ML093430124
| ML093430124 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1980 |
| From: | Early P Power Authority of the State of New York |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IPN-80-54, NUDOCS 8006060373 | |
| Download: ML093430124 (15) | |
Text
9 9
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TRUSTEES JOHN S. DYSON CHAIRMAN GEORGE L. INGALLS VICE CHAIRMAN RICHARD M.
FLYNN ROBERT I. MILLONZI 10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019 (212) 397.6200 June 2, 1980 IPN-80-54 FREDERICK R. CLARK Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:
Subject:
GEORGE T. BERRY PRESIDENT & CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER JOHN W. BOSTON EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT & DIRECTOR OF POWER OPERATIONS JOSEPH R. SCHMIEDER EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT & CHIEF ENGINEER LEROY W. SINCLAIR SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
& CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER THOMAS R. FREY SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
& GENERAL COUNSEL Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Operating Reactors Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-286 - Request for Additional Information
Dear Sir:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to Mr. Schwencer's letter to Mr. George T. Berry dated April 11, 1980. contains the additional information requested by you on the electrical override/bypass aspects of the containment purge system for Indian Point Unit No. 3.
Very truly ours, Paul Early Vic7'Presiden~ and Assistant Chief Engineer Projects cc:
Mr. T. Rebelowski Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 38 Buchanan, New York 10511 P~oo~
,/,
8006060373 n14 Ar4a
ATTACHMENT 1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-286 June 2, 1980
- 1. Describe the features that are provided in the following systems to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.47:
a) Containment Ventilation Isolation: b) Containment Spray (CS);
c) Containment Isolation (CI); d) Safety Injection (SI).
Reply:
Regulatory Guide 1.47 requires an indicating system to provide automatic indication of each bypass or deliberately induced inoperable condition that meets all three of the following guidelines:
- 1) The bypass or inoperable condition affects a system that is designed to perform automatically a function that is important to the safety of the public.
- 2) Bypass will be utilized by plant personnel or the inoperable condition can reasonably be expected to occur more frequently than once per year.
- 3) Bypass or inoperable condition is expected to occur when the affected system is normally required to be operable.
A bypass condition is considered to be an action by an operator to place a safety system in a condition whereby its automatic in itiation function cannot perform. An induced inoperable condition is considered to have occurred when a component that is in a safety system is placed out of commission and the affected system is normally required to be operable.
Although Regulatory Guide 1.47 was issued in May, 1973,.subsequent to the design and start of construction for Indian Point 3, the plant does comply with the bypass indication requirements of IEEE 279-1971.
Analysis of the schematic diagrams indicates that it is possible to set up bypass condition by certain operating sequences which are not indicated or annunicated in the control room. These possibilities are noted in the emergency procedures together with subsequent operator requirements to address this condition.
Re setting and bypassing functions on a system basis are as follows:
a) Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI)
There a re no bypass indication features for Containment Venti lation Isolation.
In the event Containment Ventilation Iso lation is reset prior to resetting Containment Spray or.Con tainment Isolation Phase A or is reset with the Containment Spray/Containment Isolation Phase A signal present, the Con tainment Ventilation Isolation relay VI (MG6) will be locked out and prevented from future operation since relay VI-R has been sealed in by either the Contaiment Spray or Containment Isolation Phase A contacts.
The above sequence can produce a bypass which is not indicated or annunicated in the control room.
b) Containment Spray System (CS)
There are no bypass indication features for Containment Spray System. In the event Containment Spray is reset with both an SI signal and CS signal in existence the Containment Spray relay SI (MG6) will be locked out and prevented from furture automatic or manual operation since relay CSIE has been sealed in the ASI and SI-Il closed contacts. The above sequence can produce a bypass condition unknown to the operator, only until such time as the safety injection is reset. The Containment Spray system, which is part of the Engineered Safeguards system is dependent upon the availability of the Containment Spray pumps, Service water pumps for cooling, Containment Re circulation Fans and Recirculation Pumps for later stages of cooling. If any of the above components are inoperable, placing its control switch in the pull out position annunciates an alarm "Safeguard Equipment Locked Open."
In addition, if control power is de-energized, an alarm "Safeguards Instru mentation Rack DC Power Failure" annunicates.
Loss of control power will prevent the CS pumps from automatically starting and the Containment Spray valves 866 and 867 from opening.
c) Containment Isolation (CI)
There are no bypass indication features from Containment Iso lation.
In the event Containment Isolation Phase A is reset prior to resetting Safety Injection or is reset with SI signal present, the Containment Isolation Phase A relay CAl (MG6) will be locked out and prevented from future automatic operation since relay CAIR has been sealed in by SIll closed contacts. A similar situation exists for Containment Isolation Phase B except the reset has to occur with the Containment Spray signal present instead of the SI signal.
(CBl is locked out since CBIR has been sealed in by the S1 closed contacts.)
The above sequence can produce a bypass condition unknown to the operator, only until such time as the safety injection is reset.
d) Safety Injection (SI)
There are two bypass conditions displayed on the Safeguards Panel (SB).
Low pressurizer pressure block is employed during start up, is displayed on the SB panel "SI Train A/B Blocked" and is automatically reset when pressurier pressure increases above the set point.
If an SI signal is received and the SI reset pushbutton is depressed after two (2) minutes have elapsed, the master relay SIl and 11 is reset and its operation blocked.
If both trains have been reset, a display "Auto SI Actuation Block" appears on the SB panel. When the SI Signal clears and the reactor trip breaker is closed the master relay is auto matically unblocked and restored to service.
Principal components of the Safety Injection system which provide core cooling immediately following a LOCA are the passive accumlators, the safety injection pumps and the residual heat removal pumps.
If the safety injection accumulator isolation valves or other safety injection valves are in a position other than prescribed for reactor operation an alarm "Safeguards Valve OFF Normal Position" annunicates.
In addition, eleven significant Motor Operated Valves (MOV) used in the Safety Injection flow path have an independent white light system to provide indication on the Safeguards Panel (SLF) that MOV's are in the correct position to insure flow in the event of an SI.
If the Safety Injection pumps or Residual Heat Removal pump switches are in the Pull Out Position an alarm "Safeguards Equipment Locked Open" annun ciates.
In addition, if either Safeguards train A or train B is placed in test at the Safeguards cabinets, an alarm, "Safeguards Train A/B in Test" annunciates at panel SC and the train is bypassed. The remaining train will provide automatic SI protection.
-4
- 2. With regard to note 12 on Drawing 9321-LL-31313 Sheet 2A, describe the method and devices that are used to control the position of the purge supply fan from louver.
Reply:
Method used is -
turn selector switches 1-1 and I-2/CBP on fan room control panel to Open position. Purge and ex haust penetrations will depressurize. When 63-2 (exhaust penetration pressure switch) closes on low pressure, relay TD3 will pick up instantly opening motor operated louvers (MOL-I and MOL-2).
33-1/MOL-1 33-2/MOL-I and MOL-2 (ao contacts) will close when purge supply fan louvers are fully open.
Devices used.are - TDI, TD3, 63-2, 33-1/MOL-I and MOL-2, 33-2/MOL-I and MOL-2, 1-1 and I-2/CBP, V2-lX, I-l/PRPT.
- 3. Systems other than liquid systems penetrating containment receiving Isolation Phase A or Phase B Signals Reply:
Systems Receiving Isolation Phase A Signals System Pentration RCS Pressurizer Relief Tank to Gas Analyzer WDS Primary System Vent and N2 Supply Line WDS Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Gas Analyzer RMS Containment Air Sample In RMS Containment Air Sample Out Sec. Sys.
Air Ejector Discharge to Containment Vent. Sys.
Purge Supply Duct Vent. Sys.
Purge Exhaust Duct Vent. Sys.
Containment Pressure Relief 02 Oxygen Supply to Cont.
H2 H2 Supply to Recombiner Inst. Air Sys.
Instrument Air/P.A. Venting Supply Line Systems Receiving Isolation Phase B Signals None
-6
- 4. What is the time setting of the SI timer?
Reply:
Two (2) minutes.
- 5. What function does the ASI relay play in the CS circuits?
(Ref:
Drawing I13E303, Sheet 6)
Reply:
The ASI relay is the high containment pressure master relay which in series with SI signal will operate the containment spray relay (SI) and by itself will operate the main line steam isolation relay (SLI).
-7
- 6. Do the CS, CI and SI valves all have two-position, maintained contract, manual position control switches?
Reply:
All of the valves in the CS, CI and SI systems that are controlled by a two-position mannual control switch have maintained contacts. Valves with three position control switches in the CS, CI and SI systems are spring return to auto.
- 7. Describe and provide photographs of the location of the reset and bypass switches that are a part of any engineered safety feature circuit.
Reply:
a) Reset switches for safety circuits are Westinghouse Type OT2 pushbuttons.
b) Reset pushbuttons for Phase A and Phase B Contain ment Isolation Signals and Containment Ventilation Isolation signals are mounted on Supervisory Panel SNF, with test reset pushbutton on Safeguards Ini tiation Racks.
See attached photographs/drawings.
c) Reset pushbuttons for Safety Injection Train A and Train B are located on Supervisory Panel SBF2, with test reset buttons mounted in Safeguards Initiation Racks.
See attached photographs/drawings.
d) Reset pushbuttons for Containment Spray are located on Supervisory Panel SBFI with test reset push buttons mounted in Safeguards Initiation Racks.
e) In addition, reset pushbutton for individual valves or groups of valves have recently been installed in Supervisory Panels SNF and SMF and in the Waste Disposal Panel and the Primary Sampling Panel.
f) Safety Injection Train A and Train B can be blocked for the low pressurizer pressure condition on start up. These switches are located on Supervisory Panel SBF2.
- 8. Indian Point 3 must meet the conditions of General Design criteria, 1,2,4 and 23 of Appendix A and Sections III and XI of Appendix B (to 10 CFR Part 50) and the national standards identified in Part II "Acceptance Criteria" of Standard Review Plan Section 3.1 (which includes IEEE Std. 323).
To ensure that these conditions are met:
- 1) Provide the information requested in Parts 2 thru 6 below for the following equipment:
a) MG6 latching relay b) "RESET" switches used in the logic circuits for Containment Ventilation Isolation, Containment Isolation, Containment Spray and Safety Injection c) The inverters that supply power to the Safeguards Cabinets d) The Safety Injection reset timer, and e) The slave relays
- 2) For each item listed in Part 1 above, provide the design specification requirement including:
a) The system safety requirements.
b) An environmental envelope as a function of time that in cludes all extrem parameters, both maximum and minimum values, expected to occur during plant shutdown, normal operation, abnormal operation, and any design basis event (including LOCA and MSLB), and post event con ditions. The envelope shall include an explicit statement of the range of energy supply and electrical loads.
c) Time required to fulfill its safety function when sub jected to any of the extremes of the environmental envelope specified in 2 (b) above.
- 3) Provide the qualification test plan, test setup, test pro cedures, land acceptance criteria for each of the items listed in (1) above.
If any method other than type test ing was used for qualification (operating experience, analysis, combined qualification, or ongoing qualification),
described that method in sufficient detail to permit an evaluation of its adequacy:
- 4) For each piece of equipment identified in (1) above, state the actual qualification envelope simulated during testing (defining the duration of the testing environment and the, margin in excess of the design requirements).
If any method other than type testing was used for qualification, identify
-10 (4) continued:
the method and define the equivalent qualification envelope so derived.
(5) Summarize the test results that demonstrate the adequacy of the qualification programs described above.
(6) Identify the qualification documents which contain detailed supporting information, including test data for items (3),
(4) and (5) above.
Reply:
The information requested in Parts 2 thru 6 above has been requested from Westinghouse and will be supplied by September 29, 1980.
- 9. For the relays that are listed in Question 8 (1) above, provide the following information:
(1) Manufacturer's name and model number.
Reply:
(a) Latching Relay (b) Reset Switches (c) Instrument Bus Inverter (d) Safety Injection Reset Timer (e) Slave Relays Westinghouse Type MG6, Style No. 289B363AII Westinghouse Type OT2 pushbuttons Westinghouse 7.5 KVA Static Inverter Agastat AGA2412PE (120 sec.)
Westinghouse BFD 66S*
75S*
120S*
48S*
- -Coil #503C428G21
-12 (2) The minimum voltage at which it must operate.
Reply:
105 volts DC per Westinghouse equipment specification, Spec. 677275 (3) The voltage at which it was seismically qualified.
Reply:
This information has been requested from Westinghouse and will be supplied by September 29, 1980.
(4) The normal operating voltage.
Reply:
129 volts DC.
105 to 140 volts maximum range.
S.d _,
' 4
-13 (5) The locations and functions of this type of relay.
Relay (a). Latching Relay Location Safeguards Initiation Racks Function Safeguards function initiation and reset (b) n/a (c) n/a (d) Reset Timer (e) Slave Relays Safeguards Initiation Racks Safeguards Initiation Racks Prevents premature reset from SBF-2 panel Auxiliary relays.
Provide additional contacts Justify the seismic qualification of any relay that was not qualified by test at its minimum operating voltage, or that was not tested in both the energized and de-energized state.
Reply:
This information has been requested from Westinghouse and will be supplied by September 29, 1980.
Reply: