ML102950568
| ML102950568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/2010 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Balian H, Leonard Cline, Joseph Deboer NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0334 | |
| Download: ML102950568 (6) | |
Text
Ziev, Tracey From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Burritt, Arthur 0V Friday, April 23, 2010 10:32 AM Balian, Harry; Cline, Leonard; DeBoer, Joseph; Douglas, Christopher; Ennis, Rick; Johnson, Jonathan; Kern, Ludwig; Miller, Ed; Moore, Ross; Patel, Amar; Raymond, William; Schroeder, Daniel; Turilin, Andrey; Welling, Blake OHara, Timothy; Conte, Richard; Gray, Harold; Cahill, Christopher Branch 3 Status - 4/23/10 B3-Status 4-23-10,doc See attached Key Salem AFW Next Steps:
NRC Next Steps:
Confirm the PSEG risk assessment to delay AFW testing is reasonable - Cahill Confirm the finite element analysis for the unit 1 as found condition is acceptable including the use of appropriate methods and assumptions - Conte/O'Hara/HQ Confirm the technical evaluation that supports 1275 psig is bounding (including a faulted S/G scenario) -
Hansell/Silk Evaluate the Unit 2 AFW extent of condition operability assessment (focus on the differences between Unit 1 & 2) - Schroeder/O'Hara Follow-up on the control air coating concern at the support, clamp - O'Hara/Gray e
Evaluate ongoing AFW piping replacements on Unit 1 - O'Hara Evaluate repairs to the control air system on Unit 1 - O'Hara AFW Information Needs Design records for as installed piping on Unit 1 & 2 (not found as of yet, still looking)
Unit 1 AFW past operability assessment Unit 1 AFW as found condition finite element analysis Unit 2 AFW operability determination kiformrwdon In this record was deleted in amordance whIh the Freedom o I lm.1tm" A01,n ExmTpd=
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. STATUS Outside of Scope 4/23/10 Highlighted items were.discussed at DRP/DRS Coordination meeting D
J*Outside of Scope Scope AFW Piping DeQradation
Background:
Unit1 - PSEG identified significant piping and coating degradation for the buried AFW supply piping for 2 of the 4 steam generators.-The pipe was schedule 80, 4" inside diameter, carbon steel piping with a protective coating. Based on preliminary UT measurements of the piping, engineering determined AFW system operability could not be assured through next operating cycle. Additional UT examinations were performed to evaluate the structural integrity of the pipe and to identify the sections of pipe that needed replacement. Based on these measurements, PSEG will replace all deep and shallow pipe on both the 12 and 14 headers. Following replacement of about 80 ft of shallow piping PSEG removed the supports for the piping that was not replaced and identified a section under a pipe support clamp that was well below minimum wall (.077). Subsequent-UTs determined that the thickness measurement was the result of a localized pit. To fully evaluate the impact of the identified, pipedecradation on the AFW system PSEGired
Structural Integrity Associates, Inc to complete a finite element analysis.
Extent of Condition:
0 Unit 2 has greater margin - it is a newer plant and is presumably in better condition; documentation exists that proves the piping was opened and inspected -16 years ago and found.to' e. in:pristinecond ition; S1I code gives more allowance to an operating unit (they can take credit for up to 90%/&df the yield stress). DRS reviewed photographs and has no immediate safety concerns. There were no similar inspections of Unit 1 AFW piping.
Unit 2 - PSEG determined that they did not perform ASME code required pressure drop test for the buried sections of the 22 and 24 headers. Unit 2 entered a 24-hr shutdown action statement at 1132 on 4/21 for this condition. PSEG subsequently completed a risk analysis that determined that it is ok to extend the periodicity of the surveillance for 7 days.
NRC Next Steps:
Conform the PSEG risk assessment to delay AFW testing is reasonable - Cahill Confirm the finite element analysis for the unit 1 as found condition is acceptable including the use of appropriate methods and assumptions - Conte/O'Hara/HQ Confirm the technical evaluation that supports 1275 psig is bounding (including a faulted S/G scenario)- Hansell/Silk Evaluate the Unit 2 AFW extent of condition operability assessment(focus on the differences between Unit 1 &'2) -
Schroeder/O'Hara Follow-up on the control air coating concern at the support clamp - O'Hara/Gray Evaluate ongoing AFW piping replacements on Unit 1 - O'Hara Evaluate repairs to the control air system on Unit 1 - O'Hara Information Needs - discussed during 4/19, 1315, status call - answers highlighted Design records for as installed piping on Unit 1 & 2 (nrot foun.das of,,yet,,still looking)
Unit 1 AFW past operability assessment Unit I AFW as found condition finite element analysis Unit 2 AFW operability determination Outside of [Scope
Outside of Scope Additional Items.4 k
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