ML090720826
| ML090720826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1978 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA-2024-000060 NUREG-0053 S9 | |
| Download: ML090720826 (46) | |
Text
Sllfet\\~
U"llllllltittll Iteltttrt
- related to operation of North Anna Power Station
. Units 1 and 2
- Virginia Electric and Power Company Supplemen~ No. 9 L:g,~~..
NUREG*0053
--'iCIIIlIiliiWb ___
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'@Suppl. No.9 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No ** &0-338 and &0-338 March 1978
Available from National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161 Price: Printed Copy $4.50; Microfiche $3.00 The price of this document for requesters outside of the North American Continent can be obtained from the National Technical Information Service.
SUPPLEMENT NO.9 TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-338 AND 50-339 NUREG-0053 Supplement No. 9 March 31, 1978
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 1.1 I ntroducti on. *. *.
3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA-STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.10 Seismic and Environmental Qualification of Seismic Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment 3.10.3 Environmental Qualification of Westinghouse and Balance-of-Plant Seismic Category 1 Instrumentation PAGE 1-1 1-1 3-1 3-1 and Electrical Equipment.. * *. * * * * * * * *.
3-1 6.0 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.2 6.3 Containment Systems 6.L.2 Containment Heat Removal Systems Emergency Core Cooling System
- 6.3.1 Background **
6.3.2 Evaluation of Cross-Connect *.*.****
6.3.3 Long-Term Test of the Outside Recirculation Spray Pump ************.*
6.3.4 Short-Term Test of the Low Head Safety 6.3.5 6.3.6 6.3.7 6.3.8 Injection Pump **.*******.
Applicability of Test Results ***
Evaluation of Emergency Core Cooling System Additional Testing ***
Performance Evaluation.
6.3.9 Operational Requirements for Safety Injection Initiation Signals *.**.******.*.
9.0 AUX I LI AR Y SY STEM S * *.
9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection Systems
22.0 CONCLUSION
S D
Qo 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-3 6-3 6-4 6-4 6-7 6-8 6-8 6-9 6-11 6-13 9-1 9-1 9-1 22-1
APPENDICES PAGE APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW. * * **
A-l i i
TABLE 3.1 TABLE 6.1 LIST OF TABLES NORTH ANNA INSTRUMENTS INSTALLED AND QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS IDENTIFICATION **.*******
INITIAL CORE CONDITIONS AND RESULTS FOR THE 3-3 DOUBLE-ENDED COLO LEG BREAK (CD=O.4) * * * * * * * * * **
6-12 iii
1.1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL DISCUSSION On June 4, 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) issued its Safety Evaluation Report regarding the application by the Virginia Electric and Power Company (licensee) for licenses to operate the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (North Anna facility). Supplement No.
oJ to the Safety Evaluation Report was issued on June 30, 1976; Supplement No.2 was issued on August 2, 1976; Supplement No.3 was issued on September 15, 1976; Supplement No.4 was issued on December 8, 1976; Supplement No.5 was issued on December 29,1976; Supplement No.6 was issued on February 2, 1977, Supplement No.7 was issued on August 18, 1977, and Supplement No.8 was issued on December 14, 1977. Supplement Nos. 1 through B to the Safety Evaluation Report documented the resolution of several outstanding items, and summarized the status of the remaining outstanding issues.
The purpose of this supplement is to update our Safety Evaluation Report (and Supplement Nos. 1 through 8) by providing (1) our evaluation of additional information submitted by the licensee since the issuance of Supplement No.8 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and (2) our evaluation of additional information for those sections of the Safety Evaluation Report where further discussion or changes are in order.
Each section of this supplement is numbered the same as the section of the Safety Evaluation Report, and is supplementary to and not in lieu of the discussion in the Safety Evaluation Report and the supplements thereto, except where specifically so noted. Appendix A is a continuation of the chronology of our principal actions related to the processing of the application.
1-1
3.10 3.10.3 I
3.0 DESIGN CRITERIA,..STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND C(MPONENTS
~~ism_~~nd Environmental Qualification of Seismic Category I
!!:!stru~ta!ion and Electrical Equipment
~J:1.:d!..Ql'lmentaLllt!alification of W,estinghouse and Balance-of-Plant Seismic Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment In Section 3.10.3 of Supplement No.8 to the Safety Evaluation Report we stated that our review of the environmental qualifications of Westinghouse and balance-of-plant seismic Category I instrumentation and electrica'i equipment was not complete.
We further stated that upon completion of our review of this matter, we would report the results of our evaluation in a supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report.
Instrumentation and electrical components required to perform a safety function are designed to function in the environment which could result from various postulated accidents.
The Virginia Electric and Power Company has implemented an environmental qualification program, as discussed in Section 3.10 of the Safety Evaluation Report, to provide assurance that the required equipment will perform under the environmental conditions which could result from various postulated accidents.
For the Westinghouse Electric Corporation scope ot supply, the analytical and testi n9 programs used by Westinghouse to sei smical1y and envi ronmentally quality instruillentation and electrical components are described in various Westinghouse topical reports.
As a result of our generic review of these topical reports and additional information supplied by Westinghouse, we determined that there was inadequate documentation of, and deficiencies in, the Westinghouse test programs for certain instrumentation.
3-1
W~th regard to the equipment provided in the design of the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 that was supplied by Westinghouse, we have performed an evaluation of the specific equipment as applicable to the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
Table 3.1 of th~s supplement identifi~s those instruments that are presently installed at the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2.
It also ~dentifies those documents which contain the equipment quali-fication test program and results for each item.
We have reviewed only those portions of these documents that apply to those items identified in the table.
We have also reviewed the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Final Safety Analysis Report and all correspondence that has been documented on this subject. The Virginia Electric and Power Company provided information which described the adequacy of the pressurizer level and con-tainment pressure instruments operability requirements for initiating safety injection.
We have reviewed this information and concluded that it is acceptable. The results of the qualification test performed on the level ins truments were found to sati sfy the operabil i ty requi rements. The acceptability of the operability requirements is discussed in Section 6.3.9 of this supplement.
The results of the seismic evaluation portion are con-tained in Section 3.10.1 of Supplement No.8 to the Safety Evaluation Report.
We have determined as a result of the review that reasonable assurance has been established that the equipment satisfies the design requirements and will survive all plant service conditions except as follows:
three instrument types were found to be not properly qualified; the Barton 386/752.
used for Pressurizer Level; the Barton 393 used for Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range); and the Foxboro Ella~ (MCA/RRW) used for Pressurizer Pressure.
The 1 icensee has demonstrated that instruments of each of the three types satisfy the design requirements during a simulated accident environment of steam, water, pressure. temperature, and chemical conditions. However, different instruments of each type were used for demonstrating that the irradiation design requirements were satisified.
The Virginia Electric and Power Company has been; nformed by us that within ninety days after receiving an operating license to operate Unit at power. a properly conducted test will have to be completed which demonstrates that these instruments are acceptably qual ffied. Test conditions must include sequential radiation exposure, seismic testing and exposure to environmental conditions expected following a postulated steamline break and/or loss-of-coolant accident, whiChever is most limiting. The operating license for Unit 1 will be conditioned to include this requirement.
In addition, a basis for establishing that the health and safety of the public will be maintained during this ninety day period was requested to be provided by the licensee for our review and acceptance before an operating license to operate Uni t 1 at power is issued.
3-2
W I
W FUNCTION ReilctOl' Coolunt P\\'CSSlIl'C
(~Ji drl 1<l\\IlC;c)
Stealll Generator Leve 1 (lia t'r0l'l Runge
~la inS team F10l1 Pressud lcr Lt'vel IJcactor Coolant rl'e~Slll'C (\\~i de Rul1Uc) f<clJctor Coolant Tei~l;)el'ature (rliJrro'.'/ & Hide Rllngcs) i{('ilctor Coolant FI O\\~
Presr,lJrizer PI'Co;SUI'C
!'\\a inS team Pr~<;surc Feedwater Flow TABLE 3.1 LQCfITIO;1 WliiUF t,CTU1~[I(
W)DI:L i\\llPLI r: I Ell S I C:..,;Jj 1 C ;\\U~,'~U/\\CY E~VIRONMENTAL ~DEQ.
In Contain..;
Rosemount 1152GP TYPE "A" Rosenloun t Report Rosemount Report nll:nL 117415 (7-75) 117t15 (7-75) &
Forest Hills Test 1152DP II G3rton R~PQl'ts Rl-
~estinghou5e Letter Barton 386/752 752-5 &. 385-6 &.
To NRC NS-CE-1324 ilCAP 7817 dated 3/23/77 393 Barton Report Rl-386-6 II 176-KF & KS
~CAP-9l57 Rosemount
~JCAP 8234 Foxboro E13DH N0143XS
~CAP 7821
{ICAP 8;;41 Ell Gf,\\ (MCAI RRH)
IS AEl NO 148 1m 143XS I
OUTSIDE Ell Gf1 NO ISAE2 E13DM NO 143XS HCI\\P 85111 ISAH2 NORTH I\\'~NA INSTRU11ENTS INSTALLED AND QUALIFIC,iITION Docur'lENTS IDENTIFICATION
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LOU\\TION I ~M:Fi\\cTur(E~-l-* r*lODEL.
-""1:'~"~~ER-- SIES~i'IC':~~~;~~~~--' i'UWfRONMENTAl J
~iJcQUI\\:::Y I!'" r
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EllAH I tlO 14lXS
'ctiao loboNt"y i W~AP 8541 Report 0-9-6030 I
I I
Cont:ai mcnt flr*2S'.urc TABLE 3.1 (Cant'd)
NORTH A:!'lA INSTRUMENTS AND QWI,LIFICATIUN DOCUMEN1S IDENTIFICATION
The licensee has provided the basis for assuring that the radiation levels that wqi occur as a result of any design basis event during a forty year period w~ll be lower than that level which the equipment was separately qualified for. These bases also identified that over a period of approx-imately three months the radiation levels that could occur are substantially lower than the level for which the equipment was separately qualified.
We conclude from review of the information provided by the licensee, that the equipment will perform its function during plant operation for a period of three months and that the health and safety of the public will be ma~ntained. During this period of time the above required tests should be completed.
As part of the review of additional qualification information, the following deficiency has been noted.
Westinghouse determined that, for certain applications, stem mounted limit switches associated with certain motor operated valves and certain air operated valves used for containment isolation and emergency core cooling system alignment should be designated as safety related and be seismicaily and environmentally qualified.
Previous to this they had not been so designated or so qualified.
Based on this, the licensee was requested to review this aspect with respect to the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The licensee has notified us that:
(1)
There are no motor operated valves in applications that would fall in thi s category.
(2)
There are ten air operated valves with stem mounted limit switches in the Westinghouse scope, and 72 in the Stone & Webster scope, per unit, that are of concern.
(3)
Of the 82 valves, 21 are located in the containment. All of the in-containment valves are utilized as containment isolation valves and as such are redundant to another isolation valve located outside of the containment.
(4)
Seismic test data has been received from the various vendors of the switches being used and has been reviewed by Westinghouse and/or Stone & Webster and determined to be satisfactory for the necessary seismic qualification.
3-5
Furthermore, the licensee has also concluded that, for the Westinghouse scope of supp'ly, there is a need to desi gnate the stem mounted 11m; t switches of safety related air operated valves as safety related because of their function of providing "latch-in" Signals to the control circuits of the valves.
Therefore, as a result of study and discussions with Westinghouse, the licensee has dec;ded to alter the circuit of the 21 valves in the containment to elim;nate the limit sw;tches as the "latch-in" device.
The "latch-in" function is to be provided by qualified relays located outside of the containment.
The circuit modification has been accomplished on the North Anna Power Station, Unit 1. Also Unit 2 modifications will be completed prior to initial fuel loading for that unit.
We conclude that this modification is an acceptable interim resolution to this deficiency. However, we do not agree that the only need to designate the stem mounted limit switches as safety related arises from their "latch-in" function as discussed in the follow;ng paragraph.
The proposed modification of the "latch-in" circuit will provide the required assurance that the safety action will be satisfactorily performed by the valve.
However, we believe that the position indicators for valves of the conta~nment isolation system are also important enough to designate the stem mounted limit switches as safety related and to require these switches to be qualified to the containment environmental condit;ons.
For the interim we have concluded that it is acceptable for North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 to:
(1) use a qualified relay for the latch-in safety action, and (2) use the position indication on the redundant isolation valves located outs;de containment to ascertain the completion of the isolation function.
As a condition of the license, we will require that the licensee provide qualified stem mounted limit switches for the position indication of these valves and that they be installed no later than the first refueling outage.
3-6
Based on the above review and results and the stipulated operating license conditions, we conclude that the qualification of the instrumentation and electrical equipment inside containment (in both the Westinghouse scope of supply and in the Stone & Webster scope of supply) is acceptab1e for the North Anna Power Station.
Our evaluation and acceptability of the qualification programs for the solid state protection system are discussed in Sections 7.2.1 of the Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements.
For the instrumentation and electrical equipment in the balance-of-plant portion outside the containment, the licensee reported that acceptable environmental qualification programs have been conducted for these components.
We requested that the licensee provide the test programs, data, and test results of typical safety related electrical equipment in the balance-of-plant portion of the North Anna facility.
The licensee supplied environmental qualification information based on current industry standards and practice for the specific types of electrical equipment involved.
The industry standards and practices consider the effects of the environment on tr1 electrical equipment and typically require testing to qual i fy the equipment for the environment. These standards and practices are typically written to address industrial and conventional power plant environments.
The environments of a nuclear power plant outside of the reactor containment building are not significantly different from industrial and conventional power plant environments.
However, we do not believe that the testing in conformance with the industry stand;.rds is sufficient to encompass all areas of the nuclear povler plant w'lere electrical equipment may be located. Typically all areas have *ome form of forced ventilation to control the environment.
There is,Jncern that the forced ventilation may not be available at all times during the lifetime of the plant and as a result the electrical equipment located there may be exposed to a more severe envirrnment than that to which it was qualified.
ThE" ref ore, we requi red the 1 i censee to revi el'i a 11 the safety reI ated electrical equipment outside the containment to determine that each piece of equipment is qualified to the full range of environments to which the equipment may be exposed and in which the equipment may be relied upon to operate.
3-7
The licensee submitted the results of their review which was based on extreme conditions including severe outside c1tmatic conditions coupled with the loss of the ventilating system for each iocation involved.
Based on their review, they identified a number of areas in which the temperature could possibly exceed the qualification temperature.
In these areas, they have committed to provide a temperature monitoring system to alert the operator if the qua1ification temperature is exceeded.
The monitoring system win include instrumentation which is of a high quality, is testable and is powered from a reliable power source.
We have reviewed the proposed temperature monitoring system and conclude that it provides the necessary information to the operator with regard to excessive temperature environment conditions if and when they occur.
If the qualificat~on temperature for any equipment is exceeded during the plant life, the licensee has committed to maintain a record of such an occurrence, report the occurrence and provide analyses to the Commission to demonstrate the continued acceptability of the equipment. Furthermore, the technical specifications limit the operation of the plant 1n the event of loss of ventilation in Class IE areas.
We conclude that this is acceptable for the qualification of electrical equipment outside of the containment for North Anna Power Station, Units and 2.
The licensee has stated that the monitoring system will be installed and operational prjor to the completion of the first refueling operation for Unit 1 and prior to initial fueling for Unit 2.
Therefore, we will include as a condition of the license for Unit 1 a requirement that for this time interval until the system is installed, the temperature in the involved areas shall be monitored and logged on a daily basis. Should the temperature of an area exceed the temperature rating of any Class lE equipment at that area during this period, the licensee is required to report such an occurrence and provide an analysis to the Commission to demonstrate the continued acceptability of the equipment.
The time period of concern (i.e., until the first refueling or about 18 months) is relat~vely short when compared to the life of the plant (about 40 yearsl.
We believe that the probability of an event which would require safety action uLlurrlng during this tlme perlod along with the colnc 4dent loss of ventilation adversely affecting the necessary safety equipment is small.
Furthermore, if such an event should occur and require safety action and ventilation to one of the trains is lost, the plant systems can perform the required satety functions w~th the redundant safety train equipment.
Therefore, based on the above considerat10ns and requirements for daily temperature moo)toring, we conclude that it is acceptable for Unit 1 to operate for thi s peri od of time wi thout the proposed temperature monitor! ng system installed.
3-8
6.2 6.2.2 6.0 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Conta~nment Heat Removal Systems In Supplement No.8 to the Safety Evaluation Report, we stated that excessive bearing wear was observed for the low head safety injection pumps.
Because these pumps are s~milar to the containment recirculation spray pumps, we requested that the long term reliability of the containment recirculation spray pumps also be demonstrated by suitable tests. Testing of the outside recirculation spray pumps has been completed; our evaluation of the pump tests that were conducted to demonstrate the long term reliability of the outside recirculation pumps is presented in Section 6.3 of this supplement.
Section 6.3 also discusses the status of the testing being done with the low head safety injection pumps and the applicability of the outside recirculation spray pump test results to the inside recirculation spray pumps.
As an interim measure, until such time that the long term reliability of the low head safety injection pumps can be demonstrated, the Virginia Electric and Power Company plans to use the outside recirculation spray pumps to provide backup (after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) emergency core cooling capability to the low head safety injection pumps.
The modifications that have been made to the outs~ de recirculat~on spray system to permit thi s back up capability consist of piping connecting the discharge of the outside recirculation spray pumps to the discharge of the low head safety injection pumps.
The cross connection piping 1s four-inch diameter piping, and each l;ne is provided with two manual isolation valves which will normally be closed and under administrative control. The rationale for this approach is that one of the two outside recirculation spray pumps is capable of satisfying both the containment cooling and core cooling requirements 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
Pump testing has demonstrated the reliability of the inside recirculation spray and low head safety inject~on pumps for times up to at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
6-1
The following is an evaluation of the Virginia Electric and Power Company's containment analyses, as they affect (1) the long term capability to maintain a subatmospheric condition in the containment and (2) the net positive suction head available to the outside recirculation spray pumps.
(1) Contai nment Depressuri zati on Analysi 5 The Virginia Electric and Power Company provided a containment analysis to justify that only one outside recirculation spray pump is needed to satisfy both the containment spray and core cooling requirements 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
The analysis was based on a cold leg (pump suction) double-ended rupture at 102 percent of full power; mi nimum engi nee red safety feature availability was assumed.
Also, the inside recirculation spray and the low head safety injection pumps were assumed to be operable for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, based on pump performance data available at the time the analysis was done.
Following initial b10wdown, the Virginia Electric and Power Company based the analysis of long term decay heat boi10ff from the core on the decay heat curve presented in the American Nuclear Society-ANS-5 Standard. For conservatism the Virginia Electric and Power Company "i ncreased the decay heat generati on by 10 percent. A three year fuel irradiation time was assumed.
This assumption is con-servative since only a portion of the core will have been irradiated for three years at the end of any operating cycle. The majority of the core will have a shorter irradiation time and will generate less decay heat than that assumed.
We, therefore, conclude that the Virginia Electric and Power Company's calculation of mass and energy release is conservative, and is acceptable.
The Virginia Electric and Power Company's analysis shows that the containment would be depressurized within one hour and would remain subatmospheric.
We have done a confirmatory analysis which also shows that the containment would be depressurized in one hour, and that one outside recirculation spray pump is capable of maintaining a subatmospheric condition in the containment with a portion of the flow diverted for core cooling purposes.
We, therefore, conclude that the Virginia Eiectric and Power Company' 5 analysis is acceptable.
6-2
6.3 6.3.1 (2)
Ne~ositive Suction Head Analysis In view of the recirculation spray system modifications that were made to provide backup emergency core cooling capability, we have reviewed the Virginia Electric and Power Company's calculation of the available net positive suction head to the outside recirculation spray pumps during system operation in this mode.
Recirculation spray system operation with the cross connect piping open will cause the outside recirculation spray pump flow rate to increase from 2000 gallons per minute to 2500 gallons per minute, the spray flow rate will be 1875 gallons per minute and the flow rate.through the cross connect for core cooling will be 625 gallons per minute.
The Virginia Electric and Power Company has calculated that the available net positive suction head to the spray pumps will be 24 feet. The required net positive suction head is 15 feet.
We have previously reviewed and accepted the Virginia Electric and Power Company's net positive suctlon head analysis. Therefore, we conclude that adequate net positive suction head will be available to the outside recirculation spray pumps when operating with the cross connect piping open.
Following several operational problems including poor bearing wear noted on the North Anna low head safety injection pumps during preoperational tests, the staff in 1 etters dated November 23, 1977, and December 27, 1977 required that the Virginia Electric and Power Company demonstrate the reliability of the low head safety injection and recirculation spray pumps.
These pumps are required for long-term cooling following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
In a letter dated January 30,1978, the Virginia Electric and Power Company proposed the addition of piping and valves that cross-connect the discharge lines of the outside recirculation spray system and the low head safety injection system.
This cross-connect allows an outside recirculation spray pump to satisfy both core cooling and containment spray functions beginning 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
In a letter dated February 13, 1978, we specified pump tests and certain analyses that would be required to be conducted to demonstrate acceptable pump performance for long-term cooling following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
6-3
6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.3.1 Evaluation of Cros~Connect In a letter dated March 13, 1978, the Virginia Electric and Power Company addressed our concerns on the adequacy of the cross-connect.
The licensee has shown that one outside recirculation spray pump is capable of supplying the flow necessary to maintain core cooling and to maintain a subatmospheric pressure in the containment for times greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
An evaluation of the containment pressure transient is presented in Section 6.2.2 of this supplement.
Section 6.2.2 of this supplement also addresses the adequacy of the net positive suction head for the outside recirculation spray pump when operating in the cross-connected mode with the increased total flow rate.
We have evaluated the net positive suction head for the low head safety injection pumps and found it acceptable.
Additionally, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has developed a procedure to be followed if use of the cross-connect capability is desired.
The licensee has also performed analyses demonstrating that the cross-connect piping and valves meet single failure and mechanical design criteria for sei smic Category I systems.
We have determined that both the installation and the potential use of the cross-connect between the outside recirculation spray system and the low head safety injection system is acceptable because it meets both the design and the systems criteria noted above.
In a letter dated February 13,1978 we required the Virginia Electric and Power Company to demonstrate the long-term reliability of the outside recirculation spray pumps.
The requirements for testing of the outside recirculation spray pumps for long-term operation as specified in our letter of February 13, 1978, consisted of a six-hour test, a series of starts and stops, and an initial six to ten-day test.
6-4
6.3.3.2 The pump testing for 10n9~term operation was conducted at full flow cond; t ions. The temperature of the water used for the 51 x-hour test was the temperature normally encountered during preoperational testing (approximately 110 de.grees Fahrenheit). The temperature of the water used for the six to ten-day test was maintained between 140 degrees Fahrenheit to 150 degrees Fahrenheit in order to simulate long-term post loss-of-coolant accident sump temperatures.
Boron and sodium hydroxide were added to the test water to simulate post loss-of-coolant accident sump conditions.
In addition to normally instai1ed instrumentation, accelerometers and pressure transducers were added along the pump column.
The data from these instruments were recorded at frequent intervals during the test.
The pump was di sassembl ed and inspected a t the camp' et; on of each test.
Measurements of each shaft journal outside diameter and bearing inSide d~ameter were taken prior to and at the completion of each test run.
Debris In our letter of February 13, 197H, we expressed concern over the effects of debris particles with a diameter in the range of two to 12 mils on the bearings of these pumps.
In order to evaluate the effects of debris, a number of samples of debris were collected at various locations inside containment. Based on these samples, the deb.ris concentration expected in the sump water after a postulated loss-of-coolant accident was calculated. The licensee was required to show that the pump tests accounted for this concentration of debris.
The test of the outside recirculation spray pump was conducted in the Unit 2 containment which is undergoing construction and in which debris was still being generated.
In a letter dated March 23, 1978, the licensee provided information which demonstrated that the water samples taken during the pump test indicated a debris concentration considered representative of that predicted to be in the sump water following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
We agree that the test conditions accounted for the debris effects on bearing performance.
The aebris concentrations which were actually used in the pump tests were considered to be conservative since no settling of debris was taken into account in the containment sampling calculations. The Virginia Electric and Power Company submitted calculations in the; r letter of March 13, i978, indicating that for the range of densities and sizes of interest, a large percentage of these debris particles could be expected to settle before reaching the sump inlet. The ~Iater samples taken during the pump test also indicated that setUing of debris particles did occur as demonstrated by the debris concentration in the test water decreasing over time.
6-5
6.3.3.3 Evaluation of _~ll.!~tde Recirculation Spray Pump Test Results A review and evaluation of the outside recirculation spray pump test data were conducted by us and by members of the Franklin Institute who were used as consultants to the staff.
We and our consultants conclude that the pump test conditions as conducted were representative of the expected post loss-of-coolant accident conditions.
Vibrational frequencies of interest were identified by a modal analysis conducted on the pump and column system. Although there was some increase in the haH-running-speed frequency component, all the observed frequencies were well-behaved and were all main-tained at satisfactory levels throughout the tests. With the exception of the above noted frequency, all other frequencies noted had stabilized.
High frequency response and analysis indicated shaft-gearing contact for a short period of time at the beginning of the test as expected.
Contact after the beginning of the test was random and intermittent after the initial break-in period.
The pump dynamic behavior was, therefore, well-behaved and indicated that the pump had reached a level of satisfactory dynamic operation over the duration of the test.
The bearing wear noted at the completion of the test was low w;th the max;mum wear on any particular bearing being less than two mils d~ametral. For stable pump operation, expected bearing Wear characteristics consist of an initial wear-in period followed by only a small amount of additional bearing wear over the remainder of the 1 ife of the pump.
The bearing wear from the six-hour test and from the six-day test was plotted on a semilog scale to predict future bearing wear. Based on this extrapolation, the maximum expected wear on any particular bearing after six months would be on the same order of magnitude as the original bearing clearance.
Stable bear;ng performance is expected to be maintained for wear of this magnitude.
6-6
6.3.4 6.3.4.1 Because some wear and scoring of the shaft journals and scoring of the bearing surfaces were observed during the test, further testing of the outside recirculation spray pump will.be necessary to confirm the extrapolated wear behavior of the bearing system.
As discussed in Section 6.3.7 of this supplement. the operating license will be conditioned to require additional confirmatory testing.
Short-Term Test of the Low Head Safety Injection Pump Considering the availability of the cross-connect, the Virginia Electric and Power Company was required in our letter dated February 13, 197!l, to demonstrate the short-term reliabilit,Y of the low head safety injection pump.
Pump Test Cond1tions The requirements for the short-term low head safety injection pump testing as specified in our letter of February 13, 1978, consisted of a four to six-hour test at the recirculation flow rate, a series of starts ana stops. and a 4H~hour test at nominal full-flow rate.
The temperature of the water used for the four to six-hour test was at the temperature normally encountered during preoperational testing.
The temperature of the water used for the 48-hour test was maintained between 140 degrees Fahrenheit and 150 degrees Fahrenheit in order to simulate long-term post loss-of-coolant accident sump temperatures.
Boron and sodium hydroxide were added to the test water to simulate post loss-of-coolant accident sump conditions.
As noted in Section 6.3.3.2 of this report, testing was conducted in the Unit 2 contain-ment which resulted in debris being present in the sump water. A sample of the pump test water taken during the test indicated debris levels typical of those seen during the previous outside recirculation spray pump testing.
Normally installed instrumentation was used to confirm pump head and flow characteristics during the test. Normally installed instrumentation was used to monitor pump vibration throughout the test.
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b.J.4.'
6.3.5 6.3.6
~~i~.luaU~Q_J,J_L~~"i."J:lead Safety Injection Pump Test Resul ts We have reviewed the test conditions and the results of the short-term test of the low head safety injection pump.
We conclude that the pump test conditions as conducted were representative of the expected post loss-af-coolant accident condtions.
In a letter dated March 23, 197e, the Virginia Electric and Power Company submitted the resu lts af the short-term test of the low head safety injection pump.
The vibration leve"' 5 monitored during the test were at a low, acceptable level.
The pump head-flow curve obtained at the end of the 48-hour test compared favorably to the manufacturer's pump head-flow curve.
Based on these results, we conclude that the test as conducted sucessful1y demonstrated the short-term reliability of the low head safety injection pumps.
Applicability of Test Results We conclude that the results from the pump testing conducted in Unit 2 are directly applicable to the pumps installed in Unit 1.
This conclusion is based on the Similarity of system design between Unit 1 and Unit 2, the tolerances required to be maintained in the manufacturing of the pumps, and the detailed installation and alignment procedures used for the Unit 2 test pumps as well as for the Unit 1 pumps.
Evaluation of Emergency Core Cooling System We conclu~e that the pump test conditions as conducted were representative of expected post loss-of-coolant accident conditions. Based on the pump test data to date and on the flexibility provided by the system cross-connect, we conclude that the low head safety injection system and recirculation spray system will provide adequate core cooling and containment spray 'in the event of a postulated loss-'-of-coolant acCident.
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6.3.7 6.3.7.1 Additional Testinq As noted in Section 6.3.3.3 of this report, further testing of the outside recirculation spray pumps will be required, but this testing is meant to be confirmatory in nature and is not required to be completed prior to power operation.
As specified in our letter of February 13, 1978, long-term testing of the low head safety injection pump and the demonstration of long-term reliability of the inside recirculation spray pump is also required.
Because of the testing to date of the outside recirculation spray pump and the availability of the cross-connect, this testing is not required to be completed prior to power operation. The license for Unit 1 will provide conditions for operation as specified in Sections 6.3.7. I through 6.3.7.4 of this supplement.
Additional Testing of the Outside Recirculation Spray Pump Further testing of the outside recirculation spray pump is required to confirm the long-term reliability of these pumps.
This testing will be used to confirm that the journal wear does not continue to a point of removing the chrome plate on the shaft, that the journal and bearing scoring does not continue at the rate initially observed, and that the half-running-speed frequency vibration stabilizes.
This additional testing will consist of a pump test of 450 hours0.00521 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.440476e-4 weeks <br />1.71225e-4 months <br /> to be accomplished as follows:
The outside recirculation spray pump that was tested shall be reassembled using the bearings and shaft sections from the six-day test. The same assembly and alignment procedures used in the previous test shan be employed.
The test shall be run at nominal-full flow with the test water conditions the same as those used for the six-day test except that the water temperature may be reduced to 130 degrees Fahrenheit to approximate long-term expected sump temperatures.
Instrumentation requirements are the same as those for the six-day test. Data shall be taped at the fan owing times:
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6.3.7.2 6.3.7.3 At startup and for one hour following startup, at four hours, at eight hours, at 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, at 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />, at 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, at 426 hours0.00493 days <br />0.118 hours <br />7.043651e-4 weeks <br />1.62093e-4 months <br />, at 438 hours0.00507 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.242063e-4 weeks <br />1.66659e-4 months <br />, and at 15 minutes before shutdown as well as during the coastdown following pump trip. At the above times, data from all pressure probes shall be recorded. Additionally, the odd numbered accelerometers (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) shall be recorded in the velocity mode while the even number accelerometers (2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) shall be recorded in the demodulated acceleration mode.
Throughout the test, the test water shall be periodically sampled to determine the concentration and size of debris.
Other normally measured pump parameters shall be recorded as required by standard operating procedures.
Measurement of the journal and bearing surfaces shall be made prior to and at the completion of the pump test.
This confirmatory testing of the outside recirculation spray pump shall be initiated within 15 days of the issuance of an operating license permitting Unit 1 to aChieve criticality and operate at power.
Additional Testing of the Low Head Safety Injection Pump The long-term testing of the low head safety injection pump shall begin within 10 days of the completion of the.confirmatory testing of the outside recirculation spray pumps.
The length of testing, test conditions, and instrumentation requirements for this testing will be similar to those required for the long-term testing of the outside recirculation spray pump and will be specified by us in separate correspondence prior to the test.
Additional Testing of the Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Acceptable short-term reliability of the inside recirculation spray pumps has been established as a result of the previous operation of these pumps.
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6.3.7.4 6.3.8 As specified In our letter of February 13,1978, the Virginia Electric ilnd Power Company must demonstrate the long-term reliability of the inside recirculation spray pumps.
We and our consuitants have concluded that the long-term reliability of the inside recirculation spray pumps can be demonstrated through the use of a modal analysis demonstrating that the natural frequencies of the pump and column system would not be expected to lead to unsatisfactory vibratory behavior.
We find that a modal analysis of this pump is sufficient to establish 10ng-term reliability based on the testing of the outside recirculation spray pump, the similar design and construction of the inside and outside recirCUlation spray pumps, and on the fact that the inside recirculation spray pump has a much shorter shaft making alignments less critical.
We will requ~re that this analysis be submitted to us by May 1, 1978.
Additional Procedural Changes The Virginia Electric and Power Company is required to incorporate procedures which ensure that in the long term cooling mode following a loss-of-coolant accident, redundant pumps are secured once stable conditions are established in order to maintain a high degree of reliability with regard to system capability and flexibility for long-term cooling.
We will require that these procedural changes be incorporated by the Virginia Electric and Power Company by April 15, 1978.
Performance Evaluation In Supplement No.4 to the Safety Evaluation Report we concluded that the emergency core cooling performance for the North Anna plant conforms to the acceptance criteria of Section 50.46 of 10 CFR 50. These analyses performed in accordance with Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 ident~fied the worst break as the double-ended col d leg break with a discharge coefficient (rlloody multiplier) of 0.4.
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On March 28, 1978, the staff met with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation to discuss a computational error discovered in the Westinghouse Evaluation Model for calculating loss-of-coolant accident in conformance with Appendix K to 10 CFR 50. The error involved a geometric error which resulted in only half of the volumetric heat generation due to metal-water reaction being ~sed in the calculation of cladding temperature. The error was determined to be present in both the blowdown code (SATAN) and the fuel rod heatup code (LOCTA).
We requested that the corrections be made to the evaluation model and that a reanalysis of the emergency core cooling system performance be performed for the North Anna facility.
In a letter dated March 30, 1978, the licensee provided a reanalysis of the most limiting break using the previously approved Westinghouse Evaluation Model maintaining the same assumption as the previous analyses provided in the licensee's letter dated October 12,1976, but with the inclusion of the correction for the metal-water reaction heat release. Table 6. 1 below summarizes a comparison of pertinent input and results of the calculations provided in the licensee's letters of October 12, 1976 and March 30, 1978.
TABLE 6.1 INITIAL CORE CONDITIONS AND RESULTS FOR THE DOUBLE-ENDED COLD LEG BREAK (CD = 0.4)
Initial Core Conditions Core Power (14wt, 102% of Licensed Rating of)
Peak Linear Power (kw/ft, 102% of)
Heat Flex Hot Channel Factor (FQ(Z))
Radial Peaking Factor (FXY ' including uncertainties)
Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F~H Accumulator Water Volume (ft3, each)
Result of Calculation
~---.----.--.-
Peak Clad Temp, OF Peak Clad Location, ft Local Zr/H20 RXN (max), %
Local Zr/H20 Location, ft Total ZR/H20 RXN, %
Hot Rod Burst Time, sec Hot Rod Burst Location, ft 6-12 VEPCO Letter dated October 12, 1976 2775 12.63 2.32 1.55 1.55 1025 VEPca letter dated October 12, 1976 2181 7.5 7.86 7,5
<0.3 25.7 6.0 VEPCO Letter dated March 30, 1978 2775
- 11. 16 2.05 1.55 1.55 1025 VEPca letter dated March 30, 197~_
2070 10.5 5.6 9.0
<0.3 30.0 6.0
6.3.9 We have reviewed the results of these analyses and also conclude that the worst break continues to be the double-ended cold leg break with a discharge coefficient (Co) of 004. For this case, the recalculated peak clad temperature of the fuel rod was 2070 degrees Fehrenheit, which is below the acceptable limit of 2200 degrees Fahrenheit as specified in Section 50.46 of 10 CFR 50.
In addition, the calculated maximum local metal-water reaction of 5.6 percent and a total core-wide metal-water reaction of less than 0.3 percent are well below the allowable limits of 17 percent and 1 percent, respectively. These analyses were performed with a total peaking factor (Fq) of 2.05 at 102 percent of nuclear steam supply system power level of 2775 megawatts thermal.
Based on this review and previous supplements of the Safety Evaluation Report describing our review of the emergency core cooling system for the North Anna plant, we conclude that the emergency core cooling system performance conforms to the acceptance criteria of Section 50.46 of 10 CFR 50.
Operational Requirements for Safety Injection Initiation Signals In a letter dated February 15, 1978, the licensee presented information stating that over the range of break sizes considered, the in;tiation of the safety injection signal based on the low pressurizer pressure/level coincidence would always occur at containment temperatures below 280 degrees Fahrenheit, for which the required instrumentation is qualified.
We have reviewed the range of break sizes to be considered required by Appendix K to 10 CFR 50, and conclude that over this range of breaks the operabqity requirements of the pressurizer level and containment pressure instruments are acceptable.
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9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 Fire Protection Systems In Section 18.2.8 of Supplement No.7 to the Safety Evaluation Report, we stated that subsequent to our evaluation of the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 fire protection system reported in Section 9.5.1 of the North anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 Safety Evaluation Report, we issued revised fire protection guidelines "Appendix A to Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch Technical Position 9.5-1" dated August 23. 1976.
On September 30, 1976, we transmitted Appendix A to Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch Technical Position to the licensee and requested performance of a fire hazards analysis and a reevaluation of the fire protection program, including a comparison with Appendix A.
On April 1, lY77, the licensee submitted the information requested in our letter.
We reviewed the information and determined additional information was required.
In letters of September 7, 1977, and December 22,1977, the licensee provided this information.
We have evaluated this information to assure that most improvements will be implemented prior to the start of operation on the second fuel cycle. However, as stated in Section 9.5.1 of the North Anna Power station, Units 1 and 2 Safety Evaluation Report, we concluded that the present fire protection system is acceptable, and, therefore, the plant can be safely operated prior to implementation of the improvements.
We requested, and the Virginia Electric and Power Company submitted for our review, the North Anna Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications for Unit 1 for the presently installed fire protection equipment at this faci 1 Hy.
We have reviewed the fire protection technical specifications proposed by the licensee and find that they agree with our Standard Technical Specificatfons for fire protection and apply to the existing North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 fire protection system and are, therefore, acceptable.
Following the implementation of the modifications of the fire protection system and administrative controls, if any are required, resulting from our review, the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 TeChnical Specifi-cations will be similarly modified to incorporate the limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for these modifications.
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22.0 CONCLUSION
S Based on our evaluation of the application as set forth in our Safety Evaluation Report issued on June 4, 1976 and Supplement Nos. 1 through 8 and our evaluation as set forth in this supplement, we conclude that the operating license can be issued to allow power operation at full rated power (2775 megawatts thermal) subject to license conditions wh~ch will require further Commission approval and license amendments before the stated condition can be removed.
We conclude that the construction of the facility has been completed in accordance with the requirements of Section 50.57(a)(l) of 10 CFR Part 50, and that construction of the facility has been monitored in accordance with the inspection program of the Commission's staff.
Subsequent to the issuance of the operating license for full rated power for the North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, the facility may then be operated only in accordance whh the Commission's regulations and the conditions of the operating license under the continuing surveillance of the Commission's staff.
We conclude that the activities authorized by the license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and we reaffirm our conclusions as stoted in our Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements.
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November 26, 1977 November 28, 1977 November 3D, 1977 December 3, 1977 December 5, 1977 December 6, 1977 December 6, 1977 December 9, 1977 DeCember 9, 1977 December 9, 1977 December 9, 1977 December 12,1977 APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW Initial Decision on Applicant's Motion for Temporary License to Load Fuel issued bY the AS&LB. Decision for Fuel Loading only for North Anna Unit 1.
DPM letter to all utilities concerning Amendment to 10 CFR 73.55.
VEPCO letter transmitting the modified amended security' plan for North Anna 1 & 2.
VEPCO letter concerning Low Head Safety Injection Pumps.
Order issued by the AS&LB correct; ng errors i. n the Initial Decision for Temporary License to Load Fuel, dated Novmeber 26, 1977.
VEPCO letter concerning the preservice examination program.
DPM letter concerning Pressure Vessel Fracture Toughness Properties - North Anna 1 & 2.
D~4 letter concerning Exemption to Certain Preservice E~amination Requirements for North Anna Unit 1.
VEPGO letter requesting permission to operate North Anna Unit 1 1n Mode 3 (Hot Standby).
VEPGO letter requesting modification to NPF-4 to permit control rod withdrawal.
VEPGO letter concerning LHSI pumps.
Summary of December 5, 1977 Meeting to Discuss Matters Related. to the. Bearing Wear in the Low Head Safety Injection Pumps.
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December 13, 1977 December 13, 1977 December 13, 1977 December 15, 1977 December 16,1977 December 16, 1977 December 16, 1977 December 16, 1977 December 16, 1977 December 16,1977 December 19, 1 Y77 December 19, 1977 Initial Decision issued by the AS&LB for authorization of full-term and full-power operating licenses for Units 1 & 2 of the North Anna Power Station.
Order Correcting Transcript of Initial Decision issued by the AS&LB.
Order issued by the AS&LB for NRC Staff to file a motion to introduce certain documents into evidence and to file supplementary proposed findings.
DPM letter transmitting 3 copies (xerox) of Supplement No.8 to the Safety Evaluation Report.
VEPGO letter describing the circumstances surrounding the discovery, evaluation and reporting of a potential failure mechanism with the Raytheon 747 circuits at North Anna 1 & 2.
VEPGO letter describing the circumstances surrounding the discovery, evaluation and reporting of an error in the Stone & Webster NG Code Program at North Anna.
VEPGO letter concerning the potential failure mechanism common to all Raytheon 747 integrated circuits.
VEPGO letter confirming information given to the staff over the phone concerning piping systems of Westinghouse and Stone & Webster.
VEPCO letter concerning problems discovered with the NC Code computer code utilized at North Anna.
VEPCO letter providing additional details of the methods and extent of the proposed initial inservice program.
VEPCO letter advising Stone and Webster has completed the necessary modifications to their NCCODE Computer Program.
DPM letter transmitting 20 copies of the printed (bound) volumes of the Supplement 8 to the SER.
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December 20, 1977 December 20, 1977 December 20, 1977 December 21, 1977 December 21, 1977 December 2a, 1977 December 22, 1977 December 22, i977 December 23; 1977 December 27,1977 December 27,1977 December 28, 1977 December 30, 1977 Order issuedpythe A.S&LB.
The heari ng wi 11 reopen on December. 29, 1977 at 10 A.M. at the NRC Hearing Room, Bethesda, Maryland.
VEPCO letter confirming the results of piping stress calculations.
DPM letter concering Notification of Reportable ltems Related to North Anna.
VEPCO letter concerning pipe stress reana1ysis.
DPM letter confirming that information was received by tel ecopy.
VEPCO letter concerning model tests of a low head safety injection pump.
VEPCO letter transmi tti ng a report enti t1 ed "Fi re Protection System Review for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Supplement 1",
VEPCO letter concerning a finding at the site where the proper size orifice had nqt yet been installed in the discharge piping of the outside recirculation spray pumps.
VEPCO letter concerning test performance data on the Defense Apparel air hood.
VEPCO letter concerning pipe stress reanlysis.
DPM letter concerning Staff Position Regarding Containment Recirculation Spray Pumps.
DPM letter requesting additional information for items 6.158 and 6.159.
VEPCO letter concerning a stuQy by La Salle Hydraulic Laboratory. Montreal. Canada concerni ng hydrau1 i c model studies on the suction to the LHSI pumps.
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January 3, 1978 January 5, 1978 January 5,1978 January 5, 1978 January 5, 1978 January 9, 1 ':378 January 9, 1978 January 10, 1978 January 10, 1978 January 10, 1978 January 12, 1978 January 13, 1978 VEPGO letter transmitting Fire Protection System Review for North Anna, Supplement No.2.
VEPGO letter advising that A. Dromerick was contacted on January 4, 1978, concerning three unevaluated potential problems.
VEPGa letter confirming the substance of the unevaluated problems at North Anna.
VEPGO letter concerning two additional technical matters on North Anna which have not been fully evaluated, which could become reportable items under NRG regulations.
VEPGO letter concerning adverse suction conditions, similar to those reported for the low head safety injection pumps.
VEPGa letter concerning the steam generator wide range level transmitters.
VEPCO letter concerning errors in recording of cable reel numbers.
VEPCO letter concerning the pressurizer pressure transmitters.
VEPGO letter concerning the leaking of the waterproof membrane surrounding the containment liner.
VEPGO letter concerning the loadings on the nozzles of the safety related components.
Representatives from NRG & VEPCO meet in Bethesda, Md. to discuss matters related to the containment recirculation spray pump.
Order issued by the AS&LB.
This order restricts the Board order of December 13, 1977 to hot standby.
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January 13, 1978 January 16, 1978 January 18, 1978 January 18, 1978 January 20, 1978 January 20, 1978 January 20, 1 Y78 January 24, 1978 January 25, 1978 January 26, 1978 January 26. 1978 VEPCO letter concerning a potential problem with Crane Company pressure seal ed bonnet til ti og di sc check valves.
VEPca letter concerning a potential problem with an unsealed duct bank of the control room.
Summary of January 12, 1978, Meeting to Discuss Matters Related to the Tests Performed by VEPCO on the Containment Recirculation Spray and Low Head Safety Injection Pumps.
VEPCO submlts a listing of all potential reportable items concerning North Anna 1 & 2.
VEPCO letter concerning valves located in the reactor coolant sampling and leak monitoring systems and tubing material.
Letter from Counsel for VEPCO concerning instances of welding irregularities, improper procedures and inaccurate record keeping that have taken place at Surry.
VEPca letter providing information requested by A. Dromerick during an audit meeting with VEPCa on 1/18/78.
VEPCO letter concerning nozzle loadings on the regen-erative heat exchanger.
Order issued by the AS&LAB deferring review of all portions of the December 13,1977 I ni ti a 1 Deci S1 on to await the outcome of the reopening.
VEPCO letter concerning information which had not previously been identified in support of Class lE equipment qualification.
DPM letter issuing NPF-4 Amendment No.1 for hot standby.
Letter, License Amendment, Federal Register Notice, Safety Evaluation and Page Changes to Technical Spec.
A & B attached.
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January 30, 1978 January 31. 1978 February " 1978 February 2,1978 February 7, 1978 February 7, 1978 February 8, 1978 February 9, 1978 February 13, 1978 February 13, 1978 February 14, 1978 February 15, 1978 VEPca letter concerning low head safety injection and recirculation spray pumps for the North Anna Station, Units 1 & 2.
Representatives from NRC & VEPCa meet in Bethesda, Md. to discuss matters related to the low head safety injection and recirculation spray pumps.
Notice to the Parties issued by the AS&LB.
This notice concerns a letter from Robert D. Pollard, Union on Concerned Scientists.
Representatives from VEPCa & NRC meet in Bethesda, Md. to discuss reporting requirements for North Anna, Units 1 & 2.
Representatives from VEPCa & NRC meet in Bethesda, Md. to discuss reporting requirements.
Summary of January 31, 1978 Meeting to Discuss VEPCa's Proposed Modification to the Recirculation Spray System and the Proposed Testing Program for the Low Head Safety Injection Pumps.
VEPca letter concerning the use of a material reportab1y used to fabricate seal plates around certain feed water 1 i nes.
Summary of February 7,1978 Meeting to Discuss Reporting Procedures for the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2.
Representatives from VEPCa & NRC meet in Bethesda, Md.
to discuss the performance of Bingham-Willemett pump.
DPM letter requesting additional information concerning VEPCa's plans to demonstrate the reliability of the low head safety injection pumps and recirculation spray pumps.
VEPCO ietter transmitting procedures which describe how events are to be reported to the NRC.
VEPCO letter concerning outstanding issues related to environmental qualification of instruments.
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February 16,1978 February 16,1978 February '7, 1978 February 2i, 1978 February 23, 1978 February 24, 1978 February 27, 1978 February 27, 1978 Narch 1, 1978 March 2, 1978 March 13, 1978 March 15, 1978 t~arch 15, 1978 VEPGO letter concerning proposed inservite testing program for ASME Code Class 1. 2 and 3 pumps.
DPM letter concerning Reporting Procedures.
Summary of February 13. 1978 Meeting to Discuss Performance of the Outside Recirculation Spray Pumps.
VEPGO letter concerning a miSSing seismic bracing from heat tracing control cabinets and resizing of orifices that are in discharge lines of the outside recirculation spray pumps.
DPM letter concerning Monthly Testing Program for the Outside Recirculation Spray Pumps.
Site Visit to discuss seismic design margins related to safety equipment.
Memorandum and Order issued by the AS&LB.
Thf s Order authori zes the staff to issue a full-term, fun -power operating license for North Anna, Unit 1.
Order issued by the AS&LB. Motion denied to enter new ev i dence by Intervenor. Arnol d.
Summary of February 24, 1978 Meeting to Discuss Seismic Design Margins of Safety Related Equipment.
DPM letter concerning PWR Reactor Vessel Seal Ring Missile Problem - North Anna, Units 1 & 2, VEPca letter concerning a proposed pump test program.
DPi'l letter concerning the Franklin Institute Resea.rch Laboratories' report on North Anna Low Head Safety Injection pumps and Containment Spray pumps.
VEPGa letter advising they have amended the security plan for North Anna to reflect reassignment of personnel and approval authority for security p!'ocedures.
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March 16, 1978 March 17,1978 March 17, 1978 VEPCO letter requesting exen.,tions to the North Anna Technical Specifications to permit operation in Mode 3 without the outside recirculation spray pumps.
DPM letter issuing Amendment No.2 to NPF-4 for North Anna Power Station, Unit No.1. This Amendment concerns an exemption to the Technical Specifications Appendix A of original NPF-4 license.
DPM letter concerning Steam Generator Questionnaire -
North Anna.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 L Kornblith, ASLBP 4~O East West Towers POSTAGE. AND FEES PAID U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION