ML071830021
| ML071830021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | National Bureau of Standards Reactor |
| Issue date: | 06/29/2007 |
| From: | Mendonca M NRC/NRR/ADRO/DPR |
| To: | Richards W US Dept of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) |
| References | |
| Download: ML071830021 (4) | |
Text
-Maiin-Mendon
- Requestion for AdditionalInformation
___Page_1 From:
Marvin Mendonca To:
Wade Richards Date:
06/29/2007 1:02:06 PM
Subject:
Requestion for Additional Information
- Wade, Attached is the request for additional information we discussed. Your timely response is needed to support completion of the review. Please provide me a date, when you feel you can provide a response.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.30(b), your response must be executed in a signed original under oath or affirmation.
- Regards, Mary
I cAternp\\GW}OO001.TMP P~g~JJj Fi61ýI Mail Envelope Properties (46853BOE. 16F : 1: 35040)
Subject:
Creation Date From:
Created By:
Requestion for Additional Information 06/29/2007 1:02:06 PM Marvin Mendonca MNMM@nrc.gov Recipients nist.gov PM wade.richards (Wade Richards)
Action Transferred Date & Time 06/29/2007 1:02:31 Post Office Delivered Route nist.gov Files Size MESSAGE 817 NIST RAI Response Review 06-27-2007_2.doc AM Date & Time 06/29/2007 1:02:06 24576 06/27/2007 10:45:43 Options Auto Delete:
Expiration Date:
Notify Recipients:
Priority:
ReplyRequested:
Return Notification:
Concealed
Subject:
Security:
No None Yes Standard No None No Standard To Be Delivered:
Status Tracking:
Immediate Delivered & Opened
NIST RAI Response Review The following questions are numbered to correspond to NIST's May 30, 2007, response to request for additional information.
2.1 Provide a reference to the mentioned previous response or a copy of the response.
2.2 Provide a reference to the mentioned previous response or a copy of the response.
4.2 Provide revised Figures 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, which were not attached to the response.
4.9 Provide justification for the conclusion that there are no lifetime issues regarding the strength of the Al or the bumup of the Cd used in the poison tubes. The neutron flux and duration of exposure should be compared to design limits for the tubes to ensure the tubes will continue to function as designed under the most limiting conditions for the license renewal period.
4.25 Provide an update to Table 4.2.3. Alternatively, remove or commit to remove Table 4.2.3 from the SAR, if the SAR contains all necessary information elsewhere.
4.28 Provide or reference analysis to support the conclusion that there would be no fuel damage from the decreased flow through the fuel elements cooled by the inner plenum. Also, the response should discuss how poison tube buckling would be detected and what actions would be required as these considerations may affect the consequences of such an accident 4.35 Provide the alloy or alloys, which compose the core frames and cladding.
4.36 Provide an update to Table 4.2.3. Alternatively, remove or commit to remove Table 4.2.3 from the SAR, if the SAR contains all necessary information elsewhere.
4.39 Provide the pressure of the helium left in the voids in the shim arms.
5.7 Provide verification that the nominal air supply pressure in the response is capable of operating the valves, and that the larger pressure is not required to operate the valves.
5.12 Provide clarification on the temperature range for TR-1 in degrees C. Verify that TR-1 is a temperature difference instrument. Verify that the SAR gives the correct temperature range for TR-1. Note TR-1 was not included in the RAI.
13.9 For each accident analysis, provide the limiting assumptions, conditions and safety system settings and where these limiting assumptions, conditions and safety system settings are required by Technical Specifications as required by 10CFR50.36. Compare the assumptions, conditions and safety system settings to those in ANSI 15.1 and NUREG 1537, which are applicable to test reactors.
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The response should provide a distinct set of information regarding accident scenarios so that a determination can be made that each accident scenario assumed the most conservative conditions allowed by the Technical Specifications. The information should show that the TS limits are supported by the appropriate accident analyses.
2