ML092810443

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License Amendment 177, Issuance of Emergency Amendment Regarding One-Time Extension to Allowed Outage Time for Technical Specification 3.7.8
ML092810443
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/09/2009
From: Martin R
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Ajluni M
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Martin R, NRR/DORL, 415-1493
References
TAC ME2351
Download: ML092810443 (14)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 October 9, 2009 Mr. Mark J. Ajluni Manager, Nuclear Licensing Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, Alabama 35201

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT REGARDING ONE-TIME EXTENSION TO ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8 (TAC NO. ME2351)

Dear Mr. Ajluni:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 177 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application consisting of two letters (NL-09-1622 and NL-09-1644) dated October 8,2009, by extending the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)" Action A, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time to seven (7) days for repair of the service water system pump seismic rings.

The SWS pumps in Train A of Unit 2 were removed from service on October 6, 2009 at 0818 central daylight savings time (CDT), for repair of the seismic rings that surround the pump. The repair and replacement of the seismic rings on the three Train A pumps would force the maintenance schedule to exceed the completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

. 7~/l1~

/ 40bert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager

/ Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 177 to NPF-8
2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 177 Renewed License No. NPF-8

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), consisting of two letters (NL-09-1622 and NL-09-1644) dated October 8, 2009, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

-2 (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 177, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within thirty (30) days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~ng~Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: October 9, 2009

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 177 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert License Pages License Pages NPF-8 page 3 I\IPF-8 page 3 TS Pages TS Pages 3.7.8.1 3.7.8.1

'3 (2) Alabama Power ~ompany, pursuant 10 Section 1O~ of !he Ad and 10 CFA Part 50, *Ucenslng of Production and U1Illzatlon FacAltiee,- to possess but not operale the'flClly at the designatecllocallon in Hou&1on County, Alabama In accordance with Ie proc:8dures anclllmltations &81 forth In this renewed MoonSf.'.

(3) Southern Nuclear, pursuan1 to the Act and 10 CFA Part 70. to receive, p()8SeSS and use at any time lpeCIal ,.jclBBr material 88 reactor fu8I:1n accordance with the Ilmllalloll8 for storage and,amoums required for reactor operation, as described In 1he Final Safety Analysis Report. as supplemenled and amended; (4) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30. 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any tlme any byproduct. source and special nuclear material as sealtcl neutron Sources for reactor sta~ *

. ,ealed sources'for reaator Ins,trumentatlon and-radiallon"monltoring ",

equipment calibration, aneras fission detectors In amounts as required; (5) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive. possess and use in amounts as required anv byproduct. '

source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or' physical form. for sample analysis or Instrument calibration or BSsociated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) SOuthern Nuclear, pursUlin1 to the Ad and 10 CFR Parts 30,40 and 70,

,to possess. but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials 8S may be 'produced by tile operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and Is sUbJeCt to the conditions specified in the Commissions'. regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter tand is subject to aU appRcable.provlslons of the Act lind the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter In enect; and Is subject to'the additional conditions specified or Incorporated below:

(1) , Maximum, Power Level Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate th8 facility at r8llctor <:ore power levels not in excess of 2ns megaw~tts thennal.

(2) Technical SpecifiCations

,The' Technical Sp&<:iffJ;atlons, contained In Appendix A, liS revised through Amendme~t No. tn., are hereby Incorporated In the renewed fic~nse. ,I Southern Nuclear snail, operala the facility in accordance ~th the Technical Specifications.

Farley'. Unit 2 Renewed ue,n,eo N", NPF-ij'

, Amendment No* 177

SWS 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Service Water System (SWS)

LCO 3.7.8 Two SWS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SWS train A.1 -----------NOTES-----------

inoperable. 1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS.

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops MODE 4,"

for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by SWS.

Restore SWS train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />

B. One SWS automatic B.1 Restore both inoperable 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> turbine bUilding isolation turbine building isolation valve inoperable in each valves to OPERABLE SWS train. status.

Farley Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-1 Amendment No. 146 (Unit 1)

Amendment No.1 77 (Unit 2)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION AMENDMENT NO. 177 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application consisting of two letters (NL-09-1622 and NL-09-1644) dated October 8, 2009, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SI\JC, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) requesting changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (FNP), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.90, "Application for Amendment of License, Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit." The LAR includes proposed changes to TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)," Action A, Completion Time from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to a one-time 7-day Completion Time to allow replacement of two of the FNP Unit 2 SWS Train A seismic support ring assemblies.

Repair of the seismic support ring assemblies involves a number of major steps, which could force the maintenance schedule to exceed the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> allowable under the existing TS requirement.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Background The SWS for the FI\JP, Unit 2, consists of two trains. The FNP TS 3.7.8 LCO requires that two SWS trains be operable. This configuration provides the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. If one SWS train is inoperable, TS 3.7.8, Action A, requires that the inoperable train be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this condition, the remaining operable SWS train is adequate to perform the heat removal function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the operable SWS train could result in a loss of the SWS safety function.

Each FNP Unit has a dedicated SWS with five service water pumps. However, the units share the intake structure, cooling water supplies to shared diesel generators, and the various discharge paths. Each train contains two dedicated pumps that together provide the required design cooling water flow for the train. The fifth pump is a swing pump that may be aligned to either train to

-2 replace an inoperable pump. Each train provides an essential supply of water to the following safety-related components in the respective train:

  • Component Cooling Heat Exchanger
  • Containment Coolers
  • Essential Switchgear Room Coolers

On August 2,2009, plant personnel heard abnormal sounds from upon starting the 2E SWS Pump.

The licensee stopped the pump and investigated the noise. The investigation indicated that the seismic support ring assembly for the 2E SWS Pump was no longer capturing the pump column.

The seismic support ring assembly consists of a ring that captures the pump column and a wall plate that supports the ring. The Unit 2 wall plates for each pump are fastened with nuts to four threaded studs grouted into the intake structure reinforced concrete. Each ring is fastened to its associated wall plate by two bolts.

Inspection of the underwater seismic support ring assembly indicated the lower two of the four wall plate bolts for the 2E SWS Pump were degraded and missing the nuts. The upper two bolts were degraded but still had nuts. The licensee determined that the seismic support ring assembly would be able to perform its design function if the two remaining wall plate bolts were able to be torqued to 150 foot-pounds (ft-Ibs) and the vertical bolts that attached the seismic ring to the wall plate were torqued to 250 ft-Ibs. All remaining bolting met the torque requirements. The licensee determined that the 2E SWS Pump seismic support ring assembly was operable but degraded.

The licensee performed additional inspections to evaluate the extent of degradation affecting the FNP, Unit 2, seismic support ring assemblies. An inspection on September 29,2009, revealed that the 2E SWS pump seismic support ring assembly was not in an operable condition and the base plate was replaced. After the 2E SWS plate was replaced and the pump was restored to an operable condition, the licensee resumed inspections. Two of the four 20 SWS Pump seismic support ring assembly horizontal wall bolt nuts were found to be loose. After the nuts were tightened to the required torque, the licensee determined that the 20 pump seismic support ring assembly was satisfactory and the pump was operable.

On October 06,2009, at 0818 central daylight savings time (COT), the licensee removed the Train A of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS from service for inspection. The 2C, 28, and 2A SWS Pump seismic support ring assemblies' base plates were found to need replacement due to the inability to establish torque of 150 ft-Ibs on the wall plate nuts. The licensee determined that disassembly and replacement of these underwater seismic support ring assemblies would involve a number of major steps that could force the maintenance schedule to exceed the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> completion time provided byTS 3.7.8, Action A. Although the licensee had contingences in place to effect repairs, the licensee determined that the extent of degradation would require additional time beyond the 72-hour completion time to restore the train to operable status. The licensee found that unforeseen difficulty drilling satisfactory anchor holes underwater was the primary reason that completion of repairs would exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

-3 To allow completion of the repairs and associated testing without an unnecessary shutdown, SNC proposed a one-time limited duration extension of the TS 3.7.8, Action A, completion time associated with Train A of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS. The requested extension would allow continued operation of FNP, Unit 2, for an additional 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> while repairs and related testing of the 2A SWS are completed provided that two Train A SWS pumps are maintained available. The licensee de"fined the pumps as available if the pumps had degraded seismic supports but were otherwise operable.

2.2 Applicable Regulatory Criteria The NRC staff performs its review of changes to TS requirements in accordance with the guidance provided by Standard Review Plan (SRP) Chapter 16, "Technical Specifications."

Chapter 16 of the SRP refers to standard TS content guidance developed by the staff for plants designed by the Westinghouse Corporation in I\JUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants." Changes consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1431, with appropriate modifications for plant-specific considerations, are acceptable.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Technical Specification 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)" requires two SWS trains to be operable. The SWS is capable of delivering cooling water during all modes of plant operation to all equipment required to function under accident conditions. All safety-related portions of the SWS, including the service water intake structure and pumps, are Seismic Category I and meet the single-failure criteria. Because the SWS operates continuously during normal plant operation, its availability is apparent to plant operators. The loss of any single component would not render the system incapable of supplying sufficient cooling water flow.

The licensee proposed a one-time 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> extension of the completion time to restore Train A of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS to operable status. The extension would result in a total completion time of no more than 7 days to restore Train A of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS to operable status. The increase in completion time is conditioned on two Train A SWS pumps being available during the entire extension to the completion time. The proposed one-time TS change defines an available SWS pump as a pump that is operable except during a seismic event. In other words, for the duration of the proposed completion time extension, an available pump lacks necessary structural support to withstand seismic accelerations but otherwise satisfies all design requirements.

The licensee determined that the design of the Unit 1 SWS seismic restraints is different and more robust than that of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS seismic restraints. The studs are larger in diameter, more securely anchored to the intake structure concrete, and made of more corrosion-resistant material. The seismic restraints themselves are fabricated in a single piece from thicker and more corrosion resistant material. Therefore, the licensee determined that the FNP, Unit 1, SWS pumps are operable. These pumps have the capability to provide cooling water to the shared Train A emergency diesel generators following design basis seismic events that could threaten the availability of the FNP, Unit 2, Train A SWS pumps.

The licensee also determined that the FNP Unit 2 SWS pumps aligned to Train B (Le., SWS Pumps 20 and 2E) were operable. The licensee repaired the seismic restraint for pump 2E and

- 4 verified that the seismic restraint for pump 2D retained acceptable integrity to perform its design functions. Therefore, Train B of the FNP, Unit 2, SWS would be capable of providing sufficient cooling water to satisfy essential functions for FNP, Unit 2.

The availability of two Train A service water pumps during the extension to the completion time provides reasonable assurance of adequate cooling water flow to Train A components for most design basis events. Design basis seismic accelerations may result in failure of the affected Train A pumps, but the pumps would be operable for all other design basis events. The probability of a design basis seismic event during the small extension to the completion time is remote.

Therefore, the Train A pumps would be available to provide sufficient cooling water to satisfy essential functions for FI\JP, Unit 2, for most design basis events, including failure of the Train B SWS pumps.

The completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for an inoperable SWS train in the FNP TS was based on a complete loss of redundancy. For the specific conditions at Ff\lP Unit 2, the SWS retains redundancy for most design basis events. Thus, the risk associated with a longer completion time for these particular conditions is very small. Therefore, the proposed extension in the completion time to restore Ff\lP Unit 2 Train A SWS pumps to operable status is acceptable.

The licensee further notes that: (a) SWS is required for all modes of plant operation and a plant shutdown would not eliminate the need for SWS operation, and (b) maintaining the plant at power allows for normal core cooling and provides for back-up cooling by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater system, which, if the unit were to shutdown, would not be available.

4.0 STATEMENT OF EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES Section 50.91 of 10 CFR Part 50 provides special exceptions for the issuance of amendments when the usual 30-day notice for public comment cannot be met. One type of special exception is an emergency. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) provides that where the NRC finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in the derate or shut down of a nuclear power plant, it may issue a license amendment involving no significant hazards consideration without prior notice and opportunity for a hearing or public comment. In this situation, the NRC will publish a notice of issuance under 10 CFR 2.106, providing for opportunity of a hearing and for public comment after issuance.

The licensee states that the SWS consists of two separate 100 percent capacity, safety-related cooling water trains. Train A contains SWS Pumps A and B, and Train B contains SWS Pumps D and E. SWS pump C is the swing pump that can be aligned to either Train A or B. This license amendment is applicable to Train A. The licensee's application states the during the months of .

August and September, 2009, the licensee responded to the need for repair and inspection of the seismic rings in the Train B pumps D and E. Upon completing these activities and pursuing the extent of condition, the licensee describes its findings on Train A as follows.

On October 06,2009 at 0818 CST [sic] hours, the Unit 2 SWS Train A was removed from service for inspection. The 2C, 2B, and 2A SWS Pump seismic support ring assemblies' base plates were found to need replacement due to the inability to establish torque of 150 ft-Ibs on the nuts of the horizontal bolting.

Disassembly and replacement of these underwater seismic support ring assemblies involve a number of major steps, including diver coordination and fabrication of a replacement seismic support ring and mounting plate that could force the

-5 maintenance schedule to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The required major steps are listed below:

1. Fabrication of a replacement seismic support ring and mounting plate.
2. Diver coordination.
3. Underwater drilling for new anchor bolting.
4. Inspection.
5. Release tagout and realign system.
6. Verify pump operation.

Although the FNP staff had foreseen the need for potential repairlreplacement of the seismic support ring assemblies and had contingences in place to effect repairs as necessary, the extent of the repairs requires additional time beyond the 72-hour Completion Time. Underwater drilling into concrete and the striking of rebar is the chief reason for the additional time. The exact location of the rebar was not known.

The Unit 2 Completion Time will expire on October 09,2009 at 0818 CST [sic].

To return the Unit 2 SWS Train A to OPERABLE status, replacement of seismic support ring assemblies must be completed for two of the three pumps. A one-time, 7-day Unit 2 Completion Time for TS 3.7.8, Action A, to allow the SWS Train A to be inoperable is requested to permit the replacement of seismic support ring assemblies and return SWS Train A to service. The proposed extended Completion Time will expire upon returning the SWS Train A to OPERABLE status, or on October 13, 2009 at 0818 CST [sic], whichever occurs first. This one-time emergency TS change will prevent an unnecessary shutdown of FNP Unit 2.

The NRC staff finds that the need for repair for all three pumps that could meet the operability requirements for Train A, (pumps 2A, 2B and 2C) did not become apparent until Train A was removed from service for inspection on October 6,2009. An unexpected condition forcing completion of two of the pumps to support Train A operability beyond the completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is the striking of reinforcing bar in the concrete walls for some of the bolts attaching the seismic ring support plates to the wall. The exact location of the reinforcing bars was not known to the licensee.

Additional Actions Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that an emergency situation exists, in that failure to act in a timely way would result in a shut down of the plant. The licensee has explained why the emergency situation occurred and why it could not be avoided. The NRC staff assessed the reasons and has determined that emergency circumstances exist pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(5) and could not have been avoided, that the submittal of information by the licensee was timely, and the licensee did not create the emergency condition. Therefore, this request was handled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).

5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DETERMINATION The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92(c) state that the Commission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not:

-6 (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or, (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated; or, (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following analysis was provided by the licensee in their letter dated October 8, 2009.

The proposed change will provide a one-time revision to the FNP Unit 2 Completion Time of TS 3.7.8, Action A, to allow an inoperable Unit 2 Train A service water for 6 days. The extended Completion Time will permit replacement of two seismic support ring assemblies for Train A.

1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not alter any plant equipment or operating practices in such a manner that the probability of an accident is increased. The proposed changes will not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient event. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not involve any physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Based on the operability of the remaining SWS train, the proposed change ensures that the accident analysis assumptions continue to be met. The system's design and operation are not affected by the proposed changes. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not altered by the proposed changes.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based on the above, SNC concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c),

and, accordingly, a 'finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justi'fied.

The NRC staff agrees with the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, has concluded that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff makes a final determination that the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

-7

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Jones Date of Issuance: October 9, 2009

October 9, 2009 Mr. Mark J. Ajluni Manager, Nuclear Licensing Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 40 Inverness Center Parkway Birmingham, Alabama 35201

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENT REGARDING ONE-TIME EXTENSION TO ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8 (TAC NO. ME2351)

Dear Mr. Ajluni:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 177 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.

The amendment changes the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application consisting of two letters (NL-09-1622 and NL-09-1644) dated October 8, 2009, by extending the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8, "Service Water System (SWS)" Action A, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time to seven (7) days for repair of the service water system pump seismic rings.

The SWS pumps in Train A of Unit 2 were removed from service on October 6,2009 at 0818 central daylight savings time (CDT), for repair of the seismic rings that surround the pump. The repair and replacement of the seismic rings on the three Train A pumps would force the maintenance schedule to exceed the completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, IRA!

Robert E. Martin, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 177 to NPF-8
2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ DISTRIBUTION:

Public RidsAcrsAcnw_MaiICTR RidsN rrDorl Lp12-1 LPL2-1 R/F RidsOgcRp RidsNrrDirsltsb RidsNrrPMFarley (hard copy) RidsNrrLASRohrer RidsNrrDssSbpb RidsRgn2MailCenter (SShaeffer) RidsNrrDorlDpr SJones Amendment No.: ML092810443 *Per Memo Dated, (**) Per E-mail OFFICE LPL2-1/PM LPL2-1/LA SBPB/BC OGC LPL2-1/BC(A)

NAME RMartin SRohrer GCasto DRoth JStang DATE 10109/2009 10108/2009 10108/2009 10108/2009 10109/2009 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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