ML080440260
| ML080440260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/2008 |
| From: | Joseph E Pollock Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2 |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2009-0192, NL-08-019 | |
| Download: ML080440260 (4) | |
Text
Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 EnfM Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249 Tel (914) 734-6700 J.E. Pollock Site Vice President Administration January 31, 2008 Re:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 NL-08-019 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station O-Pl-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Indian Point Nuclear Generatinq Unit No. 2 - Reactor Vessel' Lower Head Inspection Plans
References:
- 1) NRC Bulletin 2003-02, "Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity",
dated August 21, 2003
- 2) Entergy letter to NRC (NL-03-178), "90-Day Response to NRC Bulletin 2003-02 Regarding Leakage From Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity", dated November 13, 2003
- 3) NRC letter to Entergy, "Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 -
Response to NRC Bulletin 2003-02, Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity", dated August 2, 2005.
- 4) Entergy letter to NRC (NL-05-002), "Reactor Vessel Lower Head Inspection Results; Indian Point 2, Fall 2004 Refueling Outage (2R16)",
dated January 17, 2005
- 5) Entergy letter to NRC (NL-06-065), "Reactor Vessel Lower Head Inspection Results; Indian Point Unit 2, Spring 2006 Refueling Outage (2R17)", dated July 12, 2006
- 6) Westinghouse Report (LTR-PAFM-08-4, Rev. 0), "Technical Basis to Support Extension of Surveillance Interval for Planned Visual Inspection of the Indian Point 2 BMI Nozzles", dated January, 2008
Dear Sir or Madam:
On August 21, 2003 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin 2003-02 (Reference 1). By letter dated November 13, 2003 (Reference 2), Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) provided its response to the Bulletin. In that response Entergy described its plans to perform a 360-degree bare-metal visual (BMV) examination of all 58 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) lower head penetrations during the fall 2004 refueling outage (RFO) and to perform this BMV inspection duringt subsequent RFOs unless industry experience or site-specific observations indicate the
N L-08-019 Page 2 of 3 need for an alternative inspection approach. By letter dated August 2, 2005 (Reference 3), the NRC requested to be notified, in writing, of any changes in this plan prior to implementation. This letter provides such notification.
Inspections of the RPV lower head penetrations were conducted during the fall 2004 (Reference 4) and spring 2006 (Reference 5) RFOs. In addition, inspections of the general area under the reactor vessel were conducted. These inspections identified no evidence of leakage resulting from a breach of the lower head penetrations or attachment welds but did identify boron streaks from.the reactor cavity liner leakage.
The lower head penetration nozzles were inspected by non destructive examination (NDE) from the reactor vessel inside surface during the spring 2006 RFO. During that outage, no indications were detected in the lower head penetration nozzles. The spring 2006 lower head penetration nozzle internal inspection used ultrasonic (volumetric) and eddy current (surface) techniques which is a more thorough examination than an external visual inspection.
Performing visual inspections, including support activities such as scaffolding erection and demolition, result in a collective radiation exposure of approximately 2 rem per RFO.
In order to defer these dose significant inspections a structural integrity evaluation of the lower penetration nozzles was performed. Finite element stress analyses were carried out using the ANSYS program and the stress analysis results were used as input to the structural integrity evaluation. A non-proprietary version of the stress analysis and structural integrity evaluation is provided in Reference 6 (attached).
The results of the structural integrity evaluation, taking into consideration the NDE detection capability, support extension of the surveillance interval for planned BMV until after the 2012 RFO. Therefore, performing a BMV examination during the 2008 RFO provides no additional assurance that the penetrations will remain structurally sound.
Based on this conclusion, and on the fact that the boron from the cavity leakage impacts the effectiveness of the BMV inspection, Entergy plans to defer RPV lower head visual inspection until the spring 2012 RFO. Note that Entergy will continue to perform a visual inspection of the general area under the reactor vessel as part of the boric acid walkdowns to ensure that leakage has not occurred during the previous cycle of operation.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. R. Walpole, Licensing Manager at 914-734-6710.
Sincerely, J. E. Pollock Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center
NL-08-019 Page 3 of 3 Attachments:
- 1. Westinghouse Report LTR-PAFM-08-4 Rev. 0 cc:
Mr. John P. Boska, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I1 Division of Licensing Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Indian Point Unit 2 Mr. Paul Eddy New York State Dept. of Public Service
ATTACHMENT TO NL-08-019 Westinghouse Report LTR-PAFM-08-4 Rev.0 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 Docket Nos. 50-247