ML092120049
| ML092120049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2009 |
| From: | Justin Poole Plant Licensing Branch III |
| To: | Hale S Florida Power & Light Co, Florida Power & Light Energy Point Beach, Point Beach |
| Poole Justin/DORL/LPL3-1/ 301-415-2048 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML092120049 (2) | |
Text
From:
Poole, Justin Sent:
Friday, July 31, 2009 8:41 AM To:
'Steve_Hale@fpl.com'; COSTEDIO, JAMES
Subject:
DRAFT - RAIs from the Accident Dose Branch Regarding License Amendment Request 241 Alternate Source Term
- Steve, By letter dated December 8, 2008, FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, submitted a license amendment application for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 to revise the current licensing basis to implement the alternate source term through reanalysis of the radiological consequences of the FSAR Chapter 14 accidents.
The Accident Dose Branch has reviewed the information provided and determined that in order to complete its evaluation, additional information is required. We would like to discuss the questions, in draft form below, with you in a conference call.
This e-mail aims solely to prepare you and others for the proposed conference call. It does not convey a formal NRC staff position, and it does not formally request for additional information.
Justin C. Poole Project Manager NRR/DORL/LPL3-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301)415-2048 email: Justin.Poole@nrc.gov
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DRAFT
- 1. Please provide additional information explaining the need for the control room ventilation system (VNCR) accident mode in mitigating postulated post-design basis accident activity releases in lieu of a Technical Specification controllable safety-related system.
In addition, please provide information on any other mitigating systems (safety-related or otherwise) that will or can be used for control room isolation.
- 2. In Enclosure 3, Section 6.5, page 45 of the submittal, there is a discussion on primary-to-secondary leakage release pathway for the control rod ejection accident (CRDE) analysis. In the first paragraph it states that primary-to-secondary steam generator (SG) tube leakage is assumed to continue until 2000 seconds, or 0.556 hours0.00644 days <br />0.154 hours <br />9.193122e-4 weeks <br />2.11558e-4 months <br />, when the primary system pressure is less than the secondary system pressure. However, in the following paragraph it states that primary-to-secondary SG leakage is assumed to be 1000 gpm for the duration of the accident.
Please provide which value was used to evaluate the radiological consequences of a CRDE event.
- 3. The safety evaluation associated with Point Beach Unit 1 and Unit 2, Amendment Nos.
213 and 218, respectively (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML040680918), dated April 02, 2004, suggested that the meteorological measurement program was to be upgraded in the post 1999 timeframe.
Were the September 2002 through September 2005 meteorological data provided in the December 8, 2008 Point Beach Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request (LAR) measured under the upgraded program? If so, please highlight the upgrades and discuss the current programs capability to assess the Point Beach site meteorology, particularly with respect to atmospheric stability and wind flow.
- 4. What is the relationship of called north to true north for the Point Beach site? NRC staff examined Figure 2 of Enclosure 3 to the December 8, 2008 Point Beach LAR, but had difficulty reading the figure because it had been reduced in size.
- 5. Please provide a further discussion of why it is acceptable to use the control room atmospheric dispersion factors (/Q values) for dose estimates associated with unfiltered inleakage into the control room envelop. Where is the control room located with respect to the postulated release locations shown in the figures provided as part of the December 8, 2008 LAR?
- 6. NRC staff notes that inputs to the ARCON96 computer code were provided for the release locations identified as the limiting cases. Other than for the refueling water storage tank, did you make quantitative calculations for other possible releases (e.g.,
from Unit 1) or was the determination of which releases were limiting based upon a subjective assessment? Please confirm that the generated /Q values model the limiting doses and all potential release scenarios were considered, including those due to single failures.
DRAFT