ML083040206

LB Initial Decision (LBP-08-22)

ML083040206
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	10/30/2008
From:	Abramson P, Cole R Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
SECY RAS
References
06-848-02-LR, 50-293-LR, RAS J-162
Download: ML083040206 (28)

Text

LBP-08-22 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Ann Marshall Young, Chair1 Dr. Paul B. Abramson Dr. Richard F. Cole In the Matter of:

ENTERGY NUCLEAR GENERATION COMPANY AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station)

Docket No. 50-293-LR ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR October 30, 2008 INITIAL DECISION I.

Introduction In this Initial Decision, the Licensing Board rules on the remaining issues outstanding before it in this 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L proceeding. At issue is the Application of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy or Applicant) for renewal of the operating license for its Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (the Pilgrim plant), located in Plymouth, Massachusetts, as it is challenged by Intervenor Pilgrim Watchs contention concerning the Applicants aging management program, or AMP, for certain underground pipes. The proposed renewal would authorize the facility to operate 20 years beyond its current operating license expiration date of June 8, 2012. Intervenor Pilgrim Watch contends that the Applicants aging management program for certain buried pipes 1 Judge Young will be filing a separate opinion regarding the substance of this order in due course.

is inadequate because these programs do not provide for monitoring wells. After an oral hearing and filing of the parties proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, we find that the Applicant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its aging management program at issue here provides reasonable assurance that aging effects to certain underground pipes at the Pilgrim plant will be adequately managed so that the components in question will perform their intended functions throughout the proposed license renewal period.

II. Background A. Procedural History of Proceeding Entergy filed its Application to renew its operating license for the Pilgrim plant on January 25, 2006.2 In response to a March 27, 2006, Federal Register notice of opportunity for a hearing on the proposed license renewal,3 two petitioners timely filed hearing requests, the organization Pilgrim Watch on May 25, 2006, submitting five contentions,4 and the Massachusetts Attorney General on May 26, 2006, submitting one contention.5 2 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., License Renewal Application - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (January 25, 2006) (Agencywide Documents and Access Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML060300028).

3 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating License No. DPR-35 for an Additional 20-Year Period, 71 Fed. Reg. 15,222 (Mar. 27, 2006).

4 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene by Pilgrim Watch (May 25, 2006).

5 Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene with Respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design Features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents (May 26, 2006). The Town of Plymouth also requested to participate in the proceedings and, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c), the Board granted the Towns request. See Request of the Town of Plymouth to Participate as of Right Under 2.315(c) (Jun. 16, 2006); Order and Notice (Regarding Oral Argument and Limited Appearance Statement Sessions) (unpublished) (Jun. 21, 2006). The (continued...)

In LBP-06-236, this Board rejected the Massachusetts Attorney Generals petition to intervene,7 but granted that of Pilgrim Watch, admitting two of its proposed contentions. The first of these contentions, Contention 1, challenged the adequacy of Entergys AMP with regard to its aging management of buried pipes and tanks that contain radioactively contaminated water because it does not provide for monitoring wells that would detect leakage.8 The second Pilgrim Watch contention, which we admitted in limited form, challenged certain emergency evacuation-related input data in the Applicants Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA)

(...continued)

Town of Plymouth has not, however, chosen to participate substantively in the litigation over the sole contention currently admitted in this proceeding, although the Towns representative did attend the evidentiary hearing.

6 64 NRC 257 (2006).

7 See Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 288-300 (2007). The Massachusetts Attorney Generals appeal of this decision was also rejected. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),

Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-07-03, 65 NRC 13 (2007).

8 Pilgrim, LBP-06-23, 64 NRC at 315. Pilgrim Watchs original Contention 1, which had primarily to do with its members concern with underground leakage of radioactive contamination into the ground water, was:

The Aging Management program proposed in the Pilgrim application for license renewal is inadequate because (1) it does not provide for adequate inspection of all systems and components that may contain radioactively contaminated water and (2) there is no adequate monitoring to determine if and when leakage from these areas occurs.

Some of these systems include underground pipes and tanks which the current aging management and inspection programs do not effectively inspect and monitor.

Id. at 300. We limited our admission of the contention to the part that is within the scope of license renewal. See id. at 315; see also Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-12, 66 NRC 131 (2007). Although the contention, as proposed and as admitted, refers to buried pipes and tanks, in fact there are no buried tanks that fall within the scope of the contention.

Analysis, a part of its Environmental Report.9 A majority of the Board later granted Entergys motion for summary disposition of this contention,10 leaving only Contention 1 for litigation.

We denied summary disposition of Contention 1, finding a genuine dispute on the central and material issue of whether those Pilgrim [AMPs] that relate to relevant buried pipes and tanks are adequate on their own, without need of any leak detection devices (Intervenors propose monitoring wells), to assure that the pipes and tanks in question will perform their intended functions and thereby protect public health and safety.11 We clarified the issue remaining before to be to whether the existing AMPs for the Pilgrim plant have elements that provide appropriate assurance as required under relevant NRC regulations that the buried pipes and tanks will not develop leaks so great as to cause those pipes and tanks to be unable to perform their intended safety functions.12 We noted that a clear goal of an AMP is prevention of an aging-induced leak large enough to compromise the ability of buried piping or tanks to fulfill their intended safety function.13 9 Pilgrim, LBP-06-23, 64 NRC at 341.

10 See Pilgrim, LBP-07-12, 66 NRC 131. Pilgrim Watch sought interlocutory Commission review of this contention dismissal, see Pilgrim Watch Brief on Appeal of LBP 13 Memorandum and Order (Ruling of [sic] Motion to Discuss [sic] Petitioners Contention 3 Regarding Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives) (Nov. 13, 2007), but the Commission denied this request, stating that because Pilgrim Watch has demonstrated no grounds for interlocutory review, its appeal must await the Boards final decision. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-08-02, 67 NRC ___ (Jan.

15, 2008) (slip op. at 1-2).

11 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-12, 66 NRC 113, 128 (2007) (SD Order).

12 Id. at 129.

13 Id. Although a majority of the Board later advised the parties that [o]ngoing monitoring is not within the scope of this proceeding, and that [t]he single admitted contention relates to whether or not Applicants AMPs are sufficient to enable it to determine whether or not (continued...)

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the parties filed initial and rebuttal presentations and testimony.14 We ruled on various prehearing matters15 and posed a series of pre-hearing questions to the parties,16 to which Entergy and the Staff filed responses.17 On April 9, 2008, the day before the hearing, we held a limited appearance session in Plymouth, Massachusetts.18

(...continued) certain buried pipes and tanks are leaking at such great rates that they cannot satisfy their respective intended safety functions, Order (Revising Schedule for Evidentiary Hearing and Responding to Pilgrim Watchs December 14 and 15 Motions) (Dec. 19, 2007) (unpublished) at 1, see also Separate Statement of Judge Ann Marshall Young (Regarding [Scheduling Order])

(Dec. 21, 2007), the issue of monitoring wells was ultimately permitted to be litigated based on the Applicants opening the door to the issue by comparing the effectiveness of its AMPs to monitoring wells. Order (Ruling on Pending Matters and Addressing Preparation of Exhibits for Hearing) (Mar. 24, 2008) at 2-3 (unpublished).

14 Entergys Initial Statement of Position on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 (Jan. 9, 2008);

Exh. 1 (Entergy direct testimony); Exh. 2 (Entergy rebuttal testimony); NRC Staff Initial Statement of Position on Contention 1 (Jan. 29, 2008); Exh. 39-40 (Staff direct testimony); Exh.

41 (Staff rebuttal testimony); Pilgrim Watch Presents Statements of Position, Direct Testimony and Exhibits Under 10 CFR 2.1207 [Modified Per Request ASLB Order of February 21, 2008, section c, page 2] (Mar. 3, 2008) (adding citations and exhibits not included in Pilgrim Watchs original January 29, 2008 filing); Exh. 14-15 (Pilgrim Watch direct testimony); Exh. 13 (Pilgrim Watch rebuttal testimony).

15 See, e.g., Order (Denying Pilgrim Watchs Motion for Clarification) (Jan. 11, 2008)

(unpublished); Order (Denying Pilgrim Watchs Motion for Reconsideration) (Jan. 11, 2008)

(unpublished); Order (Ruling on Pending Matters and Addressing Preparation of Exhibits for Hearing) (Mar. 24, 2008) (unpublished) 16 Order (Board Questions for the NRC Staff and Applicant) (Jan. 31, 2008)

(unpublished); Order and Notice (Regarding Hearing, Limited Appearance Session, and Additional Questions for Parties) (Feb. 21, 2008) (unpublished) (February 21 Order).

17 Exhs. 12, 65; Exh. 41 at 14 (Staff responses to questions contained in February 21 Order); Exh. 2 at A44-A47 (Entergy responses to questions contained in February 21 Order).

18 See Transcript of Hearing (Tr.) at 557-874; Notice (Notice of Hearing and Opportunity to Make Limited Appearance Statements), 73 Fed. Reg. 11,957 (Mar. 5, 2008).

The evidentiary hearing on Contention 1 was held on April 10, 2008, in accordance with a March 5, 2008 Federal Register Notice.19 At that hearing, all prefiled testimony and exhibits not excluded in ruling on motions in limine were entered into evidence.20 Additional exhibits were also entered into the record as the evidentiary hearing proceeded.21 At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the Board, in response to the First Circuit Court of Appeals stay of the closing of the hearing,22 held the record open,23 but subsequently issued an order setting deadlines for the filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on Contention 1, and responses thereto.24 Thereafter, we issued an order denying two Pilgrim Watch motions25 that sought to strike certain Entergy and Staff testimony and to add additional 19 See 73 Fed. Reg. at 11,957.

20 Tr. at 566-589.

21 Tr. at 645, 744-45, 764, 838.

22 Massachusetts v. United States, 522 F.3d 115, 130 (1st Cir. 2008). The case before the Court involved a challenge to the NRCs failure to consider certain alleged dangers related to storage of spent fuel under the National Environmental Policy Act, either in this adjudication proceeding, or in a rule-making proceeding that would be complete before termination of this proceeding. See id. at 117-18. On May 6, 2008, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Intent to participate as an Interested State in this proceeding, but stated therein that it was not requesting a stay at this time because it anticipates that such a request may be rendered unnecessary by the Commissions ruling on the rulemaking petition prior to issuing its decision on the relicensing. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Notice of Intent to Participate as an Interested State (May 6, 2008) at 2. Indeed, on August 8, 2008, the Commission ruled on the rulemaking petition, denying it. 73 Fed. Reg. 46,204 (Aug. 8, 2008).

23 Tr. at 870.

24 Order (Setting Deadlines for Provisional Proposed Findings and Conclusions on Contention 1, and for Pleadings Related to Pilgrim Watchs Recent Motion Regarding

[Cumulative Usage Factors]) (May 12, 2008) (unpublished).

25 Pilgrim Watch Motion to Strike Incorrect and Misleading Testimony from the Record (May 15, 2008); Pilgrim Watch Motion to Include as Part of the Record Exhibits Attached to Pilgrim Watch Motion to Strike Incorrect and Misleading Testimony from the Record of May 15, (continued...)

evidence to the Contention 1 evidentiary record. The Board formally closed the record as to Contention 1 on June 4, 2008.26 On June 9, 2008, all parties filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to which the parties responded on June 23, 2008.27 We subsequently denied certain Pilgrim Watch motions moving to admit a new contention regarding cumulative usage factors28 by Memorandum and Order dated July 1, 2008.29

(...continued) 2008 (May 27, 2008).

26 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Pilgrim Watch Motions Regarding Testimony and Proposed Additional Evidence Relating to Pilgrim Watch Contention 1) (Jun. 4, 2008)

(unpublished); see also Pilgrim, CLI-08-09, 67 NRC at ___ (2008).

27 Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 (June 9, 2008); NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order in the Form of an Initial Decision (June 9, 2008); Pilgrim Watch Post-Hearing Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law (June 9, 2008); Entergys Reply to Pilgrim Watchs Proposed Post-Hearing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Contention 1 (June 23, 2008); NRC Staffs Response to Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (June 23, 2008);

Pilgrim Watch Rebuttal to Entergys Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 (June 23, 2008); Pilgrim Watch Rebuttal to NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order in the form of an Initial Decision (June 23, 2008).

28 See Pilgrim Watch Motion Requesting the Record Be Held Open so that the Board May Address a New and Significant Issue [Method to Calculate Cumulative Usage Factors (CUF)] Sua Sponte and Provide Pilgrim Watch an Opportunity for Hearing (April 9, 2008); NRC Staff Response in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch Motion Requesting Record Be Held Open (April 21, 2008); Entergys Response in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch Motion Requesting the Record Be Held Open for Sua Sponte Consideration of Cumulative Usage Factors (April 21, 2008);

Pilgrim Watch Replies to Entergys and NRCs Responses Opposing Pilgrim Watchs Motion Requesting that the Record Be Held Open for Sua Sponte Consideration of Cumulative Usage Factors (April 30, 2008); Entergys Motion to Strike Pilgrim Watchs Reply to Entergys and NRCs Responses Opposing Pilgrim Watchs Motion Requesting that the Record Be Held Open for Sua Sponte Consideration of Cumulative Usage Factors (May 1, 2008); NRC Staff Motion to Strike Pilgrim Watch Reply to NRC Staff Response to Pilgrim Watchs Motion to Hold the Record Open (May 2, 2008); Pilgrim Watch Motion Regarding the Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) (May 5, 2008); NRC Staff Motion to Strike Pilgrim Watch Motion Regarding the Cumulative Usage Factor (May 8, 2008); NRC Staff Response in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch Motion to Add New Contention Regarding the Cumulative Usage Factor (May 19, 2008);

(continued...)

B. Legal and Regulatory Framework As we noted in LBP-06-23,30 the regulatory authority relating to the renewal of nuclear power plant operating licenses is found at 10 C.F.R. Parts 5131 and 54, the latter of which concerns the Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants, and enumerates issues to be addressed in license renewal proceedings.32 As the NRC Staff has pointed out, the scope of license renewal proceedings is quite limited under Commission rules and case law.33

(...continued)

Entergys Answer to Pilgrim Watchs Motion Regarding the Cumulative Usage Factor (May 19, 2008); Pilgrim Watch Reply to Entergys & NRCs Responses to Pilgrim Watch Motion to Add New Contention Regarding the Cumulative Usage Factor (CUF) (May 27, 2008).

29 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Pilgrim Watch Motions Regarding Cumulative Usage Factors) (July 1, 2008).

30 64 NRC at 257.

31 10 C.F.R. Part 51, concerning Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, addresses the environmental aspects of license renewal. Upon the summary disposition of Pilgrim Watch Contention 3, there were, however, no environmental issues remaining in this proceeding, and we therefore do not address them further herein 32 Four sections of Part 54 in particular contain provisions relevant to the scope of safety-related issues in license renewal proceedings. First, 10 C.F.R. § 54.4 specifies the plant systems, structures, and components that are within the scope of the proceeding. Sections 54.3 (containing definitions), 54.21 (addressing technical information to be included in an application and further identifying relevant structures and components), and 54.29 (stating the Standards for Issuance of a Renewed License) provide additional definitions of what is encompassed within a license renewal review, limiting the scope to aging-management issues, as well as some time-limited aging analyses that are associated with the functions of relevant plant systems, structures, and components, and are not at issue herein. See Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,463 (May 8, 1995).

33 See NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact at 11 (citing Florida Power & Light Co.

(Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 11-13 (2001);

see also Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Catawba Nuclear Station, (continued...)

The Commission in the 2001 Turkey Point license renewal proceeding stated that, in developing 10 C.F.R. Part 54 in the 1980s, it sought to develop a process that would be both efficient, avoiding duplicative assessments where possible, and effective, allowing the NRC Staff to focus its resources on the most significant safety concerns at issue during the renewal term.34 Noting that the issues and concerns involved in an extended 20 years of operation are not identical to the issues reviewed when a reactor facility is first built and licensed, the Commission found that requiring a full reassessment of safety issues that were thoroughly reviewed when the facility was first licensed and continue to be routinely monitored and assessed by ongoing agency oversight and agency-mandated licensee programs would be both unnecessary and wasteful.35 Further, the Commission indicated it did not believe it necessary or appropriate to throw open the full gamut of provisions in a plants current licensing basis to re-analysis during the license renewal review.36 The Commission chose, rather, to focus the NRC license renewal safety review upon those potential detrimental effects of aging that are not routinely addressed by ongoing

(...continued)

Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 363-64 (2002); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-98-14, 48 NRC 39, 41 (1998), motion to vacate denied, CLI-98-15, 48 NRC 45 (1998); Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-98-17, 48 NRC 123, 125 (1998); Turkey Point, CLI-00-23, 52 NRC 327, 329 (2000);

Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-04-15, 60 NRC 81, 90, affd, CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631 (2004).

34 Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 7.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 9.

regulatory oversight programs, which it considered the most significant overall safety concern posed by extended reactor operation.37 Applicants for license renewal must demonstrate how their programs will be effective in managing the effects of aging during the proposed period of extended operation, at a detailed

... component and structure level, rather than at a more generalized system level.38 An issue can be related to plant aging and still not warrant review at the time of a license renewal application, if it is adequately dealt with by regulatory processes on an ongoing basis.39 For example, if a structure or component is already required to be replaced at mandated, specified time periods, it would fall outside the scope of license renewal review.40 Applicants must also demonstrate that all important systems, structures, and components will continue to perform their intended function in the period of extended operation; and identify any additional actions, i.e., maintenance, replacement of parts, etc.,

that will need to be taken to manage adequately the detrimental effects of aging.41 The Commission has recognized that these [a]dverse aging effects generally are gradual and thus can be detected by programs that ensure sufficient inspections and testing.42 Accordingly, license renewal proceedings are limited to a review of the plant structures and components that will require an aging management review for the period of extended operation and the plants 37 Id. at 7.

38 Id. at 8 (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,462).

39 Id. at 10 n.2.

40 Id.

41 Id. at 8 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,463).

42 Id. (citing 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,475).

systems, structures, and components that are subject to an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses.43 The Commission may issue the renewed license, under the provisions of 10 C.F.R.

§ 54.29 if it finds that, with respect to the structures and components identified under

§ 54.21(a)(1), there is reasonable assurance of ongoing conformity to the current licensing basis or CLB.44 Those systems, structures, and components (SSCs)45 are delineated in 10 CFR

§ 54.4 and include not only those SSCs that perform safety-related functions as defined in

§ 54.4(a)(1), but also those non-safety related SSCs (defined in § 54.4(a)(2)) whose failure could prevent accomplishment of the § 54.4(a)(1) tasks and those SSCs relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the 43 Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-20, 54 NRC 211, 212 (2001) (citing 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21(a) and (c), 54.4; 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461).

44 Current licensing basis (CLB) is defined at 10 C.F.R. § 54.3 as:

[T]he set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant and a licensees written commitments for ensuring compliance with and operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in effect. design-basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as documented in the most recent final safety analysis report (FSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71, and the licensee's commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing.

The term is further described by the Commission in Turkey Point as a term of art comprehending the various Commission requirements applicable to a specific plant that are in effect at the time of the license renewal application. and to represent an "evolving set of requirements and commitments for a specific plant that are modified as necessary over the life of a plant to ensure continuation of an adequate level of safety." 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,473. It is effectively addressed and maintained by ongoing agency oversight, review, and enforcement.

Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 4 NRC at 9.

45 10 C.F.R. § 54.21 (a)(1) defines the relevant systems, structures and components (SSCs) as those delineated in § 54.4.

Commissions regulations for fire protection, environmental qualification, pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transients without scram, and station blackout, as defined in § 54.4(a)(3).

10 C.F.R. § 54.4(b) advises, as the NRC Staff notes,46 that even if a particular system falls within the scope of Part 54, not all structures and components comprising that system will necessarily be subject to Part 54 aging management requirements --- only those that perform

§54.4(a) functions will be subject to the requirements in question.

C. Witnesses A total of nine witnesses provided evidence in this proceeding through their prefiled written testimony and exhibits, as well as appearing in person to respond to questions during the April 10, 2008, evidentiary hearing on Pilgrim Watch Contention 1. All prefiled testimony, including the professional qualifications of each witness, and other exhibits were admitted into evidence at the beginning of the hearing.47 Four witnesses appeared on behalf of Entergy: (1) Alan B. Cox, Technical Manager, License Renewal with Entergy Nuclear; (2) Brian R. Sullivan, Engineering Director for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; (3) Steven P. Woods, Manager, Engineering Programs and Components for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; and (4) William H. Spataro, Senior Staff Engineer-Corporate Metallurgist with Entergy Nuclear (retired as of December 31, 2007).

Pilgrim Watch had two witnesses present to respond to Board questions: (1) Arnold Gundersen, Fairwinds Associates, Inc.; and (2) Dr. David P. Ahlfeld, Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

46 Staff Proposed Findings of Fact at 12-13.

47 See Tr. at 572, 581, 589.

The following witnesses appeared on behalf of the NRC Staff: (1) Dr. James A. Davis, a Senior Materials Engineer in the NRR Division of License Renewal; (2) Terence L. Chan, Branch Chief in the Piping and Nondestructive Examination Branch within NRRs Division of Component Integrity; and (3) Andrea T. Keim, Materials Engineer in NRRs Division of Component Integrity.

We have found all of the witnesses to be qualified to present testimony on the areas they addressed. The Board has accorded each witnesss testimony the weight appropriate to his or her level of knowledge, training and experience related to the subject matter of this contention.

III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The relevant matters of concern in this proceeding are set out in 10 C.F.R.

§ 54.29(a)(1), and relate to managing the effects of the aging of critical SSCs. The Commission has characterized this as managing aging related degradation.48 NRC regulations require that a license renewal application [f]or those SSCs [within the scope], demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) [i.e. the direct and indirect safety-related functions enumerated in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4] will be managed consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.49 Challenges to the CLB itself are, however, not within the scope of a license renewal proceeding.50 Thus, the subject matter of this proceeding 48 See Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4),

CLI-1-17, 54 NRC 3, 7-8 (2001); see also Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,463 (May 8, 1995).

49 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(3).

50 See, e.g. 10 CFR. § 54.30 (b). See also Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,474-75 (May 8, 1995) (the portion of the CLB that can be impacted by the detrimental effects of aging is limited to the design-basis aspects of the CLB.

All other aspects of the CLB, e.g., quality assurance, physical protection (security), and radiation protection requirements, are not subject to physical aging processes that may cause (continued...)

is of very narrow scope.

A. Pilgrim Watchs Argument In its original form, Pilgrim Watchs Contention 1 stated:

The Aging Management Program proposed in the Pilgrim application for license renewal is inadequate because (1) it does not provide for adequate inspection of all systems and components that may contain radioactively contaminated water and (2) there is no adequate monitoring to determine if and when leakage from these areas occurs. Some of these systems include underground pipes and tanks which the current aging management and inspection programs do not effectively inspect and monitor.51 As the fundamental basis for this contention, Pilgrim Watch asserted that:

[R]ecent events around the country have demonstrated that leaks of underground pipes and tanks can result in the release of massive amounts of radioactive materials into the ground water. Exposure to this radiation can be a threat to human health, and is a violation of NRC regulations. Because older plants are more likely to experience corrosion and leakage problems, and low energy radionuclides can speed up the rate of corrosion, Pilgrim should be required, as part of its Aging Management Program, to adequately inspect and monitor any systems and components that carry radioactive water. The Aging Management Plan should be revised to include this inspection and monitoring before a license renewal is granted.52 Pilgrim Watch went on to observe that small leaks, if undetected, can eventually result in much larger releases of radioactive liquid into the ground, and noted that smaller leaks are

(...continued) noncompliance with those aspects of the CLB.); see also Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Plant) LBP-06-22, 64 NRC 229, 235 (2006) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-1-17, 54 NRC 3, 8 (2001) (issues relating to a plants CLB are ordinarily beyond the scope of a license renewal review because those issues already [are] monitored, reviewed, and commonly resolved as needed by ongoing regulatory oversight.)).

51 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene By Pilgrim Watch at 4 (May 25, 2006)

[hereinafter PW Original Petition].

52 Id. at 6.

also more difficult to detect with measures such as noting drops in water levels in tanks.53 Pilgrim Watch asserted that because of these concerns monitoring wells should be placed between the plant and the ocean, and it specifically challenged the Applicants Buried Pipes and Tanks Inspection Program.

As the Board discussed in depth in LBP 07-12, Pilgrim Watchs focus in this contention, and in general from the outset, has been their view that there is a need for monitoring wells to detect, at an early stage, leakage from buried pipes and tanks which carry (or may carry) radioactive water so that contamination of groundwater and the nearby sea can be prevented.54 However, monitoring is a matter for ongoing operation and maintenance, and not within the scope of matters properly considered in a license renewal. Therefore, after review and consideration of the substantive content of Pilgrim Watchs Contention 1, Pilgrim Watchs supporting arguments, and the limitations on matters properly contestable in a license renewal proceeding, the Board reformulated Contention 1 so that, as admitted, it read as follows:

The Aging Management Program proposed in the Pilgrim Application for license renewal is inadequate with regard to aging management of buried pipes and tanks that contain radioactively contaminated water, because it does not provide for monitoring wells that would detect leakage.55 B. The Scope of this Contention The principal contest at the time of admission of this contention was whether or not monitoring was within the scope of a license renewal proceeding (the Board indicated then, and 53 Id. at 13.

54 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-12, 66 NRC 113, 129 (2007).

55 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 315 (2006).

on numerous subsequent occasions, it is not), and the admitted contention was refocused upon the alleged need for leak detection mechanisms.56 Admitted Contention 1 had two narrowing factors: first, it relates only to buried pipes and tanks that carry or may carry radioactive water, and second, it purported that the AMP cannot be adequate without the addition of monitoring wells between the plant and the ocean.57 Unfortunately, however, none of the parties addressed, at that point, what leak detection measures are required or sufficient in an AMP.

Thus, at the contention admissibility stage, the question of what leak detection measures are required in an AMP was not sufficiently defined.

As this proceeding developed, however, in June 2007 Entergy raised without discussion the question of the impact upon the outcome of this proceeding of its interpretation of our regulations to the effect that the ONLY buried pipes and tanks which are required to be addressed in a license renewal are those whose functionality is necessary during design basis accidents58 (i.e., a set of very severe accidents which could challenge the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to safely shut down and maintain the reactor, or accidents which might have material offsite radiation releases). Entergys view was that leakage of radioactive liquids from buried pipes and tanks is not a design basis event that could cause accident consequences similar to those referred to in §§ 50.34(a)(1), 50.67(b)(2) or 100.11. 59 Consequently, preventing such leakage is not a safety-related function or other 56 Pilgrim, LBP-06-23, 64 NRC at 315.

57 Pilgrim, LBP-07-12, 66 NRC at 128-29.

58 Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition of Pilgrim Watch Contention 1, Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 4, 5 (June 8, 2007).

59 See id.; see also Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition at 15-16.

critical plant function that has to be maintained under the license renewal rules.60 Cast in this light, what ultimately has been at issue in this proceeding is whether or not the proposed AMPs are adequate, without the addition of monitoring wells, to detect leaks in two particular buried pipe systems, before those leaks become so large that the ability of those pipes to satisfy their particular intended safety function (vis--vis design basis events) is challenged. This further refinement of the issue raised by Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 was stated clearly by the Board in its December 19, 2007 Order 61, and then again in its January 11, 2008 Order.62 Perceiving a continuing lack of clarity among the parties regarding the scope of the proceeding as to this particular contention, the Board further clarified in LBP-07-12 the issue to be:

Do the AMPs for buried pipes and tanks [which might contain radioactively contaminated water], by themselves, ensure that safety-function-challenging leaks will not occur, or must some sort of leak detection devices such as the monitoring wells proposed by Intervenors be installed to meet that obligation?63 Recognizing that (a) aging management programs are directed singularly at the management of age-related degradation; and (b) the Applicant has a host of ongoing operational and maintenance programs which may enable it to detect leaks in these particular 60 See Entergys Motion For Summary Disposition at 16; see also 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.4 and 54.21.

61 See Licensing Board Order (Revising Schedule for Evidentiary Hearing and Responding to Pilgrim Watchs December 14 and 15 Motions) (Dec. 19, 2007) at 1 (unpublished) [hereinafter Dec. 19, 2007 Order].

62 See Licensing Board Order (Denying Pilgrim Watchs Motion for Reconsideration)

(Jan. 11, 2008) at 5, 6, 8 (unpublished) [hereinafter Jan. 11 2008 Order].

63 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-12, 66 NRC 113, 129 (2007).

pipes; in providing the parties guidance related to their prefiled testimony,64 so that Pilgrim Watch, the Board and any other interested person can understand how these leaks are addressed, we made a more general inquiry by asking the parties to address:

[W]hether or not the Applicant has programs and procedures in place which enable it to determine whether buried pipes and tanks containing radioactive fluids are able to satisfy their intended safety functions despite leaks - i.e. to determine that there are not leaks at such great rates so as to cause those pipes or tanks to fail to satisfy those safety functions.65 Since matters relating to the Applicants ongoing operational and maintenance programs are not within the scope of this (or any other) license renewal proceeding, this inquiry produced, as might have been expected, information that relates to measurements and procedures which are not relevant to this hearing. Nonetheless, that information aided the Board in understanding what otherwise may have appeared to be gaps in the Applicants AMPs.

C. Factual Determinations Pilgrim Watchs Contention 1 addresses only those buried pipes and tanks within the scope of license renewal that contain radioactive liquid... BOTH by design and not by design.66 Entergy has identified six systems containing buried pipes and tanks at the Pilgrim 64 See Dec. 19, 2007, Order at 2-3, requiring filing as part of the prefiled direct testimony, the following: In addition to any other material Entergy files therein, it shall, pipe-by-pipe and tank-by-tank: (a) clearly identify each buried pipe and tank which may potentially contain radioactive fluids; (b) identify the intended safety function of such pipe or tank; (c) specify the procedures by which Entergy will determine, during the license extension period, whether there are leaks present which might endanger the ability of that pipe or tank to meet its intended safety function.

65 Jan. 11, 2008 Order at 6.

66 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 315 (2006); see also Pilgrim Watch Answer Opposing Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition of Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 at 9 (June 27, 2007); NRC Staff Initial Statement of Position on Contention 1 at 11 (Jan. 29, 2008)

[hereinafter NRC Initial Statement of Position].

(continued...)

plant that, at the system level, fall within the scope of license renewal under 10 C.F.R. §54.4: (1) the condensate storage system, or CSS; (2) the salt service water system, or SSWS; (3) the fire protection water system; (4) the fuel oil system; (5) the standby gas treatment system; and (6) the station blackout diesel generator system.67 None of the parties claim that the fire protection water system, the fuel oil system, or the station blackout diesel system contain radioactively contaminated water or fall within Contention 1. Pilgrim Watch initially argued that buried piping in the standby gas treatment system falls within Contention 1,68 but dropped this claim at the hearing.69 This leaves only the condensate storage system and the salt service water system to be addressed herein.70

1. Regarding the CSS buried pipes When it moved for summary disposition in June 2007, more than a year after the initial contentions were filed, Entergy raised what now has become evident as an important issue regarding whether or not Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 is applicable to the CSS. Although not

(...continued) 67 Exh. 1 at A23.

68 Pilgrim Watch Presents Statements of Position, Direct Testimony and Exhibits under 10 CFR 2.1207 [Modified Per Request ASLB Order of February 21, 2008, section c, page 2]

(Mar. 3, 2008) at 14-15; Exh. 13 at A5; Tr. at 600.

69 Tr. at 832-33, 835. We note that, in its Response Findings, Pilgrim Watch does not dispute this but nonetheless argues that the standby gas system belongs in the license renewal process because we find the Boards decision to rule out radioactive contamination incorrect. Pilgrim Watch Rebuttal to NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order in the Form of an Initial Decision at 10-11. For reasons apparent in LBP-06-23 and in this decision, we do not revisit our ruling on this matter.

70 We address in our Conclusions of Law whether the CSS buried pipes are within the scope of license renewal so as to require aging management of them as a matter of law.

developed as an argument in that motion, Entergy asserted that the material facts that were not in dispute were the facts that preventing leakage of radioactive liquid from buried pipes and tanks is not an intended safety function or other license renewal intended function, and that such leakage is not a design basis event that could cause accident consequences comparable to those referred to in §§ 50.34(a)(1), 50.67(b)(2) or 100.11.71 The substantive effect of this assertion is to raise the argument that the CSS is not relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events, which is a prerequisite for the requirements set out in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(1) and (2) (but not (a)(3), which is a separate requirement) for consideration of any system, structure or component (in this case the CSS) in a license renewal proceeding. However, neither the NRC Staff nor Pilgrim Watch focused upon the fundamental precept of this assertion in the list of undisputed material facts, nor did Entergy explicitly make this argument at any time. Therefore, this matter did not come before the Board in a way that brought it into proper focus until the hearing on the merits. At that time, as the record now clearly reflects and as is discussed in more detail below, it became clear that no part of the CSS is so relied upon, directly or indirectly, to remain functional during a design basis accident, and therefore any challenge to its functionality is outside the scope of this proceeding, except to the extent it is relied on to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with one of the five specific regulatory provisions referred to in 54.4(a)(3). In this latter regard, Entergys expert witness testified that the CSS provides a source of water to the HPCI and RCIC systems which are credited in the 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix R analysis for safe shutdown for fire protection.72 Thus, it appears to us that these pipes indeed fall within the 71 Entergys Motion for Summary Disposition, Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 4, 5.

72 Exh. 1 at A27; see also Exh. 2 at A36.

(continued...)

scope of this proceeding under the provisions of 10CFR 54.4(a)(3).

According to uncontroverted testimony from both Entergy and the Staff, the buried piping portions of the CSS are not relied upon in Pilgrims safety analyses to perform any safety functions listed in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4(a).73 Pilgrim Watch argued, however, that, because the CSS system is the backup supply for such water, the Board should find that the CSS system is relied upon within the meaning of the regulations. We decline to adopt that interpretation. In our view, relied upon, in this context, means only the principal components which are depended upon in the analyses, and must not reasonably be extended to include any backup system. To so expand the reach of this regulation would be to open a Pandoras box, enabling expansion of the regulation not only to secondary, but tertiary and further remote supporting systems.

Thus we find that the CSS buried pipes are outside the scope of this proceeding with respect to their safety functionality. But that finding does not eliminate the need for consideration of potential leaks from those buried pipes because of their role in fire protection.

(...continued) 73 Tr. at 780; Exh. 2 at A44; Exh. 40 at A7. According to Entergy, it deemed the CSS to fall within the scope of license renewal because the systems non-buried connections to the HPCI and RCIC systems could be relied upon to provide seismic support to those safety-related systems. Further, Entergy expert witness Alan Cox testified that while the CSS is the preferred source for the HPCI and RCIC systems because it contains a higher quality of water to assure long-term cleanliness of the system, the CSS is not seismically or safety-qualified and therefore it is not the assured source to be relied upon in the event of an accident. Tr. at 781-782. Rather, the TORUS, which is seismically qualified is the assured source. Tr. at 781.

Indeed, according to Mr. Cox, there is no scenario in which the buried portions of the CSS piping would be needed for seismic support purposes, and Pilgrim Watch witness Arnold Gundersen appeared to agree with that assessment. Tr. at 794-95.

Without focus upon any one of the potential functions of the CSS buried pipes, we find that the matter of leak detection at the requisite level is adequately addressed by existing ongoing operational and maintenance programs for the CSS system which enable Entergy to detect leaks before they become large enough to challenge their functionality as relied upon for the purposes set out in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4.74 The most immediate detection of a leak in the buried CSS pipes would be through the water level indicator in each of the two condensate storage tanks which is monitored every four hours, and, at a lesser frequency, but under full flow conditions, the quarterly testing of water flow rates from the HPCI and RCIC pumps.75 The water level in each of the two condensate storage tanks is maintained above 30 feet,76 and corrective action is required if the water level drops below that level.77 To understand the import of this level, Entergy advised that only about 11 feet of water level (corresponding to 75,000 gallons) is reserved for the HPCI and RCIC use.78 Consequently, there would have to be about a 20-foot drop in tank level before the capability of the HPCI and RCIC to perform their system functions using water solely from the condensate storage tanks would be impaired.79 Entergy asserted, and Pilgrim Watch did not controvert, that such a large 74 These leak detection mechanisms are not, nor are they required to be, part of the AMP.

75 Exh. 1 at A106.

76 Entergy Answer to Board Questions at 2; Exh. 12.

77 Exh. 1 at A111; Entergy Answer to Board Questions at 2; Tr. at 786-88.

78 Exh. 1 at A112.

79 Exh. 1 at A113.

drop would be detected by the established monitoring frequency before the leakage became great enough to present the challenge at issue.80 Furthermore, Entergy averred, and Pilgrim Watch did not controvert, that its quarterly testing of the HPCI and RCIC pumps can detect any leakage of the subject buried pipes well before it reaches a level that could challenge the required flow rates of 4,250 gallons per minute (gpm) and 400 gpm for the HPCI and RCIC systems, respectively.81 In addition to the quarterly tests, the flow rates for the HPCI and RCIC systems are confirmed during system testing once every operating cycle following each refueling outage.82 And, in any event, if the required flow rates are not demonstrated, Entergy would take corrective actions.83 Therefore, as to the general challenge of the Contention regarding whether the proposed AMPs are adequate, without the addition of monitoring wells, to detect leaks in these two particular buried pipe systems before those leaks become so large that the ability of those pipes to satisfy their particular intended safety function, we find that the AMPs do not need to incorporate any additional leak detection mechanisms because of the ongoing operational and maintenance programs which measure the condensate storage tank level every four hours and measure the HPCI and RCIC flow rates every quarter. Thus we find, with regard to the CSS buried pipes, that monitoring wells are not necessary as averred by Pilgrim Watch.

80 Exh. 1 at A114.

81 Exh. 1 at A118, A120.

82 Exh. 1 at A118.

83 Exh. 1 at A119.

2. Regarding the SSW System Buried Pipes Entergy has argued that only the CSS system at the Pilgrim plant has both buried pipes or tanks designed to contain radioactive liquid, and falls within the scope of license renewal under 10 C.F.R. § 54.4.84 Pilgrim Watch, on the other hand, has argued that the salt service water (SSW) system, which, as Entergy puts it, functions as the ultimate heat sink for the reactor building closed cooling water and turbine building closed cooling water systems during plant operations and cools systems that contain radioactive liquid, may also contain radioactive water if the heat exchanger through which that cooling takes place leaks.85 Although Entergy characterized this possibility as highly unlikely, we find that the SSW system may contain radioactive water (albeit a low probability event) and, since that system is the ultimate heat sink, it is relied upon for heat removal following a design basis event and therefore within the scope of this proceeding.86 The SSW system buried piping has two principal legs: (1) the leg which brings salt water into the heat exchanger from the sea and therefore cannot contain radioactive water, and thus is outside the scope of this particular challenge; and (2) the return leg which carries the salt water back to the sea. Because the return leg might contain radioactive water if the heat exchanger by which it cools the reactor is leaking; that particular portion of the SSW system piping is within the scope of the challenge and, because it is relied upon for heat removal as described above, is within the scope of this license renewal proceeding. In following upon this matter, in its January 31, 2008 Order, the Board directed the Parties to address the following:

84 Id. ¶¶ 7-9, 13, 14.

85 See Exh. 1 at A31-32.

86 See Exh. 1 at A32.

Explain how any leak in the SSW buried pipes that might carry radioactive water from the plant to the canal that dumps into the bay could challenge the ability of the SSW system to satisfy its intended function(s)? For example, is there any correlation between any potential leak in those pipes and any potential plugs in them that might prevent them from discharging water from the SSW, thereby impeding the ability to remove heat from the RBCCW? Provide a detailed statement of the basis of and sources for your answer.87 The singular purpose of the SSW system return piping, from the perspective of its intended function, is to permit the SSW system leaving the heat exchanger to continue to flow.

Cast in its inverse, which makes the issue more clear, the only way the intended functionality of the SSW return piping could be impaired would be if it became so blocked that water could not pass. Neither the prefiled direct or rebuttal testimony, nor testimony provided at the hearing, suggests any credible scenario by which this might happen. Moreover, when questioned by the Board at the hearing on the merits, no expert suggested any scenario in which such blockage could occur that was not very speculative and required the confluence of a number of very low probability events. Furthermore, the substance of Pilgrim Watch Contention 1 relates to leaks from the piping at issue, and no credible scenario has been proposed by which a leak in the SSW system return piping could reasonably be expected to lead to such a restriction in the outlet flow. And the lack of such a credible scenario is made even clearer by noting the fact that what we characterize as the return leg actually consists of two parallel piping systems each capable of carrying the entire required outlet flow.88 Therefore, we find that leaks in the return piping cannot reasonably be expected to cause that piping to fail to satisfy its intended function (as described in 10 C.F.R. § 54.4 et. al), and therefore that the Applicants AMP is not deficient for failure to incorporate leak detection mechanisms with regard to such leaks.

87 Licensing Board Order (Board Questions for the NRC Staff and Applicant) at 2 (Jan. 31, 2008).

88 Tr. at 616-17.

CONCLUSION and ORDER Based on the foregoing discussion, the entire evidentiary record, and the parties arguments in this proceeding, it is, this 30th day of October, 2008, ORDERED that Pilgrim Watchs Contention 1 is resolved in favor of the Applicant, Entergy, and that this proceeding is terminated. This Initial Decision shall become the final action of the Commission forty (40) days from the dates of its issuance, or on December 9, 2008, unless, within fifteen (15) days of its service, a petition for review is filed in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b), or the Commission takes review on its own motion.

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

____________/RA/____________________

Dr. Paul B. Abramson ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

___________/RA/_____________________

Dr. Richard F. Cole ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Rockville, Maryland October 30, 200889 89 Copies of this Initial Decision and Order were sent this date by email to all participants or counsel for participants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

)

)

ENTERGY NUCLEAR GENERATION CO. )

AND

)

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. )

Docket No. 50-293-LR

)

(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing LB INITIAL DECISION (LBP-08-22), have been served upon the following persons by U.S. mail, first class, or through NRC internal mail.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3 F23 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Administrative Judge Ann Marshall Young, Chair Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Administrative Judge Paul B. Abramson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: O-15 D21 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

David Roth, Esq.

Marcia J. Simon, Esq.

Andrea Z. Jones, Esq.

Brian Newell, Paralegal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop: O-16C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Secretary of the Commission Mail Stop: O-16C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Perry H. Buckberg, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch I-I Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: O11-F1 Washington, DC 20555-0001

Docket No. 50-293-LR LB INITIAL DECISION (LBP-08-22) 2 Terrence A. Burke, Esq Entergy Nuclear 1340 Echelon Parkway Mail Stop: M-ECH-62 Jackson, MS 39213 David R. Lewis, Esq.

Paul A. Gaukler, Esq.

Jason B. Parker, Esq.

Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP 2300 N. Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037-1128 Kevin M. Nord, Fire Chief & Director Duxbury Emergency Management Agency 668 Tremont Street Duxbury, MA 02332 Matthew Brock, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Mary Lampert, Director Pilgrim Watch 148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332 Mark D. Sylvia, Town Manager Town of Plymouth MA Town Managers Office 11 Lincoln Street Plymouth, MA 02360 Sheila Slocum Hollis, Esq.

Duane Morris, LLP Town of Plymouth MA 505 9th Street, NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20004-2166

[Original signed by Linda D. Lewis]

Office of the Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 30th day of October 2008