Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Draft SRO Retake Written Exam
	ML100470408
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/02/2010
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
	Download: ML100470408 (201)
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FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination Syst~iii QuestionBank # IKA Syst .. iYi IKA numbe~,

IKA_number, -1 QUESTION 1 D 1701 I EPE007 I 2.4.50 I I I KA desc EPE007 GENERIC Ability to verifY system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /

45.3)

Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and increasing following a refueling outage. The following are noted at 1015:

1AD-1, E/8Et8 "TURB GEN HI VIBRATION" is LIT

Turbine bearing vibration readings on the OAC indicate:

o Bearing #9 at 11 mils o Bearing #10 at 13 mils What response is required for these conditions?

A. Monitor bearing vibrations and if vibration is unchanged at 1017, manually trip the turbine only.

B. Monitor bearing vibrations and if vibration is unchanged at 1017, manually trip the reactor and verify the turbine automatically trips.

C. Vibration limits have been exceeded for the current plant conditions, manually trip the turbine only.

D. Vibration limits have been exceeded for the current plant conditions, manually trip the reactor and verify the turbine trips automatically.

Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 1 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 1 D General Discussion Bearing vibration> 12 mils is immediate trip criteria for this plant condition, the reactor is tripped first because reactor power is >69% (P9) . A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > 10 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > 10 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: A 2 minute wait is plausible because if vibration is > 10 mils for 2 minutes, the turbine is also tripped. However that is for increasing speed between 800 and 1400 RPM only prior to syncronizing. The Rx would be tripped first (>P-9)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The turbine vibration limits have been exceeded, and turbine trip is required, but the reactor would be tripped first (> P9)

Answer D Discussion Correct: IF all of the following conditions are met, manually trip the reactor:

Reactor power greater than or equal to 69% (P-9).

Any bearing vibration exceeds 12 mils.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed Databook figure 24

~ OPT Approved 1AD-I, E8 annunc resp mt3 lesson 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 1701lEPE007 17011EPE007 12.4.50 1 KA desc EPE007 GENERIC Ability to verify verifY system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.1041.1 0/43.5

/ 43.5 /

45.3) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 2 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 2 D 1702 II APEOOS APE008 II AK1.02 I KA KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.8/41.10/

41.S /41.10/

45.3) Change in leak rate with change in pressure ...........................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Initial Conditions

1NV-294 (NV Pmps A&B Disch Flow Ctrl) is in manual

PRT pressure is 6 psig

PRT level is 67%

The PRT has a small external leak (0.05 gpm)

Pressurizer pressure is 2235 psig Final Conditions 10 minutes later

The crew notes pressurizer pressure is 2197 psig and slowly decreasing

PRT pressure is 15 psig

PRT level is 68 68% %

Based on the conditions stated above, and assuming no operator action:

1. How (if at all) is charging flow affected?

2. How (if at all) is the external leakage rate from the PRT affected?

A. Charging flow is stable PRT extemal leakage rate will increase B. Charging flow is stable PRT extemal leakage rate is stable C. Charging flow is increasing PRT extemal leakage rate is stable D. Charging flow is increasing PRT extemal extemalleakageleakage rate will increase Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 3 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 2 D General Discussion As pressure decreases, charging flow will increase due to the larger DP bewteen charging pump discharge and NC pressure. As PRT pressure increases the leak leak should increase due to the higher DP. With 1NY -294 in manual, charging would stay stable if pressure was stable MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 Answer A Discussion INV-294 in manual, student may believe flow will not change. Second part is correct.

Plausible: With 1NV-294 Answer B Discussion Plausible: With 1NV-294 NV -294 in manual, student may believe flow will not change. Candidate may believe PRT leakage would be stable since leak is very small and DP increase is < 10 psig Answer C Discussion Plausible: First part is correct. Student may believe PRT leakage would be stable since leak is very small and DP increase is < 10 psig Answer D Discussion Correct: Charging flow will increase as NC pressure decreases and PRT external leakage will increase as PRT pressure increases extemalleakage Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed BNT-FF

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved KA system QuestionBank # IKA_system KA number IKA_number I 1702 APE008 17021APEOOS AK1.02 jAK1.02 I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.8/ 4l.10 /

41.S /41.10/

45.3) Change in leak rate with change in pressure ...........................

145.3) .......................... . I 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 4 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number I QUESTION 3 A 1703 II EPE009 II EA2.34 II KA KA desc Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CPR (CFR 43.5/45.13) Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI ............................

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. Given the following conditions:

The crew is in EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) evaluating safety injection termination criteria

NC pressure is 1200 psig and stable

Containment pressure peaked at 2.8 psig and is slowly decreasing

NC subcooling is 2°F

Pressurizer level is 18% and slowly increasing

Total CA flow is 400 gpm

All S/G NR levels are approximately 21% and slowly increasing Can safety injection be terminated at this time and why or why not?

A. Yes, safety injection termination criteria are met B. No, a secondary heat sink must be established and then safety injection can be terminated C. No, NC subcooling must be increased and then safety injection can be terminated D. No, Pressurizer level must be increased and then safety injection can be terminated Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 5 oflOl of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 3 A General Discussion Original KA was replaced.

SI termination critera are:

Subcooling >0 one S/G > II % (29% ACC) or total feed flow >450 gpm I 1%

NC pressure stable or increasing PZR level> 1111% % (20% ACC)

For the conditions specified, ACC numbers are NOT used in this case therefore S/I can be terminated.

Answer A Discussion Correct: SI termination criteria are met as stated above Answer B Discussion Plausible: If containment pressure was> 3psig (ACC conditions) heat sink parameters would not be met for SI termination. Flow is < 450 gpm and S/G levels are < 29%

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Some procedures require greater than this subcooling to perform certain steps. But only >0 is required Answer D Discussion Plausible: If containment pressure was> 3psig (ACC conditions) PZR level parameter would not be met, <<20%)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS AUDIT (Bank 1033)

Development References Student References Provided D Developed El EI

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # jKA system IKA IKA IKA number I I

17031EPE009 1703IEPE009 IEA2.34 I Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) Conditions for throttling or stopping 43.5/45.13)

HPI ........................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 6 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # [KAIKA system [KA IKA_number number I QUESTION 4 D 1704 .1[ EPEOll II 2.4.35 I KA desc I EPEOll GENERIC Knowledge oflocal auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 I

/45.13) 145.13)

Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a large break LOCA occurred. Given the following:

The control room crew is in EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

Step 13.b verifies the NO & & NS ROOMS sump pump "RESET" lights OARK

The crew notes the lights are currently LIT and dispatches an operator to perform a local action The dispatched operator will place the affected NO & & NS ROOMS Sump Pumps in:

A. "AUTO" to ensure they start on "high" sump level to protect the NO and NS pump rooms from flooding B. "AUTO" to ensure they start on a "high-high" sump level to protect the NO and NS pump rooms from flooding C. "STOBY" to ensure contaminated water is contained within the sump due to potential NO and/or NS pump seal leakage O. "STOBY" to ensure a "high-high" annunciator alarm is received on increasing level to indicate possible NO and/or NS pump seal leakage Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 770f201 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 4 D General Discussion The sump pump reset lights should extinguish on an SI signal causing the pumps to only start on a high-high level.. If the reset lights are lit,the sump pumps are placed in standby. This prevents the start ofthe pumps unless they reach the high-high level which also alarms on the control room annunciator panel to alert the operator of possible seal leakage. IfIfthe the pumps started at the high level, the alarm would never be received unless the leakage was gross enough to exceed the sump pumps capacity.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Placing the pumps in AUTO will cause them to start at the high level but this would prevent receiving the HI-HI level annunciator.

The operational effect is to alert the operators of possible NDINS seal leakage Answer B Discussion Plausible: Placing the pumps in AUTO will cause them to start at a high level but this would prevent receiving the HI-HI level annunciator (the desired operational effect)

Answer C Discussion ifieakage is Plausible: Although this is the correct action, it does not ensure that the contaminated water will be contained within the sump ifleakage greater than the pumps capacity.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Placing the sump pumps in standby will ensure a HI-HI level annunciator is received in the control room, indicating possible seal leakage Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided 0D Developed ESI-3 and basis ESl-3 0D OPT Approved WL 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA

JKA system IKA IKA number II 7041EPEO I I I17041EPEOll 12.4.35 12 .4.35 11 KA desc EPEOI I GENERIC Knowledge oflocal auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 EPEOll 4I.IO /1 43.5

/45.13) 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 8 oUOl of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 5 A 1705 I APE015!017 I AK2.10 I KA desc ofthe Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Flow) and the following: (CFR 41.7 !

45.7) RCP indicators and controls .......................................

Unit 1 was operating in Mode 3 at full temperature and pressure. Given the following trends on the 1A NCP:

Time 0200 0205 0210 0215 Motor bearing temp (OF) 180 184 186 195 Lower pump bearing temp (OF) 221 225 228 231

1 seal outlet temp (OF) 205 227 235 251 Motor stator winding temp (OF) 312 314 316 323 What is the ea rliest time at which the 1A earliest 1 A NCP must be secu red?

secured?

A. 0200 B. 0205 C. 0210 D. 0215 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 9 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 5 A General Discussion Bank Question: 870 NCP Trip criteria:

Any motor bearing temperature >/= 195°F Seal Outlet temperature >/= 235°F Motor winding temperature >/= 311°F Any pump bearing water exit temperature >/= 225°F Answer A Discussion Correct: 0200 is the earliest time the NCP must be stopped since motor winding temperature reaches 311 degrees Answer B Discussion Plausible: lfthe If the student doesn't know the trip setpoint for securing the NCP on motor winding temperature, but knows the lower bearing temperature trip setpoint.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: lfthe If the student doesn't know the trip setpoints for securing the NCP on motor winding or pump bearing temperatures, but knows the #1 seal outlet temperature setpoint Answer D Discussion Plausible: lfthe If the student doesn't know the trip setpoints for securing the NCP on motor winding, pump bearing, and #1 seal outlet temperatures, but knows the motor bearing trip setpoint Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q45 (Bank 245)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OP-CN-PS-NCP

~~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved OOPS o0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system JKA_numbernumber I 1705!APEOI5/017 !AK2.10 I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC of RC Flow) and the following: (CFR 41.7

41. 7 /

45.7) Rep RCP indicators and controls ...................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 10 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1706 IKA system IKA APE025 IKA number AK1.01 II QUESTION 6 c I I I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.8/

41.8 /

41.10/45.3) Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation .........................

Unit 1 was shutdown in Mode Mode 6, in mid loop operations when a loss of NO cooling occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

The operators implemented CASE IV (Loss of NO in Mid Loop) of AP/1/A/55001019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System) and have reached AP/1/A/5500/019 step 22.

The NO system has been refilled and properly vented

Step 22 requires restart of one NO pump to restore cooling.

A caution wams the operator that restarting an NO pump can cause NC system level to decrease rapidly.

What is the reason for the NC system level decrease?

A. Due to the contraction of the water from the cooldown B. Due to the suction of water from the NC system into the NO pump C. Due to the collapse of system voids D. Due to increased system pressure Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 11 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 6 c General Discussion System) , Case IV (Loss ofND in Mid Loop) caution prior to step 22 states" NC System API1 IAI550010 19 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System),

AP/1/At5500/019 level may decrease rapidly when an ND pump is started due to the collapse of system voids. Additional makeup flow may be required."

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Sufficient cooldown will cause volumetric contraction and level drop, Cooldown is insufficient to cause a level drop at representative temperatures Answer B Discussion Plausible: The suction surge is accompanied by discharge back into the system so the mass balance remains the same.

Answer C Discussion Correct: Per AP/1/Al5500/019 ICorrect: System) , Case IV (Loss ofND in Mid Loop) caution prior to step 22 AP/l!A!55001019 (Loss of Residual Heat Removal System),

Answer D Discussion Plausible: System pressure will not increase. Mid loop operations require an open vent path to atmosphere Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q60 (Bank 260)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed Lesson Plan Objective: none

~ OPT Approved 1. AP-19 Case IV D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number II 1706iAPE025 17061APE025 iAK1.01 IAK1.01 Ii KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.8 I ofthe 4l.l0 I145.3) 41.10 45.3) Loss ofRHRS during all modes of operation ........................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 12 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1707 APE027 IKA number IKA_number AK3.03 I

QUESTION 7 c I I I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10/45.6/

45.l3) Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction ...................

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

"PZR PRESS CTRL SELECT" switch is in the 1-2 position

Pressurizer pressure channel 1 has failed low

The crew enters AP/2/A/5500/011 (Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies), Case II (Pressurizer Pressure Increasing).

Step 1 states:

"Verify al/ Pzr pressure channels - INDICA INDICATING TlNG THE SAME" With channel 1 failed low, why does the RNO for this step require the "PZR PRESS MASTER" to be placed in manual and output adjusted to 70% demand prior to selecting alternate operable channel on the "PZR PRESS CTRL SELECT" switch?

an altemate A. To ensure the backup heaters remain on to stabilize NC pressure B. To ensure the spray valves open to deal with the increasing NC pressure C. To prevent 1NC-34A (PZR PORV) from lifting and causing a decrease in NC pressure D. To prevent 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) and 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) from lifting and causing a decrease in NC pressure 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 13 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 7 c General Discussion Without placing the master controller in manual and adjusting it (70% is ~ nominal value for 2235 psig), the sprays could open and the PORV could open as well due to windup in the controller. Placing the master controller in manual and adjusting it to 70% ( nominal value for 2235 psig) does prevent a possible PORV actuation (INC-34A)

(lNC-34A) from the controlling channel.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe placing the master controller in manual and adjusting it to 70% will ensure backup heaters remain on, but this will secure the backup heaters and have "C" heater modulating.

Answer B Discussion Plausible:The student may believe placing the master controller in manual and adjusting it to 70% will ensure sprays are open but at 70%, the spray valves will be closed.

Answer C Discussion Correct: Placing the PZR pressure master controller in manual and adjusting it to 70% (nominal value for 2235 psig) will prevent a possible PORV actuation on INC -34A from the controller integral "wind up" when swapping controlling channels.

Answer D Discussion Plausible:The student may believe 1NC-32B and 1NC-36B are controlled from the controlling channel, but these are controlled from the backup channel and would not lift due to controller "wind up" when selecting an alternate operable channel Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed APIlI AP/ll

~ OPT Approved IPE lesson 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number I 17071APE027 l7071APE027 IAK3.03 I

KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 I 45.6 I 41.5,41.10/45.6/

45.13) Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction .................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCS DCS DCS DCS Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 14 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank #

1708 IKA_system JKA_number

IKA_system II EPE029 IKA_number I EK3.10 II II QUESTION 8 c KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.5 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13)

/41.1 0/45.6 /45.13) Manual rod insertion The basis for manually inserting control rods during an ATWS event is to reduce reactor power to:

A. prevent total core flux from exceeding core thermal power limits B. prevent rapid heatup of the NC system and potential overfill of the pressurizer C. ensure the only heat transferred to the NC system is from core decay heat and NC pump heat D. ensure there is sufficient steam dump capacity to prevent opening the steam line code safeties Monday, October 19,2009 Page 15 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 8 c General Discussion MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 From E-O Basis for ensuring Rx trip: Reactor trip must be verified to ensure that only heat being added to the NC Ssytem is from decay heat and reactor coolant pump heat. The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and NC pump heat are being added to the NC system. Preventing rapid heatup to prevent Pzr overfill is why steam is dumped in S.l S.1 Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may think that since the reactor is not tripped, that inserting negative reactivity with the rods is necessary to prevent core overheating and may confuse this with core thermal power. Core thermal power will actually decrease.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: The reactor coolant system will heatup when the turbine is tripped, but this is the basis for dumping steam in the ATWS procedure.

Answer C Discussion

[Correct: Per FR -S.l basis document FR-S.l Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may think rods need to be inserted during an ATWS to remove enough heat to allow the steam dumps to operate within their capacity.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed FR-SI FR-Sl and basis

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 170S[EPE029 1708[EPE029 [EK3.10 IEK3.10 I

[

KA desc Knowledge ofthe of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.5 141.10/45.6/45.13) 141.1 0/45.6/45.13) Manual rod insertion 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 16 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system jKA system IKA_number jKA_number Ij QUESTION 9 A 1709 APE054 AK3.04 I I I KA desc KA_desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.5,41.1 41.5,41.100/45.6/

145.61 45.13) Actions contained in EOPs for loss ofMFW .........................

1A CF pump was out of service for maintenance when 1B CF pump tripped on low lube oil pressure. The crew has entered AP/1/N5500/006 AP/1/N55001006 (Loss of S/G Feedwater),

Case I (Loss of CF Supply To S/Gs).

What is the minimum power level which would require a manual reactor trip and what is the basis for manually tripping the reactor above that power level when in this procedure?

A. 5%; to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels B. 10%; to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels C. 5%; to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor D. 10%; to minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor Monday, October 19,2009 Page 17 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 9 A General Discussion The basis document for AP/06, Case I, states that CA can power operation up to 5%. 10% power is when the turbine is placed on line and also P- p-P13 setpoints. To minimize the pressure and temperature transient on the reactor is the basis for tripping the reactor on a turbine trip >P9.

10 and PI3 Answer A Discussion Correct: CA can only supply S/G's when <5 % power. The Rx is tripped to ensure CA can maintain adequate S/G levels Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that CA can be used up to 10% power. Second part is correct Answer C Discussion Plausible: First part is correct. Student may believe this is the basis for tripping the reactor in this situation (actually basis for Rx trip on a turbine trip >P9)

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that CA can be used up to 10% power and that this is the basis for tripping the reactor in this situation (actually basis for Rx trip on a turbine trip >P9)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/06 0

D OPT Approved AP/06 background doc 0

D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 17091APE054 1709lAPE054 IAK3.04 I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.5,41.10 41.5,41.1 0/45.6/

145.61 45.13) Actions contained in EOPs for loss ofMFW ........................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 18 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1710 I EPE055 IKA number I

I EK3.02 I

I QUESTION 10 c KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: (CFR 41.5 /41.10/45.6/45.13)

/41.1 0/45.6 /45.13) Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power ..........

Regarding the actions of EP/11A1S000/ECA 0.0 (Loss of All AC Power):

1. Why are intact S/Gs depressurized to 165 psig?

2. What is the basis for stopping the depressurization at 165 psig?

A. 1. To enhance natural circulation until forced cooling can be restored

2. To prevent injecting N2 from the CLAs B. 1. To enhance natural circulation until forced cooling can be restored

2. To prevent voiding in the reactor vessel upper head C. 1. To minimize NC inventory loss out of the NC pump seals

2. To prevent injecting N2 from the CLAs D. 1. To minimize NC inventory loss out of the NC pump seals

2. To prevent voiding in the reactor vessel upper head Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 19 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 10 c General Discussion The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals. Although Circulation might be enhanced, this is not the reason it is done in this procedure. Stopping the depressurization at 165 psig prevents Natural Circulation injecting N2 from the CLAs. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Dumping steam will enhance natural eirccirc but this is not the reason for depressurizing the intact S/G's. Second part is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: Dumping steam will enhance natural circ but this is not the reason for depressurizing the intact S/G's. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head, it is reasonable that this may be prevented by stopping the depressurization.

Answer C Discussion Correct: The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals.

Stopping the depressurization at 165 psig prevents injecting N2 from the CLAs Answer D Discussion Plausible: The S/Gs are depressurized to reduce NC temperature and pressure thereby minimizing the loss of inventory out the NC pump seals. A bubble is actually assumed to form in the head, it is reasonable that this may be prevented by stopping Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Modified from 126? Or NEW ask NRC

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed eca 0.0 step 23 and basis Step 23

~~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number II 1710lEPE055 iEK3.02 IEK3.02 Ii KA desc 41.5 /41.10/45.6 / 45.13) Actions Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: (CFR 41.5/41.10/45.6/45.13) offsite and onsite power contained in EOP for loss of offsite 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 20 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 11 B 1711 I I APE056 I 2.1.28 I KA desc I APE056 GENERIC Knowledge ofthe of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7)

I Unit 1 is operating at 75% power and Unit 2 is at 100% power when the following switch yard PCBs open:

PCB 17

PCB 18

PCB 19 Which one of the following statements correctly describes the effect on Units 1 and 2?

A. Unit 1 will remain at 75% power and Unit 2 will run back to 48% at 18% Imin B. Unit 1 will run back to 48% at 18% I min and Unit 2 will remain at 100%

C. Unit 1 will remain at 75% power and Unit 2 will run back to 23% at 25% Imin D. Unit 1 will run back to 23% at 25% I min and Unit 2 will remain at 100%

Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 21 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 11 B General Discussion Question tests the switchyard PCB (loss ofload) turbine runback circuit. With PCB's 17 and 18 open and > 48% power, Unit 1 runback to -48% ~48%

18%lmin will occur due to loss of 1lA at 18%/min A main buss line. Unit 2 is unaffected. The runback to 23 23% 25%lmin is for a loss of KG (generator

% at 25%/min stator cooling) Believe this is high cog versus memory because changing one stem condition will make another choice correct.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Unit 1 will runback. The student may believe Unit 2 is affected, this would be the correct runback rate and target Answer B Discussion run back at 18% Imin on loss ofload Correct: Unit 1 will runback of load with PCBs 17 and 18 open Answer C Discussion Plausible: Unit 1 will runback. The student may believe Unit 2 is affected, runback target and rate are for the loss of generator stator cooling.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Unit 1 will runback, but runback target and rate are for the loss of generator stator cooling.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q42 (Bank 242)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPA

~ OPT Approved EHC ERC 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1711 APE056 2.1.28 KA desc APE056 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 22 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number II QUESTION 12 D 1712 II APE057 1I AAl.06 AAI.06 II KA KA_desc desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 441.7 1.7 /45.5 /45.6) Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost .......

Unit 2 is operating at 85% power. Given the following events and conditions:

Control rods are in manual for an engineering test

120VAC panel 2ERPA is de-energized

Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 fails low Assuming no operator action, which of the following describes the current status of the condenser steam dumps?

A. Condenser dump valves are open and will remain open until they are closed by the P-12 interlock or both trains are placed in "OFF" B. Condenser dump valves will automatically control at approximately 576.5°F following a feed pump trip and automatically control for 55rF on a reactor trip C. Condenser dump valves will automatically control at approximately 576.5°F following a feed pump trip, but manual control will be required to maintain 55rF on a reactor trip D. Condenser dump valves will automatically control for 55rF on a reactor trip but manual control will be required to control NC temperature at approximately 576.5°F following a feed pump trip Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 23 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 12 D General Discussion With Ch 1 impulse failed, Treffails to 557F. Since control rods are in manual, there is no automatic inward rod motion. This large temperature mismatch would cause the dumps to open except there is no arming signal (C-7 A or C-7B). On a trip, the target temperature is a fixed 557 T-no load and there should be no difference in normal response. However, on a feedwater pump trip runback, the dumps will not control automatically at the target temperature (576.5 at 65% power plus a 3 degree deadband ifin Tave mode))

mode) ) because they still see a temperature mismatch of actual Tavg to the failed Tref of 557 .

Answer A Discussion Plausible: This would be true if the student believes that the dumps are armed in addition to the large delta T from the Ch 1 impulse pressure failure.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: The condenser dumps WILL NOT automatically control on the runback from the feedwater pump trip due to the Ch 1 impulse pressure failure. The condenser dumps WILL automatically control using T -no load setpoint plus 3 degrees (560) on a Rx trip T-no Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the student gets this backward, the answer is opposite to actual conditions.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Condenser dumps will control automatically on T-no load (557 F)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

AP-29

~ OPT Approved

~ IDE DOOPS OPS Approved Do NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 17121APE057 IAA1.06 II KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.741.7/45.5 /45.6) Manual

/ 45.5/45.6) control of components for which automatic control is lost ...... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCS DCS Des Des Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 24 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1713 I APE058 IKA number I AK1.Ol AK1.01 I

I QUESTION 13 c I

KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: (CFR 41.8/41.10/45.3) 41.8/41.1 0/45.3) Battery charger equipment and instrumentation .......................

Given the following:

Vital charger 1 1ECCECC fails

1EMXA is unavailable to the spare charger (1 ECS)

The CRS directs an NLO to align the alternate supply to 1 ECS so that 1ECS 1ECS can be tied to bus 1EDC before the battery is depleted

1. What other MCC can be aligned to provide an altemate alternate supply to 1 ECS?

2. Per OP/1/A/6350/008 (125VDC/120VAC Vital Instrument Instru rnent and Control Power System), what plant mode(s) allow this alignment?

A. 1. 1EMXC

2. No Mode only B. 1. 1EMXC

2. Modes 5, 5,66 and No Mode C. 1. 1EMXJ

.1.

2. No Mode only D. 1. 1EMXJ

2. Modes 5, 5,66 and No Mode Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 25 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 13 c General Discussion The spare charger can be supplied fonn lEMXA and lEMXJ. Cross train power supply can only be aligned in NO MODE per procedure.

Nonnally (modes 1-6), when lECC is removed from service, the space charger (lECS) is aligned and is powered from lEMXA. lEMXC seems logical since lEMXA ECA, but lEMXI IEMXA powers 1IECA, IEMXI supplies lECC IECC and neither can supply the spare charger Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe IEMXC supplies charger IECC, and can be used to power the spare charger (lECS).

IPlausible: (IECS). No mode is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe lEMXC IEMXC supplies charger lECC, IECC, and can be used to power the spare charger (lECS). Student may think cross train power supply to spare is available in shutdown modes Answer C Discussion Correct: lEMXJ IEMXJ is the only available power supply to the spare charger (lECS)

(IECS) with IEMXA unavailable. This alignment can only be perfonned in No Mode Answer D Discussion Plausible: lEMXJ IEMXJ is the correct available power supply to the spare charger (lECS).

(IECS). Student may think cross train power supply to spare is available in shutdown modes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source Sou rce RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPL

~ OPT Approved OP/1/Al6350/008 OPIlIAl63501008 D

0 OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA

IKA system IKA IKA number I 1713IAPE058 1713IAPE058 IAK1.01 IAK.l.Ol II KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications ofthe of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: (CFR 41.8 141.10 145.3) Battery 41.8/41.10/45.3) charger equipment and instrumentation ...................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 26 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY ~ DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 14 A 1714 APE062 I AA1.02 I I I KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): (CFR 41.7 / 45.5/45.6) Loads on ofNuc1ear the SWS in the control room ..............................

Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100% power with RN pump 2A running. Given the following conditions and indications:

RN pumps 1A, 18 1Band and 2B 28 start

An Emergency Lo Pit Level actuation occurs

1. What is the expected position of 1RN-538 (Station RN Disch Hdr X-Over) and RN-54A (Station RN Disch Hdr X-Over) based on these conditions?

2. Where is RN discharge flow from the DIGs directed based on the above conditions?

A. Closed Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond B.

8. Closed RL discharge piping to Lake Wylie C. Open Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond D. Open RL discharge piping to Lake Wylie Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 27 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 14 A General Discussion The RN discharge header crossover valves (IRN-53B and lRN-54A) close on an emergency low pit level (2/3 (213 logic) and on an Ss or Sp signal they remain open. All pumps start in either case.

RN discharge from the DIGs swaps to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) on Emergency low pit level, but remains aligned to the lake on an Sp signal. The main RN discharges from the Esssentiani Headers are aligned to both the SNSWP and the RL discharge on a Sp signal therefore aligned to both is plausible.

Answer A Discussion Correct: lRN-53B and lRN-54A close and RN discharge flowpath from the DIGs aligns to the SNSWP on emergency low pit level, 2/3 ch coincidence Answer B Discussion Plausible: lRN-53B and lRN-54A close on emergency low pit level. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP but stay aligned to the lake for other signals.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that valves stay open which is true for Ss andlor Sp signal. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that valves stay open which is true for Ss andlor Sp signal. The RN discharge flowpath to the DIGs will align to the SNSWP but stay aligned to the lake for other signals.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed RN lesson plan

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system .IKA_number IKA_number I 17141APE062 IAA1.02 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): (CFR 41.7 145.5 I 45.5 145.6) Loads on the SWS in the control room ............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 28 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 15 D 1715 APE065 AA1.03 I

I I I I KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss ofInstrument Air: (CFR 41.7 /45.5/45.6)

/45.5 /45.6) Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and Unit 2 is in No Mode. During outage work on Unit 2, the instrument air (VI) supply to Unit 2 is severed and the entire VI header depressurizes.

An NLO in the area notes the problem and manually closes the VI supply isolation valve to Unit 2 and the VI header quickly repressurizes. Given the following valves and positions (prior to the loss of VI):

VALVE POSITION 1NV-1A (NC Letdn to Regen Hx Isol) Open 1CA-149 (S/G 1A CF Byp To CA Nozzle) Open 1NV-153A (Letdn Hx Otlt 3-Way Vlv) "DEMIN" 1 RN-291 (1A KC HX Outlet Throttle) "MINI FLOW" / Throttled Which one of the valves will automatically return to the position indicated in the table above after VI pressure is restored?

A. 1NV-1A B. 1CA-149 C. 1 NV-153A D. 1RN-291 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 29 of 201 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 15 D General Discussion On loss ofYI of VI the valves will fail as indicated below. Once air is restored IRN-291 lRN-291 will go back to throttled position to control mini flow. The other valves will require operator actions to be returned to their position prior to the loss ofYI.

of VI.

Answer A Discussion I NY -IA fails closes and will not reopen without operator action. Student may believe the valve will return to its previous position on Plausible: INV-1A of VI a short term loss ofYI Answer B Discussion Plausible: lCA-149 I CA-149 will fail closed and will not reopen without operator action. Student may believe the valve will return to its previous position on a short term loss ofYI of VI Answer C Discussion Plausible: 1INV-153A NY -153A will swap to the YCT VCT position and must be manually returned to the "Demin" position. Student may believe the valve will return to its previous position on a short term loss ofYI of VI Answer D Discussion Correct: This valve will fail open and will throttle automatically once air is restored.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided AP/22

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number I 171SlAPE065 1715iAPE065 iAA l. 03 jAAl.03 Ii KA desc Ability to operate and 1/ or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss ofInstrument Air: (CFR 41.7 145.5145.6)

/ 45.5/45.6) Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 30 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 16 D 1716 I WE04 I EA2.2 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CPR: 43.5/45.13) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

(CFR:

A loss of coolant accident outside containment has occurred on the residual heat removal system injection header.

The crew is performing Step 3 of EP/1/NSOOO/ECA-1.2, EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, which states:

"Verify leak path is isolated as follows:"

Which one of the following indications is used by this procedure to identify that the leak has been successfully isolated?

A. NO Pump discharge pressure increasing B. Pressurizer level increasing C. NO/NS room sump levels decreasing O. Reactor coolant pressure increasing Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 31 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 16 D General Discussion ECA-l.2 looks for the pressure increase as the crews isolate each train ofND. It is the only "symptom" that can be used to verifY verify successful leak isolation.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: ND disharge pressure would increase but that is not the indication used by ECA-I.2 ECA-l.2 .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Pressurizer level increasing is a later issue for SI S1 termination. It is not reasonable to assume that level would already be on scale and is not the indication used by ECA-l.2.

ECA-I.2.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This might be true if ifthe the leak is contained and the sumps are pumped down but is not the indication used by ECA-I.2 ECA-1.2 Answer D Discussion Correct: ECA-l.2 specifically uses NC pressure increasing as the parameter for leak isolation determination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2005 NRC Ql6 QI6 (Bank 420)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed P/lIN50001ECA-1.2 PIli Al5000IECA-1.2

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I 17161WE04 17161WE04 IEA2.2 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 43.5 145.13) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 32 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system 1717 WE05 IKA IKA_number number EK2.1 II QUESTION 17 c I

I I I KA KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

41.7 /45.7) Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and (CFR: 41.7/45.7) automatic and manual features.

Unit 1 was operating at 100% when a total loss of instrument air occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

When the instrument air header depressurized, a total loss of offeedwater feedwater occurred

The operators tripped the reactor and completed EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

The operators transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Respond to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Step 22 of EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 requires opening PZR PORVs Which one of the following statements describes:

1 1.. The motive force to open the PZR PORVs, and

2. The correct EOP bases for step 22 of EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1?

A. 1. Air pressure comes from dedicated accumulator tanks

2. PORVs are required to provide a bleed path B. 1. Air pressure comes from dedicated accumulator tanks

2. PORVs are required to depressurize the NC system to protect the S/G tubes from creep failure C. 1. N2 pressure comes from the cold leg accumulators A and B

2. PORVs are required to provide a bleed path D. 1. N2 pressure comes from the cold leg accumulators A and B

2. PORVs are required to depressurize the NC system to protect the S/G tubes from creep failure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 33 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 17 c General Discussion With a loss of VI, CLAs A& B are aligned to supply N2 to the PZR PORVs. Per H.I step 22, two PZR PORVs are opened to establish an NC system bleed path.

Tube failure may become a risk with Hi DP if the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, but this is not the basis for step 22 .

Answer A Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure comes from the CLAs not dedicated air accumulators, although some plants have these. PZR PORVs are required bleed path for heat removal Answer B Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure comes from the CLAs not dedicated air accumulators, although some plants have these. Tube failure may become a risk with hi DP ififthe the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, not step 22 basis Answer C Discussion Correct: N2 pressure does comes from the CLAs A & B. PZR PORVs are required bleed path for heat removal Answer D Discussion Plausible: N2 pressure does comes from the CLAs A & B. Tube failure may become a risk with hi DP if the S/G is required to be depressurized to introduce a low pressure water source, but this is not the basis for step 22 .

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2004 NRC Q30 (Bank 1230)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed FR-H.l and basis FR-H.I

~ OPT Approved VI 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 17171WE05 IEK2.1 I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. i 401*9 Comments: 401*9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 34 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1718

!KA system WEll IKA IKA_number number EA2.1 I

QUESTION 18 c I I I KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 43.5/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnonnal and emergency operations.

Unit 1 is responding to a LOCA into the Auxiliary Building in EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2 EP/1/A15000/ECA-1.2 (LOCA Outside of Containment). At the transition point from EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2, EP/1/A15000/ECA-1.2, the leak has not been isolated.

Which procedure will EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.2 EP/1/A15000/ECA-1.2 direct the crew to enter?

A. EP/1/A/5000/FR-C.2 EP/1/A15000/FR-C.2 (Response to Degraded Core Cooling)

B. EP/1/A/5000/E-1 EP/1/A15000/E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

C. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 EP/1/A15000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

D. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2 EP/1/A15000/ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 35 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 18 c General Discussion This question does not require the student to memorize procedure transitions. Instead, the student is expected to logically assess conditions (LOCA into the AUX BLD that cannot be isolated and pressure continues to decrease after completion ofECA-1.2) and deduce that the containment sump inventory is still being lost. The only correct procedure would be ECA-l.l ECA-I.I to address this problem. All other procedure transitions do not work.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Transition to FR-C.2 is plausible since it is possible that an unisolated LOCA would result in degraded core cooling.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Not the correct procedural transition if the NC system pressure continues to decrease (leak path not isolated).

This would be the correct procedure if the NC system pressure was stable or increasing.

Answer C Discussion Correct: Continuing loss of inventory means that there may be insufficient water in containment for recirculation cooling Answer D Discussion Plausible: Transition to ES-l.2 ES-I.2 not allowed, as the leak is not isolated.

The name of the procedure is appropriate for the situation.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q21 (Bank 221)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EP21esson

~ OPT Approved ECA-1.2 ECA-l.l 0D OPS Approved FR-C.2 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 171SlWEIl 171SlWEll IEA2.1 I

KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 36 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 19 D 1719 I APEOO5 I AK2.02 JI KA desc KA_desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod and the following: foIlowing: (CFR (CPR 41.7/45.7) 41.7 /45.7) Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches ........................................................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

While performing the RCCA movement test, control rod H-8 slipped into the core to 200 steps withdrawn

All other Bank D control rods are at 216 steps withdrawn as indicated on DRPI DR PI and step demand counters

The crew is in AP/1/A/5500/014 AP/1/A/55001014 (Control Rod Misalignment) and currently referring to OP/1/A/6150/008 OP/1/A161501008 (Rod Control).

1. What is the maximum time allowed to restore rod H-8 to within limits per Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)?

2. During rod retrieval per OP/1/A/6150/008 (Rod Control), for which rod(s) will the perOP/1/A161501008 crew utilize the lift coil disconnect switch(es)? switch( es)?

A. 1. 30 minutes

2. Rod H-8 8.

B. 1. 30 minutes

2. All rods in the affected bank except H-8 C. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. Rod H-8 D. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. All rods in the affected bank except H-8 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 37 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 19 D General Discussion The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected per OP/1/A/61501008, OP/lIA/6l501008, enclosure 4.6, step 2.11. Per TS 3.1.4, one hour is allowed to realign to within group limits. 30 minutes is the AFD spec which is often utilized with misaligned rods.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: AFD TS 3.2.3 action is 30 minutes. The student may be confused as whether all rods except H-8 or only rod H-8 needs to be disconnected Answer B Discussion Plausible: AFD TS 3.2.3 action is 30 minutes. The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: TS 3.1.4 action time is correct. The student may be confused as whether all rods except H-8 H -8 or only rod H H-8

-8 needs to be disconnected Answer D Discussion Correct: TS 3.1.4 action time is correct. The unaffected rods will have their lift coils disconnected.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/14

~ OPT Approved OP/lIAl61501008 OP/1/Al61501008 TS 3.1.4 0D OPS Approved TS 3.2.3 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 1719iAPE005 l719iAPE005 iAK2.02 i KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable I Stuck Control Rod and the following: (CFR 41.7 I145.7) ofthe 45.7) Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches ....................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 38 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 20 D 1720 I APE033 I 2.1.19 II KA desc I APE033 GENERIC Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR: 41.10/45.12)

II Unit 1 was conducting a plant startup preparing to swap main feed nozzles. Given the following:

The control board meter for N-35 has failed and is being replaced

OAC point C1A0766 (N-35 Intermediate Range Level) is reading 3.1 X 10-55 amps

Other Intermediate Range and Power Range NI channel indications are:

o N-36 = =2.7 x 10-66 amps o N-41 = 11.2%

o N-42 = 11.2%

o N-43 = 11.3%

o N-44 = 10.8%

Thermal Power Best Estimate = 11.1 %

The C-1 interlock has not been manually blocked

1. Which intermediate range instrument is reading incorrectly?

2. Assuming no operator actions are taken to block C-1 or address the incorrectly reading I/R channel, alarm 1AD-02, C/3 (l/R (I/R Hi Flux Level Rod Stop) will occur

_____ it would have if both I/R Nls were operating correctly.

A. 1. N-35 is reading too high for existing conditions

2. sooner than B. 1. N-35 is reading too high for existing conditions

2. at the same time C. 1. N-36 is reading too low for existing conditions

2. later than D. 1. N-36 is reading too low for existing conditions

2. at the same time 19,2009 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 39 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 20 D General Discussion N-36 is reading low and N-35 is reading correctly based on power range indications. Only the meter for N-35 is failed, the OAC indication is correct.

The C-I interlock is 1/2 logic at 20% amps equivalent. Since N-35 is reading correctly and is higher than N-36 the alarm will come in at the proper time based on the N-35 indication Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe N-35 is failed and is reading incorrectly, only the N-35 meter is failed. If the student believes N-35 is reading high, the second part would be correct also.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe N-35 is failed and is reading incorrectly, only the N-35 meter is failed. Ifit was reading higher and the logic was 2/2, then the second part would be correct also.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: N-36 is reading too low. Ifit was reading lower and the logic was 2/2, then the second part would be correct also.

Answer D Discussion Correct: N-36 is reading too low. Since C-l is not blocked, the alarm will occur at the same time it would have if all instrumentation was indicating correctly Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

MODIFIED 2004 NRC Q78 (Bank 1278) JJ' l

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ENB

~

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number l720APE033 1720APE033 2.1.19 KA desc APE033 GENERIC Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status. (CFR: 41.1 41.100 145.12)

I 45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 40 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 21 B 1721 I APE037 I AK1.01 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8/41.10/

45.3) Use of steam tables ..............................................

Unit 1 was operating at 50% power when a steam generator tube leak occurred on 1A S/G and was isolated per AP/1/N5500/010 AP/11A155001010 (Reactor Coolant Leak), Case I (Steam Generator Tube Leak).

Assuming uniform conditions in 1A S/G, at what minimum bulk fluid temperature in S/G 1A would an unmonitored offsite release occur?

Reference provided B. 560.7 OF C. 566.1 ofOF D. 567.7 OF Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 41 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 21 B General Discussion 1A S/G is isolated per AP lA 11 / Al5500/0 10, Case I. The S/G PORV is verified closed, but not isolated. An unmonitored release would occur if the AP/1/A/5500/01 lA S/G PORV should lift. The S/G PORV lift setpoint is 1125 psig. Using steam tables, the saturation temperature for 1140 psia = 560.712 degrees Answer A Discussion Plausible: 557 is the temperatrue steam dumps control at. This would be correct except lA S/G is isolated and this would be a monitored release (air ejectors thru Unit Vent.)

Answer B Discussion Correct:Tsat for 1125 psig (1140 psia) = 560.712 degrees F Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the student believes the S/G PORV is isolated.Thisisolated. This is saturation temperature for the first safety relief, relief,1175 1175 psig (1190 psia). Tsat for 1190 psia = 566.116 degrees F Answer D Discussion Plausible: If the student believes the S/G PORV is isolated and confuses the first and second safety lift setpoints.This is saturation temperature for the second safety relief,1190 psig (1205 psia) Tsat for 1205 psia == 567.709 degrees F Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Student References Provided Steam Tables Knowledge of ofthe the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8/41.10/

45.3) Use of steam tables ............................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 42 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 22 A 1722 II APE067 I AK1.01 AKl.01 I KA desc KA Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.8/41.1 0/45.3) Fire classifications, by type ........................................

A trash bin near the Spent Fuel Pool truck bay doors caught fire and smoke was drawn into the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation (VF) system supply ductwork.

1. What affect will this condition have on the operation of the VF system?

2. How is this fire classified?

A. 1. The VF Supply fan will trip only

2. Class A Fire B. 1. The VF Supply fan will trip only

2. Class B Fire C. 1. The VF Supply fan and the VF Filtered Exhaust fans will swap to filter mode

2. Class A Fire D. 1. The VF Supply fan and the VF Filtered Exhaust fans will swap to filter mode

2. Class B Fire Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 43 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 22 A General Discussion Per discussion with Frank on 8/12/09 this means A,B,C,D fire types. He suggested making a question of what type of fire and how is it extinguished.

The VF supply fans will trip and an alarm will sound in the control room, but the exhaust fans will continue to run unless manually secured by the operating crew.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Only the VF supply fan will trip. Trash bin would contain ordinary combustibles (wood,paper,etc.) and would be classified as Class A Answer B Discussion Plausible: Only VF supply fan would trip. Student may believe ordinary combustibles are included in Class B fire Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe VF fans supply fan will trip and align to filter mode on fire protection. Class A fire is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe VF fans supply fan will trip and align to filter mode on fire protection. Student may believe ordinary combustibles are included in Class B fire Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed VF 0D OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I I 7221APE067 17221APE067 IAKl.Ol IAK1.01 I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.8/41.10/45.3) 41.8 /41.10/45.3) Fire classifications, by type ....................................... .

401*9 Comments: 401*9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 44 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 23 B 1723 WE03 WED3 I EK2.2 I I I KA desc Knowledge of ofthe the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 /45.7) Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and 41.7/45.7) relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Unit 2 is responding to a small break LOCA in EP/2/A/5000/ES-1.2, (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization). Step 16 requires the operators to depressurize the NC system.

Which one of the following statements describes the priority and reasons for using the prescribed methods of depressurizing the NC system?

A. 1. Auxiliary spray - preferred method - does not degrade containment

2. PORV - alternate method - faster depressurization than normal spray

3. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - will not work if NC pump is not running B. 1. Pressurizer spray - preferred method to be used if NC pump is running

2. PORV - alternate method - better than auxiliary spray

3. Auxiliary Spray - method of last resort - too slow and may thermal shock the spray nozzles and degrade regenerative heat exchanger C. 1. PORV - preferred method - rapid depressurization rate

2. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - next most rapid depressurization rate

3. Auxiliary spray - method of last resort - too slow and may thermal shock the spray nozzles D. 1. Auxiliary spray - preferred method - does not degrade containment

2. Pressurizer spray - alternative method - will not work if NC pump is not running

3. PORV - method of last resort - will rupture PRT and degrade containment environment Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 45 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 23 B General Discussion Step 16 ofES-l.2 ofES-1.2 uses nonnal pressurizer spray, if available. If spray is unavailable, a PZR PORV is used. Ifno PORVs are available, then NV I aux spray is used.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe aux spray is preferred to PZR PORV due to possible reseating problems and pressurizer spray is too slow. PZR PORV is the alternative method Answer B Discussion ICorrect: Per ES-l.2 step 16 Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe PZR PORV preferred for rapid pressure reduction. Pressurizer spray preferred over aux spray Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe aux spray is preferred to pressurizer spray because ofaof a more rapid depressurization and pressurizer spray preferred over PORV due to possible res eating problems Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 NRC Q28 (Bank 228)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided ES 1.2 and ERG Background Document ES-l.2 step 14

~ OPT Approved page 17 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved I QuestionBank # IKA_system KA system IKA_number I 1723 WE03 17231WE03 EK2.2 IEK2.2 I KA desc Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7/45.7) Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 46 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 24 A 1724 I WE08 WEOS I EK3.1 I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5! 41.10, 45.6, 45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

A large steam line break occurred on Unit 1 and due to a failure of all MSIVs to close, the crew entered EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pr-essurized Thermal Shock).

Which part of the reactor vessel is most susceptible to failure for this accident sequence and what is the reason that it is most susceptible?

A. Inner reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the inner wall during the cooldown B. Inner reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the inner wall during a subsequent heatup after the S/Gs fully depressurize

c. Outer reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the outer wall during the cooldown D. Outer reactor vessel wall; because the temperature gradient across the reactor vessel wall and the pressure stress is additive and highest at the outer wall during a subsequent heatup after the S/Gs fully depressurize Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 47 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 24 A General Discussion Stress Profiles 1)

I) Heatup a) Pressure stress is higher on inner wall than outer wall.

Thennal gradient during heatup causes tensile stress on outer wall b) Thermal wal1 (cooler), compressive stress on inner wall.

C) The compressive stress on the inner wal1 wall effectively cancels portion of the pressure stress. Causes a lower total tensile stress on the inner wall.

Vessel inner wall is further from allowable stress values.

2) Cooldown a) Pressure stress profile is the same as for heatup.

Thennal gradient during cooldown causes tensile stress on inner wal1, b) Thermal wall, compressive stress on outer wall.

wall due to Delta T reinforces the tensile stress due to pressure. This causes higher total tensile stress on inner C) The tensile stress on the inner wal1 wal1. The Vessel is closer to allowable wall. al10wable stress values.

3. Since total stress is higher on the vessel inner wal1 wall on cooldown than heatup, cooldown is more limiting wall during the cooldown due to the pressure stress being additive to the temperature gradient stress.

Summary: Stresses are highest at the inner wal1 Answer A Discussion ICorrect: Per discussion above Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on heatup and cooldown.The inner vessel wall wal1 is correct but during cooldown, not subsequent heatup Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on vessel inner wal1 wall or outer wall. Correct reasons, outer vessel wall is incorrect Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may be confused on which vessel wall wal1 and whether during cooldown or subsequent heatup Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

PTS

~

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system

\KA_system IKA number

\KA_number I\

17241WE08 IEK3.1 II KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized ThermalThennal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5 141.10,

/41.10, 45.6, 45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 48 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # !KA_system IKA system IKA_number II QUESTION 25 D 1725 II WE13 WE 13 II EK3.1 I KA desc Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure) 41.5 /41.10, (CFR: 41.5! 41.10, 45.6,45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of I temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Given the following:

1A S/G pressure is 1212 psig and increasing

The crew has implemented EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.4 EP/1/A15000/FR-H.4 (Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities)

1A S/G level is approximately 18% N/R level

Operators have been dispatched to manually operate the 1A S/G PORV

1. How will 1A S/G indicated level initially respond when the PORV is opened?

2. What is the reason for this response?

A. 1. Indicated level will initially decrease

2. Increased voiding in the S/G downcomer region will cause a "shrink" phenomenon B. 1. Indicated level will initially increase

2. Increased voiding in the S/G downcomer region will cause a "swell" phenomenon C. 1. Indicated level will initially decrease

2. Increased voiding in the S/G tube bundle area will cause a "shrink" phenomenon D. 1. Indicated level will initially increase

2. Increased voiding in the S/G tube bundle area will cause a "swell" phenomenon Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 49 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 25 D General Discussion normal power operation, steam voids are fonned During nonnal formed in the tube bundle region of the Steam Generator. The amount of voiding present is dependent on steam pressure, power level, and feedwater temperature. As these voids fonn form or collapse, water is displaced into or out of the downcomer region where level is sensed.

SHRINK occurs when a transient occurs that results in a DECREASE in steam voiding. This appears as a rapid DECREASE in NIR S/G level.

SWELL occurs when any transient occurs that results in an INCREASE in steam voiding. It appears as a rapid INCREASE in indicated N/R S/G level.

At 1175 psig FR-H.4 is entered. When the S/G PORV is opened the indicated S/G level will swell due to increased voiding in the tube bundle region.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may be confused on shrink and swell as well as the tube bundle area and the downcomer region Answer B Discussion Plausible: Swell will occur but not due to increased voiding in the downcomer down comer region Answer C Discussion Plausible: Although voiding in the tube bundle region will increase, this will not result in swell, not shrink Answer D Discussion Correct: When the S/G PORV is opened the indicated S/G level will swell due to increased voiding in the tube bundle region and water is displacement into the down comer region.

downcomer Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed IFE 0 OPT Approved FR-H.4 0 OPS Appro";'ed ApproVed 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I L 1725IWE13 IEK3.1 I

KA desc Knowledge ofofthe the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

/41.10, 45.6, 45.13) Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of (CFR: 41.5 141.10, temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 50 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 26 B 1726 WE14 EA2.1 I I I KA_desc KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

(CFR: 43.5/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Which one of the following specifies the minimum condition(s) that would require a RED path entry into EP/1/N5000/FR-Z.1 (Response to High Containment Pressure)?

A. 3 psig containment pressure alone B. 15 psig containment pressure alone C. 3 psig containment pressure combined with no NS trains indicating flow D. 15 psig containment pressure combined with no NS trains indicating flow Monday, October 19,2009 Page 51 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 26 B General Discussion 15 psig red path is entered regardless ofNS status Answer A Discussion Plausible: NS initiation setpoint for high containment pressure. Student may believe high containment pressure requires entering FR -Z.l due to FR-Z.l procedure title Answer B Discussion Correct: 15 psig is the entry requirement for FR-Z.1 FR -Z.1 Answer C Discussion Plausible: NS initiation setpoint for high containment pressure. Student may believe high containment pressure without NS in service requires entering FR -Z.l due to procedure title and no containment spray available FR-Z.l Answer D Discussion Plausible: 15 psig is the entry requirement, this is independent ofNS of NS status. Student may believe NS being unavailable is part of entry conditions for FR-Z.l forFR-Z.1 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed F-O

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA KA_system system IKA_number I 1726WE14 17261WE14 EA2.1 IEA2.1 I KA desc detennine and interpret the foIIowing Ability to determine following as they apply to the (High Containment Pressure)

/45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal (CFR: 43.5 145.13) abnonnal and emergency operations.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 52 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 27 B 1727 I WE15 I I EA1.2 I KA desc Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding) 41.7/45.5/45.6)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 /45.6) Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

A large break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. The S/G sample valves must to be opened to verify a S/G tube leak does not exist.

Which of the following does not need to be RESET to allow the S/G sample valves to be opened?

A. Phase A B. Phase B C. KC NC NI NM St D. CA SYS VL V CTRL Monday, October 19,2009 Page 53 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 27 B General Discussion The KC,NC,NI,NM St RESETs are specifically designed to prevent spurious valve repositioning due to containment flooding. The steam generator sample valves have a separate reset. A separate reset is required because a containment Phase A signal disables the open circuits for these valves to prevent them from spuriously repositioning due to containment flooding. Phase B is not required, but the student may think this is a Phase B signal to close the NM valves.

To allow these valves to be operated, Phase A, CA SYS VL VLVV CTRL, and KC,NC,NI,NM St signals must be reset Answer A Discussion Plausible: Phase A signals ARE required to be reset Answer B Discussion Correct: Phase B is NOT required to be reset Answer C Discussion Plausible: KC,NC,NI,NM St signals ARE required be reset Answer D Discussion (Plausible:

IPlausible: CA SYS VL V CTRL IS required to be reset Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-l

~ OPT Approved 0

D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1727WE15 EA1.2 KA desc Ability to operate and 1/ or monitor the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.7/45.5/45.6) Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

ofthe 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 54 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 28 A 1728 I SYSOO3 I II K4.04 II KA desc Knowledge ofRCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Adequate cooling ofRCP motor and seals ...........................

What of the following states the system that provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump motor bearings and a signal that will isolate that cooling water from the pump?

A. KG KC provides cooling water and isolates on a Phase B signal B. KG KC provides cooling water and isolates on a Safety Injection signal G.

C. YV provides cooling water and isolates on a Phase B signal D. YV provides cooling water and isolates on a Safety Injection signal Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 55 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 28 A General Discussion KC provides the cooling to the motor bearings but YV provides cooling to the NCP motor stator. Phase B acuation on Hi-Hi containment pressure (3psig) isolates KC to NCP supply and return valves Answer A Discussion Correct: KC provides the cooling to the motor bearings and Phase B acuation on Hi-Hi containment pressure (3psig) isolates KC to NCP supply and return valves Answer B Discussion Plausible: KC does provide cooling. Some containment components KC cooling are isolated on a Phase A signal (NCDT and excess letdown)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: YV does not supply the NCP motor bearings, but does isolate on a Phase B signal Answer D Discussion Plausible: YV provides cooling to the NCP motor stator. Student may believe cooling is isolated on an SI signal Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NCP lesson

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA jKA system jKA number IKA Ij I 728ISYS003 1728ISYSOO3 IK4.04 I

KA desc Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Adequate cooling ofRCP ofRCPS of RCP motor and seals .......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 56 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number I QUESTION 29 B 1729 I SYS004 I A4.08 A4.0S I KA~

KA desc I Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 4117 /45.5 to 45.8) 41/7 145.5 45.S) Charging ....................................................... II Unit 2 was operating at 100%. Given the following:

. 2AD-7, Cf4 C/4 "NCP Seal Water lo Flow" is LIT

2AD-7, Ef1 E/1 "Charging Line Hillo Hi/lo Flow" is LIT

2AD-7, E/2 Ef2 "Regen Hx letdn Hi Temp" is LIT

Charging flow meter indicates 0 gpm Which single failure would cause all the symptoms noted above?

A. NC loop A cold leg temperature has failed low B. Charging flow input signal to 2NV-294 has failed high C. The pressurizer level master has failed low D. The pressurizer level master has failed high Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 57 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 29 B General Discussion Charging Flow failing high will cause 2NV -294 to "see" that 1)I) it meets the minimum required flow (47 gpm) and 2) charging flow is greater than required by the PZR Level Master. End result of this will be 2NV-294 will be fully closed in AUTO. This will result in the given symptoms.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may have a misconception concerning input to pzr reference level. Tcold failing low and subsequent decrease in charging due to decrease in reference level Answer B Discussion Correct: Charging flow input failing high with 2NV-294 in "auto" will result in the given symptoms Answer C Discussion Plausible: The pzr level master failing low would result in low charging flow (47 gpm) and high letdown temperature alarms Answer D Discussion Plausible: The pzr level master failing high would result in maximum charging output, possible misconception concerning the effects of ofthe the level master failure high or low Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2007 NRC Q31 (Bank 831)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AD-7

~ OPT Approved ILE NV D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1729SYS004 A4.08 KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 4117 / 45.5 to 45.8) Charging ...................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCSDCSDCS Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 58 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 30 B 1730 I

[ SYS005 I

[ A4.05 I[

KA desc KA Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) Position ofRWST recirculation valve (locked when not in use, continuously monitored when in use) ..........................

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

For current conditions, what is the normal position of 1NO-33 (NO Sys Rtn To FWST) and how is this position administratively controlled?

A. Closed; white tagged in position B. Closed; locked in position C. Open; white tagged in position O. Open; locked in position Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 59 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 30 B General Discussion Originally asked to be replaced because this is a manual valve. Frank said that pump mini flow could be considered as recirc to meet this KIA miniflow KJ A and to re-evaluate. Later stated that we should try to meet it with ND33.

This valve is normally closed and locked in position (refer to PTIO/B/4700/30).

PT/01B14700/30).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Correct position. White tags are commonly used for contiguration control in some plant modes Answer B Discussion Correct: This valve is normally closed and locked in position (refer to PT/01B14700/30).

PTIO/B/4700/30).

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is normal recirc flowpath and this valve is open at times during shutdown ops. White tags are commonly used for configuration control in some plant Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is normal recirc flowpath and this valve is open at times during shutdown ops. Locked is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ND OP (Page 70 of pdt)

~ OPT Approved PT/0IB/4700/40 PTIOIB/4700/40 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number JI 1730lSYS005 IA4.05 I KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 I145.5 45.5 to 45.8) Position ofRWST recirculation valve (locked when not in use, continuously monitored when in use) ......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 60 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 31 B 1731 I SYSOO5 I K1.13 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following foIIowing systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) SIS ............................................................

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a large break LOCA occurred. Given the following:

FWST level is 35%

All automatic actions have occurred

No operator actions have occurred

1. Which ECCS pump(s) are taking suction from the containment sump?

2. Which NC cold legs are the NO pumps currently injecting into?

A. 1. NO pumps only

2. Band C NC cold legs B. 1. NO pumps only

2. All 4 cold legs C. 1. NV pumps, NI pumps, NO pumps

2. Band C NC cold legs O. 1. NV pumps, NI pumps, NO pumps

2. All 4 cold legs Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 61 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 31 B General Discussion On the auto swap, only the ND pump suction aligns to the containment sump from the FWST. The NI and NY NV pumps remain on the FWST and additional operator action is required to swap them to the cont sump (via the ND pump discharge). ND injects to all four cold legs on CLR, however during HLR, ND only injects into B Band and C hot legs.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: ND pumps are correct with auto actions complete and no operator action. B and hot legs are used for ND hot leg recirc Answer B Discussion Correct: ND pumps are correct with auto actions complete and no operator action and will be injecting into all 4 cold legs Answer C Discussion Plausible: This would be correct if operator actions had occurred (NY and NI indirectly from the ND pumps). B and hot legs are used for ND hot leg recirc Answer D Discussion Plausible: This would be correct if operator actions had occurred (NV (NY and NI indirectly from the ND pumps). All pumps will be injecting into to all 4 cold legs Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NI lesson

~ OPT Approved E-O ES-1.3 0D OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17311SYSOO5 1731iSYSOO5 K 1.13 iIKl.l3 JI KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) SIS ...........................................................

401-9 Comments:

401*9 401*9 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 62 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 32 A 1732 I SYSOO6 I A1.07 I KA_desc KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5) Pressure, high and low ............................................

41.5/45.5)

Unit 1 has experienced a steam line break accident. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The operating crew has completed EP/1/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

NC pressure initially decreases to 1400 psig

Safety injection termination criteria has been met and the crew is preparing to transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination)

NC pressure is 2200 psig and increasing Per Enclosure 1 of E P/1 IA/5000/E-2, at what NC pressure will 1NV -202B and 1NV-203A (NV Pumps A&B Recirc Isol) be closed as NC pressure initially decreases and at what NC pressure will they be reopened as NC pressure subsequently increases to provide protection to the NV pumps?

A. Closed at <1500 psig decreasing and re-opened at >2000 psig increasing B. Closed at <1500 psig decreasing and re-opened at >1955 psig increasing C. Closed at <1620 psig decreasing and re-opened at >2000 psig increasing D. Closed at <1620 psig decreasing and re-opened at >1955 psig increasing Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 63 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 32 A General Discussion Per enclosure 1I the valves are closed ifNC pressure is <1500 psig and NY NV SI S1 flowpath is aligned and are reopened at NC pressure> 2000 psig .

Answer A Discussion Correct: Per E-2, enclosure 1,I, the recirc valves are closed ifNC pressure is <1500 psig and NV SI S1 flowpath is aligned and are reopened at NC pressure> 2000 psig .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Valves are closed ifNC pressure is <1500 psig and NV SI S1 flowpath is aligned. 1955 psig is the setpoint for permissive pennissive P-II P-ll and is close to the required >2000 psig Answer C Discussion

(~I 00 psig conservatism) the shutoff head for the NI Plausible: 1620 psig is procedurally (-100 N1 pumps and is close to the required <1500 psig. l Reopening at >2000 psig is correct Answer D Discussion

(~IOO psig conservatism) the shutoff head for the NI Plausible: 1620 psig is procedurally (-100 N1 pumps and is close to the required <1500 psig. 1955 psig is the setpoint for pennissive permissive P-II P-ll and is close to the required >2000 psig Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

E-2

~~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17321SYS006 1732ISYS006 IAI.07 IA1.07 I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls (CPR: 41.5/45.5) Pressure, high and low ........................................... .

including: (CFR:

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 64 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 33 D 1733 II SYSOO6 II K5.06 II KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5! 45.7) Relationship between ECCS 41.5/45.7) flow and RCS pressure ...................

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred at Time O. Given the NC System pressure trend shown below:

2500

.,u

~

Ii-2000

.,......u

s

J Ii-

~

1500 D-

~

E u

1;; 1000 1:

~

1; u

z 500 o

o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .11 11 lime (minutes)

Time Which of the following describes when each of the ECCS pumps listed begins to inject flow into the NC system?

NI Pumps NO Pumps ND A. Between 0 and 1 minute Between 8 and 9 minutes B. Between 1 and 2 minutes Between 8 and 9 minutes C. Between 0 and 1 minute Between 9 and 10 minutes O.

D. Between 1 and 2 minutes Between 9 and 10 minutes Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 65 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 33 D General Discussion NI shutoff head is 1536, ND shutoff head is 195.

MODIFIED PER FRANK E. COMMENTS 9/14/09 Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shutoff head ofNI and ND are higher or misinterpret the graph Answer B Discussion Plausible: NI will begin injecting at ~ 1.5 minutes. Student may believe shutoff head ofND is higher or misinterpret the graph Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shutoff head ofNI is higher or misinterpret the graph. ND will begin to inject at ~ 9.7 minutes Answer D Discussion Correct: NI will begin injecting at ~ 1.5 minutes and ND will begin to inject at ~ 9.7 minutes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed ND

~

~ OPT Approved NI 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system .IKA IKA_system IKA_number number I 17331SYS006 IK5.06 I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) 41.5 145.7) Relationship between ECCS flow and RCS pressure .................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 66 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 34 B 1734 II SYSOO7 I I K5.02 II KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following foIIowing concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Method offorming of forming a steam bubble in the PZR ........................

Unit 1 has completed NC fill and vent activities following a forced outage. Given the following:

A nitrogen blanket was placed on the pressurizer during the outage

NC level is 85% in preparation for drawing a bubble in the pressurizer

1. What is the limit on pressurizer heat up rate per Selected Licensee Commitment 16.5-4 (Pressurizer)?

2. What indication verifies nitrogen venting is complete while drawing a bubble in the pressurizer?

press urizer?

A. 1. 100°F per hour

2. PRT temperature equalizes with Pzr steam space temperature B.

8. 1. 100°F per hour

2. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase C. 1. 200°F per hour

2. PRT temperature equalizes with Pzr steam space temperature D. 1. 200°F per hour

2. PRT level increases without a corresponding PRT pressure increase Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 67 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 34 B General Discussion PZR heatup rate per SLC 16.5-4 is 100 degrees Flhour. PRT pressure and level indications are used to determine when all N2 has been vented from the pressurizer during bubble formation. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase Answer A Discussion Plausible: 100 Flhr is correct pzr heatup rate. PRT temperature equal to pzr steam space temperature may be logical to the student based on steaming the PZR to the PRT Answer B Discussion Correct: PZR heatup rate per SLC 16.5-4 is 100 degrees Flhour. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: 200 Flhr is the pzr cooldown rate per SLC 16.5-4. PRT temperature equal to pzr stearn steam space temperature may be logical to the student based on steaming the PZR to the PRT Answer D Discussion Plausible: 200 Flhr is the pzr cooldown rate per SLC 16.5-4. N2 venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW o Developed Development References Student References Provided OP/lIAl61001001, OP/1/A/61001001, enclosure 4.1. NOTE prior to step

~ OPT Approved 2.43. SLC 16.5-4 OOPS Approved o NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system JKA IKA_system IKA_number number I 17341SYS007 IK5.02 I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications ofthe of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5 145.7) Method ofofforming steam forming a stearn bubble in the PZR ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 68 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 35 B 1735 SYSOO8 Al.03 A1.D3 I I I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 4l.5/45.5)

/45.5) CCW pressure ...................................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3. Given the following:

1AD-6, E/1 (NCP A Thermal Barrier KC Outlet HilLo Flow) is LIT

The flow trend below:

100

~

3: 90

.2

..Q u...

LL.. 80

.....Q)

70

l

.l 0 60 Q)

.- E Q)

~;:: t:

- 50 t:: 0-

'- 0..

ro OJ) rn -

m ro

-tl.O 40 30 E

Q) 20

..t::.

J::

I- 10 u

~

0 o0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 Time (seconds)

1. At what time on the above graph should 1 KC-394A (NC Pump 1A Therm Bar Otlt) have automatically closed?

2. If the NCP 1A thermal barrier can not be isolated from the KC System by any means, how is over pressurization of the KC surge tanks prevented?

A. 1. 100 seconds

2. The KC surge tanks vent line is large enough to prevent over pressurization B. 1. 130 seconds

2. The KC surge tanks vent line is large enough to prevent over pressurization C. 1. 100 seconds

2. The KC surge tanks relief valve to the KC drain sump is large enough to prevent over pressurization D. 1. 130 seconds

2. The KC surge tanks relief valve to the KC drain sump is large enough to prevent over pressurization Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 69 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 35 B General Discussion Thennal Thermal barrier tube rupture Thermal barrier KC outlet valve will auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay)

Thennal Overpressurization of surge tanks is prevented by vent piping design size Correct flow and time delay required Reliefvalves Relief valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization Answer A Discussion Plausible: The correct flow has been reached but not for 30 seconds. Overpressurization of surge tanks is prevented by vent piping design size is correct Answer B Discussion Correct: Thermal barrier KC outlet valve will auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay). Overpressurization of surge tanks is prevented by vent piping design size Answer C Discussion Plausible: The correct flow has been reached but not for 30 seconds. Relief valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization, this not true for the KC surge tank Answer D Discussion Plausible: Thermal barrier KC outlet valve will auto close at >/= 60 gpm for 30 seconds (time delay). Reliefvalves Relief valves are typically used to prevent tank overpressurization,this not true for the KC surge tank Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed KC lesson plan and lAD-6 ARP

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II 17351SYS008 IA1.03 I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) 41.5 /45.5) CCW pressure .................................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 70 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA jKA system IKA jKA number Ij QUESTION 36 A 1736 SYSOI0 K6.01 I I I KA desc Knowledge of ofthethe effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7) Pressure detection systems Unit 2 was operating at 100%. Given the following:

Pressurizer pressure select switch is in the 3-2 position

Channel 3 pressurizer pressure fails low

Pressurizer heaters energize Assuming no operator action, what is the response of the pressurizer pressure control system as pressure increases?

A. No pressurizer PORVs will open and the reactor will trip on pressurizer high pressure B. 2NC-34A (NC PORV) will open when needed and pressurizer pressure will oscillate between 2315 psig and 2335 psig C. 2NC-32B and 2NC-36B (NC PORVs) will open when needed and pressurizer pressure will oscillate between 2315 psig and 2335 psig D. Pressurizer sprays open and pressure oscillates between 2260 psig and 2310 psig, PORVs will not be required to control pressure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 71 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 36 A General Discussion For this failure, channel 3 is controlling channel and will cause PORV 34A to remain closed on actual high pressure. Also Ch 3 blocks NC32 and NC36. Therefore no PORVs are available to respond to high pressure. The heaters will pressurize the NC system until the Rx trip setpoint is reached.

Answer A Discussion Correct: With channel 3 as the controlling channel, PORV 34A will remain closed on actual high pressure. Also Ch 3 blocks NC32 and NC36.

Therefore no PORVs are available to respond to high pressure resulting in hi press Rx trip Answer B Discussion Plausible: IfNC34 opened, then the effect noted would be correct. Ch 3 failed low prevents NC34 from opening Answer C Discussion Plausible: IfNC32 and NC 36 opened then the effect noted would be correct. Ch 3 blocks NC32 and NC36 Answer D Discussion Plausible: Sprays would normally open, do not open because they are controlled by Ch 3. Normally Ch 1 is the controlling channel.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided IPE

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 1736!SYSOIO 17361SYSOIO !K6.01 IK6.01 !I KA desc Knowledge ofthe of the effect ofa of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7) Pressure detection systems 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCS DCS DCS DCSDCS Monday, October 19,2009 Page 72 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA number system IKA_number IKA_system I QUESTION 37 B 1737 I SYS012 I K6.10 K6.l0 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect ofa ofthe of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7/45/7) 41.7/4517) Pennissive Permissive circuits Unit 1 is increasing power at 55%. Given the following conditions:

1A NC pump spuriously tripped

Both reactor trip breakers are closed

1. Which permissive enables a reactor trip on the loss of one NC pump?

2. For the conditions above, should a reactor trip have automatically occurred?

A. 1. P-7

2. Yes B. 1. P-8

2. Yes C. 1. P-7

2. No D. 1. P-8

2. No Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 73 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 37 B General Discussion On increasing power, P-8 (2/4 PR >/= 48%) enables the lout of 4 loop loss of flow (2/3 flow ch.) Rx trip. Also on increasing power, P-7 (2/4 PR >/= 10%) unblocks the 2 out of 4 loop loss of flow (2/3) Rx trip. With reactor power at 55% the Rx should automatically trip.

Per TS 3.3.1 bases:

In MODE 1I above the P-8 setpoint, a loss of flow in one RCS loop could result in DNB conditions in the core. In MODE 1I below the P-8 setpoint, a loss of offlow flow in two or more loops is required to actuate a reactor trip because of the lower power level and the greater margin to the design limit DNBR.

Answer A Discussion Plausible:Student Plausible: Student may believe P-7 unblocks 1 loop loss of flow. The Rx should trip automatically Answer B Discussion Correct: P-8 is the correct permissive and the Rx should trip automatically Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe P-7 setpoint is higher and Rx trip is not required Answer D Discussion Plausible: P-8 is the correct permissive. Student may believe P-8 setpoint is higher and Rx trip is not required Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed IPX lesson

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system JKA IKA_system number

]KA_number I]

l737jSYS012 17371SYSOl2 IK6.10 I I

KA desc Knowledge of ofthe the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7/45/7) Permissive circuits 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 74 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 38 B 1738 I SYSOl3 SYS013 I K5.02 I KA desc KA_desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Safety system logic and reliability ..................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and reducing NC pressure and temperature for a refueling outage.

Given the following:

Pressurizer pressure channels indicate at follows:

o Channel 1 is 1972 psig o Channel 2 is 1985 psig o Channel 3 is 1965 psig o Channel 4 is 1951 psig

Assuming pressurizer pressu rizer pressure channel 2 fails "as-is" at 1985 psig while the other channels of pressurizer pressure continue to track NC pressure as it decreases How many of the remaining operable pressurizer pressure channels are required to be below the P-11 setpoint before "ECCS TRN AlB PZR PRESS" can be blocked?

A. 1 of the other 2 remaining channels that input P-11 B. 2 of the other 2 remaining channels that input P-11 C. 1 of the other 3 remaining channels that input P-11 D. 2 of the other 3 remaining channels that input P-11 Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 75 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 38 B General Discussion There are 4 channels of pzr pressure for trip logic. CH 4 does NOT input P-II ofpzr P-ll logic, only channels I, 1, 2 and 3. 2/3 channels less than P-II P-l1 (1955 psig) cause the P-II P-ll light on S1I19SII19 to light (block pennissive).

permissive). Since there are only 2 channels left (1 (I and 3) that input P-II, P-ll, both must be less than P-II P-ll to allow the pennissive.

permissive. Possible misconception of requiring 2/4 logic Answer A Discussion Plausible :Ifthe

1fthe student thinks that Ch 4 inputs P-II P-ll , then this would be correct.

Answer B Discussion Correct: Channels 1,2 1, 2 and 3 input P-Il.P-I1. 2/3 channels less than 1955 psig cause the P-II P-ll light on SI/19 S1I19 to light (block pennissive).

permissive). Since there are only 2 channels left (I (1 and 3) that input P-II, P-ll, both must be less than P-II P-Il to allow the pennissive.

permissive.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: There are only 2 remaining channels that input P-II, P-ll, but almost all other permissive signals have 4 channels Answer D Discussion Plausible: There are only 2 remaining channels that input P-II, P-ll, but almost all other pennissive permissive signals have 4 channels. This would be correct if Ch 4 were the failed channel.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.3.2

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA II 117381SYS013 738lSYS013 lK5.02 IK5.02 I KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications ofthe of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) Safety system logic and reliability ................................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 of 201 Page 76 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number I QUESTION 39 A 1739 JI SYS022 I A2.01 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.3 /45.13) 41.5/43.5/45.3 /45.l3) Fan motor over-current Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. Given the following events and conditions:

1A,1 B, and 1C Lower Containment Ventilation Units (LCVU's) are in service

LCVU 1B fan trips on over-current

Lower containment average temperature is 11rF 11 rF and slowly increasing Based on the conditions above, what is the first action OP/1/A/6450/001 (Containment Ventilation (VV) Systems) specifies to provide additional cooling to lower containment?

A. Start 1D LCVU in LOW speed B. Place 1A and 1C LCVUs in "MAX" cooling only C. Place 1A and 1C LCVUs in "MAX" cooling and HIGH speed D. Start 1D LCVU in HIGH speed and place 1A and 1 C LCVUs in HIGH speed Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 77 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 39 A General Discussion Per Enclosure 4.11, when additional units are available, they should be placed on in LOW speed. If no additional units are available, then the available units should be placed in HIGH speed. System operation has changed within the last 2 years to operate in MAX cooling mode all the time.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Per OP/l/N6450/001 Enclosure

,--C_o_rr_e_ct_:_P_er_O_P_Il_I_N_6_4_S_0_IO_O_l_E_n_c_lo_s 4.11, when

_u_re_4._1_1_, idle LCVUs are available, they should be placed on in LOW speed._ _._ _ _ _ _ _--.-JI' w_h_en_id_le_L_C_V_U_s_a_r_e_a_va_i_la_b_le_,_th_e_y_s_h_o_ul_d_b_e_p_l_ac_e_d_o_n_i_n_L_O_W_s_p_e_ed_.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: This is the normal alignment (MAX), but selecting "Max Cool" was a correct action in the past.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This would be the first action if these were the only available LCVUs.

ifthese Answer D Discussion Plausible: If an idle LCVU is not available, 2 of the operating LCVUs are placed in HIGH SPEED per enclosure 4.11. Since 1ID Ifan D LCVU is available, no units would be started in high speed as a first action Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed

References:

~ OPT Approved OPII IN64S0100 II Encl4.11 OP/1/N6450/00l/

VV lesson plan D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA IKA number I I

17391SYS022 IA2.01 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts ofthe of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.S ofthose 41.5 I/43.5 43.S I/45.3 4S.3 14S.13)

/45.13) Fan motor over-current 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 78 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system JKA_number IKA_number I QUESTION 40 D 1740 SYS022 K3.02 I I I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) Containment instrumentation readings ...............................

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Initial lower containment average temperature was 103°F

All YV flow to containment was lost

Current lower containment average temperature is 116°F and increasing

1. What are the Technical Specification temperature range limits for lower containment temperature based on current plant status?

2. What affect does a higher containment temperature have on indicated pressurizer level?

A. 1. 60°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be lower than actual level B. 1. 60°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be higher than actual level C. 1. 100°F - 120°F

2. indicated level will be lower than actual level D. 1. 100°F-120°F 100°F -120°F

2. indicated level will be higher than actual level Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 79 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 40 D General Discussion This KA is met because it appears to be asking about containment conditions deteriorating and affects on instruments based on that. pzr level is affected by containment temperature since its reference leg is in containment.

Containment temperature limits are 100-120 in Mode 1 and 60-120 in modes 2, 3, 4. Actual level will be lower than indicated level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, it will have the effect on the DP cell similar to increasing pzr level.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If student thinks Mode 2,3 and 4 limits apply. If student thinks level effect is reverse Answer B Discussion Plausible: If student thinks Mode 2,3 and 4 limits apply. Indicated level will be higher than actual level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, indicated level will increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: Mode 1 Containment temperature limits. If student thinks level effect is reverse Answer D Discussion Correct: Containment temperature limits are 100-120 in Mode 1. indicated level will be higher than actual level because as the reference leg heats up and becomes less dense, indicated level will increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

TS 3.6.5

~

~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved I QuestionBank #lKA system IKA IKA IKA number II 1740lSYS022 IK3.02 II KA desc Knowledge of ofthe the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41. 7 /45.6) Containment instrumentation 41.7/45.6) readings .............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 80 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # jKA system 1741 I SYS025 IKA jKA number I

I A3.02 Ij I

QUESTION 41 c KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ice condenser system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Isolation valves Which one of the following parameters provides an input to the automatic close signal for 1NF-228A (NF Supply Containment Isolation Valve)?

A. glycol flow B. refrigerant compressor oil pressure C. glycol expansion tank level D. refrigerant compressor suction pressure Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 81 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 41 c General Discussion (lNF-228A) is located outside containment and closes on:

The NF supply containment isolation (INF-228A)

1) A loss of air or power

2) An St signal.

3) A Low-Low expansion tank level.

NF-228A is controlled from the control room. A key switch is provided on the local NF control panel to allow the Low-Low Expansion Tank 11NF-228A Level interlock to be bypassed. Meets the KA because these are parameters that could be monitored to determine when NF228A closes or why it closed.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor. Student may believe 1NF-228A INF-228A closes on high or low flow Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 1NF -228A closes for chiller protection. This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor.

NF-228A Answer C Discussion Correct - 1NF-228A 1NF-228A closes on glycol expansion tank 10-10 level.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 1I NF-228A closes to prevent system perturbation. This condition will trip the refrigerant compressor.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2004 NRC Q22 (Bank 1222)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided Lesson Plan Objective: CNT-NF SEQ 3

~ OPT Approved

References:

1. OP-CN-CNT-NF pages 12-13 D

OOPS OPS Approved o

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17411SYS025 IA3.02 I KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ice condenser system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Isolation valves 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 82 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system IKA_number number JI QUESTION 42 A 1742 I SYS026 I A2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) Failure of automatic recirculation transfer ...........................

Unit 1 was at 100% power when a LOCA occurred. The automatic and manual swap to CLR failed and the crew implemented EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 EP/1/N5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). The following conditions were noted:

The reactor trip and safety injection occurred 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago

Containment pressure was 11.2 psig

FWST level has decreased to 4.9%

In addition to securing ND pumps, what additional pumps (if any) are required to be secured per EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1?

EP/1 /A/5000/ECA-1.1?

A. All NI pumps, all NV pumps and all NS pumps B. All NI pumps, all NV pumps and all but one NS pump C. All NI pumps, all but one NV pump and all NS pumps D. No additional pumps are required to be secured Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 83 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 42 A General Discussion On the swap to CLR at 37% FWST level, the crew would enter EP/lIA/5000IES-1.3 EP/1/Al5000IES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation). At step 2 they would enter the RNO and take action to secure the ND pumps and get the containment sump suctions aligned. When step 5 is reached they would dispatch operators to manually align the containment sump suctions to ND and go to EP/lIAl5000IECA-1.1 EP/1/Al5000IECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation). In step 3 d RNO they are sent to step 4 and at step 6 RNO they determine the FWST is less than 5% and are sent to step 33 where they secure all ECCS Pumps, remove Sequencer Control Power and remove NS Pump Control Power Fuses.

11.2 psig containment pressure would require 1 NS pump in service per ECA-l.1 ECA-1.1 step 7, but all pumps are secured when FWST level is < 5%

Answer A Discussion Correct: Since ND pumps have been secured, NI,NY, NI,NV, and NS are still operating aligned to the FWST and are required to be secured also Answer B Discussion Plausible: NI and NVNY pumps will be secured. Student may believe 1 NS pump is required to be in service due to the 11.2 psig containment pressure Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe one NV pump is left on to minimize flow until other sources can be used, but at 5% FWST level all pumps must be secured.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe remaining pumps need to be in service. 5% FWST level= -20,000 gallons Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2006 NRC Q43 (Bank 649) o Developed Development References Student References Provided o OPT Approved EPI1IA15000IES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg

1. EP/1/Al5000IES-1.3 Recirculation)

OOPS Approved EPI1/AI5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Em

2. EP/1/Al5000IECA-1.1 Emergen ergen o NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 117421SYS026 7421SYS026 IA2.02 JI KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 /43.5 145.3

/45.3 145.13)

/45.13) Failure of automatic recirculation transfer .......................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 84 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 43 A 1743 SYS039 Al.09 I I I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: (CFR: 4l.5 41.5/45.5)

/45.5) Main steam line radiation monitors .................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 preparing for a startup when 1EMF-27 (Steamline (8teamline 1 B) comes into 1B)

Trip 2 alarm.

Assuming a large tube leak had occurred on 1B S/G, 8/G, what additional EMF(s) would also be expected to be in a Trip 1 or Trip 2 alarm at this time?

A. 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) only B. 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) and 1EMF-28 (Steamline (8teamline 1C) 1C) only C. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) and 1EMF-72 (S/G (8/G B Leakage) only D. 1 EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust), 1EMF-72 (S/G (8/G B Leakage), and 1EMF-73 (S/G (8/G C Leakage)

Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 85 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 43 A General Discussion 71, 72, 73, 74 do not register.

In Mode 3 the N16 monitors 71,72,73,74 Answer A Discussion Correct: In Mode 3 only lEMF-33 and lEMF-27 (given) would be available for detection ofa tube leak Answer B Discussion Plausible: If the student believes that there is shine associated with the Steamline monitors (26,27,28,29) but this applies to the N16 monitors only.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: IfN-16 monitors were active this would be correct but lEMF-73 would likely also be in alarm.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: N-16 monitors do not alarm in Mode 3 but at power this would be correct.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed E-3 0 OPT Approved E-3 background document SM 0 OPS Approved NC 0 NRC Approved PC QuestionBank # IKA system lKA IKA_system IKA_number number II l7431SYS039 17431SYS039 IA1.09 I Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) Main steam line radiation monitors ................................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 86 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA jKA system jKA_number IKA number Ij QUESTION 44 B 1744 I SYS039 I 2.2.37 I KA desc Ij SYS039 GENERIC Ability to detennine operability andlor and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7/43.5 41.7 143.5/45.12)

/45.12)

I Unit 2 is in Mode 3 at full temperature and pressure. Given the following status of 2SV-19 (S/G 2A PORV) nitrogen bottle pressures:

Bottle #1 - 1970 psig

Bottle #2 - 2165 psig What action (if any) is required for 2SV-19 per Selected Licensee Commitment 16.10-1 (Steam Ventto Atmosphere)?

A. No action is required as long as Bottle #2 remains greater than 2100 psig B. Immediately take action to restore the nitrogen supply to operable status only C. Immediately enter the applicable conditions of Technical Specification 3.7.4 (S/G PORVs) only D. Immediately take action to restore the nitrogen supply to operable status and immediately enter the applicable conditions of Technical Specification 3.7.4 (S/G PORVs)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 87 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 44 B General Discussion Per SLC 16.10-1, N2 pressure lower limit per bottle is 2100 psig. If BOTH bottles are less tha 2100, the PORV is inoperable per TS. Ifonly If only one is below 2100 then SLC 16.10-1 Condition A is the only commitment action applicable.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe no action is necessary for 1I bottle < 2100 psig Answer B Discussion Correct: With 1 bottle < 2100 psig, condition A of SLC 16.10-1 applies

!Correct:

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This is the one correct action for Condition B ofSLC 16.10-1 for both bottles < 2100 psig, but Condition A would also apply concurrently Answer D Discussion Plausible: These are the correct actions to take for both bottles < 2100 psig, Conditions A and B per SLC 16.10-1 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW D Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed SLC 16.10-1

~

~ OPT Approved TS 3.7.4 D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system 1744SYS039 1744 SYS039 2.2.37 KA desc SYS039 GENERIC Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7/43.5 /45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 88 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1745 I SYS059 IKA number IKA_number I A4.0S I

I QUESTION 45 c KA desc II I

Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.S) Feed regulating valve controller I I

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 95% power

The crew is performing steps per AP/2/A/5500/006 (Loss of S/G Feedwater)

Case III, DFCS Not In Auto

2CF-37 (S/G 2B CF Ctrl) feedwater regulating valve is in automatic

2CF-39 (S/G 2B CF Byp Ctrl) feedwater regulating bypass valve is in manual

2B steam generator level is 69% and slowly decreasing Which of the following actions will be performed to return 2B steam generator level control to automatic and results in a bumpless transfer?

A. Decrease 2CF-39 by 5% and ensure 2CF-37 moves in the open direction Depress manual for 2CF-37 and 2CF-39 Depress automatic for 2CF-37 and 2CF-39 B. Ensure 2CF-39 demand is 100% and S/G level is stabilized within 2% of setpoint Depress automatic for 2CF-39 only C. Ensure 2CF-39 demand is 100% and S/G level is stabilized within 2% of setpoint Depress manual for 2CF-37 and 2CF-39 Depress automatic for 2CF-37 and 2CF-39 D. Increase 2CF-39 by 5% and ensure 2CF-37 moves in the closed direction Depress automatic for 2CF-39 only Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 89 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 45 c General Discussion Based on ensuring that there is no transient when the valves are returned to automatic. It is required that levels be within 2% and that the bypass be fully open (normal position at this power level). Both valves must have manual depressed and then auto depressed for proper operation. 2B S/G level is slowly decreasing because level is slightly high and it is decreasing to the narrow range level setpoint AP-06 step 9

a. VerifY ICF-37 (S/G IB CF Ctrl) IN AUTOMATIC.

AP-06 step 10

10. Ensure feed reg bypass valves in automatic and DFCS tracking logic reset as follows:

CF -39 (S/G IB IF IICF-39 I B CF Byp Ctrl) has been in manual at any time during this event, THEN perform the following for S/G IE: IB:

a. IF reactor power greater than 90%,

THEN ensure ICF-39 (S/G IB CF Byp Ctrl) demand - AT 100%.

B. IF reactor power less than or equal to 90%, THEN ensure ICF-39 I CF-39 (S/G IB CF Byp Ctrl) demand AT SETPOINT DETERMINED BY PLANT ENGINEERING.

C. Ensure S/G IB NIR level WITHIN 2% OF S/G N/R LEVEL SETPOINT.

D. Ensure S/G IB NIR level- STABLE.

E. Place IICF-37 CF-37 (S/G 1B IB CF Ctrl) in manual.

F. Momentarily depress ICF-39 (S/G IB CF Byp Ctrl) "MAN" pushbutton.

G. Place ICF-39 in automatic.

H. Place IICF-37 CF-37 in automatic.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Decreasing 2CF-39 by 5% would verifY the reg valve is operating properly. Returning the valves to auto in this fashion would be a bumpless transfer if iflevel level was stable and within 2% of setpoint Answer B Discussion Plausible: Ensuring 2CF-39 demand is 100% and level is stable within 2% correct. Student may believe depressing 2CF-39 only is all that is required, but both valves must have manual depressed and then auto depressed for proper operation Answer C Discussion ICorrect: Per AP/06 procedure steps Answer D Discussion Plausible: Decreasing 2CF-39 by 5% would verifY the reg valve is operating properly. Student may believe depressing 2CF-39 only is all that is required, but both valves must have manual depressed and then auto depressed for proper operation Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 NRC Q41 (Bank 445)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed IFE D

0 OPT Approved AP 121Al5 5001006 Case 3 Enc1 AP/2/A/5500/006 Encl44 D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # [KA IKA system [KA_number IKA number I 17451SYS059 jA4.0S IA4.08 I KA desc 41.7 I 45.5 to 45.S)

Ability to manually operate and monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 45.8) Feed regulating valve controller Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 90 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 45 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DeS Des Des Des c

Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 91 of of201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank #lKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 46 D 1746 I SYS061 I 2.4.20 I KA desc I SYS061 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.13) 41.10/43.5/45.13)

I Unit 2 was operating at 100% power when a loss of offsite power occurred and the transient resulted in a reactor trip. Given the following conditions and sequence of events related to the CA system 30 minutes after the initial event:

Train "A" CA has been RESET

"B" CA could not be RESET and a maintenance crew is investigating Train "8"

The CA common suetion suction piping from condensate grade sources ruptures

2AD-5, E/1 "CA Pumps Train A Loss of Norm Suet" Suct" is LIT

2AD-5, E/2 "CA Pumps Train 8 B Loss of Norm Suet" Suct" is LIT How will the CA system respond after 5 seconds?

A. 2A CA pump trips CAPT #2 trips 2B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system 28 B.

8. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system CAPT #2 suction shifts to the RN system 2B CA pump trips 28 C. 2A CA pump suction shifts to the RN system CAPT #2 trips 28 2B CA pump trips D. 2A CA pump trips CAPT #2 suction shifts to the RN system 2B CA pump suction shifts to the RN system 28 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 92 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 46 D General Discussion This is testing the NOTE prior to step 1 of Case II of AP/06 When RESET, CA behaves as a manual trip. On low suction pressure >5 seconds the CA trains that have been reset will trip and the CA trains that have not been reset will swap suction source. CAPT needs BOTH trains reset to be considered "reset".

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If the student believes A train reset only is required for CAPT. 2A pump will trip and 2B will swap to RN Answer B Discussion Plausible: If the candidate believes reset allows suction swap Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the candidate reverses the logic Answer D Discussion Correct: With train B not reset, 2B and CAPT#2 will shift on low suction pres surer >5 sec and with train A reset and low suction pressurer >5 sec, 2A will trip.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2003 NRC Q5 (Bank 205)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed CA

~ OPT Approved AP/06 D

0 OPS Approved IAD-S ANNUNC RESP 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1746 SYS061 2.4.20 KA desc SYS061 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 4l.l 0/43.5/45.13) 41.10/43.5/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 93 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 47 D 1747 I SYS062 I A3.01 I I I KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Vital ac bus amperage Given the following:

28 DIG automatically started due to the incoming breaker to 2ET8 spuriously opening

While monitoring DIG operating parameters, the crew notes that DIG 28 "VOLTS" is 4000 V

Voltage is adjusted to normal How will 28 DIG output "AMPS" and "P/F" indications respond to this adjustment?

AMPS P/F A. increase less lagging

8. increase stay the sam same e C. decrease less lagging D. decrease stay the same Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 94 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 47 D General Discussion Students must understand that the DIG is not in parallel and that voltage must be adjusted UP. When voltage is increased, DIG lETA amps decrease. This has no effect on Power Factor. This is OE from an NLO who was attempting to control power factor while operating in isochronous mode.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Voltage needs to be increased. Student may unsure of direction for adjustment to normal voltage and of voltage and current relationship. Power factor is unaffected Answer B Discussion Plausible: Voltage needs to be increased. Student may unsure of direction for adjustment to normal voltage and of voltage and current relationship. Power factor will be unaffected Answer C Discussion Plausible: Amps will decrease as voltage is increased, but power factor is unaffected Answer D Discussion Correct: Amps will decrease as voltage is increased and power factor will be unaffected Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q47 (Bank 553)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

DG3 lesson DG3lesson

~ ~ OPT Approved 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17471SYS062 IA3.0l IA3.01 I I

KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including: (CFR: 41.7 145.5) Vital ac bus amperage 41.7/45.5) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 95 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKAIKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 48 B 1748 I SYS062 I K2.01 K2.0 1 I KA desc 1I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Major system loads ............................................. . 1I Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

All systems are properly aligned and in service for current plant conditions

A fault on transformer 1T1 8 B caused the 1TB and 1TO short side incoming breakers to open 0 pen Which one of the following describes the status of the 1Band 10 NC Pumps (NCP) and how power to 1TB and 1 1TO TO is restored to normal alignment?

A. NCPs 1 1BBand and 10 are tripped; buses 1TB and 1TO are automatically transferred back once the fault is cleared B. NCPs 1B 1Bandand 10 are running; buses 1TB and 1TO are manually transferred back once the fault is cleared C. NCPs 1B and 10 are tripped; buses 1TB and 1TO are manually transferred back once the fault is cleared O. NCPs 1Band 10 are running; buses 1TB and 1TO are automatically transferred back once the fault is cleared Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 96 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 48. B General Discussion Transfonner 1I TIB supplies the short side of 1I TB and 1I TD. The short side of 1I TB and 1I TD supply 'B' and ""D"" reactor coolant pumps respectively. The short side incoming breakers in this situation are tripped by a Zone B lockout. This would cause the tie breakers to rapidly close on all four tour 6.9KV switchgear (l(I TA, 1TB, 1TC, and 1TD), preventing a Rx trip on NCP undervoltage or NCP underfrequency. This requires manual transfer back to the nonnal breaker after the fault condition is cleared and the lockout is reset.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe busses are deenergized and the bus will transfer back to nonnal automatically once the fault is cleared Answer B Discussion Correct: Tie breakers will rapidly close on all four 6.9KV switchgear (1 TA, TA, 1TB, 1TC, and 1TD) and busses will remain energized. Restoration to nonnal alignment is perfonned manually Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe busses are deenergized. Restoration to nonnal alignment is perfonned manually Answer D Discussion Plausible:Tie breakers will rapidly close on all four 6.9KV switchgear (l(1 TA, 1TB, 1TC, and 1TD) and busses will remain energized. The student may believe the bus will transfer back to nonnal automatically once the fault is cleared.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q22 (Bank 99)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPA

~ OPT Approved EPB 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system 1748 SYS062 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Major system loads ............................................ ..

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 97 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 49 D 1749 I SYS063 I K2.01 I KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Major DC loads ................................................ . I What is the power supply for the main turbine emergency bearing oil pump (ESOP)?

A. 120V AC S. 125V DC C. 208V AC D. 250V DC Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 98 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 49 D General Discussion

!ThiS

[ThiS comes from DPD(250vdc)

Answer A Discussion Plausible: This is approximate voltage but AC Answer B Discussion IPlausible: I A DIG DC fuel oil booster pump uses this supply Plausible:1A Answer C Discussion Plausible:This is switchyard aux power voltage, approximate voltage but AC Answer D Discussion ICorrect: - comes from DPD DC bus

/Correct:

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPJ

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1749 SYS063 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Major DC loads ................................................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 99 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 50 D 1750 SYS063 K3.01 II II II KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) ED/G Unit 1 is operating at 100% power. Given the following:

1AD-11, A/8 "125VDC Diesel Gen A Control Pwr Sys Trbl" is LIT

1AD-11, 8/7 B/7 "DIG 1A 1A Panel Trouble" is LIT

The reflash module indicates"1 DGCA supply to DG Control Panel 1A open"

1A DIG Panel alarm E/5 "Loss of DC Control Power" is LIT What affect (if any) will this condition have on the start capability of the 1A DIG?

A. None, 1/A DIG will start on an automatic start signal or manually as designed B. 1A DIG will start on an automatic start signal but can not be started manually C. 1A DIG can be started manually but will not start on an automatic start signal D. 1A DIG will not start manually or on an automatic start signal Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 100 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 50 D General Discussion IA DIG has a loss of DC control power,lfthe power.Ifthe Diesel Generator is shutdown, there is no DC power available to the starting solenoids. The diesel generator will wiII not start.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the IA DIG is unaffected Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe IIA A DIG wiII will start on an automatic signal, IIA A DIG cannot be started manually manuaIly Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe IIA A DIG can be started manuaIly, manually, IA I A DIG will not start on an automatic signal Answer D Discussion Correct: With a loss of DC control power, if the Diesel Generator is shutdown, there is no DC power available to the starting solenoids.The diesel generator will wiII not start.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPL 0D OPT Approved DGI DGIA ann resp E/5 D

0 OPS Approved EQB D

0 NRC Approved I AD-II annunciator resp QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I I750lSYS063 1750lSYS063 IK3.0I IK3.01 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system wiII will have on the foIlowing:

following: (CFR: 41.7 145.6) ED/G EDIG 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 101 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # [KA system IKA

[KA number II QUESTION 51 D 1751 I SYS064 I K4.01 I KA desc Knowledge ofED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Trips while loading the ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed) ...............

Unit 1 was in Mode 3 when 1ETA experienced a blackout. Given the following:

The 1A DIG started and was sequencing on loads per the accelerated sequence

Half way through the accelerated sequence, the fuel racks stuck in an open position causing DIG speed to exceed the overspeed trip setpoint

1. What is the setpoint for the DIG overspeed trip?

2. For the conditions stated above will the DIG trip?

A. 1. 495 rpm

2. No B. 1. 495 rpm

2. Yes C. 1. 517.5 rpm

'1.

2. No D. 1. 517.5 rpm

2. Yes Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 102 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO 'NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 51 D General Discussion The DIG overspeed trip is at 115% (517.5 rpm) of normal speed (450 rpm). The main turbine trips at 110% of normal speed) 450*1.1=

450*1.1 =

495rpm. Overspeed is an emergency trips. On an auto start, ONLY emergency trips will trip the DIG, for manual starts emergency or non-emergency trips will trip it.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe overspeed is 110% of normal (450) and overspeed is not an emergency trip Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe overspeed is 110% of normal (450). The lA I A DIG will trip on overspeed (emergency trip)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: This is the correct overspeed setpoint. The student may believe overspeed is not an emergency trip Answer D Discussion ICorrect: The DIG overspeed trip is at 115% (517.5 rpm) of normal speed (450 rpm). The IA DIG will trip on overspeed (emergency trip)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed DG3

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA number IKA_number I 17511SYS064 IK4.01 I KA desc Knowledge ofEDIG ofED/G system design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Trips while loading the EDIG ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed) .............. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 103 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 52 A 1752 I SYS073 I A2.01 A2.0l I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use reet, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 procedures to cor- rect, /45.3/45.13) 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13) Erratic or failed power supply ......................................

Unit 1 was operating at 50% power when a power spike causes a 1EMF-33 (CSAE EXHAUST) Trip 2 alarm.

What manual operator actions (if any) are required to place systems affected by this EMF alarm in their post alarm condition per OP/1/B/61 00101 OX (Annunciator Response to Rad iatio n Mo nitoring Panel 1RAD-1 )

A. Swap "Unit 1 CSAE EXH" discharge from "UNIT VENT" to "AUTO" B. Close 1BB-48 (BB Pumps Disch to TB Sump)

C. Close S/G Sam Sample pie valves D. No manual actions are required Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 104 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 52 A General Discussion On trip 2, the BB valves close and the NM valves close. The ZJ must be swapped manually to AUTO. We are associating "predict" with what will and will not position automatically.

Answer A Discussion Correct: On trip 2, the BB valves close and the NM valves close. ZJ must be swapped to V VAA (aux building ventilation) manually to placing the switch in AUTO (normal position is "Unit Vent").

Answer B Discussion Plausible:This valve automatically closes Answer C Discussion IPlausible: NM sample valves auto close.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: If the student believes ZJ automatically swaps to V A (aux building ventilation)

Job Level Cognitive level Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed lRAD-l ARP IRAD-I

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17521SYS073 IA2.01 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose of those malfunctions or operations: (CPR:

(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 41.5/43.5 /45.3/45.13) Erratic or failed power supply ..................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 105 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA 1753 I SYS076 IKA_number I

number K2.01 K2.0l I

I QUESTION 53 c KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Service water ................................................... .

I 2B RN pump is normally powered from:

A. 6900V bus 2TB long side B. 6900V bus 2TD long side c.

C. 4160V bus 2ETB D. 4160V bus 2FTB Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 106 of of201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 53 c General Discussion These are all possible loads for "B" train large motors.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. Condensate and RC pumps come off the long side of both 2TD and 2TB Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. Condensate and RC pumps come off the long side of both 2TD and 2TB Answer C Discussion ICorrect: 2B RN pump power supply is 2ETB Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this large motor is supplied from this buss. 2 of 3 Main fire pumps come off the 4160 V blackout buss.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q53 (Bank 559)

~ Development References IStudent References Provided

~ Developed EPC lesson D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1753 SYS076 K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

41. 7) Service water ................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 107 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number JI QUESTION 54 D 1754 j SYS078 I I I K3.02 1I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the lAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) Systems having pneumatic valves ofthe and controls ........................

Unit 2 automatically tripped from 100% power and the crew entered EP/2/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection). Given the following:

Both trains of CA SYS VL V RESET have been "RESET" and CA flow has been throttled to maintain proper S/G levels

20 minutes after the reactor trip, a complete loss of VI pressure occurs How long (if at all) can CA flow continue to be controlled using the CA flow control valves, and when control is lost, how will CA flow be affected?

A. CA flow control is lost immediately and then CA flow will decrease B. CA flow control is lost immediately and then CA flow will increase C. CA flow control will be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and then CA flow will decrease D. CA flow control will be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and then CA flow will increase Monday, October 19,2009 Page 108 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 54 D General Discussion CA flow control valves fail open on a loss of air pressure. These valves have their own air accumulators that allow control to be maintained for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months when VI is lost. Once accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase.

Decreasing is plausible because other feed water sources to the S/Os fail closed (CF).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may not take into account the VI air accumulators that will last for an hour. Control is not immediately lost. Once the air accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may not take into account the VI air accumulators that will last for an hour. Control is not immediately lost. Once the air accumulators deplete, the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer C Discussion Plausible: The air accumulators have depleted after an hour and CA flow control is lost, but the valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Answer D Discussion Correct: The air accumulators have depleted after an hour and CA flow control is lost. The valves will fail open and from the throttled position per the stem, flow will increase Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~~ Developed AP/22

~

~ OPT Approved CA 0 OPS Approved OOPS o0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # JKA_system jKA system jKA number IKA_number Ij 17541SYS078 IK3.02 I I

KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the lAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 145.6) Systems having pneumatic valves and controls ......................

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 109 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system 1755 IKA system I SYSI03 SYS103

[KA_number IKA I

number K1.01 I

I QUESTION 55 c KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 /! 45.7 to 45.8) CCS ...........................................................

At 1000, a secondary steam leak occurred in the Unit 2 containment. The crew has started a controlled shutdown using AP/2/A/5500/009 AP/2/A/55001009 (Rapid Downpower).

Containment pressure and temperature trends indicate:

Time Temperature Tem perature Pressure 1000 113°F 0.15 psig 1005 11 rF 117°F 0.31 psig 1010 119°F 0.42 psig 1015 122°F 0.48 psig 1020 126°F 0.65 psig 1025 129°F 0.91 psig During which time period did the Lower Containment Ventilation Units (LCVUs) cooling water bypass valve (full flow valve) automatically open?

Assume no manual operator actions have been taken related to LCVU operation.

A. Between 1005 and 1010 B. Between 1010 and 1015 C. Between 1015 and 1020 D. Between 1020 and 1025 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 110 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 55 c General Discussion The LCVU bypass valve will be opened by an operator selecting HIGH speed on each LCVU or when containment pressure reaches 0.5 psig.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: 0.3 psig is the old CPCS permissive signal Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the cooling units start on high temperature (l20F (120F is the TS cont hi temp)

Answer C Discussion Correct: The LCVU bypass valve will be opened by an operator selecting HIGH speed on each LCVU or when containment pressure reaches 0.5 psig.

Answer D Discussion Plausible:0.9 psig is the current CPCS permissive signal Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NS D

0 OPT Approved VV AP/009 D

0 OPS Approved AP128 AP/28 D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_number number I 17551SYSI03 1755ISYS 103 IK1.01 JI KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections andlor and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8) CCS .......................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 111 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number !I QUESTION 56 B 1756 I SYSOOI I K2.01 II KA desc I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CPR:

(CFR: 41.7) One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets....................... . I Unit 1 was in Mode 3 with shutdown banks withdrawn in preparation for startup.

Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The 1TXS is isolated for transmissions inspection

A fault on the short side of 1TC occurs Which MG set(s) has/have a power supply available and what is the current status of the shutdown banks?

A. Only 18 1B MG set; shutdown banks are inserted 8.

B. Only 18 1B MG set; shutdown banks are withdrawn C. 1A and 18 1B MG sets; shutdown banks are inserted D. 1A and 18 1B MG sets; shutdown banks are withdrawn Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 112 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 56 B General Discussion MG sets are powered from LXC (IA)(1A) and LXD (1B). In this case lTC I TC short faults and the alternate power supply from IlTXS TXS is isolated.

Therefore all power to 1IA A MG set is lost as well as power to I C NCP. There is no reactor trip required either manually or automatically due to an NCP loss in this condition <<P-7). 1B I B MG set will continue to be powered from lLXD.

I LXD. Therefore the shutdown banks would still be withdrawn.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that 1B IB MG set is energized but IC NCP trip causes a Rx trip Answer B Discussion Correct: IB MG set continues to be powered from ILXD, but MG set IA loses power. There is no reactor trip required either manually or auotmatically due to an NCP loss in this condition <<P-7).

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that power is available to both MG sets and 1lC C NCP trip causes a Rx trip.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that power is available to both MG sets and shutdown banks will still be withdrawn Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q56 (Bank 562)

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EPA 0D OPT Approved IRE 0

D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1756 SYSOOI I756SYSOOI K2.01 KA desc Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) One-line diagram of power supply to MIG sets....................... .

401-9 401*9 Comments: 401*9 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 113 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA system QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 57 B 1757 I SYSOO2 I Kl.07 I I

KA KA_desc desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) Reactor vessel level indication system ..............................

What is the RVLlS LR level that corresponds to the top of the core?

A. 41%

B. 54%

c.

C. 61%

D. 70%

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 114 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 57 B General Discussion KJA replaced.

Original KIA The coreis core is shown to be from 23 to 54% on the lower-range meter. 41 % and 61 % are used in the core cooling CSF procedure as key levels. 70%

is the top of scale for the lower range but the upper range goes from 60% to 120% so an operator may think that 70% is top of core.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: <41 % is used in F-O for determination ofFR-C procedures Answer B Discussion Correct: 54% corresponds to the top of the core on RVLIS RVLlS Answer C Discussion Plausible: 61 % is used in FR-C.1 verifY adequate core cooling FR-C.l to verify Answer D Discussion Plausible: This is the top of scale for RVLlS IPlausible: RVLIS LR level Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided D Developed CCM

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17571SYS002 IK1.07 I KA desc Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) Reactor vessel level indication system ............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 115 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1758 I SYSOll IKA number A2.11 I

QUESTION 58 c I I I I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3 41.5/43.5 /45.3/45.13)

/45.13) Failure of PZR level instrument - low ...............................

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Given the following indications:

PZR level control in the 1-2 position

PZR level channel 1 fails low

1. What affect does this failure have on the NV system?

2. What is one of the actions AP/2/A/55001012 (Loss of Charging or Letdown) will direct in response to this failure?

A. 1. Charging flow decreases to 0 gpm

2. Swap PZR level control to the 3-2 position B. 1. Charging flow decreases to 47 gpm

2. Manually control2NV-309 control 2NV-309 (Seal Water Inj Flow) for 32 gpm seal flow C. 1. Charging flow increases to maximum

2. Swap PZR level control to the 3-2 position D. 1. Charging flow increases to maximum

2. Manually control 2NV-309 (Seal Water Inj Flow) for 32 gpm seal flow Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 116 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 58 c General Discussion ChannellI failing low causes a letdown isolation and pzr Ch.l is the controlling channel and channel 2 is the backup channel. Channel Pzr level master seeing 0% level. This results in charging flow demand to maximum.

Procedure API12 AP/12 is used because letdown isolates. Charging flow will be reduced to 32 gpm per AP/I2, 2NV -309 will control automatically AP/12, and 2NV-309 to achieve 32 gpm seal flow.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may think with letdown isolation and level increasing level master will take charging flow to O. AP112/, Case II will direct swapping to alternate operable channel (3-2)

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may think with letdown isolation and level increasing level master will take charging flow to the lowest flow the level master will call for (i.e. 47 gpm). 2NV-309 is will be controlled in auto Answer C Discussion Correct: Channell Channel I failing low causes a letdown isolation and pzr level master seeing 0% level. This results in charging flow demand to maximum. AP112/, Case II will direct swapping to alternate operable channel (3-2)

Answer D Discussion Channel I failing low causes a letdown isolation and pzr level master seeing 0% level. This results in charging flow demand to Plausible: Channell maximum. 2NV-309 will be controlled in auto Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ILE D0 OPT Approved 1lad-6 ad-6 ann resp AP/ll D0 OPS Approved ap/12 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_numbernumber I 17581SYSOIl 175SlSYSOll IA2.11 I

KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use ofthe procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 145.3 145.13) Failure of PZR level instrument - low .............................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCS DCS DCS DCSDCS Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 117 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 59 D 1759 I SYS016 I I K3.04 I KA desc Knowledge of the effectthat effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) MFW system Unit 2 was operating at 65% power when IAE work caused two Feedwater Header Pressure signals to fail low.

How is the following equipment affected by this failure?

CF Main Reg valves

CF Bypass Reg valves

CFPT Master Controller

CFPT Slave Controllers A. CF Main Reg valves and CF Bypass Reg valves fail to manual, CFPT Master controller and CFPT Slave Controllers remain in automatic B. CF Main Reg valves and CF Bypass Reg valves remain in automatic, CFPT Master controller and CFPT Slave Controllers fail to manual C. CF Main Reg valves, CF Bypass Reg valves and CFPT Master controller fail to manual, CFPT Slave Controllers remain in automatic D. CF Main Reg valves, CF Bypass Reg valves, CFPT Master controller and CFPT Slave Controllers fail to manual Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 118 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 59 D General Discussion Feedwater header pressure is one of the unit parameters that if a sufficient number of input signals fail, it will place all the controllers it affects in manual. Feedwater header pressure affects CF main Reg valves and bypasses, because it inputs S/O S/G DIP, which is used to adjust valve position.

Feedwater header pressure also affects feed pump speed, because actual S/OS/G DIP is compared with program DIP to adjust CFPT speed.

Therefore on failure of2 feedwater header pressure instruments low, all reg valveslbypasses and feed pump speed controllers will swap to manual.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Reg valves do fail to manual, but feed pumps do not remain in automatic. Student may believe CFPTs are unaffected Answer B Discussion Plausible: Reg valves fail to manual, and feed pumps fail to manual. Student may believe reg valves/bypasses valveslbypasses are unaffected Answer C Discussion Plausible: Reg valves fail to manual, and feed pumps fail to manual. Student may believe CFPT slave controllers are unaffected Answer D Discussion Correct: With 2 feedwater header pressure instruments failed low, all reg valveslbypasses and feed pump speed controllers will swap to manual.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW D Developed Development References Student References Provided IFE D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17591SYS016 IK3.04 I KA desc Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NNIS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) MFW system 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE DCS DCSDCSDCS DCS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 119 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1760 IKA I SYS028 IKA IKA I

number K6.01 II I

QUESTION 60 c KA KA desc Knowledge of the effect ofa of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: (CFR: 41.7/45.7) Hydrogen recombiners A large LOCA occurred on Unit 1. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

CONDITIONS at 1100

Containment hydrogen concentration of 6.2%

Containment pressure is 5.3 psig

1A Hydrogen Recombiner was placed in service per OP/1/N6450/01 OP/1/A/6450/010 0 (Containment Hydrogen Control Systems)

CONDITIONS at 2100

During the previous hourly temperature check, an NLO discovered the 1A 1A Hydrogen Recombiner breaker had tripped

Containment hydrogen is 3.2%

Containment pressure is 3.5 psig

1B Hydrogen Recombiner pre-heating is complete and an NLO has called the control room for guidance on adjusting power output

1. What minimum approval was required to place 1A 1A Hydrogen Recombiner in service at 1100? 11 OO?

2. To what approximate power output should 1B Hydrogen Recombiner be adjusted at2100?

Reference provided A. 1. OSM approval

2. 53 KW B. 1. OSM approval

2. 59 KW C. 1. TSC approval

2. 53 KW D. 1. TSC approval

2. 59 KW Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 120 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 60 c General Discussion TSC approval is required prior to placing a hydrogen recombiner in service with H2 conc > 6%. The output is adjusted per Data Book Figure 10 and with 3.5 psig in containment, the value read off the chart is 53 KW. If the A recombiner line is used, power will be adjusted too high (59 KW).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe only OSM approval is necessary. 53 Kw is correct Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe only OSM approval is necessary. 59 Kw is obtained if the student uses the lA recombiner that tripped Answer C Discussion Correct: Requires TSC approval, 53 Kw is correct using B recombiner Answer D Discussion Plausible: Requires TSC approval. 59 Kw is obtained if the student uses the lA recombiner that tripped Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OPI l!N645 0/0 10 encl4.10 OP/1/Al6450/010 Databook Figure 10

~ OPT Approved Databook Figure 10 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_system IKA_number IKA number II 11760lSYS028 760lSYS028 IK6.01 I

KA desc of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: (CFR: 41.7 I145.7)

Knowledge of the effect ofa 45.7) Hydrogen recombiners 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 121 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I QUESTION 61 A 1761 I SYS033 I K4.04 I I I KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CPR: 41.7) Maintenance of spent fuel pool radiation Workers are shuffling fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool in preparation for placing some new fuel into the pool for an upcoming outage.

1. What is the minimum required spent fuel pool water level over the top of the fuel assemblies specified by Technical Specifications to meet the assumptions for iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident?

2. By design, what system provides the assured source of makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool?

A. 1. 23 feet

2. RN B. 1. 23 feet

2. RF c.

C. 1. 39 feet

2. RN D. 1. 39 feet

2. RF Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 122 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 61 A General Discussion TS 3.7.14 requires 23 feet of ofwater water above the top ofthe of the spent fuel assemblies. 39 feet is the spent fuel pool (SFP) low level alarm setpoint. The RN system is the assured makeup source, however for B5b BSb purposes, a fire pump has been purchased and the RF system is capable of using either the portable HALE pump or an RF pump to supply RF water to the SPF. However, it is not the designed assured source.

Answer A Discussion Correct: TS 3.7.14 requires 23 feet of water above the top of the spent fuel assemblies. The RN system is the assured makeup source to the SFP Answer B Discussion Plausible: 23 feet is correct. RF can be used for B.5.B B.S.B purposes, but is not the designed assured makeup Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may confuse 23 feet with 39 feet (SFP 10 level alarm setpoint). RN is assured makeup Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may confuse 23 feet with 39 feet (SFP 10 level alarm setpoint). RF can be used for B.5.B B.S.B purposes, but is not the designed assured makeup Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed KF

~ OPT Approved

~ TS 3.7.14 0 OPS Approved OOPS o0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17611SYS033 IK4.04 II KA_desc KA desc Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Maintenance of spent fuel pool radiation 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 123 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 62 B 1762 I SYS035 I Al.02 A1.02 I I I KA_desc KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) S/G pressure ....................................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 at 2235 psig and 55rF 55]DF with shutdown banks withdrawn. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Steam pressure and NC Loop temperature are noted to be decreasing rapidly

The reactor is manually tripped

Main Steam Isolation does not actuate automatically and manual actuation has failed Which of the following is a complete list of the valve groups that are ensured to be closed to compensate for the lack of an automatic or manual Main Steam Isolation?

A. MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves B. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves and S/G PORVs C. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves, S/G PORVs and CAPT steam supplies D. MSIVs, MSIV bypass valves, S/G PORVs and S/G PORV block valves Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 124 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 62 B General Discussion SM isolation setpoint is 2/3 steam pressures on 114 S/Gs < 775 psig. The operator is expected to take manual action for failed auto action. Since the S/G depressurization was not automatically terminated and manual initiation of main steam isolation was unsuccessful, the operator must manually operate and/or ensure the required valves that normally close on main steam isolation are in the closed position. The required valves are the main steam isolations, main steam isolation bypasses and PORVs.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may not think the PORV is required to isolate the steam line Answer B Discussion Correct: The required valves are the main steam isolations, main steam isolation bypasses and PORVs.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe all the correct valves and the CAPT steam supplies need to be isolated. The CAPT steam supplies are isolated in E-2 iffaulted and E-3 if ruptured Answer D Discussion Plausible:The student may believe all the correct valves and the PORV blocks need to be isolated. PORV blocks are closed to isolate failed or inadvertent operation ofPORVs Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2004 NRC Q73 (Bank 1273)

Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed SM D

0 OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number I 117621SYS035 7621SYS035 IAl.02 IA1.02 I KA desc Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5) 41.5 /45.5) S/G pressure ................................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 125 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 63 D 1763 I SYS041 I A4.07 I KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) Remote gagging of stuck open-relief valves open-reliefvalves Unit 1 was operating at 75.0% power with turbine at 900 MW. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The turbine was placed in "MW IN" for an engineering test

1S8-27 1 S8-27 (SM 8yp Cond Ctrl #27) failed to approximately 75% open

Attempts to close 1S8-27 from the control room failed and operators were dispatched to close the local manual isolation valve

Steady state conditions were reached with 1 1S8-27 S8-27 not yet isolated

The engineering test was aborted and the turbine was placed in "MW OUT"

Operators slowly closed the manual isolation valve for 1 S8-27 What are the approximate values of reactor and turbine power when steady state conditions are reached after 1S8-27 is isolated?

Assume:

Steam flow thru 1 S8-27 is approximately linear and proportional with % open

Steady state is a combined temperature error signal of approximately O°F Reactor Power Turbine Power A. 72.0% 865MW

8. 73.1% 882MW C. 76.9% 918 MW 918MW D. 78.0% 935MW Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 126 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 63 D General Discussion Requested KIA change. Discussed with Frank E and he said that we could use "isolate" as gagging to meet the KIA.

This was run on the sim and the values were about 932 MW and 77.9% power.

Must know that a condenser dump is worth 4% total steam flow and a PORV is only worth 2.5 (distractor). Also with MW IN - turbine will maintain MW (Le.(i.e. 900 MW until MW OUT is selected, at which point when the steam dump is isolated, the turbine load will get the 3% steam flow which was going through the steam dump, increasing turbine load to -935 MW) and cause reactor power to go up an additional 3% to compensate for the 3% steam flow (i.e. reactor power will increase 6% until the steam dump is isolated, and then the reactor power will decrease 3%, for a final value of78%}. The reactor and turbine power of - +1- 1.9% is ifthey if they assume a PORV 75% open rather than a condenser dump.

The lower final values are if they reverse the effects ofMW IN lOUT and how reactor responds.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: If student reverses the effects ofMW of MW IN lOUT and how reactor responds for a 75% open dump.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: If student reverses the effects ofMW IN lOUT and how reactor responds for a 75% stuck open S/O S/G PORV Answer C Discussion Plausible: If the student uses PORV steam worth for dump worth. These would be correct values for a 75% stuck open S/G S/O PORV Answer D Discussion Correct: After turbine is in MW OUT and dump has been isolated, Rx power and MW should have increased by -3 %, -78% power and -735 MW from original 75% and 900 MW Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ide

~ OPT Approved EHC ERC SM 0D OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 17631SYS041 1763!SYS041 !A4.07 IA4.07 I!

KA desc Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 145.5 to 45.8) Remote gagging of stuck open-relief valves 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 127 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemsystem IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 64 D 1764 I SYS045 I K5.01 K5.0l I I

KA KA_desc desc of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MTIB System: (CFR: 41.5 Knowledge ofthe 41.5/45.7)

/45.7) Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if ifhydrogen hydrogen purity deteriorates .......................................

What gas is first used to purge the main generator casing when the generator is shutdown for outage maintenance and what is the purpose of the purge?

A. N2 gas; to prevent condensation in the hot generator windings B. C02 gas; to prevent condensation in the hot generator windings C. N2 gas; to prevent an explosive mixture D. C02 gas; to prevent an explosive mixture Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 128 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 64 D General Discussion C02 is used to purge the casing, however N2 is an available gas that is also inert. If the student thinks that H2 and the 02 in the air will combine and condense on the hot windings of the generator when it is shut down for an outage Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe that combining H2 and 02 in high temperature environment (e.g. as in H2 recombiner) will result in water in the generator.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: C02 is correct. Student may believe that combining H2 and 02 in high temperature environment (e.g. as in H2 recombiner) will result in condensation of water in the generator Answer C Discussion Plausible: N2 is not used. Preventing an explosive mixture is correct Answer D Discussion Correct: C02 is used to prevent an explosive mixture Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EGB

~

~ OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 1764[SYS045 1764[SYS045 [K5.01

!K5.01 ![

KA desc Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MTIB System: (CFR: 41.5/45.7) ofthe 41.5 /45.7) Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if hydrogen purity deteriorates ...................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 129 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number II QUESTION 65 D 1765 I 1 SYS015 I A3,03 I 1

Md~

KA desc II Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NIS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45,5) Verification of proper functioning/operability ........................ 1 1

Given the following conditions:

An inadvertent reactor trip has occurred on Unit 1

The Control Room is performing actions in EP/1/A15000/ES-O.1 (Reactor Trip Response) when the following indications are noted:

o Intermediate Range Channel N-35 is reading 5x1 OE-11 amps and decreasing o Intermediate Range Channel N-36 is reading 1x1 OE-9 amps and stable Based on current conditions:

1. What is the status of source range instruments N-31 and N-32?

2. What operator action (if any) is required to ensure both source range instruments are energized?

A. 1. Both N-31 and N-32 are energized

2. No action is required B. 1. N-31 is energized; N-32 is not energized

2. Reset TRN B SR SELECT" only C. 1. N-31 is energized; N-32 is not energized

2. Reset "TRN A SR SELECT" and "TRN B SR SELECT" D. 1. Both N-31 and N-32 are not energized

2. Reset "TRN A SR SELECT" and "TRN B SR SELECT" Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 130 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination 'QUESTION QUESTION 65 D General Discussion P-6.(lOE-10 amps) For the case given, one ofthe Source range instruments energize automatically at P-6.(lOE-l0 of the IR instruments is hung up (presumably due to a compensation issue). In this case neither source range instrument will indicate until both trains of ofSR SR are reset. Resetting one or the other is plausible because there are some systems (i.e. CA) where resetting a single train provide partial system control.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may think only 1 IR channel below P-6 will energize the SRs .

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may think P-6 is NI related (N-35 energizes N-3l, N-31, etc) and only B train SR would require reset Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may think P-6 is NI related (N-35 energizes N-3l, N-31, etc) and both trains ofSR of SR require reset Answer D Discussion Correct: Both IR channels must be < P-6 to auto energize the SR. N-36 is undercompensated, which will require both trains ofSR to be reset Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q59 (Bank 136)

~ Development References Student References Provided M Developed ENB

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1765 SYS015 A3.03 KA desc Ability to monitor automatic operation of the NIS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5) Verification of proper functioning/operability ....................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19. 19,2009 2009 Page 131 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1766 I GEN2.1 IKA number I 2.1.3 II II QUESTION 66 c KA desc II Conduct of Operations Knowledge of shift or short-term relieftumover relief turnover practices. (CFR: 41.10/45.13) I Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

Unit 2 is in Mode 5

No reactivity changes are planned

Initially there are 2 ROs assigned to each unit

The Unit 1 BOP is preparing to leave the site but plans to retum return within an hour

An RO recently assigned to the procedure group with an active license has reported to the control room to fill-in during the BOP's absence

1. Does this situation meet the requirements for "short term relief' as specified in OMP 2-22 (Shift Turnover)?

2. Based on these conditions, how many ROs are required to meet the minimum administrative shift manning requirements of OMP 1-10 (Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements)?

A. 1. No

2. 3 B. 1. Yes

2. 3 c.

C. 1. No

2. 4 D. 1. Yes

2. 4 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 132 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 66 c General Discussion Because the replacement RO has not been part of the shift activities on this day, he cannot get an abbreviated turnover which is pennitted permitted by OMP 2-22. With both units in modes 5, 6, or no mode only 3 RO's would be required. If either unit was in mode 4 or above, then 4 would be needed. In this case 4 are needed.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The first part is correct. The requirements for short term tenn relief turnover are not met.The student may believe the 4th RO is unnecessary Answer B Discussion Plausible: The requirements for short term tenn relief turnover are not met, and the 4th RO IS required to meet shift manning for these plant conditions. The student may believe the reverse of the correct answer is true.

Answer C Discussion Correct: The replacement RO has not been part of the shift activities and therefore he cannot meet the requirements for short term tenn relief With Unit I in Mode I and Unit 2 in Mode 5, 4 RO's are required Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the short term tenn relief is OK for this situation. The 4th RO IS required to meet shift manning for these plant conditions the second part is correct.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided D Developed OMP 1-10

~ OPT Approved OMP 2-22 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1766GEN2.1 2.1.3 KA desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of shift or short-term short-lenn relief turnover practices. (CFR: 41.10/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 133 of of201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 67 B 1767 II GEN2.1 II 2.1.5 II KA desc KA Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, stafting, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR:

41.10/43.5 /45.12) 41.10/43.5/45.12)

Per OMP 1-10 (Shift Manning and Overtime Requirements), what is the minimum total number of Fire Brigade members assigned for a given shift and how many of the Fire Brigade members are designated as "first responders"?

A. 8 total with 3 being designated as first responders B. 8 total with 5 being designated as first responders

c. 10 total with 3 being designated as first responders D. 10 total with 5 being designated as first responders Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 134 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 67 B General Discussion lOis the minimum ops crew compliment per TS (NLO +RO+SRO). Also ONS uses 5 suppemental members which would be 10/5 as designated first responders. 3 is the number of supplemental (non-first responders) (NSDI12)

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only 3 of the 8 minimum assigned are designated first responders, confusing with supplemental members Answer B Discussion Correct: Per NSD 112 a total of 8 members are required and per OMP 1-10, 5 of those members must be designated as first responders Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student might confuse the total number with the total crew compliment and that only 3 of the assigned are designated first ofthe responders, Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student might confuse the total number with the total crew compliment, 5 first responders is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed OMP 1-10 0 OPT Approved NSD112 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_systemsystem IKA IKA_number number II I 7671GEN2. I 17671GEN2.1 12 .1.5

. 1.5 I1 KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR:

41.10/43.5/45.12) 41.10/43.5 /45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 135 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 68 c 1768 I GEN2.1 I 2.1.7 II KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to evaluate plant performance perfonnance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.12/45.13)

/43.5/45.12/45.13)

Unit 2 is at 100% Power when an event occurred. The following parameters were noted:

NC Tavg is 585 00 F and slowly decreasing

NC pressure is 2229 psig and slowly decreasing

Turbine load is 1195 MW and slowly decreasing

Containment humidity is 14% and stable

Steam header pressure is 965 psig and slowly decreasing

S/G levels are all at 67% NR and stable SIG

PZR level is 54% and slowly decreasing

Power Range Nls are all at 100.1% 100.1 % and slowly increasing Which one of the following is the cause of these indications?

A. Main Turbine Control Valve #4 is failing closed B. Feed leak has occurred outside containment C. Steam leak has occurred outside containment D. NC leak has occurred inside containment Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 136 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 68 c General Discussion Meets the KA because you are evaluating plant performance data and determining that a problem exists and what that problem is. Indications point to a steam leak outside containment Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some of the indications, but several would be the opposite of what is in stem.

ofthe L-___________________________________________________________________________________~

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some of the indications, but a feed leak outside would not cause Tavg or MW to drop.

ofthe Answer C Discussion Correct: These are all indications ofa of a steam leak outside containment Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this would account for some of the indications.The indications. The NC Leak does not directly affect MW or NC Temp and would increase containment humidity.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2006 NRC Q67 (Bank 673)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed APIlO

~ OPT Approved

~ AP/28 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 12 .1.7 1I 17681GEN2.1 12.1.7 KA desc Conduct of Operations Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.12/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 137 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 69 B 1769 I GEN2.2 I 2.2.1 II KA desc Equipment Control Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. (CFR: 4l.5 /41.10/43.5 /43.6/45.1) 41.5 /41.10/43.5/43.6/45.1)

The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

MODE 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure, preparing for a reactor startu p

The reactor coolant system (NC) has been diluted to the estimated critical boron concentration

1KC-132 (Letdn Hx Otlt Temp Ctrl) control is in MANUAL

All other controls are in AUTOMATIC and functioning normally

Letdown flow is decreased from 100 gpm to 50 gpm Assuming NO other manipulations, over the next hour, Source Range counts will ?

A. INCREASE due to warmer water exiting the letdown heat exchanger B. INCREASE due to cooler water exiting the letdown heat exchanger C. DECREASE due to warmer water exiting the letdown heat exchanger D. DECREASE due to cooler water exiting the letdown heat exchanger Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 138 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 69 B General Discussion A decrease in letdown temperature will result in a reduction in boron concentration at the demineralizer outlet due to increased boron ion exchange by the anion resin at lower temperatures. Positive reactivity would be added due to reduced RCS boron concentration. In November of 1996 at Turnkey Point, reactor power increased .3% over a 30 minute period as a result oflowering non-regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature. Ran on Simulator. Letdown temperature decreased by approximately 15 degrees. Students may think that because letdown is reduced (which will reduce charging (in auto)) that the regen HX will not cool LID as much going into the LID hx and offset any additional cooling by KC. This is what would make warmer plausible.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may think heat exchanger outlet temperature and ion exchange are reverse.

Answer B Discussion Correct: With KC flow maintained and letdown flow decreased, letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature will decrease, thus removing boron and increasing SR counts Answer C Discussion Plausible:Student may think heat exchanger outlet temperature is reverse Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may think ion exchange is reverse.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 NRC Q70 (Bank 474)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided OP-CN-PS-NV lesson

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system lKA number IKA I I

17691GEN2.2 12.2.1 I1 KA desc Equipment Control Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. (CFR: 41.5 !/41.10/43.5/43.6/45.1) 41.10! 43.5 ! 43.6! 45.1) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 139 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 70 B 1770 GEN2.2 2.2.25 I I I KA desc Equipment Control Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 /

41.7 //43.2) 43.2)

Per Technical Specification 2.1.2 (RCS Pressure SL):

1. What NC System valves are credited to maintain the reactor coolant system below the safety limits?

2. What are the modes of applicability of this Technical Specification?

A. 1. Pzr safety valves only

2. Modes 1,2,3 and 4 B. 1. Pzr safety valves only

2. Modes 1, 1,2,3, 4 and 5 2, 3, 4and C. 1. Pzr safety valves and Pzr PORVs

2. Modes Mod es 1,2,3 1 , 2, 3 and 4 D. 1. Pzr safety valves and Pzr PORVs

2. Modes 1,2,3,4 1 , 2, 3, 4 and 5 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 140 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 70 B General Discussion Discussed this with Frank since Basis is SRO, but he pointed out that basis of safety limits is NOT SRO only, therefore it IS RO.

Only the safetys are credited on the NC system. Mode 1-5 is the applicability.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe RCS safety limit applies in Modes 1-4 Answer B Discussion Correct: The pressurizer safety valves are the credited NC system valves per TS 2.1.2 basis and RCS pressure safety limit applies in Modes 1-5 per TS 2.12 perTS Answer C Discussion PORVss are the required NC system valves and that the RCS safety limit applies in Modes 1-4 Plausible: Student may believe safeties and PORV Answer D Discussion PORVss are the required NC system valves. Modes 1-5 applicability is correct Plausible: Student may believe safeties and PORV Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 2.1.2 and basis

~~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved OOPS oD NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # KA system IKA KA number I 1770GEN2.2 1770IGEN2.2 2.2.25 12.2.25 1 K~desc KA desc Equipment Control Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 4l.5 /

/ 43.2) 41.7 /43.2) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 141 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1771 I system IKA IKA_system GEN2.3 IKA_number I

number 2.3.14 II I

QUESTION 71 c KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /43.4 / 45.10) 41.12/43.4 Unit 1 was operating at 77% power. Given the following sequence of events and conditions:

CA pump 1A was tagged out for work

A tube rupture occurs in the 1 B S/G

The crew is isolating the 1B S/G in EP/1 /N5000/E-3 /A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

1SV-13 1 SV-13 (S/G 1B PORV Manual Ctrf) is open and the isolation valve will not close

RP reports significant contamination and radiation in the Unit 1 interior doghouse

At Step 4.b of EP/1/A/5000/E-3, EP/1 /A/5000/E-3, the steam supply to the CAPT from 1 B S/G must be isolated Which valve will be used to isolate the CAPT steam supply under the conditions stated above?

A. 1 SA-1 (Main Steam 1 1SA-1 1BB to CAPT Maint Isol)

B. 1 SA-2 (S/G 1B SM to CAPT)

C. 1SA-3 (S/G 1B SM to CAPT Stop Check)

D. CAPT #1 trip and throttle valve Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 142 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 71 c General Discussion With the IB S/G ruptured and the 1B S/G PORV intermediate and unable to be isolated, the inside doghouse area would have elevated radiation and contamination levels and would be inaccessible. The CAPT#1 CAPT# I steam supply would normally be isolated using the T&T valve if both motor driven CA pumps were available (IA is not) until 1I SA-l is closed by dispatched operators, at which time the T&T valve would be reopened to make the CAPT#1 CAPT#I available from the 1I C S/G supply. Since the doghouse would be inaccessible due to rad and contamination levels, 1SA-3 (aux bldg) would be used to isolate the IB S/G supply to the CAPT#I.

CAPT#1.

Answer A Discussion Plausible:This valve would normally be used for isolation of the CAPT but would be inaccessible in this situation Answer B Discussion Plausible:This is an air operated valve and although it is in the steam supply flowpath, it is not used for CAPT isolation purposes Answer C Discussion Correct: This valve would be used for the CAPT isolation in this situation Answer D Discussion Plausible:The T &T valve is normally closed first, but only ifboth motor driven pumps are available (lA is not) and then 1SA-l T&T SA-I would be closed (if accessible) to allow the CAPT to be supplied from 1C S/G Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2004 NRC Q3 (Bank 1203)

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided E-3

~ OPT Approved DOOPS OPS Approved oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1771 GEN2.3 2.3.14 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /43.4 /45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 143 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II

. QUESTION 72 B 1772 I I GEN2.3 II 2.3.13 II KA KA_desc desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 /45.9/45.10)

Unit 1 is operating at 75% power. An engineer needs to enter the Reactor Building pipechase area to perform some scoping work for a future modification.

Per Site Directive 3.1.2 (Access to Reactor Building and Areas Having High Pressure Steam Relief Devices):

1. What permission is required to allow entry into this area?

2. What operational modes require use of the "buddy system" for entry into the Reactor Building?

A. 1. Radiation Protection and the wee SRO

2. Modes 1 and 2 only B. 1. Radiation Protection and the wee SRO Mod es 1 , 2, 3 and 4

2. Modes

e. 1. wee SRO only

2. Modes 1 and 2 only D. 1. wee SRO only Mod es 1,2,3

2. Modes 1 , 2, 3 and 4 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 144 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 72 B General Discussion Per the SD, a buddy is required in modes 1-4. RP and the WCCSRO permission is required.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: RP and WCC SRO is correct. Student may believe a buddy is only required in Modes 1 & 2 Answer B Discussion Correct: RP and WCC SRO permission is required. Buddy system applies in Modes 1-4 Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the WCC SRO permission is required and that the buddy system only applies in Modes 1I & 2.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the WCC SRO permission is required. Modes 1-4 is correct Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed SD 3.1.2

~ OPT Approved 0

D OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 1772IGEN2.3 12.3.13 1 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12/

43.4 /45.9/45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 145 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number I QUESTION 73 D 1773 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.7 I KA desc I Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 145.10)

I 45.10) I An RWP that you are preparing to work under states that the highest dose rate in a particular area (at 30 cm) is 325 mRlhr. When you arrive in the area, a flashing yellow light is in the entry path to the area.

1. How would an area with a dose rate of 325 mRlhr be posted?

2. What is the significance of the flashing yellow light?

A. 1. Rad Radiation iation Area

2. Radiography is in progress and no entry is permitted B. 1. High Radiation Area

2. Radiography is in progress and no entry is permitted

c. 1. Radiation Area

2. The area is a "Locked" High Radiation Area and the RWP you have cannot be used to enter the area D. 1. High Radiation Area

2. The area is a "Locked" High Radiation Area and the RWP you have cannot be used to enter the area Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 146 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 73 D General Discussion Dose rates from 100-1000 mRlhr require a posting ofHIGR of HIGH radiation area. A flashing yellow light signifies that an area is a LOCKED high rad area A flashing yellow light is used for "locked high rad areas" (> 1 Rlhr) where locking is not practical.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe this area should be posted as a radiation area and the flashing yellow light signifies radiography in progress Answer B Discussion Plausible: The area should be posted high radiation area. The student may believe the flashing yellow light signifies radiography in progress Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe this area should be posted as a radiation area. It is true that the RWP could no longer be used Answer D Discussion Correct: Dose rates from 100-1000 mRlhr require a posting ofRIGR of HIGH radiation area. The RWP could no longer be used since area dose rates have increased Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NSD 507

~ OPT Approved 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1773GEN2.3 2.3.7 KA desc Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.1 0) 45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 147 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number I I

QUESTION 74 D 1774 II GEN2.4 II 2.4.21 II KA desc KA Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 /43.5/

/43.5 /

45.12)

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a complete loss of offsite power occurred.

A LOCA occurred on the transient. Given the following conditions:

1A DIG did not start and manual start attempts have failed

Containment pressure is 3.4 psig

NC subcooling is -8°F

Core exit thermocouples are 642°F

RVLlS level 37%

SIG NR levels are all 25%

CA has not been reset

CA flow is 420 gpm

IIR SUR is 0 DPM

SIR SUR is 0.3 DPM Which one of the following is the highest priority CSF at this time?

A. S UBCRITICALITY SUBCRITICALITY B. CORE COOLING C. CONTAINMENT D. HEAT SINK Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 148 of of201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 74 D General Discussion Based on conditions, SUB CRITICALITY is YELLOW, CORE COOLING is ORANGE, CONTAINMENT is ORANGE, and HEAT SINK is RED. The RED path for HEAT SINK is the highest priority Answer A Discussion Plausible: Even though this is the highest priority left to right, it is only YELLOW, so it is not highest overall.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Even though this is higher priority left to right, it is ORANGE and any RED takes priority.

Answer C Discussion Plausible:This is another orange path, and student may think that this might be red due to only one train ofNS Answer D Discussion Correct: ACC numbers for S/G levels is 29% to meet heat sink and with total CA flow less than 450 gpm, then Red Path conditions are met and this is the highest priority.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed

1. OP-CN-EP-CSF

~ OPT Approved F-O 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system lKA number IKA II 1774IGEN2.4 22.4.21

.4.21 1

I 1

KA desc Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 /43.5/

45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 149 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number I QUESTION 75 B 1775 I GEN2.4 I 2.4.29 I KA desc I Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.11)

I An offsite release is occurring due to a stuck open S/G PORVon 2C S/G which has a significant tube leak.

Which one of the following identifies:

1. The on-site emergency facility that assumes responsibility for communications with offsite agencies including the NRC once it is activated?

2. What emergency classification(s) require(s) an evacuation of all non-essential personnel?

A. 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

2. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency 8.

B. 1. Technical Support Center (TSC)

2. General Emergency only C. 1. Operations Support Center (OSC)

2. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency D. 1. Operations Support Center (OSC)

2. General Emergency only Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 150 of201 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 75 B General Discussion The TSC becomes the station's central control area for emergency response and technical management. The TSC is activated at the Alert Status and will assume responsibility for communication with offsite agencies, including NRC, after activation.

Site Evacuation may occur for Site Area Emergency and AL WAYS occurs for General Emergency, must be preceded by a Site Assembly. All non-essential site personnel should proceed to one of oftwo two Evacuation Sites based on site selection criteria.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Correct location, but student may believe an evacuation is required at SAE. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Answer B Discussion Correct: The TSC will assume responsibility for communication with offsite agencies, including NRC, after activation. Site Evacuation may occur for Site Area Emergency, but is REQUIRED for General Emergency Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the OSC is responsible for communications and an evacuation is required at SAE. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the OSC is responsible for communications. An evacuation can be done at the SAE level but is REQUIRED at the GE level.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q75 (Bank 581)

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed SEP lesson

~

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1775GEN2.4 2.4.29 KA desc Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of ofthe 41.10/43.5 the emergency plan. (CFR: 4l.l0 /45.11)

/43.5/45.11) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 151 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1776 system IKA_system II APEOO8 IKA number IKA_number II AA2.18 I!

II QUESTION 76 c KA desc KA_desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Computer indications for RCS temperature and pressure ...............

Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

A pressurizer safety valve opened and did not fully reclose

The crew manually tripped the reactor, initiated safety injection and entered EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) due to the rapid decrease in NC pressure

The following indications are noted on the OAC:

o NC pressure is 1035 psig and stable o NC Tavg is 554°F and slowly decreasing o PRT pressure is 65 psig and increasing o PRT temperature is 220° F and increasing

1. Based on the OAC indications what should the temperature be downstream of the safety valve?

2. Which overpressure relief transient was used to determine the design relief capacity of the safety valves?

A. 1. 550°F

2. NCP locked rotor B. 1. 550°F tu rbine trip

2. Main turbine C. 1. 320°F

2. NCP locked rotor D. 1. 320°F

2. Main turbine trip Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 152 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 76 c General Discussion For the leaking safety, the tailpipe temeprature is based on the saturation temperature of the pressure downstream ofthe valve which is 320 degrees based on 65 psig (80 psia). Based on the upstream pressure the temperature would be 550 degrees (this is the TMI issue). Per the basis ofTS 3.4.10, the PZR safeties were sized based on a locked rotor event. The safeties handle multiple high pressure scenarios, one of which is a turbine trip.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is the correct temperature based on upstream conditions. The event is correct.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe this is the correct temperature based on upstream conditions Even though the turbine trip is something that the safeties are designed to lift for, their capacity is not sized based on this event.

Answer C Discussion Correct: 320 F is the correct temperature for downstream conditions. Locked rotor event is correct per TS 3.4.10 bases Answer D Discussion Plausible: 320 F is the correct temperature for downstream conditions. Even though the turbine trip is something that the safeties are designed to lift for, their capacity is not sized based on this event.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW

~

Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.4.10 and Basis Steam Tables D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number II 17761APE008 IAA2.18 1776jAPE008 JI KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Computer indications for RCS temperature and pressure .............. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 153 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 77 B 1777 EPEOII EA2.02 I EPEOll I I KA desc Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 /45.13) Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection ................

Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1A NV pump trips

A dispatched operator reports an overcurrent relay has actuated on the breaker

The crew entered AP/1 IA/55001012 (Loss of Charging and Letdown)

AP/1/A/55001012

1B NV pump has just been placed in service

1. What is the current status of NV letdown?

2. Which one of the following describes the latest time that 1A 1A NV pump can be restored to prevent entering a shutdown action per Technical Specification 3.5.2 (E CCS-Operating)?

A. 1. In service

2. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B. 1. Isolated

2. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C. 1. In service

2. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months D. 1. Isolated

2. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months Monday, October 19,2009 Page 154 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 77 B General Discussion Requested a new K/ A, was asked to try again by Frank and he mentioned loss of recirc procedure specifically. Called again 10/8 after attempting KIA, to write a new question and was unsuccessful. He provided a new KA.

When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. In this situation, Tech Spec 3.5.2, Condition A, is applied and allows 72 inoperability hours of in operability before the shutdown action is entered with one train ofECCS inoperable. Two trains ofECCS are required operable in Modes 1-3. One train ofECCS consists of one charging pump, one safety injection pump, one RHR pump, and one RHR Hx.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may not realize letdown automatically isolates on loss of all charging pumps. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed per TS 3.5.2, 3.5.2 , Condition A, before Unit 1I is requiremed to be in Mode 3 in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Answer B Discussion Correct: When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. In this situation, Tech Spec 3.5.2 , Condition A, is applied and allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of inoperability before the shutdown action is entered with one train ofECCS inoperable.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may not realize letdown automatically isolates on loss of all charging pumps. Student may add the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to get to Mode 3, resulting in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Answer D Discussion Plausible: When all charging pumps are tripped, letdown automatically isolates. The student may add the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowed to get to Mode 3, resulting in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS3.5.2

~ OPT Approved API12 D

0 OPS Approved 0

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II I 777iEPEOII 1777IEPEOll IEA2.02 I

KA desc Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5/45.13) Consequences to RHR of not resetting safety injection ............... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 155 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 78 D 1778 I EPE038 I 2.4.18 I KA desc I EPE038 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10/43.1/45.13)

II Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Manual reactor trip and safety injection occurred due to a tube rupture on 2A S/G

A complete loss of offsite power occurs

All S/G pressures have been maintained stable by automatic operation of the S/G PORVs

The crew is in EP/2/A/5000/E-3 EP/21A15000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) cooling down the NC system to the required core exit temperature based on 2A S/G pressure

Current NC loop Tcolds are:

o A Loop - 245°F o BLoop - 520°F o C Loop - 526°F o D Loop - 518°F

1. What is the basis for the required core exit temperature selection?

2. What is the correct procedure flowpath for this situation?

A. 1. To ensure intact S/G pressures will remain above the main steam isolation setpoint for the NC system cooldown a and nd depressurization

2. Transition to EP/2/A/5000/FR-P.1 EP/21A15000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

B. 1. To ensure intact S/G pressures will remain above the main steam isolation setpoint for the NC system cooldown and depressurization

2. Continue in EP/2/A/5000/E-3 EP/21A15000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

C. 1. To establish and maintain subcooling for the NC system cooldown and depressurization

2. Transition to EP/2/A/5000/FR-P.1 EP/21A15000/FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

D. 1. To establish and maintain subcooling for the NC system cooldown and depressurization EP/21A15000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

2. Continue in EP/2/A/5000/E-3 Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 156 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 78 D General Discussion The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling margin. The pressure in the intact S/G's must be maintained less than the ruptured S/G in order to maintain subcooling.

Based on S/G pressure being controlled by the S/G,PORV's, S/GPORV's, the NC system would be cooled down to 520 F based on core exit thermocouples. The saturation pressure for 520F is ~825psig which is 50# > the SM isolation setpoint giving a plausible distractor.

T-cold in the ruptured loop because it may cause an invalid Integrity Status Tree condition. This With NCP's off, E-3 directs disregarding the T-cold may be due to reverse flow during cooldown or SI flow redirection during depressurization. If an orange or red path is encountered due to the ruptured S/G T-Cold T-Cold then the crew would NOT transition to P.l P.I Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the temperature is selected is to prevent a main steam isolation. The student may believe transition to FR-P.l is required, but E-3 directs disregarding the T T-cold

-co ld in the ruptured loop if ifno no NCPs are on Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the temperature is selected is to prevent a main steam isolation. Continuing in E-3 is the correct procedure flowpath Answer C Discussion Plausible: The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling sub cooling margin. The student may believe transition to FR-P.l is required, but E-3 directs disregarding the ruptured loop T-cold Answer D Discussion Correct: The core exit temperature selected is based on the lowest ruptured S/G pressure in order to establish adequate subcooling margin.

Continuing in E-3 is the correct procedure flowpath Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided EP-3 and background document,P.l document,P.1

~ OPT Approved OOPS Approved o NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system 1778 EPE038 2.4.18 KA desc EPE038 GENERIC Knowledge of ofthe the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10/43.1/45.13) 41.10 143.1/45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 157 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system jKA IKA number II QUESTION 79 B 1779 I APE054 I 2.1.30 I KA desc II APE054 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7/45.7) I Unit 1 was operating at 100% power and Unit 2 was in No Mode when terrorist explosions resulted in a total loss of switchyard 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago. Given the following events and conditions:

1A D/G failed to start

The terrorists have broken through the security fence and taken control of the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)

The OSM orders an evacuation of the control room due to the ongoing security threat per AP/1 /A/5500/017

/A/5500/0 17 (Loss of Control Room)

1. Which Unit 1 CA pump(s) is/are currently available and can be controlled from the location to which the crew is evacuated?

2. What is the current emergency classification for this situation?

Reference provided A. 1. CAPT #1 only

2. Alert B. 1. CAPT #1 only

2. Site Area Emergency Emerge ncy C. 1. CAPT #1 and 1B motor driven CA Pump

2. Alert D. 1. CAPT #1 and 1 B motor driven CA Pump

2. Site Area Emerge ncy 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 158 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 79 B General Discussion All CF flow is lost because with the loss of offsite power, vacuum is lost and lAI A CA has no power. This makes answers C 1I and D 1I plausible but not correct. The knowledge is to know WHERE to send the crew. For terrorist threats, the SSF is manned, not the ASP. The only controls available for CA from the SSF is the CAPT. The ASP has controls for all CA pumps. The classification is an SAE due to the security event. It would be an ALERT due to power loss alone. Must understand that the AP evacuates to the SSF directly on security threats.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The CAPT is the only CA source which can be controlled from the SSF. The student may believe this is an Alert because without a security threat or if the threat was not within a vital area, it would be an ALERT.

Answer B Discussion Correct: The crew has evacuated to the SSF and the CAPT is the only CA source which can be controlled from the SSF. The classification is an (4.6.S.1-1) due to the security event.

SAE (4.6.S.I-I)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that the evacuatlion is to the ASP and may believe the classification is an Alert because without a security threat or if the threat was not within a vital area, it would be an ALERT.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that the evacuatlion is to the ASP. The classification is an SAE (4.6.S.I-I)

(4.6.S.1-1) due to the security event.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed RP/OI RP/OIN50001001 (Classification of RP/0IN50001001

~ OPT Approved API17 Emergency) Enclosure 1I 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved I QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1779 APE054 2.1.30 KA desc 41.7 I 45.7)

APE054 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7/45.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 159 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I QUESTION 80 D 1780 I APE077 I 2.4.18 I KA desc II APE077 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR:

(CPR: 41.10/43.1/45.13)

II Unit 1 is operating at 100% power and Unit 2 is in No Mode. Given the following:

1100 Catawba switchyard voltage is abnormally low due to a loss of a large section of the east coast electrical grid

1102 The crew enters AP/1/N55001037 (Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances), Case I (Abnormal Generator or Grid Voltage)

1110 The TCC reported that RTCA (Real Time Contingency Analysis) indicates CNS switchyard voltage would not be adequate if Unit 1 should trip

1310 The crew notified SPOC to install jumpers per AM/1/N51 001008 (4Kv Essential Power (EPC) System Degraded Voltage Logic) per AP/1/N55001037.

AP/1 I N55001037.

1. How (if at all) does the RTCA status at 1110 affect Technical Specifications for shared systems (RN,vC,YC,VA)?

2. What is the basis for installing these jumpers under the current conditions?

A. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,vA)

(RN,VC,YC,VA) are operable

2. To initiate and seal in a blackout signal to the DIG sequencer to prevent multiple actuations due to unstable grid conditions B. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,VA)

(RN,VC,YC,vA) are operable

2. To prevent the DIG sequencer from restarting the sequence on a LOCA signal after 5 seconds due to a degraded bus voltage situation C. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,vA) are inoperable

2. To initiate and seal in a blackout signal to the DIG sequencer to prevent multiple actuations due to unstable grid conditions D. 1. Shared systems (RN,VC,YC,vA) are inoperable

2. To prevent the DIG sequencer from restarting the sequence on a LOCA signal after 5 seconds due to a degraded bus voltage situation Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 160 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 80 D General Discussion In AP 137, the shared systems that require a normal and emergency power source are declared inoperable when the TCC reports that the RTCA AP/37, indicates switchyard voltage would be inadequate on a trip .The reason jumpers are placed is to prevent the DIG from loading the loca loads and then load shedding and restarting the LOCA loads due to the degraded buss conditons 5 seconds later.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shared systems are still operable until the Unit should trip. 2nd part is plausible, because the jumpers do cause a BIO to be initiated immediately if a LOCA occurs, but BIO signal does not seal in.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe shared systems are still operable until the Unit should trip. Jumpers are placed to prevent "double sequencing" of LOCA loads due to a BIO after 5 seconds when buss voltage is degraded Answer C Discussion Plausible: Shared systems are inoperable per AP137. 2nd part is plausible because the jumpers do cause a BIO to be initiated immediately if a LOCA occurs, but BIO signal does not seal in.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Shared systems are inoperable per AP!37.

AP/37. Jumpers are placed to prevent "double syquencing" ofLOCA loads due to a BIO after 5 seconds when buss voltage is degraded Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EQB

~ OPT Approved AP/37 D0 OPS Approved D0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA KA_system system KA number 1780 APE077 2.4.18 KA desc APE077 GENERIC Knowledge of the specific specitic bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10/43.1/45.13) 41.10 I 43.1 145.13) 401*9 Comments:

401-9 401-9 401*9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 161 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1781 IKA system IKA II WED5 IKA number II EA2.1 II QUESTION 81 c I

KA KA desc Ability to detennine determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) 43.5 / 45.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal (CFR: 43.5/45.13) abnonnal and emergency operations.

Unit 1 was operating at 50% power. Given the following:

Initial Conditions

1A CA pump red tagged for PMs

UST level is 104%

During a board walkdown, 1CA-6 (CA Pmps Suct From CA CST) was noted to be closed Final Conditions

The reactor was manually tripped due to a main steam equalization header break

All power is lost to 1ETB

1SM-5 (S/G 1B SM Isol) failed to close

1SM-3 (S/G 1C SM Isol) failed to close

1A S/G conditions - NR level is 10% ; pressure is 650 psig

1B S/G conditions - NR level is 0% ; pressure is 5 psig

1 1CC S/G conditions - NR level is 0% ; pressure is 7 psig

1D S/G conditions - NR level is 8% ; pressure is 675 psig

The crew is preparing to exit EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

1. Based on the Initial Conditions, how many CA pumps were required to be declared inoperable per Technical Specifications?

2. What procedure will be used next?

A. 1. 1A CA Pump only

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-2 ( Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

B. 1. All three CA pumps

2. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

C. 1. 1A CA Pump only

2. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

D. 1. All three CA pumps

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-2 ( Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

Monday, October 19,2009 Page 162 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 81 c General Discussion Only 1I CA pump is required to be declared inoperable per the initial conditions. Closing 1CA-6 does not make any CA pumps inoperable, this would only affect TS 3.7.6. E-2 would be the correct procedure under the stated conditions if this were Unit 2, but the heat sink requirements for Unit 1I are higher (11 % versus 9% for unit 2) Student must also understand that they have no CA flow since CAPT has no pressure amd lA and IB are not powered for various reasons and therefore FR-H.I entry conditions are met (No S/G NR level> II % and total feedwater flow <450 gpm).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Only IA CA pump is inoperable. Part 2 is plausible because E-2 would be the correct procedure for Unit 2 under the stated conditions Answer B Discussion Plausible:: Candidate may believe all CA pumps are inoperable because the CACST is isolated. FR-H.I entry conditions are met FR-H.l Answer C Discussion Correct: Only IA CA pump is inoperable and FR-H.l FR-H.I entry conditions are met Answer D Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe all CA pumps are inoperable because the CACST is isolated. Part 2 is plausible because E-2 would be correct for Unit 2 under the stated conditions Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed EP/II A/5000IFR-H.I EP/IIAl5000IFR-H.1

~ OPT Approved EP/lI A/5000/FR-E-2 EP/IIAl5000IFR-E-2 EP A/5 OOO/FR - E-O IIIA/5000IFR-E-0 EP/ll D

0 OPS Approved TS 3.8.1 and basis 0

D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II 178ljWE05 17811WE05 IEA2.1 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 145.13) Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 163 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number I QUESTION 82 B 1782 II APEOO5 II AA2.04 I

KA KA desc Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Interpretation of computer in-core TC map for inoperable/stuck rod location .....

Unit 1 is operating at 98% power. A surveillance test per PT 11 IA/46001001 (RCCA PT/1/A/46001001 Movement Test) is in progress. At 0200, as Control Bank D was being moved, control rod H-8 did not move and another rod in Control Bank D slipped to 120 steps withdrawn and stopped. IAE has detennined determined both rods are untrippable. A boration is in progress because SDM is not met. This is an incore thermocouple map one minute later.

R P N N M M L K J H G F E DeB A 576 572 576 611 603 605 546 599 2

3 605 624 BAD 569 4 597 602 609 617 5 602 625 616 614 6 563 611 611 626 623 568 7 602 606 617 620 8 561 612 634 572 626 9 619 611 613 614 10 548 610 606 613 574 11 627 BAD 610 614 12 612 599 608 622 13 620 619 576 626 562 14 540 628 613 608 614 15 BAD 622 580 Which single rod has slipped into the core to 120 steps withdrawn, and assuming SDM is still not met, what is the earliest time the crew is required to be ~ 75% power per Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)?

A. Rod D-12; 0400 B. Rod M-4; 0400 C. Rod D-12; 0800 D. Rod M-4; 0800 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 164 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 82 B General Discussion changed "DROPPED TO STUCK IN KA. Wrong KA per Frank Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the correct rod (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core.

Based on one rod being outside group alignment limits (H-8 should be within 12 steps because rod withdrawl would be halted when it did not

. move), the crew has 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to get to <=75% per TS 3.1.4- B.2.2 B.2.2.. Additionally for the untrippable untrippab1e rods they have 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to be in Mode 3 per TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe rod D-12 is the affected rod (located in control bank D). 0400 is the correct time required to be </= 75% power Answer B Discussion Correct: Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the indicated rod that slipped to 120 swd (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core). Per TS 3.1.4, Condition A and Condition B apply and must be <1= 75% power by 0400.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe rod D-12 is the affected rod (located in control bank D).Student may believe 6 hrs to be <75% but actually Mode 3 per TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: Based on the map provided, ROD M4 is the indicated rod that slipped to 120 swd (temperature is depressed in this area and higher in opposite side of core). 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to Mode 3 per TS 3.1.4- A.2 and therefore 0800 is plausible.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW

~ Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.1.4 and basis

~ OPT Approved

~ PT/l/N4600/001 PT /1/ Al4600/00 1 D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1782 APE005 AA2.04 KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Interpretation of computer in-core TC map for inoperable/stuck rod location 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 165 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA_system jKA_number number Ij QUESTION 83 A 1783 I APE032 I 2.4.4 I KA KA_desc desc APE032 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnonnal abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnonnal abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10/43.2/45.6)

Unit 1 was in Mode 6 performing core alterations. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

N-32 was removed from service 3 days ago

1AD-2, E/2 (TRAIN A SHUTDOWN MARGIN ALARM) is LIT 2

N-31 indicates 1.1 x1 x1002 cps

BDMS Train A train indicates "E1" 2

BDMS Train B indicates 1.4 x1 0 2 cps

1. What procedure is entered to address the stated conditions?

2. Can core alterations continue based on the above conditions?

A. 1. AP/1/A/55001013 (Boron Dilution)

2. Yes B. 1. AP/1/A/55001013 (Boron Dilution)

2. No C. 1. AP/1 IA/55001016 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System)

2. Yes D. 1. AP/1/A/55001016 (Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation System)

2. No 19, 2009 Monday, October 19,2009 Page 166 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 83 A General Discussion Both APs have an entry condition SIR Hi flux at shutdown, but only AP/13 has entry conditions for the alann given. With 2 instruments having approximately the same value, they should be detennined to be operable. (N31 and BDMS B train). TS 3.9.2 (Mode 6) requires 2 neutron flux source range monitors which can be any combination ofSR NIs Nls or BDMS channels. If the student believes both BDMS channels are required, then suspension of core alterations is plausible. The basis of the TS states that the Nis or the BDMS channels can be used in any combination to meet the 2 channels required by the LCO.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Shutdown margin alann is addessed per AP/13. 2 required source range flux monitors (N-31 and B BDMS) are operable and core alterations may continue Answer B Discussion Plausible: This is the correct procedure. If the student believes both BDMS channels are required, then suspension of core alterations is plausible.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: API16 AP/16 is the wrong procedure and will not perfonn actions required to regain control after BDMS alanns, however since it is also considered source range monitoring, AP/16 seems like a logical choice. Core alterations can continue.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: API16 AP/16 is the wrong procedure and will not perfonn actions required to regain control after BDMS alanns, however since it is also considered source range monitoring, AP 116 /16 seems like a logical choice. Also, core alterations can continue.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed ENC

~ OPT Approved AP/16 API 13 AP/13 D OPS Approved TS 3.9.2 and basis D NRC Approved lAD-2 Annunc resp IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number I I

17831APE032 12.4.4 1 KA desc KA_desc APE032 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnonnal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnonnal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.1 0 143.2 145.6) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 167 of 201

FOR RE\'IEWRE\TIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number II QUESTION 84 D 1784 I APE033 I 2.1.30 II KA desc II APE033 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

41. 7 145.7)

II Unit 2 is at 9% power performing a startup. Given the following:

Intermediate Range channel N-35 fails low

The crew removes N-35 from service per the applicable abnormal procedure

IAE estimates 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months for repair of N-35

1. When removing N-35 from service per the abnormal procedure, which fuses (if any) are removed?

2. Which course of action can be taken to maintain compliance with Technical Specification 3.3.1 (Reactor Trip Instrumentation) until N-35 can be returned to service in 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ?

A. 1. The control power fuses

2. Maintain current power level until N-35 is repaired B. 1. The control power fuses

2. Increase reactor power to 12% over the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months C. 1. No fuses are removed

2. Maintain current power level until N-35 is repaired D. 1. No fuses are removed

2. Increase reactor power to 12% over the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 168 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 84 D General Discussion Discussed wanting to change this KIA K/A since the question we have does not appear to be SRO. Frank asked us to try again 10/8/09 he was OK with assessing indications/conditions versus locating /operating.

This is assessing current plant conditions and noting that you are> (1 0-10 amps) and < PIO P6 (10-10 are >P6 P 10 (10%) and determining a course of action that complies with TS 3.3.1 which allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to repair N35 or be in a place where the TS doesn't apply. This can be done by reducing power to

< P6 or increasing power> PI o. O. Maintaining current power level is plausible because a student may believe that power cannot be increased with only one IR channel operable. Control power fuses are not removed for the IR instruments per AP/16. This is something lAB IAE might do. The control power fuses for the power range Nis are removed when a channel fails.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Control power fuses are removed for PR failures. The student may believe that power cannot be increased with only one IR channel operable.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Control power fuses are removed for PR failures. Increasing power> P-l P-I 0 (10%) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a correct action Answer C Discussion Plausible:Control power fuses are not removed. The student may believe that power cannot be increased with only one IR channel operable.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Control power fuses are not removed. Increasing power> P-lO P-l 0 (10%) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is a correct action Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided AP/16, case III and T.S. 3.3.1 bases

~ OPT Approved D

OOPS OPS Approved oD NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1784 APE033 2.1.30 KA desc APE033 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41. 41.7/45.7) 7/45.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 169 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1785 IKA I APE067 IKA IKA_number I

number AA2.02 II I

QUESTION 85 c KA desc Ability to detennine determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13) Damper position A fire on site resulted in a large amount of smoke entering the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) system ductwork.

1. What affect will this situation have on VA system operation?

2. Once all automatic actions associated with the VA system have occurred based on the conditions above, is the VA system considered operable per Technical Specifications?

A. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip only

2. Yes B. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip only

2. No c.

C. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip and the ABSU inlet dampers will close

2. Yes D. 1. VA Supply fans (ABSU) will trip and the ABSU inlet dampers will close

2. No Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 170 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 85 c General Discussion When smoke is detected in the V A ductwork, the V A supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. The supply fans and unfiltered exhaust fans are not required to meet TS 3.7.12, only the filtered exhaust fans. SRO only because a determination of system operability must be made based on equipment status.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the supply fans will trip on smoke detection. V A is operable with this alignment Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the supply fans will trip on smoke detection. Second part is plausible because the VC system is inoperable if its supply dampers are closed.

Answer C Discussion Correct: V A supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. V A is operable with this alignment Answer D Discussion Plausible: VA V A supply fans will trip and the inlet dampers will close. Second part is plausible because the VC system is inoperable ifits supply dampers are closed.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed VA D0 OPT Approved TS 3.7.12 0D OPS Approved D0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number II 17851APE067 I 785IAPE067 IAA2.02 I KA desc Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 145.13)

/45.13) Damper position 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 171 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 86 D 1786 SYSOO3 A2.02 I I I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures of those malfunctions or operations: (CPR:

to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45113) 41.5 /43.5/45.3 /45/13) Conditions which exist for an abnormal abnonnal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a nonnalnormal shutdown of an RCP ...................

Unit 2 was at 3% power and increasing. Given the following:

2AD-7 C/1 NCP #1 "SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW" is LIT

2B NCP sealleakoff is 6.5 gpm

2B NCP Seal Outlet temperature is 165°F and stable Outlettemperature

2B NCP Lower Bearing temperature is 140°F and stable

AP/2/A/55001008 (Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump)

The crew enters AP/2/A/5500/008 What is the maximum time 2B NCP can remain in service and what procedure does AP/2/A/55001008 direct the crew to enter after the pump is tripped?

AP/2/A/5500/008 A. EP/2/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) 5 minutes; EP/2/A/5000/E-O B. AP/2/A/55001004 (Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump) 5 minutes; AP/2/A/5500/004 C. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; OP/2/A/61 OP/2/A/6100/002001002 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Shutdown)

D. AP/2/A/55001004 (Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ; AP/2/A/5500/004 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 172 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 86 D General Discussion SRO ONLY because it is asking for steps within the body of the procedure and making decisions about procedure flowpath based on indications.

Per AP/08 (Malfunction of Reactor Coolant Pump) with # 1 sealleakoffflow > 6 gpm but < 7.5 gpm and # 1 seal outlet or lower bearing temperatures NOT increasing, the affected NC pump must be shutdown within 8 hrs. If#1 seal outlet or lower bearing temperatures ARE increasing, then the affected NC pump must be shutdown within 5 minutes. After all actions have been taken (Unit shutdown with control banks inserted) the pump is tripped and the crew will GO TO AP/04 (Loss of ofreactor reactor Coolant Pump)

Answer A Discussion Plausible: IF temperature on the lower bearing or # 1seal outlet was increasing, then this would be correct.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: This would be correct ifleakoffwas greater than 7.5 gpm or if#1 seal outlet or lower bearing temperatures ARE increasing and control banks were inserted Answer C Discussion Plausible: The time is correct, but althought this procedure is plausible, its not the correct procedure.

Answer D Discussion Correct: Per AP/08, step 13. After all actions have been taken (Unit shutdown with control banks inserted) the pump is tripped and the crew will GO TO AP/04 (Loss of reactor Coolant Pump)

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q86 (Bank 592)

D Development References Student References Provided 0 Developed AP/008 D

0 OPT Approved D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number I 17861SYS003 17861SYS003 IA2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RCPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5143.5/45.3 41.5 143.5/45.3/45/13) 145/13) Conditions which exist for an abnormal shutdown of an RCP in comparison to a normal shutdown of an RCP .................. .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 173 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system 1787 I SYS008 IKA number I 2.4.9 I

I QUESTION 87 c KA desc SYS008 GENERIC Knowledge of oflow low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of ofresidual residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 /43.5/45.13)

Unit 1 is at 450°F and 1860 psig heating up with shutdown banks withdrawn following a refueling outage. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Initial Conditions

All KC is lost and no KC pumps can be immediately restarted per AP/1/A/55001021 (Loss of Component Cooling)

AP/1/A/5500/021

YO has been manually aligned to provide cooling to 1A NV pump

Letdown is manually isolated and pressurizer level is increasing Final Conditions

The crew tripped the reactor and all reactor coolant pumps

The resultant transient causes a CROM housing leak estimated to be approximately 200 gpm

The crew manually safety injected

KC has not yet been restored

1. What procedure direction does AP/1/A/5500/021 AP/1/A/55001021 provide for maintaining NC pump seal injection for the current situation?

2. What procedure will the crew "GO TO" based on the final conditions?

A. 1. Maintain YO aligned to 1A NV pump and continuously monitor motor cooler flows, motor bearing temperatures and motor stator temperature EP/1 IA/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection)

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 B. 1. Maintain YO aligned to 1A NV pump and continuously monitor motor cooler flows, motor bearing temperatures and motor stator temperature AP/1/A/55001027 (Shutdown LOCA)

2. AP/1/A/5500/027 C. 1. Realign KC to the 1A NV pump, start the Standby Makeup Pump, and after a maximum of 10 minutes secure the 1A NV pump

2. EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection)

O. 1. Realign KC to the 1A NV pump, start the Standby Makeup Pump, and after a maximum of 10 minutes secure the 1A NV pump

2. AP/1/A/5500/027 AP/1/A/55001027 (Shutdown LOCA)

Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 174 of 201 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 87 c General Discussion YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NY pumps if a safety injection occurs per AP/21. The standby makeup pump provides seal injection then. The crew must secure the NY pump within 10 minutes per enclosure 7 of AP21. The correct procedure to address the SI is E-O.

AP/27 is not used unless in Mode 4 or in Mode 3 with the CLAs isolated (which they would not be in this situation).

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe YD alignment can be maintained. E-O is the correct procedure to address the SI Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe YD alignment can be maintained. Student may believe AP/27 is appropriate procedure to address the SI Answer C Discussion Correct: YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NY pumps if a safety injection occurs. E-O is the correct procedure to address the SI Answer D Discussion Plausible: YD must be isolated and KC must be realigned to NY pumps if a safety injection occurs. Student may believe AP/27 is appropriate procedure to address the SI Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP05

~ OPT Approved AP27 AP21 0 OPS Approved 0 NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I 17871SYS008 12 .4.9 1 KA desc SYS008 GENERIC Knowledge oflow power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 4l.10 / 43.5 //45.13) 45.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 175 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 88 A 1788 I SYS039 I A2.02 I I

KA_desc KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 4l.5 /43.5 /45.3/45.13) Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves .

Given the following:

Rod control is in MANUAl.MANUAL.

Turbine power has decreased from 1227 MW to 1164 MW and stabilized.

Security has reported significant steam escaping from the interior doghouse What single steam relief valve passing full flow produced the conditions noted and what actions were directed by the procedure the crew initially implemented based on the stated conditions?

A. A steam line safety; trip the reactor and go to EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

B. A S/G PORV; trip the reactor and go to EP/1/A/5000/E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

c.

C. A S/G PORV; initiate a unit shutdown per AP/1/A/5500/009 AP/1/A/55001009 (Rapid Downpower)

D. A steam line safety; initiate a unit shutdown per AP/1/A/55001009 AP/1/A/5500/009 (Rapid Downpower)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 176 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 88 A General Discussion A PORV is - 2.5% steam flow and a safety is - 5%. The turbine MW reduction represents one S/G SJG safety valve full open (-60 MW). This would be -30MW with a PORV full open. APJ28 AP/28 directs tripping the reactor and entering E-O if a steam leak is not < 5%. Otherwise a load performed per APJ09 reduction is perfonned AP/09 (or the OP which is not an answer choice) choice)..

Answer A Discussion APJ28 directs tripping the reactor and entering E-O if a steam leak is NOT < 5%.

Correct: AP/28 Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe Mw reduction is due to a S/G PORV, E-O is the correct procedure direction Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe Mw reduction is due to a S/G PORV and that a unit shutdown is necessary per AP/09 Answer D Discussion Plausible: S/G safety valve full open (-60 MW) is correct. Student may believe that a unit shutdown is necessary per AP/09 IPlausible:

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 NRC Q88 (Bank 594)

Development References Student References Provided

~

~ Developed AP/28 and basis

~ OPT Approved

~ SM 0 OPS Approved OOPS I

o0 NRC Approved i IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number IKA number II 17881SYS039 IA2.02 II KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) ofthose 41.5/43.5 /45.3/45.13) Decrease in turbine load as it relates to steam escaping from relief valves .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 177 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II QUESTION 89 B 1789 I SYS063 I 2.2.40 I KA desc I SYS063 GENERIC Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.1 0/43.2/43.5 /45.3) 41.10/43.2/43.5/45.3) I Unit 1 is in Mode 3 and cooling down in preparation for a refueling outage when IAE discovers a bad cell on 1DGBA during surveillance testing per Technical Specification SR 3.8.4.2.

1. When is the cascade to Technical Specification 3.8.1 (AC Sources - Operating required to be made?

2. With 1 DGBA already inoperable, why is an additional cascade to Technical 1DGBA Specification 3.8.9 (Distribution Systems - Operating) required if A or D channels of DC power become inoperable?

A. 1. Immediately

2. Because A and D channels supply power to the SSPS output bays B. 1. Immediately

2. Because Aand A and D channels supply power to 1EDE 1EDE and 1EDF 1EDF C. 1. Within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. Because A and D channels supply power to the SSPS output bays D. 1. Within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. Because A Aand and D channels supply power to 1EDE 1EDE and 1EDF 1EDF Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 178 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 89 B General Discussion With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately.

From the basis for TS 3.8.4 - Being powered from auctioneering diode circuits from either the A channel of DC or the A Train ofDG DC, distribution center EDE supplies breaker control power to the 4.16 kV AC and the 600 V VAC AC switchgear, auxiliary feedwater pump controls, and other important DC loads. The EDF center is powered from the B Train ofDG DC or the D channel of DC and provides DC power to Train B loads, similar to EDE center. With the loss of the channel DC power and the associated DG DC power, the load center power for the train is inoperable and the Condition(s) and Required Action(s) for the Distribution Systems must be entered immediately. Channels A and D do supply power to the SSPS output bays, however, that is not why the actions are cascaded.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is plausible because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately. Student may believe this is the reason for cascade to 3.8.9, (SSPS output bays powered via associated inverter)

Answer B Discussion Correct: With the DG DC system inoperable, 3.8.4 action directs entry into 3.8.1 immediately. A & D channels of DC power supply power to lEDEIEDF which supply 4160v control power,etc. (per discussion)

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 4 hrs is correct because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable. (SSPS output bays powered via associated inverter) A & D Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe 4 hrs is correct because that is the time where cascades are made FROM 3.8.1 when redundant equipment is inoperable. The second part is correct.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW

~ Developed Development References Student References Provided

~

TS 3.8.4 and basis

~

~ OPT Approved D

OOPS OPS Approved o NRC Approved D

QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1789SYS063 2.2.40 KA desc SYS063 GENERIC Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.1 41.100/43.2/43.5/45.3)

/43.2/43.5 /45.3) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 179 of 201 of201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA system IKA_number IKA number jI QUESTION 90 A 1790 II SYS076 I I A2.02 II KA_desc KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 41.5/43.5 /45/3/45/13)

/43.5 /45/3 /45/13) Service water header pressure ......................................

Unit 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power with 2A RN pump in service. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1A DIG was tagged for PMs

The following annunciators were LIT:

o 1AD-12, Al2 - "RN Essential Hdr A Pressure - Lo" o 2AD-12, Al2 - "RN Essential Hdr A Pressure - Lo" o 1AD-12, Al5 - "RN Essential Hdr B Pressure - Lo" o 2AD-12, Al5 - "RN Essential Hdr B Pressure - Lo"

The 2A RN pump tripped

The 1A RN pump was started and the above alarms cleared

1. Is the 2A DIG operable per Technical Specifications for the conditions stated above?

2. What system manipulations (if any) are required per OP/0IAl64001006C OP/OIAl6400/006C (Nuclear Service Water System)?

A. 1. No

2. No manipulations are required, only verification of the RN system lineup B. 1. No

2. The CA assured makeup valves from Train A RN on both units have power removed C. 1. Yes

2. No manipulations are required, only verification of the RN system lineup D. 1. Yes

2. The CA assured makeup valves from Train A RN on both units have power removed Monday, October 19, 19,20092009 Page 180 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 90 A General Discussion lA DIG inoperability results in lA RN pump being inoperable. When 2A RN pump trips, the A train loop ofRN becomes inoperable, resulting in the inoperability of both units A train DIGs. Although lA RN is functional, it is inoperable by Tech Specs due to its inoperable DIG. The RN OP, encl.

enc!. 4.11, will require ensuring at least one crossover flowpath combinations is open from either unit. These valves are normally open and there is no information given that would cause contradict this status.

A common misconception is that an inoperable RN pump makes a DIG inoperable, but this is reverse logic. The exception is in the case where both RN pumps are inoperable in which case both DIG's are inoperable.

Actions for aligning an RN pump for single pump flow (typically when inoperable> 72 hrs) include deenergizing the CA assured makeup valve Answer A Discussion Correct: Both DIG's are inoperable. Ensuring one crossover flowpath combinations from either unit is open is verified since they are already open and are not required to be manipulated Answer B Discussion Plausible: Both DIG's are inoperable. Student may believe A train CA assured makeup on both units must have power removed.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the 1lA A DIG is inoperable. Ensuring one crossover flowpath combinations from either unit is open is verified since they are already open and are not required to be manipulated Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe only the lA DIG is inoperable and that A train CA assured makeup on both units must have power removed ..

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided 0D Developed ap/20

~ OPT Approved lad-12 ann resp RN 0D OPS Approved OP101Al6400/006C OP/OI Al64001006C 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number IKA_number II 1790lSYS076 1790lSYS076 1A2 *02 IA2.02 I I

KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 14513 I 45/3 145/13) Service water header pressure ..................................... .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 181 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number I QUESTION 91 B 1791 I SYS016 I A2.02 I KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 41.5 / 43.5 /45.3 /45.5) Loss of ofpower power supply .............................................

Unit 2 is performing a power decrease required by Technical Specifications. Given the following:

At 45% power, 2SMPS5219 (Turbine Impulse Pressure 1 ATWSI AMSAC Related) stopped decreasing

The power supply to 2SMPS5218 (Turbine Impulse Pressure 1ATWSI AMSAC Related) has failed

IAE has been notified to repair failed channels

Current reactor power is 28.5%

1. What guidance does OP/2/A/61 OP/21A161 001003 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation) provide for the AMSAC system for this situation?

2. What is the Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) basis for the AMSAC System?

A. 1. Stop the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and automatic feedwater isolation under ATWS conditions B. 1. Continue the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater autostart under ATWS conditions C. 1. Stop the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater autostart under ATWS conditions D. 1. Continue the power decrease

2. AMSAC provides an independent means of initiating a turbine trip and automatic feedwater isolation under ATWS conditions Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 182 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 91 B General Discussion AMSAC input from turbine impulse pressure is 2/2 logic at 235 psig (-40% (~40% turbine load). AMSAC will automatically reset on load increase>

if logic is met (2/2) and will automatically bypass on load decrease < 40% iflogic 40% iflogic if logic is met (2/)2 and 120 sec time delay.

Since 2SMPS5218 power supply is failed and 2SMP5219 is failed at 45%, the 2/2 logic cannot be met to bypass AMSAC on the power decrease. The power decrease procedure notes that if AMSAC cannot be bypassed and the power decrease is required by Tech Specs, continue with the power decrease while IAE repairs the switches.

AMSAC basis: Per 10 CFR 50.62, Each pressurized water reactor must have equipment from sensor output to final actuation device, that is diverse from the reactor trip system, to feed water system and initiate a turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be automatically initiate the auxiliary feedwater designed to perform its function in a reliable manner and be independent from the existing reactor trip system.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe power decrease is stopped to prevent AMSAC actuation. Student may believe AMSAC provides independent means of turbine trip and CF isolation Answer B Discussion Correct: Power decrease must continue due to TS shutdown. Basis is as stated Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe power decrease is stopped to prevent AMSAC actuation. Basis is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Power decrease must continue due to TS shutdown. Student may believe AMSAC provides independent means of turbine trip and CF isolation Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed CF

~ OPT Approved SLC 16.7-1 basis OP/lIN6100/003 OPlll Al61001003 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA

[KA_number number I[

1791lSYS016 1 IA2.02 A2 *02 II KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5143.5145.3 41.5 I 43.5 145.3 145.5) Loss of power supply ............................................ .

401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 183 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA jKA_system system jKA_number IKA number Ij QUESTION 92 D 1792 I SYS029 I 2.1.28 II KA desc I j

SYS029 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7)

I Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 preparing to unload the third fuel assembly from the core.

Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

Unit 1 entered Mode 3 five days ago

All plant systems are in normal operation for the current conditions

The B train Containment Purge Exhaust System (VP) duct heaters lose power

The B train VP system fan status! status/ system flow is unchanged

1. When VP is required to be operable, does a loss of the duct heaters affect the operability of the VP train?

2. For the conditions above, is the VP system required to be operable per Technical Specification 3.9.3 (Containment Penetrations)?

A. 1. Yes

2. Yes B. 1. No

2. Yes C. 1. Yes

2. No D. 1. No

2. No Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 184 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 92 D General Discussion TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part of a critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . If they believe it is 7 days vice 3 they will choose YES.

Per the basis, the heaters do not affect the operability ofofthe the VP train, however the heaters do have an action specific to them and if they believe the spec applies this would be appealing. Because the heaters have a specificc TS action associated with them iit is logiccal to assume this is "major equipment" and meets the KA.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Student may believe the VP system operability is affected by the heaters and may believe 3.9.3 is applicable if they think recently irradiated is within the last 7 days Answer B Discussion Plausible: Loss of heaters does not affect VP operability. Student may believe 3.9.3 is applicable if they think recently irradiated is within the ifthey last 7 days.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may may believe the VP system operability is affected by the heaters. TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part of a critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Answer D Discussion Correct: Loss of heaters does not affect VP operability. TS 3.9.3 does not apply because the basis states that recently irradiated is part ofa critical core within the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.9.3 and basis

~ OPT Approved VP 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1792 SYS029 2.1.28 KA desc SYS029 GENERIC Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,2009 Page 185 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II QUESTION 93 B 1793 I I SYS033 I A2.03 I KA KA desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/

45.13) Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level .............

Unit 1 is in Mode 6 with core unload in progress. Given the following:

An RP technician in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) calls the control room and reports that level in the SFP is decreasing

The fuel assembly most recently removed from the core is currently in the reactor building manipulator crane

1. Based on current conditions, what procedure will be used to perform the mitigative actions necessary to address the problem?

2. What direction will the procedure provide for the fuel assembly currently being handled?

A. 1. AP/1/A/55001026 (Loss of Refueling Canal Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly into the upender and place in the fully down position B. 1. AP/1/A/55001026 (Loss of Refueling Canal Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly to fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal c.

C. 1. AP/1/A/55001041 (Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling or Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly into the upender and place in the fully down position D. 1. AP/1/A/55001041 (Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling or Level)

2. Lower the fuel assembly to fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal Monday, October 19, 2009 19,2009 Page 186 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 93 B General Discussion Based on the stem, AP 141 appears to be appropriate and may in fact be the procedure chosen. However, based on the stem, the refueling canal AP/41 and the SFP are physically connected at this time (refueling in progress) and step 1I of AP/41 checks this and sends the crew to AP/26 without taking any mitigative actions. If the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully Ifthe down in the core or the deep end of the canal.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: AP/26 steps will perform the required mitigative actions. This action would be taken if the assembly had been placed in the upender Answer B Discussion Correct: AP/26 steps will perform the required mitigative actions. Since the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal.

Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may believe mitigative actions will be taken in AP 141. This action would be taken if the assembly had been placed in the AP/41.

upender Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe mitigative actions will be taken in AP/41. Since the assembly is in the reactor building manipulator crane, the procedure directs the assembly to be placed fully down in the core or the deep end of the canal.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed AP/26

~ OPT Approved AP/41 D

0 OPS Approved D

0 NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA number IKA_number II 17931SYS033 IA2.03 I KA_desc Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 143.5 145.3 1I ofthose 45.13) Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 187 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1794 I system IKA IKA_system GEN2.1 IKA_number I

number 2.1.26 I

I QUESTION 94 c KA KA_desc desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). (CFR:

(CPR: 41.10/45.12) 4l.l0 145.12)

Unit 2 entered a forced outage 3 days ago to replace an NC pump motor.

2 work crews are involved in replacing the NCP motor, an NC pump crew and an IAE crew. The tagout boundary is being shared by both crews

The NC pump crew has the new motor in place and has outstanding Work Order Task Assignments (WOTAs) for wiring completion

The IAE crew has asked the Unit 2 SRO for clearance of their WOTA to allow electrical testing of the new motor which requires connecting an outside power source Per NSD 500 (Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags), in addition to ensuring the work can be performed safely, what additional condition is required to be met by the Unit 2 SRO prior to granting clearance to the IAE crew WOTA?

crewWOTA?

A. The Unit 2 SRO must obtain OSM concurrence B. The Unit 2 SRO must ensure the two crews have established constant communication C. The Unit 2 SRO must ensure all affected crews have been informed of the intent to apply an outside power source D. The Unit 2 SRO must ensure the IAE supervisor has walked down the area where the outside power source will be applied Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 188 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 94 c General Discussion If work will apply a Hazardous Energy Source within boundaries ofa tagout:

The Work Group Supervisor/designee shall ensure the Operational Control Group is informed.

Prior to the Operational Control Group giving clearance to apply a Hazardous Energy Source within boundaries of a tagout, Operational Control Group Supervisor/designee giving clearance shall:

Ensure any affected crew previously or subsequently given clearance is informed of Hazardous Energy Source being applied.

Ensure that work can be performed safely.

The Work Group Supervisor/designee shall walk down the area into which hazardous energy will be applied.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe OSM concurrence is necessary, OSM approval is required for exception to tag placement Answer B Discussion Plausible: Candidate may believe constant communication is necessary, this is true for some plant evolutions Answer C Discussion Correct: OCG supv shall: Ensure any affected crew previously or subsequently given clearance is informed of Hazardous Energy Source being applied. Ensure that work can be performed safely.

Answer D Discussion Plausible: The work group supervisor is required to walk down the area as stated above in the discussion, but this is not required for the SRO to I grant clearance Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed NSD500 D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number I 17941GEN2.1 12 . 1.26 12.1.26 J1 KA desc Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). (CFR: 41.10/45.12) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 189 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA_system IKA_number JI QUESTION 95 A 1795 I GEN2.2 I 2.2.41 II KA desc I Equipment Control Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12/45.13) 41.1 0/45.12 /45.13) II Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. Given the following:

2ND-64 (2B ND Train Cold Leg Injection Return Safety Relief) lifted and did not reseat

The crew used the closest valves in the piping available to isolate the leak

Due to parts availability it will be 4-5 days before repairs can be completed

The crew began a Technical Specification shutdown

1. How many trains of ND NO are operable?

2. What is the first operational mode reached where Technical Specification 3.5.2 (ECCS - Operating) no longer applies?

Reference provided A. 1. No trains are operable

2. Mode 4 B. 1. No trains are operable

2. Mode 5 C. 1. 2B Train of N NOD only

2. Mode 4 D. 1. 2B Train of N D only

2. Mode 5 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 190 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 95 A General Discussion Per OPIlIN62001004 OPI11A/6200/004 Residual Heat Removal System L&P 2.9 Closing IND-32A (ND Train lA Hot Leg Inj Isol) or IND-65B (ND Train IB Hot Leg Inj Isol) in Modes 1,2 or 3 makes both trains ofND inoperable since ND must be capable of injecting into al14 cold legs while meeting single failure criterium. Therefore, both valves are required to be open to ensure operability of both trains.

Answer A Discussion Correct: Isolation required closing 2ND-65B which results in both trains ofND being inoperable. TS 3.5.2 is applicable to MODES 1-3 Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may not realize closing 2ND-65B results in both trains ofND being inoperable and may believe TS 3.5.2 applies in Modes 1-4 Answer C Discussion Plausible: The student may think only 2B ND train is affected and TS 3.5.2 is not met but knows the applicability Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may think only 2B ND train is affected and TS 3.5.2 is not met and applicability is Modes 1-4 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed TS 3.5.2 CN-1561-1.1

~ OPT Approved CN-1561-1.1 CN-1562-1.3 CN-1562-1.3 0D OPS Approved OP/lIN62001004 OP/l!N6200/004 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA_system KA number 1795GEN2.2 2.2.41 KA desc Equipment Control Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. (CFR: 41.1 0 I 45.12 145.13) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE STUDENTS WILL GET FULL SIZE DRAWINGS Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 191 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination IKA QuestionBank # IKA_system system IKA IKA_number number II QUESTION 96 A 1796 II GEN2.2 I 2.2.44 I KA KA_desc desc Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verifY the status and operation ofa system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5/45.12)

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 performing a leakage calculation per PT/1/A/41501001 0 (NC System Leakage Calculation). Given the following:

Reactor coolant pump (NCP) sealleakoff values are:

o 1A NCP is 3.6 gpm o 1 B NCP is 3.8 gpm 1B o 1C NCP is 3.9 gpm o 10 NCP is 4.2 gpm

NC unidentified leakage is 0.2 gpm

NC identified leakage is 4.3 gpm

VCT pressure is 35 psig

An NLO has been dispatched to reduce VCT pressure to 25 psig What effect will this operator action have on NCP sealleakoff, and what is a correct action for this situation?

A. NCP sealleakoffflow will increase.

Notify Security within 15 minutes that the SSF is degraded.

B. NCP sealleakoffflow will decrease.

Immediately declare the standby makeup pump inoperable and if the standby makeup pump is not restored within 7 days, declare the SSF inoperable.

C. NCP sealleakoffflow will increase.

Immediately declare the standby makeup pump inoperable and if the standby makeup pump is not restored within 7 days, declare the SSF inoperable.

D. NCP sealleakoffflow will decrease.

Notify Security within 15 minutes that the SSF is degraded.

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 192 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 96 A General Discussion SRO ONLY because RO job function is not to determine who needs to be notified based on Tech Spec/SLC entries. The SRO function is to enter this into the TSAIL computer which is where the prompt is provided to notifY Security. TSAIL entry is part of an SRO T&Q Guide associated with the Work Control Center.

The tank has a hydrogen pressure regulator to maintain overpressure. Ifpressure If pressure decreases, NCP sealleakoffincreases.

Answer A Discussion Correct: When VCT pressure decreases, leakoffwill increase. With NC total leakage >/= 20 gpm the standby makeup pump is inoperable and therefore the SSF is inoperable and Security is required to be notified within 15 minutes Answer B Discussion Plausible: Student may believe leakoffwill decrease with VCT pressure and the standby makeup pump can be inoperable for 7 days prior to declaring the SSF inoperable Answer C Discussion Plausible: When VCT pressure decreases, sealleakoffwill increase. Student may believe the standby makeup pump can be inoperable for 7 days prior to declaring the SSF inoperable Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may believe leakoffwill decrease with VCT pressure. With NC total leakage >/= 20 gpm the standby makeup pump is inoperable and therefore the SSF is inoperable and Security is required to be notified within 15 minutes Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2005 NRC Q84 (Bank 488)

Development References Student References Provided D Developed SLC 16.7-9

~ OPT Approved NCP D OPS Approved D NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA IKA number II 17961GEN2.2 2 .2.44 112.2.44 11 KA desc Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verifY the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator

/43.5/45.12) actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 /45.12) 401-9 401*9 Comments: 401*9 Comments RESPONSE 401-9 Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 193 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA systemlKA system IKA number JI QUESTION 97 A 1797 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.4 I KA desc iI Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12/43.4 /45.10)

II Given the following:

A LOCA has occurred in Unit 2

The TSC has been fully staffed and activated

An individual is needed for lifesaving activities during which 27 Rem of ofTEDE TEDE exposure is expected to be received Is the individual required to be a volunteer and who is required to approve the exposure for this lifesaving activity?

A. The individual is required to be a volunteer and the TSC Emergency Coordinator is required to approve the exposure B. The individual is required to be a volunteer and the Operations Shift Manager is required to approve the exposure C. The individual is not required to be a volunteer and the TSC Emergency Coordinator is required to approve the exposure D. The individual is not required to be a volunteer and the Operations Shift Manager is required to approve the exposure Monday, October 19, 19,2009 2009 Page 194 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 97 A General Discussion To save a life or protect a large population on a volunteer basis only, a person may receive greater than 25 rem TEDE, greater than 75 rem to the lens of the eye, and greater than 250 rem to the skin and extremities. The Emergency Coordinator must approve extending the emergency worker dose limits. Since the TSC is fully staffed and activated, this would be the TSC Coordinator.

Answer A Discussion Correct: For> 25 Rem the individual is required to be a volunteer and TSC coordinator approval is required Answer B Discussion Plausible: For> 25 Rem the individual is required to be a volunteer. Student may believe OSM approval is required Answer C Discussion Plausible: Student may think volunteer is not required. TSC approval is correct Answer D Discussion Plausible: Student may think volunteer is not required and OSM approval is required Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory MODIFIED 2005 NRC Q92 (Bank 496)

D Developed Development References Student References Provided HP lesson

~ OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1797GEN2.3 2.3.4 KA desc Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 !/43.4 43.4 !/45.10) 45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19,200919, 2009 Page 195 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number JI QUESTION 98 D 1798 I GEN2.3 I 2.3.7 I KA desc II Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit peTIllit requirements during normal nOTIllal orabnormal orabnoTIllal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 4l.12 //45.10) 45.10) I An individual with a current year Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) of 1500 mR is preparing to perform a job in the RCA. The RWP states that the dose rate in the area is 200 mR/hr.

1. What is the maximum time he can work in this area without an approved dose extension?

2. If the job were estimated to take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , what is the minimum level RP position that could provide the approval of the dose extension?

A. 1. 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. An RP Supervisor B. 1. 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. The RP Manager C. 1. 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. An RP Supervisor D. 1. 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

2. The RP Manager Monday, October 19,2009 19, 2009 Page 196 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 98 D General Discussion Asked Frank to replace KIA since it was a duplicate of one on the RO exam and we were having trouble determining a good question that was SRO level and operationally valid and with 3 plausible distractors.

RP supervisor gives permission to enter hi rad areas when the alert limit (1600 mr) is exceeded. Dose extensions from 1800 up to 2000 mr are approved by the RPM per NSD507. Work can be done up to the exclude limit without extension which is 1800 mr. At 200 mr !hr, /hr, the worker would reach alert in 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and exclude in 1.5 hrs Answer A Discussion Plausible: Plausible if student believes extension required above 1600 mrem (i.e. exclude status), RP supervisor approval required to enter high rad area above 1600 mrem.

Answer B Discussion Plausible: Plausible if student believes extension required above 1600 mrem (i.e. exclude status)" correct approval Answer C Discussion Plausible: Correct time, 2nd part plausible because RP supervisor approval required to enter high rad area above 1600 mrem.

Answer D Discussion Correct: At 200 mr !hr,

/hr, the worker would reach alert in 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and exclude in 1.5 hrs. Dose extemsions up to 2000 mr are approved by the RPM per NSD507.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK D Developed Development References Student References Provided nsd507 D OPT Approved D OPS Approved D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA_system KA system KA number 1798GEN2.3 2.3.7 KA desc Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 197 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA system IKA_number II QUESTION 99 D 1799 II GEN2.4 I 2.4.20 II Md~

M~ I Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.13) 41.10 /43.5/45.13) II Unit 1 was at 25% and increasing following a refueling outage. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ago, Unit 1 experienced a large break LOCA

Containment sump level is 5.2 ft

During the swap to cold leg recirculation, 1 NI-136B (ND (NO Supply To NI Pump 1B) could not be opened

The crew has verified S/I flow per EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation)

The crew is preparing to transition out of EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3 when all running ECCS pumps begin showing signs of cavitation

1. What was the status of 1B NI pump when S/I flow was verified per EP/1/N5000/ES-1.3?

2. Which procedure will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation of the ECCS pumps?

A. 1. 1B NI was secured because 1NI-136B could not be opened

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

B. 1. 1B NI was secured because 1 NI-136B could not be opened

2. EP/1 /A/5000/ECA-1.3 (Containment Sump Blockage)

C. 1. 1B NI is running with suction from 1A train ND NO

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

D.

O. 1. 1B NI is running with suction from 1A train ND NO

2. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.3 (Containment Sump Blockage)

Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 198 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 99 D General Discussion Per ES 1.3 if adequate sump level is present and cavitation occurs with no other known cause, then blockage should be suspected and directs the SRO to ECA-1.3 versus ECA-l.l.

With NI136B closed the NI pump will still have flow from the A train ND. A pump with no suction flow would be secured.

Answer A Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that I B NI has no suction since 1I NI-136B could not be opened and ECA 1.1 will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe that IIEB NI has no suction since 1I NI-136B could not be opened. ECA-1.3 ECA-I.3 will provide the actions to address the cavitation Answer C Discussion Plausible: 1I B NI pump will receive suction flow from the 1IA A ND pump discharge. The student may believe ECA 1.1 will provide the mitigative actions to address cavitation Answer D Discussion Correct: 1I B NI pump will receive suction flow from the 1I A ND pump discharge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

~ Developed es1.3 0D OPT Approved eca1.1 ecal.l eca1.3 ecal.3 0D OPS Approved 0D NRC Approved QuestionBank # KA system KA number 1799GEN2.4 2.4.20 KA desc Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the operational implications ofEOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13) 41.10/43.5 /45.13) 401-9 Comments:

401*9 401*9 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 199 of 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QuestionBank # IKA 1800 II system IKA IKA_system GEN2.4 IKA_number II number 2.4.50 I

QUESTION 100 c I

KA KA desc Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR:

41.10/43.5 /45.3) 41.10/43.5/45.3)

Unit 1 is in Mode 5 after refueling. Given the following conditions and sequence of events:

The control room receives a 4911 emergency call reporting an explosion in Unit 1 containment

Operators note VCT level decreasing and estimate NC leakage to be 22 gpm

1RAD-1, A/2 (1 EMF-39 Containment Gas Hi Rad) is LIT

1RAD-3, E/2 (1 EMF 22 22594594 KK,53 VP Filter) is LIT and indicates 5200 mR/hr

NC system is in a "Loops Filled" condition

Both trains of SSPS are in "TEST"

Security has confirmed the explosion in containment was an act of sabotage

1. Based on the above conditions, how would this event be classified?

2. What operator action is required prior to clearing the 1 EMF-39 trip 2 alarm?

Reference provided A. 1 . Site Area Emerge ncy

2. Initiate Containment Closure B. 1. Alert

2. Initiate Containment Closure C. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. Secure VP per the operating procedure D. 1. Alert

2. Secure VP per the operating procedure Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 200 ofof201 201

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2008 SRO NRC Retake Examination QUESTION 100 c General Discussion The event is classified as a Site Area Emergency (4.6.S.1-3) due to confirmed sabotage. This would otherwise be classified as an Alert (4.3.A.3-

3) based on the dose rates associated with lEMF-22.

IEMF-22.

The reactor coolant leak results in lEMF-39 IEMF-39 will send a direct signal to trip VP even ifboth IEMF-39 trip 2 alarm. lEMF-39 if both trains ofSSPS are in test. To prevent an automatic restart ofVP following the lEMF-39 IEMF-39 trip 2, VP must be secured by procedure.

Containment closure would be initiated if the NC system was in a loops not filled condition Answer A Discussion Plausible: Site Area Emergency is correct. Containment closure would be initiated ifNC was in a loops not filled condition Answer B Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the correct classification is alert due to the VP filter EMF reading and that containment closure should be initiated as the required action Answer C Discussion Correct: Site area Emergency is correct per 4.6.S.1-3. VP is secured per the OP to prevent automatic restart on reset of lEMF-39 IEMF-39 trip 2 Answer D Discussion Plausible: The student may believe the correct classification is alert due to the VP filter EMF reading. VP is secured per the OP to prevent automatic restart on reset of lEMF-39 IEMF-39 trip 2 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW oD Developed Development References IRAD-I and lRAD-3 IRAD-3 Annunc resp Student References Provided lRAD-l RP/O/A/5000/001 (Classification of RP/OIN50001001

~ OPT Approved

~ RP/OI Emergency) Enclosure 1 VP DOOPS OPS Approved Do NRC Approved IKA QuestionBank # IKA system IKA number IKA_number JI 18001GEN2.4 12.4.50 I1 KA desc Emergency Procedures I Plan Ability to verify verifY system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR:

43.5 145.3) 41.10 I143.5 401-9 Comments: 401-9 Comments RESPONSE Monday, October 19, 2009 Page 201 of201

ML100470408

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