ML073241349

Email from T. Mcginty, NRR to M. Franovich, NRR Et Al. Fwd: Confirmation of Action for Farley

ML073241349
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/25/2007
From:	Mcginty T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Mike Franovich, Galloway M, Hiland P, Ross-Lee M, George Wilson Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2008-0016
Download: ML073241349 (4)

Text

r~re Cton -- Fwd:Cnimto of Action for Farley P, e J!

From: Tim McGinty

ý2ND To: Franovich, Mike; Galloway, Melanie; Hiland, Patrick; Ross-Lee, Mary Jane; Wilson, George Date: 10/25/2007 7:50:13 PM

Subject:

Fwd: Confirmation of Action for Farley FYI - Updated information DORL received on Farley followup from Region 2 today. Includes likely actions to be confirmed by letter, relevant to fuel reload for Unit 1 and continued Operation for Unit 2. We need to let Region 2 know if we have any comments or concerns. Thanks, Tim

>>> Charles Casto 10/25/2007 4:21 PM >>>

Greetings, We held the call with Farley this afternoon regarding their confidence that Unit 2 can continue to operate and that Unit 1 should be reloaded.

Since last weekend there have been 4 failure mechanisms. identified on Unit 1 4160v breakers. (None of the failures have repeated while the breakers were in service. Additionally, during the recent reactor trip (U-

2) all 4160v breakers operated satisfactorily.)

The 4 failure mechanisms involved components within the breaker itself. This is different than the earlier failures that prompted the AIT. Those failures were interface issues (between the Allis Chalmers cubicles and the Cutler Hammer breakers).

As we discussed previously. The licensee has conducted inspections on all load-shedding breakers on both units for the extent of condition of these vulnerabilities. Those inspections revealed only minor problems.

The root cause evaluation is still underway. We are sending a team (NRR staff) to the vendor facility next week (Pittsburgh) to review the quality work there.

We asked the licensee for the actions that they have taken and will take to provide them with confidence in operation of Unit 2. They explained to us those actions. The staff has challenged a number of the failure mechanisms and the subsequent inspections. The licensee has determined that the staff was correct in those challenges. Our assessment is that our staff, in some cases, is ahead of the licensee in determining problems, conducting inspections and evaluating extent of condition... Nevertheless, the staff (AIT) is.

comfortable that the licensee understands their concerns and is now taking the appropriate actions.

We asked the licensee if they believe that they are meeting technical specifications for Unit 2. They said that they were. We asked and they offered to write their actions in a letter to the RA. They plan to do this before fuel load on Unit 1 ...as soon as Monday.

We explained that some of the actions that we would be looking for are:

-Inspect the 13 load shed breakers for all identified vulnerabilities

-Complete inspections of all Cutler Hammer safety related breakers within x time frame.

-Conduct a root cause and extent of cause evaluations and take the appropriate corrective actions

-We would be looking for some protocol to assess any future failures consistent with the item above.

-Make their 6perability evaluations available for review

-Notify us when their actions are completed 6'.w2o

KaenCoto - Fwd:. Confti-...rmation of Action for Farley Page 2 jI I

I shared with them that we would confirm those actions in a letter to them.

Please let me know if you have any questions or directions..

casto CC: Cotton, Karen; Haney, Catherine; Marinos, Evangelos; Martin, Robert

[Karen.otton-. tion Fwd: Con.nfifirmattl&6neof. for______ .. P..e.

a c2j]

>>> Charles Casto 10/25/2007 4:21 PM >>>

Greetings, We held the call with Farley this afternoon regarding their confidence that Unit 2 can continue to operate and that Unit 1 should be reloaded.

Since last weekend there have been 4 failure mechanisms identified on Unit 1 4160v breakers. (None of the failures have repeated while the breakerswere in service. Additionally, during the recent reactor trip (U-

2) all 4160v breakers operated satisfactorily.)

The 4 failure mechanisms involved components within the breaker itself. This is different than the earlier failures that prompted the AIT. Those failures were interface issues (between the Allis Chalmers cubicles and the Cutler Hammer breakers).

As we discussed previously. The licensee has conducted inspections on all load-shedding breakers on both units for the extent of condition of these vulnerabilities. Those inspections revealed only minor problems.

The root cause evaluation is still underway. We are sending a team (NRR staff) to the vendor facility next week (Pittsburgh) to review the quality work there.

We asked the licensee for the actions that they have taken and will take to provide them with confidence in operation of Unit 2. They explained to us those actions. The staff has challenged a number of the failure mechanisms and the subsequent inspections. The licensee has determined that the staff was correct in those challenges. Our assessment is that our staff, in some cases, is ahead of the licensee in determining problems, conducting inspections and evaluating extent of condition... Nevertheless, the staff (AIT) is comfortable that the licensee understands their concerns and is now taking the appropriate actions.

We asked the licensee if they believe that they are meeting technical specifications for Unit 2. They said that they were. We asked and they offered to write their actions in a letter to the RA. They plan to do this before fuel load on Unit 1 ...as soon as Monday.

We explained that some of the actions that we would be looking for are:

-Inspect the 13 load shed breakers for all identified vulnerabilities

-Complete inspections of all Cutler Hammer safety related breakers within x time frame.

-Conduct a root cause and extent of cause evaluations and take the appropriate corrective actions

-We would be looking for some protocol to assess any future failures consistent with the item above.

-Make their operability evaluations available for review

-Notify us when their actions are completed I shared with them that we would confirm those actions in a letter to them.

Please let me know if you have any questions or directions..

casto CC: Catherine Haney; Evangelos Marinos; John Kramer; Karen Cotton; Mark

LK_!aren otton - ***Fwd: Confirmation of Action for Farley Page 3I1 Cunningham; Robert Martin; Stephen Alexander