ML102950566

Branch 3 Daily Status

ML102950566
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/23/2010
From:	NRC Region 1
To:	NRC Region 1
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0334
Download: ML102950566 (5)

Text

OSutside of Scope}

BRANCH 3 DAILY 423/o10 STATUS Highlighted items were discussed at DRP/DRS Coordination meeting Jutsid Outside of Scope BOLD items are new Wekend Coverage: Dan iALI (9X)j>007

' AL2=(2of3)0.1.> .,. AL*3-(iX)>071 3 ,

Outside of Scope i

AFW Piping Degradation

Background:

Unit1 - PSEG identified significant piping and coating degradation for the buried AFW supply piping for 2 of the 4 B 7 steam generators. The pipe was schedule 80, 4" inside diameter, carbon steel piping with a protective coating. Based E on preliminary UT measurements of the piping, engineering determined AFW system operability could not be assured through next operating cycle. Additional UT examinations were performed to evaluate the structural integrity of the pipe and to identify the sections of pipethat needed replacement. Based on these measurements, PSEG will replace all deep and shallow pipe on both the 12 and 14 headers. Following replacement of about 80 ft of shallow piping.,

Z PSEG removed the supports for the piping that was not replaced and identified a section under a pipe support clamp I3 of that was well below minimum wall (.077). Subsequent Utsidetermined that the thickness measurement was the result teAWyfmS ied of a localized pit. To fully evaluate the impact of the identif'id pipe degradation on the AFWsystemPSEG hired Qsb~i

Structural Integrity Associates, Inc to complete a finite element analysis.

Extent of Condition:

• Unit 2 has greater margin - it is a newer plant and is presumably in better condition; documentation exists that proves the piping was opened and inspected -16 years ago and found to be in pristine condition; ISI code gives more allowance to an operating unit (they can take credit for up to 90% of the yield stress). DRS reviewed photographs and has no immediate safety concerns. There were no similar inspections of Unit 1 AFW piping.

Unit 2 - PSEG determined that they did not perform ASME code required pressure drop test for the buried sections of the 22 and 24 headers. Unit 2 entered a 24-hr shutdown action statement at 1132 on 4/21 for this condition. PSEG subsequently completed a risk analysis that determined that it is ok to extend the periodicity of the surveillance for 7 days.

NRC Next Steps:

0 Conform the PSEG risk assessment to delay AFW testing is reasonable - Cahill 9 Confirm the finite element analysis for the unit 1 as found condition is acceptable including the use of appropriate methods and assumptions - Conte/O'Hara/HQ a Confirm the technical evaluation that supports 1275 psig is bounding (including a faulted S/G scenario) - Hansell/Silk

• Evaluate the Unit 2 AFW extent of condition operability assessment (focus on the differences between Unit I & 2) -

Schroeder/O'Hara Follow-up on the control air coating concern at the support clamp - O'Hara/Gray

• Evaluate ongoing AFW piping replacements on Unit 1 - O'Hara

• Evaluate repairs to the control air system on Unit 1 - O'Hara Information Needs - discussed during 4/19, 1315, status call - answers highlighted

• Design records for as installed piping on Unit 1 & 2 (not found as of yet, still looking)

• Unit 1 AFW past operability assessment

• Unit 1 AFW as found condition finite element analysis

• Unit 2 AFW operability determination J~. lUEt* UI bo~rpe

Outside of Scope Additional Items Status Board Items:

t aS*1SmIANb*t i6d piping (PIQRITY) - waitibg

' on* PSEG FEA and operability determinationto enter MC 0309

-Outside of Scope

Ouiside of S~ope' Outside of Soope