ML091190768

E-mail from N. Sheehan of USNRC to B. Holian, D. Roberts and D. Lew, Regarding Letter from Congressman on Oyster Creek

ML091190768
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/05/2008
From:	Neil Sheehan Office of Public Affairs
To:	Brian Holian, David Lew, Darrell Roberts Division of License Renewal, Division Reactor Projects I, Division of Reactor Safety I
References
FOIA/PA-2009-0070
Download: ML091190768 (4)

Text

PWarr~n Christian From: Neil Sheehan Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 1:11 PM To: Brian Holian; Darrell Roberts; David Lew Cc: Ronald Bellamy; John Richmond

Subject:

Letter from Congressman on Oyster Creek Attachments: OCSmith Letter. 12-5-2008. pdf I just received this from a reporter in New Jersey who is asking for our comment on it. I suspect we'll hear from other reporters on it before the day is out.

The issues raised cross several areas. I'd like to boil our response down to three or so key messages. Please read the letter over and let me know ASAP this afternoon what you think our key messages should be.

Thanks, Neil x5331 1

ý3/q6

CHRISTOPHER: H.' SMITH ro. . COMMITtEES.

FJOREIGIN AFFAIRS,:

CONSfTU'FENT SERi-CE CENTERS:

1540 Kuser'Road, Suite:Ag; AFRICA"AND GLOBAL HEALTH Hamilton, NJ 08619r-3828 ,:SUBCOMMITTEE (609) 585-7878 . RANKING MOMBrR TTY (609)585-3650 ... . ........ .ac 108, acey 8o'd 093t Suit+ 38A di it*b t WESTERN HEMISPHERE Whiting NJ 08759-13

.(732) 350-23"00 JILDý IM9l ~-II~ SBOMTE 2373 Raybbin Hbu's'e.Ofte Buildinrg JO of..

t 0.pte*i1tatii COMMISSION ON SECURIT-AND Washington DC20515-:3004 " ' . .COOPERATION IN EUROPE (202):2253765 .. ... ANKNG MEMBER http:]/ChrissrTihShouse~g ov .r . . !CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

ý4"KiNG MEMBER

-DEAN,NEW JERSEY DELEGATION Dec~nber...4, 20.08 Chairman .Dale.:iE. Klein United States Nuclear Regulatory Comrnrission 1* 555 R9ckkule PIike Rocl-villey Iarland .20852.

d. M hairanmDea ,Kleihl:

OnNovejnbet 19, 2008,Oysterj Cre4lNtcbleaiGenei-rtirig Statibri hiioUnd that !they had-cornicluded a 2'5-day. refuelingiand maintenance shutdown. q

~eniaian deepIy ;cohieeed that the NRC allowed the refuelingprqcess iob and also

'Iin

'aiow~e operatipn's tf resunie:wi tho ut "first iequirin g AmerG ento. fin alize. and Imake:public--for independent, rtevew*-theý three-,di*ensnaianal sfutr nalysi to hiLh the conpany-committed inFebruary 2007.-Now'hat the refueling iscomplete, it.is essential that AmerG n's 3.7b dhnlys"s be +6ncludedand made publiicin its entireiY'ritd *ydeciSion by ih`Conimssidn oitdi-cli'ensifig. Tish-,ill en'suie thatlthe6decision is'madew ith thebenefit of-additional critical.

• inform.atio~n .and--perhaps mp'most'impdttantly--with the. benefit 6f~a real; independent, in-depth review o~f the inc'stry-sponsored ana~ysis of thestructural integrity f'£the sh el 'and wherthe

.shell can satisfy all.safety requirementdedlperiod of operationr (bey6nd April,L 2009) is coniteniplated.

As'you know, Am-rGen1, hag agreed (onlyto rdlease a "sinmary"'6f itg 3-D analysis.

Whi le the .:.*Sumary'" may-be a hundred or more pages, the reported rdfusal.t.d f the NRCz staff *d tfh companytoguaranteezcitizen access to iheqactual data upon , iwh'tIe "summaryy" isbased.

wjil likcl'rais'.rfe qfi-stitions"',about: safety. transparency andaccountability. In additqn, have serious concerns aibout tlie';fih-ouncede ititenits*f of,,the:NR:C'stiff,-regardingtheiforthcomiii analysis.: Tharikfully;the1 AS!B Memordndum, of ct6be-29,[:2008, hiallnged the NRC Staff s intitial ill-advyised plan notfto:perform aniindepthp eview of thetompl'eted erGen'Gode and..

3-D anaaygis." I.,aimpleasedthat theASIB has calleddfor-a"morerigorous" rev-iew ard hasg recommended'that the staff perform o'f"haVe perffrmed", acomprehensive and in-depth review of thework 'doneby AmerGen. Still, the staffsinitial. approach ieveaed adack of vigilanceand only :servedto- further:undemine public conficdence in-,the_*staffs ability to c'prebhensiveiy oversee: safety ,issues.

AINTED ON EC'Y'CiLED PAPER

I-The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection has put forth a similar request for a timely 3-D analysis and has restated the need for the NRC to carefully and independently review the data of any industry-sponsored study. The NJDEP has also requested that its experts receive the 3-D analysis in its entirety for their review. I agree that this is essential. Regrettably, public confidence in the independence of the industry-sponsored analysis and NRC staff review of the same is low. In fact, last year's IG report, coupled with Commissioner Jaczko's dissenting comments in the Commission's October 6, 2008 Memorandum and Order underscore problems leading to a lack of public confidence in the independence and integrity of NRC staff analysis of information provided by licensee applicants. Given the enormous interest in this case and the Commission's own "apparent interest in the adequacy of AmerGen's analysis" (October 29 Memorandum, page 15) the ASLB's recommendation for an in-depth review, especially the recommendation to have it "performed," (most likely by a third party) is the best way forward.

I think it is critical to note that some activities that transpired during the 2008 refueling and shutdown may have only exacerbated public concern about the relicensing process and need for transparency. For instance, the industry press release announcing the end of the refueling outage reports that there were multiple inspections of the drywell shell and inspections of the epoxy coating and states that their "team of inspectors confirmed that this coating remains in good shape." It is troubling that the release does not mention that the same inspections resulted in a required notification to the Commission about the discovery, on October 3 1s, of a blister in the epoxy coating in Bay 11 along with a six inch rust stain and three additional bumps which they later determined to be three more epoxy blisters. Nor was there any mention in the press release of the discovery of several cracks and some rust stains in the moisture seal at the drywell shell interface with the exterior floor of the sand region in Bay 3. Nor waý it reported that that the NRC staff in its November 17, 2008 Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence (PNO) stated that there are ongoing evaluations of the cause of the blistering and of the attempts to mitigate water leakage from the reactor refueling cavity.

Perhaps even more disconcerting is an explanation about the six inch rust stain offered by AmerGen in its November 17, 2008 UPDATED COMMISSION NOTIFICATION. In an attempt to downplay the 2008 discovery of the 4 epoxy blisters and the six inch rust stain, AmerGen states they have now confirmed that the six inch rust stain was visible in the "as left" video recording of Bay 11 "taken for information purposes, and not as part of the visual inspection-at the end of the 2006 outage." This explanation in and of itself raises disturbing questions. If this six inch rust stain is in fact the samre stain recorded in 2006, how is it only now being reported to have been recorded on the "as left" video? This would mean that the 2006 visual inspection method employed was either not good enough to detect the blister and the six inch rust stain; was not properly conducted; was not properly reported; or all of the above. The NRC must conduct a vigorous investigation to get to the bottom of this considerable lapse.

In addition, in its November 17, 2008 UPDATED COMMISSION NOTIFICATION, AmerGen also concludes that the examination of the blistered area identified "trace amounts of chlorine" which they believe are most likely the cause of the corrosion. Does the NRC agree?

Are any steps being taken to increase our understanding about the cause of the ongoing corrosion that was observed?

In Section III D of the November 17, 2008 UPDATED COMMISSION NOTIFICATION, AmerGen concludes that its Aging Management Program for the drywell shell remains "adequate" and its license renewal commitments, including visual inspections, "provide reasonable assurance" that any coating degradation will be detected and corrected before significant corrosion of the underlying drywell shell can occur. Thus, while they predicate the future success of their AMP, in part, on visual inspections, they do not explain how the 2006 visual inspection missed the six inch rust stain in the first place. The eventual, but significantly delayed, report about the visual observation of this real hazard does not provide assurances of safety, it only adds to public concern. Given the fact that there was ultrasonic testing (UT) of the drywell thickness in areas around and behind the blister, as well as at other locations during this 2008 refueling, it seems that only release and citizen review of the actual UT data will truly begin to address these concerns. In the interest of full transparency, and since the NRC reports that staff reviewed the UT data, the citizen groups should have this same opportunity.

In its October 29, 2008 Memorandum, the ASLB also recommended that the Commission consider directing the NRC staff to have Sandia review-for the first time-the actual test results used to justify modification of the capacity reduction factor and report whether the use of the modified factor is justified. Clearly the status of that recommendation and publication of any additional findings by Sandia are also critical to achieving transparency and moving towards restoring public confidence in the NRC relicensing process. It seems impossible to reach a finding that the drywell meets the safety requirements if the issue of appropriate reduction factor is unresolved and remains a point of contention between the ASLB and AmerGen.

I strongly urge that all studies related to safety issues at Oyster Creek be released in a timely and public fashion to ensure independent review and help improve public confidence in any safety assessment by the NRC and in the entire NRC relicensing process. Beyond this, I am

-specifically requesting an update on the status of AmerGen's 3-D analysis; the NRC's review of the analysis; the status of the investigation of the safety issues reported during the October/November 2008 shutdown; the request for release of the 2008 UT data; and the status the ASLB's recommendation to have Sandia specifically review the data on the capacity reduction factor. I thank you in advance for your consideration of these specific requests and look forward to your timely reply.

Sincerely, CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH Member of Congress cc:

Representative Henry Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Representative Tom Davis, Ranking Republican Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform