W3F1-2009-0022, Response Request for Additional Information RAI 2 License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, and Add New Technical Specification 3/4.9.12, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration

Response Request for Additional Information RAI 2 License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, and Add New Technical Specification 3/4.9.12, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration

ML091831258
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/30/2009
From:	Christian K Entergy Nuclear South, Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC MD9685, W3F1-2009-0022
Download: ML091831258 (37)

Text

SEntergy Entergy Nuclear South Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 Tel 504-739-6496 Fax 504-739-6698 kchrisl@entergy.com Kenny J. Christian Nuclear Safety Assurance Director Waterford 3 Contains Proprietary Information submitted under 10 CFR 2.390.

W3F1 -2009-0022 June 30, 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

REFERENCE:

ResponseRequest for Additional Information RAI #2 "RE: License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, and Add New Technical Specification 3/4.9.12, Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration" (TAC NO. MD9685)

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Docket No, 50-382 License No. NPF-38

1.

NRC letter dated April 17, 2009 "Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, and Add New Technical Specification 3/4 9.12, Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration (TAC NO.

MD9685)"

2.

Entergy (Waterford 3) letter to NRC dated Feb 26, 2009, "Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding "License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage, and Add New Technical Specification 3/4.9.12, Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Boron Concentration" (W3F1 -2009-0007)

3.

NRC letter dated January 2, 2009 "Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage and Add New Technical Specification 3/4 9.12, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration (TAC NO. MD9685)"

4.

Entergy (Waterford 3) letter to NRC dated September 17, 2008, "License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Section 5.6, Fuel Storage and Add New Technical Specification.

3/4 9.12, Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration" (W3F1 -2008-0052)

/

W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 2

Dear Sir or Madam:

On April 17, 2009, Entergy received NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI #2) dated April 17, 2009 (Reference 1) needed to complete the review of the Spent Fuel Pool TS Change request. Entergy's response to the RAI (RAI#2) is contained in Attachment 1 -of this submittal. This response also includes a revised calculation report, revised ýnarkup of proposed TS pages (Attachment 3), and a corresponding revised analysis (Attachment 2) with no effect on the conclusions to the No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC).

The Spent Fuel Pool criticality analysis report (Attachment 4) was revised in order to demonstrate more conservative methodologies associated with the appropriation of uncertainties and to provide an objective means of responding to the RAI#2 requests for clarification. This revision resulted in the need for minor, conservative changes to the minimum fuel burnup and design boron concentration reflected in the original LAR. The Proposed Technical Specification Changes (mark-up) revised in Attachment 3, incorporate the more conservative limitations and clarifying editorial changes. contains proprietary information. The proprietary information was provided to Entergy in a Holtec International transmittal that is referenced by arn Affidavit for withholding Proprietary Information, Attachment 5. Holtec requests the enclosed proprietary information identified in Attachment 4 be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390 and 10CFR 9.17. Attachment 6 contains the non-proprietary Revised Holtec Licensing Report for Waterford 3 SFP Criticality Analysis (Non Proprietary Information).

There are no new commitments contained in this letter. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Robert Murillo, Manager, Licensing at. (504) 739-6715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 30, 2009.

Sin rly*

Attachments:

1. Response to RAI #2 Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify SFP TS

2. Analysis of Proposed Technical Specification Change, Revised

3. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (mark-up), Revised

4. Revised Holtec Licensing Report for SFP Criticality Analysis (Proprietary Information)

5. Affidavit for withholding Proprietary Information

6. Revised Holtec Licensing Report for SFP Criticality Analysis (Non Proprietary)

W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 3 cc:

Mr. Elmo E. Collins Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Waterford 3 P. 0. Box 822 Killona, LA 70057-3093 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. N. Kalyanam MS 0-07 D1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 American Nuclear Insurers Attn: Library 95 Glastonbury'Blvd.

Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4443 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway Attn: J. Smith P.O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Compliance.

Surveillance Division P. O. Box 4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 Winston & Strawn ATTN: N.S. Reynolds 1700 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3817 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP ATTN: T.C. Poindexter 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004

Attachment I To W3F1 -2009-0022 Response to RAI #2 Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify SFP TS to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 1 of 4 Response to RAI #2 Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify SFP TS On May 17, 2009, Entergy received an NRC Request for Information (RAI#2) dated May 17, 2009 (Reference 1) to support the review of the proposed TS change request. The RAI states:

Entergy submitted the application to revise the Waterford 3 licensing basis to reflect the new spent fuel pool (SFP) criticality analysis. Entergy performed the new analysis to credit soluble boron in the fuel storage racks for both Standard and Next Generation Fuel (NGF). The NRC staff has reviewed the application and determined that the following additional information is needed to complete the review.

RAI #2 Questions:

1.

Validation of the code, MCNP4a Appendix A of the Holtec Report No. HI-2084014, Licensing Report for Waterford Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis" (Attachment 3 to your application dated September 17, 2008), discusses the validation of the three-dimensional Monte Carlo Code MCNP4a used in criticality calculations. To allow the NRC staff to evaluate the adequacy of the validation, please provide the following additional information:

Entergy Response:

Holtec International has updated Appendix A of Holtec Licensing Report HI-2084014 (the report has been reissued as HI-2094376) with additional text and descriptions to address the additional information which was requested. Additionally, specific responses are provided for the following sub-questions:

a)

In section 2.1, you state that, "MCNP4a calculations used continuous energy cross-section data predominantly based on ENDF/B-V and ENDF/B-VI." Please explain how both'libraries were used in the MCNP4a calculations?

Entergy Response:

ENDF/B-V data was used whenever possible. However, some fission product isotopes that were available in the CASMO N-library were not available in ENDF/B-V. In these cases, ENDF/B-VI cross-sections were used. No energy group data was used because, as stated in Section 2.1, "MCNP4a calculations used continuous energy cross-section data."

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 2 of 4 b)

Please identify the cross-section library and energy group used in the benchmark calculations.

Entergy Response:

The cross-section library used in the MCNP4a benchmark was ENDF/B-V. No energy group data was used because MCNP4a calculations are performed with continuous energy cross-section data.

c)

Please identify any known problems associated with the libraries that may adversely affect the analysis.

Entergy Response:

Holtec is not aware at this time of any issues with the ENDF/B-V and ENDF/B-VI cross-section data that may affect the analysis. The Evaluated Nuclear Data Files ENDF/B-V and ENDF/B-VI have been widely used in the nuclear industry, national laboratories, and universities. Many benchmark calculations have been performed based on these libraries, and they have shown good agreement with experimental results.

d)

Please document and justify the area of applicability for the benchmarks.

Entergy Response:

Appendix A of HI-2084014 (now HI-2094376) has been updated with a discussion on the Area of Applicability.

e)

Please explain how the measurement uncertainties for the benchmarks were accounted for in the analysis.

Entergy Response:

Appendix A of HI-2084014 (now HI-2094376) has been updated with a discussion on the experimental uncertainty of the benchmark experiments.

It is noted that Appendix A has been submitted as a part of Holtec's spent fuel storage rack criticality analyses since about 1999, and has been approved as a part of numerous submittals. The additional information currently being requested has not been requested previously, and therefore additional justifications addressing the appropriateness of the current Appendix A have been presented.

to W3F 1-2009-0022 Page 3 of 4

2.

Validation of the code,, CASMO-4 Please discuss the basis for not needing to apply any methodology uncertainties associated with the use of CASMO-4 to determine the relative reactivity differences for temperature variation, manufacturing tolerances, and depletion uncertainty.

Entergy Response:

CASMO-4 has previously been used in the same capacity for Waterford-3 spent fuel criticality analysis, and has been reviewed and approved by the NRC. In order to address this RAI, Holtec has validated CASMO-4 code against selected benchmark experiments which involved performing additional calculations. Additionally, Holtec addressed how the code bias and bias uncertainty would be applied to the CASMO-4 differential calculations. The CASMO-4 benchmark information has been incorporated into the updated HI-2084014 (now HI-2094376) report as a reference.

3.

Table 7.13 on page 46 of Holtec Report No. HI-2084014 The numbers do not add up for the 2 percent enrichment case in Table 7.13 (i.e.,

MCNP calculated value plus the sum of the biases and uncertainties do not equal 0.995). Please explain.

Entergy Response:

For the 2 percent enrichment case, the calculated k-eff value is 0.9882 (Ref. HI-2094376). A footnote has been added to Table 7.13 stating that the k-eff value was conservatively increased to 0.9950 for consistency with the rest of the "Total keff0 ppm Boron" values in the table.

4.

Soluble boron calculations In Attachment 1 to your letter dated February 26, 2009, you provided a revised Table 7.14. Please clarify if the rows "Normal Keff [effective multiplication factor]

without Boron" and "Normal Keff with 600 ppm [parts per million] Boron" should indicate the MCNP calculated value. As presented, the values in these rows appear to include the sum. of biases and uncertainties and appear inconsistent with the interpolated boron concentration values.

Entergy Response:

Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 submitted in Attachment 1 to the letter dated February 26, 2009 did not provide the same information, which

.possibly led to the confusion expressed in the RAI. These tables have been updated with additional information to clarify the soluble boron amount necessary to maintain keff less than 0.95.

to

-W3F1-2009-0022 Page 4 of 4 Please demonstrate the effect of soluble boron on the biases and uncertainties for the borated cases, beyond rack and fuel uncertainties. The staff acknowledges the information on rack and fuel uncertainties provided in the letter dated February 26, 2009.

Entergy Response:

The HI-2084014 (now HI-2094376) report has been updated to show that neglecting soluble boron for other biases and -uncertainties is conservative.

In addition to the RAI #2 Questions, per email from NRC dated May 8, 2009, the following question was proposed and discussed on telephone conference call between NRC, Entergy, and Holtec International representatives May 11, 2009.

The licensee made the following statement in the application (pg. 3 of to W3F1 7-2008-0052): "Reactivity effects of abnormal and accident conditions were also evaluated to assure that under all credible abnormal and accident conditions, the keff will not exceed the regulatory limit of

0. 95 under borated conditions or 1.0 with unborated water." I don't think this is a true statement. Perhaps the licensee can provide some clarification during the call on Monday.

Entergy Response:

The last sentence on page 3 of Attachment 1 of the LAR (Reference

4) should instead read as follows: "Reactivity effects of abnormal and accident conditions were also evaluated to assure that, under all credible abnormal and accident conditions, the k-eff will not exceed the regulatory limit of 0.95 under borated conditions."

To W3F1-2009-0022 Analysis of Proposed Technical Specification Change, Revised.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 1 of 10 Analysis of Proposed Technical Specification Change, Revised

1.0 DESCRIPTION

This letter is a request to amend Operating License NPF-38 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). The Waterford 3 TS are being revised to take credit for soluble boron in the Region 1 (cask storage pit) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and refueling canal) fuel storage racks for the storage of both Standard and Next Generation Fuel (NGF) assemblies. In accordance with 10 CFR50.68, the limits for keff of the spent fuel storage racks are appropriately revised based on analysis to maintain keff less than 1.00 when flooded with unborated water, and less than, or equal to, 0.95 when flooded with water having a in this minimum boron concentration of 524 ppm during normal conditions. A new Technical RAI#2 Specification is added which includes a surveillance that ensures the required boron concentration is maintained in the spent fuel storage racks. The boron concentration will be maintained at a minimum of 1900 ppm per the new Technical Specification, significantly exceeding the required concentration levels to maintain keff within regulatory requirements.

The change is evaluated for both normal operation and accident conditions. This change will provide more flexibility in storing the more reactive NGF assemblies in the spent fuel storage racks. This change does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration, and the change is in conformance with regulatory requirements.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

The proposed change will modify TS section 5.6 as follows:

a. TS 5.6.1.a wording will be changed to: "For Region 1 (cask storage pit) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and refueling canal) racks, a maximum k~f of less than 1.00 when Revised flooded with unborated water, and less than, or equal to, 0.95 when flooded with water in this having a boron concentration of 524 ppm."

RAI#2

b. TS 5.6.1.d will be revised to replace the words "New or partially spent" with "Fresh and irradiated" and will read as follows: "Fresh and irradiated fuel assemblies may be allowed unrestricted storage in Region 1 racks."

c. TS 5. 6.1.e wording will be changed to: "Fresh fuel assemblies may be stored in the Region 2 racks provided that they are stored in a "checkerboard pattern" with empty Revised cells as illustrated in Figure 5.6-1, Pattern 1. Irradiated fuel assemblies with any in this burnup may also be stored with empty cells in the checkerboard configuration of RAI#2 Figure 5.6-1, Pattern 1."

d. TS 5.6.1.f will be revised to replace the words "Partially spent" with "Irradiated" and delete the word "discharge" and will read as follows: "Irradiated fuel assemblies with a burnup in the "acceptable range" of Figure 5.6-2 maybe allowed unrestricted storage in the Region 2 racks."

to W3F1-2009-0022 Page 2 of 10

e. TS 5.6.1.g wording will be changed to: "Irradiated fuel assemblies with a burnup of revised

> 27 GWd/MTU in the "unacceptable range" of Figure 5.6-2 may be stored in the in this RAI#2 Region 2 racks in a "checkerboard pattern", as illustrated in Figure 5.6-1, Pattern 2, with irradiated fuel in the "acceptable range" of Figure 5.6-3."

f.

TS 5.6.2 will be revised to replace the word "new" with "fresh" and will read as follows:

"The keff for fresh fuel stored in the new fuel storage racks shall be less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water and shall not exceed 0.98 when aqueous foam moderation is assumed."

g. TS Figure 5.6-1 will be replaced by a new Figure 5.6-1 to show the new Alternative Checkerboard Storage Arrangements, adding Pattern numbers (1 and 2) and providing the detailed limitations for storing new or highly reactive fuel adiacent to revised each other. Pattern 1 (checkerboardingq with empty, waterfilled cells) description is in this RAI#2 clarified to not only include fresh fuel, but to also allow the irradiated fuel to be stored in this pattern.

h. TS Figure 5.6-2 will be replaced by a new Figure 5.6-2 to show the new Acceptable Burnup Domain for Unrestricted Storage of Irradiated Fuel in Region 2 of the Spent Fuel Pool which includes the refueling canal.

i.

TS Figure 5.6-3 will be replaced by a new Figure 5.6-3 to show the Acceptable Burnup Domain for Irradiated Fuel in a Checkerboard Arrangement with Fuel of 5 wt

% Enrichment, or less, at 27 GWd/MTU Burnup, or higher, in Region 2 of the Spent Fuel Pool which includes the refueling canal.

j.

A new TS Figure, TS Figure 5.6-4, will be added to show Examples of Contiguous Fresh and Irradiated Fuel Checkerboards Which Meet Interface Requirements.

revised Clarification is added to the description of fresh fuel storagqe configuration to also allow inthis the irradiated fuel to be stored in checkerboard pattern with empty, waterfilled cells.

RAI#2 The proposed change will add TS 3/4.9.12 as follows:

1.

TS 3/4.9.12 will be entitled "Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration."

2.

A Limiting Condition for Operation will read as follows: "3.9.12 The spent fuel pool boron concentration shall be > 1900 ppm."

3.

The Applicability will read as follows: "When fuel assemblies are stored in the SFP."

4.

The Action statement will read as follows: "With the spent fuel boron concentration not within limits immediately suspend movement of fuel in the SFP and immediately initiate actions to restore boron concentration to within limits."

5.

The Surveillance Requirements will read as follows: "4.9.12 Verify the spent fuel pool concentration is within limits once per 7 days."

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 3 of 10 TS 3.9.13 The proposed change will add TS 3/4.9.13 as follows:

added by RAI#1

1.

TS 3/4.9.13 will be entitled "Spent Fuel Storage."

2.

A Limiting Condition for Operation will read as follows: "Storage of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage racks of Region 1 (cask storage pit) and Region 2 (spent revised fuel pool and refueling canal) shall be stored within the limitations of Specification in this

,RAI#2 5.6. 1.

3.

The Applicability will read as follows: "Whenever fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel storage rack."

4.

The Action statement will read as follows: "With the requirements of the LCO not met, immediately initiate action to restore the non-complying fuel assembly within requirements." and "The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable."

5.

The Surveillance Requirements will read as follows: "4.9.13 Verify by,,

administrative means that each fuel assembly meets fuel storage requirements contained in Specification 5.6.1 prior to storing the fuel assembly in a spent fuel storage rack."

The revised Holtec Licensing Report (HI-2084014, now HI-2094376 as Attachment 4 to RAI#2 response) resulted in the need for minor, conservative changes to the minimum fuel burnup requirements in Region 2 racks and an increase in SFP design boron concentration Added from that reflected in the original LAR:

in this RAI#2 Minimum boron concentration for non-accident condition was revised from 447 ppm to 524 ppm.

Minimum boron concentration for accident condition was revised from 838 ppm to 870 ppm.

3.0 BACKGROUND

License Amendment 214, approved on May 9, 2008, allowed the use of Next Generation Fuel (NGF) for Waterford 3. The new NGF fuel assemblies have a higher fuel pellet density, smaller rod diameter and thinner fuel rod cladding which results in the NGF fuel assembly being more reactive than the current Standard fuel assemblies. The acceptable storage patterns of the NGF assemblies in the spent fuel storage racks are currently limited due to the higher reactivity of these assemblies. The proposed TS changes will proyide more flexibility in the storage pattern for NGF stored in the spent fuel storage racks by taking credit for soluble boron to ensure that keff remains within regulatory limits.. Criticality analysis has demonstrated that taking credit for soluble boron in the spent fuel storage racks will ensure that keff remains within regulatory limits.

The purpose of the spent fuel storage racks is to maintain the fresh and irradiated assemblies in a safe storage condition. The current licensing basis as defined by the existing Technical' Specification Requirements, Section 5.6, and federal code requirements, 10 CFR 50.68, to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 4 of 10 specify the normal and accident parameters associated with maintaining the fresh and irradiated assemblies in a safe storage condition. Per the existing Technical Specification, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks are designed to be maintained less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water. 10 CFR 50.68 defines the criticality accident requirements associated with the spent fuel racks and states the following: "If no credit for soluble boron is taken, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. If credit is taken for soluble boron, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the keff must remain below 1.0, subcritical, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water."

Waterford 3's current Technical Specification does not take credit for soluble boron to maintain keff < 0.95. Accordingly, Waterford 3 is in compliance with 10 CFR 50.68 which states "If no credit for soluble boron is taken, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, revised 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water." The analysis shows that a minimum in this soluble boron concentration of 524 ppm is required to maintain keff within the regulatory RAI#2 requirement of < 0.95. Based on the proposed amendment, which will credit boron to maintain regulatory conformance, the following excerpt from 10 CFR50.68 applies: "If credit is taken for soluble boron, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the keff must remain below 1.00, subcritical, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water." The proposed applicable Technical Specification change is in compliance with the above statement and reads as follows: "For Region 1 and Region 2 racks, a maximum keff of less revised than 1.0 when flooded with unborated water, and less than, or equal to 0.95 when flooded in this with water having a boron concentration of 524 ppm."

RAI#2 An analysis, provided in Attachment 3 as a Holtec International Report, demonstrated that the effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, is less than 1.00 with the racks fully loaded with fuel of the highest anticipated reactivity, and flooded with unborated water at a temperature corresponding to the highest reactivity. In addition, the analysis demonstrated that keff is less than or equal to 0.95 with the racks fully loaded with fuel of the highest anticipated reactivity, and flooded with borated water at a temperature corresponding to the highest reactivity. The maximum calculated reactivity included a margin for uncertainty in reactivity calculations including manufacturing tolerances and is shown to be less than 0.95 with a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level. Reactivity effects of abnormal and accident conditions were also revised evaluated to assure that under all credible abnormal and accident conditions, the keff will not

• in this exceed the regulatory-limit of 0.95 under borated conditions.

RAI#2

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

revised in this Holtec Report No. HI-2084014, subsequently revised as HI-2094376, Rev. 0, entitled RAI#2 "Licensing Report for Waterford Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis" (Attachment 3) provides the technical analysis for the proposed change to store Standard and Next to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 5 of 10 Generation Fuel (NGF) assemblies in Holtec-designed Region 1 and Region 2 style high-density spent fuel storage racks at Waterford 3. The report analyzed the impact of the change on Region 1 and Region 2 of the spent fuel storage racks and the resultant interfaces within and between the racks in each region. Also, the report performed and evaluated various calculations related to the Fuel Transfer Carriage Criticality, Upender Criticality, New Fuel Elevator Criticality, Boron Dilution Accident Evaluation, Low Flow Rate Dilution, High Flow Dilution, Temporary Storage Racks (in the refueling pool inside containment), Fuel Pin Storage Container, and New Fuel Storage Vault.

The results of the analysis determined that the high-density spent fuel storage racks for Waterford 3 were designed using applicable codes and standards. The analysis showed that the effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, is less than 1.00 with the racks fully loaded with the fuel of the highest anticipated reactivity, and flooded with unborated water at a temperature corresponding to the highest reactivity. The report demonstrated that keff is less than or equal to 0.95 with the racks fully loaded with fuel of the highest anticipated reactivity, and flooded with borated water at a temperature corresponding to the highest reactivity.

Also, reactivity effects of abnormal and accident conditions will not result in keff exceeding~the regulatory limit of 0.95 under borated conditions.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 Applicable Requlatory Requirements/Criteria The proposed changes have been evaluated to determine whether applicable regulations and requirements continue to be met.

By letter dated February 9, 1983, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a Material License (no. SNM-1913) to Waterford 3 which authorizes the receipt, possession, inspection, and storage of uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope, contained in fuel assemblies, and the receipt, possession, and use of two Pu-Be neutron sources. In the letter, the NRC granted Waterford 3 an exemption (related to criticality alarm systems) from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, "Criticality Accident Requirements." With the approval of the proposed change this exemption is no longer required. Waterford 3 currently complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68, "Criticality Accident Requirements."

Waterford 3 proposed change will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68, "Criticality Accident Requirements."

There are eight criteria that must be satisfied in the regulation. Waterford 3 complies with these as follows:

1) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (1) - Plant procedures shall prohibit the handling and storage at any one time of more fuel assemblies than have been determined to be safely subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by unborated water.

W3's fuel handling procedures ensure that subcriticality is maintained in the reactor vessel and the spent fuel storage racks under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by unborated water. Storage of fuel assemblies is procedurally controlled to to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 6 of 10 assure keff remains below 1.0, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, when flooded with unborated water.

2) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (2) - The estimated ratio of neutron production to neutron absorption and leakage (k-effective) of the fresh fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks shall be calculated assuming the racks are loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity and flooded with unborated water and must not exceed 0.95, at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level. This evaluation need not be performed if administrative controls and/or design features prevent such flooding or if fresh fuel storage racks are not used.

revised Criticality calculations of the new fuel vault fully loaded with Standard and NGF fresh fuel in this assemblies and filled with the most reactive unborated water showed that keff did not RAI#2 exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level.

3) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (3) - If optimum moderation of fresh fuel in the fresh fuel storage racks occurs when the racks are assumed to be loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity and filled with low density hydrogenous fluid, the k-effective corresponding to this optimum moderation must not exceed 0.98, at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level. This evaluation need not be performed if administrative controls and/or design features prevent such moderation or if fresh fuel storage racks are not used.

Criticality calculations were performed on the new fuel vault fully loaded with Standard and NGF fresh fuel assemblies and filled with the most reactive low density hydrogenous fluid. The results of these calculations showed that keff did not exceed 0.98, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level.

4) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (4) - If no credit for soluble boron is taken, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. If credit is taken for soluble boron, the keff of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical), at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level, if flooded with unborated water.

revised Soluble boron credit will be taken in the spent fuel storage racks. Keff will not exceed 0.95 in this RAI#2 at a 95% probability with a 95% confidence level with at least 524 ppm boron. The criticality calculations included in the proposed change show that keff remains below 1.0, "at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, when flooded with unborated water.

5) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (5) - The quantity of SNM, other than nuclear fuel stored onsite, is less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.

W3 does not currently have a quantity of SNM, other than the nuclear fuel, stored on site to establish a critical mass.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 7 of 10

(

6) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (6) - Radiation monitors are provided in storage and associated handling areas when fuel is present to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.

Radiation monitors are located in the spent fuel storage area which alarm in the control room. When fuel movement is in progress additional radiation monitors are placed directly on the fuel handling bridges to provide an additional audible indication of excessive radiation levels.

7) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (7) - The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment of the fresh fuel assemblies is limited to five (5.0) percent by weight.

Per W3 TS 5.6.1 h, the maximum U-235 fuel enrichment limit is 5.0 weight percent.

8) 10 CFR 50.68, (b) (8) - The FSAR is amended no later than the next update which 50.71(e) of this part requires, indicating that the licensee has chosen to comply with 50.68(b).

The W3 FSAR will be amended no later than the next required update after the proposed TS change is approved and implemented.

Entergy has determined that the proposed changes do not require any exemptions or relief from regulatory requirements, other than the TS, and do not affect conformance with any General Design Criterion (GDC) differently than described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

NHSC revised 5.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration in RAI#W

1.

Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The purpose of the spent fuel storage racks is to maintain fresh and irradiated fuel in a safe storage condition. The proposed changes for the Region 1 (spent fuel cask storage area) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and, after permanent plant shutdown, refueling canal) fuel. storage.racks, which involve taking credit for soluble boron, revising the burnup-enrichment limits and loading restrictions for the storage of fuel assemblies, and increasing the keff limit for the flooding of the fuel storage racks with unborated water will not affect any accident initiator or mitigator. The proposed changes will provide more flexibility in storing the more reactive NGF assemblies in the spent fuel pool storage racks. The effects of the new fuel parameters of NGF assemblies on radiation shielding, thermal-hydraulics, seismic/structural, and mechanical drop analyses have been separately reviewed and were found to be acceptable.

The proposed changes will not alter the configuration of the storage racks or their environment. The fuel racks will not be operated outside of their design limits, and no to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 8 of 10 additional loads will be imposed on them. Therefore, these changes will not affect fuel storage rack performance or reliability. No new equipmentwill be introduced into the plant. The accuracies and response characteristics of existing instrumentation will not be modified. The proposed changes will not require, or result in, a change in safety system operation, and will not affect any system interface with the fuel storage racks. Fuel assembly placement will continue to be controlled in accordance with approved fuel handling procedures. The proposed changes in the Technical Specifications, including surveillance requirements, will not add any significant complexities or increase the possibility of operator error:

The proposed changes will not affect any barrier that mitigates dose to the public, and will not result in a new release pathway being created. The functions of equipment designed to control the release of radioactive material will not be impacted, and no mitigating actions described or assumed for an accident in the UFSAR will be altered or prevented. No assumptions previously made in evaluating the consequences of an accident will need to be modified. Onsite dose will not be increased, so the access of plant personnel to vital areas of the plant will not be restricted, and mitigating actions will not be impeded.

Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not significantly increase either the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes for the Region 1 (spent fuel cask storage area) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and, after permanent plant shutdown, refueling canal) fuel storage racks, which involve taking credit for soluble boron, revising the burnup-enrichment limits and loading restrictions for the storage of fuel assemblies, and increasing the keff limit for the flooding of the fuel storage racks with unborated water will not increase the probability of an accident which was previously considered to be credible nor create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident initiator previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

N The proposed changes do not involve changes to the configuration of plant systems, or the manner in which they are operated. Crediting soluble boron in the spent fuel pool storage rack criticality analysis will have no effect on normal pool operation and maintenance since soluble boron in Region 1 and Region 2 is currently required by procedure. The crediting of soluble boron will only result in increased sampling to verify compliance with the minimum boron concentration required by the new TS 3/4.9.12. The increased sampling ensures that a new kind of accident, boron dilution in the spent fuel pool, will not be created.

to W3F1-2009-0022 Page 9 of 10 The addition of large amounts of unborated water would be necessary to reduce the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool from the normal level of > 1900 ppm Revised specified in new TS 3/4.9.12 to either 870 ppm (needed to accommodate the most in this limiting fuel loading accident) or 524 ppm (required for non-accident conditions). A RAI#2 l(

small dilution flow might result from a leak from the cooling system into the spent fuel pool. Routine surveillance measurements of the soluble boron concentration conducted every 7 days per the new TS 3/4.9.12 would readily detect the reduction in concentration and provide sufficient time for corrective action prior to exceeding the regulatory limits.

A high flow rate dilution: accident involving continuous operation of the Condensate Storage Pool pump could add a large amount of unborated water to the spent fuel pool. However, multiple alarms would alert the Control Room to the situation, including the fuel pool high-level alarm, Fuel Handling Building sump high-level alarm, and the Liquid Waste Management Trouble alarm. It is not considered credible that either multiple alarms would fail or be ignored by Operators, or that the spilling of large volumes of water from the spent~fuel pool would be observed by plant personnel who would not take corrective actions. Moreover, if the soluble boron in the spent fuel storage racks would be completely diluted, the fuel in the racks will remain subcritical by a design margin of at least 0.005 Ak, and the keff of the fuel in the racks will remain below 1.00.

Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed changes for the Region 1 (spent fuel cask storage area) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and, after permanent plant shutdown, refueling canal) fuel storage racks, which involve taking credit-for soluble boron, revising the burnup-enrichment

.limits and loading restrictions for the storage of fuel assemblies, and increasing the keff limit for the flooding of the fuel storage racks with unborated water will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Detailed analysis with approved and benchmarked methods has shown, with a 95%

probability at a 95% confidence level, that the neutron multiplication factor, keff, of the Region 1 and Region 2 high-density spent fuel pool storage racks, loaded with either Standard or NGF assemblies, and including biases, tolerances, and uncertainties is less than 1.00 with unborated water and less than 0.95 with 524 ppm of soluble boron Revised credited. In addition, the effects of abnormal and accident conditions have been inthis evaluated to demonstrate that under credible conditions the keff will not exceed 0.95 RAI#2 with soluble boron credited. To ensure that the margin of safety for subcriticality is maintained and that keff will be below 0.95, a new TS 3/4.9.12 will require a soluble boron level of > 1900 ppm in the spent fuel pool. This is significantly greater than the required soluble boron concentration of 524 ppm under normal conditions and 870 ppm for all credible accident conditions.

to W3F1-2009-0022 Page 10 of 10 Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

5.3 Environmental Considerations The proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 PRECEDENCE The NRC has approved similar submittals for ANO-2 and Calvert Cliffs in NRC SERs dated 9/30/2003 and 6/3/2004, respectively.

7.0 REFERENCES

a.

Entergy License Amendment Request to Support Next Generation Fuel, Letter W3F1 -

2007-0037, dated August 2, 2007.

b.

NRC letter dated May 9, 2008, Correction to Amendment No. 214 Re: Request to Support Next Generation Fuel, Review and Approval of Revised Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Performance Analysis, and Review and Approval of Supplement to the ECCS Performance Analysis.

c.

NRC letter to Louisiana Power and Light Company dated February 9, 1983 granting Waterford 3 exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 requirements.

To W3FI-2009-0007 Proposed,Technical Specification Changes (mark-up), Revised to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 1 of 11 DESIGN FEATURES 5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY 5.6.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a.

normal k a:sequal to 0.95,nfib&kd with unboratepgvw-, Re.pte whi es a conserva I0 e for uncertainliek, W;.

A"

b.

A nominal 10.185 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in Region 1 (cask storage pit) spent fuel storage racks.

c.

A nominal 8.692 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies in the Region 2 (spent fuel pool and refuelling canal) racks, except for the four southern-most racks in the spent fuel pool which have an increased N-S center-to-center nominal distance of 8.892 inches.

fre S k Ai.,. rr0iA;t&

d.

Alew," ptill;* pe,,t fuel assemblies may be allowed unrestricted storage in Region I racks.

revised

e.

ew fuel assembli stored in the Re provided tha in s

in erboard pa

' asil ed i n F i gu re.

f.

-Pafiay-spernt fuel assemblies with a djwAhrge bumup in the 'accceptable range" of Figure 5.6-2 may be allowed unrestricted storage in the Region 2 racks.

of -=27 CWcl/m-Lý,

revised

g.

Ra44#yepeM fuel assemblies with a dlselesr bumupin the"unacceptable range"'

in this of Figure 5.6-2 may be stored in the.egion 2 racks pF.........

they -e,.d in RAI#2 a "checkerboard'pattern", as illustrafed in Figure 5.6-1 with speti fuel in the "acceptable range" of Figure 5.6-3.

P&t%1er'l Irtoi;o

h.

Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.0 weight percent.

5.6.2 The k.,for nfuel stored in the newfuel storage racks shall be lessthan or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated weter and shall not exceed 0.98 when aqueous foam moderation is assumed.

DRAINAGE 5.6.3 The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation +40.0 MSL. When fuel is being stored in the cask storage pit and/or the refueling canal, these areas will also be maintained at +40.0 MSL.

CAPACITY 5.6.4 The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 1849 fuel assemblies in the main pool, 255 fuel assemblies in the cask storage pit and after permanent plant shutdown 294 fuel assemblies in the refueling canal. The heat load from spent fuel stored in the refueling canal racks shall not exceed 1.72x10E6 BTU/Hr. Fuel shall not be stored in the spent fuel racks in the cask storage pit or the refueling canal unles all of the racks are installed in each respective area per the design.

5,7 NOT USED AMENDMENT NO. 1138,4,

1446, WATERFORD - UNIT 3 5-6

+99. 200.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 2 of 11 Item A (5.6.1.a)

For Region 1 (cask storage pit) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and refueling canal) racks, a Revised maximum kIff of less than 1.00 when flooded with unborated water, and less than, or equal to, in this 0.95 when flooded with water having a boron concentration of 524 ppm.

RAI#2

/

added Item B (5.6.1.e) in this RAI#2 Fresh fuel assemblies may be stored in the Region 2 racks provided that they are stored in a "checkerboard pattern" with empty cells as illustrated in Figure 5.6-1, Pattern 1. Irradiated fuel assemblies with any burnup may also be stored with empty cells in the checkerboard configuration of Figure 5.6-1, Pattern 1.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 3 of 11

'?-V-

ý AC-C u,ý.ý, P,

ýj S C SCalks w"l F ue OfleW or eu to 5%

II r-Flbd CA~ (E~noi)

Chodotd~ru A

Of 7uok Aaumevf ONd Cob Note; Either of these Cho erbo rdArrangemnents may be used in areas con us to eacch other or to areas of unrestrict storage in Region' 2, CoSb =SA Fi.u of l 17M DJR

/

Ftgwu 5.6-1 Atemeffe Chedekebeed hArmngem.,hi MATERFORD-UNIT 3 56 MNNN O

4 S64a MENOMW NO.

144 to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 4 of 11 revised in this RAI#2 INSERT 1 I'm.....

U UU U UUUUUUU Pattern 1 mCells loaded with fresh -or irradiated fuel of less than, or equal to, 5 wt% initial. U-235 enrichment

[

Water-filled, empty cells Checkerboard of Fresh or Irradiated Fuel Assemblies and Empty Storage Cells Xý X

A X

X X

X X

X X

X.

XML X

Pattern 2 Cells loaded with irradiated fuel of 27 GWd/MTU burnup, or higher Cells loaded with fuel having the enrichment-burnup combinations specified in Figure 5.6-3 Checkerboard of Fuel Assemblies with Burnups of 27 GWd/MTU, or higher, and Fuel Assemblies of Specified Enrichment-Burnup Combinations Note: Either of these checkerboard arrangements may be used in areas contiguous to areas of unrestricted storage in Region 2 (Figure 5.6-2). For interfaces between a Pattern 1 checkerboard and a Pattern 2 checkerboard, each high-reactivity irradiated assembly ( e.g., 27 GWd/MTU ) in a Pattern 2 configuration may be face-adjacent to no more than one fresh ( or irradiated ) fuel assembly; each fresh ( or irradiated ) fuel assembly in a Pattern 1 configuration may be face-adjacent with up to two high-reactivity irradiated fuel assemblies. See Figure 5.6-4 for examples of contiguous Pattern 1 and Pattern 2 fuel checkerboards which meet these requirements.

Figure 5.6-1 Alternative Checkerboard Storage Arrangements WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6a AMENDMENTNO.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 5 of 11 N

0.

C L.

-i I'-

Initial Fuel Enrichment, wt. x U-235 Figurt 5.6-2 Ao=ePtatW SurnuP DOrndn fOr Unmresate SfrWof Spent Fud-in Regilm 2-WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6b AMENDMENT NO.

144 to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 6 of 11 INSERT 2 mm 40.0 Note: it is a rceptable to linearly interpolate between data points 35.0 -

34.*

30.0 28.

Acceptable Bu nup Domain 25.0 24.

~~2n V

revised in this RAI#2 E

15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 2.0 18 2Una.ceptable Burnup Domain 2.5 3.0 3.5 Initial Fuel Enrichment ( wt%/ U-236) 4.0 4.5 5.0 Note: For enrichments lower than 2 wt%6, apply the burnup value at 2 wt%.

Figure 5.6-2 Acceptable Burnup Domain for Unrestricted Storage of Irradiated Fuel in Region 2 of the Spent Fuel Pool WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6b AMENDMENTNO.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 7 of 11 WV~~4

\\5L~L.1'3) 3 r~N~

Lf 60 50 40 C0 S

30

• 1 L&..

20 r Fo s than 2 F

10 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.1 Initial Fuel Enrichment, wt. x U-235 Ffguve 5..j Acceptable B11unup Domain for SpoM Fuoi In Chekeeks r

Arranlive wuh ruel of SuEnrIchment (or lows) at 27 MWD/KqU WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6c AMENDMENT NO.

144 to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 8 of 11 INSERT 3

m.

M E

m mmmm m m mm

.mm 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 E

M 20.0 IL 15.0 10.0 Note: it is a ceptable to linearly Interpolate between data points 43j Acceptable Bu nup Domain 31.

17.

Una ceptable Burnup D main 10.7.

revised in this RAI#2 3.7 t

0.0 2.0 4.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 Initial Fuel Enrichment ( wt% U-235) 4.0 5.0 Note: For enrichm ents lower than 2 wt%, apply the burnup value at 2 wt%.

Figure 5.6-3 Acceptable Burnup Domain for Irradiated Fuel in a Checkerboard Arrangement with Fuel of 5 wt% Enrichment, or Less, at 27 GWd/MTU Burnup, or Higher, in Region 2 of the Spent Fuel Pool WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6c AMENDMENTNO.

to W3F17-2009-0022 Page 9 of 11 INSERT 4 A

A =A A

A A

AmmmB mm Cmmmmm revised in this RAI#2

<5 wt% U-235, > 27 GWd/MTU irradiated fuel Irradiated fuel at, or above, the curve in Figure 5.6-3 B<

5 wt% U-235 fresh or irradiated fuel at any burnup C

Empty storage cell BB A

ACB C B A

BCB C

A AIC BC B A

BOCBOC A,

AC B CB A

BR r.O revised 7

< 5 wt% U-235, > 27 GWd/MTU irradiated fuel Irradiated fuel at, or above, the curve in Figure 5.6-3 B

< 5 wt% U-235 fresh or irradiated fuel at any burnup JEmpty storage cell Figure 5.6-4 Examples of Contiguous Checkerboard Configurations Which Meet Interface Requirements WATERFORD-UNIT 3 5-6d AMENDMENT NO.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 10 of 11 ADDED TS 3/4 9.12 3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) BORON CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.12 The spent fuel pool boron concentration shall be > 1900 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the SFP ACTION:

a. With the spent fuel pool boron concentration not within limits immediately suspend movement of fuel in the SFP and immediately initiate actions to restore boron concentration to within limits.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.12 Verify the spent fuel pool concentration is within limits once per 7 days.

to W3F1 -2009-0022 Page 11 of 11 ADDED added TS 3/4.9.13 in RAI#1 3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL STORAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.13 Storage of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage racks of Region 1 (cask storage pit) and Region 2 (spent fuel pool and refueling canal) revised shall be stored within the limitations of Specification,5.6.1.

in RAI#2 APPLICABILITY:

Whenever a fuel assembly is stored in a spent fuel storage rack.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the LCO not met, immediately initiate action to restore the non-complying fuel assembly within requirements.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.13 Verify by'administrative means that each fuel assembly meets fuel storage requirements contained in Specification 5.6.1 prior to storing the fuel assembly in a spent fuel storage rack.

To W3F1 -2009-0022 Affidavit for Withholding Proprietary Information

• M**M Holtec Center,555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 H O L T E C Fax (856) 797-0909 INTERNATIONAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 I, Debabrata Mitra-Majumdar, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

(1)

I am the Holtec International Proj ect Manager for the Waterford Steam Electric Station (WSES) Unit 3 Criticality Analysis Project and have reviewed the information described in paragraph (2) whichds-sought to be withheld, and am authorized to apply for its withholding.

(2)

The information sought to be withheld is the proprietary version of Holtec Report HI-2094376, Revision 0 containing Holtec Proprietary information.

(3)

In making this application for withholding of proprietary information of which it is the owner, Holtec International relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 USC Sec. 552(b)(4) and the Trade Secrets Act, 18 USC Sec. 1905, and NRC regulations 10CFR Part 9.17(a)(4), 2.390(a)(4), and 2.390(b)(1) for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" (Exemption 4). The material for which exemption from disclosure is here sought is all "confidential commercial information", and some portions also qualify under the narrower definition of "trade secret", within the meanings assigned to those terms for purposes of FOIA Exemption 4 in, respectively, Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975F2d871 (DC Cir. 1992),

and Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704F2d1280 (DC Cir.

1983).

1 of 5

• M**M Holtec Center, 555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 H O L T E C Fax (856) 797-0909 INTERNATIONAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 (4)

Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:

a.

Information that discloses a process, method, or apparatus, including supporting data and analyses, where prevention of its use by Holtec's competitors without license from Holtec International constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies;

b.

Information which, if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product.

c.

Information which reveals cost or price information, production, capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Holtec International, its customers, or its suppliers;

d.

Information which reveals aspects of past, present, or future Holtec International customer-funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Holtec International;

e.

Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection.

The information sought to be withheld is considered to be proprietary for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 4.a and 4.b, above.

(5)

The information sought to be withheld is being submitted to the NRC in confidence. The information (including that compiled from many sources) is of 2 of 5

• 0 0 0 0

Holtec Center,;555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 H O LT EC Fax (856) 797-0909 INTERNATIONAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 a sort customarily held in confidence by Holtec International, and is in fact so held. The information sought to be withheld has, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently been held in confidence by Holtec International. No public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties, including any required transmittals to the NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence. Its initial designation as proprietary information, and the subsequent steps taken to prevent its unauthorized disclosure, are as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) following.

(6)

Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a document is made by the manager of the originating component, the person most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge.

Access to such documents within Holtec International is limited on a "need to know" basis.

(7)

The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, principal scientist or other equivalent authority, by the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his designee), and by the Legal Operation, for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation.

Disclosures outside Holtec International are limited to regulatory bodies, customers, and potential customers, and their agents, suppliers, and licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or proprietary agreements.

(8)

The information classified as proprietary was developed and compiled by Holtec International at a significant cost to Holtec International. This information is classified as proprietary because it contains detailed descriptions of analytical 3 of 5

M* *

• M Holtec Center, 555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 H O L T E C Fax (856) 797-0909 INTERNATIONAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 approaches and methodologies not available elsewhere. This information would provide other parties, including competitors, with information from Holtec International's technical database and the results of evaluations performed by Holtec International. A substantial effort has been expended by Holtec International to develop this information. Release of this information would improve a competitor's position because it would enable Holtec's competitor to copy our technology and offer it for sale in competition with our company, causing us financial injury.

(9)

Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to Holtec International's competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The information is part of Holtec International's comprehensive spent fuel storage technology base, and its commercial value extends beyond the original development cost. The value of the technology base goes beyond the extensive physical database and analytical methodology, and includes development of the expertise to determine and apply the appropriate evaluation process.

The research, development, engineering, and analytical costs comprise a substantial investment of time and money by Holtec International.

The precise value of the expertise to devise an evaluation process and apply the correct analytical methodology is difficult to quantify, but it clearly is substantial.

Holtec International's competitive advantage will be lost if its competitors are able to use the results of the Holtec International experience to normalize or verify their own process or if they are able to claim an equivalent understanding by demonstrating that they can arrive at the same or similar conclusions.

4 of 5

• M**M Holtec Center, 555 Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone (856) 797-0900 H O LT EC Fax (856) 797-0909 INTERNATIONAL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 The value of this information to Holtec International would be lost if the information were disclosed to the public. Making such information available to competitors without their having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources would unfairly provide competitors with a windfall, and deprive Holtec International of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its large investment in developing these very valuable analytical tools.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

)

)

ss:

COUNTY OF BURLINGTON)

Dr. Debabrata Mitra-Majumdar, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed at Marlton, New Jersey, this 2 5th day of June, 2009.

ab a-Majumdar, Ph.D.

Holtec International Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of June

,2009.

MARIA C. MA6z of 5 NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERL' My Commission Expires April,25,201tu