTMT SPRAY HDR A TEST LINE RD ISOLATION [A5V/719 BIT rm].

i. OPEN 1-FCV-72-44, CNTMT SUMP TO CS PMP A SUCT.

j. START cntmt spray pump A.

k. ENSURE flow to RWST on 1-FI-72-34, CS PMP A FLOW.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1,Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation beginning at Step 11, where actions were suspended while Appendix B and C were completed.

BOP 1 1. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

12. MAINTAIN Intact SIG NR levels:

a. MONITOR Intact SIG NR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP

b. CONTROL intact SIG levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50% ADVJ.

13. MONITOR shutdown margin during RCS cooldown:

• REFER TO 1-SI-0-10, Shutdown Margin OR REACTINW Computer Program.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8, 9 and 10 Page 28 of 45 Event

Description:

Large loss-of-coolant-accident occurs. Requires entry into E-0, E-1, and a transition to ES-i .3. iA-A and 1 B-B safety injection pumps fail to start automatically on the safety injection signal. Automatic sump swapover fails to actuate. Attempts to manually position valves are unsuccessful.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. INITIATE RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a. WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-I 1), THEN

• BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

b. MAINTAIN T-cold cooldown less than 100°F in any I hour.

c. DUMP steam to condenser from Intact SIGs.

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

c. IF condenser NOT available, THEN Manually or locally DUMP steam from Intact S/G:

BOP

• USE Intact SIG PORV, OR

• USE TD AFW pump supply from Intact SIG.

OR

• RESET Phase A, AND USE Intact SIG blowdown.

IF Intact SIG NOT available, THEN USE Faulted SIG.

Main steam isolation valves are closed due to high containment pressure, so steam dumps are unavailable. The crew will use the SG PORVs for the cooldown.

15. CHECK ECCS in service:

• Any SI pump RUNNING, OR

• Flow thru BIT, OR Any RHR pump RUNNING in ECCS mode

15. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF EGGS NOT in service, THEN **

GO TO Step 25.

25. CHECK makeup flow adequate to maintain RCS:

a. RVLIS greater than 60% with NO RCP running, OR RVLIS greater than 63% with ANY RCP running.

b. Incore T/Cs stable or dropping.

EXAMINER: When Step 25 is addressed, inform crew that another crew will continue from this point, and terminate the scenario.

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 29 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-D Rev 28 I Step I I ActioniExpec:ed Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA I:Ec)

Page 1 Df 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION ENSURE POBsOPEN: OPEt4 manually.

• PCB 5084.

• PCB 5088.

2 ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESThBLISH at least one train Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING. AE\1 oporation.

+ ID FW pump RUNNING.

+ LCVs iii AUTO, iF cuiliulled ii MANUAL

3. ENSURE MEW isolalion: Manually CLOSE valves and

• MEW isoation and bypass STOP pumps, as necessary.

isolation valves CLOSED.

IF any valves can NOT be closed,

• MEV reg and bypass reg valves THEN CLOSED. CLOSE #1 hoator outlct valvos.

a MPP A and B TRIPPED.

a Standby MFP STOPPED.

• Cond deinin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cond booster punps TRIPPED.

14 o128

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 30 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev28 I Step I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENCIX A (E-O)

Page 2 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in

• RWST outlets 1 -LCV-62-1 35 each set alignel.

and I-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

• VCT outlots 1-LCV-62-1 32 and i-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Criarging l--V-b2-9U and 1 -FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1-FC/-63-25 anci aligned, and flow thrL BIT.

1 -FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Fbw thru BIT.

1. RCS pressure f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

greater than 1 §50 psig.

IF RCS press drops tD less than 1 CiO psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

15 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 31 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 3 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 5 CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent t101 signal.

a. Phase A isolation:

• Train A GREEN. Ivianually CLOSE valves and

• Train B GREEN. dampers as necessary

b. Cntmt vent isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN 16 of 28

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 32 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page4oflO EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP] 1) ENSURE Phase B aCtuated.

• Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray

• Cntmt press less than 28 psig. actuated.

3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump contrds OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntrnt [ADVj setpoints where provided.

17 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 33 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 j Step Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-D)

Page 5 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 7 CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor

• S/G blowdown rad recorder IMMEDIATELY.

1-RR-90-12D NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2].

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-1 19 NORMAL prior to trip [M-1 2].

• 1-RR-fl-1fl nd 1-RP-91)-112 raciation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2].

• S!G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL {M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

8 ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START DIGs 18of28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 34 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 6 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

9. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

FCO-30-146A.

• ECO-30-146B.

• ECO-30-157A.

• ECO-30-157B.

10. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as RUNNING, one on each shutdown necessary.

board preferred.

11. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be aligned to OPEN to running D/Gs. running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

12. ENSURE CCS FIX C Vianually OPEN O-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, to position A.

0-FCV..67-1 52, is open to position A.

19 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 35 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O DV 28 Step I I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Poge 7 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 13 CLOSE CCS HX C DISCHTO HDRA, O-FC\f-67-1 44.

14. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans OPEN

• EGTS fans RUNNING. dampers.

• ENSURE dampers OPEN VERIEY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

15. ENSURE ces pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as

• lA-A CCS pump. necessary.

- 1 B-B 005 pump.

• C-S OR 2B-B 005 pump NOTE

• The Upper and Lower Cntmt rad monitors sampling pumps should be shutdown if the sample flowpath is isolated.

The fo lowing equipment is located on 1 -M-9.

16. CHECK CNTh*IT PURGE fans STOP fans and STOPP ED: PLACE handswitch in PU LL-TO-LOC K.

20 cf 28

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 36 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFET( INJECTION Rev 23 Step I Action;Expected ResDonse Response Nct Ob:ained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 8 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

17. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXHfEns STOPfans and STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading PLACE handswitc[i in dampers CLOSED: FULL-TO-LOCK. manually CLOSE darnper&

13. ENSURE AB CEN SUPPLY and EXH STOP fans and Tans STOPPED. PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE

• Dirnpeis i-HS-30-158 arid 2-HS-30-270 rerriairi open duiirig A5L

19. ENSURE AB +/-N SUP & XH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED.

20. ENSURE MCR& SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.

• FCV-3i-4 21 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 37 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 9 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERLFICATION 21 ENSURE at least one CB EMER Manually START fan.

CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A.

OR Fan B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-8. OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one OR damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-7, OPEN.

22. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS Manually START fan.

fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, OR FAN B-B RUNNING,

• FCO-31-6, OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one OR damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-5, OPEN.

22 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 38 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-D Rev 28 Step ( Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 10 of W EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

23. ENSURE Control Building fans Manual[i STOP fans.

STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY and NOTIFY TSC if any EXH FANS AND dampers. damper NOT CLOSED.

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST FAN AND dampers.

24. INITIATE Appendix B.

23 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 23 Step ActionfExpected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX B (E-O)

Page 1 of 1 PHASE B PIPE BREAK CONTINGENCIES CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs; (MISS P i-XX-55-6C. -GD)

THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE i-FCV-32-iiO CLOSED. DISPATCH AUD to perForm (dSP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT Bi.

[Atrain, window 1 31

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-1Q7 CLOSED DISPATCH AUO to perForm (CISP 1-XX-55-GE)

- ATTACHF1ENT 62.

[A train. window 431

4. ENSURE 1 -FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perForm (CISP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT 63.

[A -train, window 731

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perForm (CISP 1-XX-55-6F)

- ATTACHMENT 64.

[B -train, window 741 24 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Acflons Form ES-D-2 Page 40 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIF OR SAFETY INJECTION ev 2C

?JTACHMENT 81 (E 0)

Page of 1 CONTROL AIR ISOLATION

1. CLOSE 0- SV 1013 CONTRDL AIR EL 713 A6 hD ISDL

[A6?S EL. 1 3] (chain operated ehind Fuel anc Waste I-landing BcE A).

2. IF 0-[SV-32-013 CANNOT BE CLOSED, ThFN:

OPEN 9d DISCONNECT C&SS air compre3or breakers:

a O-BKR-32-25 4BQV SD BD 1A2-A, C/3D b; O-BKR-32-25 - 430V SD BD lB 1-B, C/3D C) O-OKR-32-27 -$30V UX BLDG COM DD. C/GC d O-BKR-32-1E00 480V IJRB BLDG COM 3D. CII3C 25 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Re. 28 AIIACHMENI 132 (E-C)

Pige 1 o 1 ERCW ISOLATION

1. UNLOCK AND CLOSE 1-ISV-67-523D LOWER CNTMT /LNT CLR 10 &ID ERCW SUP ISOL P2UI692} U-i penetratIon room Norrn 01 AD DiC Criise Coo er 1 B-B in overhead) 26 o 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 42 of 45 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 ATTACHMENT B3 (E-O)

Pzge 1 of I CCS RETURN ISOLATION

1. CLOSE i-ISV-70-T0O RCP OIL COOLER CCS RETURN ISOLATION

[A4N EL. 710 u-i Penetration Room] (approximately 10 ft. North of Penetration Room Cooler 1 B-B on mezzanine above PHR Sump Valve Roorri 27 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 43 of 45 ATTACHMENT B4 (E-i])

Page of I CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

1. CLOSE 1-SV-70-516 ECTOR ULLDING CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

[413/I EL. 737] (Bohind EIDvtor apprcximtDIy 2 IL wosi or mezzanine above GA CCS Heal Echanger 2 01 2b

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page 44 of 45 WBN LOSS OF RHR SUMP RECIRC ULATON EA1 .1 Re 11 PPENDiX (ECA-i.1i Page I c1 I ERCW OPFRAT[ON

1. EN SURE tle o ERCW pumps nnin cn e1, :rin.

2. ALIGN ERC to Tra i A cntri pry:

OPEN 1FOV-7-12 CNTMTP!AYHX 1A IrLT.

OPEN 1-FOV-ET-12 CNTIr 3AY HX LA TIJRN

3. ALIGN EC to Tra 2 cntri: Epay:

OPEN -FOV-7-123CNTMTSKHX lB lr\LET.

OPEN i-FD  ?-12 CNTtC SY HX T E TIJWL

4. IF uppIy r]o es th&,. ELZO gpm on -Ft-37-1SO C -IX 1A, 3LP FLCW ad 1-EI-i-122 CS HX 2S LIP FLOW THE N ADJUST OCS heat :ha erutet Ies as neceEsar. a.d CGNSULT TSC.

3 cfS4

rApendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 45 of 45 WN LG33 O RHR 3UM RECIRCU1ATOSI ECA1.1 eh 11 APPENDIX C Fgei ot:

CNTMT SPRAY RECIRC TO 1 R1 S T ALIGNMENT TRAIN A

1. ir Frin ? ntnn i L çred F rr THEN PER FQM .h ftIILIIIy.

. NO1IrY DPOT o RVi rint.

. REEr CrLq: pmy :i P1 Af cnti: ;p pump A i PULL-TO-Lcc.

. CtO 1:C72_22. RA TO CS SUCTION.

CLQ8 1-CV-7-. CNTM WA HD A TO CtTMT

f. PLACE c Tri A DS Heat Exiarger erApenx 3.

. OPEN 1-137-72-302. CNTMT SP:AYEST L NE ISO N

EL15 EIT rn.

. 1J 1-l-/-U. .r:Tril SRi HJ- IEi ]fdz i:LIicJ.

v1 BIT rm.

OPEN 1-FCV-724, CNTMT 3MP TO CS FMP A SJCT.

START cnti: spay cuirp A.

! ENSURE i1w tc.VT c -FI-72-S4, CS PMPA FLO.

32 Gf

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST 3 Page of SM US/MCR Unit Q UO Unit Off-going Name AUO Station Q STA (STA Function) On-coming Name-Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

None

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) 1-S1-68-34

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Power is stable at 1.66 x 10-4% power, Mode 2. Source range channels have been blocked (P-6). Continue with reactor startup using 00-2, Reactor Startup, to 1-2% power and then start the 1 A main feedwater pump. Currently at Step 24 of GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup. Rod withdrawal is being conducted per SOI-85.0l, Control Rod Drive and Indication System. SOI-2&3.0l. Condensate and Feedwater System, Section 5.10, MFP lA Operation, is signed off through step 41.7. ECP was 100 steps on Bank D. RCS boron concentration is currently 1620 ppm.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift LI A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

LI A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnonnal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

LI Standing Orders [I LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUO5) LI PER review (N/A for AUOs)

LI TACFs (N/A for AUOs) LI Operator workarounds, burdens El linmediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-l [08-03-2009]

SHW TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST 3 Page of SM Q US/MCR Unit -

UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) 1 -SI-68-34

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Power is stable at 1.66 x 10-4% power, Mode 2. Source range channels have been blocked (P-6). Continue with reactor startup using GO-2, Reactor Startup, to 1-2% power and then start the IA main feedwater pump. Currently at Step 24 of GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup. Rod withdrawal is being conducted per SOI-85.01, Control Rod Drive and Indication System. SOI-2&3.01. Condensate and Feedwater System, Section 5.10, MFP 1 A Operation, is signed off through step 41.7. ECP was 100 steps on Bank D. RCS boron concentration is currently 1620 ppm.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift tumover:

U Standing Oxlers U LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) U PER review (N/A for AUOs)

U TACFs (N/A for AUOs) U Operator workarounds, burdens U Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift U A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-l [08-03-2009]

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar NRC Exam I Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: I August 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: 100% power, MDL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover: Train A/Channel I Work Week. Reduce power to 95%, to support removing the 1A CBP from service after assuming shift. IA DG is out-of-service for planned maintenance on the air start system. Expected return to service in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.8.1 .B was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. SR 3.8.1.1 .was performed 45 minutes after LCD entry. The air start system problem has been isolated to the 1A DG. The National Weather Service has issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties for the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a N-BOP Reduce power using GO-4,Normal Power Operations, to support R-RO shutdown 1A Condensate Booster Pump.

2 rx05a 33 I-RD PZR level transmitter, i-LT-68-339 fails to approximately 33%, requiring TS-SRO entry into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 rxlla 0 I-RD Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-1-73, fails low, requiring entry into AOl TS-SRO 2,Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

4 rxO9b 1-BOP Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-i-lOa fails low, requiring entry into AOl-1 6,Loss of Normal Feedwater.

5 cco7a C-BOP 1A CCS pump shaft shears and lB CCS pump fails to auto start. Aol-i 5, cc03b Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), entry is required.

• 6 th05c M-All SG 3 tube leak, requiring entry into AOl-33,Steam Generator Tube Leak, and a rapid plant shutdown using AOl-39,Rapid Load Reduction.

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation.

Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

7 ed06a C-BOP lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential lockout relay operation at the time of the reactor trip. Requires performance of AOl 43.01, Loss of Unit I Train A Shutdown Boards, during performance of EOPs.

8 ms04c C-BOP #3 MSIV fails to close.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4- Summary Initial Condition 100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover Train A/Channel I Work Week. Reduce power to 95%, to support removing the 1A CBP from service after assuming shift. 1A DG is out-of-service for planned maintenance on the air start system. Expected return to service in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.8.1 .B was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. SR 3.8.1 .1 .was performed 45 minutes after LCO entry. The air start system problem has been isolated to the 1A DG. The National Weather Service has issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties for the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Event 1 Reduce power using GO-4,Normal Power Operations, to support shutdown 1A Condensate Booster Pump.

Event 2 The pressurizer level transmitter selected for level control, 1-LT-68-339, slowly lowers to approximately 33%. The SRO enters and directs the actions of AOl-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. (Letdown isolation will NOT occur, since level remains above the 17% setpoint.) The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Condition X, LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Function 13, Condition A.

Event 3 Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-1-73, fails low, causing the T-reference input to the Rod Control System to indicate a power mismatch between reactor and turbine power. Rods will insert requiring the operator to place rod control in manual. AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2,Continuous Rod Withdrawal/Insertion. The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation, Function 16.f, Condition S.

Event 4 Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-i-i OA fails low, resulting in a steam flow-feed flow mismatch signal which throttles closed SG 2 main feedwater regulating, resulting in a SG 2 level drop. The operator must place SG 2 main feedwater regulating valve 1-FIC-3-48 in manual to recover from the level drop. The SRO enters and directs the actions of AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SG 2 main feedwater regulating valve will be returned to automatic.

Event 5 1A CCS pump shaft shears and 1 B CCS pump fails to auto start on low header pressure.

The SRO enters and directs the actions of AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). The SRO evaluates conditions and enters Tech Spec LCO 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS) Condition A.

Event 6 SG 3 tube leak develops, requiring entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction. SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Event 6 lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation at the time of the reactor trip. The board failure requires performance of AOl-43.01, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, during the performance of the EOPs.

Event 7 #3 MSIV fails to close. All attempts to close the MSIV will be unsuccessful. This will require specific E-3, RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions to be performed to address steam generator isolation.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Critical Task Summary Critical Task I Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to from WOG Critical ECA-3. 1 occurs.

Task List for E-3 Once an affected steam generator has been identified, it is isolated from the intact steam A. generators to limit radiological releases and as a necessary step toward stopping primary-to-secondary leakage. Feedwater flow is also terminated to the affected steam generator after level has returned into the narrow range. This minimizes the possibility of steam generator overfilL Critical Task 2 Isolate secondary pathways to limit depressurization and contamination by initiating Attachment 2 (E-3), Steamline Isolation (MCR), and Attachment 3 (E-3), Steam/me Isolation (Local) prior to initiating RCS cooldown.

Isolation is performed to maintain ruptured SG pressurized during the cooldown in order to allow subsequent RCS depressurization to ruptured SG pressure while maintaining RCS subcooling.

Critical Task 3 Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not unnecessarily from WOG Critical occur. Properly identifies, establishes cooldown, and maintains temperature at target Task List for E-3 temperature in accordance with E-3, Steps 17 and 18.

B.

Critical Task 4 Depressurize RCS to meet SI termination criteria before E-3, Steam Generator Tube from WOG Critical Rupture, Step 31 criteria are exceeded.

Task List for E-3 RCS pressure is decreased to stop primary-to-secondary leakage and establish indicated D. pressurizer level greater than 15%.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 344 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate lC# 344.

c. Right click on IC# 344.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 344.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value mux_07c028 197-a dg la-a mode selector in maintenance M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Alarm Alarm eg3a diesel generator failure to start dg 1 a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active mux_07c031 200-a dg la-a controls disconnected M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Alarm Alarm ms04c msiv fails to close fcv-l-22 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active mux_07c040 195-c dg la-a start air press lo [ps-82-162] M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Alarm Alarm cc03b ccs pump lb-b auto start inhibit M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 1 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-57-46a-1 dsl gen la-a to sd-bd 1 a-a bkr (green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff 00:00:00 hs-46-l dsl gen la-a to sd-bd 1 a-a bkr (green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff 00:00:00 ed06a loss of 6.9kv shutdown board bus la-a M 19 00:00:10 00:00:00 Active InActive rx05a pzr level transmitter fails to position chnl 1-68-339 M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 33 60.5077 rxl la impulse pressure transmitter 1-73 fail to position M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 5 91.0115 rxo9b main steam flow transmitter failure ft-1-lOa M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 20 86.0676 cc07a ccs pump la-a shaft break M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive th05c steam generator tube failure sg #3 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 1.5 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. Place RED HOLD NOTICE tags on IA-A Diesel Generator.

7. Ensure the indicating lights on IA-A Diesel Generator.

8. ENSURE IA-A Diesel Generator.

9. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30.

10. Place simulator in FREEZE.

Page 2 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

11. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) MOL (Middle of Life) is updated and on the desk, and that the MOL placards are on I-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

Item 3

• AFD -11.8  % -2.3  % 5.8  %

Lower Band Target Upper Band

-2.7 Actual

• Control Rods Auto Manual 220 steps Control Bank D1/D2 Item 4 Negative Positive None 1-CCP A 1-CCP B 8 C 748 ppm Item 5 Current RCS CB: 748 ppm Current fluid inside the blender is:

Acid Water Blended PW flow rate 70 gpm 1-FC-62-142, dial setting 35%

BAflow rate 8gpm 1-FC-62-139 dial setting 21%

6. Boric Acid (BA) and Primary Water (PW) volumes for the following changes:

1°FTavg increase 373 gal PW 1°F Tavg decrease 46 gal BA 10% Downpower @ 5%/hr 145 gal BA 50% Downpower @ 5%/hr 440 gal BA 1000 MW (85%) Runback 179 gal BA 950 MW (80%) Runback 262 gal BA 900 MW (75%) Runback 341 gal BA 790 MW or 800 MW Runback 487 gal PW

12. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 3 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

I nla Shutdown of IA Condensate Booster Pump.-

ROLE PLAY: Refer to SOl-2&3.01, Condensate and Feedwater System, Section 7.2, Shutdown Condensate Booster Pumps, (attached as Pages 8 through 10) and perform local actions as requested.

2 2 PZR level transmitter, 1-LT-68-339 fails to approximately 33%, requiring entry into AOl-20.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the failed level transmitter. When requested, state that the IMs will be informed that lMl-160.001 needs to be performed to trip the associated bistables.

3 3 Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-i -73, fails low, requiring entry into AOl-2.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the failed pressure transmitter. When requested, state that the IMs will be informed that lMl-160.001 needs to be performed bypass the pressure transmitter inputs.

4 4 Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-i-i Oa fails low, requiring entry into AOl-I 6 ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the failed flow transmitter.

Page 4 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No.

5 5 1A CCS pump shaft shears and lB CCS pump fails to auto start. AOI-15 entry is required.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge request to investigate cause of IA-A CCS pump trip. Report back that the pump motor has signs of an electrical fault (scorch marks, odor of burnt insulation in the area.)

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, acknowledge request to look for relay operation on the supply breaker for the IA-A CCS pump. Report back that the pump breaker has tripped on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the IA-A CCS pump. An additional package will be i prepared to determine why the lB-B CCS pump failed to automatically start on low header pressure.

Page 5 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

6 SG 3 tube leak, requiring entry into AOl-33, and a rapid plant shutdown using AOl-39. SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, acknowledge the request for samples to be drawn and analyzed for all steam generators. Wait 10 minutes, then call back and report that the #3 SG has higher activity than the other steam generators.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Radiation Protection, acknowledge the request for surveys to be performed on the steam lines and main steam lines. Wait 10 minutes, then call back and report that the areas around #3 SG have higher activity than the other steam generators.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO repeat back the request to perform E 3, Attachment 3, STEAMLINE ISOLATION (LOCAL). Report back after 5 minutes that Attachment 3 local actions are complete.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO repeat back the request to check that the HP warming valves are closed locally (due to loss of power condition. Wait 5 minutes and report back that the warming valves are closed.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Outside Routine A UO repeat back the request to perform E-3, Appendix D, MINIMIZE SECONDARY SYSTEM CONTAMINATION. Report back after 10 minutes that Attachment 3 local actions are complete.

7 10 lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential lockout relay operation.

seconds ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back request to investigate the after lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board, report that the differential lockout relay has operated, and that there reactor is extensive damage to the board. There is no fire.

trip ROLE PLAY: When Contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, repeat back request to align BATA to the B BA Pump.

• ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work ControI, acknowledge the request to have a maintenance team go to the lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board to assess the damage, and to plan repairs.

Page 6 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

6 19 #3MSlVfailstoclose.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back request to perform Attachment I of E-3 to close the #3 MSIV. Enter override msr26c to place the aux control room switch in the AUX position. Report to the crew that Attachment I of E-3 is complete. (MSIV will remain open for the remainder of the exam scenario.

Page 7 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions WBN Cordensate And Feedwater Systeri SOl-2&3.1 Unit 01OI Pacje 117 of 23 INITL&LS 7.2 Shutdown Condensate Booster Puiips CAlm ON Prior t chutdown of Cndnte Boter Pump, if I PCV 3 10 i in opertion 1 t shoiki be MOMENTALY CWSED by raising the setjint oil -FIC-3-40 t 1200 psia untfl after pumps are stopped and flow stabilized! and then. returned to its previous settng (90C 1200 psia) as ne&Jed.

NOTE Prcauin 3.OF.2hould bo r-icwcd prior to ronioVr i CBF from cr:icc.

1] FNSlJPFIr:tri CA4iJX oh PlJP n P-AL Ji A. 1-HS iO5. A ...X OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP A 1

. 1.-HS..2-107A. AUX OIL PMP CNDS 6.STR PMP B C. 1-H2-1O, AUX OIL PMP CNDS TR PMP C 2] PLACE selected CBP handwtch :o STCP. AFID HOLD lJt..TlL respectve uctEoI, valve starb t CLCSE

1_M_3]:

A. 1-HS-2-97A. CtJDS BSTI. PMP A

. 1-HS-2-91A. CtJDS 5ST. PMP 3 C. 1-HS-2-54A. CNDS PMP D Page 8 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions WB N Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.Oi Unit I Rev. 0109 Paje 118 of 233 Date______ INITIALS 7.2 Shutdown Condensate Booster Pumps Ccontinued) 3] ENSURE suctn valve CLCSED i-M-3]:

A. i-FCV-2-94 E1-HS-2-94A], CNDS STR PMP A SUCTION JLV

. 1-FCV-2-S7 1-HS-2-BTAI, CNDS BST PMP 5 SUCTION VLV C i-FCV-2-1 1-HS-2B1AJ, CNDS ESTR PMP C SUCTION JLV F4] LOCALLY OBSERVE pump rotation stops.

5] IF pump reverse rotaton ecure. THEN CLOSE se:ected Condeneate Booster Pump discharqe vave:

A. 1 -ISV-2-O7, CONDENSATE BSTR PUMP 1A DISCHARGE ISOL T7G?65j.

. 1-ISV-2-6]8. CONDENSATE STR PUMP 1 DISCHARGE ISOL T7Ff685]

C. 1 -ISV-2-609, CONDENSATE STR PUMP iC DISCHARGE ISOL T7Fi6.5]

Page 9 of 10

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions WBN Condensate And Feedwter System SOI-2&3cil Unit I Rev. 0109 Page 119 of 233 Date INITIALS 7,2 Shutdown Condensate Boaster Pumps (cGntinued) 6] CLOSE repective C5P Oil [-ix CW SuppI N/A valves not used ::

Condes.ate Booster Pump IA NOMENCLATURE LOCATION POSITION UNID PERF Nfl1AL CBP OIL CDOLE 1A 7Gei5 CLOSED 1-IS V-24-l 1 INLET ISOL Coidens.at Booster Pump lB NOMENC LATURE LOCPTION POSITION IJNID PERF NAL OBP CL COOL lb TTF655 CLOSED lISV-24-7l INLET IO L Conde.at Booster Pump IC NOMENCLATURE LOCATION POSITION UNID PERF NIT1AL CBP CL COOLER 1C RC/ T7F6S5 CLOSED l-ISV-24-7D INLET ICL 7] REPEAT Steps T2[1} thru T2[1 as rfeceseary to shutdown remaining C5Ps).

8] IF stopping the AJX OIL PUMP ThEH PLACE selected C.5P AUX CII PUMP in STOP P IJLL-TC-LOCK:

A. 1-HS-.2-1O5A. AUX OIL PMP CNDS 551R PMP A

. i-H5-2-107A. AUX OIL PMP ONDS 5STR PMP 5 C 1-HS-2-109A. AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP C 9] Section 7.2. Shutdo%n Cordensate Bocster Punis complete.

Page 10 of 10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 1 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4,Normal Power Operations, to support shutdown 1A Condensate Booster Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Controlling load reductions, Rod position and boron concentration will ensure Axial Flux remains within allowed limits. (For example, Boric acid addition can be set up to control rate of Rod insertion during a down power to control I within the required limits)

[12] IF desired to operate in IMP IN, THEN OBTAIN Unit SRO BOP concurrence to operate in IMP IN AND PLACE Turbine in IMP IN Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7, Minor Boration.

NOTES

1) Section 6.7, may be reproduced, laminated, displayed, reused, etc. as desired.

2) Minor Boration is defined as the addition of Boric Acid done several times each shift early in core life, to compensate for burnable poison burn-up, and maintain Tavg on program.

[1] ENSURE 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATER C [1-M-4], is ON, to RD equalize RCS-Pzr CB.

[2] ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6], for desired RO flow rate.

[3) ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6], for RD required_quantity.

RD [4] PLACE 1-HS-.62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], in BOR.

[5] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to RO START.

[5.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[6] MONITOR the following parameters:

Instrument Location Parameters 1-Pl-62-122 1-M- VCT PRESS 1-Ll-62-129A 1-M- VCT LEVEL RD 1-Fl-62-139 1-M- BATO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-139 1-M-6 BA BATCH COUNTER 1-FI-62-142 1-M- PW TO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-142 1-M. PW BATCH COUNTER 1-Ll-62-238 1-M-6 BAT A LEVEL 1-Ll-62242 1-M-6 BAT C LEVEL

[7] WHEN Boration is COMPLETE, THEN PLACE 1HS-62-140B, RD VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

[8] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

RD

[8.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[9] RETURN 1-FC-62-139, BATO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired RD flow rate.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 2 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4,Normal Power Operations, to support shutdown 1A Condensate Booster Pump.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) Turbine maybe operated in IMP IN above 30% turbine load as long as IMP IN does NOT cause unit instability IMP IN will control turbine load as a percentage of impulse pressure that correlates to % load vs. % of valve opening in IMP OUT. This will allow for a more linear load ascension

2) Turbine load change may be stopped by depressing the HOLD push button, using VPL, or by depressing the MANUAL push button

[13] INITIATE load reduction by PERFORMING the following on the Turbine EHC panel:

[13.1] IF during any of the following steps the REFERENCE changes in an undesired manner THEN ADJUST VPL to stop turbine load rise.

OR PUSH TURBINE MANUAL to place the turbine control mode in manual mode and proceed to section 5.6.

[13.2] PUSH REFERENCE CONTROL V (lower) button to set desired load in SETTER display.

[13.3] SET LOAD RATE as required.

[13.4] PUSH GO button.

BOP [13.5] MONITOR Generator Megawatts DROPPING.

[13.6] CHECK that load change has STOPPED when reference display equals setter OR IF desired to stop the load change, THEN STOP the load change by DEPRESSING the HOLD pushbutton

[13.7] WHEN desired to resume the load change, THEN PRESS the GO push button and continue to monitor load.

[13.8] ADJUST VALVE POSITION LIMIT to 5% above the Gov Control Indication or as needed.

[13.9] REPEAT Steps 5.3[1 3.2] to 5.3[1 3.5] to achieve desired load.

CAUTION Do not exceed load rate of 5%/minute, or 10% step change

[14] MONITOR the following during the load reduction:

[14.1] TAVG following TREF program.

RO [14.2] All RPIs, Step Counters, Loop tT, and NIS for correct power distribution, quadrant power tilts, rod insertion, rod misalignment, inoperable RPls, and inoperable rods.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 3 of 57 Event

Description:

Reduce power using GO-4,Normal Power Operations, to support shutdown IA Condensate Booster Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 4 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR level transmitter, 1-LT-68-339 fails to approximately 33%, requiring entry into AOl-20 and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

92-A PZR LEVEL HI/LO Pressurizer level transmitter, 1-LT-68-339, indicates approximately 33% level.

Letdown remains in service.

Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-LT-68-339. Reports that RO letdown isolation is NOT required.

RD May enter and take actions of ARI- 92-A PZR LEVEL HI/LO.

May place 1-HIC-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL RD to MANUAL and increase charging flow/RCP seal flow.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Level Control System.

Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from ARI 92-A, PZR LEVEL HIILO.

[1] CHECK PZR level indication on 1-M-4:

• 1-Ll-68-320 RD

• 1-LI-68-335A

. 1-Ll-68-339 RD [2] CHECK PZR level and reference level on 1-LR-68-339 [1-M-5].

[3] IF Malfunction Of Pressurizer Level Control System, THEN GO SRO TO AOI-20, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM.

RD [4] IF level is high, THEN ENSURE letdown in service.

[5] IF level is low AND PZR level control system is attempting to RD increase level to program THEN REFER TO AOI-6, SMALL REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK.

SRD [6] REFER TO Tech Specs.

Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

CAUTION Charging and letdown must be in service together. If letdown isolates or charging is lost, the other must be isolated.

1. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL:

RD

• 1-LR-68-339 (green pen).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 5 of 57 Event Descnption: PZR level transmitter, 1-LT-68-339 fails to approximately 33%, requiring entry into AOI-20 and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. CHECK if 1-XS-68-339E is selected to FAILED channel (control or backup):

. Ll-68-339, RO OR

. Ll-68-320, OR

. Ll-68-335.

RO 3. CHECK failure HIGH.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF letdown in service, THEN ** GO TO Step 4.

4. IF controlling channel failed, THEN PLACE charging valve RO controller 1-HIC-62-93A in MAN, and RESTORE level to program.

5. SELECT operable pzr level channels for control and indication

[1 -M-5]:

a. SELECT operable channels for control and backup with 1-XS-68-339E.

Since 1-Ll-68-339 has failed, the RO will select Ll-68-335 B 320 RO positIon on 1-XS-68-339E.

b. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-68-339B.

The RO confirms that LT-68-335 is selected on 1-XS-68-339B.

c. IF backup channel failed high and Letdown still in service,

_________ THEN **GO TO Step 8.

6 CHECK letdown IN SERVICE

. 1-FCV-62-69 OPEN.

RO

• 1-FCV-62-70 OPEN.

• 1-FCV-62-77 OPEN.

• Letdown orifice OPEN.

7. RESTORE pzr level control to normal:

a. MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 °F.

b. CONTROL charging and letdown to return pzr level to program.

c. ENSURE pzr control heater bank D red light LIT.

RO d. Momentarily PLACE 1-HS-68-341 H, pzr backup heater bank C, to OFF.

e. CHECK pzr program level NORMAL.

• 1-LR-68-339 (green pen)

f. RETURN charging valve controller 1-HIC-62-93A to AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 6 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR level transmitter, 1-LT-68-339 fails to approximately 33%, requiring entry into AOI-20 and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO 8. NOTIFY Work Control to remove failed channel from service.

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Function 9. Pressurizer Water Level High, Condition X:

With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

SRO

. 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Function 13. RCS Pressurizer Level, Condition A: With one or more functions with one required channel inoperable, restore the required channel to operable status within 30 days.

. 3.4.9, Pressurizer. No action required.

SRO 10. INITIATE repairs to failed instrumentlcircuitry.

SRO 11. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 7 of 57 Event

Description:

Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-i -73, fails low, requiring entry into AOl-2, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

94-A, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION 66-A, C-5 LO TURB IMPULSE PRESS ROD BLOCK 64-F, C-Il BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED cleared.

Control Rods inserting at 72 steps per minute.

Maximum demand on 1-Xl-1-33 Steam Dump Demand.

Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PT-i -73, Turbine Impulse RO Pressure transmitter low.

RO May place rod control in MANUAL to stop the unwarranted motion.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System. S Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

RO 1. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO *2. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

3. MAINTAIN T-avg on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

USE control rods.

RO OR ADJUST turbine load.

RO 4. CHECK loop T-avg channels NORMAL.

RO 5. CHECK Auct Tavg NORMAL on i-TR-68-2B.

RO 6. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

7. CHECK the following:

• Turbine impulse pressure channel i-Pl-i-73, NORMAL.

RO

• Tref and Auct Tavg NORMAL on 1 -TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1)

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE steam dumps in pressure mode as follows:

a. PLACE steam dumps to OFF.

b. PLACE mode selector HS to STEAM PRESS.

RO c. ADJUST steam dump demand to zero.

d. PLACE steam dumps to ON.

e. ENSURE controller set at 84% (1092 psig).

f. WHEN conditions allow, THEN REFER TO SOI-i .02 and PLACE steam dumps in TAVG Mode.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 8 of 57 Event

Description:

Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-1-73, fails low, requiring entry into AOl-2, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

. Power range channels.

. AFlux Indicators.

RD

• T-avg.

• Loop AT.

. Incore TCs.

. Feed flow/Steam flow.

SRO 9. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

10. REFER TO Tech Specs:

. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

SRO Function 16.f Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13, Condition S:

With one channel inoperable, verify interlock in required state for existing unit conditions within one hour or be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input (i.e., T-avg, T-ref, or NIS) change and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

11. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than SRO 15% in one hour.

EXAMINER: With 1-PT-I -73 failed low, the rod control system must remain in MANUAL.

The actions contained in steps 12-14 of AOI-22, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, are not applicable.

12. IF loop AT and loop Tavg channels were defeated due to Tavg channel failure, and Tavg channel has been repaired, THEN SRD PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, AT CHANNEL DEFEAT, and 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and select away from all AT and Tavg channels.

13. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1 °F.

SRO b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1 -M-4].

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

14. WHEN conditions allow auto pzr level control, THEN ENSURE SRD pzr level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV-62-93 in AUTO SRO 15. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenano# 4 Event# 3 Page 9 of 57 Event

Description:

Turbine impulse pressure, 1-PT-i -73, fails low, requiring entry into AOl-2, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time ] Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 4.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-i-lOa fails low, requiring entry into AOl-16.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

58-B, SG FEEDWATER FLOW HI 63-F. SG LEVEL DEVIATION Feed flow decreasing on SG 2 to match failed steam flow.

SG 2 level decreasing.

BOP Diagnose and announce the failure of 1-Fl-i-bA SC 2 Steam Flow May place SG 2 main feedwater regulating valve, 1-FIC-3-48, in BOP MANUAL and raise feedwater flow.

May place 1-PC-46-20, MFP Master Controller in MANUAL and raise BOP MFP speed.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Sub Section 3.6, MFW reg or reg bypass valve control failure.

Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.6, MFW reg or reg bypass valve control failure.

BOP 1. CONTROL failed MEW reg or bypass reg valve in MANUAL.

2. EVALUATE placing control rodsin MANUAL.

RO Since 1-PT-1-73 is failed, the rod control system is already in MANUAL.

BOP 3. CHECK MFW pumps recirc valves CLOSED.

NOTE 1.) If the main reg. valve is malfunctioning, the bypass reg. valve for the affected loop may be manually positioned as necessary up to 0.85 x 106 lb/hr flow to dampen oscillations in feedwater flow.

2.) A power tilt in the affected core quadrant may occur due to a rise in bypass flow. Flows above 84,500 Ibm/hr in the bypass line will invalidate the value of computer point Ui 118.

SRO 4. CHECK SG levels on bypass reg valve control.

• RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP GO TO Step 6.

BOP 6. CHECK S/C levels returning to PROGRAM.

BOP 7. MONITOR TDMFW Pump speed normal for current power level.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP PLACE TDMFW Pump Master Speed Control to MANUAL, THEN ADJUST speed as necessary.

NOTE A LO FW FLOW WTR HAMMER annunciation [59-C] will be received when any main feedwater flow drops to less than 0.75 x 106 lb/hr.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-1-lOa fails low, requiring entry into AOl-16.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. WHEN any SIG MEW flow drops to less than 0.55 x 106 lb/hr, BOP THEN INITIATE manual anti-water hammer actions:

CAUTION Power range N41 controls SIG I and SIG 4 MFW reg valves. N42 controls SIG 2 and SIG 3 MFW reg valves.

NOTE All power range monitors input to auctioneered high anticipatory circuit for bypass EW reg valves.

RO 9. CHECK power range N41 through N44 NORMAL.

NOTE Steps 7 & 8 should end up having the same channel (A or B) selected for steam flow and feed flow on each SIG to ensure a loss of voltage to any one channel will have minimal effect on the affected SIG level.

BOP 10. CHECK controlling steam flow Channels NORMAL.

10. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. SELECT operable channel.

BOP b. EVALUATE effect of the failed channel on the MFPs Speed Control and ADJUST in MANUAL as necessary while continuing this section.

BOP 1 1. CHECK controlling FW flow channels NORMAL.

BOP 12. CHECK press compensation channel(s) NORMAL.

13 ENSURE same channel (A or B) selected for steam flow and BOP feed flow on each SIG 14 IF affected SIG controlling channel and level NORMAL THEN BOP a. RETURN MFW reg valve to AUTO.

b. RETURN TDMFWP Speed Control to AUTO (if in MANUAL).

15. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN,

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1 °F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication BOP [1 -M-4].

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

Since 1-PT-1-73 is failed, the rod control system must remain in MANUAL.

BOP 16. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

BOP 17. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 12 of 57 Event

Description:

Steam flow transmitter, 1-FT-1-lOa fails low, requiring entry into AOI-16.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 13 of 57 Event

Description:

1A CCS pump shaft shears and lB CCS pump fails to auto start. AOl-15 entry is required.

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I Indications:

Numerous low flow alarms associated with 1A CCS header.

1A CCS pump running with no discharge pressure and low amps.

1 B CCS pump stopped, with CCS header pressure less than 40 psig.

BOP Diagnose and announce failure of 1A CCS pump May start 1 B CCS pump since the AUTO start feature failed to start BOP the pump on low header pressure Enter and direct actions of AC 1-15, Loss of Component Cooling SRO Water (CCS), Sub Section 3.2 Loss of CCS Flow or Surge Tank Level less than 60% or dropping uncontrolled.

Evaluator Note: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), Sub Section 3.2 Loss of CCS Flow or Surge Tank Level less than 60% or dropping uncontrolled.

BOP 1. CHECK CCS pumps status:

a. CHECK any CCS pump TRIPPED or running pump NOT pumping forward:

BOP

• ERCW/CCS Motor tripout alarm,

• Low header pressure (train A or B),

• Multiple low flow alarms.

b. CHECK at least one U-i Train A header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

BOP

• lA-A

• 1B-B

b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP START available U-i Train A CCS Pump.

c. CHECK any Train B header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

BOP

• c-s

• 2B-B

d. PLACE any non-operable or tripped CCS pump in STOP/PULL-BOP TO-LOCK.

e. CHECK TWO U-lTrain A header supply pumps RUNNING:

BOP

• lA-A

• lB-B

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

1A CCS pump shaft shears and lB CCS pump fails to auto start. AOl-15 entry is requ red.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

e. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE at least one of the following CLOSED to avoid excessive flow:

• RHR htx A, 1-FCV-70-156, OR SEP htx A, O-FCV-70-1 97.

BOP f. CHECK flows returned to NORMAL.

BOP g. CHECK A and B side surge tank levels between 57% and 85%.

SRO h.**GOTOStepl5.

SRO 15. EVALUATE affected equipment operation USING Appendix A.

16. WHEN CCS returned normal, THEN SRO

• CHECK only one CCS pump per Train.

. CHECK one TBBP running.

17. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS).

SRO LCO 3.7.7, Condition A. With one CCS train inoperable, restore the CCS train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

18. INITIATE repairs.

SRO SRO should report both the trip of the IA CCS pump and the failure of the lB CCS pump to start on low header pressure.

19. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN:

a. ENSURE 1-HS-70-63A, Ui SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV in P-AUTO.

b. ENSURE CCS, CVCS, CS pumps, RHR pumps & SI pumps are in normal alignment:

SRO

• REFER to SOI-70.0i Component Cooling Water (CCS).

. REFER to SQl 62.01, CVCS-Charging and letdown.

• REFER to SQl 72.01, Containment Spray System.

• REFER to SQl 74.01, Residual Heat Removal System.

• REFER to SQl 63.01, Safety Injection System.

SRQ 20. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRQ prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 15 of 57 Event

Description:

1A CCS pump shaft shears and lB CCS pump fails to auto start. AOl-15 entry is required.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 16 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube leak, requiring entry into AOI-33.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

175-B, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 RAD HI BOP Diagnoses and announces steam generator tube leak.

SRO Enters and directs actions of AOl-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 175-B, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 RAD HI.

NOTES

1) If switching in the switchyard causes this window to annunciate, the system engineer should be notified.

2) 1-RM-90-119 has associated ICS computer point R0001A.

3) ICS computer points in parentheses 0.

BOP [1] REFER TO AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

BOP [2] CHECK 1-RM-90-120 (R1O2OA) and 1-RM-90-121 (R1O21A).

[3] CHECK Post Accident monitors 1-RM-90-421 (R9055A), 1-RM-BOP 90-422 (R9056A), 1 -RM-90-423 (R9057A), and 1 -RM-90-424 (R9058A).

[4] IF Alarm is valid, THEN REQUEST Chemistry to evaluate BOP appropriate SG Blowdown routing when monitor alarms (i.e.,

CTBD or hotwell), based on ODCM limitations.

NOTE 1-HS-15-44 is key operated. Obtain key from Unit SRO.

[5] IF Step [4] Chemistry evaluation determines that SG Blowdown routing should divert to the hotwell on alarm, THEN DISPATCH BOP AUO to VERIFY 1-HS-15-44, SG BLOWDOWN DISCH TO CTBD [T511708] NOT in OPEN.

NOTE ICS screen CHEM7 provides calculated instantaneous primary to secondary leak rate value.

[6] NOTIFY Chemistry to perform CM-9.09 Effluent Radiation BOP

• Monitor Alarm Guidelines.

BOP [7] NOTIFY Radiological Protection to investigate alarm.

[8] IF monitor declared inoperable, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry Count SRO room to initiate compensatory sampling.

SRO [9] REFER TO AOl-31, Abnormal Release Of Radioactive Material.

EXAMINER: The flowing actions are taken from AOI-33, Steam Generator Leak.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube leak, requiring entry into AOl-33.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

RO 1. CHECK If PZR Level Can Be Maintained:

a. CONTROL charging flow as necessary.

1. OPEN 1-FCV-62-93 as required.

2. OPEN 1-FCV-62-89 as required.

RO 3. IF letdown at 120 gpm THEN PLACE 1-HIC-62-81A, in MANUAL, AND CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

4. IF required, ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, AND ENSURE in AUTO.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

RO b. MONITOR pzr level STABLE or INCREASING.

NOTE Condenser Vacuum Exhaust and SG blowdown Radiation Monitors should be monitored at approximately 15 minute intervals for indications of rising leak rate.

2. IDENTIFY Leaking SG(s);

a. EVALUATE the following:

• Unexpected rise in any SG narrow range level,

• Feedwater flow mismatches, RO

• High radiation from any Chemistry SG sample results,

• High radiation on any SG main steamline radiation monitor,

• RADCON survey of main steamlines and SG blowdown lines.

b. MONITOR Condenser Vacuum Exhaust and SG Blowdown Radiation Monitors

3. CHECK If VCT Level Can Be Maintained:

RO a. MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%, using automatic OR manual makeup.

NOTE:

Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

4. DETERMINE If Plant Shutdown Is Required:

• High Secondary Radiation, AND SRO

• PZR level continues to decrease, OR

• Charging flow continues to rise.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 18 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube leak, requiring entry into AOl-33.

Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior I 4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO I GO TO APPENDIX A to monitor SG leakage.

NOTE:

This appendix provides steps to monitor primary to secondary leakage and directs unit shutdown if leakage limits are exceeded.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-33, Appendix A. After the crew enters Appendix A, cue the Console Operator to modify Event 6 from a severity of 1.5 to a severity of 15.

RO 1. MONITOR PZR level STABLE.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO RETURN TO Section 3.0, Operator Actions, Step 4.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-33, Section 3.0.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

1. CHECK If PZR Level Can Be Maintained:

a. CONTROL charging flow as necessary.

1. OPEN 1-FCV-62-93 as required.

2. OPEN 1-FCV-62-89 as required.

3. IF letdown at 120 gpm THEN PLACE 1-HIC-62-81A, in MANUAL, AND CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

4. IF required, ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, AND ENSURE in AUTO.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

b. MONITOR pzr level STABLE or INCREASING.

b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following;

1. ISOLATE letdown as necessary.

2. INCREASE chg flow, and start additional chg pmp as needed.

3. IF loss of PZR level is imminent, THEN a) TRIP the reactor.

b) WHEN reactor trip is verified, THEN INITIATE Safety Injection.

c) GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 7,8 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: If the SG tube leakage rises to a point where the crew determines that pressurizer level loss is imminent, and the SRO will order a reactor trip and Safety injection actuation.

EXAMINER: The lA-A 6.9 kv Shutdown Board will trip 10 seconds after the reactor trip.

AOl-43.01,Loss of Unit I Train A Shutdown Boards will be performed in conjunction with the EOPs on a not to interfere basis. AOI-43.-1 actions are provided beginning on Page 30.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE I Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• I -)(X-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D EXAMINER: The tube leak progresses from a leak to a rupture prior to the reactor trip, and a manual safety injection will be required based on imminent loss of PZR level.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

[ Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

• SIG press less than 675 psig, OR

• RCS press less than 1870 psig, SROIRO OR

• Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

IF SI NOT required, THEN ** GO TO ES-0.1,

b. ACTUATE SI manually.

EXAMINER: Appendices A and B (E-O) are provided on pages 19 through 33.

5. EVALUATE support systems:

BOP

• REFER TO Appendixes A and B (E-0), Equipment Verification pages 15-28.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RD

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADVI.

8. MONITOR RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F:

• IF any RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-avg trending to 557°F.

RD OR

• IF NO RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-cold trending to 557° F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN:

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

• CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm RO UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

RO

• 1 -FCV-62-54

• 1 -FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

RO

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO 12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

RO

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

15. CHECK for RUPTURED S/G RO

• All S/Gs narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING.

• Secondary side radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

15. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF any S/G has level rising in an uncontrolled manner or has high radiation, THEN ** GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Early notification of RADPROT and Chemistry could expedite subsequent sampling efforts if needed.

SRO 1. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

2. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

SRO a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

3. IDENTIFY Ruptured SIG based on ANY of the following:

• Unexpected rise in SIG NR level OR RO

• S/G discharge monitor high radiation OR

• RADPROT Survey OR

• Chemistry sample.

4. ENSURE Ruptured SIG PORV aligned:

RO a. ENSURE controller in AUTO set at 90%.

b. ENSURE HS in P-AUTO.

CAUTION If turbine-driven AFW pump is only available source of feed flow, then steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained.

SRO 5. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact SIC.

RO 6. ENSURE Ruptured S/G blowdown isolated.

Critical Task I WOG Critical Task List for E 3 A.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3. 1 occurs.

Once an affected steam generator has been identified, it is isolated from the intact steam generators to limit radiological releases and as a necessary step toward stopping primary-to-secondary leakage.

Feedwater flow is also terminated to the affected steam generator after level has returned into the narrow range. This minimizes the possibility of steam generator overfill.

Critical Task I SRO 7. CLOSE Ruptured S/G MSIV and bypass valve.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenailo # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task I Manually CLOSE valves.

IF valves can NOT be closed, THEN Locally REMOVE power to valves: DISPATCH NAUO to perform Attachment I (E-3), THEN:

1) CLOSE Intact SIG MSIVs and bypass valves to isolate Ruptured SIG from intact S/Gs.

BOP 2) ISOLATE secondary pathways to limit depressurization and contamination by USING Attachment 2 (E-3), Steamline Isolation (MCR), AND Attachment 3 (E-3), Steamline Isolation (Local).

3) USE Intact S/G PORVs for dumping steam when required. IF at least one Intact S/G can NOT be isolated from Ruptured S/G, THEN ** GO TO ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA Subcooled -

Recovery.

CAUTION If any Ruptured SIG is also faulted, feed flow should remain isolated in subsequent steps UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

Cntical 8 CONTROL Ruptured S/G level Task I

a. CHECK Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. ISOLATE AFW flow to Ruptured S/G.

c. ENSURE MEW ISOLATED to Ruptured S/G:

• MEW isolation valves CLOSED.

RO

• MEW bypass isolations CLOSED.

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

• MEW pumps TRIPPED.

d. CONTROL Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

9. PLACE dump back valve to CST, 1-LIC-2-3, in MANUAL, and RO CLOSE valve.

RO 10. MAINTAIN condenser level 1-LR-2-12 on-scale [M-3].

11. DISPATCH operator to OPEN 1 -FCV-1 4-3 to bypass condensate SRO DI.

RO 12. ENSURE RADPROT dispatched to survey secondary plant.

13. NOTIFY Chemistry to obtain samples as necessary for SRO confirming_Ruptured SIG.

SRO 14. NOTIFY plant personnel of potential contaminated release.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Isolate secondary pathways to limit depressurization and contamination by initiating Attachment 2 (E-3),

Steamline Isolation MCR), and Attachment 3 (E-3), Steam/he Isolation (Local) prior to initiating RCS coo/down Isolation is performed to maintain ruptured SG pressunzed dunng the coo/down in order to allow subsequent RCS depressurization to ruptured SG pressure while maintaining RCS subcooling Critical 15 ENSURE major steam flowpaths from the ruptured SIG isolated Task 2 a TD AFW pump steam supply from Ruptured SIG CLOSED (if RO applicable)

b. Ruptured SIG MSIV and bypass valve CLOSED, OR Intact SIG MSIVs and bypass valves CLOSED.

Critical 15: RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task2 ISOLATE secondary pathways to limit depressurization and RO contamination by INITIATING Attachment 2 (E-3), Steamline Isolation (MCR), AND Attachment 3 (E-3), Steamline Isolation (Local).

RO 16. CHECK Ruptured SIG pressure greater than 690 psig.

Critical Task 3 WOG Critical Task List for E-3 B.

Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not unnecessarily occur. Properly identifies, establishes coo/down, and maintains temperature at target temperature in accordance with E-3, Steps 17 and 18 Critical 17 DETERMINE target incore temp for RCS cooldown Task 3 IF Ruptured SIG pressure is between listed values THEN USE lower value RUPTURED TARGET SG PRESSURE (PSIG) INCORE TEMP (F)

RO (471FADV]

iaco 479F 450FADV]

900 66 44FADVj aoO 451 (43IFDV]

700 434F i414FADVl 6D - 4 r41FAD,]

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position ] Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

• The 1500 psig RCP trip criteria is NOT applicable during or after a controlled RCS cooldown and depressurization.

• If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is AVAILABLE, FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, should NOT be implemented.

• Excessive steam dump cooldown rate will cause MSIV isolation due to the rate sensitive signal.

• If RCPs are not running, a false red or orange path may be indicated for FR-P.1 during the following steps. T-cold in the ruptured loop should be disregarded until Step 43.

Critical 18. INITIATE RCS cooldown to target incore temp, determined from Task3 Step 17.

BOP

a. DUMP steam to condenser from Intact SIG(s) at maximum achievable rate:

IF dumps are in Tavg mode, THEN

1) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

2) PLACE steam dump mode switch in STEAM PRESSURE.

3) ENSURE steam dump demand indicator i-Xl-1-33 reading zero.

4) PLACE steam dump controls ON.

5) PLACE steam dump controller in MAN, AND FULLY OPEN three cooldown valves (25% demand).

Critical 18 a RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Task a IF condenser steam dumps NOT available THEN USE Intact SIG PORVs at maximum achievable cooldown rate IF an Intact SIG is NOT available THEN PERFORM one BUT NOT BOTH of the following USE Faulted S/G OR GO TO ECA-3 1 SGTR LOCA Subcooled Recovery BOP b. WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-li), THEN

• BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

c. WHEN Tavg is less than 550°F (P-12), THEN BYPASS Lo-Lo Tavg interlock.

d. WHEN incore temp is less than target temp, THEN STOP RCS cooldown, AND MAINTAIN incore temperature less than or equal to target.

e. CONTINUE with Step 19 of this Instruction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

19. MONITOR Intact SIG levels:

a. At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. SIG NR levels less than 50% and controlled.

20. CONTROL Intact SIG NR levels between 29% and 50% [39%

and 50% ADV].

21. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

22. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

RO

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

23. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO 24. RESET Phase A and Phase B.

25. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air pressure greater than 75 psig [M-1 5].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [M-1 5]:

BOP

• 1 -FCV-32-80.

• 1-FCV-32-102.

• 1-FCV-32-110.

26. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

b. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

RO

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 150 psi .

9

27. CHECK target incore temperature:

a. VERIFY incore temperature less than target temperature.

SRO

b. STOP RCS cooldown.

c. MAINTAIN incore temperature less than target temperature.

RO 28. MONITOR Ruptured S/G pressure stable or rising.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

28. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

MAINTAIN Ruptured SIG at least 250 psig greater than the pressure of the SIG(s) used for cooldown:

• Slowly DUMP steam from SIG(s) used for cooldown.

• MAINTAIN RCS cooldown rate less than 100° F in one hour.

IF the Ruptured SIG depressurizes to less than 250 psig above the pressure of the SIG(s) used for cooldown, THEN ** GO TO ECA-3.l, SGTR and LOCA Subcooled Recovery.

RO 29. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 85°F [105°F AD!].

29. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF subcooling is less than 65°F [85°F ADV], THEN ** GO TO ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA Subcooled Recovery.

RO IF subcooling is STABLE OR DROPPING, THEN ** GO TO ECA 3.1, SGTR and LOCA Subcooled Recovery.

DO NOT CONTINUE this instruction UNTIL subcooling is greater than 85°F [1 05°F ADVJ.

CAUTION Cycling of the pzr PORV should be minimized to improve PORV reliability.

NOTE

• If RCPs are not running, the upper head region may void during RCS depressurization.

This will result in a rapidly rising pzr level.

• Either Loop I or 2 pzr spray valve is effective for Loop 2 RCP in service or for Loops 1, 3, & 4 RCPs in service.

Cntical Task 4 WOG Critical Task List for E 3 D Depressurize RCS to meet SI termination cnteria before E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Step 31 criteria are exceeded RCS pressure is decreased to stop pnmary-to-secondary leakage and establish indicated pressurizer level greater than 15%.

Critical 30. INITIATE RCS depressurization to minimize break flow, and Task 4 REFILL pzr to greater than 15% [33% ADV].

RO a. CHECK pzr level less than 63% [58% ADV].

b. MAINTAIN subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F AD!].

c. DEPRESSURIZE RCS with normal sprays at maximum rate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 31. DETERMINE if RCS depressurization should be stopped:

Task 4 a CONTINUE RCS depressurization UNTIL one of the following Pzr level rises to greater than 63% [58% ADV] OR

• RCS subcooling drops to less than 65°F [85°F AD.!]. OR

• BOTH of the following:

1) RCS pressure is less than Ruptured SIG pressure. AND SRO

2) Pzr level is greater than 15% [33% ADV].

b. WHEN depressurization criteria satisfied, THEN ENSURE the following:

1) Normal pzr spray valves CLOSED.

2) Pzr PORVs CLOSED

3) Aux spray valve CLOSED.

CAUTION

• SI should be terminated as quickly as possible after termination criteria are met to prevent Ruptured SIG overfill.

• If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is AVAILABLE, FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, should NOT be implemented.

32. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink with either:

SRO

• Total available feed flow greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

33. IF RHR suction aligned from RWST, THEN STOP ECCS pumps, and PLACE in A-Auto:

RO *RHRpumps.

• SI pumps.

• All BUT one charging pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

SG 3 tube ruptures, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection initiation. Requires entry into E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

1. 3 MSIV fails to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

34. ALIGN charging:

a. CLOSE RCP seal flow control I -FCV-62-89.

b. OPEN charging isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV 91.

RO c. ENSURE charging valve 1-FCV-62-85 OR 1-FCV-62-86 OPEN.

d. CHECK RHR Suction aligned from RWST.

e. OPEN seal return valves 1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-62-63.

RO 35. CLOSE BIT outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

36. CONTROL charging flow:

a. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-89 and 1-FCV-62.-93 to establish:

RO

• Seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

• Pzr level stable or rising.

37. ENSURE ECCS flow NOT required:

RO a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV j.

b. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADVI.

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential lockout relay operation.

AOI-43.01, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, actions.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

12-C B 6.9 SD BD lA-A VOLTAGE DEGRADED 101-C PRI WTR HDR PRESS LO 86-B CONTROL ROD NON-URGENT FAILURE 50-A MFPT 1A ABNORMAL 101-E RCP SEAL SUPPLY FLOW LO 108-A CHARGING FLOW HI/LO Multiple Radiation Monitor Instrument Failure alarms.

Diagnoses and announces the loss of the 1A 6.9 KV Shutdown BOP Board.

Assigns performance of AOl-43.O1, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown SRO Boards, to the BOP, to be accomplished on a not to interfere basis while the EOPs are performed.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-43.O1, Loss of Unit I Train A Shutdown Boards.

NOTE I CCP lA-A, SIP lA-A, RHR Pump lA-A, CS Pump lA-A, AFW Pump lA-A, ERCW Pumps A-A and B-A, Pressurizer Heaters Backup Group 1A, and Pressurizer Heaters Control Group 1 D will be unavailable on a loss of 6.9KV Shutdown Board 1 A-A.

NOTE 2 Operability of remaining AC power sources must be determined within one hour per LCO 3.8.1.

NOTE 3 Steps to energize 6.9KV Shutdown Board lA-A (or intermediate supply paths) may be repeated based on completed repair(s), protective relay reset, or direction from TSC.

NOTE 4 RCPs can be operated for up to 10 minutes after loss of CCS flow.

BOP 1. MONITOR 1 B-B 6.9KV Shutdown Board ENERGIZED.

2. ENSURE Diesel Generators running:

• DG lA-A BOP *DGIB-B

• DG 2A-A

• DG 2B-B

3. MONITOR RCP seal cooling available:

• Seal injection flow OR RO

• CCS flow through Thermal Barrier Heat Exchangers RO determines that the CCS system has returned to normal after the start of the lB CCS pump due to low header pressure.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential lockout relay operation.

AOI-43.O1, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, actions.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. DISPATCH personnel to Auxiliary Bldg to UNLOCK and RACK UP the following breakers:

NOMENCLATURE LOCATION IJNHJ MAINT SJPPLY FROM 6.9kv 5DB 1-BKR-211-1718?11 BOP 6.9KV UNITED lB lA-A, Cli MAINT SUPPLY FROM 6.9kV SDB 2-BKR-211-1818?1 1 6.9KV UNIT BD 2B 2A-A, Cii These actions will not be taken due to the report of damage on the board.

5. DISPATCH personnel to Turbine Bldg to CLOSE the following breakers:

NOMENCLATURE LOCATION LINID MAINT FEEDER TO 6.9kV UNIT 1 -BKR-201 -B18 6.9 KV SHUTDOWN SD 1 B BOP SD lA-A MAINT FEEDER TO 6.9kV UNIT 2-BKR-201-B?8 6.9 KV SHUTDOWN SD 25 ED 2A-A These actions will not be taken due to the report of damage on

• the board.

6. CHECK both lA-A and 2A-A 6.9 KV Shutdown bds BOP DEENERGIZED.

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO 6. **

GO TO Step [9].

9. DISPATCH personnel to the following locations to inspect for equipment damage:

BOP

• 6.9KV Shutdown Board

• 480V Shutdown Boards

• Diesel Generator Building

10. NOTIFY MAINTENANCE personnel of failure of Shutdown SRO Board.

11. ENSURE Unit 1 Instrument Power A Rack selected to ENERGIZED feeder (amber light ON) [1-M-7] (SOI-237.01).

BOP BOP operator transfers Unit I Instrument Power A Rack to its Alternate feed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 32 of 57 Event

Description:

lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential lockout relay operation.

AOl-43.O1, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, actions.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. ALIGN BAT Afor operation via BA Pump lB USING SOI-62.05.

RD BOP contacts the Auxiliary Building AUO to have alignment accomplished.

13. MONITOR Board Protective Relays NOT ACTUATED (local reports)

SRO Report received from the AUO that the IA 6.9 KV Shutdown Board tripped due to differential relay operation. The bus work appears to be severely damaged.

13. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO Step [38].

38. ENSURE affected equipment placed in STOP PULL TO LOCKIOFF:

• lA-A CCP.

• Pressurizer Heaters Group lA-A.

• lA-A Motor Driven AFW Pump.

• lA-A Component Cooling Water Pump.

RO/BOP

• lA-A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump.

• A-A ERCW Pump.

• B-A ERCW Pump.

• MCR Chiller A-A.

• EBR Chiller A-A.

• SD Bd Rm Chiller A-A.

BOP informs the SRO prior to placing equipment in pull-to-lock.

39. DISPATCH AUD to D/G Bldg to monitor D/G conditions USING BOP SOI-82 series, Appendix A, for operating parameters

40. ENSURE Train A ERCW pumps in service as required to maintain pressure and flows (S01-67.01):

BOP

• C-A ERCW Pump.

• D-A ERCW Pump.

RD 41. CHECK any charging pump RUNNING

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips ondifferential lockout relay operation.

AOl-43.01, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, actions.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

41. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. ISOLATE letdown:

• CLOSE letdown orifice(s).

RD

• CLOSE 1 -FCV-62-69A.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70A.

b. RESTORE charging and letdown:

• REFER TO Attachment 1 ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

NOTE I CCS Pump lA-A, Aux Bldg General Sup Fan lA-A, CRDM Cooler lA-A, Lower Cntmt Cooler IA-A, EBR Air Handling Unit A-A, and Cntmt Air Return Fan lA-A will be unavailable on a loss of 480V SD BD 1AI-A.

NOTE 2 Aux Bldg General Exh Fan lA-A, CRDM Cooler iC-A, Lower Cntmt Cooler IC-A, MCR ChIr A-A Compressor, 480V SDBR AHU A-A, Station Air Compr A, and HP Fire Pump lA-A will be unavailable on a loss of 480V SD BD 1A2-A.

BOP 42. ENSURE 1 B-B CCS Pump Supplying A Train (SOI-70.01).

43. ENSURE Thermal Barrier Booster Pump lB-B in service(SOl BOP 70.01).

44. EVALUATE starting additional Control Rod Drive Mech Cooler SRO Fans, Lower Compartment Cooler Fans, and Upper Compartment Cooler Fans (SOl-30.03).

45. ENSURE Aux Bldg General Supply and Exhaust Fans in service BOP as required to maintain ventilation and pressure (SOl-30.05).

46. ENSURE EBR Air Conditioning Unit B-B and MCR Air BOP Conditioning Unit B-B in service (SOl-31 .0 1).

NOTE Radiation Monitors powered from 480V C & A Vent Board 1A1-A or Radiation Monitor &

Sampling & Fire Protection 1-BD-242-1 will be inoperable on a loss of 480V C & A Vent Board 1A1-A.

BOP 47. RESET Radiation Monitor modules and alarms on 0-M-12.

NOTE I Unit 1 A Train ESF Room Coolers, Area Coolers, and Space Coolers will be unavailable on a loss of 480V C & A Vent Board 1A1-A.

NOTE 2 Emergency Gas Treatment System Fan A-A will be unavailable on a loss of 480V C &

A Vent Board 1 Al -A.

48. ENSURE lB Primary Water Pump in service as required (When RD in bypass mode, ensure Primary Water System aligned per SOl 81.01).

BOP 49. ENSURE 1 B Annulus Vacuum Fan in service (SOI-65.01).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

lA-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential lockout relay operation.

AOl-43.O1, Loss of Unit 1 Train A Shutdown Boards, actions.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

50. ENSURE A Train or B Train 480V and Shutdown Board Room BOP Ventilation in service (SOI-30.07).

CAUTION LCO 3.8.1 is expected to require performance of S/R 3.8.1.1 (0-S 1-82-2). Performers are NOT to take ANY actions which would interrupt power supplies in service by this Aol.

51. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.5.2, ECCS-Operating.

• 3.5.3, ECCS-Shutdown.

• 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating.

SRO

• 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown.

• 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating.

• 3.8.5, DC Sources-Shutdown.

• 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

3.8.10, Distribution Systems-Shutdown.

SRO 52. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

53. EVALUATE transferring 125V Batt BD I to Battery Charger 6-S SRO (SOI-236.01) or transferring I 20V AC Vital lnverter 1-I from Normal To Alternate 480V power supply (S01-235-series).

54. EVALUATE transferring 24V CAP Battery Charger I from SRO Normal to Alternate (SOI-252).

55. CHECK Unit 1 A Train Shutdown Board(s) ready to be BOP ENERGIZED.

55. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO Step [13].

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 35 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I I Action/Expec:eci Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-C)

Pege I f 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 1 ENSURE POBsOPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.

• PCB 5088.

2 ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train Both MD AEW pumps RUNNING. AEV/ oporcition.

• TD FW pump RUNNING.

LCVs iii AUTO, ur ui1iulletJ r IvIANIJAL

3. ENSURE MEW isolalion: Manually CLOSE valves and

• MEW isoation and bypass STOP pumps. as necessay.

isolation valves CLOSED.

IF any valves can NOT be closed.

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves THEN CLOSED. CLOSE #1 hocitoroutlot valvos.

• MPP A and B TRIPPED.

• Standby MEP STOPPED.

• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

a Cond booster punps TRIPPED.

14 o128

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 36 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev28 I Step Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPEN CIX A (E-O)

Page 2 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in RVVST outlets i-LCV-62-1 35 each set alignei.

and i-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

VCT ouUots 1-LCV-62-132 and i-LCV.-62-133 CLOSED.

• Charging 1-FV-b2-9U and 1 -FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and aligned, and flow thrL BIT.

1 -FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Fbw thru BIT.

1. RCS pressue f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

greater than 1550 psig.

iF RCS press drops tD less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow, 15of28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 37 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 3 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 5 CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent

a. Phase A isolaton: ation signal,

• Train A GREEN. Ivianually CLOSE valves and

• Train B GREEN. dampers as necessary.

b. Cntmt vent isolation:

• TrainAGREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

16 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 38 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 4 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

• Cntrnt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntrnt Spray

• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. actuated.

3) ENSURE cntrnt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minUtes has elapsed since Phase B actuated.

THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntrnt [AD\f]

setpoints where provided.

17of28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-D)

Page 5 of 10 ECUIPMENT VERIFICATION CHECK plant radiaticn NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit supervisor

• SIG blowdown rad recorder IMMEDIATELY.

1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-1 19 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12].

• 1-RP-fl-1flfi and 1-RR-ifl-112 raciation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• S/G main steamllne discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

8 ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs 18of28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 40 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step I I Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 6 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

9. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

FCO-30-146A.

FCO-30-14$B.

FCO-30-157A.

• FCO-30-157B.

10. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as RUNNING, one on each shutdown necessary.

board preferred.

11. ENSURE ERC vV supply valves 1 IF ERCW can NOT be aligned to OPEN to running D/Gs. running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

12. ENSURECCSHXC Manually OPEN O-FCV-67-152 ALTDISCHTOHDRB, to posifion A.

0-ECV-67-152, is open to position A.

19 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Roy 28 Step I I Action/Expected Response Response Not Dhtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 7 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

13. CLOSECCSHXC DISCH TO HDR A.

0-FCV-67-144.

14. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans OPEN

• ECTS fans RUNNING. dampers.

• ENSURE dampers OPEN VERIZY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

15. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as

• lA-A CCS pump. tiecessary.

I B-B CCS pump.

• C-S OR 2B-B CCS pump.

NOTE

• The Upper and Lower Cntmt rad monitors sampling pumps should be shutdown if the sample flowpath is isolated.

The to lowing equipment is located on 1 -M-9.

16. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans and STOPPED: PLACE handswitch in PU LL-TO-LOC K.

20 cf 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 42 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFET( INJECTION E-O Rev2B I Step ActionExpected Resonse Response Nct Ob:ained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 8 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

17. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans and STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading PLACE handswitch ri dampers CLOSED: FULL-TO-LOCK, manually CLOSE dampers -

1 ;3 ENSURE AB GEN SUPFLY and EXH STOP fans and Tans STOPPED. PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE

• Dimpeis i-HS-30-158 urid 2-HS-30-210 Ferrluarl open duiing ABI

19. ENSURE AB EN SUF & XH Manually CLOSE danpers.

dampers CLOSED

20. ENSURE MCR& SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE danpers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-3l-4.

2! of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 43 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 9 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

21. ENSURE at least one CB EMER Manually START fan.

CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A.

OR Fan B-B RUNNING.

• FC03L8. OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-7. OPEN.

22. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS Manually START fan.

fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

ECO3L6, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-5. OPEN.

22 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 44 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Re 28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 10 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

23. ENSURE Control Building fans Manually STOP fans.

STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY and NOTIFY TSC if any EXH FANS AND dampers. damper NOT CLOSED.

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST FAN AND dampers.

24. INITIATE Appendix B.

23 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 45 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E.O Rev 23 Step ctionfExpected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX B (E-O)

Page I of 1 PHASE B PIPE BREAK CONTINGENCIES CHECK PHASE B actUated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs; (MISS P i-XX-55-6C, -3D)

THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE i-FCV-32-11O CLOSED. DISPATCH AUOtD perform (dSP 1-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHF1ENT 81.

[Atrain, window 1 3]

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (dSP l-XX-55-6E)

- ATTACHMENT 62.

[A train window 43]

4. ENSURE i-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP 1-XX-55-SE)

- ATTACHMENT 63.

[A -train, window 73]

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUOta perform (CISP 1-XX-55-EFi

- ATTACHMENT 64.

[B train, window 74]

24 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 46 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETV INJECTION ev 2D ATTACHMENT Bi (ED)

Page o 1 CONTROL AIR ISOLATION

1. CLOSED- SV 1013- CONTRDL AIR FL 713 AD hD ISDL

[A6S EL. i 3] (chain operated - ehind Fuel anc Waste Handing Bd. A).

2. IF O-[SV-32-Oi3 CANNOr BE CLOSED.

TN:

OPEN aid DISCONNECT G&SS air compre3or breakers:

a O-BKR-32-25 430V SD BD iA-A, C/SD b O-BKR-32-2 430V SD BD 1 B 1-B, C/3D C) O-DKR-32-27 - 430V AUX DLDG COM [3D. CIGC ci: O-BKR-32-ooA ?1BOV URB BLDG COM BD. cic 2.5 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 47 of 57 WBN IEACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION fle 20 Al IACHMENI h2 (E-C)

Piqe 1 o 1 ERCW ISOLATION

1. UNLOCK AND CLOSE i-ISV-07-523E LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR 10 &ID ERC SUP ISOL [A2U692J U-i penetration room Norrn 01 A ?Ipe Chase Coo er lB-B n overhead) 26 o 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 48 of 57 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 ATTACHIV1ENT 63 (E-O)

Page 1 of 1 CCS RETURN I3OLATION

1. CLOSE i-ISV-70-T0O RCP OIL COOLER GCS RETURN ISOLATION

[A4IV EL. 710 u-i Penetration Roorni (approximately 10 ft. North of Penetration Room Cooler lB-B on nezzaruine above RHR Bump Valve Roon) 270128

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page 49 of 57 ATTACHMENT 84 (E-J)

Page of 1 CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

1. CLOSE i-SV-70-516 ECTOR DUELDING CCS SUPPL( ISOLATION

[AB?T EL. 737] (Bchind EIDvtor apprcxintDIy 2 ft wcl on mczzonnc abovc A CCS Heal E:changer 2I OT 23

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 50 of 57 WBN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT I (E-3)

Page 1 o4 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS 1] IF any MSIV will NOT close, THEN GO TO Section 1.1 (Attachment 1 )

[2] IF any MSIV bypass valve will NOT close, TH N GO TO Section 1.2 (Attachment 1).

3S of 47

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page5lof57 WBN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT I (E-3)

Page 2 ot 4 Ii MSIV Isolation

[1] PLACE aftected MSIV trarister control switch in AUX position:

IAuxiliar Control Room, Panels i-L-1 1A and 1-L-i 1 B]

SG (Circle AUX TRANSFER AUX EQUIPMENT affected SWITCH POSITION

)G) 1 MSIV Loop 1. Train A. 1-FCV-1-4 1-XS-1-4A MSIV Loop 1. Train . 1-FCV-1-4 1-XS-1-48 2 MSIV Loop 2, Train A. 1-FCV-1-11 1-X9-1-IIA MSIV Loop 2. Train 9. 1-FCV-1-i1 i-XS-1-.11B MlV Loop . Train A. 1-FCV-I-22 1-X-1-22A MSIV Loop 3, Train B. 1-FCV-1-22 1-XS-1-22B =

4 MSIV Loop 4. Train A. 1-FCV-1-29 1-XS-1-29A MSW Loop 4. Train B,1-FCV-1-29 1-XS-1-29B

[2] CONSULT UO to verity affected MSIV closed.

37 of 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 52 of 57 WBN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT 1 (E-3)

Page 3 of 4 1.1 MSIV Isobtion (Continued) t] IF afTected MSIV stifl open OR control power fuse removal desired, THEN REMOVE E%ISIV fuses:

SG FUSE LOCATION FUSES (Circle EOWPMENT (Two per circuit) REMOVED affected S]G)

MSIV Loop 1, Train A, 125V Vital flattery Bd I 1 -FCV-1 -4 Circuit #46 1 Circuit B-46 1SIV Loop 1, Train B, 125v Vital Batiery Od II 1-FCV-1-4 Circuit #46 Circuit B-46 MSIV Loop 2, Train A, 125V Vita] Battery Bd I 1-FCV-l-i 1 Circuit #47 2 Circuit B-47

.1SlV Loop 2, Train B, 1 25V Vital Batlery Rd II 1 -FCV-1 -11 Circuit A-47 Circuit B-47 F MSIV Loop 3, Train A, 125V Vital Battery Bd I 1-FCV-1-22 Circuit A-4 3 Circuit B-4E F M31V Loop 3, Train B, 1Z5Y Vital Battery Bd II 1 -FCV-1 -22 Circuit A-4a Circuit fl-4 MSIV Loop 4. Train A, 1 2V Vital Ratter fid I 1 -FCV-1 -2 Circuit A-49 4 Circuit B-49 F MSIV Loop 4, Train B, 125V Vital Battery Bd II 1-FCV-1-2 Circuit #49 F Circuit B-49

[4] NOTIFY UO upon completion.

38 of 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ESD-2 Page 53 of 57 WBN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT I (E-3)

Page 4 of 4 1.2 MSIV Bypass IsoItion fi] PLACE HS in OFF for MSIV bypass valves that will NOT close:

S/G NOMENCLATURE LOCATION POSITION UNID HS (Circle OFF afFected SIC)

MAIN STEAM ISOL A31J1737 OFF 1-HS-1-147B 1 VLV LOOP 1 BYP WAR MINC3_VL/

MAIN STEAM ISOL A4U1757 OFF 1-HS-1-14B 2 VLV LOOP 2 GYP

,VAR MIN C VL/

MAIN STEAM ISOL A5U1757 OFF 1-H3-1-149B 3 VLV LOOP 3 BYP WARMING_VLV MAIN STEAM ISOL A3U737 OFF 1-HS-1-1 SOB 4 \LV LOOP 4 BYP WARMING VLV

[2] NOTIFY UO upon completion.

39 of 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 54 of 57 WaN STEAM GENERATORTUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT 2 (E-3)

Page 1 of I STEAMLINE ISOLATION (MCR)

1. CLOSE the following HP steam and bypass isolation valves:

MSR A2 H STM SQL 1-r.t-2 l-HS-1-135A MSR 52 H? STM ISOL l-M-2 l-HS-1-137A MSRC2 HPSTM SQL l-M-2 l-HS-l-139A r1SR Al H? STM SQL 1-Tl-2 i-HS-l-141A F MSR 51 HP STM ISOL 1-M-2 1-HS-l-143A F MSR Cl HP STM SQL 1-M-2 1-HS-l-145A F MSR A2 HP STM BYPASS SQL 1-M-2 l-HS-1-235A MSR 82 HP STM BYPASS ISOL 1-M-2 1-HS-1-237A F MSR C2 HP STM BYPASS ISOL 1-M-2 1-HS-1-239A MSR Al HP STM BYPASS ISOL 1-M-2 1-HS-1-24lA MSR 51 HP STM BYPASS ISOL l-M-2 l-HS-1-243A F MSR Cl HP STM BYSS ISOL l-M-2 l-HS-1-24EA

2. CLOSE the following HP steam warming valves:

MSRA1 WARMING LINE 1-M-2 1-HS-l-142 F MSR A2 PARMING LINE 1-M-2 1-HS-l-136 MSR SI WARMiNG LINE l-M-2 1-HS-l-144 F MSRB2 WARMING LINE l-M-2 1-HS-1-138 F MSR CI WARMING LINE l-M-2 l-HS-1 -146 MSR C2 WARMING LINE 1-M-2 l-HS-1 -140 F

3. ENSURE BOTH Steam Seal Supply valves in CLOSED position:

a i-HS-47-180A, HP SEAL STEAM SUPPLY ISOL [i-M-2]

b. i-HS-47-181A. HP SEAL STEAM SUPPLY BYPASS [l-M-2]

4. ENSURE BOTH Steam Dump Control hand switches is in OFF RESET position:

a. 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A [1-M-4]

b. 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B [1-M-4]

40 of 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 55 of 57 WBN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E4 Rev 22 ATTACHMENT 3 (E-3)

Page 1 of 2 STEAM LINE ISOLATION (LOCAL)

1. COORDINATE steam isolation with RADPROT.

2. CLOSE at least one valve listed tar each steam moisture trap manitold:

MSTR TRAP MSTR TRAP STR ISOL MSTR TRAP DRAIN LOCATION

, LEVEL SWITCH ISOL MAIN STEAM LINES 200 1-ISV-1-916  : OR 1-ISV-l-922  : T1Mi7 201 1-ISV-1-926  : OR 1-ISV-i-932 T1MI7OS 202 1ISV-1-9S6 OR 1-ISV-1-942 C T1M?708 203 1-ISV-l-046  : OR 1-ISV-1-52  : T1M?70a COMMON STEAM HEADER 204 1-lS\1-956  : [ OR 1-ISV-1-962  : T41?705 206 1-lsv-i-e  : L OR 1-ISV-l-972  : T6J/708 STEAM DUMP HEADER 2:7 1-IS\1-976  : OR 1-ISV-1-982  : T7H708 20 1-ISV-I-956  : OR 1-ISV-1-992 T7G/708 2O 1ISV-1-96 C OR 1-ISV-1-1002 : 17F708 CLOSE steam supply isolation and bypass tar each MEPT:

MFPT NOMENCLATURE ) LOCATION POSITION UNID 1A MFPT 1A HP STEAM T2ii729 CLOSED 1-ISV-1-61  :

SUPPLY_SQL 1A MFPT1AHP STEAM T2729 CLOSED 1-IBV-1-613 SUPPLY SQL BYPASS 18 MFPT 1BHP STEAM T2H1729 CLOSED 1-ISV-1-612 SUPPLY_SQL lB MFPT lB HP STEAM T2H,729 CLOSED 1-IBV-1-614 SUPPLY SQL BYPASS 41 0147

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 56 of 57 WN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Rev 22 ATTACHMENT 3 (E-3)

Pge2of2 STEAMLINE ISOLATION (LOCAL)

4. IF stemline rming is in progress, THEN CLOSE the following valves:

IJNID NOMENCLATURE LOCATION 1-DRV-i-532 MAIN STEAM LOOP 3 NVR1729 WARMING VALVE DRAIN 1ISV-1-54O MAIN STEAM LOOPS NVR!72i MSTR TRAP_ISOL l-DRV-i-534 MAIN STEAM LOOP 2 NVR1729 WARMING VALVE_DRAIN i-ISV-i-541 MAIN STEAM LOOP 2 NVR729 MSTR TRAP ISOL I -DR V-i -536 MA IN STEAM LOOP 1 SVR729 WARMING VALVE DRIN iISV-i-542 MAIN STEAM LOOP 1 5VPJ729 =

MSTR TRAP_ISOL

-l-DRV-i-538 MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 5VR1729 WARMING VALVE DRAIN i-ISV-i -543 MAIN STEAM LOOP 4 SVR1729 MSTR TRAP_lOL 42 of 47

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 57 of 57 WEN STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE E-3 Rev 22 APPENDIX D 1

L_ J Page 1 of 1 MINIMIZE SECONDARY SYSTEM CONTAMINATION

1. PLACE station surnp pump handswitches to STOP [T9H?68.5].

2. CLOSE O-ISV-40-1283, UNLINED HOLDING POND DISCHARGE TO YARD HOLDING POND [on dam between ponds].

3. ALIGN station surnp discharge to unLined holding pond:

a) CLOSE O-ISV-40-970, CHE.M CLEANING HDR TO LVWHP

[north of LVVVH pond].

b) CLOSE O-ISV-4D-1281. CHEM HEADER ISOLTO LINED POND

[north of lined pond]

C) OPEN O-lSV-40-1232. CHEM HEADER ISOL TO UNLINED POND

[north of unlined pond].

4. PLACE station surnp pump handswitcries to AUTO.

5. MINIMIZE leakage or drainage into station sump:

• Conderisate and feedwater.

• Cond DI effluent.

• RCW or HPFP fIuhes.

413 of 47

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST 4 Page of SM US/MCR Unit -

Q UO Unit Off-going Name AUO Station Q STA (STA Function) On-coming Name-Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1A DG is out-of-service for planned maintenance on the air start system. Expected return to service in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.8.1 .B was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. SR 3.8.1.1 .was performed 45 minutes after LCO entry. The air start system problem has been isolated to the IA DG. The National Weather Service has issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties for the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train A/Charmel I Work Week.

Reduce power to 95%, to remove the 1A CBP from service for scheduled maintenance on the lube oil system. Maintenance is scheduled to begin in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Perform shutdown using GO-4, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor Power. GO-4 complete through Step 11.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift Q A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less (N/A for AUOs)

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following programs for changes since last shift turnover:

El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) El PER review El Immediate required reading El TACF (N/A for AUOs) (N/A for AUOs)

Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [06-2008) Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-l [06-12-2008]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of QSM El US/MCR Unit -

UO Unit Off-going Name El AUO Station El STA (STA Function) On-coming Name-Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1 A DG is out-of-service for planned maintenance on the air start system. Expected return to service in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.8.1 .B was entered 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago. SR 3.8.1.1 .was performed 45 minutes after LCO entry. The air start system problem has been isolated to the 1A DG. The National Weather Service has issued a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for Meigs, McMinn and Rhea Counties for the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Train AlChannel I Work Week.

Reduce power to 95%, to remove the 1A CBP from service for scheduled maintenance on the lube oil system. Maintenance is scheduled to begin in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Perform shutdown using GO-4, Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30% Reactor Power. GO-4 complete through Step 11.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift El A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less (N/A for AUOs)

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following programs for changes since last shift turnover:

El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) El PER review El Immediate required reading El TACF (N/A for AUOs) (N/A for AUOs)

Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [06-20081 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [06-12-2008]

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar NRC Exam I Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: I August 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover: Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils. Operations Management and System Engineering have met, and directed that a power reduction to 90% at 2% per minute using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction be conducted as soon as shift relief and turnover is complete. 1A Containment Spray Pump is out of service for motor bearing replacement. Pump has been out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Expected to be returned to service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a N-BOP Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration.

R-RO 2 ni07b 1-RO Power Range Monitor N42 fails high, requiring entry into AOl-4, Nuclear TS-SRO Instrumentation Malfunctions, and a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 fw03c C-RO #3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Turbine rdO9 C-BOP runback fails and rods fail to move in auto, Requires the RO to take rpO3 manual control of rod control, and the BOP to manually drop load, Requires entry into AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

4 rwl6b C-BOP 2A ERCW supply header breaksin the Yard. Requires entry into AOl-13, TS-SRO Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation of ERCW system.

5 ch27c C-BOP C-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips. Requires entry into ARI I 38-E, TS-SRO Panel M-9 Motor Tripout. Requires Tech Requirement evaluation.

6 ms02d M-All Main Steam Line Break outside containment.

7 ms04a, C-BOP #1, 2, and 3 Main Steam isolation valves fail to close in AUTO. After ms04b, operator is dispatched to perform E-2, Faulted Steam Generator ms04c, Isolation, Attachment 1, MSIVs will close. Closure will not occur until ms04d ECA-2.1 is entered. #4 Main Steam isolation valve fails to close in AUTO.

Manual isolation of #4 MSIV is not successful throughout the scenario.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor i

L Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 Summary Initial Condition Train A/Channel Ill Work Week. 100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 747 ppm.

Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils. Operations Management and System Engineering have met, and directed that a power reduction to 90% at 2% per minute using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction be conducted as soon as shift relief and turnover is complete. 1A Containment Spray Pump is out of service for motor bearing replacement. Pump has been out of service for4 hours. Expected to be returned to service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

Event 1 Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration. During power reduction, vibrations are reduced.

Event 2 Power Range Monitor N42 fails high. The RO responds by placing rod control in manual and stabilizing the plant. The SRO enters and directs actions using AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. The SRO evaluates Tech Specs and enters LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Conditions D, E, W, R, and S. Determines LCO 3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Surveillance 3.2.4.2 is applicable.

Event 3 #3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Turbine runback fails and rods fail to move in auto, Requires the RO to take manual control of rod control, and the BOP to manually drop load, Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Event 4 2A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. The BOP responds to multiple alarms on panel 0-M-27. The SRO enters Aol-i 3, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW),

and cross-connects the A and B ERCW headers to supply cooling water to equipment. The SRO evaluates Tech Specs and enters LCO 3.0.3.

Event 5 C-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips. The operator will enter into ARI 1 38-E, Panel M-9 Motor Tripout. The SRO will direct the BOP to start another lower compartment cooler to stop the rise in containment temperature. The SRO evaluates Tech Requirements and enters TR 3.6.3, Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System, Condition A.

Event 6 Main steam line break occurs on Loop 2 steam line outside containment. The SRO enters AOl-38,Main Steam or Feedwater Line Leak. Reports from outside the control room state that there is a large steam leak outside the roll-up doors at the Service Bay. The SRO orders a reactor trip and MSIV closure. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection is entered.

Event 7 #1, 2, and 3 Main Steam isolation valves fail to close in AUTO. After operator is dispatched to perform E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Attachment 1, MSIVs will close. Closure will not occur until ECA-2.1 Step 5 is performed. #4 Main Steam isolation valve fails to close in AUTO. Manual isolation of #4 MSIV is not successful throughout the scenario.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 Critical Task Summary Critical Task 1 Control the AFW flow rate to minimum detectable flow to each SG in order to minimize the from WOG Critical RCS cooldown rate before FR-P. 1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Critical Safety Function Task List, ECA- Status Tree develops an ORANGE PATH condition.

2.1, A. If feed flow to a SG is isolated and the SG is allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiation of feed flow to the SG could create significant thermal stress conditions on SG components.

Maintaining a minimum verifiable feed flow to the SG allows the components to remain in a wet condition, thereby minimizing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is later increased.

Critical Task 2 Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2.

From WOG Isolation of the feedwater to the faulted SG maximizes the cooldown capability of the non Critical Task List faulted loops following a feedline break and minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and for E-2, A energy release following a steamline break. Isolation of steam paths from the faulted SG also minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and energy release to containment. In addition, isolation of these steam paths could isolate the break.

Transition is made from ECA-2. 1 back to E-2 when MSIVs are closed for three of four SGs.

Critical Task 3 Establish secondary heat sink (return AFW flow to intact SGs greater than 410 gpm) to meet SI termination criteria prior to entering FR-H. 1.

During performance of ECA-2. 1, flow had been reduced to minimum detectable floW to minimize the RCS cooldown. Flow must be manually reestablished in order meet secondary heat sink requirements and allow SI termination.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 345 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 345.

c. Right click on IC# 345.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 345.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-72-44a-1 05040 cntmt sump hdr a fcv(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off ms04a msiv fails to close fcv-1-4 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-72-22a-1 05020 rwst spray hdr a (green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off rpO3 turbine runback signal failure (defeat) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive tu02j main turbine high vibes exciter brg #10 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 60 60 hs-72-27a-1 06020 cntmt spray pump a mtr sw (green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off Page 1 of 13

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value ms04d msiv fails to close fcv-1-29 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms04c msiv fails to close fcv-1-22 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms04b msiv fails to close fcv-1 -11 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active tu02i main turbine high vibes gen brg #9 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 67.5 67.5 hs-72-34a-1 05060 cs pump a recirc fcv(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off csr03 containment spray pump a power R 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 off off hs-72-39a-1 05080 cs hdr a isol vlv sw (green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off ni07b pr channel output signal failure pr chnl 1 M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 120 100.761 fvr1 5 #3 htr dr tank pump low delta-p reset switch R 20 00:00:00 00:00:00 reset normal rwr22 power to appendix r.valve 1-fcv-67-458 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 rwr29 power to 2-fcv-67-22 strainer 2a-a inlet 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rwr30 power to 2-fcv-67-81 aux building supply header 2a 23 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off msr26a msiv 1-4 aux transfer switch 24 00:00:00 00:00:00 aux normal fw03c #3 heater drain pump c trip M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rdO9 rods fail to move in auto M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rwl6b ercw supply header 2-a break in yard M 4 00:00:00 00:01:00 70 0 ch27c oc trip lower compartment cooler c-a M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ms02b main steam line break outside containment sg #2 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 5 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A is in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position. Place RED HOLD NOTICE tags on 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A, 1-HS-72-22A, 1-HS-72-34A, 1-HS-72-34A, 1-HS-72-39A, and l-HS-74-77A handswitches.

Ensure the indicating lights on 1--HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A, 1-HS-72-22A, 1-HS-72-34A, 1-HS-72-34A, 1-HS-72-39A, and 1-HS-74-77A handswitches are DARK.

7. Place pink Protected Equipment tag on 1-HS-72-IOA, CNTMT SPRAY PMP B handswitch.

8. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel Ill sign is placed on 1-M-30.

Page 2 of 13

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) MOL (Middle of Life) is updated and on the desk, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

Item 3

• AFD -11.8  % -2.3  % 5.8  %

Lower Band Target Upper Band

-2.7 Actual

• Control Rods Auto Manual 220 steps Control Bank D1/D2 Item 4 Negative Positive None i-CCP A 1-CCP B CB 748 ppm Item 5 Current RCS CB: 748 ppm Current fluid inside the blender is:

Acid Water Blended PW flow rate 70 gpm 1-FC-62-142, dial setting 35%

BAflow rate 8gpm 1-FC-62-139 dial setting 21%

6. Boric Acid (BA) and Primary Water (PW) volumes for the following changes:

1°F Tavg increase 373 gal PW 1°F Tavg decrease 46 gal BA 10% Downpower @ 5%/hr 145 gal BA 50% Downpower @ 5%/hr 440 gal BA 1000 MW (85%) Runback 179 gal BA 950 MW (80%) Runback 262 gal BA 900 MW (75%) Runback 341 gal BA 790 MW or 800 MW Run back 487 gal PW II. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 3 of 13

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

none Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration.

As power is reduced, REDUCE the severity malfunctions of tu02i and tu02j from 67.5 to 62.5 over a 6 minute ramp and 60 to 55 over a 6 minute ramp.

2 2 Power Range Monitor N42 fails high, requiring entry into AOI-4.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report and state that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair PR N42. If contacted to perform lMl-160.002, state that the control room will be contacted prior to tripping any bistables.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, acknowledge the report and state that the incore flux mapping_will begin_in approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

3 3 #3 heater drain pump I C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, the automatic turbine runback fails to occur, and rods fail to move in auto, requiring the RO to take manual control.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Turbine Building AUO, report that the IC #3 heater drain tank pump motor leads are burned ofl and there is the smell of burnt insulation in the area. When requested to report #3 Heater drain tank levels, use ThunderWew Page fw6 for local level and trend information.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Support AUO, report that the IC #3 heater drain tank pump tripped on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report that the rods failed to move in automatic during the runback. State that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot and repair the rod control circuit.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Turbine Building AUO to perform SOI-2&3.OI, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains and Vent System, Section 8.3, Manual Reset: of I-LCV-6-106A, #3 HEA TER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL repeat back request. Pages 74 and 75 of SOI-5&6.OI are attached as Pages 8 and 9 of the Simulator Console Operators Instructions. Use ThunderWew Page fw6 for valve and reset switch manipulations.

Page 4 of 13

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 20 10-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

4 5 2A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Outside Routine AUO, report a large amount of water in the yard near the Intake Pumping Station. After valve realignments are completed, report that the water flow has stopped.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, acknowledge being dispatched to the reactor MOV boards. Restore power to 1-FCV-67-458 using Event 21 (remote function rwr22 to on9. Restore power to 2-FCV-67-22 using Event 22 (remote function rwr29 to on9. Restore power to 2-FCV-67-81 using Event 23 (remote function rwr3O to on 9.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Outside Routine AUO, report that you are on the way to the DG Buildings to get local readings.

5 4 C-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips. Requires entry into ARI 1 38-E, Panel M-9 Motor Tripout.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Control Building AUO, report that the C-A lower compartment cooler tripped on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge report that the C-A lower compartment cooler tripped. State that a package will be prepared to troubleshoot the C-A lower compartment cooler.

6 6 Main Steam Line Break outside containment.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO or Outside Routine AUO, report a large amount of steam is visible outside the Service Bay roll-up door.

Page 5 of 13

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 5 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

7 none #1, 2, and 3 Main Steam isolation valves fail to close in AUTO. After operator is dispatched to perform E 2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Attachment 1, and when cued by the Chief Examiner these MSIVs will close. Closure will not occur until ECA-2.1 is entered.

NOTE: Remove malfunctions ms04a, ms04b, and ms04c after the crew enters ECA-2.1 and has completed the first 5 steps.

ROLE PLAY: As Control Building AUO, acknowledge request to perform Appendix I of E-2. Insert Event 20, to transfer one switch to AUX, and provide the alarms for that action. Report back that the transfer switches are in the AUX position for the MSIVs. When the operator realizes that the transfer to AUX did not close the MSIVs, perform Step 3 of the attachment. Report back after the first MSIV is closed that step 3 of the Attachment I is complete.

8 none #4 MSIV fails to close. Manual isolation is unsuccessful for the duration of the scenario.

ENSURE ms04d remains active for the scenario. Exercise care when removing ms04a, ms04b and ms04c.

Page 6 of 13

WBN Exiraction Steam, Heater Drains and 501-586.01 Unit I Vent System Rev. 0059 Pae74o1262 Date I%JITEALS 83 Manual Reset of 1-LCV-6-I6A, #3 HEAlER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROLS NOTES

1) ThE foIlow]n section aIlo a con:rolled recover of 1-LCV-6-1C6A after a#3 HDTP trip wi:h un t above 5% power.

2 Blu& liQht Ii: above RESET huffon on ioca aneI indicates 1-LCV-6-106A is bein coriiolled by Hand Indicatng Con:roller 1HIC-6-106 in the E6.2 position due 1 pump trip ith Linit above 5% power.

[1] ENSURE blue light ilt Of! local aneI [Above RESET bLtton 1 -HS-6-1 Do].

[2] ENSURE unit is below 85% poer. OR

/LL 2. 1-cotor Crin Tan1 Pums rc in sorlc 3] ENSURE 1-LIC-3-106 is in AUTO mode IMANUAL l:iutton tOT LIT.

4] ENSURE 1 -LIC-3-1 06 dsplay is selected to indica:e controller cutpu:.

5] ENSURE 1-LlC3-1O5 is in AIJTO mode and iscontrollinci NOF E The follclng stps shaild provide a snoath transfer of 3 HDT level control from 1-HIC-6-106A bc: to 1-LIC-6.-1 06. As the oulput of I-HIC-13-i 06A is raised from its design setpoint of 6.2% and l-Lc:V-6-1OA ópns, Ivl should dro in th #2. l-IDT. As leel drops, the 1 -LCV-6-1 05 valves should olose. As level contln ies to drop, the output of 1-L[c-6-ic6 should also begin :o drop. When the Output of 1-LIC-3-106 approximates that of 1-I-lc.-E-1D th.rj he 3 LIDT JMP OA lT..TICiN NTL circucar e est 1 iale 1-LCV-6-i OSA should e opened only enoLigh to es:ablish a owl dropping level trend in t9e#3HDT

[6] SLOWLY OPEN 1-LCV-6-1 06A using 1-HIC-6-106A and estal:iiish a slowly droppng level trend Ii the # HDT.

[7] ENSURE 1-LCVs-6-105s and 1058 CLOSE.

Page 7 of 13

WBN Extraction Steam, Heater Drains and SOi-5&.(J1 Unit I Vent System Rev. OJ59 Page 75 of 262 Date INITIALS 8.3 Manua Reset of 1-LCV-6-106A, 3 HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL CONTROL 3 {continued)

] WHE II the outputs of i-LIC6-iE and 1-HIC--1c6.A aroxiniateIy agree. THEN PUSH local RESET button 1-HS-6-106A, #3 l-iDT PUMP CAVITATION CNTL RESET. AND CHECK blue Iiciht goes out.

9] CHECK 1-LIC-6-1J6 conroIIing Iee[ in a stable manner.

IO] RETURt1 1-HlC6-iEA setintto fts design value of 562%.

Page 8 of 13

WBN Loss of Esseti Rw Cooling Wtr AO-3 Unit I Rev. 002.8 At DExpe::ed pcse Rs:ons Jo: Cta lEd uppI Hair IJpture in rrd or Iiuged Straner lcoriInuedj

7. CHECK upp aer2A flc.b,1t PERFQRMth c1lowin:

execb :lue f xisi . nt di i. n ..

. JNLODK, nd CLSE bk on Ed c E 1-FCd*87-45S.

b. NLo::K, and CL)SE bk on Rx r?: Ed A

- FCV.67-2..

r iNLQDK, and CL)SE bk on Rx MCV Ed 2A-A o.EA,

-FCV7-2

d. -223 :E:CV ENSURE 1-FC.?-!1 7

r 1E Th 2::<-.i,

. ENSURE 2-FCV--223 ECi 1r z o i :::ae, OE1 1.. O?EN 1-CV-OTE, CD:3 A U rn 1cr lB

. CLOSE 2-FDV-7*22. ra ICi A-A ink:.

h. CLOSE 2-FOV-78l. AE uply

-dr 2.

i. GO TO S:p 10.

76 Page 9 of 13

WEN FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLA1ION E-2 Re: 1 1 IUACF-IMENT I E

e 1: 4

1 I1STRLICTIONS

[1] IF q M3F. hIII NOT cc.

THEN

&OTQ c-;ec: 1.1 At:I-me!: i:.

2} IF M V bpz ahje wi NOT !cse..

THN

&OTO 3ec:i: iAt.:h9E1: 11.

2

WEN FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR IS OLATIDN E-2 Re. 1 1 ATTACHMENT 1 (E-2) aqe 2c 1.1 MSIV s.oIation

[I] PLACE 4S1V n.fer c.:cit it*:h in Au:x :s:ion:

4uiIia :DrD Pcon P-eIs 1-L-1 -d -L-11E]

CrI AL!X 1PAzSER UIPMEN 1cLfd WIiCH F-rIcN MCIV , Tr .k 1C.1 4

, Tr i-:-i*4

, Trr A. -FC-i MCIV 2, Trr ,

, Trr p... -:..-i:: 1;.-2.L.

M21-; 3, Trr 1X-22 =

4 FiCI. Trr.k i*x*-2.

Trr

[] iONULT ,J::o fafeXE-: iIVcI:E.

10 cf 1 2

WBN FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLA1ION E-2 Re. ii ATTACHMENT I qz II zage :3! 4 1.1 MSIflsolation iccntued:

[3] IF ffixed MS V : opn OR ccnircl tcr fuse rerrci dEireL 11-I EN.

rtr.1L rr,J i: r..ss.

o F!CZATON C l 3UIPR1ENT fly pr IruftI PE 1 CEC afLed

.1CJ , TrL A br: :

-C.:-1-4

. Crc!IE.E MCI L32 , Trir S 2br c

-C-1-4 CrctA. =

rc!i*..

MI 2, Trb A 9br

-C--11

CrcLJ

[.iCI L2 , Trr S c ii .L.7 CFcLil.7

[iCI 3, Tr A 2V  :

C-2 CrcEE MCIV 3, Tr3  !: 2b!r: C Crc.J MCIV ., Trh A l: br:

1-C-- Crc 4 Crc.dE.L MCIV 5 :5j. 5c Crc1A.

rcid:

41 NOTiFY UC upon xcr,:4et cn.

11 c 12

WEN FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR IS)LATK)N E-2 Re: 11 AUACIIMENT I qz IL_-:_ I 1.2 MSIVBypss Isolation

[1] PLACE , OFF for M V iaIdes that iII FDT i o:

NcMENC_TLRE oAr-DN PCTICil NIE H!

roe riD[d i-_:i vI N l::_

1  :

Li I P VAIIN3_L

!4:4 j --*

vLc:p

._!N(

OTAL4 ICC_ CF 3

\* L

.4i, N :TEAt OC_ QF

... LO 4 p

[2] NOTiFY IJO upon c:cnetcn.

l2cf 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # I Page 1 of 51 Event

Description:

Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration. During power reduction, vibrations are reduced.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.2, Power Reduction From Greater than 50% Power.

CAUTION Condenser Backpressure limits are on previous page.

CAUTION TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

CAUTION LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl-i 1 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated.

1. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/mm a PLACE turbine in IMP IN SRO

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE RD CONTROL

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/mm.

d. DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

EXAMINER: AS load is reduced, the turbine vibrations will improve (drop from their initial values.)

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal or Tavg lower than desired for at power conditions.

NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for Tavg Control

• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

2. INITIATE a manual boration:

a DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow RD rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1 FQ-62-1 39 to required quantity.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

4) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on i-FI-62-139.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from SOI-62.02,Boron Concentration Control,Section 6.7, Minor Boration.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 1 Page 2 of 51 Event

Description:

Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration. During power reduction, vibrations are reduced.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) Section 6.7, may be reproduced, laminated, displayed, reused, etc. as desired.

2) Minor Boration is defined as the addition of Boric Acid done several times each shift early in core life, to compensate for burnable poison burn-up, and maintain Tavg on program.

[1] ENSURE 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATER C [1-M-4], is ON to RO equalize RCS-Pzr CB.

[2] ADJUST 1 -FC-62-1 39, BA TO BLENDER [1 -M-6], for desired RO flow rate.

[3] ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6], for RO required quantity.

RO [41 PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6j, in BOR.

[5] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6J, to RO START.

[5.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[6] MONITOR the following parameters:

Instrument Location Parameters 1-Pl-62-122 1-M-6 VCT PRESS 1-Ll-62-129A -M-6 VCT LEVEL RO 1-Fl-62-139 -M-6 BATO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-139 1-M-6 BA BATCH COUNTER 1-Fl-62-142 1-M-6 PW TO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-142 1-M-6 PW BATCH COUNTER 1-Ll-62-238 1-M-6 BAT A LEVEL 1-Ll-62-242 1-M-6 BAT C LEVEL

[7] WHEN Boration is COMPLETE THEN RO PLACE 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE in AUTO

[8] TURN 1-HS-62-140A VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to START RO

[8.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[9] RETURN 1 -FC-62-1 39, BA TO BLENDER [1 -M-6J, to desired RO flow rate.

EXAMINER: The following actions are from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.2, Power Reduction From Greater than 50% Power.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

RO

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

• AFD within Target Band

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 1 Page 3 of 51 Event

Description:

Power reduction to reduce main turbine vibration. During power reduction, vibrations are reduced.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. REFER to EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO EXAMINER: Step is N/A for given conditions.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and SRO expected ramp rate.

NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in Tavg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR Tavg and Tref:

SRO

• Tavg trending to Tref.

RO

• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

SRO 8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

SRO

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1 -Sl-68-1 28.

EXAMINER: Further steps of AOI-39, Rapid Power Reduction are not included, since the crew will only reduce power to 85%, and the remainder of AOI-39 steps are power level dependent. Simulator Operator enters Event 2.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 4 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range Monitor N42 fails high L Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

83-A POWER RANGE OPERPOWER ROD WD STOP 83-D PLANT COMPUTER GENERATED ALARM (SEE ICS) 83-E POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION 90-B PZR PRESS LD-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON 115-C POWER RANGE FLUX HI 115-E POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI Control rods inserting at 72 steps per minute.

RO Diagnoses and announces Power Range N42 Failure.

May place rods in MANUAL after determining that there is no RD secondary runback in progress.

BOP May place SG 2 and 3 feedwater regulating valves in MANUAL.

Enter and direct actions of AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation SRD Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor Malfunction.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor Malfunction.

RD 1. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RD 2. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.

RD 3. CHECK N41 Normal RD 4. CHECK N42 Normal 4 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PLACE S/G 2 and SIG 3 Main FW reg valves in MANUAL PLACE all Bypass FW reg valves in MANUAL.

BOP ADJUST FW as required to maintain S/G levels on program.

PLACE S/G 1 and S/G 4 LEVEL NIS BIAS controllers in MANUAL.

MATCH bias controllers to demand output on S/Gs 1 and 4.

RD 5. CHECK N43 and N44 NORMAL

6. IF Main FW reg valves controlling S/G level, THEN:

a. ENSURE S/G Main FW reg valve level demand and level are BDP matched.

b. PLACE affected S/G Main FW reg valves in AUTO.

NOTE Control rod withdrawal may not be possible if a PRM has failed high due to the 103%

Rod Withdrawl Stop (C-2) (Annunciator window 83-A).

RD 7. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref within 3°.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 2 Page 5 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range Monitor N42 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. ENSURE 1-NR-92-145 recording an operable power range RO channel.

NOTE Inputs to 1-TR-68-2A include power range monitor, pressurizer pressure, T and Tavg.

Selection of an operable channel should consider other failures in addition to the failed power range monitor channel.

9. ENSURE 1-TR-68-2A placed to operable 1iT/OThT/OPtT RO channel using 1-XS-68-2B, iT RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT

[1 -M-5].

10. DEFEAT affected PRM functions:

SRO

• REFER TO Attachment 1, PRM Function At NIS Rack.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Attachment 1, PRM Function At NIS Rack.

NOTE The following annunciators may be affected by defeating a PRM channel:

• [66-C, 67-C, 68-C, 69-C] N-(#) OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED.

• [82-E] NIS CHANNEL IN TEST.

• [83-A] POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP.

• [83-E] POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION.

• [115-C] POWER RANGE FLUX HI.

• [115-El POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI.

A. PERFORM the following steps for the affected PRM:

1. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for RO UPPER SECTION to failed channel. (N42)

2. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for LOWER SECTION to failed channel. (N42)

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-A, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP will clear (if channel failure was high) and window 66-C, 67-C, 68-C OR 69-C, N-(#)

OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED, will come into alarm depending on which channel is bypassed.

RO 3. PLACE ROD STOP BYPASS switch to failed channel. (N42)

4. PLACE POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to failed channel.

RO (N42)

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-E, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION, will clear and annunciator window 82-E, NIS CHANNEL IN TEST, will come into alarm.

5. PLACE COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to failed RO channel. (N42)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 6 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range Monitor N42 fails high Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 115-E, POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI, will clear if the positive rate trip light is LIT.

6. IF POSITIVE RATE TRIP is LIT, THEN RESET RATE MODE RO switch.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor malfunction, at Step 11.

11. IF Bypass FW reg. valves are in MANUAL AND controlling SIG level, THEN:

SRO Determines that the step is not applicable, and continues to the next step.

12. WHEN failed PRM defeated AND AUTO rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 10.

SRO

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1 -M-4].

c. PLACE control rods in AUTO.

SRO 13. INITIATE repairs on failed channel.

SRO 14. NOTIFY Work Control to have IM trip failed channel bistables.

CAUTION Power fuses should not be removed during the performance of lMl-160 until affected SIG level controls are in manual at either the SG LEVEL NIS BIAS controller(s) or the Main FW reg valve controllers.

15. WHEN notified bistables are tripped, THEN CHECK lights and alarms referenced in Appendix A are LIT.

SRO Determines that conditions of the step are not met and continues to the next step.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 7 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range Monitor N42 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

16. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.3.1-1, RxTrip System (RTS) 2.a. Power Range Neutron Flux - High Condition D. One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND Reduce THERMAL POWER to 75% RTP within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />; OR Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND Perform SR 3.2.4.2 every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

3.a. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate High Positive Rate Condition E. With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />

6. Overtemperature 1 T Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> EXAMINER: P-7 remains operable.

SRO 16.c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

16.d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

16 e Power Range Neutron Flux P-b Condition R. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 324 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR)

SR 3.2.4.2 Verify QPTR is within limit using the movable incore detectors, once within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

17. NOTIFY Operations Duty Manager and Rx Engineering of failed SRO channel.

18. DO NOT CONTINUE with this Instruction UNTIL failed PRM SRO repair is completed.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 8 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range Monitor N42 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 9 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

14-E 1-M-1 THRU 1-M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT 29-E #3 HD TANK LEVEL HI/LO 30-E #3 HD TANK BYP TO CONDENSER OPEN BOP Diagnoses and announces 1C #3 heater drain tank pump trip May enter and direct actions of AOI-39 Rapid Load Reduction to SRO reduce load to within secondary pump capabilities May enter and direct actions of AOI-37 Rapid Load Reduction if SRO actions taken to reduce load are delayed EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 14-E, BOP [1] DETERMINE what equipment tripped.

BOP [2] PLACE control switch for tripped equipment in OFF.

BOP [3] START spare equipment as needed.

[4] ADJUST plant conditions as necessary to compensate for SRO equipment affected.

[5] REFER TO Tech Specs for operability requirements of affected SRO equipment.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 29-E,#3 HD TANK LEVEL HIILO.

[1] DISPATCH Operator to determine tank level by BOP sightglass/indicator.

[2] IF greater than 85% turbine load and all of the following exist, THEN GO TO AOl-37, Turbine Runback Response.

BOP

. 1-LIS-6-26 indicates > 79% level

. Low#3HDTpumpflow(1O,000gpm)

[3] If HI/LO tank level alarm due to level control failure, THEN BOP PLACE 1-LIC-6-105 and/or 1-LIC-6-106 in MANUAL AND RESTORE level to normal using sightglass/level indicator.

NOTE Any #3 HDT pump NOT running with turbine load 85% will place 1-HIC-6-106 in service to position 1-LCV-6-106A at approximately 56% open, indicated by a blue light which will illuminate on the local panel above the 1-LCV-6-106A RESET button. The RESET button must be pushed to allow normal valve control prior to raising load when all pumps are available. The blue light should go out when the circuit is reset. SOI-5&6.O1 may be referenced for instructions on resetting LCV 6-106A, and transferring control from 1-HIC-6-1-106A back to 1-LIC-6-106.

Appendix D ReQuired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 10 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF level is high, THEN

[a] VERIFY 1-LCV-6-106A OPEN.

[b] IF 1-LCV-6-106A is throttled, THEN RESET 1-LCV-6-106A per SOI-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains And Vent System.

BOP

[c] VERIFY 1-LCV-6-105A and -105B OPEN.

[d] CHECK #3 Heater Drain Pumps operation.

[e] IF #3 Heater Drain Pump (s) tripped, THEN REFER TO SOI-5

& 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains And Vent System for pump restart and system restoration.

[5] IF level is low, THEN BOP [a] VERIFY 1-LCV-6-106A CLOSED.

[b] VERIFY 1-LCV-6-105A and -105B CLOSED.

[6] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if SRO necessary.

EXAMINER: The following action are taken from ARI 30-E, #3 HD TANK BYP TO CONDENSER OPEN.

[1] VERIFY either 1-LCV-6-105A or -105B open by indicating lights BOP on 1-)(X-6-1 [1-M-2].

[2] IF Turbine load greater than 85% and 1-LCV-6-105B full open, BOP THEN GO TO AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response.

[3] IF Turbine load less than 85%, THEN PERFORM the following,

[a] IF system alignment normal (i.e. pumping forward) THEN DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of problem, and PERFORM the following:

[1] VERIFY 1-LCV 106A OPEN.

SRO [2] IF 1-LCV-6-106A is throttled, THEN RESET 1-LCV-6-106A per SOl-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains And Vent System.

[b] CHECK #3 Heater Drain Pumps operation.

[c] IF #3 Heater Drain Pump(s) tripped, THEN REFER TO 501-5

& 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains And Vent System, for pump restart and system restoration.

SRO [4] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

EXAMINER: Since a load reduction was in progress using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, the SRO may direct the BOP to continue to drop load by repeating AOI-39, Step 1.

CAUTION Condenser Backpressure limits are on previous page.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 11 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

CAUTION LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl-i 1 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated.

1. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/mm:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN SRO

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE RO CONTROL.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/mm.

d. DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal or Tavg lower than desired for at power conditions.

NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for Tavg Control

• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

2. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1 -FC-62-1 39, to desired flow RO rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

3) PLACE mode selector i-HS-62-140B to BOR.

4) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-Fl-62-139.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

RO

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

• AFD within Target Band

4. REFER to EPIP-i, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO Step is N/A for given conditions.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and SRO expected ramp rate.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 12 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in Tavg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR Tavg and Tref:

SRO

• Tavg trending to Tref.

RO

• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

SRO 8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, SRO NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1 -Sl-68-1 28.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-37,Turbine Runback Response, which will be implemented if the load reduction is not successful in stabilizing the secondary plant prior to the runback logic being satisfied.

1. ENSURE BOP runback to less than or equal to 1000 MW (85%)

turbine load.

BOP Automatic runback falls to occur, requiring the BOP to use the Valve Position Limit pushbutton to drop turbine load.

2. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 3°F.

RO Since the rod control system is not responding in automatic, the RO must manually insert control rods during the load reduction.

3. ENSURE at least two #3 HDT pumps RUNNING WITH BOP ADEQUATE flow to maintain SIG levels.

4. MONITOR the following to determine if main turbine free of water induction:

• HTR level alarms.

BOP

• Turbine vibration.

• Turbine Metal Temperature ICS points T2609A-T261 1A and T2060A-T2062A.

RO 5. MONITOR AFD within the limits of LCO 3.2.3.

BOP 6. ENSURE SIG levels return to program.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 13 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. DISPATCH personnel to check the following to determine cause of #3 HDT high level:

1. 3 HDT level flow & controls BOP #2 FW heater level

• I-LCV-6-106A, #3 HDT level control [T2D/708 in valve pit].

1. 3 HDT pump cavitation control I-HS-6-106A NOT reset

[TI D1708 on west wall]

8 ENSURE condensate system pumps in service as unit load SRO requires REFER TO GO-4 Normal Power Operation

9. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one SRO hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling requirements.

10. REFER TO SOI-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains, and SRO Vent System to adjust #3 HDT LEVEL and reset pump cavitation control 1 -HS-6-I 06A as necessary.

BOP II. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT light LIT

12. RETURN valve position limiter to normal

a. ENSURE turbine in IMP OUT BOP b. REDUCE turbine load using REFERENCE CONTROL V (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT light not LIT, c RETURN valve position limiter to normal

13. IF C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT [66E] THEN BOP a. VERIFY steam dump valves have zero demand.

b. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch (1-HS-1-103D)

SRO 14. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO 15. RETURN TO Instruction ineffect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 14 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump I C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Control rods fail to insert in AUTO during the load reduction.

Diagnoses and announces failure of control rods to insert in AUTO.

RO May take manual control of rods and insert rods in response to the load reduction for the loss of the 1 C #3 heater drain tank pump.

May enter and direct actions of AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor SRO Control System.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-2,Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.6, Failure of Control Rods to Move on Demand.

RO 1. CHECK CONTROL ROD URGENT alarm LIT [86-A].

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF CONTROL ROD URGENT FAILURE alarm DARK, THEN PLACE control rods in MAN, AND ** GO TO NOTE prior to SRO Step 16.

The control rods may have been placed in MANUAL upon recognition of the failure of the AUTO function.

NOTE Steps 16, 17 and 18 are to be performed for control rod problems other than Urgent Failures.

16. CHECK for the C-5 LOW TURB IMPULSE PRESS ROD BLOCK RO

[66-Al Alarm window DARK.

17. CHECK for the following rod stop alarm windows DARK:

. INTERMED RANGE HI FLUX ROD WD STOP [82-B].

. POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP [83-A].

RO

• C-il BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCkED [64-F].

• OVERPOWER AT TURB RUNBACK & C-4 ROD BLOCK

[122-D].

• OVERTEMP AT TURB RUNBACK & C-3 ROD BLOCK

[1 23-D].

18. IF rod stop alarms are clear AND control rods will move in manual, THEN:

SRO .

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 3°F.

b. INITIATE repairs to auto rod control system.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input (i.e., T-avg, T-ref, or NIS) change and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 15 of 51 Event

Description:

1. 3 heater drain pump 1 C trips on instantaneous overcurrent. During load reduction/turbine runback, turbine runback fails to occur and rods fail to move in auto, Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

19. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1°F.

SRO b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1 -M-4j.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

20. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than SRO 15% in one hour.

SRO 21. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 16 of 51 Event

Description:

2A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

223-A ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO 223-B ERCW PMP A-A DISCH PRESS LO 226-B ERCW PMP D-A DISCH PRESS LO 227-C ERCW HDR 2A STRAINER zP HI Train A ERCW Header pressure dropping below 50 psig.

Announces alarms received on the ERCW system, and evaluates BOP alarm response instructions.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 3,Loss of Essential Raw Cooling SRO Water.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 223-A ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO.

BOP [1] CHECK 0-PI-67-18A, A ERCW SUP HDR PRESS [0-M-27A].

BOP [2] DISPATCH Operator to check ERCW Train A pumps.

[3] CHECK valve alignment to ERCW Hdr A per SO 1-67.01, SRO ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

[4] REFER TO AOl-I 3, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING SRO WATER.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 227-C, ERCW HDR 2A STRAINER AP HI.

BOP [1] CHECK 2-FI-67-61, 2A ERCW SUP HDR FLOW [0-M-27A].

BOP [2] DISPATCH Operator to evaluate problem locally.

[3] BACKWASH strainer(s) as required per SOl-67.01, ESSENTIAL BOP RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

[4] REFER TO AOl-i 3, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING SRO WATER.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 3, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water, Section 3.4, Supply Header Rupture in Yard; Strainer DP alarm LIT, AND low flow with low pressure on supply header.

1. CHECK supply header pressure high with any strainer DP alarm BOP LIT.

SRO 2. INITIATE strainer backwash for appropriate strainer(s) in alarm.

3. CHECK hdr press LO alarm, DARK:

BOP ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO [223-A]

ERCW HDR B SUP PRESS LO [229-A]

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 4 Page 17 of 51 Event

Description:

2A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

START additional pumps as required, AND, DISPATCH personnel to determine location of rupture, AND, ENSURE at BOP least one strainer discharge header Cross-Tie isolation valve closed on affected train:

A Train: 1 -ISV-67-1 117 OR 2-ISV-67-1 119 B Train: 1-ISV-67-1 118 OR 2-ISV-67-1 120 BOP 4. DISPATCH AUO, with radio, to the Rx MOV Bds.

NOTE I All supply headers may return normal if supply header pressure was initially high with strainer backwash being successful in reducing supply header pressure and restoring affected supply header flow.

NOTE 2 Both Train A Supply Headers may indicate below normal pressure, visual verification may be required.

NOTE 3 MOVs with power normally removed may not travel to full closed position under high flow conditions; local verification of isolation may be required.

5. CHECK Supply Header 1A flow at expected value for existing BOP plant conditions.

NOTE Both Train B Supply Headers may indicate below normal pressure, visual verification may be required.

6. CHECK Supply Header 1 B flow at expected value for existing BOP plant conditions.

7. CHECK Supply Header 2A flow at expected value for existing BOP plant conditions.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A cIl5E, 1-FCV-67-458.

b. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/7B, 2-FCV-67-22.

c. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/8A, 2-BOP FCV-67-81.

d. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 1 B To 2A Xtie, OPEN.

e. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 2A To 1 B Xtie, OPEN.

f. OPEN 1-FCV-67-458, CCS HxASup From Hdr lB.

g. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-22, Strainer 2A-A Inlet.

h. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-81, AG Supply Hdr 2A.

i. **GOTOStep1O

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 18 of 51 Event

Description:

2A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK in-service ERCW header pressures and flows return to BOP expected values for existing plant conditions.

BOP 11. CHECK pump amps NORMAL.

12. REFER TO Tech Specs:

Since the ERCW headers are cross-connected entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required.

• 3.4.6, RCS Loops-Mode 4 Not applicable.

• 3.7.8, Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ERCW) Entered, but LCO 3.0.3 is most limiting.

Condition A One ERCW train inoperable, other than for Condition C, I Enter applicable Conditions and SRO Required Actions of LCO 38 1, 4C Sources-Operating, for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ERCW. Restore ERCW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

• 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating Diesel Generators (DG5) remain aligned to their normal supply. LCO 3.8.1 is not directly applicable. An engineering evaluation may be addressed due to the Train B ERCW supply being cross-tied to the 2A ERCW header.

SRO 13. INITIATE repair.

14. EVALUATE placing strainer discharge Cross-Tie in service for a SRO clogged strainer, lAW SOI-67.01, Section 8.4 (A Train), OR Section 8 5 (B Train) 15 IF ERCW to in-service CCS heat exchanger was interrupted SRO THEN NOTIFY Duty System Engineer to initiate evaluation for effect on CCS equipment and piping

16. REFER TO S0l-67.01, Essential Raw Cooling Water System, for SRO system realignment.

SRO 17. RETURN to instruction in effect.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Manaiement Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 19 of 51 Event

Description:

C-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips.

Time ,,

1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

138-F PANEL M-9 MOTOR TRIPOUT 104-B LWR CNTMT TEMP HI RO Announces alarm 138-E, M-9 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

Goes to Panel 1-M-9 to determine which component(s) have tripped.

BOP Announces that C-A Lower Compartment Fan has tripped.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 1 38-E, M-9 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 138-E, PANEL M-9 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

BOP [1] DETERMINE from panel 1-M-9 which motor has tripped.

[2] DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of alarm and initiate BOP corrective action.

EXAMINER: With containment temperatures rising, the SRO may direct the BOP to start the lB-B Lower CNTMT Cooler. The following steps are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure Control, Section 5.4, StartuplReserve Alignment of Lower CNTMT Coolers.

[1] ENSURE ERCW aligned to Lower CNTMT Coolers per Section BOP

5.3. EXAMINER

The following steps are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure Control, 5.3, Lower CNTMT Cooler ERCW Alignment.

[1] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler lA-A is to be started or placed in reserve, THEN ENSURE the following [0-M-27A]:

Step is marked N/A

[2] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler I B-B is to be started or placed in reserve, THEN ENSURE the following [0-M-27AJ:

A. 1-FCV-67-99, LWR CNTMT B CLRS SUP CIV, OPEN.

B 1-FCV-67-105 LWR CNTMT B CLRS SUP CIV OPEN C. 1-FCV-67-103, LWR CNTMT B CLRS RET CIV, OPEN.

D. 1-FCV-67-104, LWR CNTMT B CLRS RET CIV, OPEN.

E. 1 -HS-67-1 OOA, LWR CNTMT CLR B OUTLET TCV, in P AUTO.

[31 IF Lower CNTMT Cooler iC-A is to be started or placed in reserve, THEN ENSURE the following [0-M-27Aj:

Step is marked N/A.

[4] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1 D-B is to be started or placed in reserve THEN ENSURE the following [0-M-27Aj Step is marked N/A.

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 20 of 51 Event

Description:

C-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following steps are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure Control, Section 5.4, StartuplReserve Alignment of Lower CNTMT Coolers.

NOTE Lower CNTMT Cooler IA-A drains to the Pocket Sump. Condensate from the drain may cause a plant computer alarm on Pocket Sump rate of rise. If a valid alarm occurs, the Pocket Sump level monitor should be declared inoperable and the actions of LCO 3.4.15 performed.

[2] REFER TO Section 3.0, Precaution 3.OH before starting or placing Lower CNTMT Coolers in reserve alignment.

[3] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler lA-A is to be started, THEN Step is marked N/A.

[4] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler I B-B is to be started, THEN A. ENSURE 1-HS-30-75A, LWR CNTMT CLR B-B, in A-AUTO, AND START Cooler with 1-HS-30-75A.

B. ENSURE LWR CNTMT CLR B-B, RUNNING.

[5] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler iC-A is to be started, THEN Step is marked N/A.

[6] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler ID-B is to be started, THEN Step is marked NIA.

[8] REFER TO Tech Specs.

There are no Technical Specifications to be entered for the loss SRO of the C-A Lower Compartment Fan. The SRO must evaluate Technical Requirements, and enter TR 3.6.3 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System, Condition A. One LCC fan inoperable, restore LCC fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Manaciement Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 21 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1,2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Reactor power rising as indicated on 1-NR-92-145.

Main generator megawatts dropping.

Reactor coolant system pressure dropping.

Tavg dropping.

Diagnoses and announces rising reactor power and decreasing RO RCS Tavg.

Diagnoses and announces generator megawatts decreasing, steam flows rising. Determines that containment pressure is not rising.

BOP May dispatch personnel to assist in locating the source of the steam leak.

May enter and direct actions of AOl-38, Main Steam or Feedwater SRO Line Leak.

EXAMINER: The following steps are taken from AOI-38, Main Steam or Feedwater Line Leak.

1. IF leak threatens personnel safety, THEN:

a. TRIP Rx.

b. CLOSE the following:

SRO

• MSIVs.

. MSIV bypass valves.

c. GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Until reports are received from personnel outside the control room, the SRO may continue with AOl-38 performance.

BOP 2. CHECK SIG PORVs CLOSED.

BOP 3. CHECK steam dump valves CLOSED.

4. CHECK reactor power less than or equal to 100%:

RO

• Loop tT.

. NIS power range monitors.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

REDUCE turbine load to 90% with valve position limiter.

IF Rx power returns to 100%, THEN BOP/RO

a. TRIP Rx.

b. CLOSE all MSIVs and bypass valves.

c. ** GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO 5. ENSURE Tavg and Tref. within 3°F.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D Op Test No.: NRC Scenario 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 22 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIV5 close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1, 2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE

• It is a normal condition for Turbine load and Rx power to exhibit a nominal mismatch for loads less than 50%.

• Hotwell makeup will rise following a rapid runback. The makeup flow should be allowed to stabilize before making any determination of leak size.

6. MONITOR leak less than 3% of required steam or FW flow:

. IF power greater than 50%, THEN COMPARE turbine load to BOP reactor power and AT.

• OBSERVE steam and FW flow recorders.

. OBSERVE hotwell level makeup less than 950 gpm.

EXAMINER: It is expected that the steam leak will be large enough for the SRO to determine that a reactor trip and MSIV closure is required.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

BOPIRO a. TRIP Rx.

b. CLOSE all MSIVs and bypass valves.

c. ** GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EXAMINER: Since the MSIVs failed to close when the handswitches were placed in CLOSE, the BOP may dispatch an AUO to the Auxiliary Control Room to place the MSIV transfer switches in the AUS position to attempt to close the valves.

EXAMINER: The following steps are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE I Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO

• RPls at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO

• CSST (offsite),

OR

• D/G (blackout).

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 23 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1, 2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -XX-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D

5. EVALUATE support systems:

BOP

• REFER TO Appendixes A and B (E-0), Equipment Verification pages 15-28.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% AD)).

8. MONITOR RCS temp stable at or trending to 557°F:

• IF any RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-avg trending to 557°F.

RD

• IF NO RCP running, THEN MONITOR RCS Loop T-cold trending to 557 F 8 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED IF cooldown continues THEN PLACE steam dump controls OFF CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm RO UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV]

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or SIG PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

RD

• 1 -FCV-62-54

• 1 -FCV-62-55

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 24 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1,2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

[ Time I Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

RO a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

RO EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors RO 12 CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK SIG pressures:

RO All SIG pressures controlled or rising All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig 14 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED SRO IF SIG pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CAUTION If a faulted SIG is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

BOP I ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Manually CLOSE valves BOP IF valves can NOT be closed, THEN Locally REMOVE power to valves:

. DISPATCH NAUO to perform Attachment 1 (E-2).

NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2 PLACE steam dump controls OFF BOP

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

• 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact S/G:

• Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR SRO

• Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 25 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1, 2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: IF pressure in all four SIGs SRO dropping uncontrolled THEN GO TO ECA-2 1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ECA-2.1,Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.

CAUTION If, at anytime, except during SI termination steps 14 through 24, any Intact S/G can be isolated from the break and re-pressurized, then recovery actions should continue with E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

SRO I REFER TO EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart CAUTION If the TD AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow to ANY S/G, the steam supply must be maintained available.

2. ENSURE secondary pressure boundary isolated:

• ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

BOP

• ENSURE MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

• ENSURE MEW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

• IF both MD AEW pumps available, THEN ENSURE steam supply valves to TD AEW pump CLOSED.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Manually CLOSE valves to restore pressure boundary on at least one S/G.

IF valves CANNOT be closed, THEN DISPATCH personnel to close valves locally, one loop at a time:

BOP

• CLOSE MSIV and bypass valve as necessary USING Attachment 1 (ECA-2 1).

• ISOLATE S/G atmospheric relief valve as necessary.

• CLOSE additional feedwater or condensate MOVs as necessary.

• ISOLATE blowdown locally as necessary.

CAUTION If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, should NOT be implemented.

NOTE Minimum detectable flow is assured by observing flow indicator response to valve movement.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 26 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1,2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task I WOG Critical Task List ECA 2 1 A Control the AFW flow rate to minimum detectable flow to each SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before FR-P. 1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, Critical Safety Function Status Tree develops an ORANGE PATH condition.

If feed flow to a SG is isolated and the SG is allowed to dry out, subsequent reinitiation of feed flow to the SG could create significant thermal stress conditions on SG components. Maintaining a minimum verifiable feed flow to the SG allows the components to remain in a wet condition, thereby minimizing any thermal shock effects if feed flow is later increased.

Critical 3. CONTROL feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown and prevent SIG Task I dryout:

a. CHECK T-cold cooldown rate less than 100°F in the last one hour.

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP REDUCE feed flow to each S/G to minimum detectable to minimize cooldown. ** GO TO Substep 3c.

c. IF any SIG NR level drops to 29% [39% ADV], THEN MAINTAIN at least minimum detectable flow to each SIG with low level.

4. MONITOR shutdown margin during RCS cooldown:

• REFER TO SRO 1-SI-0-10, Shutdown Margin OR REACTINW Computer Program.

RO 5. MONITOR T-hot stable or dropping.

EXAMINER: At this point in the scenario, the #1, #2 and #3 MSIVs will close. The crew will transition back to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation for additional actions.

BOP I ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

• 1-HS-I-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact SIG:

• Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR SRO

• Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 6 and 7 Page 27 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1,2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. IDENTIFY Faulted SIG based on ANY of the following:

• Any SIG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR

• Any SIG pressure less than 120 psig, OR

• SIG enclosure temps high:

BOP 1)TlOO2Afor2 and 3,

2) Ti 003A for 1 and 4.

OR

• Local indication of break in any of the following:

1) Main steam lines,

2) Main feedwater lines, CAUTION

• If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one SG.

• RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one SIG.

Critical Task 2 WOG Critical Task List for E-Z A Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2.

Isolation of the feedwater to the faulted SG maximizes the cooldown capability of the non-faulted loops following a feedline break and minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and energy release following a steamline break. Isolation of steam paths from the faulted SG also minimizes the RCS cooldown and mass and energy release to containment. In addition, isolation of these steam paths could isolate the break.

Transition is made from ECA-2. I back to E-2 when MSIVs are closed for three of four SGs Critical 5. ISOLATE Faulted SIG:

Task 2

a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted SIG.

b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted SIG:

• MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

BOP

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

• MFPs TRIPPED.

c. ENSURE Faulted SIG PORV CLOSED.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

NOTE TD AFW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from an S/G with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available.

BOP 6. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

BOP 7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 5 Event# 6and7 Page 28 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Break outside containment. No MSIVs close initially. After entry into ECA-2.i, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, #1,2 and 3 MSIVs are closed manually. #4 MSIV remains open for the duration of the scenario.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted SIG blowciown, THEN ADJUST Intact SIG PORV controllers in AUTO to:

BOP P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

OR P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

• SIG discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

• SIG sample results by Chemistry.

Critical Task 3 Establish secondary heat sink (return AFW flow to intact SGs greater than 410 gpm) to meet SI termination criteria prior to entering FR-H. 1.

During performance of ECA-2. 1, flow had been reduced to minimum detectable flow to minimize the RCS cooldown. Flow must be manually reestablished in order meet secondary heat sink requirements and allow SI termination.

Critical 10. CHECK SI termination criteria:

Task

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one Intact SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADVj.

e. ** GO TO ES-i .1, SI Termination.

EXAMINER: Terminate the scenario when the decision is made to transition to ES-i .1, SI Termination, and inform crew that another crew will continue from this point, and terminate the scenario.

END OF SCENARIO

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page29of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-D Rev 28 I Step I ActionExpec:ed Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA

EC)

Page 1 Df 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION ENSURE POBsOPEN: OPENmanually.

• PCB 5084.

• POB 5088.

2 ENSURE AEW pump operation: ESThBLISH at least one train

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING. AFW oporation.

• ID FW pump RUNNING.

• LCVs iii AUTO, ur uuiliolleti n MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolalion: Manually CLOSE valves and

• MFW isoation and bpass STOP Ph1PS; as necessary.

isolation ialves CLOSED.

IF any valves can NOT be closed,

• MF reg and bypass reg valves THEN CLOSED. CLOSE #1 hooter outlet valves.

• MP A and B TRIPPED.

• Standby rvlFP STOPFED.

• Cond detnin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cond booster punps TRIPPED.

14 o128

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page3Oof5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I I Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENCIXA (E-O)

Page 2 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in

• RVVST outlets i-LCV-62-1 35 each set alignei and I-LOV-62-136 OPEN.

• \/CT ouUots 1-LCV-62-i 32 and I-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Charging 1-F-V-i2-9U and 1 -FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNIN(3. c. Manually START Rl-IR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1-FC/-63-25 and aligned, and flov thrL BIT.

1 -FC\/-63-26 OPEN.

• FlDv, thru BIT.

f. RCS presswe if. ENSURE SI pump flow.

greater than 1650 psig.

IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow, 15 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 31 of 51 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I I ActionExpected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 3 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 5 CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent

a. Phase A isolation: otion signal,

• Train A GREEN, Manually CLOSE valves and

• Train B GREEN. dampers as necessary.

b. Cntmt vent isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

16 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 32 of 51 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 I Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 4 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

Phase B DARK [MISSP] 1) ENSURE Phase B actuatecL Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSPJ. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray Cntmt press less than 28 psig. actuated.

3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train 8 GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated.

THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntrnt [ADV]

setpoints where provided.

li of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page33of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step I ActionExpected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-D)

Page 6 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION 7 CHECK plant radiaticn NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit supervisor

• S/G blowdown rad recorder IMMEDIATELY.

1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2],

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-1 19 NORMAL prior to trip {M-1 2].

• 1-RR-Pfl-1fl and 1-RR-Pfl-112 raciation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-1 2].

• S/c5 main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

{M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

8 ENSURE all DiGs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START DiGs 18 of 28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page34of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response I Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-O)

Page 6 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

9. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.

FCO-30-146B.

• FCO-30-157A.

• ECO-30-157B.

10. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as RUNNING, one on each shutdown necessary.

board preferred.

ii. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be aligned to OPEN to running D/Gs. running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

12. ENSURE CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TC) HDR B, to position A.

0-ECV-67-l 52, is open to position A.

19 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page35of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ov 28 Step I Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Dbtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 7 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

13. CLOSE CCS HX C DISC H TO HDR A, O-FCV-67-1 44.

14. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans OPEN

• ECTS fans RUNNING. dampers.

• ENSURE dampers OPEN VERlY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

15. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as

• lA-A CCS pump. necessary.

- I B-B CCS pump.

• C-S OR 2B-B CCS pump.

NOTE

• The Upper and Lower Cntmt rad monitors sampling pumps should be shutdown if the sample flowpath is isolated.

The fo lowing equipment is located on i-M-9.

16. CHECK CNTMT PIJRGE fans STOP fans and STOPPED: PLACE handswitch in PU LL-TO-LOC K.

20 cf 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page36of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 23 Step I I ActionExpected ResDonse I I Response Nct Oh:ained APPENDIXA (E-0)

Page 8 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

17. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans and STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading PLACE handswitch in dampers CLOSED: FULL-TO-LOCK. manually CLOSE dampers.

13. ENSURE AB GEN SUPFLY and EXH STOP fans and sans STOPPED. PLACE [landsWitch in PULL-TD-LOC K.

NOTE

• Dumpers 1-HS-30-158 wid 2-HS-30-270 reriwinupeil duiiiig ABI.

1 . ENSURE A C.+/-N SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE danpers.

dampers CLOSED.

20. ENSURE rvlCR& SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE danpers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• C\-3l-3.

• FCV-3l-4.

21 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page37of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-O Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response I I Response Not Obtained APPENDIXA (E-O)

Page 9 of ID EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

21. ENSURE at least one CB EMER Manually START fan.

CLEAN UP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

CB EIV1ERG CLEANUP FAN A-A.

OR Fan B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31 -8, OPEN.

NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-7, OPEN.

22. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS Manually START fan.

fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, OR PAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-3, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

FCO-31-5. OPEN.

22 of 28

I Aorendix D Required Ojerator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page38of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION E-Q Re\ 28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX A (E-0)

Page 10 of 10 EQUIPMENT VERIFICATION

23. ENSURE Control Building fans Manually STOP fans.

STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY and NOTIFY TSC if any EXH FANS AND dam pers. damper NOT CLOSED.

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST FAN AND dampers.

24. INITIATE Appendix B.

23or28

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 39 of 51 WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained APPENDIX B (E-O)

Page 1 of 1 PHASE B PIPE BREAK CONTINGENCIES

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated, WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs:

(MISSP iXX556C, -6D}

THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-iiO CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perrorm (dSP 1-XX-55-GE)

ATTACHF1ENT 81.

[Atrain. window 13]

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perrorm (dSP 1-XX-55-GE)

- ATTACHMENT 62.

[A -train. window 43]

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP 1-XX-55-SE)

- ATTACHMENT 63.

[A -train, window 73]

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-1$O CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform (CISP 1-XX-55-6F)

- ATTACHMENT 64.

[B train, window 74]

24 or 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page4Oof5l WBN REACTOR TRIF OR SAFETY INJECTION ev 23 ATTACHMENT Bi (E I])

Page or i CONTROL AIR ISOLATION

1. CLOSE D-SV 1013 CONTRDL AIR EL 713 A5 HD ISDL

[A6S EL. 1 3] (chain operated Dehirkd Fuel anc Waste Handing Bd. A).

2. IF O[S\L32013 CANNOT BE CLOSED.

TRN:

OPEN ad DISCONNECT C&SS air conpressor brker:

a O-BKR-32-25 4BOV SD BD 1A2-A, C?D b O-6KR-32-2S 4E0V SD BD lB 1-B, C/3D c) O-DKR-32-27 43DV AJJX DLDG COM DD. C/GC ci O-BKR-32-.1100A .180V URB BLDG COM BD, CfI5C 25 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page 41 of5l WN IEACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION fle 28 Al LAGHMENI h2 (E-C)

Pige 1 o 1 ERCW ISOLATION

1. UNLOCK AND CLOSE i-IS\-G7-523E - LOVER CNTMT \LNT CLR 10 &1D ERCW SUP ISOL EA2U/62] :U-i penetration room - Norm 01 A ipe Cflase Coo er lB-B in overhead) 26 o28

[Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page42of5l WBN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev 28 ATTACHIV1ENT 63 (E-O)

Pçje1 of I CCS RETURN ISOLATION

1. CLOSE i-IS/-70-T0O RCP OIL COOLER CCS RETURN ISOLATION

[A4?V EL. 710 U-i Penetration Roorril (approxmateI 10 ft. North of Penetration Room Cooler lB-B on nezanine above RHR Surnp Vk/e Roorr) 27 of 28

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page43of5l ATTACHI\IENT 84 (F-i])

Page of I CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION

1. CLCSE 1-SV-7O-16 ACTOR U[LDlNG CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION A6i EL. 737] (Behind ElDvetor apprcxirnatDly 2 f wesi on mezzanine above A COS Heal Exchanger 2 0128

jAendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page44of5l AOI-17 WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page ii of 26 3.3 BOP Reali9nment ACTiON/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Performance of this instruction should not be allowed to delay or interfere with actions required by applicable emergency procedures or abnormal operating procedures.

NOTE I Control room operators may initiate shutdown of pumps and equipment from the bencliboard immediately after a trip. Performance of this instruction will subsequently verify proper secondary equipment alignment.

NOTE 2 Steps in this section and items in Attachment 1 may be performed out of sequence.

DISPATCH turbine building NAUO to perform Attachment 1.

2. NOTIFY condensate demineralizer NAUO prior to Operator initiated press changes in condensate.

3. REMOVE generator excitation from service:

a. PLACE voltage regulator to TEST.

b. ZERO exciter base adjuster.

c. OPEN exciter field breaker.

d. PLACE exciter regulator control to OFF

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page45of5l AOl-i 7 WBN TURBINETRIP Revision43 Page 12 of 26 33 BOP Realignment i:Gontinuecl)

ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

4. MONITOR main turbine:

a. WHEN less than 1500 rpm, THEN:

• ENSURE seal oil backup pump RUNNING.

• ENSURE turning gear oil pump RUNNING.

b. WHEN less than 600 rpm, THEN ENSURE bearing lift oil pump RUNNING.

c. WHEN turbine is at ZERO RPM, THEN ENSURE turbine on turning gear.

d. MAINTAIN MTOT lube oI temp betv een 95 and lOOT 1

(may reqwre RCW isolation if TC/ has excessive leakage).

e. MAINTAIN GENERATOR H2 (Cold cas) temp 9FF (may require RCW isolation it TCV has excessive leakage).

f ENSURE Gland Steam Spillover Bypass valve is CLOSED using 1-HS-47-1 91A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page46of5l A0I-17 WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 13 ot26 3.3 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTION!EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

5. ALIGN MSRs

a. PUSH RESET on MSR control panel.

b, CLOSE MSR HP steam and bypass isol.

c. ENSURE MSR warming valves CLOSED.

d, OPEN MSR startup vents.

a. CLOSE MSR operating vents.

CHECK MSIVs OPEN. IF vacuum is to be maintained, THEN ENSURE auxiliary boiler is aligned for steam seals.

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 j Page47of5l AGI-17 WBM TURBINE TRIP Revisioh 43 Page 14 of 26 3.3 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTIONJEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

7. ENSURE adequate FW press:

a ENSURE two hotwell pumps RUNNING.

Lx IF FVV isolation reset.

THEN NSUR one condensate booster pump RUNNING if needed for unit conditions.

c.. ENSURE CNDS demin pumps OFF.

d. STOP #3 HDT pumps. and CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate beater strings. Notify NAUC perrorming Attachment 1 that 3 HDT pumps are stopped.

e. STOP #7 HDT pumps, and CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate heater strings.

S. SHUTDOWN ny MFV/ pump NOT required.

9. SHUTDOWN any RCVV pumps NOT required.

10. SHUTDOWN anyCCW pumpsNoT required

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page48of5l AOI-17 WBN TURBINE TRIP RvisioL 43 Page 1 Qt26 3.3 BOP Realignment (Continued)

ACTlQNfEXPECTE RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OTA1NEE 11 - ALIGN extraction steam valves and drain valves:

a CLOSE 1 and 2 Heater extraction steam valves..

b ENSURE turbine drain valves OPEN.

C. OPEN r 1FW pump turbine 1

crain valves.

12. PERFORM as required:

a OBTAIN switching instructions troni NEAD, and OPEN main generator PC6(s) rio Ds.

b FULL-TO-LOCK bus duct cooling tans.

c. VERIFY MTOT and seal oil ternps STABLE and trending to 9°F.

IF MFW isolated to steam generators, THE N REQUEST Chem Lab sample condensate and feedwater prior to re-adrnittin water to S/Ga from condensate feedwater sste m.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page49of5l AOI-17 WBN TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 160126 3.3 BOP Realignment C:ontinued)

ACT[ON/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT O8TAINED 14.. IF EGTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 30 minutes and place in P-AUTO:

REFER TO SOI-G5.02, Emergency Gas Treatment System, section on Auto EGTS Actuatior.

16.. IF ABGTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 30 minutes and place in P-AUTO:

• REFER TO 501-30.06, Auxiliary Building Ga Treatment System, section an Auto Start of AEGIS.

CAUTION Rx trip bkrs must be cycled to allow reset of MFW when isolated by SI, HI-HI S/G level, or flood level in MS valve vault room. If any SI signal is present with Auto SI blocked, cycling Rx trip bkrs will initiate SI actuation.

16.. IF MFW NOT in service, THEN ESTABLISH MFW:

• REFER TO Attachment 2, stabIishing MFVI Following Reactor Trip.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Page5Oof5l AOl-17 WBM TURBINE TRIP Revision 43 Page 17 of 26 33 BOP Realignment (Cantinuect)

ACTIONJEXPECTED RESPONSE RESPOMSE NOT OBTAINED iT CHEGK 3/6 NR levels between IF S/G level can NOT be 38%- and 50%. maintained.

THE N START M-D AFW pumps.

18 RETURN TO applicable Instruction.

- END OF SUBSECTION -

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Page 51 of5l WBN LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT E-1 Rev 15 APPENDIX E (E-1)

Page 1 of I EQUIPMENT EVALUATION

1. EVALUATE plant equipment and systems needed to support long term cooling and recovery actions, as time and personnel availability permits:

a. Cntmt Isolation Status.

b. Emergency Gas Treatment System:

One train in operation, REFER TO SOI-65.02.

c. Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment:

One train in operation, REFER TO SOI-30.06.

dAuxiliarv Building Isolation alignment:

REFER TO SOI-30.06.

e. Main Control Room Isolation alignment:

REFER TO 301-31.01.

f ERCW System:

Both trains in operation.

g. Component Cooling Water System:

Both trains in operation.

22 or 22

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST 5 Page of QSM US/MCR Unit UO Unit Off-going Name AUO Station Q STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

• Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

1 A Containment Spray Pump is out of service for motor bearing replacement. Pump has been out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. Expected to be returned to service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-RI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils. Operations Management and System Engineering have met, and directed that a power reduction to 90% at 2% per minute using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction be conducted as soon as shift relief and turnover is complete.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 - Performed by on-coming shift El A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

Q A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUO5) Q PER review (N/A for AUO5)

El TACFs (N/A for AUO5) El Operator workarounds, burdens El Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [08-03-2009]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of QSM Q US/MCR Unit UO Unit Off-going Name j1 AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

IA Containment Spray Pump is out of service for motor bearing replacement. Pump has been out of service for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.6.6.A was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago. Expected to be returned to service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils. Operations Management and System Engineering have met, and directed that a power reduction to 90% at 2% per minute using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction be conducted as soon as shift relief and turnover is complete.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift Q A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

LJ A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

Q Standing Orders Q LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) J PER review (N/A for AUOs)

U TACFs (N/A for AUOs) U Operator workarounds, burdens U Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift U A wallcdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

WA 40741 [08-20091 Page 1 of I OPDP-l-l [08-03-2009]

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar NRC Exam I Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: I August 2010 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions: 75% power, BOL. RCS boron concentration is 1128 ppm. Control Rod Bank Dat 184 steps.

Turnover: Unit 1 is at 75% power. A power escalation to the preconditioned power level of 96% is to be conducted using GOI-4, Normal Power Operations. 1 D CCW pump was shutdown in order to perform maintenance on the motor. Repairs have been completed and the pump is now available. 0-S 1-30-8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation has been in progress for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. TD AFWP is out of service to replace the trip-and-throttle valve and associated linkage. Tech Spec 3.7.5.B was entered for the TD AFWP 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago. Expected return to service is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Train A/Channel I Work Week.

Event MaIf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 n/a R-RO Raise power after repairs to 1 D CCW pump are complete.

N-BOP 2 mux_03c066 C-BOP ABGTS Fan belt fails during 0-S 1-30-8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas TS-SRO Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation surveillance performance.

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 hic-62-78a C-RO TIC-62-78 letdown temp controller fails high. ARI 1 10-D, LTDN TO DEMINS TEMP HI and ARt 247-A, LTDN HX RET FLOW LO, entry 4 rx07a 1-RO 1-PT-68-340, PZR PRESS fails low. Requires manual control of 1-PlC-TS-SRO 68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL. Requires entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

5 edlib C-BOP Loss of 120 Vac Instrument Power Rack B (1-M-7). Requires entry into TS-SRO ARI i5-E, PNL 1-M-7 BREAKER TRIP, and SOI-237.02, 120v AC Instrument Power 1 B, to transfer the rack to its alternate power source.

BOP must respond to multiple alarms.

6 sic-46-20a 1-BOP 1A MFP speed controller fails low. Requires trip of the IA MFP and entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

7 fw2O M-ALL Main feedwater header breaks in the Turbine Building, on the common header downstream of the Number 1 (high pressure) feedwater heaters.

8 rpOl b C-RO Automatic reactor trip fails to actuate. Requires the RO to manually trip rprtl the reactor. Trip switch RT-1 on l-M-4 fails to actuate. RO trips the reactor using trip switch RT-2 on 1 -M-6.

9 fw07a M-ALL 1 A-A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump trips on instantaneous li22c overcurrent. 1 B-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump develops a break on its discharge line. Requires entry into FR-H.I, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and establishment of bleed-and-feed.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam AUgust 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 6 (Snare) Summary Initial Condition 75% power, BOL. RCS boron concentration is 1128 ppm. Control Rod Bank D at 184 steps.

Turnover Unit 1 is at 75% power. A power escalation to the preconditioned power level of 96% is to be conducted using GOl-4, Normal Power Operations. 1 D CCW pump was shutdown in order to perform maintenance on the motor. Repairs have been completed and the pump is now available. TD AFWP is out of service to replace the trip-and-throttle valve and associated linkage. Tech Spec 3.7.5.A was entered for the TD AFWP 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago.

Expected return to service is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Train A/Channel I Work Week.

Event 1 Power escalation is conducted using GO-4, Normal Power Operations.

Event 2 ABGTS Fan belt fails during 0-S 1-30-8-A surveillance performance. Operator responds to ARI 1 39-A, ABGTS FAN A-NB-B FLOW LO alarm, and shuts down the A-A ABGTS fan.

SRO evaluates Tech Specs and enters LCO 3.7.12, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Condition A.

Event 3 TIC-62-78 letdown temp controller fails. RO responds to ARI 1 1 0-D LTDN TO DEMINS TEMP HI and takes manual control of temperature controller for the duration of the scenario.

Event 4 1-PT-68-340, PZR PRESS fails low. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.SRO enters AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System and directs compensatory actions.

SRO evaluates Tech Specs and enters Tech Spec LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation, Conditions W and X; LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Conditions D and L.

Event 5 Loss of 120 Vac Instrument Power Rack B (M-7). The BOP enters into ARI 15-E, PNL 1-M-7 BREAKER TRIP, and SOl-237.02, 1 20v AC Instrument Power 1 B, to transfer the rack to its alternate power source.

Event 6 1A MFP speed controller fails low. Requires trip of the 1 A MFP and entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

Event 7 Main feedwater header breaks in the Turbine Building, on the common header downstream of the Number 1 (high pressure) feedwater heaters.

Event 8 Automatic reactor trip fails to actuate. Requires the RO to manually trip the reactor. Trip switch RT-1 on 1-M-4 fails to actuate. RO trips the reactor using trip switch RT-2 on 1-M-6.

Event 9 1 A-A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. I B-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump develops a break on its discharge line. Requires entry into FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and feed-and-bleed actions to be taken.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 6 (Spare) Critical Task Summary Critical Task I Manually trip the reactor from the control room before manually tripping the turbine.

from WOG Critical Manually tripping the turbine before the reactor is tripped will cause an unnecessary Task List, E-O, A challenge to the steam generator PORV and Safety valves unless the reactor is tripped.

Reactor trip must be verified to ensure that the only heat being added to the RCS is from decay heat and reactor coolant pump heat. The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and pump heat are being added to the RCS.

Critical Task 2 Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate from WOG Critical head injection to occur.

Task List, FR-H. 1 Once the operator detects that secondary heat sink has degraded (SG wide range levels F. are less than or equal to 26%), RCS bleed and feed must be established to prevent or minimize core uncovery due to madequate core cooling.

Appendix D Watts Bar NRC Exam August 2010 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Senario 6 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 348 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 348.

c. Right click on lC# 348.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 348.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-1-18a-1 13060 stm flow to afpt isolation(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-1-15a hs-1-15a auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam s 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close hs-1-18a hs-1-18a steam flow to auxiliary feed pump turbine 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close hs-1-16a-1 13050 auxfw pmp turb stm supp(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-46-56a-1 05010 afwt a-s t&t position(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-1-16a hs-1-16a auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam s 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close hs-1-15a-1 13050 auxfw pmp turb stm supp(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-46-56a hs-46-56a mfpt a-s t&t position sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close hs-1-17a-1 13060 stm flow to afpt isolation(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-1-17a hs-1-17a steam flow to auxiliary feed pump turbin 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close Page 1 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 6 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value fwr27 overspeed trip linkage on turb afw pmp. R 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 tripped tripped rprtl rprtl manual reactor trip close-trip sw ) 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close i07a electric afw pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive fw2lb afW discharge line break afw pump lb-b M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 81 0 mux_03c066 139-a abgts fan a-a/b-b flow lo M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 On Off hic-62-78a 26050 letdown htx outlet temp 0 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 42.9382 rx07a pzr pressure transmitter fails to position chnl 1 68-340 M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 66.3382 edl lb loss of 120 vac inst power rack m-7 panel b M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive sic-46-20a sic-46-20a main feed pump turbine a speed controller 0 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto fw2O feed water line break M 7 00:00:00 00:01:00 80 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. Place RED HOLD NOTICE tags on 1-HS-1-15A, SG I STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-16A, SG 4 STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-17A STEAM HDR TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-18A STEAM HDR TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-46-56A-S T-D AFWP T&T VLV.

7. Ensure the indicating lights (RED and GREEN) on 1-HS-1-15A, SG I STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-16A, SG 4 STEAM SUPPLY TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-17A STEAM HDR TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-1-18A STEAM HDR TO T-D AFW PMP; 1-HS-46-56A-S T-D AFWP T&T VLV are DARK.

8. ENSURE annunciators 60-A, AFW PMP A-S ELEC OVERSPEED TRIP and 61-A, AFW PMP A-S MECH OVERSPEED TRIP are LIT.

9. ENSURE pink Protected Equipment tags are hung on thelA-A and lB-B MD AFW pump handswitches.

10. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30.

11. Place simulator in FREEZE.

Page 2 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 6 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

11. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) BOL (Beginning Of Life) is updated and on the desk, and that the BOL placards are on I-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

Item 3

• AFD -20  % 0.2  % 13.0  %

Lower Band Target Upper Band

-1.9 Actual

• Control Rods Auto Manual 184 steps Control Bank D1/D2 Item 4 Negative Positive None 1 -CCP A I -CCP B CB 1150 ppm Item 5 Current RCS C  :

5 1128 ppm Current fluid inside the blender is:

Acid L1 Water Blended PW flow rate 70 gpm 1-FC-62-142, dial setting 35%

BA flow rate 13.6 gpm 1-FC-62-139 dial selling 34%

6. Boric Acid (BA) and Primary Water (PW) volumes for the following changes:

1°FTavg increase 175 gal PW 1°F Tavg decrease 32 gal BA 10% Downpower @ 5%/hr 130 gal BA 50% Downpower @ 5%/hr 800 gal BA 1000 MW (85%) Runback 200 gal BA 950 MW (80%) Runback 285 gal BA 900 MW (75%) Runback 369 gal BA 790 MW or 800 MW Runback 535 gal PW

12. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 3 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 6 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No No I none Raise power after repairs to I C #3 HDT pump are complete.

ROLE PLAY: None 2 2 ABGTS Fan trips during 0-SI-30-8-A surveillance performance.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that A ABGTS Fan has tripped.

There is damage to the fan motor due to the drive belt failure.

3 3 TIC-62-78 letdown temp controller fails high ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that Letdownl-TCV-70-192 is responding to manual signals.

4 4 PZR press 1-PT-68-340 fails high ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge the report of the failure of 1-PT 340. If requested, state that a package to troubleshoot the failed circuit will be prepared. If requested to trip bistable, state that IMl-160.002 will be prepared and that personnel will contact the control room prior to tripping any bistables.

5 5 Loss of 120 Vac Instrument Power Rack B (1-M-7).

ROLE PLAY: Call the Control Room as a Unit 2 electrician and report that work was performed on the Unit I instrument power distribution panel instead of the Unit 2 instrument power distribution panel. The work in the panel resulted in the panel resulted in an inadvertent trip of the normal feeder breaker.

6 6 1A speed controller fail low, requiring IA MFP to be tripped.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, report that there is no sign of any problems with the MFP turbine speed changers or speed control circuit.

Page4of5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2010-08 NRC Examination Scenario 6 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No.

7 7 Main feedwater header breaks in the turbine building.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, report that there a large amount of steam in the Turbine Building and that you are ensuring that no one enters the Turbine Building.

ROLE PLAY: After the high pressure feedwater heater isolation valves are closed, report as the Turbine Building AUO that the noise has stopped, and that the steam is clearing from the Turbine Building.

8 none Automatic reactor trip fails to actuate. Requires the RO to manually trip the reactor. Trip switch RT-1 on 1-M-4 fails to actuate. RO trips the reactor using trip switch RT-2 on 1-M-6.

ROLE PLAY: None.

9 none I A-A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. I B-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump develops a break on its discharge line.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary building AUO, report that there is no apparent cause visible for the IA MD AFW pump trip.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, report that the IA MD AFW pump breaker tripped on instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, report that there is a pipe rupture on the piping associated with the lB-B MD AFW pump, pipe failure, downstream of back pressure regulating valve, and upstream of the level control valve on elev. 757 ft.

Page 5of5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 1 of 25 Event

Description:

Raise power after repairs to 1 D CCW pump are complete.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

Section 5.2, Unit Startup from 30% to 100% Reactor Power, with Step 24 being repeated to raise power. The crew begins at Step 38.

[24] CONTINUE ascension to 90% power (70 to 74% if following refueling) by performing the following:

[24.1] IF during any of the following steps the REFERENCE changes in an undesired manner, THEN ADJUST VPL to stop turbine load rise OR PUSH TURBINE MANUAL to place the turbine control mode in manual mode and BOP PROCEED to section 5.6.

[24.2] ADJUST VALVE POSITION LIMIT to 90% or to 5%

above the Gov Control Indication.

[24.3] SET LOAD RATE at predetermined value.

[24.4] PUSH REFERENCE CONTROL (raise) button to set desired load in SETTER display.

NOTE RCS should be diluted to raise TAVG, then Turbine load raised along with TAVG. Control rods will be used along with dilution to maintain AJ and, if needed, for temperature.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from SOl-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.6, Minor Dilution.

NOTES

1) Section 6.6, Minor Dilution, may be reproduced, laminated; displayed, reused, etc. as desired.

2) Minor Dilution is defined as the addition of Primary Water done several times each shift to compensate for fuel burn-up, and maintain Tavg on program.

[1] ENSURE 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATER C, is ON, to equalize Pzr-RCS CB.

[2] ADJUST 1-FQ-62-142, PW BATCH COUNTER, for required quantity.

[3] PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE in DIL.

[4] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

[4.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 1 Page 2 of 25 Event

Description:

Raise power after repairs to 1 D CCW pump are complete.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[51 MONITOR the following parameters:

Instrument Location Parameters 1-Pl-62-122 1-M-6 VCT PRESS 1-Ll-62-129A 1-M-6 VCT LEVEL l-FI-62-142 1-M-6 PWTO BLENDER FLOW 1-FQ-62-142 1-M-6 PW BATCH COUNTER 1-FQ-62-139 1-M-6 BA BATCH COUNTER

[6] WHEN dilution is COMPLETE, AND 1-FCV-62-128 is closed, THEN PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

[7] TURN 1-HS-62-.140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

[7.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

[8] IF desired to reduce VCT level, THEN GO TO Section 8.5, VCT Level Reduction.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

[24.5] PUSH GO button.

[24.6] MONITOR Generator Megawatts RISING.

[24.7] CHECK that load rise has STOPPED when reference BOP display equals setter OR IF desired to stop the load change THEN STOP the load change by DEPRESSING the HOLD pushbutton

[24.8] WHEN desired to resume the load change, THEN PRESS the GO push button and continue to monitor load.

[38] ENSURE both Stator Water Heat Exchangers are in service BOP prior to exceeding 75% power.

NOTE The numbers below the pressure indication for 1-PIS-47-13 correspond to four relays (LEDs) that enable the runback logic. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 should be illuminated indicating all four relays are enabled.

[39] CHECK HP Turbine Impulse Pressure I Turbine Runback LEDs BOP (1, 2, 3, 4) lit on panel L-262A, 1-PIS-47-13, TB 729 column T3IJ.

[40] IF startup is following refueling, THEN CONTINUE ascension to SRO 90% RTP by performing the following:

Step is marked as NIA

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 3 of 25 Event

Description:

Raise power after repairs to 1 D CCW pump are complete.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[41] BEFORE raising above 80% power, THEN ENSURE the following:

[41.1] 1 -LCV-6-1 06A controlling properly.

[41.2] 1 -LCV-6-1 05A and 1 05B are NOT open.

NOTES

1) After operations less than 85% Reactor power for more than 2 weeks, Reactor Engineering evaluation of Hot Channel Factors per 1-SI-0-20 is required, before exceeding 90% power.

2) Performing NIS check and adjustment relatively close to 100% power may eliminate the need to RE-PERFORM these actions upon reaching 100% power.

[42] WHEN power is at or above 95%, THEN PERFORM the following

[42.1) ADJUST PR NIS per 1-Sl-92-1, NIS Daily Comparison.

[42.2] IF evaluation of Hot Channel Factors is required, THEN ENSURE 1-Sl-0-20, COMPLETE.

[42.3] ENSURE MIG performs 1-SI-68-30 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after power stabilizes at 90% or above (N/A if NOT applicable).

[42.4] ENSURE the following level controllers maintaining levels within normal ranges:

A. Feedwater heaters.

B. MSR drain tanks NOTE Turbine is normally operated in IMP OUT control below 30% turbine load. IMP IN operation above 30% turbine load is permissible as long as the unit remains stable (e.g. no instabilities due to IMP IN operation.)

[42.5] IF desired to limit instabilities due to IMP IN operation at loads greater than 95%, THEN OBTAIN Unft SRO concurrence to operate in IMP OUT AND PLACE Turbine in IMP OUT.

[43] IF this a startup following a refueling, THEN HOLD power between 94 and 98% to complete post-refueling testing.

[44] IF startup is following refueling, THEN ENSURE applicable portions of the PETs are COMPLETE for full power operation.

[45] CONTINUE ascension to 100% power by performing the following:

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 4 of 25 Event

Description:

Raise power after repairs to 1 D CCW pump are complete.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTES

1) TI-45, Determination of Preconditioned Reactor Power, identifies ramp rates, specific power levels where HOLD times are required, and control rod withdrawal limits.

2) Power escalation ramp rates and hold times should be per the most conservative of either the fuel pre-conditioning guidelines of TI-45 or the Turbine loading recommendations of SQl-47.02

3) Turbine load change may be stopped by depressing the HOLD push button, using VPL, or by depressing the MANUAL push button

[45.1] IF during any of the following steps the REFERENCE changes in an undesired manner THEN ADJUST VPL. to stop turbine load rise OR PUSH TURBINE MANUALto place the turbine control mode in manual mode and PROCEED to section5.6

[45.2] CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT light is NOT LIT.

[45.3] SET VALVE POSITION LIMIT at 100% or to 5% above the Gov Control Indication.

[45.4] SET LOAD RATE at predetermined value.

[45.5] PUSH REFERENCE CONTROL A (raise) button to set desired load in SETTER display.

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 2 Page 5 of 25 Event

Description:

ABGTS Fan drive failure during O-SI-30-8-A surveillance performance. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

1 39-A ABGTS FAN A-A/B-B FLOW LO Announces Window 139-A, ABGTS FAN A-NB-B FLOW LO alarm RO when received.

Determines that A-A ABGTS fan motor is running based on RED BOP indicating light LIT on panel 0-M-25.

Enters and directs actions of ARI 1 39-A ABGTS FAN A-A/B-B SRO FLOW LO.

May direct the BOP to shutdown the A-A ABGTS Fan using 0-Sl SRO 8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 139-A ABGTS FAN A-NB-B FLOW LO.

[1] IF selected for P-AUTO, THEN ENSURE standby ABGTS starts.

BOP B-B ABGTS fan is in the A-AUTO position, so step is N/A.

[2] DETERMINE cause of failure, and INITIATE repairs if needed.

SRO Report from the Auxiliary Building AUO is that the drive belt for the A-A ABGTS fan is broken. SRO should direct the BOP to stop the A-A ABGTS fan, using O-Sl-30-8 steps.

[3] REFER TO SOI-30.06, AUXILIARY BUILDING GAS S RO TREA TMENT S YSTEM (ABG TS).

[4] REFER TO Tech Specs.

SRO 3.7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS),

Condition A: With one ABGTS train inoperable, restore the ABGTS train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 0-SI-30-8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation, beginning at Step 15.

[15] WHEN ABGTS Train A has operated continuously for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (600 mm), THEN PERFORM the following:

A. IF using Stop Watch, THEN PLACE 1-HS-30-146A, ABGTS FAN A-A [0-M-25J, in STOP, simultaneous with stopping the Stop Watch.

B. IF using meter, THEN PLACE 1-HS-30-146A, ABGTS FAN A-A [0-M-25], in STOP.

C. ENSURE Suction and Discharge dampers, FCO-30-146A and FCO-30-146B, CLOSE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 6 of 25 Event

Description:

ABGTS Fan drive failure during O-Sl-30-8-A surveillance performance. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

[16] ENSURE 1-HS-30-146A, ABGTS Fan A-A in A AUTO.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 7 of 25 Event

Description:

TIC-62-78 letdown temp controller fails high. Requires ARI entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

I 10-D LTDN TO DEMINS TEMP HI 247-B LTDN HX RET TEMP HI Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-HIC-62-78, Letdown RO temperature controller.

RO May place 1-TIC-62-78 in MANUAL and control temperature.

May place 1-HS-62-79A, LTDN HI TEMP DIVERT, to the VCT RO position.

BOP Responds to ARI 247-B LTDN HX RET TEMP HI alarm Enters and directs actions of ARI 11 0-D, LTDN TO DEM INS TEMP SRO HI.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 110-0, LTDN TO DEMINS TEMP HI.

[1]IF letdown temperature is greater than 137.5°F on l-TI-62-78 RO [1-M-6J, THEN ENSURE CVCS demineralizers bypassed (lights above 1-HS-62-79 [1-M-6]).

[2] ENSURE letdown flow is 45 gpm to 120 gpm on 1-FI-62-82 RO

[1 -M-6].

[3] ENSURE charging flow is 57 gpm to 132 gpm on 1 -Fl-62-93A RO

[1 -M-5].

[4] ADJUST 1-HIC-62-78A to maintain letdown temperature less RO than 127°F on 1-TI-62-78.

[5] IF problem is due to loss of CCS, THEN REFER TO AOl-IS, SRO LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCS).

SRO [6] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

[7] WHEN ready to return to normal, THEN PLACE 1-HS RO 79A, LTDN HI TEMP DIVERT, in DEMIN position, and HOLD until 1-TCV-62-79 is fully open.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 247-B LTDN HX RET TEMP HI.

[1] CHECK 1-TI-70-191, LTDN HX RET TEMP [0-M-27B].

BOP BOP will request that the RO check 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL for proper operation.

[2] CHECK letdown flow and pressure and REDUCE letdown flow as RO necessary.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 8 of 25 Event

Description:

TIC-62-78 letdown temp controller fails high. Requires ARI entry.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] CHECK 1-TCV-70-192 maintaining letdown temp at setpoint.

BOP If not done previously, BOP will request that the RO check 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL for proper operation.

[4] START CCS Pump, or REDUCE CCS loads to maintain press SRO between 40 and 108 psi on 1-Pl-70-24A, CCS HX A SUP PRESS

[0-M-27B].

[5] ENSURE proper valve lineup through Ltdn Hx per 501-70.01, SRO Component Cooling Water (CCS).

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

SR0 Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 4.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenano# 6 Event# 4 Page 9 25 Event

Description:

PZR press 1-PT-68-340 fails low. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON 1 24-C PZR PRESS LO 124-D PZR LO PRESS SI Diagnose and announces failure of 1-Pl-68-340, PZR PRESS RO downscale.

May refer to ARI 90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON RO for actions.

RO May refer to ARI 1 24-C PZR PRESS LO for actions.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Pressure Control System.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON.

[1] CHECK PZR pressure on 1-PI-68-334 and -340 [1-M-5].

[2] IF a PZR pressure channel has failed, THEN

[a] PLACE PZR master controller i-PIC-68-340A in manual control and stabilize pressure.

[b] GO TO AC 1-18, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 124-B PZR PRESS HI.

[1] IF plant cooldown in progress, THEN ENSURE PZR low pressure SI is blocked (Window 69-B lit).

[2] IF PZR pressure control system failure, THEN GO TO AOl-i 8, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

NOTE 120 AC VITAL PWR BD 1-IV [breaker 2] supplies the plugmold power strip associated with both PZR spray valves and several other instruments required to respond to this event.

1. CHECK pressurizer pressure stable or trending to desired pressure:

• I -PI-68-340A, RC

• 1-PI-68-334,

• 1-PI-68-323,

• 1 -P 1-68-322.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 4 Page 10 25 Event

Description:

PZR press 1-PT-68-340 fails low. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.

Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE pzr master controller 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal.

2. CHECK 1-XS-68-340D selected to a failed controlling or backup RO channel.

3 RESTORE press control to normal

a. SELECT operable channels for control and backup with 1-XS-68-340D b ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-RO 68-340 B

c. ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to operable channel using 1-XS-68-2B, LiT RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

d WHEN Pressurizer pressure on program THEN RETURN Pzr master controller I -PIC-68-340A to AUTO SRO 4 NOTIFY Work Control to remove failed channel from service SRO 5 **GO TO Step 17 17 REFER TO the following Tech Specs 3.3.1 Function 6. Overtemperature AT, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR Be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> Function Ba Pressurizer Pressure Low, Condition)( With one channel inoperable, place the channel in tnp within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> Function Bb Pressurizer Pressure High, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in tnp within 72 SRO hours OR Be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> 332 Function I d, Pressurizer Pressure Low, Condition D, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in tnp within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> Function 8 b Pressunzer Pressure, P-Il, Condition L, With one P-Il interlock channel inoperable, venfy interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 11 25 Event

Description:

PZR press 1-PT-68-340 fails low. Requires Tech Spec Evaluation.

Time ,,

Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 5 Page 12 of 25 Event

Description:

Loss of 120 Vac Instwment Power Rack B (1-M-7).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

15-E PNL l-M-7 BREAKER TRIP.

Multiple related system alarms.

22-E GENERATOR AUX PNL ALARM (PNL-1-L-39) 50-B MFPT lB ABNORMAL 52-C MFPT B AC CONTROL BUS UNDERVOLTAGE 166-F SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER 174-E 1-RR-90-1 AREA MONITORS INSTR MALF 1 75-E VAC PMP EXH 1 -RM-1 19 INSTR MALF 179-D CCS HX A OUTLET 1-RM-123 INST MALF 185-D 0-RR-90-12 PARTICULATE MONITOR INSTR MALE 183-DAB VENT 0-RM-101 INSTR MALE 185-C SERV BLDG VENT 0-RM-132 INSTR MALE 180-C CCS HX C OUTLET 0-RM-123 INSTR MALE BOP Diagnoses and announces the instrument power rack breaker trip.

May dispatch the Turbine Building AUO to 1-L-39 to determine which BOP alarms are in.

May go to panel 1-M-7 to transfer Instrument Power Rack B from its BOP normal to alternate supply.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 15-E, PNL 1-M-7 BREAKER TRIP.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 15-E. PNL 1-M-7 BREAKER TRIP.

EXAMINER: The report from the field will inform the crew that the cause of the loss of the normal supply was a wrong unit human error.

[1] CHECK panels and racks for tripped breaker.

[2] IF normal supply is lost to a panel, THEN TRANSFER to alternate supply per: SOI-237.01, l2OVac Instrument Power 1A, SOl 237.02, 120V ac Instrument Power 1 B, or SOl-238.01, 120V ac Preferred Power Systems as required.

[3] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from SOI-237.02, 120V AC Instrument Power IB, Section 8.1, Transfer Instrument Power B Rack from Normal to Alternate Supply.

[1] OBTAIN SRO approval.

[2j VERIFY ALTERNATE FEEDER AVAILABLE Amber light LIT

[Instrument Power B Rack Transfer Switch, I -M-7].

NOTE Instrument Power Rack Transfer Switch is break-before-make, and may cause a brief loss of potential during transfer.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page 13 of 25 Event

Description:

Loss of 120 Vac Instrument Power Rack B (1-M-7).

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] REFER TO TABLE 8-1 for possible affects of temporary loss of potential to 1 20V Instrument Power B Rack:

TABLE 8-1 FEEDS POSSIBLE AFFECT Aux Boilers TRIP lncore Monitoring LOSS OF CIRCUIT SGBD Release Path LOSS OF CIRCUIT

[4] PLACE INSTRUMENT POWER B RACK TRANSFER SWITCH, in ALTERNATE FEEDER.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel Typically Maintenance Shift Supervisor (MSS). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Event 5. Additional events will occur after Event 5 is entered by the Console Operator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 6 Page 14 of 25 Event

Description:

1A MFP speed controller fails low. Requires trip of the 1A MFP and entry into Aol-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION Speed (rpm) indication for the 1A MFP pump dropping as indicated on 1-Sl-46-20A MFPT A SPEED.

Pressure indication for 1A MFP dropping as indicated on 1-Pl-3-66A MFWP A DISCH PRESS.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the reduction in speed on the IA MEP.

May place 1-SC-46-20A, MFPT A SPPED CONTROL in MANUAL BOP and attempt to increase 1A MFPT speed.

Enters and directs actions of AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.7, MEW pump speed control circuit failure.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ARI 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION.

[1] DETERMINE which S/G has abnormal level.

BOP BOP determines ALL SG levels are abnormal.

[2] CHECK steam flow/feed flow instrumentation to VERIFY level BOP controls are restoring S/G levels to NORMAL.

[3] IF level controls have malfunctioned, THEN

[a] PLACE EW controls in manual.

BOP [b] RESTORE S/G level to normal and GO TO AOl-i 6, LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER.

SRO determines step is N/A.

[4] IF MEPT speed controls have malfunctioned, THEN

[a] PLACE MFPT speed controls in manual.

BOP [b] RESTORE MEW/MS zP to program AND GO TO AOl-i 6, LOSS OF NORMAL FEED WA TER.

SRO directs the BOP to place the IA MFPT speed control in MANUAL, and to raise pump speed.

SRO [5] INITIATE WO for corrective action, if necessary.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.7, MFW pump speed control circuit failure.

BOP I. CHECK MEWPT speed controller(s) NORMAL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 6 Event# 6 Page 15 of 25 Event

Description:

1A MFP speed controller fails low. Requires trip of the 1A MFP and entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTROL MFP speed using MANUAL control of master controller or individual controller(s) as required.

(p) IF MANUAL control of individual MFWPT controller is BOP ineffective, THEN TRIP affected MFWPT, and ** GO TO Section 3.4 or 3.5 as applicable.

SRO will direct the BOP to manually trip the IA MFP since it is not responding to changes made via 1-SC-46-20A, MFPT A

- SPEED CONTROL EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Loss of MFWP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

1. (p) IF loss of SIG level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and **

GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

2. CHECK turbine load less than or equal to 1000 MWe (85%).

3. PLACE tripped MFP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and CLOSE recirc valve.

4. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%).

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

(p) IF Standby MFWP NOT available, THEN REDUCE turbine load to less than 800 MWe with valve position limiter.

5. ENSURE MFWP speed rising to control SIG A-P and levels on program.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Manually CONTROL MFWPT speed.

EXAMINER: During the performance of AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, the feedwater line in the common header downstream of the high pressure heaters will develop. The crew will initiate a manual reactor trip and close the #1 (High Pressure) feedwater isolation valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 16 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RD attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Reactor power increasing on all Power Range indications.

RCS temperature dropping.

PZR level dropping.

PZR pressure dropping.

NO radiation changes on either the primary or secondary radiation monitors.

168-B TURB FDN SUMP LEVEL HI.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the feedwater line break.

May direct the RO to trip the reactor, based on imminent loss of SG SRO level.

Recognizes that the reactor did not trip automatically and initiates a RD manual reactor trip. Trips the reactor from handswitch RT-2 on 1 -M 6, after handswitch RT-1 fails to operate.

RD Performs Immediate Operator Actions following the reactor trip.

BOP Performs Immediate Operator Actions following the reactor trip SRO Enters and directs actions of E-O,Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from E-O,Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE I Steps I thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

NOTE 2 Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

Critical Task I from WOG Critical Task List, E-O, A Manually trip the reactor from the control room before manually tripping the turbine.

Manually tripping the turbine before the reactor is tripped will cause an unnecessary chailenge to the steam generator PORV and Safety valves unless the reactor is tripped.

Critical 1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Task I

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RD

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

RO

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards

a. At least one board energized from:

RD CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenano# 6 Event# 7,8and9 Page 17 of 25 Event Descnption: Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RD attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6

• to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RD b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -XX-55-6C

• 1 -XX-55-6D

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

• SIG press less than 675 psig, OR

• RCS press less than 1870 psig, SRO/RO OR

• Cntmt press greater than 1.5psig THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

IF SI NOT required, THEN GO TO ES-0.1,

b. ACTUATE SI manually.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response.

CAUTION Plant conditions, AFW pump start signals and flow requirements should be evaluated as time allows.

1 MONITOR SI actuation criteria RO

• IF SI actuation occurs during the performance of this Instruction THEN ** GO TO E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection BOP 2 CHECK Generator PCBs OPEN

3. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RD

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running. OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event# 7, 8 and 9 Page 18 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RD attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temperature is less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps, SIG PORVs, and blowdown isolation valves CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN ENSURE total feed flow is less than or equal to 500 gpm

• REFER TO SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for manual control of TDAFWP

• MAINTAIN at least one SIG NR level greater than 29% or total feed flow between 410 and 500 gpm for heat sink.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN:

RD

• CLOSEMSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

IF temperature is less than 547° F after AFW is controlled, THEN INITIATE boration:

• REFER TO AOI-34, Immediate Boration.

IF temperature is greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps, or SIG PORVs OPEN.

WHEN cooldown is controlled, THEN RETURN AFW to AUTO as desired.

4. ENSURE AFW operation:

a AFW established

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

TD AFW pump RUNNING BOP LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL b Heat sink available

• Total feed flow greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29%.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP b. IF heat sink can NOT be established, THEN **

GO TO FR-Hi, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CAUTION

• If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, this Instruction should NOT be performed.

• If an Intact SIG is available, feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted SIG.

I CHECK if secondary heat sink is required RO a. RCS pressure greater than any Intact S/G pressure.

b. RCS temperature, greater than 375°F [360°F ADVI.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 19 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RO attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 2. ENSURE at least one charging pump RUNNING.

CAUTION RCS bleed and feed criteria must be monitored for immediate response if the criteria is exceeded.

3. DETERMINE if RCS bleed and feed required:

a. CHECK RCS bleed and feed required:

• Any THREE SIG WR levels less than or equal to 26% [36%

RO ADV].OR

• RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig.

b. STOP all RCPs, and ** GO TO Cautions prior to Step 18 to initiate RCS bleed and feed.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a MONITOR RCS bleed and feed criteria RD WHEN criteria are met, THEN PERFORM Substep 3b.

GO TO step 4.

BOP 4. ENSURE SIG blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP 5. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

NOTE If the use of condensate flow is anticipated, then a higher pzr level will better accommodate the level shrink from S/G cooldown and depressurization.

RO 6. CONTROL pzr level between 29% and 63% [47% and 58% ADVJ.

EXAMINER: Reports from the field are that the IA-A MD AFWP tripped on instantaneous overcurrent and the motor has suffered damage. There is a break on the discharge piping of the I B-B MD AFW pump, which prevents flow to #3 and #4 SGs. The TD AFW pump will require a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to reassemble the trip and throttle valve and linkage. The feedwater line break prevents use of secondary pumps as a supply to the SGs.

7. ESTABLISH MD AFW pump flow:

a. CHECK MD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

b. ENSURE both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

c. ENSURE MD AFW LCVs OPEN.

BOP

d. CHECK MD AFW pump flow greater than 410 gpm.

e. CHECK NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

f RETURN TO Instruction in effect 8 ESTABLISH TD AFW pump flow BOP

a. CHECK TD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 20 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RD attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time 0 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRD

a. ** GO TO Step 9.

RD 9. STOP all four RCPs.

10. IF Secondary pumps will be used to feed SIGs, THEN REFER TO Appendix A (FR-H.1), Establishing MEW following Reactor BDP Trip, while continuing this Instruction.

Based on the location of the feedwater break, secondary pumps will NOT be used to fill the SGs.

CAUTION

• If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

• If plant conditions degrade after automatic SI is blocked, manual actuation may be required.

NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

11. BLOCK SI signals:

a. INITIATE RCS depressurization to less than 1912 psig:

RD IF letdown in service, THEN ALIGN aux spray USING Appendix B (FR-H.1), ALIGN AUX SPRAY.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from Appendix B (FR-H.1),ALIGN AUX SPRAY.

RD 1. ENSURE at least one charging pump running.

2. IF charging is not aligned, THEN ALIGN charging:

a) CLOSE RCP seal flow control 1 -FCV-62-89.

RD b) OPEN charging isolation I -FCV-62-90 and I -FCV-62-91.

c) ENSURE charging 1-FCV-62-85 or 1-FCV-62-86 OPEN.

CAUTION If RCS is on cold leg recirc, seal return isolation valves should not be opened (prevents sump inventory from diverting to VCT).

RD d) OPEN seal return 1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-62-63.

3. ENSURE BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-6325 AND 1-FCV-63-26 RD CLOSED.

NOTE Aux spray flow can be maximized by closing the normal pzr spray valve(s).

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 21 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RO attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RO must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CONTROL aux spray flow:

a) OPEN aux spray 1-FCV-62-84.

b) CLOSE charging 1-FCV-62-85 and 1-FCV-62-86.

RO c) MODULATE Pzr Spray valves as needed to control Pzr pressure.

d) ADJUST aux spray flow rate with 1 -FCV-62-93 and 1 -FCV 89 as needed.

EXAMINER: The following actions are the continuation of FR-H.1, Step 11

b. BLOCK auto SI actuation signals [68-B], and [69-B]:

1) NOTIFY IMs to block auto SI USING IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block.

2) WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-Il), THEN

• BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

RO

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

c. ENSURE high cntmt pressure SI signal CLEARED [78-GJ.

d. CHECK SI actuated.

d. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

GO TO Substep 1 lf.

f. MAINTAIN RCS pressure less than 1912 psig.

NOTE

• Cycling reactor trip breakers to allow MFW Isolation reset is only required if SI or HI-HI SIG level has occurred.

• If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling reactor trip breakers will initiate SI.

12. PREPARE for MEW startup:

a. PLACE MEW pump controllers in MANUAL, and SET to zero.

b. PLACE MEW reg valve controllers in MANUAL, and SET to zero.

BOP c. PLACE MEW reg bypass valve controllers in MANUAL, and SETtozero.

d. CHECK EW bypass isolation valves OPEN.

Based on the location of the feedwater break, MFPs will NOT be used to fill the SGs.

NOTE If the standby feed pump will be used, only the hotwell pumps should be started to prevent an overpressure condition.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 22 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RO attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RO must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. ESTABLISH feedwater flow:

a. START secondary plant pumps as necessary:

1) Hotwell pumps.

BOP 2) Condensate booster pumps.

3) Cond Dl booster pumps.

Based on the location of the feedwater break, secondary pumps will NOT be used to fill the SGs.

13. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF secondary plant pumps are NOT available, THEN **

GO TO Step 17.

17. DETERMINE if RCS bleed and feed required:

a. MONITOR RCS bleed and feed criteria:

RD

• Any THREE SIG WR levels less than or equal to 26% [36%

ADV]. OR

• RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig.

17. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RETURN TO Cautions prior to Step 1.

SRO The crew may return to the Cautions prior to Step 1, if SG wide range level has not dropped to the point where Bleed-and feed criteria have not been met.

EXAMINER: When bleed and feed criteria are met, then the following steps will be performed.

CAUTION

• Step 18 Through 20 must be performed quickly in order to establish RCS heat removal by RCS bleed and feed.

• Termination of bleed and feed is required prior to transitioning out of FR-H.1 when heat sink is restored.

Cntical Task 2 from WOG Critical Task List, FR-H. I F.

Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate head injection to occur.

Once the operator detects that secondary heat sink has degraded (SG wide range levels are less than or equal to 26%), RCS bleed and feed must be established to prevent or minimize core uncovery due to inadequate core cooling.

Cntical RD 18. ACTUATE SI.

Critical 19. ENSURE at least one of the following RCS feed paths:

Task 2 RD

• At least one charging pump injecting thru BIT OR

• At least one SI Pump running with its injection valves open

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RO attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RO must go to handswitch RT-2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

• When the reactor vessel head vent block valve is opened, the throttle valve will cycle open and closed.

• Slowly opening (5 seconds stroke time) the head vent valve will prevent water hammer and pipe damage.

Critical 20. ENSURE adequate RCS bleed path:

Task 2 RO

a. ENSURE all pzr PORVs and pzr PORV block valves OPEN.

CAUTION WHEN feedwater source is AVAILABLE, THEN feed rate will be controlled by Steps 30 and 31.

NOTE The details of Steps 4 through 15 may be referred to as necessary to establish feed flow in the following step but procedure performance must continue to terminate RCS bleed and feed.

21. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO 22. RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.

23. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [M-1 5].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [M-15]:

BOP

• 1 -FCV-32-80.

• 1-FCV-32-102.

• 1-FCV 32-110.

24. PERFORM Steps 1 through 6 of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SRO SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this Instruction.

25. MAINTAIN RCS bleed and feed paths:

• MAINTAIN charging pump injection thru BIT RO

• MAINTAINSI pumpflow.

• MAINTAIN both pzr PORVs and block valves OPEN.

CAUTION If containment pressure rises to greater than 2.8 psig, containment spray should be verified.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RO attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-i on i-M-4. The RO must go to handswitch RT-2 on i-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

26. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. Spray pumps running.

b. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

RO c. RESET containment spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves l-FCV-72-2 and i-FCV 72- 39.

26.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO **

a. IF both spray pumps stopped, THEN GO TO Step 27.

27. WHEN RWST level is less than 34% THEN ** GO TO ES-i .3, SRO TRANSFER TO RHR CONTAINMENT SUMP.

28. ENSURE CCS alignment for RHR operation:

a. RHR heat exchanger B outlet i-FCV-70-153 OPEN.

BOP

b. RHR heat exchanger A outlet i-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

c. SFP heat exchanger A supply 0-FCV-70-i97 CLOSED.

NOTE The details of Steps 4 through 15 may be referred to as necessary to establish feed flow in the following step but procedure performance must continue to terminate RCS bleed and feed.

29. EVALUATE the following to restore level in at least one SIG:

a. AFW pumps.

b.MFW pumps.

SRO

c. Condensate pumps.

d. ERCW valves to AFW suction.

e. HPFP spool piece (AOl-7.06).

CAUTION Feedwater flow rates should be controlled to prevent excessive RCS cooldown.

NOTE If possible, a S/G should be selected to feed which has WR level greater than 15% [25%

ADV] and RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature less than 550°F.

30 ESTABLISH feedflow to one Selected S/C BOP a Feed source AVAILABLE 30.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO Step 33.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 6 Event # 7, 8 and 9 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater line rupture downstream of the high pressure feedwater heaters.

Automatic reactor trip does not occur. The RD attempts to initiate the reactor trip using handswitch RT-1 on 1-M-4. The RD must go to handswitch RT2 on 1-M-6 to initiate the manual reactor trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

33. CHECK all RCS bleed and feed termination criteria met:

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

SRO

• Incore T/C dropping.

• T-hot dropping.

33. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTINUE RCS bleed and feed UNTIL all criteria met.

SRO CONTINUE actions to restore secondary heat sink.

GO TO Note prior to Step 29.

EXAMINER: When the crew has addressed Step 33 RNO and determines that a return to Step 29 is required, inform them that another crew will continue from here.

END OF SCENARIO

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST 6 Page of QSM US/MCR Unit Q UO Unit Off-going Name 11 AUO Station C STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

TD AFWP is out of service to replace the trip-and throttle valve and associated linkage. Tech Spec 3.7.5.B was entered for the TD AFWP 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago. Expected return to service is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. 1 D CCW pump was shutdown in order to perform maintenance on the motor. Repairs have been completed and the pump is now available.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) 0-S1-30-8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation has been in progress for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />.

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Unit 1 is at 75% power, BOL conditions, following the completion of repairs to the 1 D CCW pump. A power escalation to the preconditioned power level of 96% is to be conducted using GOI-4, Normal Power Operations. RCS boron concentration is 1128 ppm. Control Rod Bank Dat 184 steps.

Train A/Channel I Work Week.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None planned Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift A review of the Operating L.og since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

LJ A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

E] Standing Orders Q LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) Q PER review (N/A for AUOs)

D TACFs (N/A for AUOs) U Operator workamunds, burdens U Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 - Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A walkdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [08-03-2009]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page of QSM El US/MCR Unit -

UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station El STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift/Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup/conditions:

TD AFWP is out of service to replace the trip-and throttle valve and associated linkage. Tech Spec 3.7.5.B was entered for the TD AFWP 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago. Expected return to service is 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. 1 D CCW pump was shutdown in order to perform maintenance on the motor. Repairs have been completed and the pump is now available.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for new brief) 0-SI-30-8-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Train A 10-hour Operation has been in progress for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. V

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Unit 1 is at 75% power, BOL conditions, following the completion of repairs to the ID CCW pump. A power escalation to the preconditioned power level of 96% is to be conducted using GOI-4, Normal Power Operations. RCS boron concentration is 1128 ppm. Control Rod Bank Dat 184 steps.

Train AlChannel I Work Week.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Performed by on-coming shift El A review of the Operating Log since last held shift or 3 days, whichever is less.

El A review of the Rounds sheets/Abnormal readings (AUOs only)

Review the following for changes since last shift turnover:

El Standing Orders El LCO(s) in actions (N/A for AUOs) El PER review (N/A for AUOs)

El TACFs (N/A for AUOs) El Operator workarounds, burdens El Immediate required reading.

and other challenges Part 3 Performed by both off-going and on-coming shift El A wallcdown of the MCR control boards (N/A for AUOs)

Relief Time: Relief Date:

TVA 40741 [08-2009] Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-l [08-03-2009]