ML070930597

Proposed Change Number (PCN) - 577 Lovs Relay Replacement

ML070930597
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	03/30/2007
From:	Katz B Southern California Edison Co
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO
References
TAC MA9641, TAC MA9642
Download: ML070930597 (27)

Text

• l SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Brian Katz EDISON Vice President An EDISON INTERNATIONAL Company March 30, 2007 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D.C. 20555

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 Proposed Change Number (PCN) - 577 LOVS Relay Replacement

References:

1. Letter from D. E. Nunn (SCE) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated August 11, 1999,

Subject:

"San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, Docket Nos 50-361 and 50-362, Proposed Change Number (PCN) 488, Degraded Voltage and Loss of Voltage Setpoints".

2. Letter from L. Raghavan to Harold B. Ray (SCE), dated November 29, 2000;

Subject:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 - Issuance of Amendments on Degraded Voltage and Loss of Voltage Setpoints (TAC Nos. MA9641 and MA9642)

Dear Sir or Madam:

Persuant to 10CFR50.90, Southern California Edison (SCE) hereby requests the following amendment to operating licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Units 2 and 3, respectively. In Technical Specifications (TS), "Diesel Generator-Undervoltage Start", revise Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.3.7.3.b to lower the allowable operating time and narrow the allowable operating voltage band of the loss of voltage function.

The current design of the SONGS diesel generator (DG) and Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) systems fully comply with their surveillance requirements (SRs),

including 3.3.7.3.b ("Loss of Voltage Function") and 3.8.1.11.c.1 (AC Systems -

Operating), in verifying that the system responds properly and starts the DG (including resetting of the 4.16kV bus undervoltage logic) in less than 10 seconds. On the supporting component basis, the design calculations assume that to meet these SRs, the LOVS relays (including auxiliary relays) will actuate within 0.6 seconds following the DG start within the subsequent 9.4 seconds. In the actual plant installation, the LOVS relays actuate slower than the 0.6 second limit assumed in the calculation. This does not render the LCO not met, since the SR is only surveills the total specified 10 second limit (i.e.: the sum of the P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128 949-368-9275 Fax 949-368-9881

Document Control Desk March 30, 2007 LOVS relay actuation time plus DG start time). This SR threshold for OPERABILITY has always been satisfied since the DG start times are sufficiently faster than the 9.4 seconds assumed in the calculation such that the system has always met the specified 10 second SR limit.

In order to reduce the operating time for the LOVS relays, SONGS proposes replacing the specific model of relay used in the plant with a faster relay.

Since the Bases to SR 3.3.7.3.b specifically requires that this surveillance 11verifies the accuracy of each component within the instrument channel,"

changing the specific model of relay requires that we appropriately change the acceptance~criteria for the SR. Note: the wording cited is per the Standard Technical Specifications for CE plants, NUREG 1432.

Since replacement of these relays requires a system outage, SONGS would like to replace these relays starting at the Unit 3 Cycle 15 refueling outage, which is currently forecast for October 2008.

Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented in the next available unit outages of sufficient duration.

If you have any questions or require any additional information, please contact Linda T. Conklin at (949) 368-9443.

Sincerely, cc: B. S. Mallett, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV N. Kalyanam, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 C. C. Osterholtz, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 S. Y. Hsu, California Department of Health Services, Radiologic Health Branch

Document Control Desk March 30, 2007 Attachments A. Existing Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 2 B. Existing Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 3 C. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 2 D. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 3 E. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 2 F. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 3 G. List of Regulatory Commitments

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA )

EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. for a Class 103 ) Docket No. 50-361 License to Acquire, Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as Part of ) Amendment Application Unit No. 2 of the San Onofre Nuclear ) No. 249 Generating Station SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 249. This amendment application consists of Proposed Change No. NPF-10-577 which is a request to revise Facility Operating License NPF-1 0 to alter the Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) to facilitate testing requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR § 50.30(b), the following affirmation is provided: Brian Katz states that he is Vice President of Southern California Edison, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern California Edison and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

State of California County of San Diego Brian Katz, Vice President Subscribed and sworn to E) before me on this 3041% day of by IT Lh4 Kfl-a personally known to me or proved -to-'e-o-the-ba~is-of-salisfacter-y-e-idence-to be the person who appeared before me.

Notary Public 1"* f

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA )

EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. for a Class 103 ) Docket No. 50-362 License to Acquire, Possess, and Use )

a Utilization Facility as Part of ) Amendment Application Unit No. 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear ) No. 234 Generating Station )

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 234. This amendment application consists of

-Proposed Change No. NPF-1 5-577 which is a request to revise Facility Operating License NPF-1 5 to alter the Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) to facilitate testing requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR § 50.30(b), the following affirmation is provided: Brian Katz states that he is Vice President of Southern California Edison, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern California Edison and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

State of California County of San Diego Brian Katz, Vice President Subscribed and sworn to (o-r before me on this -Sii-P day of by -?- rcI k,___ ,

personally known to me orpfeveE4e-me-en4heas-ef-saatifactoPje\dence to be the person who appeared before me.

Notary Public

ENCLOSURE2 LICENSEE'S EVALUATION PCN 577 LOVS Relay Replacement

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS

.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

7.0 REFERENCES

Attachments A. Existing Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 2 B. Existing Technical Specifications pages, Unit 3 C. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 2 D. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 3 E. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 2 F. Proposed Technical Specifications Pages, Unit 3 G. List of Regulatory Commitments

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This letter is a request to amend Operating Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3, respectively.

This license amendment request will revise Technical Specification (TS)

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.7.3.b "Loss of Voltage Function" to a narrower operating voltage band and lower operating time for channel calibration testing. This proposed change will reduce the actuation time of the Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) relays (including auxiliary relays) below the allowed time of 0.6 seconds (used in the design analysis). Thus it will provide additional conservatism in starting the Diesel Generator and resetting the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relay logic within the required 10 seconds timing limit from the loss of offsite power.

The new Basler BE1-27 undervoltage relays, have inverse voltage time characteristics similar to the original Westinghouse CV-2 relays, but the reset time is significantly lower as these relays are electronically operated.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

Currently, SR 3.3.7.3.b, "Loss of Voltage Function" states the allowable channel calibration voltage range is > 3554 V and < 3796 V and Time delay is > 0.75 seconds < 1.0 seconds at 0 V. This proposed change will revise these values to > 3594.1 V and < 3745.2 V, Time delay: > 0.26 seconds and < 0.71 seconds at 57 V with initial voltage of 115.5 V. The 115.5 V initial voltage (110% of the 105 V setpoint) to 57 V minimum voltage is selected based on the available manufacturer's relay curves which provides the specific time at 57 V when voltage is dropped from 115.5 V.

The current design of the SONGS diesel generator (DG) and Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) systems fully comply with their surveillance requirements (SRs), including 3.3.7.3.b ("Loss of Voltage Function") and 3.8.1.11.c.1 (AC Systems - Operating), in verifying that the system responds properly and starts the DG including resetting the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relay logic within the 10 seconds time limit. On the supporting component basis, the design calculations assume that to meet these SRs, the LOVS relays (including auxiliary relays) will actuate within 0.6 seconds following the DG starting within the subsequent 9.4 seconds.

In the actual plant installation, the LOVS relays actuate slower than the 0.6 second limit assumed in the calculation. This does not render the LCO not met, since the SR is only surveills the total specified 10 second limit (i.e.: the sum of the LOVS relay actuation time plus DG start time).

This SR threshold for OPERABILITY has always been satisfied since the Page 1 of 7

DG start times are sufficiently faster than the 9.4 seconds assumed in the calculation such that the system has always met the specified 10 second SR limit.

In order to reduce the operating time for the LOVS relays, SONGS proposes replacing the specific model of relay used in the plant with a faster relay.

Since the Bases to SR 3.3.7.3.b specifically requires that this surveillance "verifies the accuracy of each component within the instrument channel,"

changing the specific model of relay requires that we appropriately change the acceptance criteria for the SR. Note: the wording cited is per the Standard Technical Specifications for CE plants, NUREG 1432.

3.0 BACKGROUND

Existing Design Configuration Undervoltage relay protection for the SONGS Units 2 & 3 Safety Related 4.16 kV buses is described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report-(UFSAR) Section 8.3.1.1.3.13.B.

Each of the two 4.16 kV Safety Related buses per Unit is equipped with undervoltage relays to permit automatic transfer to the alternate preferred power source and for DG starting. The undervoltage relaying scheme is designed to perform the following functions:

1. Loss of Voltage Protection Four undervoltage relays (Westinghouse CV-2 induction disc type with inverse time characteristics) 127F1, F2, F3 and F4 are provided on each 4.16 kV Safety Related bus. The output contacts of the relays are combined in two-out-of-four logic to generate a Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) with a time delay of approximately 1 second for complete loss of voltage.

LOVS perform the following:

a. LOVS with a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) will transfer the 4.16 kV Safety Related bus to the standby power source (i.e. the DG);

b. LOVS without SIAS will transfer the 4.16 kV Safety Related bus to the alternate preferred power source if available. If the alternate power source is not available it will transfer the 4.16 kV Safety Related bus to the standby power source.

Page 2 of 7

PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM SCE has performed calculations to revise the Setpoints for the Loss of Voltage Function and corresponding Time Delay Settings based on the functional operating characteristics of the new Basler BEl-27 undervoltage relay. The proposed allowable values were determined, based on the new Basler relay (BE1-27), to perform relay calibration during surveillance test per TS SR 3.3.7.3.b. The proposed change will reduce the actuation time of the LOVS scheme. Thus it will provide additional coservatism for starting the DG and resetting the 4.16kV bus LOVS scheme within 10 seconds timing limit from the loss of preferred power.

Modification Required for Implementation SCE has identified the following modifications that will be necessary in order to implement the proposed design. This change will reduce the reset time of the LOVS relays:

1. Replace all sixteen (16) existing Westinghouse CV-2 undervoltage relays installed on the 4.16 kV Safety Related buses, A04 and A06, in both SONGS Units 2 and 3 with new Basler BE1-27 electronic undervoltage relays.

SCE expects that the proposed modifications will be completed during scheduled outages starting with the SONGS Unit 3 Cycle 15 refueling outages which is currently forecast for October, 2008.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Existing LOVS Relays During surveillance testing, it is important to measure both the dropout voltage, at which the relay actuates upon sensing the loss of voltage, and the pickup voltage, at which the relay resets to enable sequencing of loads on the bus.

The existing loss of voltage protection scheme is designed to ensure that the 4.16 kV Safety Related buses separate from the grid and transfer to the DG when 4.16 kV Class1 E bus voltage may either be degraded or lost beyond its allowable limits of voltage and ready for load sequencing within the 10 second timing requirement from loss of power. The existing allowable "loss of voltage function" channel calibration values are > 3554 Page 3 of 7

V and < 3796 V, Time Delay > 0.75 seconds and < 1.0 seconds. In addition, it ensures that the DG starts and resets the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relay logic within the required 10 seconds timing from the loss of preferred power source.

Proposed LOVS Relays The proposed loss of voltage protection scheme is designed to ensure that the 4.16 kV Safety Related buses (1) do separate from the preferred power source and do transfer to the DG when 4.16 kV Safety Related bus voltage is degraded or lost as described above. The proposed allowable "loss of voltage function" channel calibration values are > 3594.1 V and

< 3745.2 V, with a Time delay from >0.26 seconds to < 0.71 seconds at 57 V with an initial voltage of 115.5 V. This allowable values will ensure proper operation of the relay within its acceptable accuracy parameters.

The reset time of the new Basler BE1-27 relay is extremely small and as a result the resetting time of LOVS relays (including auxiliary relays) will be reduced. As noted previously, since the Bases to SR 3.3.7.3.b specifically requires that this surveillance "verifies the accuracy of each component within the instrument channel," changing the specific model of relay requires that we appropriately change the acceptance criteria for the SR.

Note: the wording cited is per the Standard Technical Specifications for CE plants, NUREG 1432. Consequently, to reflect the performance fo the new relays, the lower allowable value is reduced from 0.75 to 0.26 seconds based on engineeering judgement to increase operational conservatism and still prevent spurious actuation of the LOVS relays. The upper allowable value was selected to allow additional conservatism for the DG start time including resetting the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relay logic within the required 10 seconds time limit. Consequently, use of Basler BE1 -27 electronic relay and reducing the time delay to 0.26 seconds does not create different type of failure or unanticipated trip.

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS

.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Southern California Edison (SCE) has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the standards set forth in 10CFR50.92, issuance of Amendment, as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Page 4 of 7

Response: No.

This proposed change revises the Technical Specification (TS)

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.7.3.b allowable set point values of the Loss of Voltage Function for the channel calibration testing. This proposed change will allow Southern California Edison (SCE) to increase margin and conservatism for the loss of voltage relay settings and overall loop uncertainties while performing Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) channel calibration testing.

The loss of voltage function is detected by the LOVS relays installed on the 4.16 kV Safety Related busses. Normally, these devices are not considered to be accident initiators. The proposed change narrows the voltage operating band and lowers the allowable upper limit for this loss of voltage detection by use of the electronic type Basler BE1-27 under-voltage relays. However, the reset time of the relay reduces significantly. The proposed change does not impact probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or i different kind of accident from accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed allowable values for the LOVS relays voltage settings and the minimum operating voltage of the of-site power will provide acceptable level of protection for the plant equipment.

3. Does the proposed change involve significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed loss of voltage function scheme is designed to ensure that plant equipment will not operate beyond its normal operating range for satisfactory operation of all the safety related equipment. The proposed loss of voltage function values will not affect the existing protection criterion for the plant equipment and will not reduce margin of safety.

Based on the above, SCE concludes that the proposed amendments present no significant hazards consideration under Page 5 of 7

the substance set forth in 10CFR50.92 (c), and accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric Power Systems" GDC 17 states in part:

"Electric Power Systems" - An onsite electric power system and on offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.

Conclusion The safety function of the LOVS is to ensure operability of Safety Related equipment. The effect of this proposed change would be to allow continued operation while the 4.16 kV Safety Related buses switches over to the Diesel Generator in the event of loss of voltage from the preferred power supplies. To determine the acceptability of this proposed change, SCE has evaluated the DG starting time and resetting time for the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relays within the required 10 seconds timing from the loss of preferred power source. The proposed change will reduce the resetting time of LOVS relays (including auxiliary relays). This will allow additional conservatism for the DG start time including resetting the 4.16kV bus undervoltage relay logic within the required 10 seconds timing limit.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10CFR20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amount of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure. Accordingly, the proposed Page 6 of 7

amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10CFR51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10CFR51.22 (b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCE

1. Letter from D. E. Nunn (SCE) to Document Control Desk (NRC) dated July 20, 2000,

Subject:

"Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362, Supplement 1 to Proposed Technical Specification Change Number NPF-10/15-488, Degraded Voltage and Loss Of Voltage Setpoints, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Units 2 and 3."

Page 7 of 7

ATTACHMENT A Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Existing Technical Specifications pages, Unit 2

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout Ž 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D < 2.17 seconds.

ii.

162D > 78 seconds and < 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S Ž 4.16 seconds and

• 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Loss of Voltage Function Ž 3554 V and

• 3796 V Time delay: Ž 0.75 seconds and

• 1.0 seconds at 0 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to Ž4151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-34 Amendment No. 4-7-4-,196 1

ATTACHMENT B Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Existing Technical Specifications pages, Unit 3

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout Ž 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162D Ž 78 seconds and 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S Ž 4.16 seconds and < 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Loss of Voltage Function Ž 3554 V and

• 3796 V Time delay: Ž 0.75 seconds and

• 1.0 seconds at 0 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to 24151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-34 Amendment No. ,187

ATTACHMENT C Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Proposed Technical Specifications pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 2

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout Ž 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162D Ž 78 seconds and 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S Ž 4.16 seconds and

• 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Inq nf Voltage Functinn > ;4 V 3594.1 V and 3 V 3745.2 V Time dplav: 0.-T5 0.26 secnndk And

< 4--A n-71 qprnndr1 At 4-4 57 V with initial voltage 115.5 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to Ž4151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-34 Amendment No. 174,19*

ATTACHMENT D Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Proposed Technical Specifications pages, Redline and Strikeout, Unit 3

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout Ž 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162D > 78 seconds and

• 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S 2 4.16 seconds and < 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Inqq nf Voltage Functinn  ;

3594.1 V and 37-96-V 3 3745.2 V Time dplAv: (--7-5 0.26 sernndq and 0

< 4-4n -71 qprnnds At - 57 V with initial voltage 115.5 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to Ž4151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-34 Amendment No. I165187

ATTACHMENT E Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Proposed Technical Specifications pages, Unit 2

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout 2 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162D Ž 78 seconds and 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S Ž 4.16 seconds and

• 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Loss of Voltage Function > 3594.1 V and < 3745.2 V Time delay: Ž 0.26 seconds and

< 0.71 seconds at 57 V with initial voltage 115.5 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to 24151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.3-34 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT F Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Proposed Technical Specifications pages, Unit 3

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function:

i. Dropout Ž 4123.0 V*

ii. Pickup

• 4144.6 V*

SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162D Ž 78 seconds and 128 seconds.

DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay:

i. 127D Ž 1.83 seconds and

• 2.17 seconds.

ii. 162S Ž 4.16 seconds and

• 4.44 seconds.

iii. 162T Ž 0.88 seconds and

• 1.62 seconds.

b. Loss of Voltage Function > 3594.1 V and

• 3745.2 V Time delay: Ž 0.26 seconds and

< 0.71 seconds at 57 V with initial voltage 115.5 V.

• Dropout and pickup values will be set to Ž4151.0 V and *4172.8 V, respectively, until actions identified in SCE submittal dated May 27, 2005 are completed.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.3-34 Amendment No.

ATTACHMENT G Proposed Change Notice (PCN) 577 LOVS Relay Replacement San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 List of Regulatory Commitments

List of Regulatory Commitments

1. (NONE).