ML100740264
| ML100740264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 02/24/2010 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2009-0214, MA-AA-716-004, Rev 7 | |
| Download: ML100740264 (22) | |
Text
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 - - Deleted: Revision 6 Page 25 of 36 f ATTACHMENT 2 Complex Troubleshooting (Troubleshooting Data Sheet)
Page 1 of 5 - Rev.4 IR No: 00907846 Station: Oyster Creek WR or AR No: A2222268 System: 424 - Condensate Transfer System WO No: C2021071, C2021073 Component/ETN: __
Operating Conditions: 100% Power Initial Problem Statement: Measurements from the ESW Vault and water well (MW-K1 5-1A) indicate that there is a leak of water from the CST.
A Troubleshooting Team was formed to identify sources of leaks from the CST to the ground. This was postulated because the measurements of tritium found in the well (MW-K15-1A) were 4.5 x 106 pCi/I. This measurement of activity it similar to the water found in the CST. Using Oyster Creek Topical Report 116- "Oyster Creek Underground Piping Program Description and Status" a list of high probability piping locations were selected.
I p[nvoleArpropriate Personnel: - - - I Deleted: ¶ 0] Engineering: [I Corporate: __
0] Op's: __ [] Work Week Manager: _
0] Maintenance: __ E] Project Manager. __
0] Vendor: Structural Integrity Assoc. E] Other Sites: __
I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - JDeleted: I Personnel Knowledgeable of the Problems:
NAME DEPARTMENT TELEPHONE NUMBER Is equipment Quarantine Req'd ONO EYES (if yes what equipment?)
I - --- 6f__- --- ------- -- -- JDeleted:¶$
Sequences of Events/Time Line:
REQ'D [I YES (Attach) 0 NO Critical Component Impacted 0 YES El NO Reviewed By: ___ Ap proved By: __
Ifthe complex troubleshooting plan cannot be completed with high confidence document decision to continue operations in Operational Technical Decision Making (OTDM) in accordance with OP-AA-106-101-1006 Troubleshooting Team Lead __ OTDM #
,Revision 7 _ - Deleted: Revision 6 Page 26 of 36 ATTACHMENT 2 Complex Troubleshooting (Troubleshooting Data Sheet)
Page 2 of 5 Document troubleshooting results identifying failed component and failure mode and the basis for high confidence (How physical evidence supports defined failed components and failure modes and refutes other potential failures.
Troubleshooting Team Lead _ Date__
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 fDeleted: Revision 6 Page 27 of 36 ATTACHMENT 2 Complex Troubleshooting (Troubleshooting Data Sheet)
Page 3 of 5 Data Gathering Checklist (Check box for data attached)
Internal Sources:
Documentation Recorded Data Z Interviews Z Operating Logs El Correspondence El Maintenance Work Packages and Records
[] Internal Sources 0 Inspection Records El Industry Bulletins El Equipment History Records El EPIX Records El Strip Chart Recordings E] OPEX Records El Trend Chart Recordings 0 Procedures and Instructions E] Sequence of Event Recorders E] Vendor Manuals 0 Radiological Surveys Z Drawings and Specifications El Plant Parameter Readings Z Sample Analysis and Results 0 Post Maintenance/Mod Test Results E] Design Basis Information E] Previous CRs External Sources:
El Written Statements El Correspondence El PRA El Industry Bulletins El Part 21 Records 0 Vendor Contacts
[] Recent Mods to SSC El NRC NRR Suggested TopicslQuestions to Support Failure Modes Analyses El What is the purpose/function of the 0 When did the failure(s) occur? How do you know for system/component? sure?
El How is the system/component designed to El Could the unwanted energy (e.g., motive power, work? control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.)
have been deflected or evaded?
El How does the system/component really work? 0 Have all reasonable failure modes been identified?
E] What components are potentially involved? El Were adequate human factors considered in the design of the equipment?
El How is the system/component supposed to 0 Have similar failures occurred before at Exelon be operated? stations or the industry?
E] How is the system/component really El Is the system/component properly labeled for ease of.
operated? operation?
El Are vendor operation and maintenance El How was the failed component maintained?
recommendations followed?
El Is there sufficient technical information for El What is the maintenance history for the operating the component properly? system/component?
El What is the operating history for the El Is there sufficient technical information for maintaining system/component? the component properly?
E] What form of energy (e.g., motive power, 0 Did the environment (e.g., humidity, vibration, etc.)
control, power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, have an effect on the problem?
etc.) caused the first component/subcomponent to fail?
El What form of energy (e.g., motive power, El Could the commercial grade dedication process have control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, contributed to the failure(s)?
etc.) caused the second, third, etc.,
component/subcomponent to fail?
El Was this energy (e.g., motive power, control El Could this failure affect the opposite train/unit? If not, power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) why?
supposed to be present or was it undesirable?
El What failed first? El Is this failure also on the opposite train/unit? What is the difference? Why is it different?
E] Could something have failed earlier than the time of the event?
El Did any thing else fail as a result of the first failure?
El What barriers existed between the energy (e.g., motive power, control power, instrument air, hydraulic fluid, etc.) and the first failure?
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Page 29 of 36 ATTACHMENT 2 Complex Troubleshooting (Failure Mode Tree)
Page 4 of 5 PROBLEM Measurements from the ESW Vault and adjacent water well indicate that there is a leak of water from the CST.
A-4: 6" Line - A-2: 6" Line - SS-4: 8" Line- CS-26: 1" Line-Condensate system Condensate system Hotwell level Hotwell level control to Hotwell level to Hotwell level control system to system to the control system leaks control system leaks the Hotwell (Trench Condensate Pump (Trench # 1) (Trench #1) #1) Seals (Trench #1)
High Priority: GW Ruled out Ruled Out: Low Priority: This line testing indicated pipe Piping was re-routed GW inspection did not is isolated from the TB degradation. ECR above ground by a indicate pipe and the CTB, by the TCCP will be previous modification degradation. following valves: V implemented to jumper 23, -802, -801, and -25.
out section of suspected Air Bleed off test will be section of piping using performed to confirm stopple valves. presence of leak.
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Deleted: 6 Page 5 of 22 PROBLEM Measurements from the ESW Vault and water well (MW-K15-1A) indicate that there is a leak of water from the CST.
FAILURE MODES FAILURE MODE 7 CS-24: 10" Line - CS-38: I" Line- CS-27: CST and CST Tank Itself Hotwell level (CRD 150 psig) - Demin Storage control system to ASME XI - Class 3 Water Tanks the Hotwell (Trench - Code Case N-523 Overflow lines
- 1)
Ruled Out: GW Low Priority: Due to (1) Ruled out A new sample well will location of positive sample be located between the inspection did not results for Tritium; (2) line is Pipe is void, indicate likely piping stainless steel. New deep depressurized, and CST and the well where degradation. wells around the CST will open ended in the TB. Tritiated water was bound the leak which might No water was found in found (MW-15K-lA).
be able to rule this line out. CST internal inspection Revisit this. the TB during the will be pulled up and Pipe cannot be tested. walkdown performed Excavation of site can provide performed visual inspection of line. on 04/17/09
MA-AA-716-004 Revisions7 ..... - " Deleted: 6 -
Page 6 of 22 PROBLEM Measurements from the ESW Vault and water well (MW-K15-1A) indicate that there is a leak of water from the CST.
FALURE .MOD FAILURE MODE 044 'FAILURE MOD)E 12 Leak in penetrations Leak in the CST Leak of the CTB Leak in the transfer in the Condenser yard from above sump line connecting the Bay ground piping CTB sump to the TB 1-3 sump Ruled Out - Operations Ruled Out - Operations Ruled Out. Low Priority: Presently performed a Condenser Bay performed a walkdown of the sump is dry. During the last dive to visually inspect piping yard around the CST to Presently sump is dry. few months, Operations penetrations on the Turbine determine if there were any Operations performed reported only small amounts Building West Wall for visual or physical evidence of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> leak test of of water being pumped out indications of leakage coming a leak in the yard. The results from the sump. Walkdown into the Condenser Bay. No of the walkdown determined sump with no loss of performed to determine if any leakage was found. that there were no indications level. active water is gravity of a leak at that l6cation. draining through this line.
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Deleted: 6 Page 7 of 22 PROBLEM Measurements from the ESW Vault and water well (MW-K15-1A) indicate that there is a leak of water from the CST.
FAILURE, M-'.,ODE1.
FALREM~tODE44 FA16URE ,MODE 15 FAILURE MODE 16 Leak in conduit to A-2 6" Al: Condensate. A-3 6" Al: Fuel the ESW vault Transfer from Turbine Pool Cooling line to Building to pipe tunnel Fuel Pool Filter in to the Reactor Building Radwaste Ruled Out - There is Ruled Out: Due to location Ruled Out: Due to location of tritiated water found and of tritiated water found and no water source location of this section of location of this section of located near the buried pipe for following buried pipe for following conduit reasons: (1) no direct reasons: (1) no direct pathway from south side of pathway from south side of RB to tritiated well; (2) long RB to tritiated well; (2) long distance would result in a distance would result in a slow, steady rise in slow, steady rise in concentration not the step concentration not the step change seen change seen
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 --- Deleted: 6 Page 8 of 22 ATTACHMENT 2 Complex Troubleshooting (Failure Mode / Cause Table)
Page 5 of 5 Failure Mode No. 1 Description A-4: 6" Line - Condensate system to Hotwell level control system leaks (Trench #1)
Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed. not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Engineering Degradation / Failureof the A-4 1) Perform Guide Wave Testing from excavation No Leakage GW indicates OPEN 6" Piping 2) Perform Guided Wave from Inside identified potential leakage Condensate Building
- 3) Excavate below the Condensate Transfer Building
- 4) ECR will jumper out the suspected length of piping and then perform and pressure drop test on the line.
MA-AA-716-004 Revision,7._ - - Deleted: 6 Page 9 of 22 Failure Mode No. 2 Description A-2: 6" Line - Condensate system to Hotwell level control system leaks (Trnch #1)
Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Maintenance Degradation/Failure of the A-2: No Leakage No Leakage CLOSED 6" line Ruled Out Piping was re-routed above ground by identified identified a previous modification
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 - Deleted: 6 Page 10 of 22 Failure Mode No. 3 Description SS-4: 8" Line - Hotwell level control system to the Hotwell (Trench #1)
Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Maintenance Degradation/Failure of the SS-4 1) Perform Guide Wave Testing from excavation 1) No Indications CLOSED 8" line of Pipe wall GW testing
- 2) Perform Guided Wave from Inside de-gradation, showed no Condensate Building strong evidence
- 2) No Indications of pipe wall of Pipe wall degradation degradation.
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Deleted: 6 Page 11 of 22 Failure Mode No. 4 Description CS-26: 1" Line - Hotwell level control system to the Condensate Pump Seals (Trench)
Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed. not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Maintenance Degradation of the CS-26 1" line No leakage OPEN
- 1) Pressure test the Line identified
MA-AA-716-004 Revision .7 -( Deleted: 6 1 Page 12 of 22 Failure Mode No. 5 Description CS-26: 1" Line - Hotwell level control system to the Condensate Pump Seals (Trench)
Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system operation as designed, not as failed Status Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Maintenance Degraded/Failed CS-24 10" line 1) Perform Guide Wave Testing from excavation No Indications of GW testing CLOSED Pipe wall showed no
- 2) Perform Guided Wave from Inside de-gradation. strong evidence Condensate Building of pipe wall degqradation
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 -( Deleted: 61 Page 13 of 22 Failure Mode No. 6 Description CS-38: 1"Line - (CRD 150 psig) - ASME Xl - Class 3 - Code Case N-523 Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Engineering Degraded/Failed CS-38 1" line No leakage OPEN
- 1) Excavate and perform visual inspection identified
- 2) Perform ECR to re-route flow to water quality line (potential)
I-
MA-AA-716-004 Revisions7 ........ - - ( Deleted: 6 Page 14 of 22 Failure Mode No. 7 Description CS-27: CST and Demin Storage Water Tanks Overflow lines Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Operations Degraded/Failed demin storage No Leakage No Leakage CLOSED water tanks overflow lines Ruled out Line is void and open ended in the TB. identified identified No water found in the TB Basement during walkdown.
MA-AA-716-004 I Deleted: 6 Revision 7 Page 15 of 22 Failure Mode No. 8 Description CST Tank Itself Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below .*Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed. not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expe~ted Actual Tank degradation 1) New well OPEN
- 1) Two new sample wells located:1) directly Low Tritium directly west of west of the CST; 2) SW of the CST. levels the tank shows high level of tritium consistent with CST Failure Mode No. 8 Description CST Tank Itself Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Deleted: 6 Page 16 of 22 Tank degradation New well directly OPEN
- 2) Install moisture sensing instrumentation in Low Tritium west of the tank the tank. levels shows high level sof troirum
- 3) UT Inspect the bottom with a diver
- 4) Bore a hole in the concrete based of the tank skirt base of the tanks and then sample any water under the tank.
Failure Mode No. 11 Description Leak of the Condensate Transfer Building (CTB) sump Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected I Actual
MA-AA-716-004 Revision_7 .- Deleted: 6 Page 17 of 22 Sump degradation Water level in Water level in CLOSED
- 2) Fill the sump and see if the level drops Failure Mode No.. 12 Description Leak in the transfer line connecting the CTB sump to the TB 1-3 sump Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps .Expected I Actual
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 Deleted: 6 Page 18 of 22 Floor Drain Line leaks No Degqradation OPEN
- 1) Perform and tracer test in the Pipe wall
- 2) Inspect with Boroscope Failure Mode No. 13 Description Leak in conduit to ESW Vault Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 - - - Deleted: 6 Page 19 of 22 Failure Mode No. 14 Description Leak in conduit to ESW Vault Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual A-2 6" Al: Condensate. Transfer No Hi-gh Tritium from Turbine Building to pipe tunnel Sample the wells on south of the Turbine Levels to the Reactor Building. Thi saline is Building about 6 feet below grade This line runs between the South Wall of the Reactor building and the Pipe Tunnel which runs east to west.
Low Priority
MA-AA-716-004 Revision 7 -( Deleted: 6 -°1 Page 20 of 22 Failure Mode No. 15 Description Leak in conduit to ESW Vault Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed. not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual A-3 6" Al: Fuel Pool Cooling No Higqh Tritium line to Fuel Pool Filter in Sample the wells on south of the Turbine Levels Radwaste Building Failure Mode No. 15 Description Leak in conduit to ESW Vault Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected I Actual
MA-AA-716-004 Revisions7 ...... Deleted: 6 Page 21 of 22 Failure Mode No. 16 Description Leak in conduit to ESW Vault Refer to Attachment 4 for examples of risk Results Owner and rigor determination for steps below *Expected results are based on system Status operation as designed, not as failed Cause(s) Validation/Action Steps Expected Actual Leak in the Offgas holdup No Hi-oh Tritium Lines Sample the wells on south of the Turbine Levels Building Low Priority
MA-AA-716-004 -Deleted: 6 Revision 7....
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