ML070930403
| ML070930403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/2007 |
| From: | Thadani M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Harrison A, Head S South Texas |
| Thadani, M C, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-1476 | |
| References | |
| TAC MD2343, TAC MD2344 | |
| Download: ML070930403 (3) | |
Text
From:
Mohan Thadani To:
INTERNET:awharrison@stpegs.com; Internet:smhead@stpegs.com Date:
04/03/2007 11:30:42 AM
Subject:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CC:
Lapinsky, George; Wood, Kent Scott/Wayne:
The NRC staff has reviewed your request for amendments revising the criticality analysis for spent fuel pool and containment storage areas, and has identified the following RAI. Your response to the RAI below is needed in order to facilitate the NRC's timely response to your request. If STPNOC would like a formal request for this RAI, such a request will be promptly provided upon request.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Mohan REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR REQUEST FOR SPENT FUEL POOL AND CONTAINMENT STORAGE AREA CRITICALITY ANALYSIS TAC NOS. MD2343 AND MD2344 Please provide answers to the following questions relative to the effects of the new criticality analysis and storage configuration on human performance:
1.
Generally, will the new fuel storage configuration require more or fewer fuel moves than the current configuration, i.e., will the new configuration require more fuel shuffling or less per refueling?
2.
Does the new configuration require a more complex methodology to characterize fuel assemblies?
3.
Does the new configuration require a more complex methodology to specify the correct storage rack locations?
4.
Is training required to support using the new configuration (e.g., for the operators, reactor engineers, fuel handlers)? If not, why not?
5.
Who specifies the correct location for a specific assembly? Is this a change from previous practice?
6.
What barriers are in place to prevent mispositioning an assembly? For example, is there a written plan or procedure that delineates what is to be moved, in what sequence, to which location? Are there physical interlocks or permissives?
Software controls? Will the new analysis or the new configuration affect any of these barriers? If yes, what controls are in place to protect the integrity of the barriers?
7.
Is independent verification of the plan/procedure required?
8.
Is independent verification of each physical move required?
9.
Is independent verification of the final storage configuration required?
10.
Assuming that a fuel assembly is mispositioned, how would the error be detected?
11.
What barriers are in place to prevent a common mode human error that results in misloading multiple assemblies, i.e., an initial error followed by dependent errors, such as inadvertently sequencing the fuel moves incorrectly, failing to identify the correct assemblies or the correct locations, or making a common error in calculation that perpetuates itself throughout the spent fuel configuration?
Mail Envelope Properties (46127322.5F6 : 23 : 35106)
Subject:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Creation Date 04/03/2007 11:30:42 AM From:
Mohan Thadani Created By:
MCT@nrc.gov Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO04.HQGWDO01 GWL2 CC (George Lapinsky)
STPEGS.COM awharrison (INTERNET:awharrison@stpegs.com) smhead (Internet:smhead@stpegs.com)
Post Office Route TWGWPO04.HQGWDO01 nrc.gov STPEGS.COM Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 4654 04/03/2007 11:30:42 AM Options Expiration Date:
None Priority:
High ReplyRequested:
No Return Notification:
None Concealed
Subject:
No Security:
Standard