Text

Handouts to Applicants (Folder 3)
	ML102510235
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/05/2010
From:	D'Antonio J; Operations Branch I
To:	; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
	Hansell S
Shared Package
ML100560049	List: IR 05000412/2010301; ML101040650; ML102180301; ML102510196; ML102510217; ML102510235; ML102510316; ML102520175; ML102520178; ML102520182; ML102650433; ML102650445; ML102650459; ML111680038; ML111680049;
References
	TAC U01821
	Download: ML102510235 (96)
	v • d • e

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BVPS - [oP 20M-53A.1.A-5.1

Tttle, Nutiiber Revision 1 1 OF Plus Subcooling Based On Core Exit TCs A-S.l I

MINIMUMSUBCOOLING (F)

RCS PRESSURE (PSIG)

'COLUMN 2 COLUMN 1 ADVERSE CNMT*

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(Page 1 of

13)

A9.330B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-4SD.4.AAA HEAT TRACING SYSTEM TROUBLE GENERAL SKILL REFERENCE Revision 7 Prepared by Date Pages Issued Effective Date J. G. Sites 03/02/06 1 through 13 05/24/06 Reviewed by Date Validated by Date T. J. Esper 03/16/06 N/A PORC Meeting No.

PORC Not Required Date PAF-06-00732

(Page 2 of 13)

BVPS -GSR Electric Heat Tracing System Operating Procedures Unit 2 20M-45D.4.AAA Revision 7 Page 2 of 13 HEAT TRACING SYSTEM TROUBLE AB-6B ANN. WINDOW NO. AB-6B Description CRT No.lComputer Address

1. HEAT TRACE PAB PNL N1 3 N6612D

2. HEAT TRACE PAB PNL N2 3 N6613D

3. HEAT TRACE PAB PNL N3 3 N6614D

4. HEAT TRACE PAB PNL N4 3 N7100D

5. HEAT TRACE SFGDS PNL N1 3 N6615D

6. HEAT TRACE COND POLISH PNL N1 3 N6616D

7. HEAT TRACE COND POLISH PNL N2 3 N6617D B. HEAT TRACE SFGDS PNLA1 3 N661BD

9. HEAT TRACE SFGDS PNL B1 3 N6619D

10. HEAT TRACE PNL PAS 3 N7101 D CAUSES AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. HEAT TRACE PAB PNL N1 Setpoint:

Device:

Any Local Panel Alarm

[2HTS-PNLN1AB]

PROBABLE CAUSE

a.

Individual heat trace circuit temperature high/low

b.

Individual circuit controller failure CAUTION:

ANY COMPONENT MANIPULATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, THAT IS NOT RETURNED TO NSA UPON PROCEDURE COMPLETION, SHALL BE YELLOW CAUTION TAGGED AND LOGGED IN THE DAILY JOURNAL, WITH REFERENCE MADE TO THE SPECIFIC ARP USED.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a.

Individual Heat Trace Circuit Temperature High/Low.

1) Verify individual circuit temperature alarm at the circuit temperature controller located on the annunciated panel.

(Page 9 of

13)

BVPS -GSR Electric Heat Tracing System Operating Procedures Unit 2 20M-45D.4.AAA Revision 7 Page 9 of 13 HEAT TRACING SYSTEM TROUBLE A8-SB

b.

Individual circuit controller failure CAUTION:

ANY COMPONENT MANIPULATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, THAT IS NOT RETURNED TO NSA UPON PROCEDURE COMPLETION, SHALL BE YELLOW CAUTION TAGGED AND LOGGED IN THE DAILY JOURNAL, WITH REFERENCE MADE TO THE SPECIFIC ARP USED.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a.

Loss of Power.

1)

Verify power available to circuit and restore if possible.

2)

If above is unsuccessful, notify the SM.

b.

Individual Circuit Temperature Controller Failure.

1) Verify proper operation of the redundant circuit. Use 20M-45D.5.B.1, "Table 45D Circuit Classes" as a guide.

8. HEAT TRACE SFGDS PNL A1 Setpoint:

Device:

Any Local Panel Alarm 99-0CB1-V [2HTS*PNLA1SG]

Signal Isolator PROBABLE CAUSE

a.

Individual heat trace circuit temperature highllow

b.

Individual circuit controller failure CAUTION:

ANY COMPONENT MANIPULATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, THAT IS NOT RETURNED TO NSA UPON PROCEDURE COMPLETION, SHALL BE YELLOW CAUTION TAGGED AND LOGGED IN THE DAILY JOURNAL, WITH REFERENCE MADE TO THE SPECIFIC ARP USED.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a.

Individual Heat Trace Circuit Temperature High/Low.

1) Verify individual circuit temperature alarm at the circuit temperature controller located on the annunciated panel.

2) Verify individual circuit temperature controller setpoint is adjusted in accordance with 20M-45D.5.B.2, "Table 45D Circuit Controller Setpoints And Alarms."

(Page 10 of

13)

BVPS - GSR Electric Heat Tracing System Operating Procedures Unit 2 20M-45D.4.AAA Revision 7 Page 10 of 13 HEAT TRACING SYSTEM TROUBLE A8-SB

3)

Determine if alarm is due to system flow transient or power failure:

a)

If alarm is due to system flow transient, then take no action.

b) If alarm is high without apparent system flow transient, then notify shift supervisor.

c)

If alarm is low without apparent system flow transient:

(1) Verify power available to circuit and restore if possible.

(2) If above is not successful, notify the SM.

b.

Individual Circuit Temperature Controller Failure.

1) Verify proper operation of the redundant circuit. Use 20M-45D.5.B.1, "Table 45D Circuit Classes" as a guide.

2) If the failed circuit controller is located on [2HTS*PNLA1SG], Refer to the applicable Technical Specification Action Requirement [CTS] 3/4.1

[ITS] T.S. 3.5.4).

9. HEAT TRACE SFGDS PNL B1 Setpoint:

Device:

Any Local Panel Alarm 99-PCB1-H [2HTS*PNLB1SG]

Signal Isolator PROBABLE CAUSE

a.

Individual heat trace circuit temperature high/low

b.

Individual circuit controller failure CAUTION:

ANY COMPONENT MANIPULATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, THAT IS NOT RETURNED TO NSA UPON PROCEDURE COMPLETION, SHALL BE YELLOW CAUTION TAGGED AND LOGGED IN THE DAILY JOURNAL, WITH REFERENCE MADE TO THE SPECIFIC ARP USED.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a.

Individual Heat Trace Circuit Temperature High/Low.

1) Verify individual circuit temperature alarm at the circuit temperature controller located on the annunciated panel.

2) Verify individual circuit temperature controller setpoint is adjusted in accordance with 20M-45D.5.B.2, "Table 45D Circuit Controller Setpoints and Alarms."

(Page 11 of

13)

BVPS - GSR Electric Heat Tracing System Operating Procedures Unit 2 20M-45D.4.AAA Revision 7 Page 11 of 13 HEAT TRACING SYSTEM TROUBLE A8-6B

3) Determine if alarm is due to system flow transient or power failure:

a) If alarm is due to system flow transient, then take no action.

b) If alarm is high without apparent system flow transient, then notify shift supervisor.

c)

If alarm is low without apparent system flow transient:

(1) Verify power available to circuit and restore if possible.

(2) If above is unsuccessful, notify the SM.

b.

Individual Circuit Temperature Controller Failure.

1) Verify proper operation of the redundant circuit. Use 20M-45D.5.B.1, "Table 450 Circuit Classes" as a guide.

2) If the failed circuit controller is located on [2HTS"PNLB1SG], Refer to the applicable Technical Specification Action Requirement ([CTS] 3/4.1

[ITS] T.S. 3.5.4).

10. HEAT TRACE PNL PAS Setpoint:

Device:

Any Local Panel Alarm

[2HTS*PN L*PAS]

PROBABLE CAUSE

a.

Individual heat trace circuit temperature high/low

b.

Individual circuit controller failure ANY COMPONENT MANIPULATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, THAT IS NOT RETURNED TO NSA UPON PROCEDURE COMPLETION, SHALL BE YELLOW CAUTION TAGGED AND LOGGED IN THE DAILY JOURNAL, WITH REFERENCE MADE TO THE SPECIFIC ARP USED.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

a.

Individual Heat Trace Circuit Temperature High/Low.

1) Verify individual circuit temperature alarm at the circuit temperature controller located on the annunciated panel.

2) Verify individual circuit temperature controller setpoint is adjusted in accordance with 20M-45D.5.B.2, "Table 450 Circuit Controller Setpoints And Alarms."

(Page 1 of

23)

A9.330B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-45D.5.B.1 TABLE 450 CIRCUIT CLASSES Revision 3 Prepared by Date Pages Issued Effective Date R. P. Weiss 04/30/03 1 through 23 05/08/03 Reviewed by Date Validated by Date R. Plummer 05/01/03 N/A PORC Meeting No.

PORC Not Required Date PAF-03-01727

(Page 2 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables Unit2 20M-450.5.B.1 Revision 3 Page 2 of 23 TABLE 450 CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS-JB1-1 2HTS-JB1-2 2HTS-JB1-3 2HTS-JB1-4 2HTS-JB1-5 2HTS-JB1-6 2HTS-JB1-7 2HTS-JB1-B 2HTS-JB1-9A 2HTS-JB1-11 2HTS-JB1-12A 2HTS-JB1-13A 2HTS-JB1-14 2HTS-JB 1-16A&B 2HTS-JB1-17 2HTS-JB1-1BA&B 2HTS-JB1-19AB&C 2HTS-JB 1-20 NOTE 1 -

(0) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Line/Equi pment 2QSS-012-2-2 2QSS-012-2-2 2QSS-012-1-2 2QSS-012-1-2 2QSS-006-16-4 2QSS-006-16-4 2QSS-006-243-2 2QSS-006-243-2 2QSS-004-242-2 2QSS-006-34-4 2QSS-006-34-4 2QSS-002-7-4 2QSS-F1104 Instrument Line 2QSS-004-105-4 2QSS-012-100-4 2FNC-006-3-4 2QSS-002-29-4 2QSS-150-210-4 2QSS-500-91B-4 2QSS-150-42-4 Class III III III III III III III III III III III III III III III III III III Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR

(Page 3 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables TABLE 45D CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS-JB1-21 2HTS-JB1-22 2HTS-JB1-23 2HTS-JB 1-25A&B 2HTS-JB1-26 2HTS-J81-27 2HTS*J81-28 2HTS* JB 1-29 2HTS*J81-30 2HTS* JB1-31 2HTS-JB1-32 2HTS-J81-33 NOTE 1 - (O) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Unit 2 Zone 1 Line/Equipment 20SS-006-71-2 20SS-002-65-2 20SS-002-28-4 20SS-003-209-4 20SS-002-127 -4 20SS-P23 Heated Enclosure 20SS*TK22 20SS*TK22 20SS*LT100A Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT 1 OOA Sensing Line 20SS-750-914-2 20SS*LT100B Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT100B Sensing Line 20SS-750-915-2 20SS*LT101A Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT101A Sensing Line 20SS-750-916-2 20M-45D.5.B.1 Revision 3 Page 3 of 23 Class III III Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR NR III III NR NR III III III III NR NR NR(O}

NOTE 1 NR(O)

NOTE 1 III III NR(P}

NOTE 1 NR(P}

NOTE 1 III III NR NR

(Page 4 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables TABLE 450 CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS-JB1-34 2HTS-JB1-35 2HTS-JB1-36 2HTS-JB1-37 2HTS-JB 1-38 2HTS-JB 1-39 2HTS*JB1-40A&B 2HTS* JB1-41A&B 2HTS" JB 1-42 2HTS* JB 1-43 2HTS*JB1-44B&C 2HTS* JB 1-45A NOTE 1 - (0) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Unit 2 Zone 1 Line/Equipment 2QSS*LT101B Heated Enclosure 2QSS*LT101 B Sensing Line 2QSS-750-917-2 2QSS*LT1 02A Heated Enclosure 2QSS*LT1 02A Sensing Line 2QSS*LT102B Heated Enclosure 2QSS"LT102B Sensing Line 2SIS-008-346-2 Train (A) 2SIS-008-346-2 Train (B) 2SIS-014-1-2 Train (A) 2SIS-014-1-2 Train (B) 2QSS*LT104A Sensing Line 2QSS-750-907-2 2QSS*L T 1 04C Sensing Line 2QSS-750-911-2 20M-450.5.B.1 Revision 3 Page 4 of 23 Class III Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR III NR III NR III NR III NR III NR III III III III R(O)

NOTE 1 R(P)

NOTE 1 R(O)

NOTE 1 R(P) NOTE 1 III NR(O)

NOTE-1 III NR(O)

NOTE-1

(Page 5 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables TABLE 450 CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS* JB1-46B&C 2HTS*JB1-47A&C 2HTS-JB1-48A&B" 2HTS-JB1-49 2HTS-JB1-50 2HTS-JB1-51A&B 2HTS-JB1-52 2HTS-JB1-53 2HTS-JB1-54 2HTS-JB1-55 2HTS-J B 1-56A&B 2HTS-JB1-57 2HTS-JB1-58 2HTS-JB1-59 NOTE 1 - (0) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Unit 2 Zone 1 Line/Equipment 2QSS*LT104B Sensing Line 20SS-750-909-2 2QSS*LT1040 Sensing Line 20SS-750-913-2 2WTD-150-104-4 2WTO-106-48-4 2WTO-150-41-4 2WTO-006-4-4 2WTO-LT107 Sensing Line 2WTO-LT107 Heated Enclosure 2WTO-LT106 Sensing Line 2WTO-LT106 Heated Enclosure 2WTD-150-105-4 2WTO-008-101-4 2WTO-004-111-4 20SS-P1103 Instrument Line Class III III III III III III III III III'"

III 20M-450.5.B.1 Revision 3 Page 5 of 23 Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR(P)

NOTE-1 NR(P)

NOTE-1 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR

(Page 6 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables TABLE 45D CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS*JB1-62 2HTS*.IB 1-63B 2HTS*JB1-64 2HTS* JB1-65B 2HTS* JB 1-66 2HTS* J B 1-67 A&C 2HTS*JB1-68 2HTS*JB1-69A 2HTS-JB 1-70 2HTS-JB1-71A&B NOTE 1 - (0) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Unit 2 Zone 1 Line/Equipment 20SS*L T 1 04A Heated Enclosure

[20SS*LT104A]

Sensing Line 20SS-7S0-907-2 20SS*LT1 04B Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT104B Sensing Line 20SS-7S0-909-2 20SS*LT104C Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT104C Sensing Line 20SS-750-911-2 20SS*LT104D Heated Enclosure 20SS*LT 1 04D Sensing Line 20SS-7S0-913-2 20SS*P110S Sensing Line 2WTD-150-221-4 2WTD-H23A Pump and Suction Line 2WTD-1S0-222-4 2WTD-H23A Heater and Discharge Line 20M-4SD.S.B.1 Revision 3 Page 6 of 23 Class III Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR(O)

NOTE 1 III NR(O)

NOTE 1 III NR(P)

NOTE 1 III NR(O)

NOTE 1 III NR(P)

NOTE 1 III R(P)

NOTE 1 III NR NR

(Page 7 of

23)

Beaver Valley Power Station Electric Heat Tracing System Figures and Tables Unit 2 20M-45D.5.B.1 Revision 3 Page 7 of 23 TABLE 45D CIRCUIT CLASSES Circuit No.

2HTS-JB1-72A&B 2HTS-JB1-73 2HTS-JB1-74 2HTS-J B 1-75A&B NOTE 1 - (0) Orange Bus (P) Purple Bus Zone 1 Line/Equipment 2QSS-F1104 2WTD-TK23 6" Vent 2C H S-003-678-4 2WTD-150-223-4 2WTD-H23B Pump and Suction Line 2WTD-150-224-4 2WTD-H23B Heater and Discharge Line Class III III III III Redundant (R)/

Nonredundant (NR)

NR NR NR NR

(Page 1 of 14.)

A9.330B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-4S0.S.B.2 TABLE 450 CIRCUIT CONTROLLER SETPOINTS AND ALARMS Revision 12 Prepared by Date Pages Issued Effective Date C. R. Kuhn 08/20/09 1 through 14 10/21/09 Reviewed by Date Validated by Date R. Mueller 08120109 N/A PORe Meeting No.

PORC Not Required Date PAF-09-01867

ZONEI CKT 1-001 1-002 1-003 1-004 1-005 1-00S 1-007 1*008 1*009 1*011 1-012 1*013 1-014 1-016 1-017 1-018 1*028 1-029 1-030 1*031 1*03S 1*037 NOTE 1:

NOTE 2:

NOTE 3:

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Q

u 0

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Q Z -I (j)

C

I N

13 N1SG 15 N1SG 16 N1SG 2

2 13 Note 3 1 Note 3 2 Note 3 35 35 35 110 110 110 2QSS-FI104(HE) 2QSS-004-105-4 2QSS*TK21 (VENT)

RWST RWST RWST 005 OOS OOS 13-2 13-2 13*2

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u 17 N1SG 2

3 Note 3 35 110 2FNC-006-3-4 RWST 007 13-2

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(j) 1 A1SG 1 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*L T100A(HE)

RWST 010 13-2 2 A1SG 2 Note 1 45 110 2QSS*LT1 OOA(SL)

RWST 010 13-2 1 B1SG 1 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*LT1 OOB(HE)

RWST 010 13-2 2 B1SG 2 Note 1 45 110 2QSS*L T100B(SL)

RWST 010 13-2 30 N1SG 3

2 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*L T102A(HE) 31 N1SG 3

3 Note 1 45 110 2QSS*LT102A(SL)

Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of SO°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 55°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F, Set point is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 45°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F, RWST RWST 012 012 13-2 13-2 I\\.)

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CKT NAME ROW COL ON OFF ALR ALR SWI #

HEAT TRACED LOCATION 555 VOND 1-038 32 N1SG 3

4 Note3 35 110 2QSS+LTl 02B(HE)

RWST 012 13-2 1-039 33 N1SG 3

5 Note 1 45 110 2QSSkLT102B(SL)

RWST 012 13-2 1-040 3 A1SG 3 60 70 45 110 2SIS-008-346-2 RWST 013 13-2 1-041 3 B1SG 360 70 45 110 2SIS-008-346-2 RWST 013 13-2 1-042 4 A1SG 4 80 90 45 110 2SIS-014-1-2 RWST 014 13-2 1-043 4 B1SG 4 80 90 45 110 2SIS-014-1-2 RWST 014 13-2 1-044 9 A1SG 9 Note 1 45 110 2QSSkLT104A(SL)

RWST 005 13-2 1-045 10 A1SG 10 Note 1 45 110 2QSSkLT104C(SL)

RWST 003 13-2 1-046 9 B1SG 9 Note 1 45 110 2QSS*LT1 04B(SL)

RWST 005 13-2 1-047 10 B1SG 10 Note 1 45 110 2QSS*L Tl04D(SL)

RWST 003 13-2 1-048 34 N1SG 3

6 45 50 35 110 2WTD-150-104-4 2WTD-TK23 015 32-1 1-049A 35 N1SG 3

7 45 50 35 110 2WTD-006-48-4 2WTD-TK23 015 13-1 1-050A 36 N1SG 3

B 45 50 35 110 2WTO-003-41-4 2WTD-TK23 015 13-1 1-051A 37 N1SG 3

9 45 50 35 110 2WTD-006-4-4 2WTD-TK23 015 13-1 1-052 38 N1SG 3

10 Nole 1 45 145 2WTD-LT107(SL) 2WTD-TK23 129 13-1 1-053 39 N1SG 3

11 60 70 45 145 2WTD-LT107(HE) 2WTD-TK23 129 13-1 1-054 40 N1SG 3

12 45 50 35 110 2WTD*LT106(SL) 2WTD-TK23 129 13-1 1-055 41 N1SG 3

13 45 50 35 145 2WTD*L T106(HE) 2WTD-TK23 129 32-1 1-056 42 N1SG 3

14 45 50 35 110 2WTD*150*105-4 2WTD-TK23 129 32-1 1-057 43 N1SG 4

1 45 50 35 110 2WTO-00B-l01-4 2WTD-Tk23 129 32-1 1-058 44 N1SG 4

2 45 50 35 145 2WTD-004-111-4 2WTD-TK23 129 32-2 1-059 45 N1SG 4

3 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*Pll03 RWST 004 13-2 1-062 5 A1SG 5 Note 3 35 145 2QSS+LT104A(HE)

RWST 005 13-2 omro

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........ ro J>,.NN NOTE1: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 600F and maximum OF F temperature of 95°F, NOTE 2: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 55°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F, NOTE 3: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 45°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F,

'U i>>

\\Q (l) g,

... e ZONEI 8KR CA8 MODULE SET-PT LOW HI TEST PANEL PNU LINE/EQUIPMENT 2001.550:

CKT NAME ROW COL ON OFF ALR ALR SWI #

HEAT TRACED LOCATION 555 VOND 1*063 6 A1SG 6 Note 2 45 110 2QSS*LT104A(SL)

RWST 005 13-2 1-064 5 81SG 5 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*LTl 04B(HE)

RWST 005 13-2 1*065 6 81SG 6 Note 2 45 110 2QSS'L T104B(SL)

RWST 005 13-2 1-066 7 A1SG 7 Note 3 35 145 2QSS*L T104C(HE)

RWST 003 13-2 1-067 8 A1SG 8 Note 2 45 110 2QSS*L Tl04C(SL)

RWST 003 13-2 1-068 7 81SG 7 Note 3 35 110 2QSS*LT104D(HE)

RWST 003 13-2 1-069 8 B1SG 8 Note 2 45 110 2QSS*L T104D(SL)

RWST 003 13-2 1-071 48 N1SG 4

6 60 70 45 110 2WTD-150-221-4 2WTD-TK23 015 32-1 2WTD-150-222-4 1-072 50 N1SG 4

8 Note 3 35 110 2QSS-Fll04(SL)

RWST 005 32-2 1-073 51 N1SG 4

9 45 50 35 110 2WTD-TK23(VENT) 2WTD-TK23 015 13-1 1-074 52 N1SG 4

10 Note 3 35 110 2CHS-003-678-4 RWST 007 13-2 1-075 49 N1SG 4

7 60 70 45 110 2WTD-150-223-4 2WTD-TK23 015 32-1 2WTD-15-224-4 3-001 1 N2AB 1 80 90 70 110 N2AB 2

2 2CHS-001-160-4 AUX 773 041 7*2 3-002 2 N2AB 2 80 90 70 110 N2A8 2

1 2CHS-003-51-4 AUX773 041 7-2 3-003 1 N3AB 1 80 90 70 110 N3AB 2

2 2CHS-002-54-4 AUX 755 042 7-2 3-005A 47 N3AB 4

5 80 90 70 110 N3AB 5

2 2CHS'TK21A AUX 755 075 7-2 3-006 3 N3AB 3 80 90 70 110 N3AB 12 2CH8-002-55-3 AUX 755 043 7*2 3-007 4 N3AB 4 80 90 70 110 N3A8 11 2CH8-002-570-3 AUX 755 043 7*2 3-008 5 N3AB 5 80 90 70 110 N2AB 2

2CHS-003-51-4 AUX 773 041 7-2 3-009 6 N3A8 6 eo 90 70 110 N3AB 9 2CHS-003-41-3 AUX755 044 7-2 3-010 7 N3A8 7 eo 90 70 110 N3AB 8 2CH8-003-41-3 AUX755 044 7-2 3-011 8 N3AB e eo 90 70 110 N3AB 7 2CH8-002-43-3 AUX 755 045 7-2 3-012 9 N3AB 9 80 90 70 110 N3AB 6 2CHS-002-43-3 AUX 755 046 7-2 3-013 10 N3A8 10 eo 90 70 110 N3AB 5 2CHS-002-200-3 AUX755 047 7-2 3-014 11 N3A8 11 eo 90 70 110 N3AB 42CHS-750-194-3 AUX755 046 7-2

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<1> ::So ()l J:>.~. 0 o 0

_::::l <.n

...""...""OJ J:>.rvrv NOTE 1: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 60°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F.

NOTE 2: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 55°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F.

NOTE 3: Setpoint is field adjustable with minimum ON Temperature of 45°F and maximum OFF temperature of 95°F.

A9.330B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-4S0.3.C POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST Revision 12 Prepared by Date Pages Issued Effective Date J.P.Keegan 04/12/10 1 through 33 04/15/10 Reviewed by R. Mueller Date 04/13/10 Validated by N/A Date PORC Meeting No.

Date PORC Not Required N/A PAF-10-00838

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit2 20M-4SD.3.C Electric Heat Tracing System Revision 12 Normal System Arrangement Page 2 of 33 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST Note:

All breakers are in the CON N position, all 480 V line starter ACB's are in the ON position, verified by 20M-37.S Table 37-7; all 120VAC breakers are in the ON position, verified by 20M-38.S Tables 38-2, 38-3, and 38-4; all 125 VDC breakers are in the ON position, verified by 20M-39.S Table 39-4; all backup protection breakers are in the ON position, verified by 20M-37.S Table 37-8 and 20M-39.S Table 39-5; all knife switches are verified by 20ST-45.6; all. toggle switches are in the ON position, unless otherwise noted. Electrically operated valve position (control switch position) is verified by the respective valve list.

Process instrumentation power supply is verified by 20M-4.3 Power Supply and Control Switch List. Asterisked (*) items must have input power fuseholders installed and shall be lighted or unlighted as specif ied. Items requiring signatures in the PS&CSL designate field verifications. These components are not listed in Load List of 20M-37.S, 38.5, 39.5, 20ST-45.6 or 20M-4.3 PS&CSL.

Components that list alternative normal system arrangements shall have the AS-LEFT position circled when position verifications are performed and initialed.

'--______S_u-'-p_er_scripted references are contained in Section 3, REFERENCES.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-45D.3.C Electric Heat Tracing System Revision 12 Normal System Arrangement Page 3 of 33 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST WARNING:

THIS POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST SHALL NOT BE USED IN DETERMINING CLEARANCE POINTS WITHOUT ALSO REFERENCING THE LOAD LISTS OF O.M. CHAPTERS 37, 38 AND 39. REVIEWING THE LOAD LISTS WILL HELP ENSURE THE CLEARING OPERATION DOES NOT INADVERTENTLY AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION OF ANOTHER PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.

CUBICLE LOAD NSA INITIAUDATE

[MCC*2-E11]

9B 2HTS*TRFA1SG (1) OFF ON

[MCC*2-E12]

8B 2HTS*TRFB1SG (1) OFF I

ON

[MCC-2-07 -01]

1C 2HTS-TRFN1CP (1) OFF 7C 2HTS-TRFN2CP ON I

[MCC-2-08]

1C 2HTS-TRFN1 SG (1) OFF I

ON

[MCC-2-14]

100 2HTS-TRFN3AB (1) OFF ON

[MCC-2-15]

4B 2HTS-TRF-PAS (1) OFF I

ON

[MCC-2-16]

20 2HTS-TRFN1AB (1) OFF ON 60 2HTS-TRFN2AB (1) OFF ON 5E 2HTS-TRFN4AB (1) OFF ON

[PNL-AC2-05]

5-34 2HTS-TEST-N1AB ON 2HTS-TEST-N2AB 2HTS-TEST-N3AB 2HTS-TEST-N4AB

[PNL-AC2-08]

8-19 2HTS-TEST-N1CP ON 8-20 2HTS-TEST-N2CP ON I Note (1)

May be OFF if Heat Trace NOT in service, by procedure.

J

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 20M-45D.3.C Electric Heat Tracing System Revision 12 Normal System Arrangement Page 4 of 33 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST WARNING:

THIS POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST SHALL NOT BE USED IN DETERMINING CLEARANCE POINTS WITHOUT ALSO REFERENCING THE LOAD LISTS OF O.M. CHAPTERS 37,38 AND 39. REVIEWING THE LOAD LISTS WILL HELP ENSURE THE CLEARING OPERATION DOES NOT INADVERTENTLY AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION OF ANOTHER PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.

CUBICLE LOAD NSA INITIAUDA TE

[PNL-AC2-13]

13-1 2HTS-01 (1) OFF ON 13-2 2HTS-02 (1) OFF ON 13-3 2HTS-03 (1) OFF I

ON 13-4 2HTS-04 (1) OFF ON 13-6 2HTS-06 (1) OFF I

ON

[PNL-AC2-26]

26-1 CKT-ET-279 (1) OFF ON 26-3 CKT-ET-280 (1) OFF ON 26-5 CKT-ET-281 (1) OFF I

ON 26-7 CKT-ET-282 (1) OFF ON

[2PNL-RCP BP-04]

04-15 2HTS-JB3-130 ON 04-16 04-17 04-18 04-19 04-20 2HTS-~IB3-132 2HTS-JB3-133 2HTS-JB3-134 2HTS-JB3-135 2HTS-JB3-136 ON ON ON ON ON I

[2PNL-RCP BP-05]

05-10B 2HTS-JB3-149 ON I

05-10C 2HTS-JB3-153 ON INote (1)

May be OFF if Heat Trace NOT in service, by procedure.

~.--~~------

~

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit2 20M-45D.3.C Electric Heat Tracing System Revision 12 Normal System Arrangement Page 5 of 33 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SWITCH LIST Train A =Normal Train 1Train B =Standby Train Train aligned (Circle One)

A OR B Shift Manager Initial: ___

Note 1 Train A AND Train B Heat Tracing Circuits marked "Note 1", may be energized simultaneously IF desired. Mark N/A in the position NOT used.

Note 2 Train A SHALL be energized as the Normal Train UNLESS designated otherwise by the Shift Manager on Page 4 for circuits marked "Note 2". The Standby Train B may be energized in a backup capacity WHEN Train A is unavailable AND Train A has been de-energized. Train A and Train B SHALL NOT be energized simultaneously for these circuits. Components that list alternative normal system arrangements shall have the AS-LEFT position circled when position verifications are performed and initialed.

Transformer [2HTS*TRFA 1 SG]

Transformer Breaker 480 VAC

[MCC*2-E11] Cub 9B NSA: ON, May be OFF if Heat Trace NOT in service, by procedure.

Control/Distribution Panel [2HTS*PNLA 1 SG] (Bus AE Loads)

(1,___.___

Main Breaker - located in [2HT S*PNLA 1 SG]

(2)__--' ___

DC Power Supply and Internal Fan Supply (1 )__--',___

Breaker 30 located in [2HTS*PNLA1 SG]

(2) 1___

DC Power Supply/Supply Fuse - Installed

(*) (1) ___1__

Located in [2HTS"PNLA1SG]

(2)

/___

Alarm Control Relay Supply Breaker 29 Located in [2HTS*PNLA1SG]

Alarm Output Isolator Switch Located in [2HTS*PNLA1SG]

2 3

4

!l;.

l 9

i No.10080-RM-0085B rr I I ! l'I"r'I'I'f'l I I 1'1 I I! I I I If' I I ~ 1'1 i bi I I'f i I ",I, 1.'1 11,'1'1'1,:>

A~

~ BCD I --~~~-2---~--~r~~~~~~~~~~~--~~,u'~--~----'----'----~----~---";---~----'---~~

e' OUENCH SPRAy HEADER EL 735'-6" SPRA Y PUHP T~t R\\oIST

'ARO T PIPE T\\JNNEL T soum """EGUMOS Ill..OG

~

2-OSS-"0S-3"'~. (CL152:!

NOTEs:

30 t:ElNSTRUMENTS ~ OOTDOOR PORTIONS CF LlNES CONNECTED TD 20SS-11Q:ltZ~} TO BE PRDV[D£I) WITH El..ECTRtC t£AT TRACING.

2-0SS-.'.~'-2tX-~[:=EL~;~87;!'~6::}I____l rU1\\G~l 7~tpG.. -.i/~'- I s,,,*... I 3"'-4~-:)

Rft'H5ZA (F-5) 3.t.~-..... I-r-I......3.14 2.THE lZ-VENT ON THE 20SS-TKZltz-}RFIJElING WATER STORAGE TANK WILL BE PROvIDED BY THE TANk MMlUFACTURER.

~~~~_~CTOR CONTAINHENT II~

NORTI1 SAFEGUARDS BLDG r ~

CU53

~CL153 I~'~'

17 STRT208

~.3 OUfNeH 2~OS5-006~llr04NOTE 25 P22e RECIRC REFUELING WATER COOlJNG PUHPS 375 CPM - 10 FT TDH

""';;-2-05$-0112'25.-').

T<

106 2-0S5-006-9-<4 NNS 5C-2 AOV AOV

~

RESIOUAL HEAT PT 2~OSS-010-3~2t8-1 ow QUENCH CLl53 SPRAY HEAOER

3. TtE CONTROL EQUIPMENT MAR~ NI..DJofBERs SHALL u,cLUDE A PREFIX WHICH 15 IOENrtCAl TO THE SYSTEM CODE PREFIX FOR T~

ASSOCIATED EOOIPt1ENT* OR PIPE t.INE, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

"'. LOCATE SPECTACLE FLANGES ~ LM CONNECTIONS NEM THE OPERATING FLOOR LEVEL G:

~

e.. OUEHCH SPRAY NOZZLES (3)ARE INSTALLED ON THE EXTENSION OF LINE ZwOSS,"",0Z~7~".

q.lH..ESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. ALL ROOT CONt£CTIDHS SHALl BE CF THE SAHE pIPE t. COOE CLASSES AS THE PIPE TO wHlcH CONNECTED

& SHALL BE CF THE SAME DIAMETER AS TtE ASSOCIATEO ROOT VALvE.

10. VALVES 2QSS-217 AND 2055-218 ARE AIR TESTIt-(i CONNECTlOHS AND wILL 9E LOCATED NEAR AN OPERATING FLOOR LEVEL.

11.- ALL PIPING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE REACTOR CQNTAJta1E)IT SHALL ae: MAJNTAINED TO CLEANNESS LEVEL 8 IN ACCOR:f:JAN:E WITH 2BVH~6Z.

12..AU. CLASS

LINES OH 2DSS-TK2HZ-1 REFlELlt<<i WATER STORAGE TANK wILL BE ABOVE THE NORMAL UN FLUID LEVEL.

13. LUtiNG FLANT OPERATION LINES 2-0SS~006-1.2 AND 2-0SS-006-131~2 ARE em...TEO BLANK.

lo4.A1-L CONNECTlONS TO 2OSS-n:::-2UI-)REfUE1..J~ WATER STOOAGE TANk ARE: HADE DrRECTLY TO TANK f,(ilZLES.

15. H(THOO DF c:LOSU£ FOR LOCAL VENTS. DRAINS, TEST CONNECTIONS SHALL BE SHOWN. REFER TO 2BVM-2t1 FOR ADDiTIONAL DETAILS.

ls.. THE FCLLOWING VALVE TyPE steSTl.TtJTIOHS ARE ACCEPTABLE:

(i--4,

Y-.,

101-04.

18. EXCLUSION BARRIER PER 2BvS-<:t20.

~

tq. P1PELINE 2-QSS-00S~JA~" CONTAINS A SCHEDULE ISS SPOOL PIECE. SEE PIPING DRAwINGS FOR DETAILS.

38 21.LOCATE TEST CONNECT[ONS AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO CHECK VALVES.

~

25. THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY STRAINERS WILL HAvE Tt-£lR ELEMENTS REMOVEO REMOVE~ AND PLUGGED DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: 2QSS~STRT2217 AHD RIot-a7A

&. ORAlN PIPING RM~aqc PIPING RM-7GA RB-S3C RH-f.\\2A NI

~

IBFL N15 i)(2UZ-}

UNG 'WATER

'(AOE TANK 100 GAL CAt>

(NOTE'S 1-1<4)

~

AND THE ASSOCIATED ORAIN vALVES 2OSS*STRTZIIJB.

~

L-U 18 RECl'FlC 12-S1S-008-346'2<Z'""

eU53 FROM LOW HEAD

°0 Ou aSAFETY OOECTION FIG 11-1 (F ~5l RH-87A (F-'ll YARO I PIPE TUNNEL ISAFEGUARDS 2-CHS~093::re-"')t,l

~ BLOG d T

T Nq~ 4"'-U:;:'~-£"-£'L-'

""\\;

II CL153 a i %.1 YARO TPIPE TUNNEL

~

0 I( 2-0SS-00S'I~-'

~

CLl53 N6 U

TLO'HEL rAROTpll"E k..

.....1. r2;'F~-026-3-04 F~7,'rnj~gL L---.:::;..__----.l FIGR~~~V::.101 N5 u Ii-Fro 20-1 tF~3) YARDlPfPE TUNNEL RM-B2A U-." RM-7GA tJ-61 PII"E 11JNNEL~SOUTH SAFEGUARDS BLOG _t N2 ~ '--"c(, t - II 2~SlS~~H"'-1-2(Z-1.l. I NOTE t ~ (TYP} 1 .1 LO ABC D E f i "A' OUENCH SPRAY t-£AOER "A~~lLIR~.~..~lLUll WATER FIG 29-3 <<:Sf) "A"a,/ENCH RS-83C tC 112' M SPRAY HEADER eN 3/' 203 AOC2-0SS-150-2J3-2fA-1

t

---i ~ 2-0SS-0l0-Z03-2(A-l P21AIAQ} OUENCH SPRAY PUMP 3000GPM 330FT TOH V CNM 1/2' 20' ADC 3/4' 2-oSS-7sa-212*2{B~) ~

H;aSS-00S~2i"'-21B-l 1-0--7--1 2-0SS-0l0~202-2ce-r-I f>2J9rBPl OUE~H SPRAY PUI-P 3000GPH 330FT TOH OOALlTY GROUP CLASSIFICAT

'INCORPORATED BY REFEREI THE UFSAR. A CHANCE TO CROIJP CLASSJFlCATIONs COl A CHA"""E TO THE UFSAR.. NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED FENOC fjjf[~TIItri r£H>JNr t2/4/0q -~ I1\\'F J ALL COHPONENTS ON THIS GRAWING ARE PRECEOED BY -20SS-' UNLESS OTHERWISE INOJCATEO~ OP MANUAL FIG NO 450-7 & 13 BEAVER VALLEY POwER STATION UNIT <2 30 K 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 \\Q !1) o I-tt t: .~ "l.....)r.:" -KL~ '/1$/. ~ ~-.----------~-~~---.----.-..-- ----...-.-..--.~ --~- ---.-~-- ~.-.---.-~~---

~.~--..------~~ ~------..----

? No.10080-RM-0087A T---- 8 2-515-0£13-88-219-) L 10-11-2(8-) CL-1502 TO HOT LEGS 2-StS~0U:l~q-2{l-) E ~m'~1=r ' LINENWSS F,.llo FLOOR DRAIN F LOCAL SAMPLE DEtAIL ~FETICLA" lN~ LOelli. VENT & DRAIN !:ETAIL NOTE-FF ~:flf,-'" I G ,.,.-Z-SIS-750-IBO-2tA-/ 2-&"-7_-21A-)-V' "-_J{I\\..} 2-SIS-750-IlII-zjl...j 2-515-003-94-2!l.-) l!-S1$-750-116-Z !z-) CL-1502 2~SIS~0a3~eB>>2(B-~ G-2 I<OTE QQ 6=" '*V4CZ..' ~NOTEQQ 2-S[S-t5"-30~2tZ~) ~~~a~*__~._~_~__~_~_~_.~,-~----~-, TOH 3165 PS[G CAP 2-".5 GPM A.UX. BLDG. TUNNEl r z..lll'~-Zrzzr~~?~. \\~_ h~ ~Jt\\ * ... RM-7<ro E-5 2~StS-01"'-t-2(l-} CL-153-Z-SlS-01"-1;ZtZ~) -~~S'I~G_3 WMEAS lOA'" ~""I~ 2-SIS-808-346-2(Z-1 ! TO RWST CL-153 i.EllE."" RM-87A.B

RM-7lB RY-IA RM-_

RM-SCU1.B RH-SSA.B Rfo1-75A RM-7SA RM-7qo STORAGE TANk CL-l53 LON I£AIl ~TT INJa:TION t; 10 A B FROM HIGH HeAD SAFET~~SECTlON NOTE~ E~ GAGGED DURING INITIAL HYDRO TEST pslG FOR NORMAL PLANT OPERATION. STRAIGHT SlOE INSTALLED c 0.. OVERFU)W FRO" COOLANT HEAD TANK I~rmw. TO PIJIIp A. FLANGE FOR FLOW METERING OIIIFICE TO V£RIF'Y FLOW DURING PflE.QPERATIONAL ttsTING T_'!HE WESTIIIIGHOUSI: SPIN NUIoI8DI I'OR ~PON£NTS ID u ~- 't..t£PJiOTE$ SAFETY RELATED !SEE NOTE RR}.. AA.lOCAT£ III.. \\12 AS Cl.0SE AS POSS>BLE TO 1II!.~~II~"ck~C~~£ TO 6'-CB8 IEAREST Res ct. THIS SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED TO A CLEANNESS 1.VL ? IN ACCORDANCE WiTH 2BVt-I-s2. ~ n~~~ ~!'~l~erA;r:~s.r~ a~ IE <3G HI'< JJ. Koc LL. !>IN. CXl. F f'P. QQ. ~~~ION FLas. WITH '*i SWAGEl.OK RR. 8E OISREGAROEo. REFER LIST lAeL) AS THE ASSET'S OA CATEGORY. G 25150P21A(AO) 2 SISltP2!B(aP) OUAUTY GR(lJP CLASSlFICATIONS ARE "INCORPORATED 8Y REFERENCE'INTO THE UFSAR. Ai CHANGE TO DUALITY (API.!+-1) TOH-22!SFT CAP-3000GPM (APLH-2) PORTIONS IF 111ls DOCUMENT ARE NUCLEAR SOFtTY RELATED GROUP CLASSJFJCATtONS COHSTlTUTES A CHAN(j£ TO THE UFSAA. i =:"ffo t::7:'"A10C nRSrfJER6r BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO 2 EC!'-IMH!223 ,. c::.1 Vi 1<<L!NIIHJIATlIIi C1H'ANr lOCN 2~RH-00B7A-E0G-e223-B1 1:'1 (')w nT o.r.R.o.M EER 6821346877 3-7-07 MVF j&" SAFETY 1..,.... 28 9 2 37 *HAR-2007 \\4,38 ",\\"""'-0087A.oo" ~ CAElXJI 6 7 8 .s:rsrf_

'" 'lil No. 10080-RM-421-4 4 I-' o I-' A c E I F BLOCK B 55 .a 24' 3'

i

~ 18' ORAW[NG UNLESS OP MANUAL FIG. NO. 21-4 c F 1 G r-- ~ ---, 3 4 5 A 6 7 8 9 PREP-a """Q'.7 Cl£1JDI I I THEHERtJ Cv~S'f~EJi 01-OCT~ 1~95 7go2::30C.30ZJ2m421304e,ogn

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity LCO 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg) ~ 500°F. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 > 0.35 \\lCVgm. -NOTE LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. A.1 Verify DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 within the acceptable region of Figure 3.4.16-1. Once per 4 hours AND A.2 Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limit. 48 hours B. Gross specific activity of the reactor coolant not within limit. B.1 Be in MODE 3 with T8vg < 500°F. 6 hours C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. C.1 Be in MODE 3 with Tavg < 500°F. 6 hours OR DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16-1. Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.4.16 -1 Amendments 278/161

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor coolant gross specific activity ~ 1001 E ~CiJgm. 7 days SR 3.4.16.2 -NOTE* Only required to be performed In MODE 1. Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity ~ 0.35 ~Cilgm. 14 days Between 2 and 6 hours after a THERMAL POWER change of~ 15% RTP within a 1 hour period SR 3.4.16.3 -NOTE* Not required to be performed until 31 days after a minimum of 2 effective full power days and 20 days of MODE 1 operation have elapsed since the reactor was last subcritlcal for ~ 48 hours. Determine E from a sample taken In MODE 1 after a 184 days minimum of 2 effective full power days and 20 days of MODE 1 operation have elapsed since the reactor was last subcritlcal for ~ 48 hours. Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.4.16 - 2 Amendments 2781161

Res Specific Activity 3.4.16 Eg; u.a:

E

~ ~ ~

u.

(3 W 0.. en ~ I ~ 5 0 w w en 0 c l-S 0 0 U 0:: g ~ 250 200 150 100 50 ~ ~ ~ " ~ UNACCEPTABLEOPERAnON " ~ ACCEPTABLE OPERAnoN I~ ~ ~ 0:: o 20 30 ~ 50 00 ~ 00 90 100 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER Figure 3.4.16-1 (Page 1 of 1) Reactor Coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1*131 Specific Activity limit Versus Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER Amendments 278/161 Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.4.16 - 3

Completion Times 1.3 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.3 Completion Times PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to establish the*Completion Time convention and to provide guidance for its use. BACKGROUND limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) specify minimum requirements for ensuring safe operation of the unit. The ACTIONS associated with an LCO state Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LCO can fall to be met. Specified with each stated Condition are Required Actlon(s) and Completion Tlme(s). DESCRIPTION The Completion Time Is the amount of time allowed for completing a Required Action. 'It is referenced to the time of discovery of a situation (e.g., Inoperable equipment or variable not within limits) that requires entering an ACTIONS Condition unless otherwise specIDed, providing the unit is In a MODE or specIDed condition stated In the Applicability of the LCO. Required Actions must be completed prior to the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An ACTIONS Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until the Condition no longer exists or the unit is not within the LCO Applicability. If situations are discovered that require entry Into more than one Condition at a time. within a single LCO (multiple Conditions), the Required Actions for each Condition must be performed within the associated Completion Time. When in multiple Conditions, separate Completion Times are tracked for each Condition starting from the time of discovery of the situation that required entry Into the Condition. Once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be Inoperable or not within limits, will nQ1 result In separate entry into the Condition, unless specifically stated. The Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply to each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry Into the Condition. However, when asubseguent train, subsystem, component, or variable expressed In the Condition Is discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, the Completion Tlme(s} may be extended. To apply this / Completion Time extension, two criteria must first be met. The subsequent inoperabillty:

a.

Must exist concurrent with the first inoperability and Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 1.3 -1 Amendments 278/161

OS System 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6 Ouench Spray (OS) System LCO 3.6.6 Two QS trains shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One QS train Inoperable. A.1 Restore QS train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. B.1 ANP B.2 Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 5. 6 hours 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each QS manual, power operated. and automatic valve in the flow path that Is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is In the correct position. 31 days SR 3.6.6.2 Verify each QS pump's developed head at the flow test point Is greater than or equal to the required developed head. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each QS automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 18 months SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each as pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 18 months Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 3.6.6 -1 Amendments 278/161

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e:1 of 39 07 RISK MANAGEMENT Effective Date: 05/14/10 APproved:~ ~ V Program Manager

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e:2 of 39 07 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 PURPOSE 4 2.0 SCOPE 4 3.0 DEFINITIONS 5 4.0 PROCEDURE DETAILS 7 4.1 Responsibilities 7 4.2 Risk Classification 8 4.2.1 Assessing and Classifying the Risk of an Activity 8 4.2.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 9 4.2.3 Shutdown Defense in Depth Risk Assessment 9 4.2.4 Asset Utilization 9 4.2.5 System (GRID) Operations and Risk 10 4.2.6 Risk Assessment Worksheet 13 4.2.7 Time Remaining in a Shutdown Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 13 4.2.8 Severe Weather 14 4.3 Implementing Risk Level Management Actions and Controls 14 4.3.3.1 Green Risk 15 4.3.3.2 Yellow Risk 15 4.3.3.3 Orange Risk 16 4.3.3.4 Red Risk 17 4.4 Communication of Risk Level 19 4.5 Protected Equipment and Protected Equipment Postings 19 4.5.1 Why Equipment is Posted 19 4.5.2 When Postings are Determined 20 4.5.3 Where Postings Will Be Placed 21 4.5.4 Specific Situations to Protect Equipment 21 4.5.5 Control of Protected EqUipment Postings 22 4.5.6 Crossing a Protected Equipment Posting Boundary 23 5.0 RECORDS 24

6.0 REFERENCES

25 7.0 SCOPE OF REVISION 27

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: 07 Ipa g e:3 of 39 TABLE OF CONTENTS ATTACHMENTS - Exempt Activities 29 - Plant Risk Matrix 30 - Risk Assessment Worksheet 31 - Examples of Asset Utilization Factors 35.- Risk Management Controls 36 - Protected Equipment Tracking Log 38 - Protected Equipment Posting 39

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: \\pa g e:4 of 39 07 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure establishes the administrative controls, responsibilities, duties for direction, control, conduct, and oversight of risk significant activities and conditions at FENOC Power Plants based on evaluations of nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, environmental safety, and generation risk associated with Activities or Plant Conditions. 2.0 SCOPE 2.1 This procedure applies to all Activities, which may be performed by any work group. 2.2 This procedure applies to Plant Conditions that determine differing levels of risks. 2.3 Exempt activities are listed in Attachment 1, Exempt Activities. Exempt activities shall be conducted as a Green Risk Activity. 2.4 This procedure provides the guidance during both operating and shutdown conditions. During shutdown conditions, asset utilization risk impact and associated actions shall only apply to work with impact to switchyard and grid reliability. 2.5 Other FENOC programs are designed with management of risk in mind and serve as an integrated approach to overall Risk Management. Some of these programs are: NOP-OP-1003 Grid Reliability Protocol NOP-OP-1005 Shutdown Defense in Depth NOP-OP-1010 Operational Decision Making NOP-OP-1004 Reactivity Management NOBP-OP-1004 Reactivity Planning NOBP-OP-0007 Conduct Of Infrequently Performed Tests Or Evolutions NOBP-OP-0012 Operator Work-Arounds, Burdens and Control Room Deficiencies

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: IPage:5 of 39 07 2.6 When exercising Abnormal Operating Procedures (Off Normal Instructions - PY), Emergency Operating Procedures, Priority 100 Immediate Maintenance, or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, assessing and managing these activities per this procedure may be waived at the discretion of the Shift Manager. 2.7 For emergent Activities or Plant Conditions a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall perform Risk Assessment in accordance with Attachment 2, Plant Risk Matrix and Attachment 3, Risk Assessment Worksheet. 3.0 DEFINITIONS 3.1 Activity - Any corrective, preventive, modification, troubleshooting, inspection, testing or calibration Activity performed on plant systems, structures or components. 3.2 Continuous Job Site Coverage - Providing supervision during the entire performance of the applicable work Activity. During preparation and restoration activities which do not create a challenge to the plant or personnel safety, the assigned individual does not need to be present, however verification of proper preparation should be performed. 3.3 Critical Step(s) -lAW NOBP-LP-2604, Effective Job Briefs. A procedure step or action that, if performed incorrectly, will cause immediate, irreversible, intolerable harm to plant eqUipment, people, or significantly impact plant operation. 3.4 Intrusive Activity - An Activity which breaches the boundary of a plant system or component, such as work (use of tools) on valve internals, pump internals, electrical cabinets, or electrical breakers. 3.5 Intrusive Involvement - A series of management actions (observations, questioning, challenge meetings) that probe the level of a worker's preparation and knowledge of an Activity. It ensures that the appropriate level of questioning and challenge is conducted, typically prior to Activity performance. Intrusive involvement should verify a complete and in-depth understanding of the potential risk and error traps, and that mitigating and contingency actions are preplanned and in-place. Intrusive involvement must be carefully managed during the Activity to not introduce additional risk and should be limited to stopping an unsafe act or an unrecoverable error.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e:6 of 39 07 3.6 Plant Condition - Those factors that, independent from individual activities, cause a Risk Level to be greater than Green. Examples of a Plant Condition independent of an Activity would be: A PRA value based on the aggregate of planned work, degraded equipment, and Operator workarounds RCS level at mid-loop in the early stages of a refuel outage, when core time to boil is short. 3.7 Risk Assessment - The function of assessing nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, environmental safety, or generation risk, to personnel and safe plant operation, while performing Activities and during Plant Conditions. 3.8 Risk Evaluator - The individuals who use the Risk Assessment Tools, Attachments 1, 2, and 3, to determine the risk level of an Activity or Plant Condition. 3.9 Risk Significant Activity - Activity that poses a potential decrease in margin to nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, environmental safety, or generation risk and requires additional planning, special precautions, and management oversight to adequately manage the risks. This applies to Activities classified as YELLOW, ORANGE, or RED Risk. 3.10 Risk Management Actions (RMA) - Measures established to mitigate the risk impacts of performing Activities or Plant Conditions. 3.11 Wadsworth Control Center Conservative Operations - A condition defined by the Wadsworth Control Center that limits work and testing Activities which increase the level of risk associated with the operation of the FirstEnergy Transmission System. 3.12 Yellow, Orange and Red Risk Activities or Plant Conditions - Activities or Plant Conditions that pose a potential hazard to nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, environmental safety, or generation risk, and require additional planning, special precautions and management oversight to adequately manage the risks.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: IPage:7 of 39 07 4.0 PROCEDURE DETAILS Any work order prepared (within Work Management 12 week process) prior to the implementation of this procedure revision, or a previous revision of this procedure, may be processed without additional restrictions. 4.1 Responsibilities 4.1.1 Shift Manager The Operations Shift Manager shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the impact on plant risk is evaluated. 4.1.2 Duty Team The Duty Team Leader and Duty Team Members will provide Risk Management Actions oversight in accordance with NOBP-OP-0014, FENOC Duty Teams. 4.1.3 Risk Evaluator (Screening Committee, Work Planner, ALARA Supervisor, or Operations SRO)

1.

Performs risk review of the Activity or Plant Conditions to determine plant risk.

2.

Documents the risk level in the notification/order. 4.1.4 Work Week Manager For all non-green risk Activities ensure that the Work Implementation Schedule highlights these Activities. 4.1.5 ALARA Supervisor The ALARA Supervisor is responsible for evaluating and assigning the Radiological Risk associated with RCA Activities. This includes communicating the assigned risk to the Work Week Manager for highlighting in the Work Implementation Schedule.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipage:aof 39 07 4.1.6 Worker Although this NOP delineates oversight and involvement for supervisors and above, this does not remove the ownership or the responsibility of the individual worker to ensure that all activities are conducted in a safe manner and that all appropriate human performance tools and techniques are utilized to prevent errors. This responsibility commences during the walkdown phase of the Activity through completion. 4.2 Risk Classification 4.2.1 Assessing and Classifying the Risk of an Activity

1.

The screening committee lAW NOP-WM-1003, Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation, Screening, and Minor Deficiency Monitoring Processes, shall perform an initial Risk Assessmentof new notifications.

2.

Other orders (PMs, Surveillance tests, etc.) will be screened by the Work Management Process lAW NOP-WM-2003 Work Management Surveillance Process and NOP-WM-3001 Work Management PM Process.

3.

The final verification of Risk Assessment shall be performed during the Operations review of the integrated schedule. Following the assessment, the risk color and reason for the color shall be documented on the Notification/Order.

4.

The Risk Evaluator(s) should use Attachment 1. Exempt Activities, to determine if the Activity is exempt.

5.

The Risk Evaluator shall use Attachment 2 Plant Risk Matrix, and Attachment 3 Risk Assessment Worksheet, for the risk review.

6.

IF an Order/Notification is transferred from an outage to an on-line status or on-line to outage status, THEN the risk shall be re-assessed.

7.

Repetitive Activities or tests which have not had a significant revision since the last performance do not require a new assessment to be performed.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: 1pa g e:9 of 39 07 4.2.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

1.

IF a valid PRA model is available and,an evaluation has been completed, THEN perform the required Risk Management Actions. For some Risk Level Plant Conditions {train/divisional outages, aggregate risk}, possibly only the Risk Management Controls on Attachment 5 will apply if there is no specific Activity for which to apply supervisory or oversight actions. 4.2.3 Shutdown Defense in Depth Risk Assessment

1.

During Shutdown periods, all Activities and Plant Conditions continue to be assessed utilizing the Risk Assessment Tools, Attachments 1, 2, and 3.

2.

Shutdown Defense in Depth risk management is established by first determining the risk color using NOP-OP-1005 and site specific procedures. Once the risk color is determined, then the controls of this procedure, Risk Management. can be applied. For some Risk Level Plant Conditions (time to boil. train/divisional outages), possibly only the Risk Management Controls on Attachment 5 will apply if there is no specific Activity for which to apply supervisory or oversight actions. 3: If an Order/Notification is transferred from on-line to an outage status, the risk shall be re-assessed. 4.2.4 Asset Utilization

1.

Asset Utilization classifies conditions based on multiple factors and criteria in Attachment 4, Examples of Asset Utilization Factors. Asset Utilization will provide a color designation in both a predictive outlook and in real time as conditions change. When real time changes occur. Asset Utilization notifies the Control Room at each FENOC Unit of the escalation or lowering of conditions. When Asset Utilization reports an elevation in condition (Risk Level color from Attachment 4), Work Management and Operations shall assess all work for risk to generation or grid reliability. Activities that meet the following criteria and would otherwise be a lower Risk Level than the Asset Utilization Risk Level should be treated at the same Risk Level as the Asset Utilization Risk Level: For Activities in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability. the Activity should be terminated or completed as

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revis1on: Ipa g o10 of 39 07 determined by the Shift Manager based on whichever is better to reduce the risk. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be rescheduled to a time when the Asset Utilization Risk Level has returned to Green. For Activities in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, the Activity should typically be completed. This is assuming that completing this work will improve the Risk margin by making the equipment available. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, rescheduling the Activities must be weighed against creating additional risk. If possible, risk Activities of an intrusive nature should be delayed until after the peak load or until the control room has been notified that Asset Utilization Risk Level has returned to Green. 4.2.5 System (GRID) Operations and Risk

1.

Information and direction for operating grid risk and grid operating conditions may come from the following sources, listed in expected order of communication: Beaver Valley Duquesne (DLCO) Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection Operator (PJM) Wadsworth Control Center Davis Besse Wadsworth Control Center Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) Perry Wadsworth Control Center Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO)

2.

Duquesne Light Company (DLCO) System Operations or Pennsylvania New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection Operator (PJM) control the grid at Beaver Valley. The Duquesne Light Company grid is operated in a normal mode only. No intermediate warnirlgs for operations are specified by DLCO. Duquesne Light Company" or PJM shall notify Beaver Valley of Emergency Conditions specific to the Duquesne Light Company System.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP*1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e11 of 39 07

3.

WCC Modes: The Wadsworth Control Center normally operates in two modes: Normal Operations and Conservative Operations. The system grid is not intentionally operated in an Emergency condition.

a.

Normal Operations Normal Operations requires no additional restrictions or actions. The Wadsworth Control Center shall notify FENOC of the operating grid conditions in both a predictive outlook and in real time as grid conditions change. When real time grid changes occur, the Wadsworth Control Center shall notify the Control Room at each affected FENOC Unit of the escalation or lowering of grid condition.

b.

Conservative Operations In Conservative Operations, the Wadsworth Control Center limits grid maintenance, testing and operations that increase risk to reliable grid operation. These actions do not indicate a degraded grid as defined by voltage or frequency degradation, but are a proactive step at reducing risk when conditions warrant minimizing potential impact. When the Wadsworth Control Center reports Conservative Operations, Work Management and Operations shall assess all work for risk to generation or grid reliability. Activities that meet the following criteria and would otherwise be a lower Risk Level than Orange should be treated as Orange Risk Level: For Activities in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be terminated or completed as determined by the Shift Manager based on whichever is better to reduce the risk. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be rescheduled to a time when the Asset Utilization Risk Level has returned to Green.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: 1pa g e12 of 39 07 For Activities in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, the Activity should typically be completed. This is assuming that completing this work will improve the Risk margin by making the equipment available. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, rescheduling the Activities must be weighed against creating additional risk. If possible, risk Activities of an intrusive nature should be delayed until after the peak load or until Asset Utilization notifies the control room of Green Risk.

c.

Emergency Grid Operations The system grid is not intentionally operated in an Emergency condition. If the system operator declares an emergency or degraded grid, the actions for RED risk shall be implemented concurrent with site specific procedures for degraded grid. When the Wadsworth Control Center reports Emergency Operations, Work Management and Operations shall assess all work for risk to generation or grid reliability. Activities that meet the following criteria and would otherwise be a lower Risk Level than Red should be treated as Red Risk Level: F or Activities in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be terminated or completed as determined by the Shift Manager based on whichever is better to reduce the risk. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be rescheduled to a time when the Asset Utilization Risk Level has returned to Green. For Activities in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, the Activity should typically be completed. This is assuming that completing this work will improve the Risk margin by making the equipment available.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e13 of 39 07 For Activities scheduled but not in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, rescheduling the Activities must be weighed against creating additional risk. If possible, risk Activities of an intrusive nature should be delayed until after the peak load or until Asset Utilization notifies the control room of Green Risk. Additionally, work on safety systems critical to response in a loss of power must be evaluated for action. If the Activity has not started, it should be postponed. If maintenance is in progress, prompt restoration should be considered, including adding resources or additional shifts. 4.2.6 Risk Assessment Worksheet

1.

Risk classification can be derived from certain activities or plant conditions as described in Attachment 3, Risk Assessment Worksheet.

2.

The Risk Assessment Worksheet is arranged according to nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, environmental safety, and generation risk. 4.2.7 Time Remaining in a Shutdown Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO)

1.

A unique impact on generation risk in nuclear power plants is the Shutdown LCO as related to Technical SpeCifications and associated design criteria (LRM, ORM, TRM).

2.

A short duration Shutdown LCO requires added attention and resources to manage the impact. These unique criteria are detailed in the generation risk section of the Risk Assessment Worksheet.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipage~ 4 of 39 07 4.2.8 Severe Weather

1.

Concurrent with site specific procedures for severe weather, when severe weather is observed locally or when the control room is notified of a pending severe weather warning, plant Activities with potential impact to the grid or unit reliability should be reviewed for suspension or expedited completion. For Activities in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be terminated or completed as determined by the Shift Manager based on whichever is better to reduce the risk. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that pose a risk to generation or grid reliability, the Activity should be rescheduled to a time when the Asset Utilization Risk Level has returned to Green. For Activities in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, the Activity should typically be completed. This is assuming that completing this work will improve the Risk margin by making the equipment available. For Activities scheduled but not in progress that impact safety equipment operability or availability, rescheduling the Activities must be weighed against creating additional risk. If possible, risk Activities of an intrusive nature should be delayed until after the peak load or until Asset Utilization notifies the control room of Green Risk.

2.

Risk decisions based on Severe Weather conditions should consider the safe environmental conditions of those who perform the activities. 4.3 Implementing Risk Level Management Actions and Controls 4.3.1 This section provides the details to implement the Risk Level Management Actions. Attachment 2 is a reflection of this section and is to be used as a reference. 4.3.2 For Risk Levels that are based only on Plant Conditions, such as during Shutdown (time to boil, train/divisional outages, etc.) or PRA (train/divisional outages, aggregate risk, etc.), only the Risk Management Controls on Attachment 5 will apply since there is no specific Activity for which to apply supervisory or oversight actions.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e15 of 39 07 4.3.3 Perform the following for a given Risk Level:

1.

Green Risk

a.

Level of Supervision - The first line supervisor shall ensure: Self-Check and/or Peer Check in accordance with normal management expectations.

b.

Level of Preparation Oversight - Oversight shall be provided in accordance with normal management expectations.

c.

Level of Task Oversight - Oversight shall be provided in accordance with normal management expectations.

2.

Yellow Risk

a.

Each of the Risk Management Controls of Attachment 5 should be implemented, as feasible, to increase risk awareness and control, reduce the duration of Activities and Plant Conditions associated with elevated risk, and minimize the magnitude of risk increase.

b.

Protected Equipment Postings should be used for Yellow Risk Level Activities and Plant Conditions.

c.

Approval: Yellow Risk Activities or Plant Conditions shall be approved by the Operations Manager or designee, and shall be documented by approving the Work Implementation Schedule or approving the Outage Schedule per Milestone "Outage Schedule Frozen" of NOBP-OM-2001. Approval of emergent Yellow Risk Activities shall be documented in the unit log.

d.

Level of Supervision - The first line supervisor shall: attend the pre-job brief, ensure that the proper human performance tools are utilized during the performance of the Activity, provide direct observation of all critical steps, attend the post-job brief.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Use Category: Risk Management General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e16 of 39 07

e.

level of Preparation Oversight - Intrusive involvement of the line Superintendent or Manager shall ensure that the following occur: proper planning/preparation, use of appropriate human performance tools, appropriate supervision is provided, required task oversight.

f.

level of Task Oversight - Duty Team in accordance with normal management expectations. NOTE When Asset Utilization makes a declaration of Orange or Red Risk, or the Transmission System Operator declares they are operating in the Conservative or Emergency Operations mode, any plant Activity with potential to impact unit or grid reliability should be immediately evaluated in accordance with Steps 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.3.

3.

Orange Risk

a.

Each of the Risk Management Controls of Attachment 5 should be implemented, as feasible, to increase risk awareness and control, reduce the duration of Activities and Plant Conditions associated with elevated risk, and minimize the magnitude of risk increase.

b.

Protected Equipment Postings should be used for Orange Risk Level I Activities and Plant Conditions.

c.

Approval: Orange Risk Activities or Plant Conditions shall be approved by the Director of Site Operations or deSignee. and shall be documented by approving the Work Implementation Schedule or approving the Outage Schedule per Milestone "Outage Schedule Frozen" of NOBP-OM-2001. Approval of emergent Orange Risk Activities shall be documented in the unit log.

d.

level of Supervision - The first line supervisor shall: attend pre-job brief (line superintendent or manager should attend the pre-job brief),

Title:

Procedure Number: NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE NOP-OP-1007 Use Category: Risk Management General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e17 of 39 07 ensure that the proper human performance tools are utilized during the performance of the Activity, provide continuous job site coverage, attend post-job brief.

e.

Level of Preparation Oversight - Intrusive involvement of the Line Superintendent or Manager and the Duty Team Leader shall ensure that the following occur: proper planning/preparation, use of appropriate human performance tools, appropriate supervision is provided, required task oversight.

f.

Level of Task Oversight - Duty Team Member or as directed by the Duty Team Leader, the subject matter expert, provide oversight of all critical steps.

g.

Switchyard work should not be allowed on dedicated off-site sources during periods of Orange Risk, unless the switchyard work is approved at the same level of approval as the Orange Risk work.

h.

A challenge call should be conducted as directed by the Director of Site Operations. NOTE When Asset Utilization makes a declaration of Red Risk, or the Transmission System Operator declares they are operating in the Conservative or Emergency Operations

mode, any plant Activity with potential to impact unit or grid reliability should be immediatel evaluated in accordance with Ste s 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.3.

4.

Red Risk

a.

It is unacceptable to voluntarily enter a Red Risk Activity or condition. If an emergent Activity or condition causes, or degradation may cause an unplanned entry into a Red Risk Activity or Plant Condition, immediate action shall be taken to restore and/or protect equipment necessary to mitigate events.

b.

Protected Equipment Postings should be used for Red Risk Level Activities and Plant Conditions.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e18 of 39 07

c.

Each of the Risk Management Controls of Attachment 5 should be implemented, as feasible, to increase risk awareness and control, reduce the duration of Activities and Plant Conditions associated with elevated risk, and minimize the magnitude of risk increase.

d.

Approval: The Site Vice President shall approve all Red Risk Activities or Plant Conditions. The approval shall be documented in the unit log.

e.

Level of Supervision - The first line supervisor shall: attend pre-job brief (Duty Team Leader shall attend the pre-job brief), ensure that the proper human performance tools are utilized during the performance of the Activity, provide continuous job site coverage. attend post-job brief.

f.

Level of Preparation Oversight - Intrusive involvement of the line manager and Duty Team Leader (Director or above) shall ensure that the following occur: proper planning/preparation, use of appropriate human performance tools, appropriate supervision is provided, required task oversight.

g.

Level of Task Oversight - Duty Team Member (Manager level or above) shall provide continuous job site Oversight.

h.

Switchyard work should not be allowed on dedicated off-site sources during periods of red risk, unless.the switchyard work is approved at the same level of approval as the Red Risk work.

i.

A challenge call should be conducted as directed by the Director of Site Operations.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipage~ 9 of 39 07 4.4 Communication of Risk Level 4.4.1 The Plant Risk Level, protected equipment, work Activities or Plant Conditions of elevated risk, and possible contingencies, should be covered during shift turnovers and shop briefs. 4.4.2 The risk traffic light and electronic bulletin boards (as applicable) should indicate the PRA risk color for incoming plant personnel. Job or task risk shall not apply to the traffic light. 4.4.3 When PRA risk level changes, the Shift Manager shall ensure the following communications occur: Make a Unit Log entry Make a plant announcement of the change Change the site risk traffic light color. 4.4.4 When the risk level change is unexpected, or outside of the schedule by more than one hour, the Shift Manger shall ensure the site Duty Team is notified via alpha page. 4.5 Protected Equipment and Protected Equipment Postings 4.5.1 Why Eguipment is Posted

1.

Protecting equipment is necessary to limit operation or maintenance on plant eqUipment when its redundant eqUipment is out of service, when the equipment is needed to ensure minimum safety and operational margin, or when it is needed for Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions. The on line goal is to maintain plant emergency response capability and prevent inadvertent plant trips, transients, or Technical SpeCification Limiting Condition for Operation entries. The Shutdown goal is to maintain Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions. Protected eqUipment postings are deSigned to limit plant risk, transients, and to prevent inadvertent Tech Spec entry due to maintenance, testing, or inadvertent equipment manipulations through increased personnel awareness.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Tille: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e20 of 39 07

2.

Site-speci'fic documents containing additional Protected Equipment Posting information are: BVBP-OPS-0012, Guidance For Protected Train Work During Normal Operations BVBP-OPS-0027, Outage Defense In Depth 1/2-ADM-0712, Shutdown Defense In Depth Assessment DBBP-OPS-0011, Protected Train Room Sign Posting PYBP-POS-2-2, Protected Equipment Postings

3.

Although Exempt Activities of Attachment 1 are considered Green Risk, the controls of this section, Protected Equipment Postings, still apply and all personnel and activities shall adhere to the controls established for protected equipment. 4.5.2 When Postings are Determined

1.

For Online activities, establishment of the need for protected equipment will normally occur during Work Week planning. Work Control and Operations will determine the required scope of protected eqUipment and postings per NOP-WM-1001. Order Planning Process.

2.

For Outage activities, establishment of the need for protected equipment will normally occur during Outage planning. Outage Management and Operations will determine the required scope of protected equipment and postings in conjunction with NOP-OM-2031, Outage Management Scheduling Process and NOP-OP-1005, Shutdown Defense in Depth.

3.

For Emergent work affecting system availability, Ops Shift Management will promptly determine the equipment to be protected. Ops Shift Management will evaluate scheduled work and evaluate work that could impact the protected equipment. Posting will be established as required as soon as possible after the unavailability is identified.

Procedure Number: NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE NOP-OP-1007 Use Category:

Title:

General Skill Reference Risk Management Revision: 07 4.5.3 Where Postings Will Be Placed

1.

The Shift Manager, during outages with input from the Shutdown Defense in Depth Coordinator/Advisor, determines the appropriate locations for Protected Equipment Postings.

2.

Protected Equipment Postings are placed to call attention to a system, component or device that is important to safety, poses a risk to generation, or is important to key shutdown Defense in Depth functions.

3.

Consideration should be given to protecting equipment that, if it becomes unavailable concurrent with the planned plant configuration for maintenance, will result in an unplanned increase in overall risk to an Orange or Red Risk condition.

4.

Protected Equipment Postings are normally placed on the doors or entranceways to a system, component or device that are important to safety, pose a risk to generation, or are important to Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions. When necessary to place the postings within a room or close to the system, component, or device, then a "stand-off' distance (recommend 2 feet minimum) should be maintained between the posting and the component where possible. For applications where a 2 feet minimum cannot be achieved, other barriers or actions should be put in place with Operations Shift Management approval.

5.

At a minimum, the following is posted to provide component level protection: Main power supply feed breaker or driving force supply isolation valve The component or general area Local controls

6.

The Protected Equipment Postings process should consider ALARA. 4.5.4 Specific Situations to Protect Equipment

1.

When risk Significant equipment is made unavailable and overall risk is Yellow or greater, actions shall be taken to protect redundant/diverse equipment or equipment to ensure Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions. Consideration should be given to protecting equipment that, if it becomes unavailable concurrent with the planned plant configuration for maintenance, will result in an unplanned increase in overall risk to an Orange or Red Risk condition.

Procedure Number: NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Use Category: General Skill Reference Risk Management Revision: gIpa e22 of 39 07

2.

When a Prompt Operability Determination (POD) is pending, then the Shift Manager should evaluate protecting redundant equipment to that which is in question under the POD.

3.

Protected Equipment Postings should be used to protect redundant equipment, equipment needed to ensure minimum safety and operational margin, or equipment needed for Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions. The following is a list of situations where protected equipment is required. When a Yellow, Orange, or Red risk category will be entered. When a component is out-of-service and failure of the remaining component would cause a unit trip or entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. When the equipment is necessary to ensure Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions are not challenged, such as running decay heat removal. When failure of the component would cause a degradation in Key Shutdown Defense in Depth Functions per NOP-OP-1005. When a component is out-of-service for ~ 3 days and failure of the remaining component would cause a signi'ficant plant transient (>20%). 4.5.5 Control of Protected Equipment Postings

1.

Protected Equipment Postings will be tracked to ensure that site personnel recognition of the protected equipment is sustained and for collection of posting devices when the eqUipment is restored to normal. The Protected Equipment Tracking Log (Attachment 6 or similar Form) completed by Operations will be maintained in the control room until all postings have been removed for a given list, and shall contain, as a minimum: Reason for posting Equipment Number/Noun Name or Room/Door identifier Location of posting(s) Number of postings Installation information Removal information

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Jpa g e23 of 39 07

2.

IF rooms or areas containing protected and non-protected equipment are posted, THEN postings may need to be relocated to allow work on the non-protected equipment without enacting all the controls for working inside a protected equipment posting. Consideration should be given to the nature of the work near, or with the potential to effect, protected equipment even if that work is not in the protected equipment posting.

3.

The Protected Equipment Posting shown on Attachment 7 is the only acceptable format. All postings shall include this sign. Methods of establishing the Protected Equipment Posting boundary shall include the sign and may include the following: a.' Protective Covers may be placed over devices that should not be manipulated, as long as operability is not affected.

b.

Barrier Rope, plastic chains, or tape can be used to establish a boundary with applicable postings to warn personnel of protected equipment status.

c.

Areas with multiple entrance points should have a sign at each entry point.

d.

Placement of highly visible reminders such as orange cones, or easels that can also bear signage to delineate the protected equipment. Reusable laminated signs are also an alternative.

e.

Magnetic placards that are placed on breaker doors, room doors, or panels to mark the protected equipment. 4.5.6 Crossing a Protected Equipment Posting Boundary

1.

Work on protected eqUipment - Generally work on protected eqUipment will not be allowed. This includes Training Activities in the area. Any work on protected equipment shall include the following:

a.

The workers must be authorized by the Shift Manager or deSignee to enter these areas to perform work or recommence work after a one-hour stoppage.

b.

Work crews shall notify the Shift Manager or designee when work in the posted area has been completed.

5.1 NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 TiUe: Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: .. rpage24 of 39 07 C. The work group will receive a pre-job briefing from Operations prior to entry. This should include the risk significant equipment and risk management actions that shall be observed.

d.

Supplemental Human Performance barriers, in accordance with NOBP-LP-2603, Event-Free Tools and Verification Practices should be used.

e.

For Intrusive Activities, continuous oversight of the work group by Supervisory personnel is required.

f.

For Intrusive Activities, an Operations SRO will perform a walkdown with the work group prior to commencing work to ensure all aspects of the work are assessed, including such challenges as proximity risk.

g.

Walkdowns and oversight may need to be adjusted based on ALARA considerations.

2.

Individuals requiring routine access to these areas (operator rounds, fire watch, security inspections, etc.) shall also contact the Shift Manager or designee prior to entering these areas. The Shift Manager or designee may allow further entries over the shift without further communications. 5.0 RECORDS Records Handling Records completed/generated by this procedure shall be handled in accordance with direction per this procedure. 5.2 Records Capture The following records are completed/generated by this document: Quality Records None Non-Quality Records None

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e29 of 39 07 ATIACHMENT 1: EXEMPT ACTIVITIES Page 1 of 1

1.

Routine station Activities including Chern istry and Radiation Protection samples performed on a weekly or more frequent basis, pump oil additions, and operator rounds.

2.

Work Activities that are entirely bounded and contained within a Clearance Boundary (this does not include Test Tags clearances). Unless the clearance results in reduced trip logic, actuation of a safety function, or the Activity affects the clearance boundary.

3.

Work on: spare parts, bench work, shop fabrication, and staging of materials, equipment, components, supplies and fittings.

4.

Facility Maintenance Activities meeting ALL of the following criteria:

Work scope is not Power Block Equipment. (Reference NOP-WM-0001)
The work does not affect Safety, Regulatory, Tech Spec, Code, or Environmental Qualifications.

5.

Toolpouch Maintenance Activities lAW Repair Identification and Toolpouch Maintenance, NOP-WM-9001.

6.

Fire Protection Activities: Fire hose, extinguisher, fire fighting equipment and plant door inspections.

Fire Detector Surveillances that are detection only and are not interlocked with any other system.

7.

Non-Tech Spec required crane and manlift Surveillances.

8.

Work Activities on Security equipment.

9.

Non Intrusive Activities performed without physical impact (e.g., engineering calculations, run time data gathering, setpoint verifications, visual inspections, etc.).

10. Lubrication Activities not requiring additional equipm ent operation.

11. Removing dried boron off piping and equipment.

12. Maintenance Activities under the following conditions:

local instrumentation when isolated from the process stream, in an isolation/thermal well or that is isolated from the process stream, there is no interface with control or remote indicators or other equipment and, no common process taps with other instruments unless they are also not included in this process.
Activities on instrumentation loops, which only provide local, remote panel or Control Room alarms, computer point or indication changes with no actuation or equipment control.
cleaning or replacing external screens and filters (for example, Main Feedwater Pump motors, Inverters, etc.)
shop work.

13. Non-safety related thermal insulation (non-aSbestos) removal/modification and installation activities.

14. Operations surveillances which have no impact to grid or unit reliability.

Title:

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007 Use Category: Risk Management General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e30 of 39 07 ATIACHMENT 2: PLANT RISK MATRIX Page 1 of 1 ~ 'S; c.J < til C 0 c.J < PRA Shutdown Defense in Depth Asset Utilization Wadsworth Control Center Risk Assessment ,...-Worksheet. Time remaining on SID lCO Approval Brief Level Green Yellow Orange Red Green Yellow Orange Red Green Yellow Orange Red Green Yellow Orange Red Normal Normal Operations Conservative Operations Emergency Operations Operations Green Y~lIow Orange Red s 8 hours or activity ~ 24 hours < 24 hours but> 8 hours duration >50% of TS SID action time Work Operations Manager Director of Site Operations Implementation Site Vice President Schedule or (Work Implementation Schedule (Work Implementation (Control Room log) Outage Schedule or Outage Schedule) Schedule or Outage Schedule) Standard Brief Brief w/line Supervisor Brief w/line Superintendent Brief w/Duty Team or Manager leader For Risk levels \\hat are based only on Plant Conditions. such as during Shutdown (time to boil, train/divisional outages. etc.) or PRA (train/divisional outages. aggregate risk. etc.). only \\he Risk Management Controls on Attachment 5 wlll apply since there is no specific Activity for whIch to apply supervisory or oversight actions. Additional Risk Each of the Risk Management Controls of Attachment 5 should be implemented. as feasible. Management Actions None to Increase risk awareness and control, reduce the duration of Activities and Plant Conditions associated with elevated risk. and minimize the magnitude of risk increase. level of lAW Normal Supervisor ensure proper tools are Supervisor continuous job site Supervisor continuous job Management utilized and observe critical steps. coverage site coverage SuperviSion Expectations Intrusive involvement of the Line Intrusive involvement of Line Intrusive involvement of level of lAW Normal Superintendent or Manager In job Superintendent or Manager and line Manager and Duty Preparation Management preparation Duty Team Leader in job Team Leader (Director or preparation. above) In job preparation Oversight Expectations Duty Team lAW Normal Duty Team Member or as directed Duty Team Member Management Expectations by \\he Duty Team leader. the (Manager level or above) levelofTask lAW Normal subject matter expert, provide continuous Job site Management oversight of aU critical steps coverage Oversight Expectations Challenge Not Required Challenge Call should be conducted as directed by Call the Director of Site Operations Protected Protected Equipment Postings should be used for Yellow, Orange. and Red Risk Equipment Not Required Postings level Activities and Plant Conditions.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e31 of 39 07 AITACHMENT 3: RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET Page 1 of4 ALL "NO" answers to the questions indicate the Activity poses Green Risk to Nuclear Safety, Industrial Safety, Radiological Safety, Environmental Safety and Generation/Production. no:>r1tnrnno:>n InC',nrr *.,MIIV (i.e., any error), that would cause a reactor trip and the chan nel is not bypassed, unplanned power change, unplanned start/stop or actuation of trip sensitive Engineered Safety Features, or Turbine Trip circuitry equipment. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Yellow.

2.

Activity, if performed incorrectly (Le., any single unrecoverable error), that YES/NO would cause a loss of, or defeat of a safety system. If answer is yes, this U,...iu,nl shall be Yellow.

3.

Activity, if performed incorrectly (Le., any single unrecoverable error), that YES/NO would cause a loss or unavailability of an Offsite Power Source or Emergency Diesel Generation. If answer is this will be Yellow.

4.

Any physical performed on or near protected train equipm ent or trip YES/NO sensitive equipment that would cause a plant transient or loss of an engineered safety feature. (e.g., building a scaffold over a protected diesel or an operating feed pump at-power.) 'If answer is'yes, this Activity will be Yellow.*

5.

Maintenance CM or EM Activity that will affect reactivity sensitive or reactivity YES/NO monitoring systems. Refer to NOP*OP-1004 for Reactivity Sensitive systems. If answer is this will be Yellow.

6.

Activity, if performed incorrectly (i.e., any single unrecoverable error), would YES/NO cause a loss of a safety electrical bus or would result in the loss of a load center and cause a plant tr ip or rapid power reduction. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Yellow. Based on Activity frequency and complexity the be u to

e.

7.

Complex or Intrusive A that involves performance of critical steps in multiple areas, are performed less often than quarterly, and if performed Yellow incorrectly (Le., any single unrecoverable error), would Significantly increase YES/NO the possibility of a plant transient. (e.g., RP S trip and channel is not by passed, unplanned power change, unplanned start/stop or actuation of trip sensitive Engineered Safety Function, or Turbine T rip circuitry eqUipment). a) If answer is yes, this Activity will be Orange. Orange b) If the Activity is performed more often than quarterly with a successful YES/NO working history, the Activity may be classified as yellow. NOTE: If the specific Activity is performed less often than quarterly, but are typical of similar tests performed more often than quarterly. the manager may request a change in risk level Activity to be approved the Director of Site

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Use Category: Risk Management General Skill Reference Revision: Ipa g e32 of 39 07 ATIACHMENT 3: RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET Page 2 of4

8.

Activity that is performed on ent/Drywell Penetrations when required to be Operable. If compensatory actions satisfy technical specifications compliance, i.e., isolate the penetration, the Activ ity may be screened as green. If answer is yes and actions can restore the penetration, this Activity will be Yellow. If answer is not restore the this will be Red.

9.

Maintenance M or EM Activity that will affect the ability to manage reactivity in YES/NO the core, spent fuel pool or new fuel storage. (e.g., anticipating, controlling, and r",<:.nnruiirln to . If answer is this will be (""lor......."'....

10.

Activity, if incorrectly would degrade the ability of Operations to control YES/NO the plant, e.g., places the plant in an unusual conf iguration or involves complex of Activities. If answer is this will be

11.

Activity removes equi pment from service that upon a plant t rip, with no additional YES/NO

12.

failures, would cause a loss of the ability to remove decay heat. If answer is yes, this will be Activity will be performed on a system operating at ~ 500 psig or ~ 200°F and an unisolable system breach is required, {e.g., on-line leak repair or repacking a valve on its If answer is this will be Yellow. YES/NO YES/NO

2.

Activity will be performed in an environment that req a heat stress stay time YES/NO calculation $ 15 minutes. If answer is this shall be Y

3.

Activity will be on a system that requires a breach will directly YES/NO expose personnel to haz ardous chemicals or gases and purging/flushing or ventilating alone will not remove the hazard. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Yellow.

4.

Asbestos work . If answer is yes, this Activity YES/NO will be Yellow.

5.

Activity is required to be performed within 3 feet of the edge water, pools, or YES/NO open holes, and no handrail separating worker from the edge. If answer is yes, this will be Yellow.

6.

Activity at a height> 6 ft above ground, water, or other surfaces when the use of YES/NO fall protection, scaffolding, or a ladder is not practical. If answer is yes, this L>. "T'M'T\\I will be Yellow.

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: 07 \\ pa g e33 of 39 ATIACHMENT 3: RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET Page 3 of4 B.

7.

YES/NO

8.

YES/NO

9.

YES/NO

10.

11.

Activity entry a "permit"confined space: YES/NO that contains a known hazardous atmosphere OR an Activity will require entry into a "permit" required confined space and includes the use of a hazardous material.

12.

be on, unguarded, uninsulated lines and equipment YES/NO operating at > 50 Volts. If voltage> 50 volts and <600 volts, this Activity will be Yellow. If voltage> 600 volts, this Activity will be Red. Equipment, including testing equipment, where amplitude is minimal such that no industrial safety hazard exists (e.g., scintillation detector) should be reviewed and

13.

Activity involving application of freeze seals. If answer is yes, this Activity will be YES/NO Yellow.

14.

Activity involving work within 3 feet of any unguarded rotating equipment or YES/NO equipment with the potential for rotation. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Yellow. c.. *

1.

accordance with NOP-OP-4107, Radiation Work Permit (RWP). If answer is yes, this will answer is If an this will be Activity involving an ALARA High Risk as determined by the ALARA Supervisor in excl

NUCLEAR OPERATING PROCEDURE Procedure Number: NOP-OP-1007

Title:

Risk Management Use Category: General Skill Reference Revision: 1pa g e34 of 39 07 ATTACHMENT 3: RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET Page 4 of4 D.

1.

of hazardous or radioactive material to the environment. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Orange. However, for frequently performed Activities where a successful Activity history exists, provided appropriate specific evolution procedures are in place, this Activity will be Yellow. This excludes approved C1i'CIlr.h::llrn".'CI bound ed the site vironmental n",,'tnl"c::.

2.

YES/NO normal) instruction for spill or chemical release. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Orange. However, for frequently performed Activities where a successful Activity history exists, provided appropriate specific evolution procedures are in Activity, if performed incorrectly, 90uld entry the site abnormal (off E.

1.

YES/NO Activity, if performed incorrectly, could cause an unmonit""rOti this will If YES/NO

2.

3.

Activity time remaining is a Tech Spec LCO with s 24-hour but> 8-hour action, YES/N which requires a unit shutdown if not exited. If answer is yes, this Activity will be Yellow.

4.

Activity time remaining is a Tech Spec LCO with s 8-hour action, which requires a YES/NO unit shutdown if not exited. If answer is this will be

e.

5.

Activity duration is scheduled to be ~ 50% of the allowable Tech Spec Action Statement for any TS which requires a unit shutdown if not exited. If answer is this Activ will be 0

licensing. Requirements Manual Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.12 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.12 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation LR 3.3.12 Two channels of the Gaseous Waste System Surge Tank Discharge Oxygen Monitor (2GWS-OA100MB) shall be OPERABLE with A1armlTrip Setpoints set to ensure the limits of LR 3.7.6 are not exceeded. -NOTE The requirements of LR 3.3.12 are part of the Technical Specification 5.5.8, -Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program." APPLICABILITY: During waste gas decay tank filling operation. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required channels with AlarmlTrip setpolnt less conservative than required. B. One required channel inoperable. A.1 B.1 AND B.2 Declare the affected channel(s} Inoperable. Take and analyze grab samples. Restore Inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. Immediately \\ Once per 24 hours 30 days ~ Beaver Valley Unit 2 3.3.12 -1 LRM Revision 52

Licensing Requirements Manual Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.12 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION C. Two required channels Inoperable. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.1 AND C.2 Take and analyze grab samples. Restore Inoperable channels to OPERABLE status. Once per 4 hours during degassing operations AND Once per 24 hours during other operations 30 days D. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met. 0.1 Prepare and submit a Special Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50;4 to eXplain why the inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner. 30 days LICENSING REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCES SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY LRS 3.3.12.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 24 hours LRS 3.3.12.2 Perform CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST. 31 days LRS 3.3.12.3

NOTE*

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall Include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal:

1.

One volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen, and

2.

Four volume percent oxygen, balance nitrogen. Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 days Beaver Valley Unit 2 3.3.12 - 2 LRM Revision 52

5.5.8 Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program This program provides controls for potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the '{V9ste qas_ Sy inIlII _ _ and.' the quantity of radioactivity conta ned unprotected Iqu storage tanks. The gaseous radioactivity quantities shall be determined following the methodology in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ETSB 11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Release due to Waste Gas System Leak or Failure." The liquid radwaste quantities shall be determ ined in accordance with Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.3, "Postulated Radioactive Release due to Tank Failures." The program shall include:

a.

The limits for concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the Waste Gas Holdup System and a surveillance program to ensure the lim its are maintained. Such limits shall ensure that the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen is maintained below flammability limits,

b.

the quantity of radioactivity cOI")!~)r:!ed each connected group of~f~l'~ the amount that would result in a exposure > 0.5 rem to any individual in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents. and J

c.

A surveillance program to ensure that the quantity of radioactivity contained in all outdoor liquid radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls, capable of holding the tanks' contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Uqu id Radwaste Treatment System is less than the amount that would result in concentrations greater than the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an unrestricted area, in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program surveillance frequencies. Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 5.5 -16 Amendments 278/170

(page 70 of

66)

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number; 1I2-0DC-3.03 Tille; ODCM: Controls for RETS and REMP Programs Unit; 1/2 Revision; 8 Level OfUse; General Skill Reference Page Number; 70-.Of86 ATTACHMENT 0 Page 1 of 1 ODCM CONTROLS: GAS STORAGE TANKS CONTROLS: GAS STORAGE TANKS 3.11.2.5 In accordance with T.S. 5.5.8, the quantity of radioactivity contained in the following gas storage tanks(s) shall be limited to the noble gas values listed below (considered as Xe 133).

a.

':::52,000 Curies: Each BV-l Waste Gas Decay Tank (1 GW-TK-l A, odGW-TK IB, or IGW-TK-IC)

b.

':::19,000 Curies: Any connected group ofBV-2 Gaseous Waste Storage Tanks (2GWS-TK25A thru 2GWS-TK25G) AI:PJ,JJ:ABILITY: At all times.

a.

With the quantity ofradioactive material in any gas storage tank exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank and within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and

b.

Submit a Special Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 (b)(l) within 30 days and include a schedule and a description of activities planned and/or taken to reduce the contents to within the specified limits.

c.

The provisions ofODCM Control 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1 L2.5.1 For BY-l Waste Gas Decfly-Tanks: The quantity of radioactive material contained in each B V-I Waste Gas Decay Tank shall be determined to be within the above limit at least once per 24 hours when radioactive materials are being added to the tank. Performance of this surveillance is required when the gross concentration ofthe primary coolant is greater than 100 uCi/m!. For BV-2 Gaseous Waste Storage Tanks: The quantity of radioactive material contained in any connected group ofBV-2 Gaseous Waste Storage Tanks shall be determined to be within the above limit at least once per 24 hours when radioactive materials are being added to the tanks.

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad (RCS activity. corecooling. heat sink) 1.2 RCS (Integrity, SGTR, heat sink) 1.3 Containment (CNMT Red Path, CNMT bypass) 1 SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.5 RCS Unident Leakage 2.9 Turbine Failure 2.2 Loss of FunctionlComm' s 2.6 RCS Ident. Leakage 2.10 StmlFeed Line.B~eak 2.3 Failure ofRx Prot.-ATWS 2.7 Technical Specification S(D 2.4 Fuel bad Degradation 2.8 Safety Limit Exceeded _ LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (power Ops) (Modes 1-4) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 &: 6) 3 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and ED JUDGEMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas 4.6 Security 4 Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.7 ED Judgement Figure 4-A Figure 4-BlFigure 4-C Table 4-3ffable 4-4 DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA 5.1 Earthquake 5.3 Aircraft CrasblProjectile 5.2 TomadolHigh Winds 5.4 River Level High 5 Table 5-1 , 5.5 River Level Low Figure 5-A 5.6 WatercrafiCrash (RW/SWS Loss) SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.3 Loss of AC(Shutdown) (Modes 5 &: 6) 6.2 RCS Inventory-Shutdown 6.4 Loss of DC (Shutdown) (Modes 5 &: 6) 6 6.5 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling (All Modes) 7 Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

EPPII-lb Attachment A RCS leak that requires an additional charging pump be started with letdown isolated. OR Unisolable RCS leak causes safety injection actuation indicated by direct entry into EOP E-l EOPE-O Not Applicable

' Due to streaming thru airlock Time After 2.RMR-RQ201 2.RMR-RQ2OZ' SID Irs rnRIhr rnRIhr 12RMR-RQ201 = clm 1026 0-1)5 2_7E+02 L4E-Kl0 2RMR-RQ2OZ = clm 3020 0_5-4 2_0E+02 B_0E-1l1 L5E+02 3_7E-1l1 LZE-Kl2 2_OE-1Jl Morue§:

NOTE: threshold ha.. been, readings. con!ainmen! pressure). NOTE: The INDICATOR N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U ~ o ~ ~ ~ Z o I-( rJl rJl I-( ~ M ,...-.(* r N * ~ r ,...-.( ,...-.( or sump NOT LOCA RUPTURED SlG is also FAULTED Outside of CNMT OR P-to-S leakrate >T/S with approx. 4-8 hr. steam release from affected S/G via nonisolable MSSV, SGADV, or from MSLB outside of CNMT CNMT H2 rises >4% OR CNMT pressure> 11 PSIG with less than one full train ofCNMT spray Unexplained VALID rise in reading on area or ventilation monitors in contiguous areas with knownLOCA OR HIGH Alarm on 2SWS RQIOOA,B,C, or D AND affected HX is NOT 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS An IAIJJICATOR -is considered to be MET ifthe stated or is, reached or exceeded, on the basis of confirmed observation or v:4LID irzstmmen! The Emergency Director must use judgemen! when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g., should be considered.MET zl the parameter is indeterminate due to instrumen!s that are not available or out cfrange and the existence ofthe condition can not he reasonably discounted. NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to he MET if, in the judgemen! of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR will be MET imminently (i.e., within 1 to 2 hours in the absence ofa viable success path). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

1.

In me matrix to !he left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in each barrier colunnL If one or more INDIC-I\\. TORS are met, check the LOSS block at the bottom ofthe cohmm. _2. If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LOSS block at the bottom ofthe barrier column.

3.

Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERLI\\. below and make the appropriate declaration. ofany Two (2) barriers and Potential loss ofthird barrier. OR of all three (3) barriers. SITEAREA EMERGENCY

- J1LU::;::; QI Potential LOSS ofany two (2) barriers.

OR of one (1) barrier and a Potential LOSS of a second

";::"7.,.::,-,:-::.:.:=-:-:.;.:i:,t:i:;:.f:~:.~.?~:.:t';:~:i,~.?;~~';:;:i:~';:~:;'~+~+~';:;;;t+':++';:;~:~+'::i:~*{

ALERT LOSS QI Potential LOSS ofFuel Clad barrier. OR LOSS QI Potential LOSS ofRCS barrier. UNUSUAL EVENT QI Potential Loss of CNMT barrier. SEEALSO R4L 'S: Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specific Activity>LCO) RCS Unidentified or Pressure Boundr)r Leakage> 10 gprn. RC~: Identified Leakage> 25 gprn. 14 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused e}..'Plosive device. CIV1L DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emexgency condition and any numeric values which define that.condition (i,e., the basis of the declara1ion). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the conditioo is VALID) by the Emexgency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emexgency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITlG....u. SAFETY FUNCTlON (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (E..'\\.B): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the pos1lllated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment 1hat imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage pennanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (ie., stearn or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or oveIheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station Il'\\DICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Roam, or reports received from plant personnel. whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1his protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Er.:lergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED P A TIl condition within 1 5 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED P A 1H TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLlS full range) andlor decreasing trend on core thennocouple temperatures), INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LO\\"\\'ER E..XPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combusilble gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPER.4..TlON: as specified irl the B\\'PS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional perfonnance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 150f53 OR.4NGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more.cSFs by the BOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure, The source of1he projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeterJence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by:the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Dehberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation ofplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFIG...4NT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine nmback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full e1ectricalload; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation 'The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A wolk stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of wolkers to enfurce compliance willi demands made on the B VPS or' one ofits vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or heallli by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of nonnal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnOlIDal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimmn dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to 1he indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need. for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concem regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, roprure, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint cb:ipp:ing, scratches) should not be included. VITAL ARE.A is any area within the PROTECTED ll.R.EA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material,. the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation Revision 14 .r' i, )'/ ..:.. cO \\,

I Inability to cool the core /1 -or 2J

1.

Actions of FR-C.l (RED PATH) are INEFFECTIVE

2.

[a amIb} a, 'Three max core exit :thermocouples > 1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and R VLIS full range level <40%

b. Actions taken have NOT resulted in a rising trend in R VLIS full range level or a dropping trend in core exit thermocouple tempera1ures within 15 minutes of initiation of restoration actions Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain hot shutdown

[lor2} I. Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terririnus for core cooling or heat sink exists

2.

Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 F; or three max core exit fuermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and R VLIS full :range level <40% Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure if Reactor Protection",amI Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier MaJriX" Complete loss of function needed to achieve Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by Tech Specs [1 and 2 amI 3}

1.

Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHS, CCP, SWS)

2.

Inability to remove heat via the condenser

3.

ShUtdOVllIl to MODE 5 required by TIS UNPLANNED Loss of communications [lor2}

1.

In-plant [a and b and c}

a.

UNPLAN'NED Loss of All Pax Phones

b.

UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (PageIParty)

c.

UNPL~D Loss of All Radios (Handie-Talkies)

2.

Offsite [a and band c]

a.

UNPLANNED Loss ofENS

b. UNPL4.N'NED Loss ofBell Lines

c.

UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to OflSite 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" tmd Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents " Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress [J amI 2 amI 3}

1.

Loss of most (>75%) annunciators Q! indications

2.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

3.

Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs: Subcriticality Vessel Integrity Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators ~ indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress ~ a loss of non-alarming compensatory indications [J amI 2 and 3}

1.

UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) annmciators or indications for >15 minutes

2.

SM judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3.

[aorb}

a.

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in

b.

UNPLANNED loss of most aununciators or indications for>15 minutes [1 and2}

1.

UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) annmciators Q! indications for >15 minutes

2.

SM judgement that additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit 1 2 3 4 1 2 3' 4 1 2 3 4 ALL AltA to Matri:r " 1 2 1 2 2 Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier J\\latri:r " Reactor power >5'% after VALID trip signal(s)and toss of core cooling capability [1 and2}

1.

Ops personnel report FR-S.l has been entered and subsequent actions do NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and decreasing

2.

[a orb] a Ops personnel report CSF stallls tree RED PATH terminus exists for core cooling.or heat sink

b. 'Three max core exit thermocouples

>1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs running and R VLIS full range level <4()01o Reactor trip failure after VALlD Trip signal(s) with reactor power >50/. and attempts to cause a manual trip from the control room are unsuccessful

1.

Ops personnel report FR-S.l has been entered and manual reactor trip from control room did NOT result in reduction ofpower to <5% and decreasing to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matri:r" Automatic reactor trip did not occur after VALlD trip signal and manual trip from control room was successful [1 andl}

1.

VALID reactor trip signal received or required.

2.

Manual reactor trip from control room was successful and power is <5% and decreasing Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds LCO (refer to Bv-PS T.S. 3.4.16) [lor2}

1. VALID high alarm on 2CHS-RQI0lAIB

[3051] reactor coolant letdo"WIl monitor

2. Radiochemistry 3.4.16 analysis exceeds T.S.

2 3 4 5 Not Applicable N .~ z ,0 ~ .E-! ~ ~ .~ ~ .~ .~ .~ rJj ~ rJj ~ N rtj* N N '" N l"""I* N 18 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and,any numeric V'.ililes which define that ccmdition (i.e., the basis 0/ the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VAliD) by the EmergenC-j Director that the CRITERlON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (wuess otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required tc prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized ThennaI Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inven10ry (RCS). EXCLUSION ARE..J\\ BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postnlated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceedillg the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred butis NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station Il':'DlCATOR(s): Are available via instrwnentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs. EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators ~that an Er.lergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. Th'EFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PAW condition within 15 mimrtes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PAW TER.MINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the ap?licable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. LCD, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional perfonnance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 19 of 53 ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structme. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structme or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contairied therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PAm: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is llider extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation ofplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGl\\'1FIC.!\\NT TRANSIENT: i\\n UNPL.t>,NNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controned areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enfurce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerons to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., a1ann se1points, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redlmdant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, ruplnre, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA Vi'hich contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fuilure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation Revision 14 ( ~ I(

AnA NotApplicable N ~ Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Ma:trix" ";';,i;.* NotApplicable Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss ofFunction " Inabill1y to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Vi'lthln Technical Specification Time Limits [1 and2} 1 2

1.

A Technical Specification Required Action Q! Specified Condition, requiring a mode reduction., has been entered 3 4

2.

The unit has NOT been placed in the required mode Q! Specified Condition within the time prescribed by the Required Action NotApplicable NotApplicable Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded [1 or2}

1. T.S. 2.1.1 specifies the safety limits for the reactor core which are applicable in Modes 1 and 2.

I 2

2. T.S. 2.1.2 specifies the safety limit for the 3

Reactor Coolant System pressure which is 4 applicable in MODES 1,2,3, 4 and 5. 5 z o 1-0( ~ ~ ~ ~

E

~ ~ V)

>I 1'J1 00*

N r-t" N r \\0* N r-In* N Refer to Barrier Matrix" Tab 1 "Fission Barrier Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS leakage> 10 GPM

1.

Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) >10 GPM as indicated below [a or b}

a. 20ST-6.2 or 20ST-6.2A results 2

1

b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, 3

VeT level dropping at a rate >10 4 GPM (> I%/min indicated on 2CHS LI-115 with no VCT makeup in 5* progress) Refer to 1 "Fission Product Barrier Ma:trix" BarrierMa.tri:x" Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM

1.

Identified RCS leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) >25 GPM as indicated below [a or b or c}

a.

20ST-6.2 or 20ST-6.2A Results 1

b.

UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, 2 IDGS-TK-21, and 2DGS-TK-22 3 4

c.

Indication of Steam Generator Tube leakage >25 GPM 5*

Applies to Mode 5 ijRCSPressurized 20 of 53 Revision 14

c DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT. UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA OR.4.NGE PATH: Mdriitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is :under severe challenge. BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTIJRBANCE: A group,of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at :the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the ba.si.s of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination thai the condition is VALID) by'lhe Emergency Director that the CRITERJON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indi.cations being available to Control Room operators that, an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTlON (CSFs): A plant safety fimction required toprevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Contain:ment) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA, BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary SUlTOunru.ng the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, 1ll1confined combustion, or a catllstrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (Le., stearn or feed line rupture) that results in an mJ.controlled decrease in stearn generator pressure or the stearn generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as'slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOST AGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room,. or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1bis protocol is the necessity for 'lhese assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of 'lhe RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameter.; (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIlNTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present m a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPWSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which cornbus1lble gases will not explode due to ignition. LeO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the B\\iPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 21 of 53 PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or lamJ.ched towards a plant structure. The source of.the projectile may be onsiteor offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient :tocanse concem regarding the irrte,grity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by'lhe EOPs which indicates that a CSF is 1ll1der extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprirnary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Dehberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation ofplant equipment wi'lh 'lhe intent to render the equipment mJ.available. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) Automatic turbine rmJ.back >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip~ (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enfurce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of nonnal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnollIlal or emergency procedmes are UNPLANNED. With specific regard 10 radioadivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in 1his definition are mJ.intentional releases, mJ.rnonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in 1his definition is the need fortirnely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAl\\l.o\\GE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: defollIlation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which c.ould directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to r-ddiation Revision 14 ( o

1 2 3 1 2 3 Refer to Matri:x:" Product Barrier Turbine failure generated misSiles cause penetration of a missile shield 'W3lI of any area containing safety related equipment

1.

Plant persormel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration ofa missile shield waJ1listed in Table 2-1 Turbine failure results in casing penetration

1.

Plant persormel report a turbine failure which results in penetration of the turbine casing or damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil leakage 2 3 4 Refer to Matrix" Matrix" 1 "FissianProduct Barrier Matrix" UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS cooldoWD and Safety Injection actuation [1 ami2]

1.

Ops persormel report rapid depressurization of Main Steam System that causes SLI <<500 psig)

2.

Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated Table 2-1 Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall Penetration EAL Diesel Generator Bldg. Service Bldg 745' and 760' Electrical Switchgear 730' Containment Main Steam Valve Room Primary Aux. Building 2FWE-TK210 EPPII-lb Attachnient A M ~ z o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ rJ'J. ~ r.I') .,..-.( I M Q.jI.... ,J:::J ~ 10 .,..-.(* M" 0\\* N 22 of53 Revision 14

I DEFINITIONS!ACRONYIVIS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring oione or more CSFs by the EOPs which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or acti:vities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any nmneric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration)...till classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERlON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety fimction required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to*the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Slrik, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary. side leakage (I.e., steam or feed line rupture) that resuJ:ts in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if1arge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel. whichever is most Iimi.ting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATIl condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED P A TIl TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLlS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorizatioIl LOWER EXPLOSIV"E LLWT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 23 of 53 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concem regarding the integrity ofthe affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSF s by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary lea1.'age ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:.1m UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED ARE.A.. by a body of WOIkers to enforce compliance with demands made on 1he BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnOlmal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Dischmge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, mnnoni.tored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accoracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable "I'.'ithout measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concem regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact:, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Smface blemishes (e.g., paiI'lt chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation Revision 14 \\".* (0 I

EPPII-lb Attachment A s 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Refer to Tab 1 "FIssion P.rodnct Barrier :M:atrix>> and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Loss of all Yital DC power for>15 minutes

1.. Voltage <llOA VDC on DC buses 2-1 and 2-2 and 2-3 and 2-4 for> 15 minutes Also Refer lo Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier MoJrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss ofFunction", and Tab 2.1. "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss ofShutdown Systems" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss ofFunction", and Tab 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss ofShutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 minutes

[1 or 2J

1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 2-1 2-3 for> 15 minutes

2. Voltage <110.4 VTIC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for> 15 minutes Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss ofDC (Shutdown)" for modes 5, 6, and defoe1ed 1

2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 aDd onsite AC power [1 and2} L lill and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes

2.

[a orb ore}

a.

Ops personnel report CSF statns tree RED PAmQ! ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling

b.

Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emexgency bus is NOT likely from any source within 4 hours ofloss

c.

Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 F.Q! three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with no RCPs

RVIJS full:ra:llf!:e <40%

Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutes

1.

AE DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes AC power to emergency buses reduced to a single source of power such that any additional failure will result in the de energization of both buses [1 and2}

1.

Either AE Q! DF 4KV emergency bus is de-energized for> 15 minutes

2.

The energized AE Q! DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source ofpower [a orb]

a.

Emergency diesel generator

b.

2A Q! 2D 4KV norma! bus Loss of offsite power. supply for>15 minutes [1 and2}

1.

Offsite power supply to AE and DF 4KV buses unavailable for > 15 minutes.

2.

Each diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus ~ ~ ~ o ~ o ~ r..I'J r..I'J o ~. ('fj* ('fj N "" ~ l""'i* ~ 5 6 De fuel 5 6 De fuel Refer to 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" to 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for>15 minutes

1.

AE DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes Also Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" UNPLANNED loss of offsite power supply for >15 minutes [1 and2]

1.

Offsite power supply to AE and DF 4KV buses unavailable for> 15 minutes.

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 26 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or moreCSFs by ilie EOPs which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates iliat a CSF is under severe challenge. BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DIS~ANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station -operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any m:n:neric values which define that condition (i.e., 1he basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is ilie necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless oilierwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to ilie environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). E:~CLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which ilie postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding ilie criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. EXPLOSION: A mpid, violent, unconfined combustion. or a catastrophic ~ure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent str:uctures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action atthe station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Genemtor) Existence of secondary side leakage (ie., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generatorpressure or ilie steam genemtor being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources ofsmoke such as* slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities o{smoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage a"oainst ilie station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrurneniation. calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in ilie Control Room, or reports received from plant personneL whichever is most limiting, or oilier evidence that ilie associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1bis protocol is ilie necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators iliat an Emergency Action Level (EM) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in ilie level of severity of ilie RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in ilie level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (R\\'lJS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core ilierrnocouple temperatures). INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without auiliorizatioll LO\\\\'ER EXPLOSIVE LIl\\flT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. LCD, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fimctional perfoIInance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 27 of 53 PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of ilie projectile may be onsite oroffSite. Potential for damage is sufficient to Quse concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the opei-ability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A. RED PATH: Monitoring ofone or more CSFs by ilie EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Stearn Genemtor) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment wiili ilie intent to render ilie equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofilie following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% ilierrnal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% :full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner ~ontroned areas in ilie immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage withinilie PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance wiili demands made on ilie BVPS or one ofits vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt nOIInal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life orheal1h by reason of:inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnoIInal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regan:! to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unrnonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release mtes, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personneL such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or ilie report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timeJy assessment (Le., within 15 minutes). v1SIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable wiiliout measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concem regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: defoIInation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or materiaL ilie failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger ilie public health and safety.by eJqJosure to radiation Revision 14 r Co ~'''--' ( "-. (

I

ProtedSd Area :.:

1 2 3 4 2 3 4 All All FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB-l), Cable Spreading Room (CB-Z), Control Room {CB-3), West Communications Room (CB--6), or Cable Tunnel {CT-l~ resulting in:an evacuation of the cou1rol room per 20M-56C.4 -<<Alternate Safe Smadown" and loss of::m,y required equipment results in an uncontr.oDed RCS He3tup [1 and 1 and 3}

1.

20M-56CA "Alternate Safe Shutdoym" entered

2.

Ops personnel report inability to operate any ofthe fonowing equipment required by 20M-56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 2CHS-P21A lSWS-P21A 2FWE-PZ3A & 2FWE-P2.2 EGS-EG2*1 Black DC> Alternate SID P...el 2SAS-C11A 2ccp*P11A 2llHS*P21A

3.

Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB-l), Cable Spreading Room (CB-Z), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CT-l) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 20M-56C.4..Ai1.ernate Safe SmadqH'n"

1.

20M-56CA Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment [1 andl}

1.

FIRE in any ofthe listed areas in Table 4-1

2.

[a orb]

a.

Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure ill: equipment in listed area due to FIRE

b.

Control room indication of degraded systenJ or component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm All All Refer to Tah 4.1 "Fire" or Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" to Tab 4.l"Fire" or Tab 1 Product Barrier Matrix" in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment [1 andl]

1.

EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2.

[a orb]

a.

Ops persormel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure ill: equipment in listed area

b.

Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION to Tab 4.6"*<:",...,,,..;,,,,, EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those are3S listed in Table 4-1

1.

UNPL.ANl\\'ED EXPLOSION in ill: adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Refer to Tab 4.1, "Fire" or Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab 4.6"Security" TABLE 4-1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS Control Room Diesel Gen. Bldgs Contaimnent Building Inst & Relay Rm 707 Intake Str Cubicles Prim. Auxiliary Building Emerg. Switchgear UlfU2 Cable Tunnel (CV-3) Rod Con1:rol Cable Vault Bldg. Relay Room Safeguards Building Cable Spreading Room 725 Main. Steam Vlv Rm Fuel Building West Communications Room 707 Penetrations Area Service Building ERF Substa & ERF DG Bldg Cable Tunnel 712 Cable Tunnel 735 RWST 2QSS-TK21 Figure 4-A PROTECTED _t\\REA/SITE PERIMETER ~ ~*;",;-"'7ii:~t~~J~y. . EPPII-1b Attachment A M ~ Z ~ .~ ~ C!l § ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ ~ -1 ~ Q.;) J,.,. = OJ) ~ .,......( '" I ~ Q.) ,.Q. ~ N * ~ r.. .,......(* ~ 30 of 53 Revision

1 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA EMERGENCY: SeeEAL4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A gf.ollp of ten (l0) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values wl:rich define that condition (i.ce., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the conditian is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERlON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (tmless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety fimction required to *prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticali1y, Core Cooling, Heat Sink. Vessel Integrity (presSUrized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary sw:rounding the BVPS units beyond which the pos1lllated UFSAR accidents will not result in popul.a1ion doses exyeeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion. or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that :imparts energy of sufficient force to pote:ntially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontro1led decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.. TIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT reCprlred iflarge quantities ofSmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator :knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant persormel, whichever is most limiting. or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed 'lVith 15 minutes (tmless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMJNUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple tempenitures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area 'lVithout authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combusnble gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional perfonnance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 31 of 53 ORANGE PA'fB: Monitoring of one or moreCSFs by the EOPs 'Which indicates that.a CSF is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plaut structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses a1l owner controlled areas within the security Perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-.40... RED PAm: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary Jeakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Dehberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation ofplaut equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFIc:.4.NT TRANSIENT:.A.n UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe fonowing: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thennal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses a1l owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppagewitbin the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance 'lVith demands made on the BVPS or one ofits vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or.action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of nonnal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance 'lVith abnolIDal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., aJ.ann setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (Le., 'lVithin 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable 'lVithout measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: defolIDation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED.A..REA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure 10 radiation Revision 14 (0 Co ~ I

Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or Tab 1 "Fission Product BaTTier Matrix" Matrix" TABLE 4-2 Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Containment BuildJng Safeguards Building Primary Aux. Building Fuel Handling Building Emergency Switchgear Penetrations Area Control Building Ul/u2 Cable Tunnel Service Building (mel. FW Reg Vlv Rm) Turbine Building Primary Intake Structure Diesel Generator Building Demin. Water S1o. (2FWE-TK210) RWST (2QSS-TK2l) Rod Control Cable Vault (inc MSVR) Figure 4-B ONE l\\1ILE RADIUS Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 or Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" NOTE: Wind directions as reported byARERAS and by the NWS are directions which the wind is coming FROM .':'.':-:-:->>:-:-.-:-:_>>:' :<<<<<'.<'. _.':.:->..~.'.'. "....:.....:..........,.:...:...:...,....:......... ~ *.*..:.......:*...',........ "".,'.",',".,".. _.."...........-............ . :;sa EPPII-lb Attachment A N ~ I Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ 7JJ ~ N ~ ~ ~ Q.I,.,. OJ) = ~ N I 0) ,.....0( ,.0 ~ ('f')* Refer to 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility structure which proln"bits safe operation of systems required to establish or maintain coldSfD (1 and 2)

1.

Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within any building listed in Table 4-2

2.

Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessmy to establish and maintain cold shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment All (,A or A. Normal operation of the plant impeded due to access restrict.1ons caused by UNPL..'\\NNED TOXIC GAS concentrations within a facility structure listed in Table 4-2 All B. Confirmed report by local, county,.Q!: state officials that an off site TOXIC GAS release has occurred within one mile of the site with the potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >lower toxicity level (LTL) (Refer to Figure 4-A & 4-B Refer to AOP 112 44A.l "Toxic Gas Release", for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their Release of flammable gas wi1hin a faclIity structure containing safety related equipment or associated.with power prodnct.1on

1.

Plant personnel report the average of three readings taken in a -10ft triangular area is >25% LEL within any building listed in Table 4-2 All (.4. or A. UNPLANNED release of flammable gas within the SITE PERIMETER.

1.

Plant personnel report llie average of three readings taken in a -1 Dft All 1riangular area is >25% LEL within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 4-A) B. Confirmed report by local, county, or state officials that an offslte flammable gas release has occurred wi1hin one mile of the site with potential to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% LEL (refer to Figure 4-A & 4-B) limits. 32 of 53 Revisi 011 14

( Figure 4-C tf' \\c ~~, EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY Cc0 ~, I I I t \\ 33 of 53 Revision 14

EPPII-lb ~ j'MMUWtlli'4"'MIm ~ e_ -- ___l!:Wdi,m Attachment A criterion I Indicator Security event resulting in loss of physical control ofthe facility.

1.

HOSTILE FORCE.has :!Bken control of plant equipment such that plant persormel are unable to operate equipment required to mamtain safety fimctions. All Security event has or is oecurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions needed to protect the public

1. A notification from the site security force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact,.

or other HOSTILE All ACTION is ocCUIring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA. Credible Security event whicb indicates an actual !'! potential substantial degradation in the level ofsafety of the plant [1 or 2 or 3 or 4]

1. A notification from the site security force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact,.

or other HOSTILE All ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). 2.. A validated notification from the NRC, or other credible A.:,oency, of an airliner attack threat less than 30 minutes away.

3. BOMB discovered within a VITAL.AREA

4. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Credible Security event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant [1 or 2]

1. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more ofthe events listed in Table 4-4 All

2. A valid notification from NRC, or other credible Agency, providing information of an aircraft threat Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA All All Evacuation of the control room has been initiated and control of all necessary equipment bas not been established within 15 mmutes of manning the Shutdown Panel [1 and 2]

1.

AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room All Inaccessibility" has been entered

2... Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 minutes ofmanning the shutdown panel Also refer 10 Tab 4.1 "Fire" Evacuation ofthe control room is required

1.

AOP 2.33.1A "ControlRoom inaccessibility" has been entered All Not Applicable All 34 of 53 Events.are :in :process or have occtmed wlrich involve actual or :imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of.containment integrity or security events that result in an aclJJ.aJ. loss ofp'hyskal control ofthe fadJity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective ActionGuide1ine exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDRY. (Refer to 4-C On preceding page) Events are in process or have occurred, which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or security events that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) tUWilTd :rite personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely fa:i1uTe Ofor; (2) prevents liffective access to equipment needed for the protet:JkJn ofthe public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure leVels, which exceed EPA Protective Action Guidel:ine exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDRY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding page) O~ Events are in process or have oectmed, an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant;, or a security event that involves probable lift threatening risk to site personnel or damage to :rite equipment because of intentional malicious dedicated efforts ofHOSTILE ACI10N. Arrf releases are eX'Pected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guidel:ine exposure levels. Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to fadJity protection. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are eX'Pected unless further degradation ofsafety systems occurs. ~

.~,.

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I---- r-I SPEcmc DEFINITIONS HOSTILE ACTION: Any combination of attributes that alone or together indicates a systematic use of violence, terror, deadly force, or intimidation to achieve an end. As used in this context HOSTILE ACTION includes; land based attacks, water borne attacks, air borne attacks, explosive

devices, BOMBs, incendiary devices or projectiles.

Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION does not include acts of CIVIL DISTURBANCE or STRIKE ACTION. These activities should be classified using non-violent basedEALs. Table 4-3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHU1DOWN PANEL One Auxiliary F eedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump One Boric Acid Pump and Bomtion Valve 2CHS*FCVI22 J.aPJe....... SECURITY EVENTS

a.

SABOTAGF1INTRUSION has or is Occurring Between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA-(Figure 4-A)

b.

HOSTAGElEXTORTION Situation That Threatens to Interrupt Plant Operations

c.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing

d.

Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt NOIIDal Plant Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)

e.

A credible site-specific security threat notification. Revision 14 N ~ .~ Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 ~ N <

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t* ~ \\C* ~ tn* ~

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY. SITE AREA EMERGENCY: SeeEAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station opera:ti.onsor activities at the site. Each CRITERION iden1lfies the emergency condition and any numeric values Which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the decIoraticn). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERlON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments 10 be campleted within 15 minutes (miless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exc:eecied. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to, prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containmen1.) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in pcpulation doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combus1ipn, or a catastrophic fuilure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (ie., steam orfeed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Somces of smoke such as 'slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute firf:s. Observation offlame is prefe:rred but is NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOST AGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station lNDICATOR(s): Are available via mstrumentation, calculations, procedure EriiJy (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, teoperatn:res, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant per50Imel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED P A TIl condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATIl TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLlS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core then:nocouple temperatures), INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authori71l.tion. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combnsllble gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BV,PS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 35 of 53 ORANGE PATH: Monitoring,of one *or more CSFs by the EOPs Which indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown. or launched towards.a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offSite, Potential for damage is sufficient to cause conCeal regarding the integrity of the affected structmeor the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A. RED PAm: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs Which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment"or mis-operation ofplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic tmbine runback >25% then:nal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a bOOy *of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioadi.vity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactivel Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direCt observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (ie., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint cbipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREI>. which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fuilure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endan",oer the public health and safety by exposme to radiation Revision 14 ( G CCO i I \\.... (_~I

38 of 53 Fignr:e 5-A EPPII-lb Attachment A Revision 14 N

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== ~ ~ ~ U ~ ~ rJl ~ ~. ~ I tn ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I tn ~

J

~ I-( ~ ~ N

tn

~ tn All All 1 "Fission Product Eardlquake greater than 0.06g acceleration occurs [1 and2}

1.

A seismic event has occmred as indicated by Ann AlO-SH <<!nit of Seismic Exceed Preset andfor Spectral Accelerations"

2.

[a andb}

a.. "OBE" lamp lit on [2ERS-CCC-l],

Seismic Instrumentation Central Control Cabinet (Indicative ofa >.06g acceleration)

b.

Event detemrined to be a valid seismic event as defined by 20M-45BA.F. Also refer to 1120M-53C.4A.75.3 "Acts of Earthquake detected by site seismic instrumentation >6.(11g acceleration [1 and2}

1.

Ann AI0-5H "!nit of Seismic Exceed Preset andfor Spectral Accelerations" indicates initiation of the Accelerograph Recording System

2.

[aorb} a Ground motion sensed by plant personnel

b.

Unit 1 reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation Also refer to 1120M-53G.4A75.3 "Acts of Nature-Earthquake " All All Refer to Matrix" Matrix" Tornado!!!: high wind strikes any structure Osted in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage[l and2} I. Tornado QI high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1

2.

[a orb}

a.

Confumed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b.

Control room indications ofdegraded safety system QI component response within listed structures due to event Tornado within the PERIMETER

1.

Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A) Site Perimeter ";.J~ .... **L~'*ifJ;

- ,~~j~;t*

Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With TomadolHi \\Vind and Aircraft EALs Containment Building Control Bldg Safeguards Building Cable Vault and Rod Control Bldg Primary Aux. Building Main Steam Valve Room Fuel Handling Building Main Intake Structure RWST (2QSS-TK21) Demin. Water Sto. (2FWE-TK-2 24 ton C02 unit Diesel Generator Building Service Building (inel. FW Reg Vlv Rm)

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENER-4.L EMERGENCY. SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs byfue BOPs which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge. BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which dejine that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by fue Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments 10 be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (E.t.,L) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY CEAB): A boundary surrOlJllding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding fue criteria of 10 CPR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A E.."XPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combUstion. or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts* energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components E..XTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (Le., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator beingcampletely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required ifla'rge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage againstthe station to ensure that demands will be met by the station lNDlc..4..TOR(s): Are available via instrumentation. calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator kno'Wledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant persormel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1bis protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Roam Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS.. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (R VLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorizatiolL LOWER EXPWSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustJ.ble gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO. LThflTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fimctional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thro'lVll, or launched towards a plant structure. The source offue projectile may be onsite orofl'site. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses an owner controned areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the BOPs which indicates that a CSF is tmder extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injectiolL SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) E1ectricalload rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses an owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A wolk stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of wolkers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one ofits vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt nonnal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnonnal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With spedfic regard to radioactivity releases. a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, lJIlIDonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redtmdant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, fue condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (ie., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing. or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: defonnation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration. mpture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping" scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fuilure, destruction. or release of which could direcfly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation r r (0 39 of 53 Revision 14

1 "Fission Barrier " Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in structural damage [1 and2]

1.

Plant per50mel report aircraft Q!: PROJECTILE has impacted any structure listed in Table 5-1 on previous page

2.

[a orbJ a Confumed report of any VISIBLE DAMA.GE to specified structures

b.

Control Room indications of degraded safety system Q!: component response (w:ifbi.n listed structures) due to event Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER I. Plant persomel report aircraft crash Q!: PROJECTILE impact within the SITE PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on previous page) Refer to ALL Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Watercraft strikes primary intake structure and results in a reduction of Service Water flow [land 2J I, Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck the primary intake structure

2.

SWS flow reduction indicated by sustamed pressure reduction to <30 psig on 2SWS PI-113A and/or 113B toAOP 2.30.1 "Loss AttA

N

~ I Z ~ ~ 0 Z ~

== ~ .~ ~ ~ U ~ .~

~

00 ~ .~ Mat:rix" to Tab 1 "Fission Barrier Mat:rix" River water level> 705 Ft mean sea level [1 or 2J

1.

ILR-CW-IOI. if accessible, indicates >705 mean sea level

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-262-1882) ALL Q!: Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool Lower Gauge Reading >52.48 Ft Note Mean Sea Level Lower Gauge Reading + 652.52Ft River water level>700 Ft Mean Sea Level [1or2J

1.

ILR-CW-IOI indicates> 700 Ft Mean Sea Level ALL

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-262-1882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lower Pool Lower Gauge Reading >47.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level Lower Gauge Reading. + 652.52Ft Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Mat:rix" . River water level < 650 Ft Mean Sea Level [1 or 2J

1.

ILR-CW-IOI indicates <650 Pt Mean Sea Level ALL

2.

National Weather Bureau (412-262-1882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) Reports Montgomery Lower Pool Lower Gauge Reading < -2.52 Ft Note Mean Sea Level = Lower Gauge Reading + 652.52 Ft River water level < 654' Ft Mean Sea Level [1 or 2J

1. ILR-CW-10l indicates < 654 Ft Mean Sea Level ALL'

2. National Weather Bureau (412-262-1882) or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400)

Reports Montgomery Lower Pool Lower Gauge Reading <+1.48 Ft Note: Mean Sea Level== Lower Gauge Reading + 652.52 Ft 40 of 53 Revision ]4

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT. GENERAL EJ\\1ERGENC\\'~ SI1E AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs ;which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVlL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the* emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based.on an assessment (i.e., determination* that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that 1he CRITERJON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAt) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFElY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcritica1ity, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). E.,~CLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (E..o\\B): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 1 00. Refer to Figure 7-A. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic fuilure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attemptto cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light.. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Enlry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant persormel whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAt) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). lNTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL):* Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 41 of 53 indicates that a CSF is under severe cluillenge. PROJECllLE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding *the integrity of the affected structure or1he operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on F:igure 4-A. RED PAm: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that aCSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Stearn Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Dehoerate damage, mis-aligmnent, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render 1he equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more ofthe following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one ofits vendors. The STIliKE ACTION must 1hreaten to interrupt nOTIIlal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of nOIlllal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with ahnOlIIlal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). hnplicit in this definition are unintentional releases, urunonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or dischaIge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMA.GE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Dama,,<>e is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Fxample. damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, pene1ration, rupture, cracking. paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction., or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation Revision 14 ( I~ '.,~- (0 '~ l

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJJuenls" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that bas or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel [1 and]}

1.

[a orb}

a.

Loss ofRES m: CCP or SWS

b. Loss ofRCS Inventory with inadequate makeup

2.

[a andb}

a.

Ops personnclreport 2RCS-LI-I02, LR-I02 RCS level :instrumentation elfava.ilable) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches

b. Other corrfumed indications offuel uncovery Not Applicable Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with inadequate make-up

[1 andl}

1.

Ops persormcl report 2RCS-LI-I02, LR-I02 RCS level instrumentation :in the Control Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 inches

2.

Ops report inability to make-up RCS inventory Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJJuents" Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown [J and]}

1.

UNPLANNED Loss of RES or CCP m: SWS

2.

[a orb ore} 5

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if 6 available) indicate 'the temperature has increased >I 0 F and has exceeded 200F.

b.

(wIRHS in service) RES inlet temperature has :increased > I 0 F and has exceeded 200 F.

c.

(w/o CETCs or RES), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is ~~1-.~';_~ :in the Rx vessel temperature increase of more than 10 F [1 and]}

1.

UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP m: 5 SWS 6

2.

[a or b or e}

a.

Core exit thermocouples (CETC) available) indicate the temperature has increased> 10 F

b.

(WIRHS in service) RES inlet temperature has increased> 1 0 F

c.

(w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 15 minutes 5 6 5 6 Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJJuents" UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC power for>15 minutes L AE DF 4KV emergency buses not energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" UNPLANNED loS's of aU offsite power supply for >15 minutes [1 andl}

1.

Offsite power supply to AE and DF 4KV buses unavailable for > 15 minutes.

2.

Either diesel generator is supplying power to its respective emergency bus 5 6 De. Fuel 5 6 De Fuel 5 6 De Fuel AHA M ~ z o p.... ~ ~ ~ to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJJuents" Co-' .~ ~ 00 ~ ~ E 00 00> 'Z .~ Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss ofShutdown Systems" o ~ E ~ 00

== UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for>15 minutes [J or 2}

1.

2.

Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 2-3 for >15 minutes iftrain A is the priority train Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 2-4 for>15 minutes iftrain B is the priority train ~ \\0 44 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by fueEOPs which EMERGENCY: SeeEAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF ls under severe challenge. BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station*Operations or activities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis ofthe declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is V.Al.Il1) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol ls the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being aVBila.ble to Control Roam operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAt) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (preSsurized ThermoJ Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). E..XCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in populanoI\\ doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. E..XPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combllStion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment lhat imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures., systems or components E..'ITORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (ie., stearn or feed line ruptnre) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Somces of smoke such as: slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute

1l.res. Observation off1ame ls preferred butls NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure th~t demands will be met by the stafion INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation., calculations, procedure Enlly (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever ls most limiting, or 01ber evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1hls protocolls the necessity for these asl'>essments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTNE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) andlor decreasing trend on core thennocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONJINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which PROJECflLE: An object ejected., thrown, or launched towards a pIant structure. The source ofthe projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage ls sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A. RED PATII: Monitoring ofone or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF ls under extreme challenge. RUPTIJRED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Dehberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation ofplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:(l) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection> 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enfurce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt nonnal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that ls dangerollS to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action ls UNPLANNED ifit ls not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnonnal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alann setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition ls considered to be VALID when it ls conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redtmdant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy ls removed. Implicit in this definition ls the need for timely assessment (Le., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAM.AGE: Damage to equipment or structnre that ls readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component E.xample damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA ls any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains o (0 combushble gases will not explode due to ignition. equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the safety by exposure to radiation BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fimctiona1 performance level lie for equipment required for safe shutdown. 45 of 53 Revision 14

Refer 10 Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJJuents" EPPlI-lb Attachment A M ~ I z o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ INTENTIONALLY BLJ\\'NK 00 ~ ~ E 00 00 Z ~ o ~ E ~

== 00 Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Major damage to irradiated fuel; ~ loss of water level that bas or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel [1 and2]

1.

VALID HIGH alann on 2RMF-RQ202 [1031], 2HVR-RQ104AIB [1024, 1028], 2R.MF-RQ301AIB [1032,2032],.QI 2RMR RQ203 [1025]

2.

[a orb]

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has Q! will exceed available makeup capacity such that i.rra.d.iated fuel will be uncovered 10 Tab 6.2 for In-vessel UNPLANNED loss ofwater level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered

[1 and 2 and 3]

l. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal

2.

VALID HIGH a1ann on 2RMR-RQ203 [1025] QI2RMF-RQ-202 [1031]

3.

Fuel remains covered with water Inadvertent reactor criticality Nuclear instrumentation indicate unanticipated sustained positive 3 startup rate 4 5 6 NotApplicable \\0* \\0 If)* \\0 46 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSU_4.L EVENT, GENERAL El\\IERGENCY. SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which ' EMERGENCY: SeeEAL4.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently protesting station operations or acti:v:ities at the site. Each CRITERION identifies file emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis o/the dec1aralion). All ".'"if.. classifications are based *on an assessment (i.e., determination that the .condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERlON has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat sink, Vessel Integrity (preSsurized ThernuJl Shock), Integrity (Containment) and InventOIy (RCS), EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary SllITmmding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment 1hat imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (ie., steam or feed line rupt:m:e) that results in an Wlcontroned decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is Nor required if1arge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed. HOsTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDIC.-\\TOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in 1his protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or.decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combusuble gases 'Will not explode due to ignition. Leo, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fimctional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. indicates that a CSF is Wlder severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or laWlched tow.ardsa plant structure. The source of the projectile may he onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A. RED PAm: Monitoring of one or more CSFs*bythe EOPs which indicates that aCSF is Wlder extreme cru.:nenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or canse a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the fonowing: (1) Automatic turbine rWlback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses*1I11 owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A woIk stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of work-ers to enfbrce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXI C GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnonnal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been au1borized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Wlintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., ala:rm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check" or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant persormel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in 1his definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISffiLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readfly observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected 'Safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rup1llre, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation ,n (\\to \\~ 47 of 53 Revision 14 I I

EPPII-1b TABLE 7-1 Attachment A EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified dose projectioY.Jiassessment, as listed at the bottom ofeach column. Ifthe assessment cannot.be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutesfor UE), the declaration shall be made based on the Not Applicable All All All All EAB dose resulting from an aetnal or ilnminent Rdease or gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mR TEDE m: 5000 mR child 1byroid CDE for the 1Ictnalgr projected duration of1lie release [1 or2or 3} . 1. A VALID gas effluent nd monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 4 afTable 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indical.e EAB dose >1000 mR ~'Y for the actual orproject.ed duration of the release

3.

EPP dose projection results indical.e EAE dose >1000 mR TEOE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or project.ed duration of the release EAB dose resulting from an aetnal or release of gaseous radioac:tiv1ty that exceeds 100 . mR TEDE Q!. SOO mR child thyroid CDE for the Jletnal !!!. projected duration of the release [1 or2 od}

1.

A VALID gas effiuent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 3 afTable 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless dose projections,,>jthin this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NQI. exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate RAE dose >100 mR ~-'Y for the actual or projected duration of the release

3.

EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose >100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration ofthe release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 200 times T.S. 5.5.2 I Offslte Dose Calculation Manual Limit for IS minutes [1or2or3} I. A VALID gas effiuent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for >IS minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Fic:ld survey results indicate >10 mRIhr l3-y at the EAE for>15 minutes

3.

EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose >10 mR TEDE for the: duration of,the release Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radloacthity that exceeds 2 times T.S. 5.5.2 I Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 minutes [1 or2or 3}

1.

A VALID gas effiuent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7*1 for >60 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Field survey results indicate >0.1 mRIhr I3'Y at the RAE for >60 minutes

3.

EPP dose projection results indicate EAE dose >0.1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Not Applicable Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times T_So 5.5.2 I Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 minutes [1or2}

1.

A VALID liquid effiuent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless dose projections within this timc period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded All

2.

Sample results exceed 200 times T.S. 5.5.210fi'sitc Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an umnonitored release of liquid radioactivity> 15 minutes in duration Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times T.S. 5..5..Z I Olfsite Dose Calculation :Manual Limit for 60 minutes [J or2}

1.

A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless dose projections within tills time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded

2.

Sample results exceed 2 times the T.S. S.5.210ffsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60 minutes in duration VALID reading. NOTE: These monitors have the ability to divert or terminate effluent flow. Ensure that a release:is in progress prior to using the EAL's. Column I UE Column 2 Alert Colmnn3 Site Column 4 General nla uCi/m1 nla uCilcc nla uCilcc nla uCi/sec nla cpm nla cprn Ifa RWDA (Batch Release) is Appllcable 2SGC-RQlOO II065] . 2HVS-RQlOIB 12039] RBC Purge iHVS-RQI09B LR [2040] RBC Purge 2HVS-RQl09E Eff[5040] RBC Purge "' RM-IGW-lOSB (GWST) RM-IGW-I09 Channel 5 (GWS1) 2x the ODeM Limit 2.28E..Q3 uCilrnI 1.48E-04 uCi/cc 636E-04 uCi/cc 2.26E+03 uCilsec 7.86E+OS cpm nla cpm 200x tbe ODCM Limit nla uCilrnI 1.48E-02 uCi/cc 6.36E-02 uCilcc 2.26E+05 uCi/sec nil! cpm nla cpm nla uCilrnI nil! uCi/cc nla uCilcc nla uCi/scc nla cpm nil! cpm For All Other UnRlanned Releases 2x the ODCM Limit 6.02E--04 uCilcc 2.12E--04 uCi/cc nil!. uCi/cc nla uCilcc 5.88E+03 uCilsec 6.30E-03 uCilcc 5.16E-02 uCilcc 3.22E-03 uCilcc nla uCilcc nla uCi/sec 2.28E-03 uCilrnI 8.60E-OS uCihnJ 8.60E-OS uCi/rn1 200x the ODeM LImit 6.02E--02 uCilcc 2.12E-Ol uCilec nla uCilcc nil!. uCi/cc S.88E+05 uCilsec nil!. uCi/cc nil! uCi/cc 3.22E-Ol uCi/cc nil!. uCi/cc nil!. uCi/sec nla uCi/ml 8.60E-03 uCilml 8.60E-03 uCi/ml 1.67E-0l uCilcc 8.13E..Q2 uCi/cc 7.26E-02 uCi/cc nla uCilcc 1.95E+06 uCi/sec nil!. uCi/cc nla uCi/cc nla uCi/cc 4.65E-Ol uCi/cc l.32E+06 uCi/sec nla uCi/rn1 nil! uCi/ml nil!. uCi/ml nla uCilcc nil!. uCi/cc 7.26E-OI uCi/cc 6.45E-Ol uCi/cc 1.95E+07 uCi/sec nil! uCi/cc nla uCi/cc nil!. uCi/cc 4.6SE+OO uCilcc 1.32E+07 uCi/sec nla uCi/rn1 nla uCi/rn1 nla uCi/rn1 SLCRS Unfibered PatbwaI (also called Ventilation Vent) 2HVS-RQI0IB [2039] SLCRS Filtered PatbwaI (also called Elevated Release) 2HVS-RQl D9B LR [2040] 2HVS-RQlO9C MR [3040] 2HVS-RQ109D HR [4040] 2HVS-RQI09E Eff [5040] Decontamination Building Vent 2RMQ-RQ30lB [2033] Waste Gas Storage Vault Vent 2RMQ-RQ303B [2037] Condensate Polishing Building Vent 2HVL-RQ112B [2013] Main Steam Reliefs 2MSS-RQI01Afl0lBIl0IC [1005/300515005] 2MSS-RQIOIAflOlBIlOIC Eff [2005/4005/6005] Liquid Emuent Pathways 2SGC-RQI00 [1065] 2SWS-RQIOl [1068] 2SWS-RQI02 [1067] N ~ C) Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u ts o o ~ ~ ~ ~ -.a m I.. N* I Minimum Release Duration 60 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes 't""* Assessment Method for Gaseous Release 1I2*HPP*03.06.012 II2-HPP-03.06.013 l/2-HPP-03.0S.0 12 II2-HPP-03.0S.0 13 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.x 112-EPP-IP-2.6.x 112-EPP-IP*2.6.x Assessment Method for Liquid Release 1/2-EPP-IP-2.7 l/2-EPP-IP-2.7.1 II2-EPP-IP-2.7.1 50 of 53 Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT. UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA. EMERGENCY: SeeEALf\\.7 BOMB: A fused explosive device. CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (1 0) or more persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. Ell:ch CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination thaJ the condition is VALID) by the EmeIgeIlCY Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room opetatoIS that an EmeIgeIlCY Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to!prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the enviromnent There are six CSFs: Subcriticality,Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (COnlainmerd.) and Inventory (RCS). EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrOlnlCnng the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CPR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A. EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to po~y damage permanent structures, systems or components EA.'TORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat offorce. FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontroned decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as,slipping drive belts or oveihea.ted electrical equipment do not constitnte fires. Observation offlame is preferred bnt is NOT required iflarge quantities ofsmoke and heat are observed HOST AGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatnres, etc,) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel., whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Roam Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PAW condition within 15 minutes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core thermocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combusllble gases will not explode due to ignition. LCD, LIMITING CONDmON FOR OPER...\\.TION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum fimctional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. 51 of53 ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of,one or more CSFs by the EOPs "Which indicates that a CSF is under.severe challenge. PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant s1:ructure. The source of the projectile may be onsite oroffsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to causeconcem regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment.contained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controned areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPmRED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the fonowing: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrica110ad rejection >25% full electrical load.; (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controned areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of wo:dcers to enfurce compliance with demands made on the B VPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXI C GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ofinhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnOlmal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel., such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISffiLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structnre that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continlL.-"'rl operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation Revision (.. ) t} ,(0

~

Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EjJluents" to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Tab 7.1 "GaseousEjJluents" UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the faciIlty that impedes safe operations ~ establishment or maintenance ofcold shutdown [1 or 2J

1.

VALID area radiation monitor readings QI All survey results exceed 15 mRIbr in the Control Room lRMC-RQ201/202 [1069/1072] or PAP 2RMS-RQ223 [1071} for>15 minutes

2.

[aandbJ

I.

VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2

b.

Access restrictions impede operation of systems necessary for safe operation or the ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown increase in radiation levels within the racllity

1.

VALID area radiation monitor readings increase -by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes Note: In either the UE or ALERT EAL. the ED TmLSt All determine the =e ofincrease in rodiation levels and review other CRITERIAlINDlCATORS for applicability (e.g., a dose rote of 15 mRIhr in the Control Room could be =edby a release associaJed with a more significant event). All Refer to 7.1 Major damage to irradiated fuel;.!!!: loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel [1 and2J

1.

VALID HIGH al.an:n on 2RMR-RQ203 [1025] or 2RMF-RQ202 [1031} or 2RMF RQ301 NB [103212032} or 2HVR RQ104A1B [10241 1028}

2.

[a orbJ

a.

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b.

Plant personnel report water level drop bas or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In vessel Uncovery UNPLANNED loss or watf>.r level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with ruel remaining covered [1 and 2 and 3]

1.

Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel poolm: reactor cavity, m: transfer canal

2.

VALID HlGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 [1025] or 2RMF-RQ202 [1031]

3.

Fuel remains covered with water Table7~2 Areas Associated 'Vitb EAL 7.3 L-oCATION INDICATOR READING 730' Service Bldg (H2 Analyzers) Survey Results >WO mRlhr general area PASS Cubic1e(735' PAB) RMP-RQ-204 [1050J > 1 00 mRlhr general area Chern Sample Panel(718' PAB) RMP-RQ-210 [1059J > 1 00 mRlhr general area 737' Safeguards (H2Control System Operations) RMR-RQ-205A,B [1022,1023] >100 mRlhr general area 741' Safeguards{Safe SimtdOMl Valves) Survey Results >100 mRIhr general area 738'Cable VauIt{RHRSuction Valves) Survey Results 773' PAB(WRGMSampling) Survey Results 788' Main Steam &Cab1e Vault Survey Results Alternate ShutdoMl.Panel Room Survey Results > 1 00 mR/hr general area > 1 00 mRlhr general area >100 mRlhr general area >100 mRlbr general area West Cable Vault (73 0') Survey Results >I00 mRlbr general area A Penetrations (713') Survey Results >5 RIbrgeneral area C&D Penetrations (718') Survey Results > 1 00 mRlhr general area Cable Vault (755') Survey Results >100 mRIhr general area CNMT Instr Air Room (773') Survey Results > 1 00 mRlbr general area AElDF Switchgear Survey Results >100 mRlhr general area Turbine Bldg 735' West Survey Results >100 mRlhr general area EDG2-1,2-2 Survey Results >5 RIbr general area EPPiI-lb Attachment A N ~ \\-' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U 100-( Figure 7-A o ~ EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY o ~ ~ ~ 1= r-(I)....

I C)

IT: ~- ..0 ~ ~ ri 52 of Revision 14

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT. GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE AREA ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that.a CSF is under severe cballenge. BOMB: A fused explosive device. CML DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently JJl;otesting station operations or activities at the site. El,lCh CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All ~i:fications are based on an assessment (i.e., determinaJion tlud the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has bfren met or exceeded. :Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for *these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of inffications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency ACtion Level (EAL) has been exceeded. ciuTICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to!prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six. CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (PresSUrized Themuzl Shock),.Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS). E.."lCCLUSION ARK<\\, BOUNDARY (E.<\\B): A boundary smrounding the B'v'PS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A E..\\:PLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic fiilure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to p~tentially damage permanent structures, systems or components mORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station bythreatofforce. F~ULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., stearn or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontroDed decrease in steam gerierator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light Sources of smoke such as' slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute ~es. ObserVation offlame is preferred but is NOT required iflarge quantities O~~llloke and heat are observed. HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station Th"1)ICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calcula.tions, procedl.lre Eritry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, teIhperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant persorme1, Whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these asseSsments to be completed with 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration. action(s) does not r!!$ult in a reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 IDinntes from identification ofthe Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATII TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor vessel water level (RVLIS full range) andlor decreasing trend on core thetmocouple temperatures). INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. LO\\VER EXPLOSIVE LlMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. LeO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the B \\lpS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown. PROJECTILE: 1m object ejected, thrown, or launched towards.a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential for damage is sufficient to cause concem regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability ofsafety equipment cont.ained therein. The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled. areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence ofprimary to secondary leakage ofa magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection. SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-aligrnnent, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the fonowing: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electricalloa~ (3) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A. STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enfurce compliance with demands made on 1he BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered. TOXIC GAS: A gas that is ~oerous to life or health by reason ofinhaIation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED ifit is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnoIDIal or emergency procedl.lres are UNPLANNED. With.:specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if it has not been aufuorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Aufuor.i7.ation (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, unmonitored. releases, or planned. releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, minimmn dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, andlor discharge of incorrect tank). VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes). VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structnre that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or CClIIIponent Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, comPonents, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation () ( I; ~O ~. 53 of 53 Revision 14}}

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:U01821, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML102510196, ML102510217, ML102510235, ML102510316, ML102650433, ML102650445, ML102650459, ML111680049
MONTHYEAR2010-07-03 [Table View]

ML102510235

Text

6.0 REFERENCES

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