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NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2008002 and 05000323/2008002, Response to Disputed Non-cited Violation
	ML082200502
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/07/2008
From:	Caniano R; Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Conway J; Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
	IR-08-002 EA-08-182
	Download: ML082200502 (9)
	v • d • e

August 7, 2008

EA-08-182

John T. Conway, Senior Vice President &

Chief Nuclear Officer

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 3

Mail Code 104/6/601

Avila Beach, CA 93424

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT

05000275/2008002 and 05000323/2008002, RESPONSE TO DISPUTED

NONCITED VIOLATION

Dear Mr. Conway:

This response refers to your letter dated June 2, 2008, submitted in response to Noncited

Violation 05000323/2008002-03, Failure to Follow Procedures, issued in the Integrated NRC

Inspection Report 05000275/2008002 and 05000323/2008002 dated May 1, 2008. In your

letter, you denied the violation documented in the NRC integrated inspection report. The

violation identified the sites failure to implement Procedure RCP D-430, Plant Airborne

Radioactivity Surveillance, Revision 18, which required your staff to properly locate a

continuous air monitor to effectively monitor the air for radioactive material to alert workers of

changing radiological conditions.

We have reviewed the denial of the noncited violation. Our comments and conclusions are

addressed in Enclosure 1. In summary, the NRC has concluded that a violation did occur,

however, it has been rewritten to clarify our position.

Part 20.1501(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that each

licensee make or cause to be made surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to

comply with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 and that are reasonable under the

circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels, concentrations

or quantities of radioactive materials, and the potential radiological hazards that could be

present. Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, a survey means an evaluation of the

radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer,

release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation.

Part 20.1201(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states, in part, that the

licensee shall control the occupational dose to individual adults to specified limits.

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

R E GI ON I V

612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400

ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

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Contrary to this requirement, as of February 13, 2008, the licensee failed to perform an

evaluation of the radiological conditions and the potential hazards during fuel pool

activities that was necessary to comply with 10 CFR 20.1201(a) and that were

reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the concentrations of radioactive

materials, and the potential radiological hazards that could be present. Specifically, the

licensee failed to evaluate the placement of an Air Monitoring Sampler (AMS)-4 monitor

to ensure that surveys taken were appropriate for monitoring the concentrations of

radioactive material and the potential radiological hazards that could be present.

Because this failure to perform radiological surveys is of very low safety significance

and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action

Request A0719338, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with

Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000323/2008002-03, Failure to

Conduct Adequate Surveys.

In addition, the NRC has concluded that the noncited violation is associated with a green finding

and with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective

action component for failure to take timely corrective actions to address personnel safety

issues (P.1(d)).

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter will be

made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from

the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public

Electronic Reading Room).

If you have any questions regarding our conclusions, please contact Mr. Michael P. Shannon,

Chief, Plant Support Branch, at 817-860-8215.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roy J. Caniano, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Dockets: 50-275; 50-323

Licenses: DPR-80; DPR-82

Enclosure: as stated

cc w/enclosure:

Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter

ATTN: Andrew Christie

P.O. Box 15755

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

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Nancy Culver

San Luis Obispo

Mothers for Peace

P.O. Box 164

Pismo Beach, CA 93448

Chairman

San Luis Obispo County

Board of Supervisors

1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430

San Luis Obispo, CA 93408

Truman Burns\\Robert Kinosian

California Public Utilities Commission

505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102

San Francisco, CA 94102

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Attn: Robert R. Wellington, Esq.

Legal Counsel

857 Cass Street, Suite D

Monterey, CA 93940

Director, Radiological Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)

Sacramento, CA 95899-7414

City Editor

The Tribune

3825 South Higuera Street

P.O. Box 112

San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112

James D. Boyd, Commissioner

California Energy Commission

1516 Ninth Street (MS 31)

Sacramento, CA 95814

James R. Becker, Site Vice President and

Station Director

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

- 4 -

Jennifer Tang

Field Representative

United States Senator Barbara Boxer

1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240

San Francisco, CA 94111

Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section

National Preparedness Directorate

Technological Hazards Division

Department of Homeland Security

1111 Broadway, Suite 1200

Oakland, CA 94607-4052

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

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Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Michael.Peck@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Tony.Brown@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/B (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

DRS STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)

Mark Cox, OEDO RIV Coordinator (Mark.Cox@nrc.gov)

ROPreports

DC Site Secretary (Agnes.Chan@nrc.gov)

SUNSI Review Completed: ___Y_____ ADAMS: 7 Yes No Initials: ______

7 Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available

Sensitive 7 Non-Sensitive

HP:PSB2

C:PSB1

C:PBB

RA:ACES

OE:EPPOB

C:PSB1

D:DRS

CGraves/lmb

MPShannon

VGGaddy

MGVasquez

NDHilton

MPShannon

RJCaniano

/RA/

/RA/CMaier for

/RA/JWray for

/RA/

7/29/08

7/23/08

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8/4/08

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8/7/0/

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

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Enclosure

Noncited Violation 05000323/2008002-03, Failure to Follow Procedures:

The referenced report stated:

Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires procedures be established, implemented, and

maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Appendix A. Section 7 of Appendix A recommends radiation protection procedures for

airborne radioactivity monitoring. Licensee implementing Procedure RCP D-430, Plant

Airborne Radioactivity Surveillance, Section 2.2, states, in part, the purpose of the

continuous air monitors is to alert personnel to changes in radiological conditions and

that locations are selected based on their potential as contributors to airborne activity.

Contrary to this requirement, the licensee failed to implement this procedure because

the selected location of the continuous air monitor did not provide adequate coverage to

alarm and alert the workers of changes in radiological conditions.

In the Enclosure of your letter, you denied the following three aspects of the violation:

1. You stated there was no procedural violation as the AMS-4 monitor was located

at the south end of the fuel handling building and set up as required by

Procedure RCP D-430, Attachment 10.1.

2. You stated that even if the condition identified by the inspector constituted a procedural

noncompliance, it did not rise to a level of significance greater than minor in accordance

with the guidance of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612.

3. You stated that the assignment of cross-cutting aspect P.1(d), as defined in NRC

Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, is not warranted because prompt corrective actions

were taken to relocate the AMS-4 monitor adjacent to the permanently installed

continuous air monitor (system partial iodine noble gas (SPING)).

The regional staff, in consultation with NRCs Office of Enforcement and with members of the

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has concluded that a violation has occurred. However,

the violation has been rewritten as discussed below.

1. While the AMS-4 monitor may have been set up to satisfy the wording in the procedure

and radiation work permit, the NRCs position at the time of the violation was that its

location was not appropriate to meet the intent of the procedure. Specifically, as

referenced in the violation, Section 2.2 of Procedure RCP D-430, Plant Airborne

Radioactivity Surveillance, Revision 18, states, in part, the purpose of the continuous air

monitors is to alert personnel to changes in radiological conditions and that locations are

selected based on their potential as contributors to airborne activity. Your staff did not

provide an evaluation showing that the placement of AMS-4 monitor was appropriate to

monitor for airborne radioactive material and alert the workers. Additionally, the SPING,

which was out of service, is installed under the exhaust register at the south end of the

building.

- 2 -

Enclosure

Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.1501, states, in part, that each

licensee shall make or cause to be made, surveys that may be necessary for the

licensee to comply with the regulations in this part. Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, a

survey means an evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards

incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive

material or other sources of radiation. In this case no evaluation was performed that

indicated the location of the AMS-4 monitor was appropriate for monitoring for airborne

contamination in the form of noble gas. Noble gas is considered to be an external

exposure hazard, rather than an inhalation and internal hazard. Your staff noted a

significant fuel failure while the reactor was online leading up to the Unit 2 Refueling

Outage 14. This contributed to a higher potential for noble gas release during evolutions

involving fuel movement during the outage. The other radiation monitors in the area

were monitors with Geiger-Mueller detectors, which would be less sensitive to the beta

radiation and, therefore, would not provide indication until a radiation alarm from a more

significant event occurred. Additionally, these monitors were not within the ventilation

flow path and would not alarm unless a more significant event occurred.

In addition, spent fuel pool work involving the movement of activated spent fuel that

could be damaged includes a potential radiological hazard involving exposure to iodines

and alpha emitters. These hazards can be experienced when long handled tools and

equipment are removed from the spent fuel pool and dry out, regardless of whether first-

pass deconning has been performed. The derived air concentration (DAC) for alpha

emitters are very restrictive, and the beta-gamma to alpha ratios need evaluation to

determine the extent of the alpha hazard (see EPRI alpha guidelines).

The enclosure to your letter provided no new information regarding an evaluation to

justify the placement of the continuous air monitor. You also stated that PG&E agrees

with the NRC inspectors observation that the continuous air monitor had been moved to

a location that was not as effective in detecting changes in radiological conditions. In

response to this, your staff has placed the continuous air monitor in a more appropriate

location and made procedural changes to help ensure that the continuous air monitor be

located under an exhaust register at the south end of the fuel handling building.

You further state that the Diablo Canyon Power Plant contamination control program and

airborne monitoring ensures internal exposures of involved workers are maintained

ALARA. The NRC acknowledges that an efficient ALARA program will contain many

facets of contamination and airborne monitoring that must work in conjunction to

maintain radiation dose ALARA. However, if any one part of the program fails, then

unintended worker dose can occur.

2. You stated that even if the condition identified by the inspector constituted a procedural

noncompliance, it did not rise to a level of significance greater than minor in accordance

with the guidance of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612. You base this conclusion

on the fact that other radiation monitors are installed in the fuel pool area and also point

out Examples 2.b and 2.h of Appendix E to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 dealing with

administrative limits the licensee imposed on itself.

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Enclosure

Although there may be other radiation monitors present that may help to indicate if a

severe problem exists, you state that this continuous air monitor had a sample head

installed for monitoring for noble gas, and in particular, for the beta radiation from Kr-85.

The other radiation monitors within the vicinity of the area were Geiger-Mueller monitors,

which would be less sensitive to the beta radiation and, therefore, would not provide

indication until a more significant event occurred.

Examples 2.b and 2.h of Appendix E to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 provide

information about a licensee setting lower limits to certain situations to ensure that the

licensee does not violate a federal requirement. This violation involved a failure to

adequately evaluate radiological conditions in order to demonstrate that federal

requirements are met, and is not related to an administrative limit put in place by your

staff.

The NRC has determined that none of the minor examples in Appendix E to Inspection

Manual Chapter 0612 are appropriate to this situation.

3. A cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective

action component, for failure to take timely corrective actions to address personnel

safety issues (P.1(d)) was assigned to this violation because of a similar instance from

May 2006 for which Action Request A0666110 was assigned to evaluate the adequacy

of AMS-4 monitor placement in the fuel building during fuel moves. At the time of the

2008 inspection, this action request was open and no information could be provided to

show that an evaluation was conducted. You state that this is unwarranted because

prompt corrective actions were taken to relocate the AMS-4 monitor back to its normal

location adjacent to the SPING. The action request made no reference of any corrective

actions being performed, nor that your staff considered that actions taken were

appropriate. In response to the February 2008 inspection, your staff made procedural

changes to ensure that the AMS-4 monitor be located underneath the exhaust register in

the south end of the fuel pool floor.

Based on our review, as described above, the NRC has concluded that the inspectors

observation is a violation of NRC requirements. However, to clarify the NRCs position, the

violation was rewritten as stated below:

Noncited Violation 05000323/2008002-03, Failure to Conduct an Adequate Evaluation: