ML110060295
| ML110060295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/2005 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N10-0355 2-EOP-CFST-1, Rev 25 | |
| Download: ML110060295 (74) | |
Text
PSEG Internal Use Onlv PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C.
SALENUOPERATIONS Page! of!
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES
+ Biennial Review performed Yes_ No __ NA_X_
+ Change Package (s) incorporated into this revision:
REVISION
SUMMARY
The following changes are included in this revision:
Revised Figure 6~ Coolant Inventory Status Tree to reflect RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE values of "32%, 42%, 63% and 93%" versus the indicated values of "38%,50%, 71%, and 100%". Figure 6, RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE values of 32%,
42%, 63% and 93% were incorporated in Revision 23, and during the revision process for Revision 24, the Revision 22 valves were incorrectly reverted back to.
This editorial change restores the Figure 6, RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE values to the correct values as incorporated in Revision 23, and is consistent with the values specified in the Unit 2 Critical Safety Function Status Tree Basis Document.
[20229708]
Revision bars were not utilized in this revision.
IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS:
Effective Date:OL/ /07)0 S-None APPROVED: ---:-----1.
- +/-)~""""':'I/_I_1, :'Lf-I'.=.~,~t_#i"' __ _
Operations ¥t;;:;:; ~ Salem
2-EOP-CFST-l 1.0 2.0 3.0 Salem 2 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE 2-EOP-CFST-l CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Entry Conditions See Procedure Operator Actions 2.1 Immediate Actions None 2.2 Subsequent Actions See Procedure Attaeltment List 3.1 Tables A - SubcoolingTable - Normal Containment B - Subcooling Table - Adverse Containment C ~ Use of the Core Exit Thermocouple Display Panel D - Subcooling Calculation and Recording Table 3.2 Figures 1 - Shutdown Margin Status Tree 2 - Core Cooling Status Tree 3 - Heat Sink Status Tree 4 - Thermal Shock Status Tree 4A - Thermal Shock Limit A Curve 5 - Containment Environment Status Tree 6 - Containment Inventory Status Tree 3.3 Graphs None 3.4 Chet.:koff Sheets None 3.5 Attachments 1 - Summary of Major Actions for Yellow Path Status Trees 2 - CFST Status Log Sheet 3 - Use of the Subcooling Margin Monitor Display Rev 25
- .*.. : *******.*.*.* -:.:.::.:: ****.****.*..**.*..******.***...,!"'.: *. ~~ *.**.. ;....................
..,,~~ *.,................................... ~.*.****.*.****.*.**. -.................................................. _.................................................................................. "................................................................. ****************.. ***.. **.. *****.. *******.. *****.. ******1 SECTION 1.0 2.0 3.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE ENTRY CONDITIONS IMMEDIATE ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS ATTACHMENTS Summary of Major Actions for Yellow Path Status Trees CFST Status Log Sheet Use of the Subcooling Margin Monitor Display TABLES Table A TableD Table C TableD FIGURES Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 4A Figure 5 Figure 6 Salem 2 Sub cooling Table - Normal Containment Subcooling Table - Adverse Containment Use of the Core Exit Thermocouple Display Panels Suhcooling Calculation and Recording Table Shutdown Margin Status Tree Core Cooling Status Tree Heat Sink Status Tree Thermal Shock Status Tree Thermal Shock Limit A Curve Containment Environment Status Tree Coolant Inventory Status Tree Page 1 orI8 PAGE 2
2 2
7 10 11 13 14 14 18 Rev 25
~~ ************.*******..**.*...**.....*..***..************************.., ************** - *************** - ***************************** -
......... ~
............................................................................................................................................ _................................................................................ J 2-EOP-CFST-1 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 1.1 2-EOP-TRIP-l, when explicitly directed.
1.2 Upon transition from 2-EOP-TRIP-l to any other EOP.
2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 2.1 None 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS NOTE The Subcooling Margin Monitor (SMM) should be used to determine RCS subcooling. If the SMM is inoperable, then calculate and log RCS sub cooling on Table D. The value of T -sat is obtained by using Table A for Normal Containment or Table B for Adverse Containment. should be referred to for instructions regarding operation of the Subcooling Margin Monitor (SMM) display.
NOTE SPDS is not designed to be used as a primary indication, and no actions should be based upon SPDS indications without verification of the primary indications, which are the installed Control Room IE instruments. The one exception is the SPDS and Plant Computer core exit thermocouple displays which are considered primary displays and are exempt from class IE requirements. SPDS should be monitored periodically for changes in the CFST condition.
3.1 If AT ANYTIME while monitoring CFSTs, the SPDS and Plant Computer CET Temperature Displays are NOT available.
THEN SCAN the CETs at the CET Display Panel in accordance with Table C and LOG indications on the appropriate Table C data sheet.
The Shift Radiation Protection Technician is to be notified if CET readings are to be taken at the CET Display Panel.
Salem 2 Page 2 orl8 Rev 25
2-EOpwCFST-l Salem 2 3.2 PERFORM an initial scan of the six CFSTs using Figures 1 thru 6.
RECORD on Attachment 2 and give Attachment 2 to the CRS.
3.3 IMPLEMENT continuous monitoring of the CFSTs.
WHEN a change in the evaluation of CFSTs occurs, THEN NOTIFY the eRS of the change via Attachment 2.
IF any CFST as indicated on SPDS shows a RED or PURPLE path, THEN SCAN that particular CFST manually, using all available Control Room indications and Figures 1 thru 6. LOG any change on Attachment 2.
WHEN both of the following conditions are met:
All evaluated CFSTs are GREEN or YELLOW Plant is in stable condition, THEN the frequency of CPST monitoring may be reduced to every fifteen minutes at the direction of the CRS.
NOTE CET monitoring may be performed at either the SPDS or Plant Computer displays to track the direction oftemperature trends.
3.4 INFORM the CRS if any ofthe following are observed:
Five or more CETs exceed 700° F.
Five or more CETs exceed 12000P.
An unexpected steady rise in temperature occurs over several minutes.
3.5 IF contairunent pressure exceeds 4 psig. and subsequently lowers to less tban 3 psig, THEN reset the SPDS to normal by performing the following:
- 1.
Display the Heat Sink Status Tree page.
- 2.
Using the cursor and the keyboard roller ball, LEFT *CLICK the
~'FORCE NORMAL" button in the upper right portion of the display.
- 3.
VERIFY that "Containment NORMAL" appears in GREEN in the upper left portion of the display Page 3 of 18 Rev 25
~,.-.................................... _.. _.... _..... __......,............................................... _...... -.................. -................................ -........ _.... _........ _............ -.................. -........................ -...................... _...................................................................................... j 2-EOP-CFST -1 Salem 2 NOTE IfR44 dose rates lower to less than lEOS RlHR. and the integrated R44 dose has remains less than 1 E06 Rad, the SMM and SPDS may be in I1Adverse" wmecessarily. The TSC will monitor SPDS and inform the STA when "NORMAL" or "ADVERSE" mode should be selected.
3.6 IF infonned by the TSC that ADVERSE containment conditions now exist due to high containment radiation, THEN ensure that the SMM and SPDS displays are in I1ADVERSE" mode as follows:
NOTE The SMM "ADVERSE" pushbutton will flash if adverse containment exists only due to high radiation. If the adverse containment pressure condition also exists, the "ADVERSE" pushbutton will be lit and solid.
Once the containment pressure condition clears, the "ADVERSE" pushbutton will begin to flash ifR44 readings are still greater than lEOS RfHR.
For the SMMs, PERFORM the following:
- 1.
IF an SMM chmmel "ADVERSE" button is lit solid, take no action on that chatmel and proceed to the next step.
- 2.
IF either SMM channel "ADVERSE" button is dark OR flashing, THEN press the "ADVERSE" button on that channel AND verify that the light remains on and solid.
- 3.
IF an adverse containment pressure is present and subsequently clears, THEN press both SMM "ADVERSE" buttons arm verify that their lights remains on and solid.
For SPDS, PERFORM the following:
- 1.
Display the Heat Sink Status Tree page.
- 2.
VERIFY that "Containment ADVERSE" appears in RED in the upper left portion ofthe display.
- 3.
IF the ADVERSE setting was not verified in the previous step.
THEN. using the cursor and the keyboard roller ball. LEFT-CLICK the "SET ADVERSE" button in the upper left portion ofthe display.
- 4.
VERIFY that "Containment ADVERSE" now appears in RED.
Page 4ofl8 Rev 25
2-EOP*CFST -1 Salem 2 3.7 IF DIRECTED by the TSC that adverse conditions due to high radiation no longer exist, THEN manually switch the SMM and SPDS displays to tlNORMAL" mode as follows:
IF the SMMs were manually selected to "ADVERSE" in Step 3.6, THEN DEPRESS the "ADVERSE" pushbuttons on both Channels A & Band verify the "ADVERSE" light is extinguished.
IF the SMM "ADVERSE" pushbuttons are flashing due to previous high radiation, THEN DEPRESS the "ADVERSE" pushbutton until the backlight is extinguished.
NOTE If the SPDS display automatically switched to "ADVERSE" mode due to R44levels greater than lE05 RlHR, the "NORMAL" mode cannot be selected unless radiation levels lower to less than IEOS RlHR.
IF SPDS is to be switched to "NORMAL",
THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1.
Display the Heat Sink Status Tree page.
- 2.
Using the cursor and the keyboard roller ball, LEFT-CLICK the "FORCE NORMAL" button in the upper right portion of the display.
- 3.
VERIFY that "Containment NORMAL" appears in GREEN in the upper left portion of the display.
Page 50rI8 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l Salem 2 NOTE will assist the CRS in determining whether there is an FRP which will effect a desired outcome. The desired outcome may not be addressed with specific actions with the EOP in current use. This information should be discussed with the eRS as plant conditions allow.
The STA should remain focused on the CFSTs and continue to monitor RCS temperature and pressure, Reactor power, SG parameters and other indications in order to detect unexpected values or trends.
3.8 IF the following conditions are met:
Initial scan of the CFSTs using Figures 1 thru 6 has been completed and results reported to the CRS via Attachment 2 Verification has been made that no higher priority than a YELLOW PATH exists for the CFSTs, THEN CONSULT Attachment 1, nsummary of Major Actions for YELLOW Path Status Trees l1 3.9 WHEN transition is made out ofthe EOP network and at the eRS direction, THEN TERMINATE 2-EOP-CFST-1.
END OF PROCEDURE Page 6orl8 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l ATTACHMENT 1
SUMMARY
OF MAJOR ACTIONS FOR YELLOW PATH STATUS TREES (Page 1 of3)
(1)
Functional Restoration Shutdown Margin
+ 2-EOP-FRSM-2 "Response to Loss of Core Shutdown" Major Actions:
Check if Loss of Core Shutdown is from core reactivity or instnunentation problems Borate the RCS as necessary Check shutdown margin (2)
Functional Restoration Core Cooling
+ 2-EOP-FRCC-3 "Response to Saturated Core Cooling Conditions" Major Actions:
Establish BCCS Iqjection flow to maintain minimum ReS subcooling Check for open RCS vent paths (PZR PORVs or Reactor head vents)
(3)
Functional Restoration Heat Sink Salem 2
+ 2-EOP-FRHS-2 "Response to Steam Generator Overpressure!!
Major Actions:
Isolate FW and release steam from affected SG Cool down Res using the unaffected SGs
+ 2-EOP-FRHS-3 IlResponse to Steam Generator High Level" Major Actions:
Isolate affected SG Check affected SG for indications of a SGTR Establish blowdown from the affected SG Page 7 of 18 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l ATTACHMENT 1
SUMMARY
OF MAJOR ACTIONS FOR YELLOW PATH STATUS TREES (Page 2 of3)
(3)
Functional Restoration Heat Sink (continued) 2-EOP-FRHS-4 "Response to Loss of SG Atmospheric Reliefs and Condenser Dump Valves II Major Actions:
Restore nonnal steam release capability Dump steam locally 2-EOP-FRHS-5 IIResponse to Steam Generator Low Lever' Major Actions:
Verify blowdown isolation Determine if the affected SG is faulted
- sa fill rate detennination (4)
Functional Restoration Thermal Shock 2-EOP-FRTS-2 "Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions l1 Major Actions:
Stop ReS cooldown Faulted SG isolation Decrease Res pressure to within Tech Spec limits Restrict further cooldown if necessary (to less than Tech Spec limits)
(5)
Functional Restoration Containment Environment 2-EOP-FRCE-3 "Response to High Containment Radiation" Major Actions:
VerifY containment ventilation isolation Place CFCUs in service NotifY TSC of containment radiation levels and perform actions they recommend Salem 2 Page 8 of 18 Rev 25
.............................................................,.................................................. _............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ***********************************1
SUMMARY
OF MAJOR ACTIONS FOR YELLO~PATHSTATUSTREES (Page 3 of 3)
ATTACHMENT 1 (6)
Functional Restoration Coolant Inventory
+ 2-EOP-FRCI-l "Response to High Pressurizer Level" Major Actions:
IF ECCS flow established~
THEN return to procedure in effect Establish charging and letdown (or excess letdown)
Reduce PZR pressure Establish CCW for RCP seal retum Energize PZR heaters and control charging and letdown to draw a bubble in the PZR
+ 2-EOP-FRCI-2 "Response to Low RCS Inventory" Major Actions:
Verify normal and excess letdown isolation, establish charging flow Increase charging flow or start ECCS pumps to restore PZR level
+ 2-EOP-FRCI-3 "Response to Void in Reactor Vessel" Major Actions:
Establish charging and letdown (or excess letdown)
Repressurize ReS to collapse voids
- Start a Rep to collapse voids Establish RCS subcooling Vent reactor vessel head Salem 2 Page 9 or18 Rev 25 I
............,..,.....................................................,......................................*. ************".* *.-., **,**.w****************************.....* -........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1 2-EOP-CFST -1 ATTACHMENT 2 CFST STATUS LOG SHEET TIME I I
RED PURPLE YELLOW GREEN SHUTDOWN MARGIN FRSM-l FRSM-l FRSM-2 SAT CORE COOLING FRCC-l FRCC-2 FRCC-3 SAT HEAT SINK FRHS-l FRHS-2 SAT FRHS-3 FRHS-4 FRHS-5 THERMAL SHOCK FRTS-l FRTS-l FRTS-2 SAT CONTAINMENT FRCE-1 FRCE-1 FRCE-3 SAT ENVIRONMENT FRCE-2 COOLANT FRCI-l SAT INVENTORY FRCI-2 FRCI-3 This attaclnnent is to be used:
- 1) After the first initial scan of the CFSTs is perfonned.
- 2) When a change of CFST status is identified.
- 3) When SPDS indicates a RED or PURPLE path and the individual status tree must be scanned manually.
NOTE: Duplicate copies of this attachment may be contained in tIus procedure in the event of reproduction device unavailability.
Salem 2 Page 10 of 18 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l Normal Operations USE OF THE SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITOR DISPLAY (Page 1 of2)
ATTACHMENT 3 When the TEST button is extinguished the display is in the "Normal" mode of operation.
The ADVERSE and ACK buttons mayor may not be backlit in this mode. In the Normal mode, the displayed value is the calculated temperature margin to saturation. Positive values indicate that the ReS is in a subcooled condition while negative readings indicate a superheated condition exist.
NOTE During accident conditions the TSC must be consulted for use of the Subcooling Margin Monitor ADVERSE button.
Adverse Button Operation In "Normal" mode, if the Adverse button is illuminated, the displayed temperature margin is adjusted for the adverse conditions of containment pressure andlor radiation.
This is done to compensate the reading for the effect that adverse containment conditions are having on the instrumentation. Depressing the ADVERSE button will illuminate or extinguish its' backlight and manually input or remove the adjustments to the margin calculations. This can be done at any time except during high containment pressure conditions. There is no manual override during high containment pressure conditions.
Contaimnent Pressure - The Adverse button will illuminate whenever the containment pressure setpoint of 4 psig is reached. and will reset and extinguish only at 3 psig. There is no manual reset or override for the overpressure condition.
Containment Radiation - When containment radiation exceeds 1E05 RlHR since last system reset, the Adverse button will flash and the margin displayed will reflect the adjustments made for adverse conditions. Depressing the Adverse button one time will bring the ADVERSE light on solid. Depressing it once more will extinguish the light and remove the adverse adjustments input to the margin calculations.
Salem 2 Page 11 of 18 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST -1 USE OF THE SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITOR DISPLAY (Page 20f2)
NOTE The ACK button will be continuously illuminated on channel A & B due to an "Absolute Zero" signal from R44A & R44B wide range radiation monitors. The CETPS sends this signal to the SCMM as an E3 error.
ACK Button Operation ATTACHMENT 3 The ACK button is used to acknowledge errors and alarms. A flashing display signifies an error or alarm, and if depressed will remain backlit for as long as the error condition exist. The digital display will go into the flashing mode if a new alarm/error occurs. The following is a list of error numbers that may appear on the SCMM display. After depressing the ACK button, the error number(s) will be displayed twice, then return to the "Nornlal" display mode Error #
Description EO Any CETC System Error (E65-E73 on chassis front panel)
El RCS Pressure Input Shorted or Open E2 Containment PressUl'e Input Shorted or Open E3 Containment Radiation Input Shorted or Open Diagnostic Test Mode Procedure SC.OP-SO.CET-OOOl(Q), Core Exit Thennocouple Processing System Operation, should be referred to for SCMM Diagnostic Test Mode operating instructions.
Salem 2 Page 12 of 18 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l PT403 PT405 2400 2375 2350 2325 2300 2275 2250 2225 2200 2175 2150 2125 2100 2075 2050 2025 2000 1975 1950 1925 1900 1875 1850 1825 1800 1775 1750 1725 1700 1675 1650 1625 Salem 2 TABLE A (Page 1 of 1)
SUBCOOLING TABLE - NORMAL CONTAINMENT (Less than 4 psig AND less than 1E05 Rlhr.)
T-SAT PT403 T-SAT PT403 CET RTD PT405 CET RTD PT405 644 646 1600 586 590 800 642 645 1575 583 587 775 641 643 1550 581 585 750 639 642 1525 579 583 725 638 640 1500 577 581 700 636 639 1475 574 579 675 634 637 1450 572 577 650 633 636 1425 570 574 625 631 634 1400 567 572 600 629 632 1375 565 570 575 628 631 1350 562 567 550 626 629 1325 560 565 525 624 627 1300 557 562 500 623 626 1275 555 560 475 621 624 1250 552 557 450 619 622 1225 549 555 425 617 620 1200 547 552 400 615 619 1175 544 550 375 614 617 1150 541 547 350 612 615 1125 538 544 325 610 613 1100 535 541 300 608 611 1075 532 539 275 606 609 1050 529 535 250 604 608 1025 526 532 225 602 606 1000 523 529 200 600 604 975 520 526 175 598 602 950 517 523 150 596 600 925 513 520 125 594 598 900 510 516 100 592 596 875 506 513 75 590 594 850 503 510 50 588 592 825 499 506 25 NOTE Refer to Table D to calculate and record subcooling.
Page 13 of18 T-SAT CET RTD 495 503 492 499 488 496 483 492 479 488 475 483 470 479 466 475 461 470 456 466 451 461 446 455 440 450 434 445 428 440 421 433 415 428 407 421 400 414 391 407 383 399 373 391 362 382 351 372 337 360 321 348 303 332 278 315 242 293 208 263 200 210 200 209 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST -1 PT403 PT405 2400 2375 2350 2325 2300 2275 2250 2225 2200 2175 2150 2125 2100 2075 2050 2025 2000 1975 1950 1925 1900 1875 1850 1825 1800 1775 1750 1725 1700 1675 1650 1625 Salem 2 TABLER (Page loft)
SUBCOOLING TABLE ADVERSE CONTAINMENT (Greater than or equal to 4 psig OR IE05 Rlhr.)
T-SAT PT403 T-SAT PT403 CET RTD PT405 CET RTD PT405 629 638 1600 564 576 800 627 637 1575 562 573 775 625 635 1550 559 571 750 624 634 1525 557 569 725 622 632 1500 554 566 700 620 631 1475 552 564 675 618 629 1450 549 562 650 616 628 1425 546 558 625 615 625 1400 543 556 600 613 623 1375 541 554 575 611 622 1350 538 550 550 609 620 1325 535 548 525 607 618 1300 532 544 500 605 617 1275 529 542 475 603 614 1250 526 538 450 601 612 1225 523 536 425 599 610 1200 519 532 400 597 609 1175 516 530 375 596 607 1150 513 526 350 594 605 1125 509 523 325 591 602 1100 506 519 300 589 600 1075 502 516 275 587 598 1050 499 513 250 585 597 1025 495 509 225 583 594 1000 491 505 200 581 592 975 487 501 175 578 590 950 483 498 150 576 588 925 479 494 125 574 586 900 475 489 100 571 583 875 470 485 75 569 581 850 465 481 50 567 579 825 461 476 25 NOTE Refer to Table D to calculate and record subcooling.
Page 14 of 18 T-SAT CET RTD 456 471 451 466 445 462 440 456 434 450 428 445 549 562 414 432 407 425 400 418 391 410 382 402 373 393 362 384 350 374 337 362 321 349 302 333 286 315 278 292 271 259 264 211 256 211 247 211 237 211 227 211 215 210 202 210 194 210 194 210 194 210 194 209 Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST -1 Salem 2 TABLEC (page 1 of3)
USE OF THE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE DISPLAY PANELS NOTE In the "ALL" mode, the display will progress through the first and second highest CETs in each quadrant, then sequentially display all CETs assigned to that channel (channel A or B as applicable). The CET display panel will return to "NORMAL" mode anytime the "TMAXICET" pushbutton is depressed or the system is left inactive for 3 minutes.
- 1.
SCAN (by selecting the "ALU mode) and record channel A CETs as follows:
- a.
DEPRESS the "SUBMODE/IST/2ND" pushbutton until "ALV' is indicated on the display and the "SUBMODE/IST/2ND" pushbutton is illuminated.
- b.
RECORD readings on Table C, Page 2 of3.
- 2.
IF Channel A fails, THEN SCAN (by selecting the HALL" mode) and record Chmmel B CETs as follows:
- a.
DEPRESS the "SUBMODEIl ST/2ND" pushbutton until "ALL" is indicated on the display and the nSUBMODE/IST/2ND" pushbutton is illuminated.
- b.
RECORD readings on Table C, Page 3 of3.
- 3.
INFORM the CRS if any of the following are observed:
Five or more CETs exceed 700oP.
Five or more CETs exceed 1200°F.
An unexpected steady rise in temperature occurs over several minutes.
Page 15 of IS Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l CET TIME CHANA CE04 CE14 CE33 CESl CES7 CE05 CE23 CE35 CE39 CE47 CE21 CE49 CE54 CES8 CE19 CE38 CE48 CE50 CE56 CElS CE16 CE2S CE37 CE44 CE22 CE4S CES2 CE53 CESS Salem 2 TABLEC (Page 2 0(3)
CET RECORD CHANNEL A TIME TIME TIME Page 16 of 18 TIME TIME TIME Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l CET TIME CHANB CEll CE29 CE30 CE41 CE46 CE02 CE03 CEIO CEl3 CE2S CEl7 CEIS CE32 CE36 CE43 CE08 CE20 CE26 CE34 CE42 CEOt CE06 CE07 CEl2 CE27 CE09 CE24 CE3t CE40 Salem 2 TABLEC (Page 3 of3)
CET RECORD CHANNELB TIME TIME TIME Page 17 of 18 TIME TIME TIME Rev 25
2-EOP-CFST-l CFST TIME TABLE USED (AlB)
TABLED (Page 1 of 1)
Res SUBCOOLING CALCULATION RCS Tsat RCS*
PRESSURE TEMPERATURE PT-403/405 eF)
T (pSIG) eF)
Salem 2 Page 18 or18 SUBCOOLING Tsat-T
("F)
Rev 25
SALEM GENERATING STATION CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES BASIS DOCUMENT
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
POWER RANGE LESS THAN 5%
Kurpose:
To determine if nuclear power is significant.
ERG Basis:
Figure 1, Block 1 F-O.l Basis Document Page 1 Following a reactor trip, nuclear power promptly drops to only a few percent of nominal, and then decays away to a level some 8 decades less. Decay heat levels resulting from radioactive fission product decay are never more than a few percent of nominal power and also decrease in time. Safeguards heat removal systems are sized to remove only decay heat and not significant core power. The 5% level was chosen because it is clearly readable on the power range meters. Nuclear power above a 5% level, in a core supposed to be shutdown, is considered an e:>..1.reme challenge to the fuel clad/matrix barrier and a RED priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is FRSM-I, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 5%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint P.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Maximum nuclear power level for performance of the EOP network.
2-EOP-CFST-I, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 1, Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
IR SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE To determine the behavior of neutron flux on the IR channels.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 2 At this point, power range flux has been determined to be not significant, so no extreme challenge exists.
However, a positive startup rate (SUR) in the intermediate range will shortly lead to power production if operator action is not taken, since no inherent feedback mechanisms exist below the point of adding heat. A positive SUR is considered a severe challenge to the Safety Function and a PURPLE priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for function response is EOP-FRSM-l, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safoty Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Pigure 1, Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
P*O.1 Decision Block:
SOURCERANGEENERG~ED Purl!ose:
To determine if high voltage is applied to the SR detectors.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 3 This decision point is used to detennine if further evaluation should be directed at the SR flux behavior, or back at the IR channel indications.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
~---...........................................,................................ _.... ".,............................................ _..................................... __......................,.... _........ _...........................................,.............................................. _............,....................................
2*EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 1, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.l Decision Block:
SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE
Purpose:
To check for adequate indication of sub criticality.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 4 Normally, following reactor trip, neutron flux decreases into the source range and stays there. Typically SR count rate fluctuates and does not exhibit any sustained increasing trend. Such a trend, as indicated by a positive SUR, is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRSM-2, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF CORE SHUTDOWN. If source range SUR is zero or negative the Shutdown Margin CFST is satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: Variations in the source range count rate could cause a temporary positive SUR.
A sustained increasing trend indicates a YELLOW priority condition.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 1, Block 5 ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
IR SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN -0.2 DPM ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 5 Normally, following reactor trip, intermediate range flux decays at a constant -OJ dpm. A rate of decrease less negative than -0.2 dpm (e.g., -0.1 dpm) is considered to represent a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for fimction restoration is EOP-FRSM-2, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF CORE SHUTDOWN. If the rate of decrease is more negative than -0.2 dpm, then the Shutdown Margin CFST criterion are satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint P.04 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Intermediate range startup rate for entry into FRSM-2.
-.~,... ",.....*..................................... _..... _.............. _.. _
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 1 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
5 OR MORE CETs GREATER THAN 1200 DEGREES
Purpose:
To determine if inadequate core cooling has been reached.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 6 Analyses of inadequate core cooling scenarios show that core exit temperature greater than 1200 0 P is a satisfactory criterion for basing extreme operator action. At least 5 themlocouples should be reading greater than l200°F. Five has been chosen to allow for thermocouples failing high. This temperature indicates that most liquid inventory has already been removed from the RCS and that core decay heat is superheating steam in the core. An extreme challenge to the fuel matrix/clad barrier is imminent and a RED priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for ftmctional response is EOP-FRCC-I, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING. If CETs are less than l200°F, then subsequent blocks check for other extreme, severe, not satisfied or satisfied conditions for the Core Cooling CFST.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
Plant-Specific Information: The following criteria should be used to determine which CETs to monitor:
- 1. At least one CET should be located as close as possible to the geometric center of the core.
- 2. The other CETs should be located at least one per quadrant over the highest power assemblies in each quadrant. The outer two rows of assemblies should be excluded, since they can receive significant cooling from SG drainage due to refluxing. The CETs should be selected at each refueling to ensure that the highest power assemblies are always being used.
- 3. If the capability exists to monitor a large percentage or all of the CETs and rapidly determine if five of the CETs are reading greater than 1200°F, then this capability may be used. For example, if a SPDS which monitors all the CETs and automatically selects and displays the highest CET readings in each quadrant is available, then this system could be used during the accident to determine if an inadequate core cooling condition exists. In this case, it is not necessary to preselect five specific CETs to monitor during the accident.
~---"""""""""""""""""""""""".'.*............ _...........................*...,........................................................ _.............* _.*................................... _................................................ -.....................................................................................................
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Fieure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 1 (CONTINUED)
Supplemental Information:
(CONTINUED)
Basis Document Page 7 Plant~Specific Information:
Hot leg temperature indications are not recommended for use in determining an inadequate core cooling condition. Analyses presented in ERG References 1 and 2 show that hot leg temperature reacts significantly slower than core exit temperature to uncovery of the core for some scenarios. The major reason being that water draining from the SGs to the core can affect the hot leg temperatW'e indication. Also, hot leg temperature at best indicates the average core temperature while CETs indicate a localized exit temperature above the hottest regions of the core.
Plant-Specific Information: It is not necessary to add instrument uncertainties to the l200°F value. An unceliainty of up to 2000P was factored into the selection of this value.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Setpoint G.04 Description Core exit temperature indicative of superheat conditions.
ERG Deviations:
DEV.l JUST.
Specified "5 OR MORE CETs" whereas ERG does not specify any particular number.
Incorporated basis information requirements, which allow for erroneous readings on one or two CETs.
.............................................. "",.~.=,~=~"............................................................................................. ~
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 8 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
RCS SUBCOOLlNG GREATER THAN 0 DEGREES
Purpose:
To determine if core exit sub cooling is being maintained and ECCS flow not required.
ERG Basis:
If core exit subcooling is less than O°F, then ECCS flow should be maintained to the ReS to provide inventory make-up and the Core Cooling CFST criteria are not satisfied. Subsequent blocks check for inadequate or degraded core cooling conditions. If greater than OaF ReS subcooling is indicated, then the CFST criteria are satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint R.ot No deviation from the ERG.
Description The sum of temperature and pressure measurement system errors including allowances for normal channel accuracies, translated into temperature using saturation tables - based on Subcooling Margin Monitor.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2. Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
IS ANY RCP RUNNING
Purpose:
To determine which RVLIS range is applicable for subsequent symptoms.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 9 The reference plant RVLIS has two ranges, full range and dynamic head range, for use without RCPs running and with RCPs running. respectively. This block determines which reading should be used to assess the Core Cooling CFST status in subsequent blocks. If any RCP is running, then the dynamic head range of RVLIS should be used in assessing core cooling conditions. If no Rep is running, then the full range should be used. Refer to the document REACTOR VESSEL LIQUID INVENTORY SYSTEM in the Generic Issues section of the ERG Executive Volume. <TIle tirst sentence conflicts with reference plant RVLIS design as descdbed in DW-94-025 (three ranges). DW-96-025 has been submitted by this plant to coneet text to be consistent with DW-94-025 basis.... Riley>
EOPBasis:
Same as ERG basis, with the following additional information:
Plant design includes three RVLIS ranges-- full, upper, and dynamic. Full and upper range indications are only valid with all RCPs stopped. Dynamic range indication is valid when one or more Reps are running.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
5 OR MORE CETs GREATER THAN 700 DEGREES
Purpose:
Basis Document Page 10 To detennine if one of the altemate inadequate core cooling criteria has been exceeded.
ERG Basis:
If at least five core exit thermocouples indicate greater than 700°F, superheat at the core exit is indicated.
An inadequate core cooling condition will exist if, in the next block, RVLIS indicates less than 3.5 feet collapsed liquid level in the core.
If core exit thelmocouples indicate less than 700oP, then an inadequate core cooling condition does not exist and the subsequent RVLIS check will assess whether a degraded core cooling condition has been reached.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
Plant-Specific Information: CETs to be monitored should be chosen the same as for 1200°F.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Setpoint G.03 Description Core exit temperature corresponding to 6700P plus normal chrumel accuracy or 700°F, whichever is greater.
ERG Deviations:
DEV.I JUST.
Specified "5 OR MORE CETs H whereas ERG does not specifY any particular number.
Incorporated basis information requirements~ which allow for erroneous readings on one or two CETs.
2-EOP-CFST-I, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 5 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN:
44% FOR 4 RCPs 30% FOR 3 RCPs 20% FOR 2 Reps 13% FOR 1 Rep
Purpose:
Basis Document Page 11 To determine ifRCS voiding has increased to greater than 50% void fraction with any RCP running ERG Basis:
If an RCP is operating, then even under a highly voided RCS condition, the CETs can be expected to indicate saturated temperatures. This block checks for RCS voiding less than 50% which, if RCPs are subsequently stopped, would ensure the core would initially be kept covered and adequately cooled. If RVLIS dynamic head range is less than 44%, 30%, 20%, 13%, depending on the number of RCPs running, then a degraded core cooling condition exists.
A PURPLE priority is warranted and EOP-FRCC-2, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, is the appropriate procedure for functional response. If RVLIS dynamic head range is greater than 44%, 30%, 20%, 13%, depending on the number of RCPs running, then only a saturated core cooling condition exists. A YELLOW priority is warranted and EOP-FRCC-3, RESPONSE TO SATURATED CORE COOLING CONDITIONS, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 12 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 5 (CONTINUED)
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 44% ~4 Reps 30% -3 Reps 20% -2 Reps 13% -1 Rep ERG Deviations:
Setpoint L.O}
No deviation from the ERG.
Description RVLIS dynamic range value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 50 percent with Reps running plus lmcertainties.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Fit,:;ure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 6 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
RVLIS FULL RANGE GREATER THAN 39%
Purpose:
Basis Document Page 13 To determine if the core is uncovered to less than 39% and an inadequate core cooling condition exists.
ERG Basis:
If RVLIS full range is less than 39%, then the core is uncovered and an inadequate core cooling condition has been reached.
A RED priority is warranted and FRCC-l, RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING, is the appropriate procedure for fimctional response. If RVLIS full range is greater than 39%, then a degraded core cooling condition exists since the core exit temperatures are greater than 700°F from the previous block. A PURPLE priority is warranted and EOP-FRCC-2, RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 39%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint K.Ol No deviation from the ERG.
Description RVLIS full range value which is 3.5 feet above the bottom of the active fuel in core with zero void fraction plus lllcertainties.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 2, Block 7 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.2 Decision Block:
RVLIS FULL RANGE GREATER THAN 39%
Purpose:
To determine if a degraded core cooling condition has been reached ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 14 If RVLIS full range is less than 39%, then the core is uncovered, but since core exit temperature has not reached 700oP, an inadequate core cooling condition has not been reached. A degraded core cooling condition exists. A PURPLE priority is warranted and EOP-FRCC-2, RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING, is the appropriate procedure for functional response. If RVLIS full range is greater than 39%, then only a saturated core cooling condition exists. A YELLOW priority is warranted and EOP-FRCC-3, RESPONSE TO SATURATED CORE COOLING, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 39%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint K.Ol No deviation from the ERG.
Description RVLIS full range value which is 3.5 feet above the bottom of the active fuel in core with zero void fraction plus unceliainties.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 15 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 1 ERG Status Tree No:
F-OJ Decision Block.~
SG NR GREATER THAN 9% (15% ADVERSE) IN AT LEAST ONE SG
Purpose:
To determine if at least one SG has level sufficient for maintenance of a heat sink ERG Basis:
A level in the NR in any SG, including a ruptured SG, is sufficient to ensure an adequate secondary inventory for a secondary heat sink. If level is not in the NR, the operation of the feed system will detennine whether a loss of secondary heat sink is imminent.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 9%
15%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint M.02 M.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Value showing S/G level just in the nalTOW range including allowances for normal chmmel accuracy and reference leg process errors.
Value showing S/G level just in the narrow range including allowance for normal channel accuracy, post-accident transmitter errors, and reference leg process errors, not to exceed 50%.
I I l
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 16 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.3 Decision Block:
TOTAL FEED WATER FLOW TO SGs GREATER THAN 22E04 LBIHR
Purpose:
To determine, in the absence of SG NR level on span, whether feed flow is sufficient to establish a secondary heat sink.
ERG Basis:
Total feedwater flow of greater than 22E04 LBIHR ensures that, in the absence ofNR level in any SG, the capability of feedwater to restore level and maintain a secondary heat sink is available. If not, then an extreme challenge to heat sink is imminent and a RED priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRHS-l, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: If feed flow is throttled due to operator action instructed from EOP-LOSC-2, MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR DEPRESSURIZATION, EOP-FRTS-l, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURlZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS, or due to SG level setpoints for normal containment conditions in other procedures, then EOP-FRHS-l does not need to be implemented.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 22x 104 Ih/hr ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 8.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description The minimum safeguards AFW flow requirement for heat removal plus allowances for normal channel accuracy (typically one AFW pump capacity at SG design pressure).
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.3 Decision Block:
ALL SG PRESSURES LESS THAN 1125 PSIG
Purpose:
To determine if any SG pressure is above the SO design limits.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 17 In the event that pressure in any SG is greater than the highest steamline safety valve setpoint, then the SG design limit may be exceeded and integrity may be challenged. Also, there is no flow path in use removing energy fro111 that SG. The heat sink function is not satisfied and a YELLOW priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRHS-2, RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 1125 psig ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 0.01 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Pressure for highest steamline safety valve setpoint.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.3 Decision Block:
ALL SO NR LEVELS LESS THAN 67%
Purpose:
To determine if any SO is approaching an overfill condition.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 18 An overfeed due to excess feed flow or a SOTR may lead to a high level in an SO. This block checks all SOs to ensure identification since it may cause unwanted atmospheric releases or challenge SO integrity.
Note that although the level in the affected SO may reach the top ofthe NR span, significant volume still exists before the SG fills with water. The heat sink function is not satisfied and a YELLOW priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRHS*3, RESPONSE TO STEAM OENERA TOR HIGH LEVEL.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: If a high SG level is occurring in an SO identified as ruptured, then guidance provided in the SGTR series procedures is appropriate to prevent further primary-to-secondary leakage.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 67%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint M.04 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Value corresponding to high-high SIG level feedwater isolation.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 5 ERG Status Tree No:
F-0.3 Decision Block:
ALL SG PRESSURES LESS THAN 1070 PSIG
Purpose:
To determine if any SG safety valves are open.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 19 If any SG safety valve is open, then an unisolable heat removal path is being used. A better path is to use steam dump to condenser or SG atmospheric steam dumps which are controllable and isolable.
Also, condenser steam dump will not release steam to the atmosphere. The heat sink function is not satisfied and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRHS-4, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SO ATMOSPHERIC RELIEFS AND CONDENSER DUMP VALVES.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 1070 psig ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 0.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Pressure for lowest steamline safety valve setpoint.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 20 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 3, Block 6 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.3 Decision Block:
ALL SG NR LEVELS GREATER THAN 9% (15% ADVERSE)
Purpose:
To determine if all SGs have level and inventory in the normal range.
ERG Basis:
Feedwater should be maintained until all SGs are in the NR lUlless a faulted SG is identified. NR level is reestablished in all SGs to maintain symmetric cooling of the ReS. If any level is low, the heat sink function is not satisfied and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRHS-5, RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR LOW LEVEL.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: A faulted SG that has had feed flow isolated to it will result in this indication.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 9%
15%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint M.02 M.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Value showing S/G level just in the nan'ow range including allowances for normal channel accuracy and reference leg process errors.
Value showing S/G level just in the narrow range including allowance for normal channel accuracy, post-accident transmitter errors, and reference leg process errors, not to exceed 50%.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 21 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 1 ERG Statns Tree No:
F-O.4 Decision Block:
ALL T-COLD COOLDOWN RATES LESS THAN 100°F IN LAST 60 MINUTES
Purpose:
To determine if a cold leg cooldown in excess of normal cooldown limits has occurred.
ERG Basis:
If the temperature decrease in any cold leg has exceeded lOO°F in the previous 60 minutes, then there is a potential concern for thermal shock. If not, then no other checks on rate-dependent limits are necessary. The only concern remaining is cold overpressure which will be checked in subsequent blocks. If the temperature decrease has exceeded 100 0P in the previous 60 minutes, the degree of cooldown must be assessed before a thermal shock concern can be identified. This is checked in subsequent blocks.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 1.04 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Maximum cold leg temperature decrease in any 60 minute time period to prevent a challenge to the reactor pressure vessel integrity.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.4 Decision Block:
ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 312°P
Purpose:
To determine ifRCS temperature is less than where POPS should be in service.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 22 In order to determine if cold overpressure is a concem, a check is made on whether RCS cold leg temperature has decreased to below the temperature at which POPS should be placed in service.
Subsequent blocks check if a cold overpressure condition exists.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 106 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Res temperature below which cold overpressure protection system (POPS) is required to be in service.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
F-OA Decision Block:
ALL ReS PRESSURE/TEMP POINTS TO THE RIGHT OF LIMIT A
Purpose:
To determine iflimits indicating a potential thermal shock have been exceeded.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 23 The objective of Limit A is to provide a limit that indicates a potential thermal shock condition exists if it is exceeded. The basis of this limit is to prevent growth of a flaw that could conservatively be present in the vessel wall. The method used to calculate this limit is described in the DESCRIPTION section of the ERG background document. If Limit A has been exceeded, then operator action is necessary to limit further ReS temperature decreases or ReS pressure increases. A RED priority is warranted since an extreme challenge to the function is occurring and EOP-FRTS-l, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
If Limit A has not been exceeded, then additional checks are made in subsequent blocks to determine if a less severe thermal shock condition exists.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value Table Setpoint C.04 ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
Description Limit A corresponding to the generic category which bounds plant specific vessel RTNDT, including temperature nonnal channel accuracy and post accident transmitter errors
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-OA Decision Block:
RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN 375 PSIG
Purpose:
To detennine if cold overpressurization limit has been exceeded.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 24 If the cold overpressure protection system should be in service and RCS pressure exceeds cold overpressure limits, then action may be necessary to minimize or decrease Res pressure. The priority of action will be determined in subsequent blocks. If RCS pressure has not exceeded the cold overpressure limit, then the Thermal Shock CFST is satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 375 psig ERG Deviations:
Setpoint B.13 No deviation from the ERG.
Description ReS pressure for placing PZR Overpressure Protection System (POPS) in service.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 25 EOP Fi\\:ure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 5 ERG Status Tree No:
P-O.4 Decision Block:
ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 2800P
Purpose:
To determine if ReS conditions have reached an imminent thermal shock condition where full repressurization should not be allowed.
ERG Basis:
The region between Limit A and 2800P is where a flaw is not calculated to grow, but where Limit A may be quickly exceeded if repressUl'ization occurs. If any cold leg temperature is less than 280oP, then operator action is necessary to minimize further RCS temperature decreases and Res pressure increases.
A PURPLE priority is warranted since a severe challenge to the function exists and EOP-FRTS-l, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS, is the appropriate procedure for functional response. If all cold leg temperatures are greater than 280oP, then a subsequent block checks for a less severe thermal shock condition.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 1.01 No deviation from the ERG.
Description ReS cold leg temperature corresponding to temperature TI, including allowances for normal channel accuracy and post-accident transmitter errors. Refer to background document for status tree F -04, INTEGRITY.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 26 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 6 ERG Status Tree No:
F-OA Decision Block:
ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 280°F
Purpose:
To determine iffull repressurization is allowed for a cold overpressure condition.
ERG Basis:
If cold leg temperature in any RCS cold leg is less than 280°F and RCS pressure is greater than the cold overpressure limit, then a severe challenge to the function exists and operator action is necessary to limit ReS pressure. A PURPLE priority is warranted and EOP-FRTS-l, RESPONSE. TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
If all RCS cold leg temperatures are greater than 280°F, then even though the cold overpressure limit has been exceeded (previous block), there is no extreme or severe challenge to vessel integrity, even at very high pressure. A YELLOW priority is warranted, however, since the function is not satisfied and EOP-FRTS-2, RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED PRESSURlZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS, is the appropriate procedure for functional response.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 1.01 No deviation from the ERG.
Description RCS cold leg temperature corresponding to temperature Tl, including allowances for normal channel accuracy and post-accident transntitter errors. Refer to background document for status tree F-04, INTEGRITY.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 27 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 4, Block 7 ERG Status Tree No:
F-OA Decision Block:
ALL T -COLDs GREATER THAN 310°F
Purpose:
To determine ifRCS conditions are within limits where a thermal shock condition would be anticipated.
ERG Basis:
If any cold leg temperature is less than 310°F, then conditions are close to the point where an extreme or severe challenge to a Thermal Shock limit will exist. The temperature region between 310°F and 280°F is intended to allow time for operator action to try to prevent entering a region of imminent thermal shock.
It has also been defined because cooldown limits more restrictive than the Technical Specification normal cooldown curves are required to safely achieve cold shutdown conditions. For these reasons the function is not satisfied and a YELLOW priority is walTanted.
The appropriate procedure for functional response is EOP-FRTS-2, RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS. If all RCS cold leg temperatures are greater than 310°F, then the Thermal Shock CFST is satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: If a YELLOW priority is reached during a greater than 100°F in one hour cooldown, no soak is required but additional restrictions beyond Technical Specifications do apply.
Setpoints and Numerical Values!
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint 1.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description ReS cold leg temperature cOlTesponding to temperature T2, including allowances for normal channel accuracy.
Refer to background document for status tree F-04, INTEGRITY.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 5, Block 1 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.5 Decision Block:
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 47 PSIG
Purpose:
To evaluate if pressure in containment is less than design pressure.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 28 If containment pressure is greater than design pressure, an extreme challenge to the containment barrier exists. The challenge does not necessarily come from the pressure alone, but rather from the potential pressure spike which could result from a hydrogen ignition. The total preSSlU'e could then potentially exceed the strength of containment. Also, above containment design pressure, leakage may exceed design basis limits. It is expected that containment pressure suppression equipment should be able to maintain pressure below design pressure. If not, then operator action is necessary to check containment functions and a RED priority is warranted.
The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCE-l, RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: It should be noted that once all actions of EOP-FRCE-l are completed and the operator is returned to the procedure and step in effect, this particular containment function may not be restored and the Containment Environment CFST may continue to display a RED priority. If this is the case, EOP-FRCE-l does not need to be implemented again since all necessary actions have already been performed.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 47 psig ERG Deviations:
Setpoint T.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Value corresponding to containment design pressure.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 5, Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.5 Decision Block:
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 15 PSIG
Purpose:
To determine if the pressure in containment is less than High-3 pressure setpoint.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 29 Pressure above High 3 indicates a significant energy release to containment and merits prompt operation of containment pressure suppression equipment and performance of Phase B Isolation. At pressures below design pressure, it is unlikely that even a hydrogen ignition could result in sufficient overpressure to fail containment.
Therefore, pressure above High-3 is considered a severe challenge to the contairunent barrier, but gives the operator significant margin for pressure suppression and a PURPLE priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCE-l, RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis with the following additional information:
Salem plant design only includes High-l and High-2 setpoints for Containment pressure. High-3 for the Reference Plant (CS actuation) corresponds to High-2 (15 psi g) for Salem. The Containment Spray System constitutes the "contaimnent pressure suppression equipment tl in the ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: It should be noted that once all actions of EOP-FRCE-l are completed and the operator is returned to the procedure and step in effect, this particular containment nmction may not be restored and the Containment Environment CFST may continue to display a PURPLE priority. If this is the case, EOP-FRCE-l does not need to be implemented again since all necessary actions have already been performed.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 15 psig ERG Deviations:
Setpoint T.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Containment pressure setpoint for spray actuation.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Fiflure No And
Title:
Figure 5, Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.5 Decision Block:
CONTAINMENT SUMP LESS THAN 78% (75% ADVERSE)
Purpose:
To determine if containment is flooded.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 30 High energy line breaks could result in a large volume of water being pumped into containment. As the water level rises, it might threaten the availability of equipment required for long term cooling of the core and/or containment. Such a high water level is considered a severe challenge to the containment barrier and a PURPLE priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCE-2, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL.
[DW-91-027] Include both normal and adverse smnp level values if instrumentation is subject to adverse containment conditions.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: It should be noted that once all actions of EOP-FRCE-2 are completed and the operator is returned to the procedure and step in effect, tIlls particular containment function may not be restored and the Containment Environment CFST may continue to display a PURPLE priority. If this is the case, EOP-FRCE*2 does not need to be implemented again since all necessary actions have already been performed.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 31 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 5, Block 3 (CONTINUED)
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 78%
75%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint T.07 T.08 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Containment water level just below design flood level minus allowances for normal channel accuracy.
Containment water level just below design flood level minus allowances for normal channel accuracy and post accident transmitter errors.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 5, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.5 Decision Block:
R-44 RADIATION LESS THAN 2 RlHr
Purpose:
To determine if Containment Building radiation is less than 2 Rlhr.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 32 Normally, Containment Building radiation levels are fairly low and constant. However, during an accident, significant radioactivity may be released into the contailmlent atmosphere. In-containment systems are available to filter and sClub the contaminants from the atmosphere, and radiation alone does not represent a threat to containment integrity.
This is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCE-3, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT RADIATION. If contaimnent radiation is less than 2 Rlhr, then the CFST criteria are satisfied.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
Plant-Specific Information: Though the 2 Rlhr setpoint is plant-specific, a typical setpoint value would be 2 Rlhr to 3 RIhr. The radiation alarm setpoint would be reached due to any significant Res leakage into containment or after a steamline break inside contaimnent assuming Teclmical Specification leakage from the SGs.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
- Y!!!!£ 2R1hr ERG Deviations:
Setpoint T.20 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Radiation level alarm setpoint for post accident containment radiation monitor.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 1 ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
PZR LEVEL LESS THAN 92%
Purpose:
To determine if PZR level is above the normal operating range.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 33 This decision point allows proper resolution of the actual inventory condition in subsequent decision blocks. If PZR level is above the normal operating range, the next decision block determines if it is due to excess inventory or voids in the vessel. If level is not high, then further questions check for low level and voids in the vessel.
EOP Basis:
SanIe as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 92%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint D.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Pressurizer high level reactor trip setpoint.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6. Block 2 ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
PZR LEVEL GREATER THAN 17%
Purpose:
To determine ifPZR level is below the normal operating range.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 34 This block is entered after having determined that PZR level is not high. If level is also not low, then the PZR inventory is considered satisfactory and a further question is asked about reactor vessel level. If PZR level is not greater than 17%. then the problem is one oflow inventory. with or without voids in the vessel. The condition is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The Core Cooling Status Tree checks for more severe or extreme challenges to Coolant Inventory that also challenge the Core Cooling CFST. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCI-2, RESPONSE TO LOW ReS INVENTORY.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
None Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 17%
ERG Deviations:
Setpoint D.02 No deviation from the ERG.
Description Pressurizer level letdown isolation setpoint.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 3 ERG Status Tree No:
Decision Block:
IS ANY RCP RUNNING (added by DW-94-02S)
Purpose:
To determine the proper RVLIS range to use.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 35 The reference plant RVLIS has three ranges, full range and upper range, which are used without RCPs nUlling, and dynamic head range which is used with RCPs rmming. This block detennines which range should be used to assess the Coolant Inventory CFST status in subsequent blocks. If no RCP is running, then the full range should be used. If any RCP is running, then there will not be a steam void in the upper head due to RCPs forcing flow into the upper head region. Any indicated void will be in the form of a non-condensable gas/water mixture that is forced through the core via the running Rep. Since subsequent stopping of the RCPs may cause an upper head void when the non-condensables come out of solution, it is desirable to vent in an attempt to remove any non-condensables that have accumulated in the upper head while the RCPs are running. Therefore, the dynamic range RVLIS is used to determine the potential for upper head voiding once the pumps are stopped Refer to the document REACTOR VESSEL LIQUID INVENTORY SYSTEM in the Generic Issues section of the ERG Executive Volume.
(DW-94-025)
[DW-94-025] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to be used.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
Commitment C0550: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP-CFST-I Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272/94-007*01.
DW-94-025 meets the intent of this commitment.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 4 ERG Status Tree No:
F-0.6 Decision Block:
IS ANY RCP RUNNING (added by DW-94-02S)
Purpose:
To determine the proper RVLIS range to use.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 36 The reference plant RVLIS has three ranges, full range and upper range, which are used without RCPs running, and dynamic head range which is used with RCPs running. This block determines which range should be used to assess the Coolant Inventory CFST status in subsequent blocks. If no RCP is running, then the full range should be used. If any RCP is rU1ming, then there will not be a steam void in the upper head due to RCPs forcing flow into the upper head region. Any indicated void will be in the form of a non-condensable gas/water mixture that is forced through the core via the rtU1ning RCP. Since subsequent stopping of the RCPs may cause an upper head void when the non-condensables come out of solution, it is desirable to vent in an attempt to remove any non-condensables that have accumulated in the upper head while the RCPs are running. Therefore, the dynamic range RVLIS is used to determine the potential for upper head voiding once the pumps are stopped Refer to the document REACTOR VESSEL LIQUID INVENTORY SYSTEM in the Generic Issues section of the ERG Executive Volmne.
(DW-94-02S)
[DW-94-02S] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to he used.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
Commitment COSSO: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP-CFST-l Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272/94-007-01.
DW-94-025 meets the intent of this commitment.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
None ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 5 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.6 Decision Block:
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN:
93% FOR 4 RCPs 63% FOR 3 RCPs 42% FOR 2 RCPs 32% FOR 1 RCP
Purpose:
To determine if voids exist in the reactor vessel.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 37 Having already detennined that PZR level is high, this question tries to defIne the cause. If the upper head region is full, then the problem is simply one of excess inventory; the condition is considered not satisfied for Coolant Inventory and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCI-l, RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL. If the RVLIS does indicate voids in the upper head region, then the problem is likely due to some type of bubble in that region. If Reps are running, a steam void is not expected to exist in the upper head. Instead, the void will be in the form of a non-condensable gas/water mixture that is forced through the core via the running Rep. Since the presence of a small void fraction in itself does not represent a challenge to the Inventory CFST, it is considered a not satisfIed condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCI-3, RESPONSE TO VOID IN REACTOR VESSEL. (DW-94-02S)
[DW-94-025] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to be used.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: If a controlled cooldown is in progress and cooldownldepressurization must continue, then FRCI-3 should not be implemented.
Conunitment COSSO: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP-CFST-l Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272/94-007-01.
DW-94-025 meets the intent of this commitment.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 38 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6. Block 5 (CONTINUED)
~etpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 93% FOR 4 RCPs 63% FOR 3 RCPs 42% FOR 2 Reps 32% FOR 1 Rep ERG Deviations:
Setpoint L.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description RVLIS dynamic range value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 0 percent with Reps rmming including allowances for nonnal channel accuracy.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 6 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.6 Decision Block:
RVLIS UPPER RANGE GREATER THAN 100%
Purpose:
To determine ifvoids exist in the reactor vesseL ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 39 Having already determined that PZR level is high, this question tries to define the cause. If the upper head region is full, then the problem is simply one of excess inventory; the condition is considered not satisfied for Inventory and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP~FRCI-l, RESPONSE TO HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL.
If the RVLIS does indicate voids in the upper head region, then the problem is likely due to some type of bubble in that region. Since the presence of a bubble, in itself, does not represent a challenge to the Coolant Inventory CFST, it is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCI-3, RESPONSE TO VOID IN REACTOR VESSEL. It is acceptable to use RVLIS upper range instead offull range in this decision block. (DW-94-025)
[DW-94-025] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to be used.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item:
If a controlled natural circulation cooldown is in progress and cooldownldepressurization must continue, then FRCI-3 should not be implemented.
Commitment C0550: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP-CFST~1 Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272J94~007~Ol.
DW~94-025 meets the intent of this commitment.
2~EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Step No:
Figure 6, Block 6 (CONTINUED)
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Description Basis Document Page 40 Value 100%
Setpoint lOI RVLIS upper range value indicating upper head region full.
ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 7 ERG Status Tree No:
F*O.6 Decision Block:
RVLIS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN:
93% FOR 4 Reps 63% FOR 3 RCPs 42% FOR 2 RCPs 32% FOR 1 RCP
Purpose:
To determine if voids exist in the reactor vessel.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 41 Having determined that PZR level is normal, the remaining inventory question relates to water level in the reactor vessel. Iflevel does not indicate that the vessel is full, then some type of voids are present in the vessel upper head. If Reps are running, a steam void is not expected to exist in the upper head.
Instead. the void will be in the form of a non-condensables gas/water mixture that is forced through the core via the running Rep. Since the presence of a small void fraction in itself does not represent a challenge to the Coolant Inventory CFST. It is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP*FRCI-3, RESPONSE TO VOIn IN THE REACTOR VESSEL. CDW-94-02S)
[DW-94-02S] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to be used.
EOPBasis:
Having determined that PZR level is normal, the remaining inventory question relates to water level in the reactor vessel. If level does not indicate that the vessel is full, then some type of voids are present in the vessel upper head. The presence of an upper head void does not, in itself, represent a challenge to the Coolant Inventory CFST. It is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP~FRCI-3, RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN THE REACTOR VESSEL.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 42 EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 7 (CONTINUED)
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item: If a controlled cooldown is in progress and cooldownldepressurization must continue, then FRCI~3 should not be implemented.
Commitment COSSo: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP~CFST -1 Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272/94-007-01.
DW-94-02S meets the intent of this commitment.
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Value 93% FOR 4 RCPs 63% FOR 3 RCPs 42% FOR 2 RCPs 32% FOR 1 RCP ERG Deviations:
Setpoint L.03 No deviation from the ERG.
Description RVLIS dynamic range value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 0 percent with RCPs running including allowances for normal channel accuracy.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Figure No And
Title:
Figure 6, Block 8 ERG Status Tree No:
F-O.6 Decision Block:
RVLIS UPPER RANGE GREATER THAN 100%
Purpose:
To determine ifvoids exist in the reactor vessel.
ERG Basis:
Basis Document Page 43 Having determined that PZR level is normal, the remaining inventory question relates to water level in the reactor vessel. If level does not indicate that the vessel is full, then some type of voids are present in the vessel upper head. The presence of an upper head void does not, in itself, represent a challenge to the Coolant Inventory CFST. It is considered a not satisfied condition and a YELLOW priority is warranted. The appropriate procedure for function restoration is EOP-FRCI-3, RESPONSE TO VOID IN THE REACTOR VESSEL. It is acceptable to use RVLIS upper range instead o/full range in this decision block. (DW-94-025)
[DW-94-02S] Revised Coolant Inventory Status Tree and clarified RVLIS ranges to be used.
EOP Basis:
Same as ERG basis.
Supplemental Information:
ERG Knowledge Item:
If a controlled natural circulation cooldown is III progress and cooldownldepressurization must continue, then FRCI-3 should not be implemented.
ConIDlitment cosso: This commitment indicates in a general way that EOP-CFST-l Figure 6 should be revised to address concerns raised in LER 272/94-007-01.
DW-94-025 meets the intent of this commitment.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees EOP Step No:
Figure 6, Block 8 (CONTINUED)
Setpoints and Numerical Values:
Description Basis Document Page 44 Value 100%
Setpoint J.Ol RVLIS upper range value indicating upper head region full.
ERG Deviations:
No deviation from the ERG.
2-EOP-CFST-l, Rev. 25 Critical Safety Function Status Trees Basis Document Page 45 2-EOP-CFST-l: CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES EOPIERG CORRELATION NOTES: For the purposes of this step-to-step cOll'elation, BOP decision blocks (vertical layout) are numbered from top to bottomlleft to right.
ERG decision blocks (horizontal layout) are nmnbered from left to rightltop to bottom.
F-O.6 Decision Blocks 3 and 4 were split into three blocks each per DW-94-02S.
There are no "step sequence tables" for the status trees as there are for the other ERGs.
,--------,------~--,---,-.-... -,----
I SOURCE RANGE SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE YES I NO FIGURE 1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN STATUS TREE I
SOURCE RANGE ENERGIZED YES I NO I
IR SUR MORE NEGATIVE THAN
-0.2 DPM YES I NO IR SUR ZERO OR NEGATIVE YES NO I
I GREEN I r YELLOW I I GREEN II YELLOW I I PURPLE 1 I
SAT II FRSM-2 I I SAT II FRSM-2 I I FRSM-1 l SALEM UNJT 2 POWER RAI--JGE LESS THAN 51 YES -I NO
[
RED 1 r FRSM-1 -I
[Op-eFST-'1 REV. 25
I RED I FRCC-1 GREEN I SAT I SALEM UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 CORE COOLING STATUS TREE EOP-CFST -1 RVLlS DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN:
44;1. FOR 4 RCPs 301. FOR 3 Reps 20X FOR 2 RCPs 131. FOR 1 Rep YES NO 5 OR MORE.
CETs GREATER THAN 1200 DEGREES YES NO Res SUBCOOLING GREATER THAN o DEGREES YES NO IS ANY RCP RUNNING YES NO I
5 OR MORE CETs GREATER THAN 700 DEGREES RVLlS FULL RANGE GREATER THAN 391.
YES I NO YES NO RVLlS FULL RANGE GREATER THAN 39/.
YES NO YELLOW I PURPLE I I PURPLE I RED I
YELLOW PURPLE FRCC-3 I FRCC-2 I I FRCC-2 Ii FRCC-1 I FRCC-3 FRCC-2 REV. 25
-........ ---.-.-.. ---~._--.-... --.-.. -.. -.~.-~--------.--... -.-.. ----.. ----.----............. __.. -........... _-
I ALL SG NR LEVELS GREATER THAN 91.
(151. ADVERSE>
YES I NO L GREEN J I YELLOW I I
SAT I L FRHS-5 J SALEM UNIT 2 FIGURE 3 HEAT SINK STATUS TREE J
ALL SG PRESSURES LESS THAN 1070 PSIG YES 1 NO J
I ALL SG NR LEVELS LESS THAN 67%
YES I NO I
I YELLOW I I YELLOW I FRHS-4 J l FRHS-3 J SG bJR GREATER THAN 9%
(151. ADVERSE)
IN AT LEAST ONE SG YES I NO
.-----'J
.I ALL SG PRESSURES LESS THAN 1125 PSIG YES I NO I YELLOW I FRHS-2 TOTAL FEEDWATER FLOW TO SGs GREATER THAI~
22[04 LB/HR YES J NO I
I RED I
I FRHS-l I
[OP-(rST-l REV. 25
FIGURE 4 THERMAL SHOCK STATUS TREE ALL T -COLD COOL DOWN RATES LESS THAN 100" F IN LAST 60 MINUTES YES I NO Eop**crsr -I
~--------------~I I~ ______________ ~
I 1
ALL T -COLDs GREATER THAN 312" F YES I NO I
I Res PRESSURE LESS THAN 375 PSIG YES I NO I
I ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 280"F YES I NO I GREEN I I GREEN II YELLOW I l PURPLE I I
SAT I I SAT II FRTS-2 I I FRTS-1 I SALEM UNIT 2 I
ALL T -COLDs GREATER THAN 280°F I
ALL T-COLDs GREATER THAN 310 0 F YES I NO YES I NO I
ALL Res PRESSURE/
TEMP POINTS TO THE RIGHT OF LIMIT A YES I NO I
I GREEN I I YELLOW II PURPLE I I RED I
I SAT I I FRTS-2 II FRTS-1 I I FRTS-1 I REV. 25
.------.---.-.--... ----.-.... ~-------
FIGURE 4A THERMAL SHOCK LIMIT A CURVE Eop-eFST -1 PTS PLANT OPERATIONAL LIMITS CURVE 3000 2700 -
2560 PSIG
<:01;:,
",()
'1; 2400 -
2200 PSIG~~
265°F 2100 -
C)
I..f) 1800 -
CL w
0::
1500 -
=:J I..f)
<..n w
1200 0::
0...
900 -
Ll MIT A-----?-
T1--- T2-600 -
300 -
230* F 280°F 310°F 0
I I
I o
100 200 300 400 TEMPERATURE of SALEM UNIT 2 REV. 25
....... -... -.----... -----.. --~----.. -.. ----.
FIGURE 5 CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT ST ATUS TREE I
R-44 RADIATION LESS THAN 2 R/Hr YES I NO I GREEN II YELLOW I I
SAT II.. FRCE-3 I SALEM UNIT 2 I
CONT AINMENT SUMP LESS THAN 7S1 (751 ADVERSE)
YES I NO I
I PURPLE I I FRCE-2 I I
CONTAfNMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN
'15 PS IG YES J NO I
l PURPLE J I FRCE-1 I CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 47 PSIG YES I NO j
I RED J I FRCE-1 I E OF' -(J '~, T -*'1 REV, 25
~.-...... -.... -. __._--...,"'-_
... __._.-.................. ".,~--
.. -.. -~-~---.-.-.--~---------
... ---------.---.---.-.----.~
FIGURE 5 COOLANT INVENTORY STATUS TREE E OP-CF S T -'1 PZR LE VEL LESS THAN 92%
YES J NO I
l I
PZR LEVEL GREATER THAN 17%
YES I NO I
IS ANY IS ANY Rep RCP RUNNING RUNNING YES NO YES NO I
I RVLlS RVLlS DYNAMIC RANGE DYNAMIC RANGE GREATER THAN:
GREATER THAN:
93/. FOR 4 Reps RVLIS 93/. FOR 4 RCPs RVLIS 63/. FOR 3 Reps UPPER RANGE 53/. FOR 3 Reps UPPER RANGE 42/. FOR 2 Reps GREATER THAN 42/. FOR 2 RCPs GREATER THAN 321. FOR 1 Rep 100"/,
327. FOR 1 Rep 100%
YES I NO YES NO YES J NO YES NO I YELLOW I I YELLOW I I YELLOW I l YELLOW I l YELLOW I I FRC J-3 I FRCI-3 I I. FRCI-2 I l FRCI-31 I FRCI-3 I GREEN I I GREEN I YELLOW I I YELLOW I SAT I I
SAT j FRCI -1 I l FRC]-1 I SALEM UNIT 2 REV. 25