Text

Email: (PA) Vermont Yankee Documents from Samuel Hernandez-Quinones
	ML062890050
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	07/07/2006
From:	Hernandez-Quinones S; NRC/NRR/ADRO/DLR
To:	Moret E; Argonne National Lab (ANL)
References
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	Download: ML062890050 (769)
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{{#Wiki_filter:RicýhardEmch.- RE: VermontYan'keeDo'cuments Page1 From: Samuel Hernandez-Quinones To: Ellen Moret Date: Fri, Jul 7, 2006 2:55 PM

Subject:

RE: Vermont Yankee Documents Ellen Attached are the comments that we have received so far. Also attached are the scoping meeting transcripts. An additional box containing the comments and transcripts should get to ANL today or Monday. Sam

            >>> "Moret, Ellen N." <moret@anl.gov> 07/07/2006 2:36 PM >>>

Hi Sam-Thanks, I received the documents today. One more thing: can you please send me the transcripts of the scoping meetings? Thanks a lot. Ellen

            -----Original Message -----

From: Samuel Hernandez-Quinones fmailto:SHQ@nrc..ovl Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 9:12 AM To: Moret, Ellen N.

Subject:

Re: Vermont Yankee Documents Ellen a box with the documents should arrive at Argonne today. I will send you and Dave a list that contains all the accession numbers for the documents located in ADAMS, I will also send you an email with all the comments received later today. Sam

           >>> "Moret, Ellen N." <moret@anl.qov> 07/07/2006 10:08 AM >>>

Hi Sam-- I was just checking up with you on the status of the documents from Vermont Yankee. Do you know when they plan on being sent to Argonne? Also Dave Miller wanted me to ask you about some comments that we being mailed to him from Massachusetts. I don't believe he has received them yet. Do you know if/when they were supposd to arrive? Thanks. Ellen Moret CCO: AVci@anl.gov; David S. Miller; Richard Emch

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RE: Vermont Yankee Documents Creation Date Fri, Jul 7, 2006 2:54 PM From: Samuel Hernandez-Quinones Created By: SHQ@nrc.gov Recipients anl.gov avci CC (AVci @anl.gov) david.s.miller CC (David S. Miller) moret (Ellen Moret) nrc.gov OWGWPOO2.HQGWDO01 RLE CC (Richard Emch) Post Office Route anl.gov OWGWPOO2.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov Files Size Date &, Time MESSAGE 2760 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:54 PM ANR Comments.pdf 67651 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:33 PM Comment 1.pdf 21105296 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:34 PM Comment 2.pdf 82021 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:34 PM Comment 3.pdf 90261 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:34 PM Comment 4.pdf 61393 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:35 PM Comment 5.pdf 57659 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:35 PM Comment 6.pdf 99124 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:35 PM Comment 7.pdf 88653 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:36 PM Comment 8.pdf 121180 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:36 PM Comment 9.pdf 247442 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:37 PM Comment 10.pdf 104269 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:37 PM Comment 11 .pdf 122450 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:37 PM Comment 12.pdf 92799 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:37 PM Comment 13.pdf 89452 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:38 PM Comment 14.pdf 41506 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:38 PM Comment 15.pdf 260349 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:39 PM Comment 16.pdf 502642 Friday, July 7, 2006 2:39 PM Corrected Open House Transcript ML061840036.pdf 92469 Monday, July 3, 2006 9:14 AM Corrected Afternoon Transcript ML061840033.pdf 268446 Monday, July 3, 2006

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[Veront~nkeeElS - Scopýing Commients Page From: "Gjessing, Catherine" <Catherine.Gjessing@state.vt.us> To: <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov> Date: Fri, Jun 23, 2006 5:21 PM

Subject:

Scoping Comments Good afternoon, Attached are scoping comments from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources. Please feel free to contact Catherine Gjessing at 241-3618 or Julie Moore 241-3687 with any questions. Thank you. CC: "Moore, Julie" <Julie.Moore@state.vt.us>, "Sayles, John" <John.Sayles@state.vt.us>

State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 100 South Main Street, Center Building Waterbury, VT 05671-0301 Telephone: (802) 241-3620 Fax: (802) 241-3796 MEMORANDUM TO: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FROM: VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES DATE: JUNE 23, 2006

SUBJECT:

SCOPING COMMENTS FOR VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION LICENSE RENEWAL The primary purpose of these scoping comments is to request site specific analysis of various issues in the context of the license renewal process for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (Agency) has referred to the list of NEPA issues for license renewal set forth in Table A-I of NUREG-1850, FrequentlyAsked Questions on License Renewal of NuclearPowerReactors (March 2006). It is the Agency's understanding that this comprehensive list also indicates whether the issue is subject to a generic or site specific Environmental Impact Statement. The Agency is suggesting that some of the generic issues be examined in more detail in order to determine whether a site specific environmental impact analysis should be performed. The Agency has the following comments regarding the generic environmental impact analysis: " Issues 18, 20, 23, 24, and 28 through 30 (Thermalplume barrierto migratingfish, Prematureemergence of aquaticinsects, Losses among organismsexposed to sublethal stresses,Stimulation of nuisance organisms,Entrainment,Impingement, and Heat shock) As we understand it, these issues are associated with intake structures and thermal discharge issues which require a NPDES permit. The requirements of the Clean Water Act and the NPDES permit will provide assurance that the impacts of permitted intake structures and discharges meet the applicable federal and state requirements. It would be helpful, however, to have some limited site specific review of these issues. For example, have recent scientific studies regarding intake structure and thermal impacts on migrating fish species and aquatic organisms, in similar habitats or within this region, led to new knowledge applicable to these'issues? Are there any organisms present in the Vernon area which are particularly susceptible to sublethal stresses or heat shock? Are there any specific study protocols recommended for determining the impacts of intake and discharges on species present in the affected regions of the Connecticut River? " Issues 43 and 46 (Birdcollisions). The Agency is interested in bird mortality rates. In particular, the Agency is interested in whether the numbers and species of birds which I

have experienced mortalities with the cooling towers and the power lines are an issue of concern. This concern is also applicable to the met towers on site.

" Issue 45 (Powerline right of way management). The Agency is interested in this issue as it relates to rare, threatened and endangered species which may be present in proximity to the power lines. In addition, the Agency is interested in preserving undisturbed riparian buffers in areas of surface water or stream crossings.
" Issue 75 (Design-basisaccidents). Is there new knowledge or technology that is applicable to this issue and should be applied in the context of the license renewal? See comments on External Design Basis Events below.
"   Issue 87 (Waste Management) The Agency is suggesting that low level radioactive waste issue should be evaluated on a site specific basis. Title 10 Vermont Statue Annotated contains §7066 (c) states:

No generator of low-level radioactive waste in the state existing on the date of enactment of this section may increase its generation of waste in a year by more than 20 percent of the total annual volume of waste from all generators estimated for disposal by the secretary of natural resources, under subdivision 7065(a)(3) of this title, unless that generator receives a favorable determination from the secretary of natural resources that disposal capacity will be available as provided by section 3.04(11) of the compact agreement. The Agency would like to know whether Entergy Vermont Yankee will increase production of low-level radioactive waste as a consequence of the renewal and, if so, will any increase remain in compliance with the state statutory requirements regarding low level radioactive waste generation, minimization, and reporting. See also, Issue 89 below. Issue 89 (Water Quality) The Agency believes that groundwater and surface water quality are issues of great importance to Vermonters and should be subject to a site specific analysis. With respect to groundwater, it would be very useful to determine the natural background levels of radionuclides at the Entergy Vermont Yankee facility and in the vicinity of regional monitoring devices. What is the potential contribution to groundwater of constituents from land spreading of low-level constituents on site? How will both the natural and anthropogenic background levels be used when determining whether future releases from the facility exceed health standards In addition to the issues listed above the Agency is suggesting that the scope of the NEPA review also include an inquiry about whether there is new site specific knowledge and technology or scientific knowledge which is relevant to the nuclear plant Design Basis for External Events, such as seismic or flood events. For example, how should the operating basis (OBE) and safe shutdown seismic (SSE) events be determined in 2006? It appears that accelerations for a 500-year event were used as the starting place for determining OBE and SSE in 1966. The International Building Code (IBC) standards suggest that accelerations for a 2,500-year return interval are now the base standard for design of industrial/commercial structures. Are the OBE and SSE as determined in 1966 consistent with recent advances in 2

seismic engineering and current scientific knowledge? Is there current knowledge or technology applicable to the Design Basis for floods? 3

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Scoping Comments Creation Date Fri, Jun 23, 2006 5:20 PM From: "Gjessing, Catherine" <Catherine.Giessini(pstatc.vt.us> Created By: Cathcrinc.Gicssin2(@statceM.us Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankecEIS state.vt.us John.Sayles CC (John Sayles) Julie.Moore CC (Julie Moore) Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov state.vt.us Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 211 Friday, June 23, 2006 5:20 PM TEXT.htm 1433 Scoping Comments-jsm.doc 53248 Mime.822 76991 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed

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HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBER EISENBERG, LLP 1726 M Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 202) 328-3500 (202) 328-6918 fax Ca =7 June 15, 2006 m CD -. 3 ,3e BY FEDERAL EXPRESS Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office of Administration 0 :11 m ON Room T-6D59 Two WhiteFlint North 11545 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20952 301-415-1590

SUBJECT:

EIS Scoping Processfor Vermont I'ankee NuclearPlantLicense Renewal, 71 Fed.Reg. 20,733 (April21, 2006)

Dear Madam/Sir:

On behalf ofMassachusetts Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly, we are writing to submit comments on the proposed scope of the supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement ("Supplemental GELS") for the renewal of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant operating license. The Attorney General seeks consideration in the Supplemental GEIS of the environmental impacts of a severe accident in the Vermont Yankee fuel pool, including accidents caused by equipment failures, natural disasters, and intentional malicious acts. The Attorney General also seeks consideration of a reasonable array of alternatives for avoiding or mitigating the impacts of a severe pool fire, including combined low-density pool storage and dry storage of spent fuel. The technical grounds for the Attorney General's request are discussed in detail in the enclosed Hearing Request, submitted to the Commission on May 26,2006.1 The Hearing Request also discusses the basis for the Attorney General's position that the analysis he seeks is required by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") regulations and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). In addition, we wish to draw your attention to a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which the Court ruled that the Commission's rationale 1 Massachusetts Attorney General's Request for a Hearing and Petition to Intervene With Respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.'s Application for Renewal of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Operating License, etc. (May 26, 2006) ("Hearing Request"). The Hearing Request is now pending before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. .,* -.0 I I -.-- ~ -. ~-

                                                                                                                                °!
                                                                                                                      ..  . -J,

HARMON, CURRAN, SPIELBERG&S*ISENBERG, LLP Chief, Rules and Directives Branch June 15, 2006 Page 2 for refusing to consider the environmental impacts of intentional malicious attacks against nuclear facilities, as set forth in PrivateFuel Storage (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002) ("PFS'), fails to meet NEPA's reasonableness standard. Sall Luis ObispoMothersforPeace v. NuclearRegulatory Commission, No. 03-74628 (June 2,2006) ("Mothersfor Peace'). A copy of the decision is enclosed. The Mothersfor Peace decision constitutes a significant precedent that supports including the environmental impacts of intentional malicious attacks on the Vermont Yankee pool within the scope of the Supplemental EIS. Sincerely, Matthew Brock, Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Office of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108

Enclosure:

As stated

t-' FOR PUBLICATION UNITED'STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE; SANTA LUCIA CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB; PEG PINARD, Petitioners, No. 03-74628 PACuIFC GAS ANID ELECTRIC NRC No. COMPANY, CLI-03-01; intervenor, CLI-02-23

v. OPINION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Argued and Submitted October 17, 2005-San Francisco, California Filed June 2, 2006 Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani,* Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade Opinion by Judge Thomas

   *  *The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

6063

SAN Ltns OBIsPo MOTHERS V. NRC 6067 COUNSEL Diane Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for the petitioners. Charles E. Mullins, United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, Washington, D.C., for the respondents. David A. Repka, Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for respondent-intervenor PG&E. Sheldon L. Trubatch, Esq., Offices of Robert K. Temple, Esq., Chicago, Illinois, for amicus San Luis Obispo County. Kevin James, California Department of Justice, Oakland, Cal-ifornia, for amicus States of California, Massachusetts, Utah and Washington. Jay E. Silberg, Shaw Pittman, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for amicus Nuclear Energy Institute. OPINION THOMAS, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question, inter*alia, as to whether the likely environmental consequerices of a potential terrorist

A 6068 SAN Luis OaIsPo MOTHERS V. NRC attack on a nuclear facility must be considered in an environ-mental review required under the National Environmental Policy Act. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion ("NRC") contends that the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is so remote and speculative that the potential consequences of such an attack need not be consid-ered at all in such a review. The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and other groups disagree and petition for review of the NRC's approval of a proposed Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part. The NRC is an independent federal agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials. Intervenor Pacific Gas and Electric Company ('PG&E") filed an application with the NRC under 10 C.F.R. Part 72 for a license to construct and operate an Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation ("Storage Installation" or "ISFSI") at PG&E's Diablo Canyon Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon") in San Luis Obispo, California' The NRC granted the license. The question presented by this petition for review is whether, in doing so, the NRC complied with federal stat-utes including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4437, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("AEA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g, and the Admin-istrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. NEPA establishes a "national policy [to] encourage produc-tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-ment," and was intended to reduce or eliminate environmental damage and to promote "the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to" the United States. Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321). The Supreme Court has identified NEPA's "twin aims" as "plac[ing] upon an agency the obliga-tion to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action[, and] ensur[ing] that the agency

SAN Ltns OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6069 will inform the public that it has indeed considered environ-mental concerns in its decisionmaking process." Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NaturalRes. Def. Counsel, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Rather than mandating particular results, NEPA imposes on federal agencies procedural requirements that force consider-ation of the environmental consequences of agency actions. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756. At NEPA's core'is the require-ment that federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS"), or: include in every recommendation or report on pro-posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible offi-cial on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Id. at 757 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). As an alternative to the EIS, an agency may prepare a more

limited environmental assessment (':BA"). concluding in a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("TONSI"), briefly pre-senting the reasons why the action will not have a significant impact on the human environment. Id...at -757-58 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501A(e), 1508.13).-If, however, the EA does not lead to the conclusion that.a FONSI is warranted, the agency remains obligated to prepare an EIS. Id. at 757.

660o SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC While NEPA requires the NRC to consider environmental effects of its decisions, the AEA is primarily concerned with setting minimum safety standards for the licensing and opera-tion of nuclear facilities. The NRC does not contest that the two statutes impose independent obligations, so that compli-ance with the AEA does not excuse the agency from its NEPA obligations. The AEA lays out the process for consid-eration of the public health and safety aspects of nuclear power plant licensing, and requires the NRC to determine whether the licensing and operation of a proposed facility is "in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a). The NRC is not, however, required to make this determina-tion withouit assistance; federal law provides a framework for hearings on material issues that interested persons raise by specific and timely petition. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a); 10 C.F.R.

§§ 2.308-.348; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. The initial hearing is held before a three-person Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Licensing Board"). 10 C.F.R. § 2.321. The Licensing Board's findings and decision constitute the agency's initial determination, although a party may file a petition for review with the Commission within 15 days of the Licensing Board's decision. 10 C.F.R. § 2.341. If the petition is granted, the Commission specifies the issues to be reviewed and the par-ties to the review proceedings, 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(c)(1), and renders a final decision. 10 C.F.R. § 2.344. A party may then petition this court for review of the Commission's final deci-sion. 28 U.S.C. § 2344.

II With this general statutory background, we turn to the facts underlying the petition for review. On December 21, 2001, PtG&E applied to the NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 72 for a license to construct and operate a Storage Installation at Diablo Canyon. The Storage Installation would permit the

.a SAN Luns OBIsPo Moamns v. NRC 6071 necessary and on-site storage of spent fuel, the byproduct of the two nuclear reactors at that site. PG&E expects to fill its existing spent fuel storage capacity at Diablo Canyon some-time this year. Therefore, unless additional spent fuel storage capacity is created, the Diablo Canyon reactors cannot con-tinue to function beyond 2006. PG&E proposes to build a dry cask storage facility. The basic unit of the storage system is the Multi-Purpose Canister ("Canister"), a stainless steel cylinder that is filled with radio-active waste materials and welded shut. The Canisters are loaded into concrete storage overpacks that are designed to permit passive cooling via the circulation of air. The storage casks, or the filled Canisters loaded into overpacks, are then placed on one of seven concrete pads. The Storage Installation would house a total of 140 storage casks, 2 more than the 138 projected to be required for storage of spent fuel generated at Diablo Canyon through 2025. On April 22, 2002, the NRC published a Notice of Oppor-tunity for Hearing. Under the regulatory scheme, interested parties could then request a hearing or petition for leave to intervene. 10 C.F.R. §2.309(a). A written hearing request, which must contain the contentions the party wants litigated at the hearing, will be granted if the petitioner has standing, and has posed at least one admissible contention.! Id. On July 19, 2002, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, a non-profit corporation' concerned with Diablo Canyon's

      'In order to be admissible, a contention must: be set forth *ith particu-larity, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1); provide a specific statement of the disputed issue of law or fact, 10 C.F.RL § 2.309(0fl)(i); provide the basis for the contention, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(0(I)(ii); demonstrate that the issue is within the .scopeof the proceeding, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(0(lXiii); demonstrate that the issue is material to the findings the NRC must make, 10 C.F.R.
  § 2.309(0(1)(iv); provide supporting references and expert opinions, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(0(1)(v); and provide sufficient information to show the existence of a genuine issue of law or fact, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(I)(vi).

6072 SAN Luis Oaispo MomERs v. NRC local impact, the Sierra Club, a non-profit corporation con-cerned with national environmental policy, and Peg Pinard, an individual citizen, (collectively "Petitioners") submitted a hearing request and a petition to intervene, asserting conten-tions for admission. In Licensing Board Proceeding LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413 ("LBP 02-23"), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board addressed the admissibility of the July 19 petition's five Tech-nical and three Environmental Contentions. One Technical Contention, TC-l, dealing with the state of PG&E's finances, was deemed admissible; the acceptance of at least one conten-tion meant that the petition was granted. Although the Licens-ing Board deemed two Environmental Contentions, EC-1, dealing with the failure to address environmental impacts of terrorist or other acts of malice or insanity, and EC-3, dealing with the failure to evaluate environmental impacts of trans-portation of radioactive materials? inadmissible, the Licensing Board nonetheless referred the final ruling as to the admissi-bility of these two contentions to the NRC, "in light of the 2 Technical Contention Number One ("TC-I') alleged Inadequate Seis-mic Analysis. TC-2 alleged PG&E's Financial Qualifications Are Not Demonstrated. TC-3 alleged PG&E May Not Apply for a License for a Third Party. TC-4 alleged Failure to Establish Financial Relationships Between Parties Involved in Construction and Operation of Installation. TC-5 alleged Failure to Provide Sufficient Description of Construction and Operation Costs. Environmental Contention Number One ("EC-l") alleged Failure to Address Environmental Impacts of Destructive Acts of Malice or Insanity. EC-2 alleged Failure to Fully Describe Purposes of Proposed Action or*to Evaluate All Reasonably Associated Environmental Impacts and Alternatives. EC-3 alleged Failure to Evaluate Environmental Impacts of Transportation.

   "Because the Storage Installation is not a permanent repository, this contention assumes the eventual transport of the materials stored there to a permanent site. Among the materials submitted to support the contention were some dealing with possible terrorist or other malicious attacks on the spent fuel while in transit. The ruling on the contention was "referr[ed]

... to the Commission to the extent terrorism and sabotage matters are proffered in support of its admission." 56 NRC at 453.

SAN Luis OBtspo MoTHERs v. NRC 6073 Commission's ongoing 'top to bottom' review of the agency's safeguards and physical security programs." 56 NRC at 448. In a memorandum and order, CLI-03-1, 57 NRC I ("CLI 03-01"), the NRC accepted the Licensing Board's referral of its decision to reject the environmental contentions related to terrorism. Although the Commission affirmed the Licensing Board's rejection of the contentions, it based its decision on a different rationale.-The NRC relied on four prior decisions in which it held that the NEPA does not require a terrorism review.! These decisions, most particularly PrivateFuel Stor-age, CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002), outlined four reasons for this holding: (1) the possibility of terrorist attack is too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require study under NEPA; (2) because the risk of a terrorist attack cannot be determined, the 'analysis is likely to be meaningless; (3) NEPA does not require a "worst-case" analysis; and (4) NEPA's public process is not an appropriate forum for sensitive security issues. The NRC concluded: Our decision today rests entirely on our understand-ing of NEPA and of what means are best suited to dealing with terrorism. Nonetheless, our conclusion comports with the practical realities of spent fuel storag *and the congressional policy to encourage utilities to provide for spent fuel storage at reactor sites pending construction of a permanent repository. Storage of spent fuel at commercial reactor sites offers no unusual technological challenges. Indeed, it has been occurring at Diablo Canyon for many

  ' nThose cases include: PrivateFdelStorage.LLC, CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002) (Storage Installation); Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-24, 56 NRC 335 (2002); Domin-ion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Nuclear Power Station), CLI-02-27, 56 NRC 367 (2002); and Duke Energy Corp. (Nuclear Power Station), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358 (2002). All four cases were.decided on December 18, 2002.

.i 6074 SAN Luis Osisro MoTHms v. NRC years and will continue whether or not we license the proposed Installation. 57 NRC at 7. In September of 2002, prior to the NRC's decision on the first petition, Petitioners submitted a second petition, this time requesting suspension of the Storage Installation licensing proceeding pending comprehensive review of the adequacy of Diablo Canyon's design and operation measures for protec-tion against terrorist attack and other acts of malice or insan-ity. Unlike the July 19 petition, this one addressed security measures for the entire Diablo Canyon complex, not merely the Storage Installation. Petitioners explained that 10 C.F.R.

     § 2.335, which prohibits challenges to any NRC rule or regu-lation in an adjudicatory proceeding involving initial or renewal licensing, prevented the raising of contentions con-testing the adequacy of NRC safety requirements protecting against terrorist or other malicious attacks on the entire com-plex in the July 19 Petition. Petitioners also stated that 10 C.F.R. § 72.32 prevented them from raising emergency plan-ning contentions in the earlier petition: Thus, Petitioners insisted that the second petition "d[id] not constitute a request for rulemaking, nor ...for enforcement action," and instead defined it, without reference to any particular hearing-granting provision of the regulations, as "a request for actions that are necessary to ensure that any licensing decision made by the Commission with respect to the proposed Diablo Can-yon 'Installation complies with the Commission's statutory obligations under the Atomic Energy Act."

In a memorandum and order, CLI-02-23; 56 NRC 230 ("CLI 02-23"), the NRC denied the September 2002 petition. Because thb petition did not, according to the NRC, "fit com-fortably.in any specific category, [the Commission] treat[ed] it as a general moti6n brought under the procedural require-ments of 10 C.F.R. § 2.730."' In rejecting the petition, the "Since renumbered as 10 C.F.R. § 2:323, this regulation provides, sim-ply, for "motions".

SAN Luis OnisPo MOTERS v. NRC 6075 Commission reasoned. that by not suspending operating licenses at installations and power plants following the Sep-tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it had demonstrated its implicit Conclusion that the continued operation of these facil-ities neither posed an imminent risk to the public health, nor was inimical to the common defense. Further, the Commis-sion concluded that because it had already initiated a thorough review of its safeguards and physical security program, there was no reason to suspend the Diablo Canyon licensing pro-ceeding to address the terrorism-related concerns raised by the Petitioners. It stated that "[t]here certainly is no reason to believe that any danger to public health and safety would result from mere continuation of this adjudicatory proceed-ing," given that the proceeding was in its initial stages, that construction was not scheduled to begin for several years, and that the Petitioners would be able to comment on any changes in the rules resulting from the Commission's ongoing review of terrorism-related matters if and when they were to occur. In a memorandum and order, CLI-03-12, 58 NRC 185 (2003) ("CLI 03-02'), the NRC denied the petitions for agency review of the Licensing Board's decisions that "cumu-latively, rejected challeniges to [the PG&E] Installation appli-cation." This denial thus became a final order, reviewable by this court on petition for review. 28 U.S.C. § 2344. In October of 2003, the Spent Fuel Project Office of the NRC's Office of Material Safety and Safeguards released its Environmental Assessment Related to the Construction. and -Operation of the Diablo Canyoni Independent Spent Fuel Stor- -age Installation. The 26-page document contains the NRC's conclusion "that the construction; operation. and decommis-sioning of the Diablo Canyon Installation will not result in significant impact to the environment," and therefore that "an [EIS] is not warranted for the proposed action, and pursuant to 10 C.F.R. [§] 51.31, a Finding of No Significanit Impact is appropriate."

A 6076 Sm Luis OQisPo MoTHERs v. NRC The EA is not devoid of discussion of terrorist attacks. Indeed, the document contains the Commission's response to a comment submitted by the California Energy Commission in response to an earlier draft that "there is no discussion in the EA of the potential destruction of the casks or blockage of air inlet ducts as the result of sabotage or a terrorist attack

 . ..    [nor is there] a description of how decisions are being made regarding the configuration, design and spacing of the casks, the use of berms, and the location of the ISFSI to mini-mize the vulnerability of the ISFSI to potential attack." The NRC responded:

In several recent cases, . . . the Commission has determined that an NRC environmental review is not the appropriate forum for the consideration of terror-ist acts. The NRC staff considers the security of spent fuel as part of its safety review ofeach applica-tion for an ISFSI license. In addition to reviewing an ISFSI application against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, the NRC staff evaluates the proposed security plans and facility design features to deter-mine whether the requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," are met. The details of specific security measures for each facility are Safeguards Information, and as such, can not be released to the public. The NRC has also initiated several actions to fur-ther ensure the safety of spent fuel in storage. Addi-tional security measures have been put in place at nuclear facilities, including ISFSIs currently storing spent fuel. These measures include increased. secur-ý ity patrols, augmented security forces and weapons, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military 'authorities,' and additional limitations on vehicular access. Also, as part of its comprehensive review of its security pro-gram, the NRC is conducting several technical

SAN Ltns OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6077 studies to assess potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage facilities to a spectrum of terrorist acts. The results of these studies will be used to determine if revisions to the current NRC security requirements are warranted. Petitioners argue that, in denying their petitions, the NRC violated the AEA, the APA, and NEPA. Although we reject the AEA and APA "claims, we agree with Petitioners that the agency has failed to comply with NEPA. We have jurisdiction over those final orders of the NRC made reviewable by 42 U.S.C. § 2239, which includes final orders entered in licens-ing proceedings, under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). III We turn first to Petitioners' AEA argument. Specifically, Petitioners argue that the NRC violated its regulations imple-menting the AEA, as well as the AEA's hearing provisions, when it denied Petitioners a hearing on whether NEPA required consideration of the environmental impact of a ter-rorist attack on the Storage Installation; they also argue that the NRC violated the AEA's hearing provisions in denying Petitioners a hearing on post-September 11th security mea-sures for the entire Diablo Canyon complex. Both of these challenges fail. A [1] The NRC did not violate the AEA or its implementing regulations when it failed to explain its rejection of Petition-ers' contentions by addressing each of their arguments. Noth-ing in the regulations or the AEA requires the NRC to provide such an explanation. Section 189(a) of the AEA granits public hearing rights "upon the request of any person. whose interest may be affect-ed" by an NRC licensing proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2239. The

. 105-171 > 87-165 a) As estimated from computations with MACCS2 at comparable sites with the parameters given in (Beyea et al. 2004a). Reduction by 1/3d"to account for wind rose effects. b) Based on Chanin and Murfin. "We believe.., that it might be reasonable to double the cost estimates provided [here] in order to account for indirect costs." (Chanin and Murfin 1996), p. 6-3. The factor might not be as great in the current case, however, because of economies of scale. We assume that litigation costs offset any economies of scale. c) Assumes 5% loss in property valtue for an area surrounding the plume that includes 1 to 10 times as many persons as are in the (0.24 radian) plume extending out to 250 miles (see Appendix I). A similar 5% loss in property value is assumed in the plume from 250-1000 miles. $132,000 in property value assumed per capita (Beyea et al. 2004a). Although not included in this total for the contention phase, loss in property value upon sale by government ofremediated property should be included here. MACCS2 assumes no such loss. d) We have not attempted an estimate forthis category in the contention phase. 9

1 Table2. Cost estimatesfor a release of -100% ofspent-fuelpoolinventory of Cs-137 assumingno increasein cancerrisk coefficient (billionsofdollars) Category Pilgrim Vermont Yankee Comment Direct costsa) 163 173 Indirect administrative 163 173 costsb) II Loss in property values 16-162 17-172 adjacent to treated areas&) Costs associated with ?? Particularly important cleanup or demolition of for Pilgrim, with its downtown business and proximity to Boston commercial districts, heavy industrial areas, or high-rise apartment buildings. d) Total > 342-488 > 364-518 a) As estimated from computations with MACCS2 at comparable sites with the parameters given in (Beyea et al. 2004a). Figures reduced by 1/3d'to account for wind rose effects. b) Based on Chanin and Murfin. "We believe.., that it might be reasonable to double the cost estimates provided [here] in order to account for indirect costs." (Chanin and Murfin 1996), p. 6-3. The factor might not be as great in the current case, however, because of economies of scale. We assume that litigation costs offset the economies of scale. c) Assumes 5% loss in property value for an area including I to 10 times as many persons as are in a 0.24 radian plume extending out to 700 miles (see text). A similar 5% loss in property value is assumed in the plume from 700-1000 miles. $132,000 in property value assumed per capita (Beyea et al. 2004a). Although not included in this total for the contention phase, loss in property value upon sale by government of remediated property should be included here. MACCS2 assumes no such loss. d) We have not attempted an estimate for this category in the contention phase. 10

I Note that the latent cancer estimates in Table 3, below, are lower limits, because they only include the cancers from Cesium-137. This approximation ignores shorter isotopes in the fresh fuel in the pool, especially Cesium-134 (Benjamin 2003). Table 3. Estimatesfor latent cancersfollowing releasesfrom the spent-fuelpools at either1'ilgrim or Vermont Yankee (assuming no increase in cancer risk number) Category 10% release [-100% release Latent cancers in main plume 1300 4000 path from residual contaminations) Latent cancers from deposited 1300 4000 resuspensionb) Total 2,700 8,000 a) Based on typical numbers for plants analyzed in (Beyea et al. 2004a). Figures reduced by 11/3" to account for wind rose effects. Cancers in the direct plume are reduced by more than a factor often from decontamination and deconstruction. b) Assumes 10% resuspension and redistribution of deposited Cesium-137 resulting from a) wind removal in the first few weeks, and b) remediation/demolition efforts over successive years. *It is possible that even the iesuspended Cesium would produce concentrations high enough to justify remediation, with a corresponding reduction in projected cancers. However, clean-up costs would be increased. I have not been able to incorporate new understanding of the flow of air over and around the New England Coastline that has been achieved in recent years. Still, this new knowledge should be taken into account in EISs for cioastal facilities. Releases from Pilgrim headed initially out to sea will remain tightly concentrated due to reduced turbulence'until winds blow the puffs back over land (Zagar et al.), (Angevine et al. 2006). This can lead to hot spots of radioactivity in unexpected locations (Angevine et al. 2004). Dismissing radioactivity blowing'out to sea is inappropriate. Reduction of turbulence on transport from Pilgrim across the water to Boston should also be studied. Although incorporating such meteorological understanding into a PSA or equivalent at Pilgrim would not be likely to make more that a factor of two difference in risk, the change could bring more SAMAs into play and would be significant in an absolute sense, when combined with the increase arising from incorporation of new values of radiation dose conversion coefficients (discussed below). The program 11

CALPUFF (Scire et al. 2000) has the capability to account for reduced turbulence over ocean water and could be used in sensitivity studies to see how important the phenomenon is at Pilgrim. New cancer risk coefficients There have been increases in the value of the cancer risk assigned to low doses ofradiation that should be taken into account in EISs. These increases have been steady since 1972,6 which makes the original EISs out of date. In addition, there has been a marked increase in the value of the cancer mortality risk per unit of radiation at low doses (2-to-3 rem average) as a result of recent studies published on a) radiation workers (Cardis et al. 2005) and b) the Techa River cohort (Krestinina et al. 2005). Both studies give similar values for low dose, protracted exposure, namely about 1 cancer death per Sievert (100 rem). Worker study: The average dose for the workers was 2-rem. The authors of this large, international study of radiation workers included major figures in the field of radiation studies. The authors state, "On the basis of these estimates, 1-2% of deaths from cancer among workers in this cohort may be attributable to radiation." Although it can be misleading to interpret epidemiologic data in this way (Beyea and Greenland 1999), because it implies to non-experts a single-cause model of cancer, there is no doubt that a 1-2% increase in cancer mortality for a worker population is unusually high. Techa River Cohort:The results for the Techa River cohort are equally striking, showing a strong linear effect down to a few rads. The average dose was 3 rads. The authors, who once again include major figures in the field of radiation studies, state: "It is estimated that about 2.5% of the solid cancer deaths...are associated with the radiation exposure." As in the worker population, an increase in solid cancer deaths of 2.5% from a'dose of 3 rads is extraordinarily high compared to past estimates. Such high risk coefficients imply that background radiation itself must increase cancer mortality by 3-5%.7 (It has long been known that background radon concentrations may well increase lung cancer rates by 10% or more (Lubin et al. 1995), (Darby et'al. 2005).) Critics of studies like those by 6For instance, there was a large increase in*the risk coefficients eitimated between the 1980 BEIR III report and the 1990 BEIR.V report. See Table 4-4 of (National Research Council 1990), where the lifetime risk estimates increased by a factor of4.6-19, depending on the risk model. 7 Assuming 0.1 rem per year background, which ignores the "equivalent" dose to the lung from radon. It is more difficult to compare rates of lung cancer, because the interaction ofsmoking and radiation has been found to lie between a linear and relative model. Therefore, such interactions must be taken into account, before drawing conclusions about area-wide differences, or lack of differences, in lung cancer rates. 12

Cardis et al. and by Krestinina et al. argue that such big effects, if they were real, should show up in cancer statistics in places like Colorado, where background radiation is high, when compared to areas of the country where background radiation is lower. However, crude statistical analysis that does not adjust for covariates at an individual level is unlikely to be very reliable (Lubin 1998). Also, there is an issue of the confounding effect of hypoxia (Weinberg et al. 1987). Hypoxia also varies with altitude. Because the average dose in these two new studies is so low and so close to background radiation dose, there is no way to escape the linear non-threshold model. Even were a hypothetical hormesis effect to lead to a minimum risk at background levels (5 rem lifetime dose), the risk has to rise again after another 2-3 rem dose, based on the studies by Cardis et al. and Krestinina et al. Could the increased risk numbers be due to a systematic underestimate or underreporting of doses? Random errors in doses would tend, in most cases, to reduce the strength of associations (Carroll et al. 1998), (Thomas et al. 1993). On the other hand, if dose errors were not random, but were proportionately underestimated or proportionately underreported in the worker studies and the Techa River cohort, then the risk coefficients could be inflated. For this to happen in both studies would be a coincidence. And in the radiation worker study, the results for Hanford do not support the missing-dose hypothesis, even though we know the neutron doses were likely underreported at Hanford (CohenAssociates 2005). In fact, the cancer risk numbers at Hanford were lower than average, not higher (Cardis et al. 2005). Finally, should the Techa River cohort dose estimates be too low that would mean that modem dose reconstruction techniques are underestimating doses, suggesting that other modem dose estimation techniques, such as those used in MACCS2 (Chanin and Young 1997), the standard NRC consequence code, could well be too low. In that case, an upward adjustment of doses would be required, if the risk coefficients were kept the same. Certainly, from a public health point of view, the arguments are strong for making use of the new risk coefficients, one way or another, with programs like MACCS2 and other consequence codes. Recent press reports around the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident seemed to suggest that effects of radiation doses were lower than expected. Not at all. The "new" estimates of4,000 projected fatalities were merely a re-interpretation of a study from the 1990s. No longer were 5,000 projected cancers ouiside the most highly contaminated regions counted. Also, another 7,000 cancers projected to occur in Europe were not noted by the press (Cardis et al. 2006). A summary of all of these estimates can be found in (Cardis et al. 2006). Were the new risk coefficients discussed earlier applied to the population dose estimates, the projected numbers of fatalities from the Chernobyl releases would 13

climb much higher. The confusion over the Chernobyl numbers appears to be traceable to a typo in a highly publicized IAEA report (Forum 2005) that relied on a WHO report for its cancer numbers (WHO 2005). The.WHO report stated that the "Expert Group" concluded that there may be up to 4 000 additional cancer deaths among the three highest exposed groups over their lifetime (emphasis added). This was translated in the IAEA report to, "The total number of people that could have died or could die in the future due to Chornobyl originated exposure over the lifetime of emergency workers and residents of most contaminated areas is estimated to be around 4 000." (Emphasis added.) In fact, in my view, the last clause should have referred to "residents of the most contaminated areas..."S Impact of new cancer risks. As a result of these two radiation studies, all probabilistic safety analyses prepared prior to them need to be revisited. These new studies should change the threshold for adoption of severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA). For instance, the current Environmental Report for Pilgrim assigns a value of $2,000 per person rem in deciding whether a proposed SAMA is cost effective. According to the results of the study by Cardis et al., $2,000 per rem implies a valuation of

$200,000 per cancer death before discounting, which is way to low. 9 The same low valuation of life would arise from use of the risk numbers derived from the Techa River cohort (Krestinina et al. 2005).
As a result, the SAMA analyses prepared for the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee facilities need to be redone, even without inclusion ofspent-fuel-pool fires as a risk to be addressed. Presumably, a number of additional SAMAs that were previously rejected by the applicant's methodology will now become cost effective. In addition to affecting the existing SAMA calculations, the new cancer risk coefficients make the consideration in an EIS of mitigation measures for spent-fuel-pool fires especially important. In addition to providing motivation for a reanalysis of past PSAs and SAMA thresholds, the results of these new epidermiologic studies throw into doubt the entire basis of the NRC culture, which maintains that the linear non-threshold theory (LNT) is conservative, providing a margin of safety. Although it has always been known that the. dose-response at doses below the 25-rad average dose of the Atomic Bomb survivors could be supralinear, as opposed to sublinear, the possibility has not been 8 Note that the JAEA stands by its original wording, not accepting itas a typo. Personal Communication, 2006, D. Kinley, IAEA public information, Vienna. 9 $50,000 net present value for a cancer death occurring 20 years from now, based on the 7%per year discount rate assumed in the Pilgrim Environmental Report, which leads to a factor of4 reduction inpresent value for a cancer induced 20 years from now. 14
given much attention in the radiation protection community until now.' 0 This is not the time forpro forma treatment of licensing applications. Whereas it would be unreasonable to require an applicant to redo analysis after every new paper is published in the scientific literature, the increase at low doses is very dramatic in this case. It represents a 5-fold increase over th6 risk estimated in BEIR VII (NRC 2005). Based on information in (Little 1998), it appears to represent a factor of 10 over the standard value used in the MACCS2 computer code, which is the code on which the applicants' analyses are based. With such a high reported increase, public health considerations have to take precedence over applicant convenience. The paper by Cardis et al., at the very minimum, demands that a thorough analysis be made of mitigation and alternatives to spent-fuel pool storage. For example, application of the new risk coefficients would drive the risk of spent-fuel-pool accidents during decommissioning (without even considering terrorist threats) above the NRC's safety goal. See Figures ES-1, ES-2 of (Collins and Hubbard 2001). Quantitative damage estimates for releases from Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee, assuming cancer risk coefficients are increased to accommodate the new epidemiologic studies: This section presents a subset of consequence estimates for hypothetical releases of Cesium-137 from spent-fuel pools at Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee, assuming a 3-fold increase in cancer risk coefficients to conservatively account for the latest studies on radiation risk at low dose. To account for some weighting of other studies, I have chosen a value lower than the factor of 5-to-10 increase that is suggested by the study of(Cardis et al. 2005).11 As with earlier Tables, e6timates are presented for economic costs and latent cancers. Variance in the estimates are not considered for the contention phase. See the Table footnotes and Appendix I for details. Political, psychological, and social impacts of hypothetical releases are not considered, although they could obviously be significant. As stated earlier, there appears to'exist a "radiation syndrome" that affects a'subset of exposed populations, c~iusing debilitating psychiatric symptoms (Vyner 1983). Psychological effects of radiation disasters are expected to be most serious for children (CEH 2003). 10 There has been some discussion, however, that the A-Bomb survivor data produces low risk coefficients due to a healthy survivor effect (Stewart and Kneale 1993; Stewart and Kneale 1999). In addition, I have always wondered about the lowest dose data inPierce, which seems to show a supralinear effect below 5 rem (Pierce et al. 1996), page 9. 11 Part of the factor of 5 comes from the use ofa dose and dose rate effectiveness factor, which is commonly used with the MACCS2 code, as in (Beyea et al. 2004a). 15
Once again, releases lower than 10% of the Cesium-137 inventory, even releases too low to justify remediation, could have costs associated with loss in property value in the range of 10 to 100 billion dollars. The damage estimates shown in the Tables are much less than the GDP of the US, which is about 12 trillion per year. However, some of the numbers are considerably larger than the annual payment on the national debt, which is about 350 billion dollars per year, indicating that government borrowing to cover the damage payments from a spent-fuel-pool fire could represent a major perturbation on the economy. Thus, once again, significant macroeconomic effects could be expected depending on the state of the economy at the time of any hypothetical release. The regional impacts would be expected to be the most serious. Estimating such effects are beyond the scope of this report. The Tables include numbers in some cells to 3-significant figures. This does not imply any comparable level of accuracy. 16
Table4. Cost estimatesfor a releaseoflO% ofspent-fuel-pool inventory of Cs-137assuming 3-fold increasein cancerrisk coefficient (billionsofdollars) Category
Pilgrim Vermont Yankee Comment Direct costs?) 89 79 Indirect administrative 89 79 costsb)
Loss in property values > 7-74 > 9-87 adjacent to treated areas) Costs associated with ?? ?? Particularly important cleanup or demolition of for Pilgrim, with its downtown business and proximity to Boston commercial districts, heavy industrial areas, or high-rise apartment buildings.d) Total > 186-253 > 167-245 a) As estimated from computations with MACCS2 at comparable sites with the parameters given in (Beyea et al. 2004a). An increase in the cancer risk numbers is mathematically equivalent to an increase in release magnitbde, which is how the numbers in the Table were computed. Figures reduced by 1/3'd to account for wind rose effects. b) Based on Chanin and Murfin. "We believe.., that it might be reasonable to double the cost estimates provided [here] in order to account for indirect costs." (Chanin and Murfin 1996), p. 6-3. The factor might not be as great in the current case, however, because of economies of scale. We assume that litigation costs offset the economies of scale. c) Assumed to be at least as great as the figures calculated in Table 1, where the cancer risk coefficient was left unchanged. Although not included in this total for the contention phase, loss in property value upon sale by government ofremediated property should be included here. MACCS2 assumes no such loss. d) We have not attempted an estimate for this category in the contention phase. 17
Table 5. Cost estimatesfor a release of -100% of spent-fuel-,pool inventory ofCs-137 assuming a three-fold increasein cancerrisk coefficient (billionsofdollars) I Category Pilgrim Vermont Yankee Comment Direct costs'). 283 353 Indirect administrative 283 353 costs b) Loss in property values 16-162 17-172 adjacent to treated areasc) Costs associated with ?? 7? Particularly important cleanup or demolition of for Pilgrim, with its downtown business and proximity to Boston commercial districts, heavy industrial areas, or high-rise apartment buildings d) Costs due to delays in ??? implementing remediation and deconstructiond Total > 582-728 > 723-878 a) As estimated from computations with MACCS2 at comparable sites with the parameters given in (Beyea et al. 2004a). An increase in the cancer risk numbers is mathematically equivalent to an increase in release magnitude, which is how the numbers in the Table were computed. Figures reduced by 1/3d' to account for wind rose effects. b) Based on Chanin and Murfin. "We believe.., that it might be reasonable to double the cost estimates provided [here] in order to account for indirect costs." (Chanin and Murfin 1996), p. 6-3. The factor might not be as great in the current case, however, because of economies of scale. We assume that litigation costs offset the economies of scale...... c) Assumed to be at least as great as'the figures calculated in Table 2, where the cancer risk coefficient was left unchanged. Although not included in this total for the contention phase, loss in property value upon sale by government of remediated property should be included here. MACCS2 assumes no such loss. d) We have not attempted an estimate for this category in the contention phase. 18
a 6 Note that the latent cancer estimates in Table 6, below, are lower limits, because they only include the cancers from Cesium-137. This approximation ignores shorter isotopes in the fresh fuel in the pool, especially Cesium-134 (Benjamin 2003). Table 6. Estimatesfor latent cancersfollowing releasesfrom the spent-fuel pools at eitherPilgrim or Vermont Yankee (assuming a 3-fold increase in cancer risk number) Category 10% release -100% release Latent cancers in main plume 4,000 12,000 path from residual contamination') Latent cancers from deposited 4,000 12,000 resuspensionb) Total 18,000 24,000 a) Based on typical numbers for plants analyzed in (Beyea et al. 2004a) multiplied by a factor of 3. Figures reduced by 1/3d to account for wind rose effects. Cancers in the direct plume are reduced by more than a factor often from decontamination and deconstruction. b) Assumes 10% resuspension and redistribution of deposited Cesium-137 resulting from a) wind removal in the first few weeks, and b) remediation/deconstruction efforts over successive years. It is possible that even the resuspended Cesium would produce concentrations high enough to justify remediation, with a corresponding reduction in projected cancers. However, clean-up costs would be increased. Regulatory implications. The results in Tables 1-6, along with the discussion in the text suggest that: The applicant should withdraw and revise its Environmental Reports for Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee. The NRC should prepare supplements to the August 1979 Generic Environmental Impact Statement on handling and storage of spent fuel (NUREG-0575), and the'May 1996 GEIS on license renewal (NUREG-1437). The revised documents should consider the new cancer risk coefficients ptiblished by Cardis et al. and Kristinina et al. For both reactor accidents and spent-fuel-pool fires, when relevant, the documents should consider.loss ofpropeirty value outside remediated areas. They should consider wind-driven resuspension, especially from iremediation activities, that carries radioactivity to new areas in the immediate weeks and years following the release. Although MACCS2 does not directly account 19
'4 ° . . for such refinements, it may be possible to mimic their effects in the program.12 In their economic calculations, the revised documents should include administrative and litigation costs associated with clean up and demolition. The ER for Pilgrim should consider the reduced turbulence over ocean water, including transport directly over water to the Boston area. The NUREG supplements should consider the impacts of coastal meteorology for reactors on the East and West Coasts. The program CALPUFF can be used to deal with dispersion over coastal waters. 2 This might be done by adding on extra plume segments to the end of astandard run, with varying deay times, and a total added release equal to the assumed resuspension fraction times the initial release. This will tend to produce the mathematical equivalent of resuspended material being carried indirections different from the main plume. 20
.4Q°*
Appendix 1. Variance in estimates are not considered in this report for the contention phase. Based on the report of Gordon Thompson, the inventories at Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee are somewhat higher than the 35 MCi considered in (Beyea et al. 2004a). For Pilgrim, Dr. Thompson estimates 44 MCi; for Vermont Yankee, 39 MCi. Thompson has also estimated a hotter heat rate for releases at Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee than was assumed in the calculations in (Beyea et al. 2004a). 106-128 MW vs 40 MW. Plume rise varies as the 1I/3 power of the heat rate in the standard "Briggs" formula for plume rise (Parks 1997), which implies a 50% greater rise than would have been calculated in the MACCS2 program that was used in the paper by Beyea, Lyman and von Hippel. For the contention phase of these proceedings, this difference has been ignored, since a 50% increase in plume rise is within 1-standard deviation of the value predicted by the formula (Irwin and Hanna 2004). Rather than make new MACCS2 calculations for the contention phase of these proceedings, the azimuthally-averaged radial population distributions for both Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee have been compared as a function of distance with those for which economic and latent cancer consequences have been calculated in (Beyea et al. 2004a). It is the radial population numbers that drive the economic damage costs and cancer numbers. Figures I and 2 show the azimuthally-averaged radial population distributions for Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee for two different maximum distances. The CensusCD computer program (Geolytics 2002) was used to generate these population distributions. The same program was used in (Beyea et al. 2004a) for the five reactors, Catawba, Indian Point, LaSalle, Palo Verde, and TMI. The effect of variation in wind direction at Pilgrim is to reduce the average damages and latent fatalities. Wind rose data'taken from the Pilgrim FSAR shown in Figure 5 for the 300 foot tower suggest a reduction factor of 0.666 for that facility. See caption for Figure 5. I did not find similar data for a high tower in the FSAR for Vermont Yankee, so I have used the 0.666 factor determined for Pilgrim. Wind flows at the surface given in the Vermont Yankee FSAR are not particularly relevant to a hot release during a'fire, since the plume will be elevated. The variance with angle appears to be quite large, because the population figures change with release angle, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. For economic damages from the 10% releases, we are interested in populations out to 250 miles 21
V (based on wedge model calculations). For the -100% releases, the corresponding distance is 700 miles. The Pilgrim population figures best match Catawba out to 250 miles. For Vermont Yankee the population figures best match Lasalle out to 250 miles. Out to 700 miles, both Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee are most similar to Lasalle, although I discount the Lasalle cost figures to account for the lower population values of Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee. Table 7, shows the relevant costs extracted from Table 3 of (Beyea et al. 2004a) and adjusted as indicated in the Table footnotes. These numbers were then fit to a power law function of release magnitude. The corresponding functions were used to generate costs estimates for the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee releases estimated by Thompson, which differ somewhat from the releases assumed for a spent-fuel fire in (Beyea et al. 2004a). Table 7. Assigning damage cost estimates in billionsof dollarsbased on Table 3 of(Beyea et aL 2004a) Release magnitude Pilgrim Vermont Yankee 3.5 MCi 718) 5 4 b) 35 MCi 219c) 243d) a) Cost figure for Catawba for a 3.5 MCi release. b) Cost figure for Lasalle for a 3.5 MCi release. c) Cost figure for Lasalle for a 35 MCi release reduced by 20% d) Cost figure for Lasalle for a 35 MCi release reduced by 10% Extrapolated and interpolated direct damage costs for Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee were computed from the following formulas: Pilgrim: Damages = 0.66* 35* (release in Mci)-5 Vermont Yankee: Damages = 0.66 *24 * (release in MCi)°'6 The factor of 0.66 comes from wind-rose effects. Administrative costs are taken equal to direct costs, following the suggestion of(Chanin and Murfin 1996). Property loss estimates are discussed below. 22
OThe Power of Composting; The Power of Partnership," in Proceedings of the International Symposium on "The Science of Composting." 30 May - 2 June, 1995, Bologna, Italy.
"On the Importance of Thinking Like an Ecosystem," In Almanac for the Environment, Grosset/Putnam, NY, 1994. "Beyond the Politics of Blame", EPRI Journal, July/August 1993 (reprinted InAgricultural Engineering),
Bringing Environmental Damage Costs into the Electricity Marketplace: Gains to be Expected and Pitfalls to be Avoided, presented at the National Conference on Environmental Externalities, Wyoming, Oct. 1990.
"Linking Energy Consumption with GNP", Review of Beyond Oil. Chemical & Engineering News, 64, p. 25-26, Dec. 1, 1986.
Articles and reports related to blomass and forest research: Managing White-tailed Deer in Forest Habitat From an Ecosystem Perspective, Pennsylvania Case Study. (Latham, Beyea, Benner, Dunn, Fajvan, Freed, Grund, Horsley, Rhoads and Shissler) Report by the Deer Management Forum for Audubon Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania Habitat Alliance, Harrisburg. xix + 340 pp., 2005 (Accessible at htto:/-/oa.audubon.or-ldeer forum reoort main.htm)
"Use of meta-analysis to assign bird species to assemblages indicative of responsiveness to logging intensity In northeastern, hardwood forests." (Beyea, Hartley, Burger), 1 0 th Annual Conference or the Wildlife Society, Burlington, 2003. *Bird Relationships to Habitat Characteristics Created by Timber Harvesting in Pennsylvania," B.
Ross, M. Morrison, W. Hoffman,-T.S. Fredericksen, R.J. Sawicki, E. Ross, M.B. Lester, J. Beyea, B.N. Johnson, Journal of the Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, 74: 71-84, 2001 "The Impact of Logging on Wildlife: A Study InNortheastern Pennsylvania," TS Fredericksen, BD Ross, W Hoffman, E. Ross, M.L. Morrison, J. Beyea, MB Lester, BN Johnson, Journal of Forestr, 98(4): 4-10, 2000.
"Bioenergy Inthe United States: Progress and Possibilities," (with J Cook). Biomass and Bioenergav 18. 2000. "Relative Abundance and Species Richness of Herpetofauna In Forest Stands In Pennsylvania,"
(with BD Ross, T Fredericksen, E Ross, W Hoffman, ML. Morrison, MB Lester, BN Johnson, NJ Fredericksen), Forest Science, 46: 139-146, 2000.
"Using the Best Scientific Data for Endangered Species Conservation,' (Smallwood, Beyea, Mordson), Environmental Manaaement 24(4):421-435. 1999. "Short-term understory plant community responses to timber harvesting on non-industrial private forestlands In Pennsylvania," (with TS Fredericksen, BD Ross, W Hoffman, ML. Morrison, BN Johnson, MB Lester, E Ross), Forest Ecology and Management, 116:129-139, 1999. "Adequacy of Natural Hardwood Regeneration on Forestlands In Northeastern Pennsylvania,"
(with T.S. Fredericksen; B. Ross, W. Hoffman, M. Lester, M. Morrison, B.N. Johnson), Northern Journal of 9
Applied Forestry, 15(3):130-134,1998.
'Ecology of Agricultural Monocultures: Some Consequences for Blodiversity in Biomass Energy Farms,' (with W. Hoffman and J. Cook). Proceedings of the 2nd Biomass Conference of the Americas, 1995, pp. 1618-1627. 'National Biofuels Roundtable : Principles and Guidelines for the Development of Biomass Energy Systems,' Biomass and Bloeneray (Overend et ao., to be published). *Economic and Environmental Opportunities Through Biomass Development: Report of the CONEG Governors' Biomass Policy Roundtable," August 1995. "Biomass Power The Challenge and the Opportunity,' Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Utility Biomass Energy Commercialization Association, 1994.
Avian Species Diversity and Policy Issues in Large-Scale Short-Rotation Wood Energy Crops: Annual Reports to the Department of Energy (with Hoffman and Cook). 1992-1994
'Some Ecological Guidelines for Large-scale Biomass Plantations," Proceedings of the First Biomass Conference of the Americas, August 30-September 2, 1993. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Pp. 33-41. (with Hoffman and Cook)
The Habitat Value of Short-Rotation Poplar Plantations: Avian Population Studies and Management Alternatives (with W. Hoffman, J. Cook), 1993. Toward Ecological Guidelines for Large-Scale Biomass Energy Development, based on an Audubon/Princeton University Biomass Workshop, 1992. 0Biotechnologlcal Advances in Biomass Energy and Chemical Production: Impacts on Wildlife and Habitat", (with K. Keeler), Critical Re In Biotechnology. CRC Press, Florida, February 1991.
"Potential Impacts of Biomass Production In the U.S. on Biological Diversity", (with Jim Cook and Kathleen Keeler), Annual Review of Energy. Calif., 1991. An adaptation appears in Biologue, Sept. 1991. "Preserving Blodiversity In the Face of Large Scale Demand for Blofuels", (with K.Keeler and J.Cook), Institute for Gas and Technology, Proceedings of Conference on Energy From Biomass Wastes XV (3/25-29/91), Wash.D.C., 1991. 'Biofuels: Answer to Global Warming or Growing Threat to Blodiversity?' In Forestry and Environment...Engineering Solutions - from a conference held June 5-6. 1991. American Society of Agricultural Engineers; St. Joseph, Mt. (with Cook and Keeler)
Other Articles, Reports, and Testimony "Scientific misconceptions among Daubert gatekeepers: the need for reform of expert review procedures." (with Daniel Berger) Law and Contemoorarv Problems 64: 325-387, 2001.
'Scientists In the Courtroom,' S , 284:1125,1999 (letter). "International Standard for Calculating Pollution Taxes," (with Michael Italiano), Proceedings of the 9 0th Annual Meeting of the Air and Waste Management Association, Toronto, July 1997 *10
OAvian Issues in Wind Development,* in Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Wind Energy Association, March 1995 "Principles for a National Avian-Wind Power Research Plan, Proceedings of National Avian-Wind Power Planning Meeting, Denver, CO, Department of Energy, February 1995.
"Environmental Concerns Regarding Electric Power Transmission in North American", (with. John DeCicco and Stephen Bemow), Energv Policy, Jan. 1992.
Interview of Jan Beyea by Valerie Harms, Annals of Earth, Sept. 1991.
"The Impact of Environmental Issues on Public Support for Fusion Research", P and S 19(1), p. 6-7, January, 1990. "Biotechnology's Promise - and Danger", (with J. P. Myers), at._j ougs Post Dispatch, 1989. "Physics Pro Bono", letter to hysicsIQd., (40,10), October 1987. Also, "Physics Pro Bono Redux," response, (41.8) August 1988. ."Protecting the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge," (with Brock Evans) before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, June 11, 1987. "Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife Refuges", (Stege and Beyea), AnnualRl j of.Eneg., Ii,p. 143, 1986. "Land Use Issues and the Media", published debate, Center for Communication, NYC, Oct, 1984.
Implications for Mortality of Weakening the Clean Alr Act, (with G. Steve Jordan), Audubon EPAD Report #18, May, 1982.
"Inthe Matter of Application of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for Conversion to Coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5", testimony and cross-examination on the health Impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversion to coal; Department of Environmental Resources, State of N.Y., Nov. 5, 1981.
Supervised Studies:
"The Decision Tree: A partnership for enhancing value on private forests," Matthew Keefer, Brad Ross, Proceedings of the Fragmentation2000 Conference, Anapolis, Maryland, September 17-20, 2000 "Compost and the Regeneration of our Nation's Degraded Lands' (a series of Audubon essays and brochures), 1995. "Easthampton Residential Compost Pilot," National Audubon Society, 1995 The National Audubon Society's Almanac for the Environment: The Ecology of Everyday Life, Grosset/Putnam, NY, 1994 Alaskan Wildlife Species and Habitats That Are Sensitive to Offshore Oil and Gas Development, by Dorene A. Bolze, EPAD Report #30, January, 1987.
Side Effects of Renewable Energy Sources, by Larry Medsker, Revised Edition, Audubon EPAD Report #15, December, 1982. 11
.1 Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants October 2000
Technical Contributors Group Leaders: Timothy E. Collins, DSSA George Hubbard, DSSAISPLB Risk Assessment: Glenn Kelly, DSSN/SPSB Michael Cheok, DSSNSPSB Gareth Parry, DSSA Mark Rubin, DSSNSPSB Robert Palla, DSSNSPSB Primary Technical Support: Seismic Goutam Bagchi, DE Robert Rothman, DEJEMEB Criticality Larry Kopp, DSSNSRXB Anthony Ulses, DSSNSRXB Thermal-hydraulics Joseph Staudenmeier, DSSNSRXB Walt Jenson, DSSAISRXB Christopher Boyd, RES/DSARE/SMSAB Consequences Jason Schaperow, RES/DSAREISMSAB Charles Tinkler, RES/DSARE Heavy Loads Edward Throm, DSSNSPSB Secondary Technical Support: Additional Support: Tanya Eaton, DSSNSPLB David Diec, DSSNSPLB Diane Jackson, DSSNSPLB John Lehning, DSSNSPLB Study Preparation: Paula Magnanelli, DSSA
Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accidents at Decommissioning Plants Table of Contents EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
........................................................ viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
........................................................ 1-1 2.0 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSES ........................................ 2-1 3.0 RISK ASSESSMENT OF SPENT FUEL POOLS AT DECOMMISSIONING PLANTS... 3-1 3.1 Basis and Findings of SFP Risk Assessment ............................. 3-2 3.2 Characteristics of SFP Design and Operations for a Decommissioning Plant ... 3-3 3.3 Estimated Frequencies of Spent Fuel Uncovery and Assumptions That Influence the Results ........................................................ 3-6 3.3.1 Internal and External Initiator Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Uncovery .... 3-7 3.3.2 Important Assumptions ...................... ................ 3-11 3.4 Internal Event Scenarios Leading to Fuel Uncovery .................... 3-12 3.4.1 Loss of Cooling ............................................. 3-12 3.4.2 Loss of Coolant Inventory ...................................... 3-14 3.4.3 Loss of Offsite Power from Plant-Centered and Grid Related Events ... 3-15 3.4.4 Loss of Offsite Power from Severe Weather Events ................ 3-15 3.4.5 Internal Fire ................................................. 3-16 3.4.6 Heavy Load Drops ........................................... 3-16 3.4.7 Spent Fuel Pool Uncovery Frequency at Times OtherThan I yearAfter Shutdown .................................................. 3-18 3.5 Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Accident Scenarios (External Events) .. 3-18 3.5.1 Seismic Events ............................................. 3-18 3.5.2 Aircraft Crashes ............................................. 3-23 3.5.3 Tornadoes .................................................. 3-24 3.6 Criticality In Spent Fuel Pool ......................................... 3-25 3.7 Consequences and Risks of SFP Accidents ............................ 3-27 3.7.1 . Consequences of SFP Accidents .............................. 3-28 3.7.2 Risk Modeling for SFP Accidents............................... 3-34 3.7.3 "Risk Results ................................................ 3-39 4.0 IMPLICATIONS OF SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RISK FOR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ........................... ; ........................... 4-1 4.1 Risk-informed Decision Making ........................................ 4-1 4.1.1 Increases in Risk ............................................. 4-2 4.1.2 Defense-in-Depth ............................................. 4-6 4.1.3 Safety Margins ........ ....................................... 4-8 4.1.4
Implementation and Monitoring Program .......................... 4-10 4.2 Implications for Regulatory Requirements for Emergency Preparedness, Security, v/ October 2000
) and Insurance ..................................................... 4-13 4.2.1 Emergency Preparedness ..................................... 4-13 4.2.2 Security ................................................... 4-14 4.2.3 Insurance .................................................. 4-15 5.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................... 5-1
6.0 REFERENCES
............................................... ......... 6-1 7.0 ACRONYMS .................................. ........................ 7-1 List of Figures ES-1 Individual Early Fatality Risk Within I Mile ..................................... xi ES-2 Individual Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles .......................... xii Figure 2.1 Heatup Time From 30 *C to 900 °C .................................... 2-3 Figure 2.2 PWR Heatup Times for Air Cooling and Adiabatic Heatup ................. 2-3 Figure 3.1 Assumed Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ....... .................. 3-3 Figure 3.2 Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Seismically Induced Failure Based on LLNL Estimates and an HCLPF of 1.2 g Peak Spectral Acceleration ............. 3-21 Figure 3.3 Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Seismically Induced Failure Based on EPRI Estimates and an HCLPF of 1.2 g Peak Spectral Acceleration .............. 3-22 Figure 3.7-1 Early Fatality Consequences for Spent Fuel Pool Source Terms ..... 3-32 Figure 3.7-2 Societal Dose Consequences for Spent Fuel Pool Source Terms ....... 3-33 Figure 3.7-3 Spent Fuel Pool Early Fatality Risk ............................... 3-41 Figure 3.7-4 Spent Fuel Pool Societal Risk ................................... 3.42 Figure 3.7-5 Sensitivity of Early Fatality Risk to Emergency Planning - Cask Drop Event ....................................................... 343 Figure 3.7-6 Sensitivity of Societal Risk to Emergency Planning - Cask Drop Event 3.44 Figure 3.7-7 Individual Early Fatality Risk Within 1 Mile .......................... 3-47 Figure 3.7-8 Individual Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles ................. 3-48 List of Tables Table 2.1 Time to Heatup and Boiloff SFP Inventory Down to 3 Feet Above Top of Fuel (60 GWD/MTU) .......................... 2-1 Table 3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Risk Analysis -7 Frequency of Fuel Uncovery ..... 3-9 Table 3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling RiskAnalysis - Frequency Partition for Air Flow ... 3-10 Table 3.7-1 Consequences of an SFP Accident With a High Ruthenium Source Term .. 3-29 Table 3.7-2
Consequences of an SFP Accident With a Low Ruthenium' Source Term *. 3-30 Table 3.7-3 Frequency of Boil Down Events Leading to Spent Fuel Uncbvery .......... 3-35 Table 3.7-4 Mean Frequency of Rapid Draindown Due to Seismic Events ............ 3-37 Table 3.7-5 Frequency of Rapid Draindown Spent Fuel Uncovery Due to Nonseismic Events . .................. ............................ 3-38 Table 4.1-1 Industry Decommissioning Commitments ........................... 4-11 Table*4.1-2. Staff Decommissioning Assumptions ............................... 4-12 Vi October 2000
-.) Appendices Appendix 1A Thermal-hydraulics Analysis of Spent Fuel Pool Heatup ............... AIA-1 Appendix 1B Temperature Criteria for Spent Fuel Pool Analysis .................. A1B-1 Appendix 2 Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Risk at Decommissioning Plants ....... A24-Appendix 2B Structural Integrity of Spent Fuel Pools Subject to Seismic Loads ...... A2B-1 Enhanced Seismic Checklist Comments Concerning Seismic Screening And Seismic Risk of Spent Fuel Pools for Decommissioning Plants by Robert P. Kennedy, October 1999 Response to Questions Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Seismic-Induced Failure Modes and Locations and the Expected Level of Collateral Damage Appendix 26 Structural Integrity of Spent Fuel Pool Structures Subject to HWavy Loads Drops ..................................................... A2C-1 Appendix 2D Structural Integrity of Spent Fuel Pool Structures Subject to Aircraft Crashes ............................................... A2D-1 Appendix 2E Structural Integrity of Spent Fuel Pool Structures Subject to Tornados ... A2E-1 Appendix 3 Assessment of the Potential for Criticality In Decommissioning Spent Fuel Pool ....................................................... A3-1 Appendix4 Consequence Assessment from Zirconium Fire ..................... A4-1 Appendix 4A Risk-Informed Requirements for Decommissioning ................. A4A-1 Appendix 4B Effect of Fission Product Inventory Available for Release on Spent Fuel Pool Accident Consequences ............................. ; ..... A4B-1 Appendix 4C Pool Performance Guideline ................................... A4C-1 Appendix 4D Change in Risk Associated with EP Relaxations ................... A4D-1 Appendix 5 November 12, 1999 Nuclear Energy Institute Commitment Letter ....... A5-1 Appendix 6 Public Comments ............................................. A6-1 October 2000
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report documents a study of spent fuel pool (SFP) accident risk at decommissioning nuclear power plants. The study was undertaken to support development of a risk-informed technical basis for reviewing exemption requests and a regulatory framework for integrated rulemaking. The staff published a draft study In February 2000 for public comment and significant comments were received from the public and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). To address these comments the staff did further analyses and also added sensitivity studies on evacuation timing to assess the risk significance of relaxed offsite emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning. The staff based its sensitivity assessment on the guidance In Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions On Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis." The staffs analyses and conclusions apply to decommissioning facilities with SFPs that meet the design and operational characteristics assumed in the risk analysis. These characteristics are Identified In the study as Industry decommissioning commitments (lDCs) and staff decommissioning assumptions (SDAs). Provisions for confirmation of these characteristics would need to be an Integral part of rulemaking. The results of the study Indicate that the risk at SFPs Is low and well within the Commission's Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs). The risk Islow because of the very low likelihood of a zirconium fire even'though the consequences from a zirconium fire could be serious. The results are shown InFigures ES-1 and ES-2. Because of the Importance of seismic events In the analysis, and the considerable uncertainty in seismic hazard estimates, the results are presented for both the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) seismic hazard estimates. In addition, to address a concern raised by the ACRS, the results also Include a sensitivity to a large ruthenium and fuel fines release fraction. As Illustrated in the figures, the risk is well below the QHOs for both the Individual risk of early fatality and the Individual risk of latent cancer fatality. The study Includes use of a pool performance guideline (PPG) as an indicator of low risk at decommissioning facilities. The recommended PPG value for events leading to uncovery of the spent fuel was based on similarities Inthe consequences from a SFP zirconium fire to the consequences from a large early release event at an operating reactor. A value equal to the large early release frequency (LERF) criterion (lx10"5 per year) was recommended for the PPG. By maintaining the frequency of events leading to uncovery of the spent fuel at decommissioning facilities below the PPG, the risk'from zirconium fires will be low and consistent with the guidance InRG 1.174 for allowing changes to the plant licensing basis that slightly Increase risk. With one exception (the H.B. Robinson site) all Central and Eastern sites which Implement the IDCs and SDAs would be expected tomeet the PPG regardless of whether LLNL or EPRI seismic hazard estimates are assumed. The Robinson site would satisfy the PPG ifthe EPRI hazard estimate Is applied but not ifthe LLNL hazard is-used. Therefore, Western sites and Robinson would need to be considered on a site-specific basis because of important differences in seismically induced failure potential of the SFPs. ViH October 2000
The appropriateness of the PPG was questioned by the ACRS in view of potential effects of the fission product ruthenium, the release of fuel fines, and the effects of revised plume parameters. The staff added sensitivity studies to its analyses to examine these issues. The consequences of a significant release of ruthenium and fuel fines were found to be notable, but not so important as to render inappropriate the staff's proposed PPG of 1x10i per year. The plume parameter sensitivities were found to be of lesser significance. In its thermal-hydraulic analysis, documented In Appendix 1A, the staff concluded that it was not feasible, without numerous constraints, to establish a generic decay heat level (and therefore a decay time) beyond which a zirconium fire is physically Impossible. Heat removal is very sensitive to these additional constraints, which involve factors such as fuel assembly geometry and SFP rack configuration. However, fuel assembly geometry and rack configuration are plant specific, and both are subject to unpredictable changes after an earthquake or cask.drop that drains the pool. Therefore, since a non-negligible decay heat source lasts many years and since configurations ensuring sufficient air flow for cooling cannot be assured, the possibility of reaching the zirconium ignition temperature cannot be precluded on a generic basis. The staff found that the event sequences important to risk at decommissioning plants are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For emergency planning (EP) assessments this Is an Important difference relative to operating plants where typically a large number of different sequences make significant contributions to risk. Relaxation of offsite EP a few months after shutdown resulted in only a""small change" In risk, consistent with the guidance of RG 1.174. Figures ES-1 and ES-2 illustrate this finding. The change In risk due to relaxation of offsite EP Is small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP requirements, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences Including cask drops (for which emergency planning Is expected to be more effective) are too low In likelihood to have a significant impact on risk. For comparison, at operating reactors additional risk-significant accidents for which EP is expected to provide dose savings are on the order of lx10i5 per year, while for decommissioning facilities, the largest contributor for which EP would provide dose savings is about two orders of magnitude lower (cask drop sequence at 2x10"7 per year).1 Other policy considerations beyond the scope of this technical study will need to be considered for EP requirement revisions and previous exemptions because a criteria of sufficient cooling to preclude a fire cannot be satisfied on a generic basis. Insurance does'not lend itself to a "small change In risk6analysis because Insurance affects neither the probability northe consequences of an event. As seen In figure ES-2, as long as a zirconium fire Is possible, the long-term consequences of an SFP fire may be significant. These long-term consequences (and risk) decrease very slowly because cesium-1 37 has a half life of approximately 30 years. The thermal-hydraulic analysis Indicates that when air flow has been restricted, such as might occur after a cask drop or major earthquake, the possibility of a fire lasts many years and a criterion of "sufficient cooling to preclude a fire" can not be defined on a 1Consistent with PRA limitations and practice, contributions to risk from safeguards events are not Included in these frequency estimates. EP might also provide dose savings in such events. ix October 2000
generic basis. Other policy considerations beyond the scope of this technical study will therefore need to be considered for insurance requirements. The study also discusses implications for security provisions at decommissioning plants. For security, risk insights can be used to determine what targets are important to protect against sabotage. However, any revisions in security provisions should be constrained by an effectiveness assessment of the safeguards provisions against a design-basis threat. Because the possibility of a zirconium fire leading to a large fission product release cannot be ruled out even many years after final shutdown, the safeguards provisions at decommissioning plants should undergo further review. The results of this study may have Implications on previous exemptions at decommissioning sites, devitalization of spent fuel pools at operating reactors and related regulatory activities. The staff's risk analyses were complicated by a lack of data on severe-earthquake return frequencies, source term generation In an air environment, and SFP design variability. Although the staff believes that decommissioning rulemaking can proceed on the basis of the current assessment, more research may be useful to reduce uncertainties and to provide Insights on operating reactor safety. In particular, the staff believes that research may be useful on source term generation in air, which could also be Important to the risk of accidents at operating reactors during shutdowns, when the reactor coolant system and the primary containment may both be open. In summary, the study finds that:
1. The risk at decommissioning plants is low and well within the Commission's safety goals.
The risk Is low because of the very low likelihood of a zirconium fire even though the consequences from a zirconium fire could be serious.
2. The overall low risk in conjunction with Important differences in dominant sequences relative to operating reactors, results in a small change In risk at decommissioning plants If offsite emergency planning is relaxed. The change Is consistent with staff guidelines for small Increases In risk.

3. Insurance, security, and emergency planning requirement revisions need to be considered In light of other policy considerations, because a criterion of "sufficient cooling to preclude a fire" cannot be satisfied on a generic basis.

4. Research on source term generation In an air environment would be useful for reducing uncertainties.
X October 2000
2.0 THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSES Analyses were performed to evaluate the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pools (SFPs) of decommissioning plants and determine the time available for plant operators to take actions to prevent a zirconium fire. These are discussed inAppendix 1A. The focus was the time available before fuel uncovery and the time available before the zirconium Ignites after fuel uncovery. These times were utilized in performing the risk assessment discussed in Section 3. To establish the times available before fuel uncovery, calculations were performed to determine the time to heat the SFP coolant to a point of boiling and then boil the coolant down to 3 feet above the top of the fuel. As can be seen InTable 2.1 below, the time available to take actions before any fuel uncovery Is 100 hours4.167 days 0.595 weeks 0.137 months or more for an SFP Inwhich pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuel has decayed at least 60 days. Table 2.1 Time to Heatup and Boiloff SFP Inventory Down to 3 Feet Above Top of Fuel (60 GWD/MTU) DECAY TIME PWR BWR 60 days 100 hours4.167 days 0.595 weeks 0.137 months (>4 days) 145 hours6.042 days 0.863 weeks 0.199 months (>6 days) 1 year 195 hours8.125 days 1.161 weeks 0.267 months (>8 days) 253 hours10.542 days 1.506 weeks 0.347 months (>10 days) 2 years 272 hours11.333 days 1.619 weeks 0.373 months (>11 days) 337 hours14.042 days 2.006 weeks 0.462 months (>14 days) 5 years 400 hours16.667 days 2.381 weeks 0.548 months (>16 days) 459 hours19.125 days 2.732 weeks 0.629 months (>19 days) 10 years 476 hours19.833 days 2.833 weeks 0.652 months (>19 days) 532 hours22.167 days 3.167 weeks 0.729 months (>22 days) The analyses InAppendix 1A determined that the amount of time available (after complete fuel uncovery) before a zirconium fire depends on various factors, including decay heat rate, fuel bumup, fuel storage cbnfiguration, building ventilation rates and air flow paths, and fuel cladding oxidation rates. While the February 2000 study indicated that for the cases analyzed a required decay time of 5 years would preclude a zirconium fire, the revised analyses show that ItIs not feasible, without numerous constraints, to define a generic decay heat level (and therefore decay time) beyond which a zirconium fire Is not physically possible. Heat removal Is very sensitive to these constraints, and two of these constraints, fuel assembly geometry and spent fuel pool rack configuration, are plant specific. Both are also subject to unpredictable changes as a result of the severe seisrmic, cask drop, and possibly other dynamic events which could rapidly drain the pool. Therefore, since the decay heat source remains nonnegligible for many years and since configurations that ensure sufficient air flow2 for cooling cannot be assured, a zirconium
'Although a reduced air flow condition could reduce the oxygen levels to a point where a fire would not be possible; there is sufficient uncertainty Inthe available data as to when this level would be reached and if Itcould be maintained. It Is not possible to predict when a zirconium fire would not occur because of a lack of oxygen. Blockage of the air flow around the fuel could be 2-1 October 2000
") fire cannot be precluded, although the likelihood may be reduced by accident management measures. Figure 2.1 plots the heatup time air-cooled PWR and BVR fuel take to heat up from 30 °C to 900 °C versus time since reactor shutdown. The figure shows that after 4 years, PWR fuel could reach the point of fission product release in about 24 hours1 days 0.143 weeks 0.0329 months . Figure 2.2 shows the timing of the event by comparing the air-cooled calculations to an adiabatic heatup calculation for PWR fuel with a bumup of 60 GWDIMTU. The figure Indicates an unrealistic result that until 2 years have passed the air-cooled heatup rates are faster than the adiabatic heatup rates. This is because the air-cooled case Includes heat addition from oxidation while the adiabatic case does not In the early years after shutdown, the additional heat source from oxidation at higher temperatures Is high enough to offset any benefit from air cooling. This result Is discussed further in Appendix IA. The results using obstructed airflow (adiabatic heatup) show that at 5 years after shutdown, the release of fission products may occur approximately 24 hours1 days 0.143 weeks 0.0329 months after the accident. In summary, 60 days after reactor shutdown for boildown type events, there is considerable time (>100 hours4.167 days 0.595 weeks 0.137 months ) to take action to preclude a fission product release or zirconium fire before uncovering the top of the fuel. However, if the fuel is uncovered, heatup to the zirconium Ignition temperature during the first years after shutdown would take less than 10 hours0.417 days 0.0595 weeks 0.0137 months even with unobstructed air flow. After 5 years, the heatup would take at least 24 hours1 days 0.143 weeks 0.0329 months even with obstructed air flow cases. Therefore, a zirconium fire would still be possible after 5 years for cases Involving obstructed air flow and unsuccessful accident management measures. These results and how they affect SFP risk and decommissioning regulations are discussed In Sections 3 and 4 of this study. caused by collapsed structures and/or a partial draindown of the SFP coolant or by reconfiguration of the fuel assemblies during a seismic event or heavy load drop.. A loss of SFP building ventilation could also preclude or Inhibit effective cooling. As discussed InAppendix IA, air flow blockage without any recovery actions could result Ina near-adiabatic fuel heatup and a zirconium fire even after 5 years. 2-2 October 2000
S S -S Heatup Time to Release (Air Cooling) 40-1230-0
6. PWR E20 -
BWR
'10 0.164 1 2 3 4 shutdown time (years)
Figure 2.1 Heatup Time From 30 °C to 900 °C )PWR Adiabatic vs. Air cooled 30 25
.020 Air Cooled E 15 Adiabatic -6,:10 cc ,- II I 0.1644 shutdown time (years)
Figure 2.2 PWR Heatup Times for Air Cooling and Adiabatic Heatup 2-3 October 2000
I I
A SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE
-Public.Report Committee on the Safety and .ecurity of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Board on Radioactive Waste Management Division on Earth and Life Studies NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL Of PC?L4TJOe, ACADEM,*S THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Washington, D.C.
www.nap.edu
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. This study was supported by grant number NRC-04-04-067 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number 0-309-09647-2 Library of Congress Control Number 2005926244 Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, httpJ/www.nap.edu Copyright 2006 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
-THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES Adviers to the Nolion on Sdence, Engineering,and ledidne The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in"scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare.
Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress In 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr.
Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is. autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing* with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors enginbering programs aimed at meeting national needs; encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Wm. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established In 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions In the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own Initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, andeducatior. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences In .1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general polici*6s determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and' engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and Dr. Wm. A. Wulf are chair and vice chair, respectively,, of the National Research Council www.national-academies.org
COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE LOUIS J. LANZEROTTI, Chair,New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, and Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill CARL A. ALEXANDER, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio ROBERT M. BERNERO, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (retired), Gaithersburg, Maryland M. QUINN BREWSTER, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign GREGORY R. CHOPPIN,.Florida State University, Tallahassee NANCY J. COOKE, Arizona State University, Mesa LOUIS ANTHONY COX, Jr.,1 Cox Associates, Inc., Denver, Colorado GORDON R. JOHNSON, Network Computing Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota ROBERT P. KENNEDY, RPK Structural Mechanics Consulting, Escondido, California KENNETH K. KUO, Pennsylvania State University, University Park RICHARD T. LAHEY, Jr., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York KATHLEEN R. MEYER, Keystone Scientific, Inc., Fort Collins, Colorado FREDERICK J. MOODY, GE Nuclear Energy (retired), Murphys, California TIMOTHY R. NEAL, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico JOHN WREATHALL,1 John Wreathall & Company, Inc., Dublin, Ohio LORING A. WYLLIE, Jr., Degenkolb Engineers, San Francisco, California PETER D. ZIMMERMAN, King's College London, United Kingdom Staff KEVIN D. CROWLEY, Study Director BARBARA PASTINA, Senior Program Officer MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, Senior Program Officer ELISABETH A. REESE, Program Officer DARLA THOMPSON, Research Associate TONI G. GREENLEAF, Administrative Associate 'Drs. Cox and Wreathall resigned from the committee on February 26 and March 17, 2004, respectively. iv
BOARD ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT RICHARD A. MESERVE,1 Chair, Carnegie Institution, Washington, D.C. ROBERT M. BERNERO, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (retired), Gaithersburg, Maryland SUE B. CLARK, Washington State University, Pullman ALLEN G CROFF, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired), Tennessee DAVID E. DANIEL,'University of Illinois, Urbana RODNEY C. EWING, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor ROGER L. HAGENGRUBER, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque KLAUS KOHN, Technische Universitat Clausthal, Germ'any HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia SUSAN M.LANGHORST, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri NIKOLAI P. LAVEROV, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow MILTON LEVENSON, Bechtel International (retired), Menlo Park, California PAUL A. LOCKE, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland NORINE E. NOONAN, College of Charleston, South Carolina EUGENE A. ROSA, Washington State University, Pullman ATSUYUKI SUZUKI, Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, Tokyo Staff KEVIN D. CROWLEY, Director MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, Senior Program Officer BARBARA PASTINA, Senior Program Officer JOHN R. WILEY, Senior Program Officer TONI GREENLEAF, AdministrativeAssociate DARLA J. THOMPSON, Research Associate LAURA D. LLANOS, Senior Program Assistant MARILI ULLOA, Senior Program Assistant JAMES YATES. JR., Office Assistant Dr. Meserve did not participate in the oversight of this study. V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study would not have been possible without the help of several organizations and individuals who were called tipon for information and advice. The committee would like to acknowledge especially the following organizations and individuals for their help:
Congressional staff members Kevin Cook, Terry Tyborowski, and Jeanne Wilson (retired)'for their guidance on the study task.
0 Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff Farouk Eltawila, who served as the primary liaison for this study, and Charles Tinkler and Francis (Skip) Young for their support of the committee's information-gathering activities.. 0 Department of Homeland Security staff member Jon MacLaren, who also served as a liaison to the committee.
Steve Kraft and John Vincent (deceased) of the Nuclear Energy Institute and staff of Energy Resources International for providing Information about spent fuel storage practices In Industry.

ENTERGY Corp., Exelon Corp, and Arizona Public Service Corp. staff for organizing tours of the Braidwood, Dresden, Indian Point, and Palo Verde nuclear generating statibns.'
. German organizations and individuals who helped organize a tour of spent fuel storage facilities in Germany. These organizations and individuals are explicitly .acknowledged in Appendix C. , Speakers (see Appendix A) and participants at committee meetings as well as those who sent written comments for providing their knowledge and perspectives on this-important matter.
This report has been reviewed in draft form b; Individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution In making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The content-of the review comments and draft manuscript remain cohfidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: John F. Aheame, Sigma Xi and Duke University Romesh C. Batra, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Robert J. Budnitz, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Philip R. Clark, GPU Nuclear Corporation (retired) Richard L.*Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center Roger L. Hagengruber, The University of New Mexico Darleane C. Hoffman, E.O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Melvin F. Kanninen, MFK Consulting Services Milton Levenson, Bechtel International (retired) Allison Macfarlane, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard A. Meserve, Carnegie Institution of Washington vii
Donald R. Olander, University of California, Berkeley Theofanis G. Theofanous, University of California, Santa Barbara George W. Ullrich, SAIC Frank N. von Hippel, Princeton University Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the report's conclusions or recommendations, nor did.they see the final draft of the report before its release: The review of this report was overseen by Chris G. Whipple, ENVIRON International Corporation, and R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago. Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution. viii
CONTENTS Note to Readers, I Summary for Congress, 3 Executive Summary, 5
1. Introduction and Background, 12 1.1 Context for this study, 12 1.2 Strategy to address the study charges, 13 1.3 Report roadmap, 16 1.4 Background on spent nuclear fuel and Its storage, 16

2. Terrorist Attacks on Spent Fuel Storage, 25 2.1 Background on risk, 25.
2.2 Tgrrorist attack scenarios, 28 2.3 Risks of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage facilities, 34 2.4 Findings and recommendations, 36
3. Spent Fuel Pool Storage, 38 3.1 Background on spent fuel pool storage, 40 3.2 Previous studies on safety and security of pool storage, 44 3.3 Evaluation of the potential risks of pool storage, 47 3.4 Findings and recommendations, 57

4. Dry Cask Storage and Comparative Risks, 60 4.1 Backgrourid on dry cask storage, 61 4.2 Evaluation of potential risks of dry cask storage, 64 4.3 Potential ddvant~ges of dry storage over wet storage, 68 4.4 Findings and recommendations, 69

5. Implerrientation Issues, 75 5.1 Timing issues, 75.
5.2 Communication Issues, 75 5.3 Finding and recommendation, 77 References, 79 Appendixes A. Information-gathering sessions, 83 B. Biographical sketches of committee members, 87 C. Tour-of selected spent fuel storage-related installations In Germany, 92 D. Historical development of current commercial power reactor fuel operations, 100 E. Glossary, 108 F. Acronyms, 115 ix
NOTE TO READERS This report is based on a classified report that was developed at the request of the U.S. Congress with sponsorship from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security. This report contains all of the findings and recommendations that appear in the classified report. Some have been slightly reworded and other sensitive Information that might allow terrorists to exploit potential vulnerabiities has been redacted to protect national security. Nevertheless, the National Research Council and the authoring committee believe that this report provides an accurate summary of the classified report, including Its findings .and recommendations. The authoring &ommitteefor this report examined the potential consequences of a large number of 'cenarios for attacking spent fuel storage facilities at commercial nuclear power plants. Some of these scenarios were developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as part of Its ongoing vulnerability analyses, whereas others were developed by the committee based upon the expertise of its members or suggestions from participants at the committee's open meetings. The committee focused Its discussions about terrorist attacks on the concept of maximum crediblescenarios.These are defined by the committee to be physically realistic classes of attacks that, if carried out successfully, would produce the most serious potential consequences within that class. In a practical sense they can be said to bound the consequences for a given type of attack. Such scenarios could In some cases be very difficult to carry out because they require a high level of skill and knowledge or luck on the part of the attackers. It was nevertheless useful to analyze these scenarios because they provide decision makers with a better understanding of the full range of potential consequences from terrorist attacks. The committee uses the term potentialconsequences advisedly. It is important to recognize that-b terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage facility would not necessarily result in the release of any radioactivity to the environment. The consequences of such an attack would depend not only on the nature of the attack itself, but also on the construction of the spent fuel storage facility; its location relative to surrounding features that might shield it from the attack; and the ability of the guards and operators at the facility to respond to the attack and/or mitigate Its consequences. Facility-specific analyses are required to determlhe the potential vulnerability of a given facility to a given type of terrorist attack. Congress asked the National Research Council for technical advice related to the vulnerability of spent fuel storage facilities to terrorist attacks: Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission', and the Department of Homeland Security are responsible for translating this advice into policy actions. This will require the balancing of costs, risks, and benefits across the nation's industrial infrastructure. The committee was not asked to examine the potential vulnerabilities of other types of infrastructure to terrorist attacks or the consequences of such attacks. While such comparisons will likely be difficult, they will be essential for ensuring that the nation's limited resources are used judiciously in proiecting Its citizens from terrorist attacks. I
SUMMARY
FOR CONGRESS The U.S. Congress asked the National Academies to provide independent scientific and technical advice on the safety and security of commercial spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States, specifically with respect to the following charges:
Potential safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel presently stored in cooling pools at commercial nuclear reactor sites.
0 Safety and security advantages, if any, of dry cask storage versus wet pool storage at these reactor sites.
Potential safety and security advantages, if any, of dry cask storage using various single-, dual-, and multi-purpose cask designs.

The risks of terrorist attacks on these materials and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device.
Congress requested that the National Academies produce a classified report that addresses these charges within 6 months and also provide an unclassified summary for unlimited public distribution. The first request was fulfilled In July 2004. This report fulfills the second request. The highlights of the report are as follows: (1) Spent fuel pools are necessary at all operating nuclear power plants to store recently discharged fuel. (2) The committee judges that successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible. (3) Ifan attack leads to
propagating zirconium cladding fire, Itbould result in the release of large amounts of radioactive material.
(4) Additional analyses are needed to understand more fully the vulnerabilities and consequences of events that could lead to propagating zirconium cladding fires. (5) It appears to be feasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium cladding fire by rearranging spent fuel assemblies in the pool and making provision for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the fuel, even Ifthe pool or overlying - building were severely. damaged.
.(6) Dry cask storage has inherent security advantages over spent fuel pool storage, but It can only be used to store older spent fuel.
(7) There are no large security differences among different storage-cask designs. (8) It would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel from storage facilities for use in significant radiological dispersal devices (dirty bombs). The statement of task does not direct the committee to recommend whether the transfer of spent fuel from pool to dry cask storage should be accelerated. The committee judges, however, that further engineering analyses and cost-benefit studies would be needed before decisions on this and other mitigative measures are taken. The report contains detailed recommendations for improving the security of spent fuel storage' regardless of how it is stored. 3
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
In the Fiscal Year 2004 Energy and Water Development Conference Report, the U.S. Congress asked the National Academies to provide independent scientific and technical advice on the safety and security1 of commercial spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States, specifically with respect to the following four charges: (1) Potential safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel presently stored in cooling pools at commercial *reactorsites. (2) Safety and security~advantages, if any, of dry cask storage versus wet pool storage at these reactor sites. (3) Potential safety and security advantages, if any, of dry cask storage using various single-, dual-, and multi-purpose cask designs. (4) The risks of terrorist attacks on these materials and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device. Congress requested that the National Academies produce a classified report that addresses these charges within 6 months and also provide an unclassified summary for unlimited public distribution. The first request was fulfilled in July 2004. This report fulfills the second request. Spent nuclear fuel Is stored at commercial nuclear power plant sites In two configurations:
In water-filled pools, referred to as spent fuel pools.

In dry casks that are designed either for storage (single-purpose casks) or both storage and transportation (dual-purpose casks). There are two basic cask designs: bare-fuel casks and canister-based casks, which can be licensed for either single- or dual-purpose use, depending on their design.
Spent fuel pools are currently in use at all 65 sites with operating commercial nuclear power reactors, at 8 sites where commercial power reactors have been shut down, and at one site not associated with an operating or shutdown power reactor. Dry-cask storage facilities have been established at 28 operating; shutdown, or decommissioned power plants. The nuclear industry projects that up to three or four nuclear power plants will reach full capacity in their spent fuel pools each year for at least the next 17 years. The congressional request for this study was prompted by conflicting public claims about the safety and security of commercial spent nuclear fuel storage at nuclear power plants. Some analysts have argued that the dense packing of spent fuel in cooling pools at nuclear power p!ants does not allow a sufficient safety margin in the event of a loss-of-pool-coolant event from an accident or terrorist attack. They assert that such events could result in the release of large quantities of radioactive material to the environment if the zirconium cladding of the spent fuel overheats and ignites. To reduce the potential for such fires, these 'In the context of this study, safety refers to measures that protect spent nuclear fuel storage facilities against failure, damage, human error, or other.accidents that would disperse radioactivity Inthe environment. Securityrefers to measures to protect spent fuel storage facilities against sabotage, attacks, or theft. 5
6 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE analysts have suggested that spent fuel more than five years old be removed from the pool and stored in dry casks, and that the remaining younger fuel be reconfigured in the pool to allow more space for air cooling in the event of a loss-of-pool-coolant event. The committee that was appointed to perform the present study examined the vulnerability of spent fuel stored in pools and dry casks to accidents and terrorist attacks. Any event that results in the breach of a spent fuel pool or a dry cask, whether accidental or intentional, has the potential to release radioactive material to the environment. The* committee therefore focused its limited time on understanding twb issues: (1) Under what circumstances could pools or casks be breached? And (2) what would be the radioactive releases from such breaches? To address these questions, the committee performed a critical review of the security analyses that have been carried out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its contractors, the Department of Homeland Security, industry, and other Independent experts to determine if they are olbjective, complete, and credible. The committee was unable to examine several important issues related to these questions either because It was unable to obtain needed information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or because of time constraints. Details are provided in Chapters 1 and 2. The committee's findings and recommendations from this analysis are provided below, organized by the four charges of the study task. The ordering of the charges has been rearranged to provide a more logical exposition of results. CHARGE 4: RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THESE MATERIALS AND THE RISK THESE MATERIALS MIGHT BE USED TO CONSTRUCT A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE The concept of risk as applied to terrorist attacks .underpins the entire statement of task for this study. Therefore, the committee examined this final charge first to provide the basis"for addressing the remainder of the task statement. The committee's examination of Charge 4 is provided in Chapter 2. On the basis of this examination, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations numbered according to the chapters Inwhich they appear: FINDING 2A: Theprobability of terrorist attacks onlspent fuel storage cannot be assessed quantitatively or comparatively. Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because It Is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target'given the well known public dread of radiation. Terrorists view nuclear power plant facilities as desirable targets because of the large inventories of radioactivity they contain. While it would be difficult to attack such facilities, the committee judges that attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate technical means are possible. It is important to recognize, however, that an attack that damages a power plant or its spent fuel storage facilities would not necessarily result In the release of any radioactivity to the environment. There are potential steps that can be taken to lower the potential consequences of such attacks.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
7 FINDING 2B: The committee judges that the likelihood terrorists could steal enough spent fuel for use In a significant radiological dispersal dlevice is small. Removal of a spent fuel assembly from the pool or dry cask would prove extremely difficult under almost any terrorist.attack scenario. Attempts by a knowledgeable insider(s) to remove single rods and related debris fromthe pool might prove easier, but the amount of m6terial that could be removed would be small. Moreover, superior materials could be stolen or purchased more easily from other sources. Even though the likelihood of spent fuel theft appears to be small, it is nevertheless important that the protection of these materials be maintained and improved as vulnerabilities are Identified; RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should review and upgrade, where necessary, its security requirements for protecting spent fuel rods not contained In fuel assemblies from theft by knowledgeable insiders, especially In facilities where Individual fuel rods or portions of rods are being stored In pools. FINDING 2C: A number of security Improvements at nuclear power plants have been Instituted since the events of September 11, 2001. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not provide the committee with enough Information to evaluate* the effectiveness of these procedures for protecting stored spent fuel. Surveillance and other human-factors related security procedures are just as Important as the physical barriers in preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks. Although the committee did learn about some of the changes that havebeen instituted since the September 11, 2001, attacks, it was not provided with enough information to evaluate the effectiveness of procedures now In place. RECOMMENDATION: Although the committee did not specifically Investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of improved surveillance and security measures for protecting stored spent fuel, an assessment of current measures should be performed by an Independent 2 organization. CHARGE 1: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND SECURITY RISKS OF SPENT NUCLEAR*FUEL STORED IN POOLS The committee's examination of Cha'rge 1 is provided in Chapter 3. On the basis of this examination, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations: FINDING 3A: Pool storage is required at all operating commercial nuclear power plants to cool newly discharged spent fuel. Freshly discharged spent fuel generates too much decay heat to be passively air cooled. This fuel riust be stored in a pool that has an active heat removal system (i.e.,.water pumps and heat exchangers) for at least one year before being moved to dry storage. Most dry storage systems are licensed to store fuel that has been out of the reactor for at least five years.-Although spent fuel younger than five years could be stored in dry casks, the changes required for shielding and heat-removal 2 That is, independent of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear industry.
8 SAFETYAND SECURITY OFCOMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE could be substantial, especially for fuel that has been discharged for less than about three years. FINDING 313: The committee finds that, under some conditions, a terrorist attack that partially or cornpletely drained a spent fuel. pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee's classified report. FINDING 3C: It appears to be feasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium cladding fire following a loss-of-pool-coolant event using readily implemented measures. The following measures appear to have particular merit: Reconfiguring the spent fuel in the pools (i.e., redistribution of high decay-heat assemblies so that they are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies) to more evenly distribute decay-heat loads and enhance radiative heat transfer;, limiting the frequency df offloads of full reactor cores into spent fuel pools, requiring longer shutdowns of the reactor before any fuel is offloaded, and providing enhanced security when such offloads must be made; and development of a redundant and diverse response system to mitigate loss-of-pool-coolant events that would be capable of operation even Ifthe pool or overlying building were severely damaged. FINDING 3D: The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attacks are plant-design specific. Therefore, specific vulnerabilitles can be understood only by examining the characteristics of spent fuel storage at each plant. AM described in Chapter 3, there are substantial differences In the designs of spent fuel pools that make them more or lessvulnerable to certain types of terrorist attacks. FINDING 3E: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and independent analysts have made progress In understanding some vulnerabillties of spent fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks and the consequences of such attacks fof releases of radioactivity to the environment. However, additional work on specific issues Is needed urgently. The analyses carried out to date provide a general understanding of spent fuel behavior in a loss-of-pool-coolant event and the vulnerability of spent fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks that could cause such events to occur. The work to date, however, has not been sufficient to adequately understand the vulnerabilities and consequences of such events. Additional analyses are needed to fill Inthe knowledge gaps so that well-informed policy decisions can be made. RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should undertake additional best-estimate analyses to more fully understand the" vulnerabllities and consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant everits that could lead to'a zirconium cladding fire. Based on these analyses, the Commission should take appropriate actions to address any significant vulnerabilities that are Identified. The committee provides detailson additional analyses that should be carried out In its classified report. Cost-benefit considerations will be an important part of such decisions. RECOMMENDATION: While the work described in the previous recommendation under Finding 3E, above, Is being carried out, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that power plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
9 events in spent fuel pools that could result in propagating zirconium cladding fires. The committee judges that there are at least two such measures thatshould be implemented promptly. Reconfiguring of fuel in the pools so that high decay-heat fuel assemblies are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies. This will more evenly distribute decay-heat loads, thus enhancing radiative heat transfer in the event of a loss of pool coolant.
Provision for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the fuel even if the pool or overlying building were severely damaged.
Reconfiguring of fuel In the pool would be a prudent measure that could probably be Implemented at all plants at little cost, time, or exposure of workers to radiation. The second measure would probably be more expensive to implement and may not be needed 9t all plants, particularly plants in which spent fuel pools are located below grade or bre protected from external line-of-sight attacks by exterior walls and other structures. The committee anticipates that the costs and benefits of options for Implementing the second measure would be examined to help decide what requirements would be Imposed. Further, the committee does not presume to anticipate the best design of such a system--whether it should be Installed on the walls of a pool or deployed from a location where It Is unlikely to be compromised by the iame attack-but simply notes the demanding requirements such a system must meet. CHARGE 3: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND SECURITY ADVANTAGES, IF ANY, OF DIFFERENT DRY CASK STORAGE DESIGNS The thidd charge to the committee focuses exclusively on the safety and security of dry casks. The committee addressed this charge first in Chapter 4 to provide the basis for the comparative analysis between dry casks and pools as called for In Charge 2. FINDING 4A: Although there are differences in the robusthess of different dry cask designs (e.g.; bare-fuel versus canister-based), the differences are not large when measured bythe absolute magnitudes of radionuclide releases in the event of a breach. All storage cask designs are vulnerable to some types of terrorist attacks, but the quantity of radioactive material releases predicted from such attacks Is relatively small. These releases are not easily dispersed In the environment. FINDING 4B: Additional steps can be taken to mnake dry casks less vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks. Although the vulnerabilities.of current cask designs are already small, additional, relatively simple steps can be taken to reduce them as discussed in Chapter 4. RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear RegulatoryCommission should consider using the results of the vulnerability analyses for possible upgrades of requirements In 10 CFR 72 for dry casks, specifically to Improve their resistance to terrorist attacks. The committee was told by
10 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff that such a step is already under consideration. CHARGE 2: SAFETY AND SECURITY ADVANTAGES, IF ANY, OF DRY CASK STORAGE VERSUS WET POOL STORAGE In Chapter 4, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations with respect to the comparative component of Charge 2: FINDING 4C: Dry cask storage does not eliminate the need for pool storage at operating commercial reactors. Under present U.S. practices, dry cask storage can only be used to store fuel that has been out of the reactor long 'enough (generally greater than five years under current practices) to.be passively air cooled. FINDING 4D: Dry cask storage for older, cooler spent fuel has two Inherent advantages over pool storage: (1) It Is a passive system that relies on natural air circulation for cooling; and (2) It divides the Inventory of that spent fuel among a large number of discrete, robust containers. These factors make It more difficult to attack a large amount of spent fuel at one time and also reduce the consequences of such attacks. The robust construction of thiese casks prevents large-scale releases of radioactivity In all of the attack scenarios examined by the committee In its classified report. FINDING .4E: Depending on the outcome of plant-specific vulnerability analyses described in the committee's classified report, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might determine that earlier movements of spent fuel from pools Into dry cask storage would be prudent to reduce the potential consequences of terrorist attacks on pools at some commercial nuclear plants. The statement of task directs the committee to examine the risks of spent fuel storage options and alternatives for decision makers, not to recommend whether any spent fuel should be transferred from pool storage to cask storage. In fact, there may be some commercial plants that, because of pool designs or fuel loadings, may require some removal of spent fuel from their pools. If there is a need to remove spent fuel from the pools it should become clearer once the vulnerability and -consequence analyses described in the classified report are completed. The committee expects that cost-benefit considerations would be a part of these analyses. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES Implementation of the recommendations in Chapters 2-4 will require action and cooperation by a large number of parties. The final chapter of the report provides a brief discussion of two implementation Issues that the committee believes are of special interest to Congress: Timing Issues: Ensuring that high-quality, expert analyses are completed in a timely manner;, and CommunicationsIssues: Ensuring that the results of the analyses are communicated to relevant parties so that appropriate and timely mitigating actions can be taken. This discussion leads to the following finding and recommendation. FINDING 5A: Security restrictions on sharing of information and analyses are hindering progress In addressing potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage to
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
11 terrorist attacks. Current classification and security practices appear to discourage information sharing between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry. They impede the review and feedback processes that can enhance the technical soundness of the analyses being carried.out; they make it difficult to build support within the industry for potential mitigative measures; and they may undermine the confidence that the industry, expert panels such as this one, and the public place in the adequacy of such measures. RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should Improve the sharing of pertinent Information on vulnerability and consequence analyses of spent fuel storage with nuclear power plant operators and dry cask storage system vendors on a timely basis. The committee also believes that the public is an Important audience for the work being carried out to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage facilities. While It would be inappropriate to share all information publicly, more constructive interaction with the public and Independent analysts could improve the work being carried out and also Increase public confidence in Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry decisions and actions to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage to terrorist threats. Li
I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND In the Fiscal Year 2004 Energy and Water Development Conference Report, the U.S. Congress asked the National Academies to provide independent scientific and technical advice on the safety and security1 of commercial spent nuclear fuel storage in the. United States (see Box 1.1). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Securityjointly sponsored this study, as directed by Congress. Awareness and concerns about the threat of high-impact terrorism have become acute and pervasive since the attacks on September 11, 2001. The information gathered by the committee during this study led Itto conclude that there were indeed credible concerns about the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel storage In the current threat environment. From the outset the committee believed that safety and security issues must be addressed quickly to determine whether additional measures are needed to prevent or mitigate attacks that could cause grave harm to people and cause widespread fear, disruption, and economic loss. The information gathered during this study reinforced that view. Any concern related to nuclear power plants.2 has added stakes: Many peopile fear radiation more than
.they fear exposure. to other physical insults. This amplifies the concern over a potential terrorist attack Involving radioactive materials beyond the physical Injuries It might cause, and beyond the economic costs of the cleanup.
1.1 CONTEXT FOR THIS STUDY The congressional request for this study was prompted by conflicting public claims about the.safety.and security of commercial spent nuclear fuel storage at nuclear power plants. Some have argued that the dense packing used for storing spent fuel in cooling pools at nearly every nuclear power plant does not provide a sufficient safetj margin in the event of a pool breach and consequent water loss from an accident or terrorist attack.3 In such cases, the potential exists for the fuel most recently discharged from a reactor to heat up sufficiently for Its zirconium cladding to Ignite, possibly resulting In the release of large amounts of radioactivity to the environment (Alvarez et al., 2003a). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's own analyses have suggested that such zirconium cladding fires and releases of radioactivity are possible (e.g., USNRC, 2001a). Toreduce the potential for such ani event, Alvarez et al. (2003a) suggested that spent fuel more than five years old be removed from the pool and stored in dry casks, and In the context of this study, safety refers to measures that protect spent nuclear fuel storage facilities against failure, damage, human error, or other accidents that would disperse radioactivity Inthe environment. Security refers to measures to protect spent fuel storage facilities against sabotage, attacks, or theft. 2 Safety and security of reactors at nuclear power plants are outside of the committee's statement of task and have been addressed only where they could not be separated from spent fuel storage. The distinctions between spent fuel storage and operating nuclear power reactors are sometimes blurred In public discussions of nuclear and radiological concerns. he committee refers to such occurrences as loss-of-pool-coolantevents in this report. 12
INTRODUCTIONAND BACKGROUND 13 that the remaining younger fuel be rearranged in the pool to allow more space for cooling (see also Marsh and Stanford, 2001; Thompson, 2003). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, the nuclear industry, and some others have argued that densely packed pool storage can be carried out both safely and securely (USNRC, 2003a). Policy actions to improve the safety and security of spent fuel storage could have significant national consequences. Nuclear power plants generate approximately 20 percent of the electricity produced in the United States. The Issue of its future availability and use is critical to our nation's present and future energy security. The safety and security of spent fuel storage Is an important aspect of the acceptability of nuclear power. Decisions that affect such a large portion of our nation's electricity supply must be considered carefully, wisely, and with a balanced view. 1.2 STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE STUDY CHARGES Congress directed the National Academies to produce a classified report that addresses the statement of task shown In Box 1.1 within 6 months and an unclassified summary for unlimited public dissemination within 12 months. This report, which has undergone a security review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and found to contain-no classified national security or safeguards Information, fulfills the second request. The National Research Council of the National Academies appointed a commnittee of 15 experts to carry out this study. Biographical sketches of the committee members are provided in Appendix B. The committee met six times from February to June 2004 to gather Information and complete its classified report. The committee met again In August, October, and November 2004 and in January 2005 to develop this public report. Details on the iniformation-gathering sessions and speakers are provided inAppendix A. Most of the information-gathering sessions were not open to the public because they involved presentations and discussions of classified information. The committee recognized, however, that important contributions to this study could be made by industry representatives, Independent analysts, and the public, so itscheduled open, unclassified The classified report was briefed to the agencies and Congress on July 15, 2004.
14 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE sessions at three of its meetings to obtain comments from interested organizations and individuals. Public comments at these meetings were encouraged and considered. Subgroups of the committee visited several nuclear power plants to learn first-hand how spent fuel Is being managed in wet and dry storage: the Dresden and Braidwood Nuclear Generating Stations in Illinois, which are owned and operated by Exelon Nuclear Corp.; the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station in New York, which is owned and operated by ENTERGY Corp.; and the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, which is operated by Arizona Public Service Corp. A subgroup of committee members also traveled to Germany to visit spent fuel storage Installations at Ahaus and Lingen and to talk with experts about the safety and security of German spent fuel storage. The German government has been concerned about security for a long time, and the German nuclear Industry has made adjustments to spent fuel storage designs and operations that reduce their vulnerability to'accidents and terrorist attacks. A summary of the trip to Germany is provided in Appendix C. The statement of task for this study directed the committee to examine both the safety and the security of spent fuel storage. It is Important to recognize that these are two sides of the same coin In the sense that any event that results In the breach of a spent fuel pool or a dry cask, whether accidental orintentional, has the potential to release radioactive material to the environment. The committee therefore focused its limited time on understanding two Issues: (1) Under what circumstances could pools or casks be breached? And (2) what would be the radioactive releases from such breaches? The initiating events that could lead to the accidentalbreach of a spent fuel pool are well known: A large seismic event or the accidental drop of a cask on the pool wall that could lead to the loss of pool coolant. The condition that could lead to an accidental breach of a dry storage cask is similarly well known: an accidental drop of the cask during handling operations. Current Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations are designed toprevent such accidental conditions by Imposing requirements on the design and operation of spent fuel storage facilities. These regulations have been in place for decades and have so far been effective in preventing accidental releases of radioactive materials from these facilities into the environment. The Initiating events that could lead to the Intentionalbreach 6f a spent fuel pool or dry storage cask are not as well understood. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has had long-standing requirements in place to deal with radiological sabotage (included in the "design basis threat'; see Chapter 2), but the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks provided a graphic demonstration of a much broader array of potential threats. As described Inthe following chapters; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently sponsoring studies to better understand the potential.consequences of such terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage facilities. . Eadry on in this study*the committee made a judgment that it shouldfocus most of its attention concerning such Initiating events on the security aspects of its task statement. Many of the phenomena that follow an Initiating event (e.g., lois of pool coolant or cask breach) would be the same whether it arose from an accident or terrorist attack, as noted previously. While the mitigation strategies for such events might be similar, they would require different kinds of preparation. Given the relatively short time frame for this study, the committee focused its efforts
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 15 on performing a critical review of the security analyses that have been carried out by the NuclearRegulatory Commission and its contractors, the Department of Homeland Security, industry (i.e., EPRI, formerly named the Electric Power Research Institute; ENTERGY Corp.; and dry cask vendors), and other independent experts to determine if they are objective, complete, and 6redible. The committee could only perform limited independent safety and security analyses based on the information it gathered. The committee made many requests for Information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, its Sandia National Laboratories contractor, and other organizations and individuals, often with little advance notice. For the most part, all parties responded well to these requests. The committee was able to access experts who could answer its technical questions and was pleased with the cooperation and Information it received during its visits to spent fuel storage facilities. This cooperation was essential in enabling the committee to complete its task within the requested six-month timeframe. Ia.- The comrmittee was forced to circumscribe some aspects of its examinations, however, due to time and/or Information constraints. In particular, the committee did not pursue In-depth examinations of the following topics: Human factors Issues Involved In responding to terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage. These include surveillance activities to identify potential threats (both inside and outside the plant); the response of security forces; and the preparation of plant personnel to deploy mitigative measures in the event of an attack.. The behavior of radioactive material after It enters the environment from a spent fuel pool or dry cask. The committee assumed that any large release of radioactivity from a spent fuel storage facility would be problematic even Inthe absence of knowledge of how it would disperse In the environment. The committee instead focused Its efforts on understanding how much radioactive material would be released, if any,*in the case of an attack.
" The economic consequences of potential terrorist attacks, except insofar as noting the possible magnitude of cleanup costs after a catastrophic release of radioactivity.
The costs of potential measures to mitigate spent fuel storage vulnerabilities. The committee understands that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would Include cost-benefit considerations In decisions to impose any new requirements on Industry for such measures.
The committee also did not examine the potential vulnerability of commercial spent fuel while being transported. That topic is not only outside of the committee's task, but there is another National Academies study currently underway to examine transportation issues.' Because most of the studies on spent fuel'storage vulnerabilities undertaken for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are still in progress, the committee w is not able to review completed technicaldocuments. Instead, the committee had to rely on presentations by and discussions with technical experts. The committee does not believe that these difficulties prevented it from developing sound findings and recommendations from the information it 5 Committee on Transportation of Radioactive Waste. See http:Inational-acadernies.org/transportofradwaste. That committee's final report is now planned for completion in the late summer of 2005.
16 SAFETYAND SECURITY OFCOMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE did receive. The committee was able to draw upon other information sources both domestic and foreign,6 including the experience and expertise of its members, to fill some of the information gaps. 1.3 REPORT ROADMAP The sections that follow in this chapter provide background on storage of spent nuclear fuel, which may be helpful to noh-experts in understanding the issues discussed in the following chapters. The other chapters are organized to explicitly address the four charges of the committee's statement of task:
" Chapter 2 addresses the last charge to the committee to "explicitly consider the risks of terrorist attacks on these materials and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device." " Chapter 3 addresses the first charge to the committee to examine the "potential safety and security risks pf spent nuclear fuel presently stored in cooling pools at commercial reactor sites." " Chapter 4 addresses the second and third charges to examine the safety and security advantages, if any, of dry cask storage versus wet pool storage at these reactor sites" and the "potential safety and security advantages, if any, of dry cask storage using various single-, dual-, and multi-purpose cask designs."
Chapter 5 concerns Implementation of the recommendations In this report, specifically concerning timing and communication issues.
The appendixes provide supporting information, Including a glossary and acronym list, descriptions of the committee's meetings, and biographical sketches of the committee members.
1.4 BACKGROUND
ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND ITS STORAGE This section is provided for readers who are not familiar with the technical features of spent nuclear fuel and its storage. Other readers should skip directly to Chapter 2. Spent nuclear fuel is fuel that has been irradiated or "burned" in the core of a nuclear reactor. In power reactors, the energy released from fission reactions in the nuclear fuel heats water7 to produce steam that drives turbines to generate electricity. Spent nuclear fuel from non-commercial reactors (such as research reactors, naval propulsion reactors, and plutonium production reactors) is not considered in this study. 1.4.1 Nuclear Fuel Almost all commercial reactor fuel in the United States is in the form of solid, cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide. The pellets are about 0.4 to 0.65 Inch (1.0 to 1.65 centimeters) in length and about 0.3 to 0.5 inch (0.8 to 1.25 centimeters) in diameter. The 6 For example, the aforementioned visits to Lingen and Ahaus, In Germany. 7A different coolant can be used, but all power reactors now operating in theUnited States are water cooled.
INTRODUCTIONAND BACKGROUND 17 pellets are loaded into tubes, called fuel cladding, made of a zirconium metal alloy, called zircaloy. A loaded tube, which is typically 11.5 to 14.75 feet (3.5 to 4.5 meters) in length, is called a fuel rod (also referred to as a fuelpin or fuel element). Fuel rods are bundled together, with a 0.12 to 0.18 Inch (0.3 to 0.45 centimeter) space left between each for coolant to flow, to form a square fuel assembly (see FIGURE 1.1) measuring about 6 to 9 inches (15 to 23 centimeters) on a side. Typical fuel assemblies for.boiling water nuclear reactors (BWRs) hold 49 to 63 fuel* rods, and fuel assemblies for pressurized water nuclear reactors (PWRs) hold 164 to 264 fuel rods.8 Depending on reactor design, typically-between 190 and 750 assemblies, each weighing from 275 to 685 kg (600 to 1500 pounds), make up a power reactor core. New fuel assemblies (i.e., those that have not been irradiated in a reactor) do not require special cooling or radiation shielding; they can be moved with a crane In open air. Once in the
.reactor, however, the fuel undergoes nuclear fission and begins to generate the radioactive fission products iind activation products that require shielding and cooling.
The uranium oxide fuel essentially is composed of two Isotopes of uranium: Initially, about 3-5 percent 9 by weight Is fissile uranium (uranium-235), which is the component that sustains the fission chain reaction; and about 95-97 percent is uranium-238, which can capture a neutron to produce fissile plutonium and other radioactive heavy isotopes * (actinides). Each fission event, whether in uranium or plutonium, releases energy and neutrons as the fissioning nucleus splits into two (and Infrequently three) radioactive fragments, called fissioh products. When the fissile material has been consumed to a level where It Is no longer economically viable. (typically 4.5 to 6 years of operation for current fuel designs), the fuel Is considered spent and Is removed from the reactor core. Spent fuel assemblies are highly radioactive. The decay of radioactive fission products and other constituents generates heat (called decay heat) and penetrating (gamma and neutron) radiation. Therefore cooling,* shielding, and remote handling are required for spent nuclear fuel. The amount of heat and radiation generated by a spent fuel assembly after its removal from a reactor depends on the number of fissions thit have occurred In the fuel, called the bum-up, and the time that has elapsed since the fuel was removed from-the reactor. The rate of decay-heat generation by spent reactor fuel ahd how It will change with .time after the fuel is removed from the reactor can be calculated. The results of an example calculation are shown In FIGURE 1.2. At discharge from the reactor, a spent fuel assembly generates on the order of tens of kilowatts of heat. Decay-hiat production diminishes as very short-lived radionuclides decay away, dropping heat generation by a factor of.1 00 during the first year;, droppingby. another factor of 5 between year one and year five; and dropping about 40 percent between year five and year ten (see FIGURE -1.2). Within a year of discharge from the reactor, decay-heat production in spent.nuclear fuel is dominated by foibr radionuclides: Ruthenium-1 06 (with a 372.6-day half-life), cerium-144 (284.4-day half-life), cesium-137 (30.2-year half-life), a Technical specifications for the fuel assemblies are taken from the American National Standard document for pool storage of spent nuclear fuel (American' Nuclear Society, 1988). 9 With only a few exceptions, commercial nuclear power reactors Inthe United States have been fueled with low-enriched uranium, that is, less than 20 percent of the uranium Is uranium-235. Uranium found in nature has about 0.71 percent uranium-235 by weight
18 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE E ca nd 9-, Exparmon spring Fuel cadding Rlodcontrol pellet cluster
*"uel elemwnt. FLOue nl FIGURE 1.1 Fuel rods, also called fuel pins or elements, are bundled together into fuel assemblies as shown here. This fuel assembly is for a PWR reactor. SOURCE: Duderstadt and Hamilton (1976; Figure 3-7).
and cesium-1 34.(2.1-year half-life) and their short-lived decay products contribute nearly 90 percent of the decay heat from a spent fuel ass6mbly. Longer-lived radionuclides persist in the spent fuel even as the decay heat drops further. Cesium-1 37 dec.ays to barium-137, emitting a beta particle and a high-energy gamma ray. The cesium-1 37 half-life of 30.2 years Is Sufficiently long to ensure that this radionuclide will persist during storage. It and other materials present in the fuel will form small particles, called aerosols,in a zirconium cladding fire. Shorter-lived radionuclides decay away rapidly after removal of the spent fuel from the reactor. One of these is Iodine-131, which is of particular concern in reactor core accidents because it can be taken up in large quantities by the human thyroid. This radionuclide has a half-life of about 8 days and typically persists in significant quantities in spent fuel only on the order of a few months.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUNiD 19 10000000
. ..--. Actinides 1000000: \ Fission products --*-Total £100000 .10o000 IL *- 100 10 Time since discharge from reactor FIGURE 1.2 Decay-heat power for spent fuel (measured In watts per metric ton of uranium) plotted on a logarithmic scale as a function of time after reactor discharge. Note that th6 horizontal axis is a data series, not a scale. SOURCE: Based on data from USNRC (1984).
1.4.2 Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage. technologies for spent nuclear fuel have three primary objectives: 0 Cool the fuel to prevent heat-up to high temperatures from radioactive decay.
Shield workers and the public from the radiation emitted by radioactive decay in the spent fuel and provide a barrier for any releases of radioactivity.
0 Prevent criticality accidents (uncontrolled fission chain reactions). After.the fuel assemblies are unloaded from the reactor they are stored in water pools, called'spent fuelpools. The water in the pools provides radiation shielding and cooling and captures all but noble gas radionuclides in case offuel rod leaks. 10 The geometry of the fuel and neutron absorbers (such as boron, hafnium, and cadmium) .within the racks that hold the spent fuel or Inthe cooling water help prevent criticality events."1 The water in the pool is circulated through heat exchangers for cooling and ion exchange filters to capture any radionuclides and other contaminants that get Into the water. Makeup water is also added to the .pool to replace pool water lost to evaporation. The operation of the pumps and heat exchangers is especially important during and Immediately after reactor 10 If the cladding in the fuel rods is breached sorte radioactive materials will be released Into the pool. 1'See'the Glossary (Appendix E) for a definition of criticality. Most of the fuel's capacity for sustaining criticality is expended Inthe reactor as the uranium and plutonium are fissioned.
20 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE refueling operations, because this is when larger quantities of higher heat-generating spent fuel are placed into the pool. Current U.S. regulations require that spent fuel be stored in the power plant's fuel pool for at least one year after its discharge from the reactor before being moved to dry storage. After that time the spent fuel can be moved; but only with active cooling. Active cooling is generally necessary for about three years after the spent fuel is removed from the reactor core (USNRC, 2003b). When a spent fuel pool Is filled to capacity, older fuel, which has lower decay-heat, is moved to other pools or placed into dry casks. Heat generated in the loaded dry casks is removed by air convection and thermal radiation. The cask provides shielding of penetrating radiation and confinement of the radionuclides in the spent fuel. As with pool storage, criticality control Is accomplished by placing the fuel in a fixed geometry and separating Individual fuel assemblies with neutron absorbers. Standard industry practice is to place In dry storage only spent fuel that has cooled for five years or more after discharge from the reactor.12 Most spent fuel In wet or dry storage is located at nuclear power plant sites (i.e., on-site storage). There are significant differences in the design and construction of wet and dry storage Installations at commercial nuclear power plants. The characteristics depend on the type of the nuclear power plant, the age of the spent fuel storage Installation, or the type of dry casks used. The design and features of spent fuel pools and dry storage facilities are discussed In Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 1.4.3 Spent Fuel Inventories As of 2003, approximately 50,000 MTU (metric tons of uranium) of spent fuel have been.generated over the past four decades In the United States. A typical nuclear power plant generates about 20 MTU per year. The entire U.S. nuclear industry generates about 2000 MTU per year. Of the approximately 50,000 MTU of commercial spent fuel in the United States, 43,600 MTU are currently stored in pools and 6200 MTU are in dry storage. Pool storage exists at all 65 sites with operating commercial nuclear power reactors1 3 and at 8 sites where commercial power reactors are no longer operating (i.e., they have been shut down or decommissioned) (FIGURE 1.3). Additionally, there Is an away-from-reactor spent fuel pool operating at the G.E. Morris Facility in Illinois (see Appendix D). Of the spent fuel in dry storage, 4500 MTU are in storage at 22 sites with operating commercial nuclear power reactors, and 1700 MTU are in storage at 6 sites where the commercial reactors are no longer operating.-An additional dry-storage facility is operated
by the federal government at the Idaho National Laboratory. It stores most of the damaged fuel frorm the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor accident.
12 Fuel aged as little as three years could be stored Inpassively cooled casks, but fewer assemblies could be accommodated in each cask because of the higher heat load. 13 There are 103 operating commercial nuclear power reactors Inthe United States. Many sites have more than one operating reactor.
-INTRODUCTIONAND BACKGROUND2 21 FIGURE 1.3 Locations of spent fuel storage facilities In the United States.
TABLE 1.1 provides a listing of the 30 operating Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs14) In the United States. These ISFSIs include the dry storage facilities at operating and shutdown commercial power reactor sites as well as the storage facilities at the Morris and Idaho sites, as described above. The committee did not examine the Morris and Idaho facilities as part of this study. At-reactor pool storage Is not considered to be an ISFSI because it operates under the power reactor license. 1.4.4 History of Spent Fuel.Storage Spent fuel pools at commercial nuclear power plants were not designed to accommodate all the fuel used during the operating lifetime of the reactors they service. Most commercial power plants were designed with small pools urider the assumption that.. fuel would be cooled for a short period of time after discharge from the reactor and then be sent offsitdfor recycling (i.e., reprocessing).15 A commercial reprocessing industry never developed, however, for the reasons discussed In Appendix D. Newer power plants were designed with larger pool storage capacities. Even plants with larger-capacity pools will run out of pool space if they operate beyond their Initial 40-year licenses. In 2000, the nuclear power industry projected that roughly three or four plants per year would run out of needed storage space in their pools without additional interim storage capacity (see FIGURE 1.4). Another development that logically could reduce the demand for storage of spent nuclear fuel at the sites of power plants is the'availability of a geologic repository for 14 An ISFSI Is a facility for storing spent fuel in wet pools or dry casks and Is defined InTitle.10, Part 72 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 15 Residual uranium-235 and plutonium Inthe spent fuel would be recovered for the manufacture of new fuel. The waste products in the fuel, principally the fission products, would be immobilized in solid matrices and stored for eventual disposal.
22 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE TABLE 1.1: Operating ISFSIs in the United States as of July 2004 Name Location Palo Verde Arizona Arkansas Nuclear One Arkansas Rancho Seco California San Onofre California Diablo Canyon California Fort St. Vrain ' Colorado Edwin L. Hatch Georgia 2 DOE-INL Idaho G.E. Morris 3 Illinois Dresden Illinois Duane Arnold Iowa Maine Yankee Maine Calvert Cliffs Maryland Big Rock Point Michigan Palisades Michigan Prairie Island Minnesota Yankee Rowe Massachusetts Oyster Creek New Jersey JA. FitzPatrick New York McGuire North Carolina Davis-Besse Ohio Trojan Oregon Susquehanna Pennsylvania Peach Bottom Pennsylvania Robinson South Carolina Oconee South Carolina North Anna Virginia. Surry Virginia Columbia Gen. Station Washington Point Beach Wisconsin NOTES:
'The Fort St. Vrain ISFSI stores fuel from a commercial gas-cooled reactor. The facility is operated by the Depaftment of Energy.
2The DOE-INL facility stores fuel from the Three-Mile Island Unit
. 2 reactor. The facility is operated by the Department of Energy.
3-The G.E. Morris ISFSI Is a wet storage facility. SOURCES: Data from the USNRC (2004)."
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 23 FIGURE 1.4 Projection of the number of commercial nuclear power plants that will run out of needed space In their spent fuel pools In coming years If they do not add Interim storage. These data, looking only at plants that did not already use dry cask storage, were provided to the Nuclear Regulatory.Commission in 2000. SOURCE: USNRC (2001b). disposal of spent nuclear fuel. But a nuclear waste repository is not expectedto be in operation until at least 2010, and even then it will take several decades for all of the spent fuel to be shipped for disposal..Thds, onsite storage of spent fuel.is likely to continue for at least several decades. Power plant operators have made two changes in spent fuel storage procedures to increase the capacity of onsite storage. First, starting In the late 1970s, plant operators began to install high-density racks that enable more spent fuel to be stored in the pools. This has increased storage capacities In some pools by up to about a factor of five (USNRC, 2003b). Second, as noted above, many plant operators have moved older spent fuel from the pools into dry cask storage systems (see Chapter 4) or into other pools when available to make room for freshly discharged spent fuel and to maintain the capacity for a full-core offload.16. The original spent fuel racks; sometimes called' "open racks," were designed to store spent fuel In an open array, with open vertical and lateral channels between the fuel assemblies to promote water circulation. The high-density storage racks eliminated many of the channels so that the fuel assemblies could be packed closer together (FIGURE 1.5). This configuration does not allow as much water (or air circulation in loss-of-pool-coolant events) through the spent fuel assemblies as the original open-rack design. 16 Although not required by regulation, It is standard practice in the nuclear industry to maintain enough open space in the spent fuel pool to hold the entire core of the nuclear reactor. This provides an additional margin of safety should the fuel have to be removed from the reactor core in an emergency or for maintenance purposes.
24 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Several nuclear utilities have already submitted license applications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build 16 new lSFSIs. Among the potential new lSFSIs, a consortium of utilities has submitted a license for a private fuel storage facility (PFS) in Utah for interim dry storage of up to 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel. Most or all pools store some spent fuel that has aged more than five years after discharge from the reactor, and so could be transferred to dry-cask storage. The amount that could be transferred depends on plant-specific Information such as pool size and configuration, operating history of the reactor, the enrichment and bum-up level in the fuel, and availability of an ISFSI. Empty Cell I I --II r.-.-I r-N
-BWR Assembly Boraflex Panel In Steel Wrapper Coolant Flow Flow Holes 4)
(Through the rack support footing) FIGURE 1.5 Dense spent fuel pool storage racks for BWR fuel. This cross-sectional illustration shows the principal elements of the spent fuel rackwhich sits on the bottom of the pool. SOURCE: Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing materials (2004).
2 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE This chapter addresses the final charge to the committee to "explicitly consider the-risks of terrorist attacks on. [spent fuel] and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device." The concept of risk as applied to terrorist attacks underpins the entire'statement of task for this study. Therefore, the committee addresses this final charge first to provide the basii for addressing the remainder of the task statement.
The chapter is organized into the following sections:
0 Backjround on risk.
Terrorist attack scenarios.

Risks of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage facilities.
0 Findings and recommendations.
2.1 BACKGROUND
ON RISK "Risk" Is a function of three factors (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981):
" The scenariodescribing the undesirable event.
The probabilitythat the scenario will occur.
" The consequences if the scenario should occur.
In the context of the present report, a scenariodescribes the modes and mechanisms of a possible terrorist attack against a spent fuel storage facility. For example, a scenario might involve a suicide attack with a hijacked civilian airliner. Another might involve a ground assault with a truck bomb. Several such scenarios are described later in this chapter and discussed In more detail In the committee's classified report. Probabilityis a dimensionless quantity that expresses the likelihood that a given scenario will occur over a specified time period. Ifthe occurrence of a scenario Is judged to be impossible, It would have a probability of 0.0. On the other hand, If the scerario were judged to be certain, it has a probability of 1.0. A scenario that had a.50 percent chance of occurrence during the period contemplated Would have a probability of 0.5. Consequences describe the undesirable results if the scenario were to occur. For example; a terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage facility could release Ionizing radiation to the environment.' The exposure of the public to this radiation could have both deterministic and stochastic effects. The former would occur from short-term exposures to very high doses of ionizing radiation, the latter to smaller doses that might have no immediate effects 1Terrorist scenarios and consequences are being described here for the sake of Illustration. One should not conclude from this description that the committee believes that such consequences would necessarily occur as the result of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage facility. 25
26 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE
*but could result in cancer induction some years or decades later.2 Consequences also could be described in terms of economic damage. These could arise, for example, from the loss of use of the facility and surrounding areas or costs to clean up those areas. There also could be severe psychological consequences that bould drive changes in public acceptance of commercial nuclear energy.
The quantitative expression for the risk of a particular scenario, for example a suicide terrorist attack with a hijacked airliner, is Risk aIrneratit6 = Probability ir,, atak x Consequences airiner attack (1) The total risk would be the sum of the risks for all possible independent attack scenarios. For example, if a spent fuel storage facility was determined to be vulnerable to attacks using airliners, truck bombs, and armed'assaults, the total risk would be calculated as Risk tcw Risk
=e attac + Risk truckbb atck + Risk amied =au, attac (2)
Such equations are routinely used to calculate the risks of various Industrial accidents, iricluding accidents at nuclear powerplants, through a process known as probabilisticrisk assessment.Each accident is assigned a numerical probability based on a careful analysis of the sequence of failures (e.g., human or mechanical failures) that could produce the accident. The consequences of such accidents are typically expressed in terms of injuries, deaths, or economic losses. It is possible to estimate the risks of Industrial accidents because there are sufficient experience and data to quantify the probabilities and consequences. This Is not the case for terrorist attacks. To date, experts have not found'a way to apply these quantitative risk equations to terrorist attacks because of two primary difficulties: The first is to develop a complete set of bounding scenarios for such attacks; the second rs to estimate their probabilities. These depend on impossible-to-quantify factors such as terrorist motivations, expertise, and access to technical means. 3 They also depend on the effectiveness of measures that might prevent or mitigate such attacks. In the absence of quantitative Information on risks, one could attempt to make qualitative risk comparisons. Such comparisons could estimate, for example, the relative risks of attacks on spent fuel storage facilities versus attacks on commercial nuclear power reactors or other critical Infrastructure such as chemical plants.'Although a comparison of such risks is beyond the scope of this study, the committee recognizes that policy decisions about spent fuel storage may need to take into account such comparative risk issues, 2Such cancers would likely not be directly traceable to the radiation dose received from a terrorist attack and would likely be indistinguishable from the large population of cancers that result from other causes. 3Political scientists and counter-terror specialists haýe argued whether terrorists seek headlines, casualties, or both (e.g., Jenkins 1975, 1985). The September 11, 2001, attacks Inthe United States and the March 11; 2004, attacks in Spain demonstrate that some terrorists, particularly those of al-Qaida and its allies, Intend to commit mass murder and/or mass economic disruption, both of which may have Important political consequences. Further information about the motivation of terrorists is provided in NRC (2002).
TERRORISTATTACKS ON SIPENT FUEL STORAGE 27 especially for decisions regarding the expenditure of limited societal resources to address terrorist threats. The 2002 National Research Council report Making the Nation Safer. The Role of Science and Technology In Countering Terrorismframed this issue as follows (NRC, 2002,
p. 43):
The potential vulnerabilities of NPPs [nuclear power plants] to terrorist attack seem to have captured the imagination of the public and the media, perhaps because of a perception that a successfulattack could harm large populations and have severe economic and environmental consequences. There are, however, many other types of large industrial facilities that are potentially vulnerable to attack, for example, petroleum refineries, chemical plants, and oil and liquefied natural gas supertankers. These facilities do not have theiobUst construction and security features characteristic of NPPs, and many'are located near highly populated urban areas. Groups seeking to carry out high-impact terrorism will likely choose targets that have a high probability of being attacked successfully.4 If success is measured by the number of people killed and Injured or the permanent destruction of property, then spent fuel storage facilities may not make good terrorist targets owing to their relatively robust construction (see Chapters 1 and 3) and security. Industrialized societies like the United States provide terrorists a large number of "softr (i~e., unprotected) targets that could be attacked more easily with greater effect than spent fuel storage facilities. These Include chemical plants, refineries, transportation systems, and other facilities where large numbers of people gather (see NRC, 2002). On the other hand, there are other success criteria that might influence a terrorist's decision to attack a "hard" (i.e., robust or well protected) target such as a commercial nuclear power plant and its spent fuel storage facilities. Such attacks could spread panic and shut down the power plant for an extended period of time even with no loss of life. Moreover, an attack that resulted In the release of radioactive material could threaten the viability of commercial nuclear power. These considerations led the committee to conclude that It could not address its charge using quantitative and comparative risk assessments. The committee decided Instead to examine a range of possible terrorist attack scenarios In terms of (1) their potential for damaging spent fuel pools and dry storage casks; and (2) their potential for radioactive material releases. This allowed the committee to make qualitative judgments about the vulnerability of spent fuel storage facilities to terrorist attacks and potential measures that could be taken to mitigate them. ' This point was made to the committee Ina briefing by the Department of Homeland Security, where "success" means that the terrorist was able to achieve the goals of the attack, whatever they might be.
28 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE 2.2 TERRORIST ATTACK SCENARIOS It is possible to imagine a wide range of terrorist attacks against spent fuel storage facilities. Each would have a range of potential consequences depending on the characteristics of the attack and the facility being targeted as well as any post-attack mitigative actions t6 prevent or reduce the release of radioactive material. The committee focused its discussions about terrorist attacks around the concept of a maximum credible scenario-thatis, an attack that is physically possible to carry out and that produces the most serious potential consequences within a given class of attack scenarios. The following example illustrates the concept: One of the scenario classes considered by the committee In this chapter involves suicide attacks against spent fuel storage facilities with civilian passenger aircraft. The physics of such attacks are well understood: In general, heavier and higher-speed aircraft produce greater Impact forces than lighter and slower aircraft, all else being equal. Consequently, the maximum credible scenario for suicide attacks involving civilian passenger aircraft would utilize the largest civilian passenger aircraft widely used in the United States flying at maximum cruising speed and hitting the facility at its most vulnerable point. Such an attack provides an upper bound to the damage that could be Inflicted by th.is type of aircraft attack. The maximum credible scenario is particularly useful for obtaining a general understanding of the damage that could be inflicted, but It would not necessarily apply to every spent fuel storage facility. To be judged a "credible" scenario, the terrorist must be able to successfully carry It out as designed-for example, to hit a spent fuel storage facility with the largest civilian aircraft at Its most vulnerable point. This would rule out attacks that are physically impossible, such as flying a large civilian aircraft into a facility that Is located below ground levrel or protected by surrounding hills or buildings. This also would iule out attacks involving weapons that are not available to terrorists (e.g., aircraft-launched weapons such as 'bunker-buster" bombs or nuclear weapons). This is not intended, however, to rule out attacks that are judged to have a low probability for success simply because terrorists might lack the skill and knowledge or luck to carry them out. In fact, if the consequences of such attacks were severe, policy makers might still decide that prudent mitigating actions should be taken regardless of their low probabilities of occurrence.$ This might be especially true Ifquick, Inekpensive fixes could be implemented. The main benefit of analyzing the maximum c&edible scenario Is that it provides decision makers with a better characterization of the full range of potential consequences so that sound policy judgments can be made.
.The analyses carried out for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (described In the committee's classified report) do not consider maximum credible scenarios. Instead, the analyses employ referencescenariosthat are based either ori the characteristics of previous terrorist attacks or on qualitative judgments of the technical means and methods that might be employed In attacks against spent fuel storage facilities. Although such'reference scenarios are useful for gaining insights on potential consequences of terrorist attacks, they 5The Department of Energy, for example, routinely examines the consequences of very low probability events Involving nuclear weapons safety and security; see, for example, AL 56XB Development and Production Manual published by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. See httpY/prp.lanI.govfdocumentslodp manual.asp.
TERRORISTATTACKS ON SPENTFUEL STORAGE 29 are not necessarily bounding. This becomes important when the reference scenario attack results in damage to a facility that verges on failure. The committee prefers a maximum credible scenario approach for one important reason: It believes that terrorists who choose to attack hardened facilities like spent fuel storage facilities would choose weapons capable of producing maximum destruction. Of course, once the consequences of such attacks are known, an element of expert judgment is required to determine whether such attacks have a high likelihood of being carried out as designed. Such judgment Is especially important when making policy decisions about actions to reduce the vulnerabilities of facilities to such attacks. The consequences of terrorist attacks can be described in terms of either maximum crediblereleases.or best-estimate releases.The former describes the largest releases of radioactive mateial following an attack based on quantitative analytical models (e.g., the MELCOR compUter code described in Chapter 3). The latter describes the median estimates from such models. in both cases, the estimates may not account for mitigative actions that could be taken after an attack to reduce or even elinrinate releases. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission analyses reviewed by the committee in its classified report are best-estimate releases for various terrorist attack scenirios. The estimates in NUREG-1738 (USNRC, 2001a) and Alvarez et al. (2003a), on the other hand, describe maximum-credible to worst-case releases. 6 The committee considered four classes of terrorist attack scenarios in this study-
Air attacks using large civilian aircraft or smaller aircraft laden with explosives.

Ground attacks by groups of well-armed and well-trained individuals.
" Attacks involving combined air and land assaults.
Thefts of spent fuel for use by terrorists (including knowledgeable insiders) in rafiological dispersal devices.
The committee devoted time at Its meetings discussing these scenarios. It also received briefings on possible scenarios from Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff and suggestions for scenarios from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other experts, and the public. Some scenarios were dismissed by the committee as not credible. An example of such a scenario is an attack on a spent fuel storage facility with a nuclear weapon. Such weapons would be relatively difficult7 for terrorists to build or steal. Even if such a weapon could be obtained, the committee can think of no reason that It would be used against a spent fuel storage facility rather than another target. There are easier ways toattack spent fuel storage facilities, as discussed in the classified report, and there are more attractive targets for nuclear weapons, for example, large population centers. 6 Worst-case releases are based on the most unfavorable conditions that could occur in a given scenario, regardless of whether those conditions were physically realistic. For example, a worst-case estimate of the radionuclide releases from an attack on a spent fuel pool might assume thaf all of the volatile radionuclides contained in the spent fuel would be released, even Ifquantitative 'analytical models showed that such releases were very unlikely to occur. 7 Difficult but certainly not impossible. See Chapter 2 InNRC (2002).
30 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE Given the experience of September 11, 2001, and the attacks that have occurred in other parts of the world, it is clear to the committee that the ability of the most capable terrorists to carry out attacks is limited only by their access to technical means. It is probably not limited by the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit or train attackers'or bring them and any needed equipment Into the United States-if indeed they are not already here. Moreover, the demonstrated willingness of terrorists to carry out suicide attacks greatly expands the scenarios that need to be considered when analyzing potential threats. As is discussed in some detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the facilities used to store spent fuel at nuclear power plants are very robust. Thus, only attacks that Involve the application Of large energy impulses or that allow terrorists to gain interior access have any chance of releasing substantial quantities of radioactive material. This further restricts the scenarios that need to be considered. For example, attacks using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) of the type that have been carried out in Iraq against U.S. and coalition forces would not likely be successful if the intent of the attack Is to cause substantial damage to the facility. Of course, such an attack would get the public's attention and might even have economic consequences for the attacked plant and possibly the entire commercial nuclear power industry. The threat scenarios summarized In this chapter are based on documents provided to the committee, briefings received at committee meetings, and the committee's own expert judgment. 8 Further overview and information on nuclear and radiological threats in general canbe found in the NRC (2002) report and references therein. 2.2.1 Air Attacks The September 11, 2001, attacks 9 demonstrated that terrorists are capable of successfully attacking fixed infrastructure with large civilian jetliners. The security of civilian passenger.airliners has been Improved since these attacks were carried out, and the vulnerability of civilian passenger aircraft to highjacking has been reduced. Nevertheless, the committee judges, based on the evidence made available to it during this study, that attacks with civilian aircraft remain a credible threat. Such aircraft are used routinely in freight and charter services, and la.rge numbers of such aircraft enter the United States from other countries each day. Improvements to ground security or cargo inspection would likely not eliminate the threat posed by an air crew willing to stage a suicid6 attack with a chartered air freighter. Although the September 11, 2001, attacks utilized Boeing 757 and 767 airliners, larger aircraft (Boeing 747,777; Airbus 340) are in routine use around the world, and an even larger aircraft (Airbus 380) is entering production. Assaults by such large aircraft could Impart enormous energy impulses to spent fuel storage facilities. Additionally, attacks with The committee found limited Information in the open literature on various scenarios for terrorist attacks on nuclear plants and their spent fuel storage facilities. 9 The al-Qaida terrorist organization hijacked and crashed two Boeing 767 airliners into Towers I and 2 of the World Trade Center building In New York and a Boeing 757 airliner Into the Pentagon building InArlington, Virginia. A second Boeing 757, which was believed to be targeted either on the White House or the U.S. Capitol (see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 16 [Outline of the 9111 Plot], pages 18-19) crashed in an open field near Jennerstown, Pennsylvania.
TERRORISTATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE 31 aircraft carrying large fuel loads could produce fires that would greatly complicate rescue and recovery efforts. Previous studies on aircraft crash impacts (Droste et al., 2002; Lange et al., 2002; FHSK, 2003; RBR Consultants, 2003; Thomauske, 2003) suggest that the consequences of a heavy aircraft crash on a nuclear installation depend on factors such as the following:
Type and design of the aircraft.

Spieed of the aircraft.

Fuel loading of the aircraft and total weight at Impact.

Angle-of-attack and point-of-impact on the facility.

Construction of the facility.
Location of the target with respect to ground level (i.e., below or above grade).10
The presence of surrodnding buildings and other obstacles (e.g., hills, transmission lines) that might block certain potential flight paths into the facility.
In other words, the consequences of such attacks are scenardo- and plant-design specific. It is not possible to make any general statements about spent fuel storage facility vulnerabilities to air attacks that would apply to all U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. U.S. commercial nuclear power plants are not required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to defend against air attacks. The Commission believes that It Is the responsibility of the U.S. government to implement security measures to prevent such attacks. The commercial nuclear Industry shares this view. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff informed the c6mmittee that the Commission has directed power plant operators to take steps to reduce the likelihood of serious consequences should such attacks occur. The staff also Informed the committee that the Commission may Issue additional directives once the vulnerability analyses it is sponsoring at Sandia National Laboratories are completed. These analyses are described in the committee's classified report (see also Chapters 3 and 4.in this report). 2.2.2 Ground Affacks Ground attacks on a nuclear facility could take three forms: (1) a direct assault on the facility by armed groups, (2) a stand-off attack using app.ropriate weapons, or (3) an assault having both air and ground components. The direct assault Would likely be carried out by a group of well-armed and trained attackers, perhaps working With the assistance of an Insider. The objective of such an attack would likely be to gain entry to protected and vital areas of the plant (FIGURE 2.1) to carry out radiological sabotage. The attackers would need to have knowledge of the design, location, and operation of the spent fuel facility to carry out such an attack successfully. Commercial nuclear power plants are required by the Nuclear.Regulatory Commission to maintain a professional guard force at each plant to defend against a Commission-developed design basis threat (DBT), which includes a ground assault. The protective force is a critical part of a nuclear power plant's security system f6r deterring, 10 All current dry cask storage facilities in the United States are constructed at ground level, whereas spent fuel pools can be located above or below grade, depending on plant design (see Chapter 3).
32 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORA GE
~~W \Ow erConeas; *Protected 'Area""*'
z-* .1***.,*
" "~ * *...t.. . *r ~ e~**. *t~ t "
FIGURE 2.1 Commercial nuclear power plant sites are'demarcated as shown for security purposes. The part of the power plant site over which the plant operator exercises control is referred~ to as the owner-controlled area. This usually corresponds to the boundary of the site. Located within this area are one or more protectedareas to which access Is restricted using guards, fences, and other barriers. Dry cask storage facilities, formally referred to as Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs), are located within these areas. The vitle/area of the plant contains the reactor core, support buildings, and the-spent fuel pool. It Is the most carefully controlled and guarded part of the plant site. SOURCE: Modified from Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing materials (2004). detecting, thwarting, or impeding attacks. The Commission staff declined to provide a formal briefing to the committee on the DBT for radiological sabotage, asserting that the committee did not have a need to know this information. Nevertheless, the committee was able to discern the details of the DBT from a series of presentations made by Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff. Commission staff also provided a fact check of this information as the classified report was being finalized. Power plant operators arerequired to demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that there is 'high assurance' that their guard forces can thwart the Commission-definedI DBT assault. This guard force also must be able to provide deterrence against a beyond-DBT attack depending on the adversarial force. Reinforcing forces would be provided by local and state law enforcement aswell as federal forces. The Commission staff also informed the committee that since the September 11,2001, attacks, the Commission has been working with OHS to improve coordination procedures with federal, state, and local agencies to improve their response capabllities In the event of an attack. DHS also is making grants to local law enforcement agencies arounld power plant sites to raise their [ capabilities to respond to requests for assistance.n
TERRORISTATTACKS ON SI5ENT FUEL STORAGE 33 Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued directives to power plant operators to enhance protection against vehicle bombs. The Commission also has issued directives to power plant operators to enhance protection against insider threats. The committee does not have enough information to judge whether the measures at power plants are in fact sufficient to defend against either a DBT or a beyond-DBT attack on spent fuel storage. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to provide detailed briefings to the committee on surveillance, security procedures, and security training at commercial nuclear.power plants. Consequently, the committee was unable to evaluate their effectiveness. A recent General Accounting Office report (GAO, 2003) was critical of some of these procedures, but the committee has no basis for judging whether these criticisms
*were justified. Nevertheless, the committee judges that surveillance and security procedures .at commercial nu6lear power plants are just as Important as physical barriers in preventing successful terroIst attacks and mitigating their-consequences.
2.2.3 Attacks Haying Both Air and Ground Components Hybrid attacks that combine aspects of both air and ground attacks also could be mounted by terrorists. These could deliver attaPking forces directly to a spent fuel 'storage facility, bypassing the security perimeters and security personnel deployed to protect agairist a ground attack. The committee considered various scenarios for such attacks. The committee judges that some scenarioý are feasible. Details are provided in the classified report. 2.2.4 Terrorist Theft of Spent Fuel for Use In a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) An RDD, or so-called dirty bomb, is a device that disperses radioactive material using chemical explosives or other means (NRC, 2002). RDDs do not involve fission-induced explosions of the kind associated with nuclear weapons. While RDD attacks can be carded out witfi any source of radioactivity, this discussion Is confined to scenarios that Involve the theft of spent fuel for such use.1 ' A crude RDD device could be fabricated simply by loading stolen spent fuel onto a truck carrying high explosives. The truck could be driven to another location and detonated. The dispersal of radioactivity from such an attack would be unlikely to cause many Immediate deaths, but there could be fatalities from the chemical explosion as well as considerable cleanup costs and adverse psychological effects. It would be difficult for terrorists to steal a large quantity of spent fuel (e.g., a single spent fuel assembly) for use in an RDD for three reasons. First, spent fuel.is highly radioactive and the'efore requires heavy shielding to handle. Second, the use of heavy equipment would be required to remove spent fuel assemblies from a pool o&dry cask. Third, controls are in place at plants to deter and detect such thefts. Additional details on these controls are provided In the classified report. Theft and removal of an assembly or individual fuel rods during an assault on the plant might be easier, because the guard force would likely be preoccupied defending the plant. However, the amount of material that could be removed would be small, and getting it "An attack on a spent fuel facility that resulted in the direct release of radioactivity would be an act of radiological sabotage of the kind considered previously Inthis chapter.
34 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE out of the plant would be time consuming and obvious to the plant defenders and other responding forces. There are broken fuel rods and other debris, mostly from older assemblies, in storage at many plants. These materials are typically stored along the sides of the spent fuel pools and could be more easily removed from the plant than an entire assembly. Pieces of fuel rods also are sometimes intentionally removed from assemblies for offsite laboratory analysis. Some plants have misplaced fuel rod pieces.12 A knowledgeable insider might be able to retrieve some of this material from the pool, but getting it out of the plant under normal operating conditions would be difficult. Even the successful theft of a part of a spent fuel rod would provide a terrorist with. only a relatively small amount of radioactive material. Superior materials could be obtained from other facilities. This material also can be purchased (Zimmerman and Loeb, 2004). Moreover, even with explosive dissemination, It is unlikely that much of the spent fuel will be aerosolized unless it is Incorporated Into a well-designed RDD. More likely, such an event would break up and scatter.the fuel pellets In relatively large chunks, which would not pose an overwhelming cleanup challenge. Even though the likelihood of spent fuel theft appears to be small, it is nevertheless important that the protection of these materials be maintained and improved as vulnerabilities are Identified. 2.3 RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff told the committee that it believes that the consequences of a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool would likely unfold slowly enough that there would be time to take mitigative actions to prevent a large release of radioactivity. They also pointed out that since the September 11; 2001, attacks, the Nuclear Regulatory. Commission has issued several orders that contain Interim Compensatory Measures that require power plant operators to consider potential mitigative actions in the event of such an attack. The committee received a briefing on some of these measures at one of its meetings. According to Commission staff, such measures provide an bdditional margin of safety. The nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have also asserted 13 that the robust construction and stringent security requirements at nuclear power plants make them less vulnerable to terrorist attack than softer targets such as chemical plants and refineries'(e.g., Chapin et al., 2002). They argue that scarce resources should be devoted to 12 For example, at the Millstone and Vermont Yankee plants in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Inthe case of Millstone, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determined on the basis of extensive analysis that these rods were likely disposed of as low-level waste. After the committee's classified report was published, Commission staff Informed the committee that Vermont Yankee had accounted for the missing rod segments and that Humbolt Bay had uncovered and IsInvestigating an inventory discrepancy Involving spent fuel rod segments. 13 These arguments tend to be generic in nature and do not differentiate spent fuel pools from the rest of the power plant.
TERRORISTA TTACKS ON SIPENT FUEL STORAGE 35 upgrading security at these other critical facilities rather than at already well-protected. nuclear plants. There are two unstated propositions in the ardument that nuclear plants are less vulnerable than other facilities. The first speaks to the probability of terrorist attacks on such facilities; the second speaks to the consequences:
" Proposition1: Nuclear power plants (and their spent fuel facilities) are less desirable as terrorist targets because they are robust and well protected. " Proposition2: If attacked, nuclear plants (and their spent fuel storage facilities) are likely to sustain little or n6 damage because they are robust and well protected.
The committee obtained a briefing from the Department of Homeland Security to address the first proposition. Details are provided In the classified report. While the committee's classified report was in review, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Issued a staff paper (Staff Statement No. 16, Outline of.the 9/11 Plot, pages 12-13) suggesting that al-Qaida initially included unidentified nuclear plants among an expanded list of targets for the September 11, 2001, attacks. According to that report, these plants were eliminiited from the target list along with several other facilities when the terrorist organization scaled back the number of planned attacks. Nevertheless, if this information Is correct, it provides further indications that commercial. nuclear power plants are of interest to terrorist groups, 14 even though softer targets may have a higher priority with many terrorists. With respect to the first proposition, the committee judges that it Is not prudent to dismiss nuclear plants, Including their spent fuel storage facilities, as undesirable targets for attacks by terrorists. As to the second proposition that terrorist attacks are likely to cause little or no damage, a poorly designed attack or an attack by unsophisticated terrorists might produce little physical damage to the plant. There could, however, be severe adverse psychological effects from such an attack that could have considerable economic consequences. On the other hand, attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to advanced weapons might - cause considerable physical damage to a spent fuel storage facility, especially in a suicide attack. It Is irhportant to recognize that an attack that damages a power plant or its spent fuel facilities would not necessarily result in the release of any radioactivity to the environment. While it may not be possible to deter such an attack, there are many potential mitigation steps that can be taken to lower its potential coinsequences should an attack occur. These are discussed in some detail in the committee's classified report (see also Chapters 3 and 4 in this report). 14 In another example of concern, police InToronto, Canada, detained 19 men in August 2003 based on suspicious activities that Included surveillance and flying lessons that would take them over a nuclear power plant (Ferguson et al., 2004).
36 SAFETYAND SECURI7Y OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE In summary, the 'committee judges that the plausibility of an attack on a spent fuel storage facility, coupled with the public fear associated with radioactivity, indicates that the possibility of attacks cannot be dismissed. 2.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS With respect to the committee's task to "explicitly consider the risks of terrorist attacks on [spent fuel] and the risk these materials might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device," the committee offers the following findings and recommendations: FINDING 2A: The probability of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage cannot be assessed quantitatively or comparatively. Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because It Is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations .of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well-known public dread of radiation. Terrorists view nuclear power plant facilities as desirable targets because of the large Inventories of radionuclides they contain. The committee believes that knowledgeable terrorists might choose to attack spent fuel pools because (1) at U.S. commercial power plants, these pools are less well protected structurally than reactor cores; and (2) they typically contain inventories of medium- and long-lived radionuclides that are several times greater than those contained in Individual reactor cores. FINDING 2B: The committee judges that the likelihood terrorists could steal enough spent fuel for use In a significant radiological dispersal device Is small. Spent fuel assemblies In pools or dry casks are large, heavy, and highly radioactive. They are too large and radioactive to be handled by a single Individual. Removal of an assembly from the pool or dry cask would prove extremely difficult under almost any terrorist attack scenario. Attempts by a knowledgeable insider(s) to remove single rods and related debris from the pool might prove easier, but It would likely be very difficult to get it out of the plant under normal operating conditions. Theft and removal during an assault on the plant might be easier because the guard force would likely be occupied defending the plant. However, the amount of materialthat'could be removed would be small. Moreover, there are other facilities from which highly radioactive material could be more easily stolen, and this material also can be purchased. Even though the likelihood of spent fuel theft appears to be small, it is nevertheless important that the protection of these materialsbe maintained and Improved as vulnerabilities are Identified. RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Comnmission should review and upgrade, where necessary, Its security requirements for protecting spent fuel rods not contained In fuel assemblies from theft by knowledgeable Insiders, especially in facilities where Individual fuel rods or portions of rods are being stored in pools. FINDING 2C: A number of security Improvements at nuclear power plants have been instituted since the events of September 11, 200.1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not provide the committee with enough information to evaluate the effectiveness of these procedures for protecting stored spent fuel.
TERRORISTATTACKS ON StPENT FUEL STORAGE 37 Surveillance and security procedures are just as important as physical barriers in preventing and mitigating terrorist attacks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission declined to provide the committee with detailed briefings on the surveillance and security procedures that are now in place to protect spent fuel facilities at commercial nuclear power plants against terrorist attacks. Although the committee did learn about some of the changes that have been instituted since the September 11, 2001, attacks, it was not provided with enough information to evaluate the effectiveness of procedures now in place. RECOMMENDATION: Although the committee did not specifically Investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of Improved surveillance and security measures for protecting stored spent fuel, an assessment of current measures should be performed by an Independent1 5 organization. 15 That Is, Independent of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear industry.
3 SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE. This chapter addresses the first charge of the committee's statement of task to assess "potential safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel presently stored in cooling pools at commercial reactor sites."' As noted in Chapter 1, storage of spent fuel In pools at commercial reactor sites has three primary objectives:
" Cool the fuel to prevent heat-up to high temperatures from radioactive decay. " Shield workers and the public from the radiation emitted by radioactive decay in the spent fuel and provide a barrier for any releases of radioactivity.
Prevent criticality accidents.
The first two of these objectives could be compromised by a terrorist attack that partially or completely drains the spent fuel pool.! The committee will refer to such scenarios as "loss-of-pool-coolant" events. Such events could have several deleterious consequences: Most Immediately, Ionizing radiation levels Inthe spent fuel building rise as the water level in the pool falls. Once the water level drops to within a few feet (a meter or so) of the tops of the fuel racks, elevated radiation fields could prevent direct access to the Immediate areas around the lip of the spent fuel pool building by workers. This might hamper but would not necessarily prevent the application of mitigative measures, such as deployment of fire hoses to replenish the water in the pool. The ability to remove decay heat from the spent fuel also would be reduced as the water level drops, especially when it drops below the tops of the fuel assemblies. This would cause temperatures in the fuel assemblies to rise, accelerating the oxidation of the zirconium alloy (zircaloy) cladding that encases the uranium oxide pellets. This oxidation reaction can occur in the presence of both air and steam and is strongly exothermic-that Is, the reaction releases large quantities of heat, which can further raise cladding temperatures. The steam reaction also generates large quantities of hydrogen: Reaction in air:. Zr + 02 -> ZrO2 heat released = 1.2 x 107 joules/kilogram Reaction in steam: Zr + 21-120 -- ZrO2 + 21-12 heat released = 5.8 x 106 joules/kilogram Abasic description of pool storage can be found in Chapter 1 and historical background can be found InAppendix D.Section 3.1 provides additional technical details about pool storage. 2 The committee could probably design configurations in which fuel might be deformed or relocated to enable its re-criticality, but the committee judges such an event to be unlikely. Also, the committee notes that while re-criticality would certainly be an undesirable outcome, criticality accidents have happened several times at locations around the world and have not been catastrophic offsite. An accompanying breach of the fuel cladding would still be the chief concern. 38
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE 39 These oxidation reactions can become locally self-sustaining (i.e., autocatalytico) at high temperatures (i.e., abouit a factor of 10 higher than the boiling point of water) if a supply of oxygen and/or steam is available to sustain the reactions. (These reactions will not occur when the spent fuel Is under water because heat removal prevents such high temperatures from being reached).The result could be a runaway oxidation reaction-referred to in this report as.a zirconium cladding fire---that proceeds as a bum front (e.g., as seen in a forest fire or a fireworks sparkler) along the axis of the fuel rod toward the source of oxidant (i.e., air or steam). The heat released from such fires can be even greater than the decay heat produced in newly discharged spent fuel. As fuel rod temperatures increase, the gas pressure Inside the fuel rod increases and eventually can cause the cladding to ball6on out and rupture. At higher temperatures (around 1800"C [approximately 3300"FJ), zirconium cladding reacts with the uranium oxide
.fuel to form a complex molten phase containing zirconium-uranium oxide. Beginning with the cladding rupture,, these events would result In the release of radioactive fission gases and some of the fuel'9 radioactive material In the form of aerosols Into the building that houses the spent fuel pool and possibly Into the environment. If the heat from one burning assembly Is not dissipated, the fire could spread to other spent fuel assemblies in the pool, producing a propagating zirconium cladding fire.
The high-temperature reaction of zirconium and steam has been described quantitatively since at least the early 1960s (e.g., Baker and Just, 1962). The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor and a set of experiments (e.g., CORA, FPT 1-6, CODEX, ORNL-VI, VERCORS) have provided a basis for understanding the phenomena of zirconium cladding fires and fission-product releases from Irradiated fuel in a reactor core accident. This understanding and data from the experiments form the foundation for computer simulations of severe accidents involving nuclear fuel. These experiments and computer simulations are for Inside-reactor vessel events rather than events in an open-air spent fuel pool array. This ch'apter examines possible Initiating factors for such loss-of-pool-coolant events and the potential consequences of such events. It Is organized Into the following four main sections: 0 Background on spent fuel pool storage. 0 Previous studies on safety and security of pool storage.
Evaluation of the potential risks of pool storage.

Findings and recommendations.
3 That Is, the reaction heatwill increase temperatures In adjacent areas of the fuel rod, which in turn will accelerate oxidation and release even more heat Autocatalytic oxidation leading to a "runaway r reaction requires a complex balance of heat and mass transfer, so assigning a specific ignition temperature Isnot possible. Empirical equations have been developed to predict the reaction rate as a function of temperature when steam and oxygen supply are not limited (see, e.g., Tong and Weisman, 1996, p. 223). Numerous scaled experiments have found that the oxidation reaction proceeds very slowly below approximately 900"C (1700"F).
40 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE
3.1 BACKGROUND
ON SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE After a power reactor Is shut down, its nuclear fuel continues to produce heat from radioactive decay (see FIGURE 1.2). Although only one-third of the fuel in the reactor core is replaced during each refueling ciycle, operators commonly offload the entire core (e~pecially at pressurized water reactors [PWRs]) into the pool during refueling 4 to facilitate loading of fresh fuel or for inspection or repair of the reactor vessel and internals. Heat generation in the pool Is at its highest point just after the full core has been offloaded. Pool heat loads can be quite high, as exemplified by a "typical" boiling water reactor (BWR) which was used in some of the analyses discussed elsewhere in this chapter (this BWR Is hereafter referred to as the "reference BWR"). This pool has approximately 3800 locations for storage of spent fuel assemblies, about 3000 of which are occupied by four-and-one-third reactor cores (13 one-third-core offloads) in a pool approximately 35 feet wide, 40 feet long, and 39 feet deep (10.7 meters wide, 12.2 meters long, and 11.9 meters deep) with a water capacity of almost 400,000 gallons (1.51 million liters). According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, the total decay heat in the spent fuel pool Is 3.9 megawatts (MW) ten days after a one-third-core offload. The vast majority of this heat is from decay in the newly discharged spent fuel. Heat loads would be substantially higher in spent fuel pools that contained a full-core offload. Although spent fuel pools have a variety of designs, they share one common characteristic: Almost all spent fuel pools are located outside of the containment structure that holds the reactor pressure vessel.5 In some reactor designs, the spent fuel pools are contained within the reactor building,6 which is typically constructed of about 2 feet of reinforced concrete (see FIGURE 3.1). In other designs, howeier, one or more walls of the spent fuel pool may be located on the exterior wall of an auxiliary building that is located adjacent to the containment building (see FIGURE 3.2). As described in more detail below, some pools are built ator below grade, whereas others are located at the top of the reactor building. The enclosing superstructures above the pool are typically steel, industrial-type buildings designed to house cranes that are used to move reactor components, spent fuel, and spent fuel casks. These superstructures above the pool are designed to resist damage from seismid loads but not from large tornado-borne missiles (e.g., cars and telephone .poles), which would usually impact the superstructures at low angles (i.e., moving. horizontally). In contrast, the typical spent fuel pool is robust. The pool walls and the external walls of the building housing the pool (these external walls may incorporate one or more pool walls in some plants) are designed for seismic stability and to resist horizontal
A 1996 survey by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC, 1996) found that the majority of commercial power reactors routinely offload their entire core to the spent fuel pool during refueling outages. The practice Is more common among PWRs than. BWRs, which tend to offload only that fuel that Isto be replaced, but some BWRs do offload the full core. In response to a committee Inquiry, an Energy Resources Intemational staff member confirmed that this Is still the case today.
I The exceptions in the United States are the Mark III BWRs, which have two pools, one of which is inside the containment. As discussed in Appendix C, spent fuel pools at German commercial nuclear power plants also are located inside reactor containment structures. . A PWR containment structure Is a large, domed building that houses the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators, and other equipment In a BWR, the containment structure houses less equipment, is located closer in to the pressure vessel, and sits inside a building called the reactor building, which also houses the spent fuel pool and safety-related equipment to support the reactor.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE4 41 FIGURE 3.1 Schematic section through a G.E. Mark I BWR reactor plant. The spent fuel pool is located in the reactor building well above ground level. This diagram Is for a BWR with a reinforced concrete superstructure (roof). Most designs have thin steel superstructures. SOURCE: Lamarsh (1975, Figure 11.3). strikes of tornado missiles. The superstructures and pools were not, however, specifically designed to resist terrorist attacks. The typical spent fuel pool is about 40 feet (12 meters) deep and can be 40 or more feet (12 meters) in each horizontal dimension. The pool walls are constructed of reinforced concrete typically having a thickness between 4 and 8 feet (1.2 to 2.4 meters). The pools.. contain a Y,- to YA-inch-thlck (6 to 13 mm) stainless steel liner, which is attached to the walls with studs embedded in the concrete. The pools also contain vertical storage racks for holding spent and fresh fuel assemblies, and some pools have a gated compartment to hold a spent fuel storage cask while it is being loaded and sealed (see Chapter 4). The storage racks are-about 13 feet (4 meters) inheight and are installed near the bottom of the spent fuel pool. The racks have feet to Provide space between their bottoms and the pool floor. There is also space between the sides of the rack and the steel pool linbrs for circulation of water (FIGURE*3.3). There are about 26 feet (8 meters) of water above the top of the'spent fuel racks. This provides substantial radiation shielding even when an assembly Is being moved above the rack. Transfers of spent fuel from the reactor core to the spent fuel pool or from the pool to storage casks are carried out underwater to provide shielding and cooling. The general elevation of the spent fuel pool matches that of the vessel containing the reactor core. Pressurized water reactor designs use comparatively shorter reactoi"
42 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE FIGURE 3.2 Schematic section through a PWR reactor plant. The spent fuel pool is located in the fuel-handling building next to the domed reactor containmeht building at or slightly below ground level. SOURCE: Modified from Duderstadt and Hamilton (1976, Figure 3-4). vessels closer to ground level (grade) and also have spent fuel pools that are close to grade (FIGURE 3.2). The design shown Inthis figure Is typical of the fuel pool arrangement for PWRs. Nuclear power plant sites that contain two reactors are usually arranged In a mirror-image fashion, with the two spent fuel pools (or a shared pool) located in a common area adjoining both reactor buildings. For single-plant or two-plant arrangements, the building covering the spent fuel pool and crane structures is typically an ordinary steel Industrial building. There are 69 PWRs currently In operation in the United States; 6 PWRs have been decommissioned but continue to have active spent fuel pool storage. In contrast, In boiling water reactor designs, the reactor vessel is at a higher elevation, and the BWR vessels are somewhat taller than PWR vessels.7 Consequently, BWRs have more elevated spent fuel pools, generally well above grade. FIGURE 3.1 shows the general design for the 22 BWR Mark I plants operating In the United States. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is conducting a survey of the plants to obtain a p better understanding of the variations In design of spent fuel pools across the nation. The following Information was provided to the committee from that survey: 7 The higher elevation accommodates control mechanisms that sit under the reactor, and the extra height accommodates steam separation and drying equipment at the top of the vessel. The fuel Is about the same length as PWR fuel.
SPENTFUEL POOL STORAGE4 43 FIGURE 3.3 Example of a section of a PWR spent fuel pool and support facilities. The pool is located to the right in the figure; the support equipment to the left. SOURCE: American Nuclear Society (1988). 0 PWR spent fuel pools: Spent fuel pools are located in buildings adjoining the reactor containment. buildings at PWR plants (see FIGURE 3.2). Some pools are posiftoned such that their spent fuel is below grade. As shown in Figure 3.2, some pool walls also serve as the external walls of the spent fuel pool buildings. Some plants have structures surrounding the spent fuel pool building that would provide some shielding of the pools from low-angle line-of-sight attacks. A more complete plant survey would be needed to establish the extent of pool exposure-. to such attacks.
BWR spent fuel pools: MARK I and II BWR plants are located above grade and are shielded by at least one exterior building wall. Some pools are also shielded by the reactor buildings. Some Pools are also shielded by "significant7 surrounding structures, and some have supplemental floor.and column supports.
The vulnerability of a spent fuel pool to terrorist 6ttack depends in part on its location with respect to ground level as well as its construction. Pools are potentially susceptible to attacks from above or from the sides depending on their elevation with respect to grade and the presence of surrounding shielding structures. As noted in Chapter 1, nearly all pools contain high-density spent fuel racks. These racks allow approximately five times as many assemblies to be stored in the pool as would have been possible with the original racks, which had open lateral channels between the fuel assemblies to enhance water circulation. i
44 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE 3.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON SAFETY AND SECURITY OF POOL STORAGE Several reports have been published on the safety of spent fuel pool storage. One of the earliest analyses was contained in the Reactor Safety Study (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1975), which concluded that spent fuel pool safety risks were very much smaller than those involving the cores of nuclear reactors. This conclusion is not surprising: The cooling system in a spent fuel pool Is simple. The coolant is at atmospheric pressure; the spent fuel is in a subcritical configuration-and generates little heat relative to that generated In an operating reactor;, and the design and location of piping in the pool make a severe loss-of-pool-coolant event unlikely during normal operating conditions. Despite changes in reactor and fuel storage operations, such as longer fuel residence times in the core and higher-density pool storage, the conclusions of that study are still broadly applicable today. It is important to recognize, however, that the Reactor Safety Study did not address the consequences of terrorist attacks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Its contractors have periodically re-analyzed the safety of spent nuclear fuel storage (see Benjamin et al., 1979; BNL, 1987, 1997; USNRC, 1983,2001 a, 2003b). All of these studies suggest that a loss-of-pool-coolant event could trigger a zirconium cladding fire In the exposed spent fuel. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission considered such an accident to be so unlikely that no specific action was warranted, despite changes in reactor operations that have resulted in increased fuel bum-ups and fuel storage operations that have resulted In more densely packed spent fuel pools. In 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent FuelPoolAccident Risk at DecommissioningNuclearPowerPlants,to provide a technical basis for rulemaking for power plant decommissioning (USNRC, 2001a).. A draft of the study was issued for public comments, Including comments by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and a quality review of the methods, assumptions, and models used In the analysis was carried out by the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The study provided a probabilistic risk assessment that Identified severe accident scenarios and estimated their consequences. The analysis determined, for a given set of fuel characteristics, how much time would be required to boil off enough water to allow the fuel rods to reach temperatures sufficient to initiate a zirconium cladding fire. The analysis suggested that large earthquakes and drops of fuel casks from an overhead crane during transfer operations were the two event Initiators that could lead to a loss-of-pool-coolant accident. For cases where active cooling (but not the coolant) has been lost, the thermal-hydraulic analyses suggested that operators would have about 100 hours4.167 days 0.595 weeks 0.137 months (more than four,days) to act before the fuel was uncovered sufficiently through boiling of cooling water in the pool to allow the fuel rods to Ignite. This time was characterized as an "underestimate" given the simplifications assumed for the.loss-of-pool-coolant scenario. The ovirall conclusion of the study was that the risk of a spent fuel pool accident leading'to a zirconium cladding fire was low despite the. large consequences because the predicted frequency of such accidents was very low. The study also concluded; however, that the consequences of a zirconium cladding fire in a spent fuel pool could be serious and, that once the fuel was uncovered, it might take only a few hours for the most recently discharged spent fuel rods to Ignite.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE 45 A paper by Alvarez et al. (2003a; see also Thompson, 2003) took the analyses in NUREG-1 738 to their logical ends in light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: Namely, what would happen if there were a loss-of-pool-coolant event that drained the spent fuel pool? Such an event was not considered in NUREG-1 738, but the analytical results in that study were presented in a manner that made such an analysis possible. Alvarez and his co-authors concluded that such an event would lead to the rapid heat-up of spent fuel in a dense-packed pool to temperatures at which the zirconium alloy cladding would catch fire and release many of the fuel's fission products, particularly cesium-137. They suggested that the fire could spread to the older spent fuel, resulting in long-term contamination consequences that were worse than those from the Chemobyl accident Citing two reports by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL, 1987, 1997), they estimated that between 10 and 100 percent of the cesium-1 37 could be mobilized in the plume from the burning spent fuel pool, which could cause tens of thousands of excess cancer deaths, lots of tens of thousands of square kilometers of land, and economic losses In the hundreds 0f billions of dollars. The excess cancer estimates were revised downward to between 2000 and 6000 cancer deaths In a subsequent paper (Beyea et al., 2004) that more accurately accounted for average population densities around U.S. power plants. Alvarez and his.co-authors recommended that spent fuel be transferred to dry storage within five years of discharge from the reactor. They noted that this would reduce the radioactive Inventories In spent fuel pools and allow the remaining fuel to be returned to open-rack storage to allow for more effective coolant circulation, should a loss-of-pool-coolant event occur. The authors also discussed other compensatory measures that could be taken to reduce the consequences of such events. The Alvarez et al. (2003a) paper received extensive attention and comments, including a comment from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff (USNRC, 2003a; see Alvarez et al., 2003b, for a response). None of the commentators challenged the main conclusion of the Alvarez et al. (2003a) paper that a severe loss-of-pool-coolant accident might lead to a-spent fuel fire in a dense-packed pool. Rather, the commentators challenged the likelihood that such an event could occur through accident or sabotage, the assumptions used to calculate the offsite consequences of such an event, and the cost-effectiveness of the authors' proposal to move spent fuel into dry cask storage..One commentator summarized these differences in a single sentence (Benjamin, 2003, p. 53): 'In a nutshell, [Alvarez et al.] correctly !dentify a problem that needs to be addressed, but they do not adequately demonstrate that the proposed solution Is cost-effective or that it is optimal." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff provided a briefing to the committee that provides a further critique of the Alvarez et al. (2003a) analysis that goes beyond the USNRC (2003a) paper..Commission staff told the committee that the NUREG-1 738 analyses.attempted to provide a bounding analysis of current and conceivable future spent fuel pools at plants undergoing decommissioning and therefore. relied on conservative assumptions. The analysis assumed, for example, that tile pool contained an equivalent of three-and-one-half reactor cores of spent fuel, including the core from the most recent reactor cycle. The staff also asserted that NUREG-1738 did not provide a realistic analysis of consequences. Commission staff concluded that "the risks and potential societal cost of [a] terrorist attack on spent fuel pools do not justify the complex and costly measures
46 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE proposed in Alvarez et al. (2003) to move and store 1/3 of spent fuel pools [sic] inventory in dry storage casks."a The committee provides a discussion of the Alvarez et al. (2003a) analysis in its classified report. The committee judges that some of their release estimates should not be dismissed. The 2003 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC, 2003b) staff publication NUREG-0933, A Prioritizationof Generic Safety Issues,9 discusses beyond-design-basis accidents in spent fuel pools. The study draws some of the same consequence conclusions as the Alvarez et al. (2003a) paper. It notes that in a dense-packed pool, a zirconium cladding fire "would probably spread to most or all of the spent fuel pool" (p. 1). This could drive what the report refers to as "borderline aged fuel" Into a molten condition leading to the release of fission products comparable to molten fuel in a reactor core. The NUREG-0933 report (USNRC, 2003b) summarizes technical analyses of the frequencies of severe accidents for three BWR scenarios. The report concludes that the
.greatest risk Is from a beyond-design-basis seismic event. While the consequences of such accidents are considerable, the report concludes that their frequencies are no greater than would be expected for reactor core damage accidents due to seismic events beyond the design basis safe shutdown earthquake.
An analysis of spent fuel. operating experience by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff (USNRC, 1997) showed that several accidental partial-loss-of-pool-coolant events have occurred as a result of human error. Two of these Involved the loss of more than 5 feet of water from the pool, but none had serious consequences. Nevertheless, Commission staff suggested that plant-specific analyses and corrective actions should be taken to reduce the potential for such events in the future. It Is Important to recognize that with the exception of the Alvarez et al. (2003a) paper, all of the previous U.S. work reviewed by the committee has focused on safety risks, not security risks. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission analyses of spent fuel storage vulnerabilities were not completed by the time the committee finalized its information gathering for this report, but the committee did receive briefings on this work. In addition, analyses have been undertaken of external impacts on power plant structures by aircraft for the few commercial power plants that are located close enough to airports to consider hardening of the plant design to resist accidental aircraft crashes. These analyses were .done as part of the plants' licensing safety analyses. The comrmittee did not look further into these few plants becaLise the aircraft considered were smaller and the impact velocities considered were much lower than those that might be brought to.bear in a well-planned terrorist attack. The committee did learn about work to assess the risks of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks in Germany (see Appendix C for.a description). However, the details of this work are classified by the German government and therefore are unavailable to the 'The quote is from a PowerPoint presentation made by Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff t6 the committee at one of Its meetings. 9NUREG-0933 is a historical record that provides a yearly update of generic safety Issues. It does not provide any additional technical analysis of these issues.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE'4 47 committee for review. Consequently, the committee was unable to provide a technical assessment. 3.3 EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF POOL STORAGE Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, spent fuel pool analyses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were focused almost exclusively on safety. On the basis of these analyses, the Commission concluded that spent fuel storage carried risks that were no greater (and likely much lower) than risks for operating nuclear reactors, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised the possibility of a new kind of threat to commercial power plants and spent fuel storage: prdmeditated, carefully planned, high-impact attar6ks by terrorists to damage these facilities for the purpose of releasing radiation to the eivironment and spreading fear and panic among civilian populations. The Commission informed the committee that Its conclusions about risks of spent fuel storage are now being reevaluated In light of these new threats. Prior to September 11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission viewed the most-credible sabotage event as a violent external land assault by small groups of well-trained, heavily armed Individuals aided by a knowledgeable insider.10 The Commission has long-established requirements for physical protection systems at power plants to thwart such assaults. The committee was told that these requirements have been increased since the September 11,2001, attacks. To the committee's knowledge, there are currently no requirements In place to defend against the kinds of larger-scale, premeditated, skillful attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001, whether or not a commercial aircraft is Involved. Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and representatives from the nuclear Industry repeatedly told the committee that they view detecting, preventing, and thwarting such attacks as the federal government's responsibility. It is important to recognize that nuclear power plants In the United States and most of the rest of the world'1 were designed primarily with safety, not security, in mind.' 2 The reinforced concrete containment buildings that house the reactors were designed to contain internal pressures of up to about 4 atmospheres in case steam Is'released in the event of.. various hypothetical reactor accidents. These and other plant structures were not specifically designed to resist external terrorist attacks, although their robust construction would certainly provide significant protection against external assaults with airplanes or other types of weapons. Moreover, commercial power plants are substantially more robust than other critical infrastructure such as chemical plants, refineries, and fossil-fuel-fired electrical generating stations. / 10This Is known as the "design basis threat" for radiological sabotage of nuclear power plants. See Chapter2. " 11 Spent fuel storage facilities InGermany are designed to survive the impact of a Phantom military jet without a significant release of radiation. Since September 11, 2001, the Germans have also examined the Impact of a range of aircraft, Including large civilian airliners, on these facilities. A discussion is provided InAppendix C. 12 No nuclear power plant ordered after the mid-1 970s has been built in the United States, so the designswere developed long before domestic terrorism of the kind seen on September 11,2001, became a concern.
48 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, a great deal of additional work hIas been or is being carried out by government and private entities to assess the security risks posed by terrorist attacks against nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage. The committee provides a discussion of these studies in the following subsections. Some of these studies are still.in progress. The committee's discussion of this work In the following subsections is organized around the following two questions: (1) Could an accident or terrorist attack lead to a loss-of-pool-coolant event that would partially or completely drain a spent fuel pool? (2) What would be the radioactive releases if a pool were drained? 3.3.1 Could a Terrorist Attack Lead to a Loss-of-Pool-Coolant Event? A terrorist attack that either disrupted the cooling system for the spent fuel pool or damaged or collapsed the pool Itself could potentially lead to a loss-of-pool-coolant event. The cooling system could be disrupted by disabling or damaging the system that circulates water from the pool to heat exchangers to remove decay heat. This system would not likely be a primary target of a terrorist attack, but it could be damaged as the result of an attack on the spent fuel pool or other targets at the plant (e.g., the power for the pumps could be interrupted). The loss of cooling capacity would be of much greater concern were It to occur during or shortly after a reactor offloading operation, because the pool would contain a large amount of high decay-heat fuel. The consequences of a damaged cooling system would be quite predictable: The temperature of the pool water would rise until the pool began to boil. Steam produced by boiling would carry away heat, and the steam would cool as It expanded into thle open space above the pool. 13 Boiling would slowly consume the water in the pool, and if no additional water were added the pool level would drop. It would likely take several days of continuous boiling to uncover the fuel. Unless physical access to the pool were completely restricted (e.g., by high radiation fields or debris), there would likely be sufficient time to bring in auxiliary water supplies to keep the water level in the pool at safe levels until the cooling system could be repaired. This conclusion presumes, of course, that.technical means, trained workers, and a sufficient water supply were available to Implement such measures. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that alternative sources of water be identified and available as an element of each plant's operating license. The p6ol-boiling event described above could result in the release of small amounts of radionuclides that are normally present in pool water.14 These radionuclides would likely have little or no offsite Impacts given their small concentrations in the steam and their subsequent dilution in air once released to the environment. Moreover, as long as the spent fuel is covered with a'stea*m-water mixture, it would not heat up sufficiently for the cladding to ignite. A loss-of-pool-coolant event resulting from damage or collapse of the pool could 13 The building above the spent fuel pool contains blow-out panels that could be removed to Orovide additional ventilation. 14 This contamination may enter the water from damaged fuel or from neutron-activated materials that build up on the external surfaces of the fuel assemblies. The latter material is referred to as "crud.!
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE 49 have more severe consequences. Severe damage of the pool wall could potentially result from several types of terrorist attacks, for Instance: (1) Attacks with large civilian aircraft. (2) Attacks with high-energy weapons. (3) Attacks with explosive charges. The committee reviewed two independent analyses of aircraft impacts on power plant structures: A study sponsored by EPRI completed in 2002 provides a generic analysis of civilian airliner impacts on commercial power plant structures (EPRI, 2002). A study in progress by Sandia National Laboratori6s for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission examines the consequences of an aircraft impact on an actual BWR power plant. The EPPJ and Sandia analyses used different finite element and finite difference codes that are in'common use in research and industry.15 Both sets of analyses attempted to validate the codes against physical tests, such as the Sandia "slug tests' that impacted water barrels into a concrete test wall at high speeds. EPRi's analysis used a Riera Impact loading condition, which models the aircraft impact on a rigid structure and is a slightly conservative assumption because the structures are in fact deformable. The Sandia. analysis was carried out on powerful computers that allowed the aircraft to be included. explicitly in the calculations. The committee also reviewed the preliminary results of Nuclear Regulatory Commission studies on the response of thick reinforced concrete walls such as those used In spent fuel pools to attacks involving simple explosive charges and other high-energy devices. The details of the analyses were not provided and therefore could not be evaluated quantitatively. However, some of these preliminary results are described In the committee's classified report. The results of these aircraft and assault studies are classified or safeguards information. The committee has corncluded that there are some scenarios that could lead to the partial failure of the spent fuel pool wall, thereby resulting in the partial or complete loss of pool coolant. A zirconium cladding fire could result if timely mitigative actions to cool the fuel were not taken. Details are provided In the classified report. 3.3.2 What would be the Radioactive Releases if a Pool Were Drained? There are two ways in which an attack on a spent fuel pool could spread radioactive contamination: mechanical dispersion and zirconium cladding fires. An explosion or high-energy impact directly on the spent fuel could mechanically pulverize and loft fuel out of the pool. This would contaminate the plant and surrounding site with pieces of spent fuel. Large- 's The EPRI analyses used sev'eral finite element models (ABAQUS, LS DYNA, ANACAP, and WINFRITH) and Riera Impact functions. The Sandia analyses used the CTH finite difference model and the Pronto3D finite element analysis model. The CTH code has been Used for a wide range of impact penetration and explosive detonation problems by thd Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and industry du.ing the past decade. CTH results have been compared extensively with experimental results. As an Eulerian code (where material flows through a fixed grid) It can readily handle severe distortions. It also has a variety of computational material models for dynamic (high-strain.rate) conditions, although it is limited Inthat Itdoes not explicitly model structural members, such as rebar and metal liners in the concrete structure, because of computational requirements.
50 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE scale offsite releases of the radioactive constituents would not occur, however, unless they were mobilized by a zirconium cladding fire that melted the fuel pellets and released some of their radionuclide inventory. Such fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now sponsoring work at Sandia National Laboratories to Improve upon the analyses in NUREG-1738 (USNRC, 2001a), and in particular to obtain an Improved phenomenological understanding of the thermal and hydraulic processes that would occur in a spent fuel pool from a loss-of-pool-coolant event. The committee received briefings on this work from Commission and Sandia staff during the course of this study. Additionally, the committee received a briefing from ENTERGY Corp. staff and Its consultants under contract to analyze and understand the consequences of a loss-of-pool-coolant event in a spent fuel pool In a PWR plant. The Sandia analyses were carried out on the reference BWR described in Section 3.1. Sandia's analysis of a PWR spent.fuel pool had only just begun by the end of May 2004 and has not yet yielded any results. The committee had less opportunity to examine ENTERGY's approach and results. Because of these limitations, the committee was unable to examine In any detail the effects of the differences between BWR and PWR pools and fuel, except as noted with respect to their locations relative to grade. The analyses were carried out using several well-established computer codes. The MELCOR code, which was developed by Sandia for use in analyzing severe-reactor core accidents, was used to model fluid flow, heat transfer, fuel cladding oxidation kinetics, and fission product release phenomena associated with spent fuel assemblies. This code has been benchmarked against data from experiments (e.g., the FPT experiments on the Ph6bus test facility, and the VERCORS, CORA, and ORNL VI experiments)' 6 that involve zirconium oxidation kinetics and fission product release. However, none of the experiments was designed to simulate the. physical conditions in a spent fuel pool. Many of the phenomena are not significantly different In a reactor core and in a spent fuel pool, but a few important differences, particularly concerning fire propagation from hotter fuel assemblies to cooler fuel assemblies and nuclear fuel volatilities, warrant more detailed analyses or further experiments. In principle, MELCOR can perform "best-estimate" calculations that address a range of accident evolutions, accounting for temperature, availability of oxidizing air and steam,' 7 and speciation and transport of radionuclides. Sandia calculated the decay heat in the assemblies using the ANSI/ANS 5.1 code based on actual characteristics of the spent fuel (i.e., actual fuel ages, bum-ups, and locations) in the reference BWR pool. Flow and mixing behavior in the pool and reactor building enclosing the pool were modeled using a separate computational fluId dynamics (CFD) code.. Two types of analyses were carded out. A "separate effects" analysis was undertaken to examine the thermal responses of a spent fuel assembly (FIGURE 3.4) in a These experiments were designed to examine phenomena that occur in reactor cores during severe T accidents. The phenomena include core degradation.
" Oxygen feeds the zirconium reaction and enhances release and transport of ruthenium-1 06, and the steam reaction releases hydrogen; whereas limited availability of oxygen starves the reaction.
Steam can also entrain released fission products.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAdE 51 9 x 9 BWR Assemblies A 7d 5 Assemblies B
-V iblies LUr Concrete FIGURE 3.4 Configuration of fuel assembliesused for separate effects analysis. (A) Top view of BWR spent fuel assemblies used in the*model. (B) Side view showing spent fuel assemblies in the pool. SOURCE: Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing materials (2004).
52 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE
*A EWROMAN-<--K- Hot" *FIGURE 3.5 Two configurations used in the separate effects models shown in FIGURE 3.4:
(A) Center hot spent fuel assembly surrounded by~four~cold assemblies; and (B) center hot spent fuel assembly surrounded by four hot assemblies. SOURCE: Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing materials (2004). loss-of-p~ool-coolant event. This analysiswas used to understand how thermal behavior is
influenced by factors such as decay heat In the fuel assembly, heat transfer with adjacent assemblies, and heat transfer to .circulating air or steam in a drained spent fuel pool. This analysis was u~sed to guide the development of 'global respornses models to examine the thermal-hydraulic behavior of a;n entire spent fuel pool.*
"iThe separate effects analysis examined the thermal behavior of a high decay-heat BWR spent fuel assembly surrounded either by four low decay-heat assemblies (FIGURE 3.5A) or four high decay-heat assemblies (FIGURE 3.5B). This analysis showed that the potential for heat build-up In a fuel assembly sufficient to initiate a zirconium cladding fire depends on Its decay heat (which Is related to its age) and on the rate at which heat can be transferred to adjacent assemblies and to circulating air or steam.
SPENTFUELPOOL STORAGE5 53 In the.configuration shown in FIGURE 3.5A, the low decay-heat assemblies act as thermal radiation heat sinks, thereby allowing the more rapid transfer of heat away from the center fuel assembly than would be the case if the center assembly were surrounded by high decay-heat assemblies. The results from this analysis indicate that this.configuration can be air cooled sufficiently to prevent the Initiation of a zirconium cladding fire within a relatively short time after the center fuel assembly is discharged from the reactor. In the configuration shown in FIGURE 3.5B, heat transfer away from the center assembly is reduced and heat build-up is more rapid. Results indicate that this configuration cannot be air cooled for a significantly longer time after the center fuel assembly is discharged from the' reactor. The global analysis modeled the actual design and fuel loading pattem of the reference BWR spent fuel pool. The pool was divided into seven regions based on fuel age.
.Within each of those seven regions, the model for the fuel racks was subdivided into 16 zones. The grouoipng of assemblies Into zones reduced the computational requirements compared to modeling every assembly."8 Two scenarios were examined: (1) a complete loss-of-pool-coolant scenario in which the pool is drained to a level below the bottom of spent fuel assemblies; and (2) a partial-loss-of-pool-coolant scenario in which water levels in the pool drain to a level somewhere between the top and bottom of the fuel assemblies. In the former case, a convective air circulation path can be.established along the entire length of the fuel assemblies, which promotes convective air cooling of the fuel. In the latter case, an effective air circulation path cannot form because the bottom of the assembly is blocked by water. Steam is generated by boiling of the pool water, and the zirconium cladding oxidation reaction produces hydrogen gas. This analysis suggests that circulation blockage has a significant impact on thermal behavior of the fuel assemblies. The specific Impact depends on the depth to which the pool is drained.
The global analysis examined the thermal behavior of fuel assemblies In the pool at 1, 3, and 12 months after the offloading of one-third of a core of spent fuel from the reactor. Sensitivity studies were carried out to assess the importance of radiation heat transfer between different regions of the pool, the effects of building damage on releases of radioactive material to the environment, and the effects of varying the assumed location and size of the hole In the pool wall. The results of these analyses are provided in the committ6e's classified report. For. some scenarios, the fuel could be air cooled within a relatively short time after its removal from the reactor. If a loss-of-coolant event took place before the fuel could be air cooled, however, a zirconium *claddingfire could be Initiated if no mitigative actions were taken. Such fires could release some of the fuel's radioactive material inventory to the environment in the form of aerosols. For a partial-loss-of-pool-coolant event, the analysis indicates that the potential for zirconium cladding fires would exist for an even greater time (compared to the complete-loss-of-pool-coolant event) after the spent fuel was discharged from the 'eactor because air circulation can be blbcked by water at the bottom of the pool. Thermal coupling betWeen adjacent assemblies will be due primarily to radiative rather than convective heat transfer. However, this heat transfer mode has been modeled simplistically in the MELCOR runs 18 The global-response model runs took between 10 and 12 days on the personal computers used in the Sandia analyses.
.54 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE performed by Sandia. 19 If the water level is above the top of the fuel racks, decay heat in the fuel could cause the pool water to boil. Once watef levels fall below a certain level in the fuel assembly, the exposed portion of the fuel cladding might heat up sufficiently to ignite if no mitigative actions were taken. This could result In the release of a substantial fraction of the cesium inventory to the environment In the form of aerosols.
A zirconium cladding fire in the presence of steam could generate hydrogen gas over the course of the event. The generation and transport of hydrogen gas In air was modeled in the Sandia calculations as was the deflagration of a hydrogen-air mixture in the closed building space above the spent fuel pool. The deflagration of hydrogen could enhance the release of radioactive material in some scenarios. Sandia was just beginning to carry out a similar set of analyses for a "reference" PWR spent fuel pool when the committee completed information gathering for its classified report. There are reasons to believe that the results for a PWR pool could be somewhat different, and possibly more severe, than for a BWR pool: PWR assemblies are larger, have somewhat higher bum-ups, and some assemblies sit directly over the rack feet, which may Impede cooling. While PWR fuel assemblies hold more fuel, th'ei also have more open channels within them for water circulation. The committee was told that as part of this work, a sensitivity analysis will be carried out to understand how design differences among U.S. PWRs will influence the model results. ENTERGY Corp. has carried out Independent separate-effects modeling of a PWR spent fuel pool using the MELCOR code. The analyses addressed both partial and complete loss-of-pool-coolant events for its PWR spent fuel assemblies in a region of the pool where there are no water channels in the spent fuel racks. The analyses were made for relatively fresh spent fuel assemblies (i.e., separate models were run for assemblies that had been discharged from the reactor for 4, 30, and 90 days) surrounded by four'cold' assemblies that had been discharged for two years. In general, the ENTERGY results are similar to those from the Sandia separate-effects analyses mentioned above, Several steps could be taken to mitigate the effects of such loss-of-pool-coolant events short of removal of spent fuel from the pool. Among these are the following: The spent fuel assemblies in the pools can be reconfigured in a "checkerboard' pattern so that newer, higher decay-heat fuel elements are surrounded by older, lower decay-heat elements. The older elements will act as radiation heat sinks in the event of a coolant loss so that the fuel Is air coolable within a short time of its discharge from the reactor. Altematively, newly discharged fuel can be placed near the pool wall, which also acts as a heat sink. ENTERGY staff estimates that reconfiguring the fuel in one of its pools Into a checkerboard pattem would take only about 10. hours of extra Work, but would not extend a refueling outage. Reconfiguring of fuel alre6dy in the pool could be done at any time. It does not require a reactor outage. " In a reactor core accident, heat transfer by thermal radiation Is not Important because all of the fuel assemblies are at approximately the same temperature. Consequently, there is no net heat transfer between them. But spent fuel pools contain assemblies of different ages, bum-ups, and decay-heat production. The hotter assemblies will radiate heat to cooler assemblies.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE 55 If there is sufficient space in the pool, empty slots can also be arranged to promote natural air convection in a complete-loss-of-pool-coolant event. The cask loading area in some pools may serve this purpose if it is in communication with the rest of the pool.
Preinstalled emergency water makeup systems in spent fuel pools would provide a mechanism to replace pool water in the event of a coolant loss.
Preinstalled water spray systems above or within the pool could also be used to. cool the fuel In a loss-of-pool-coolant event. 0 The committee carried out a simple aggregate calculation suggesting that a water bpray of about 50 to 60 gallons (about 190 to 225 liters) per minute -forthe whole pool would likely be adequate to prevent a zirconium cladding fire in a loss-of-pool-coolant event. A simple, low-pressure spray distribution experiment could verify what distribution of coolant would be sufficient to cool a spent fuel pool. Such a system would have to be designed to function even if the spent fuel pool or building were severely damaged in an attack? 1
Limiting full-core offloads to situations when such offloads are required would reduce the decay heat load in the pool during routine refueling outages.
Altematively, delaying the offload of fuel to the pool after a reactor shutdown would reduce the decay-heat load in the pool. The walls of spent fuel pools could be reinforced to prevent damage that could lead to a loss-of-pool-coolant event.
Security levels at the plant could be Increased during outages that involve core offloads.
Of course, damage to the pool and high radiation fields could make it difficult to take some of these mitigative measures. Multiple redundant and diverse measures may be required so that more than one remedy is available to mitigate a loss-of-pool-coolant event, especially when access to the pool is limited by damage or high radiation fields. Cost considerations might be significant, particularly for measures such as installing hardened spray systems and lengthening refueling outages, but the committee did not examine the costs of these measures. 3.3.3 Discussion The Sandia and ENTERGY analyses described in this chapter were still in progress when the committee completed its classified report. As noted previously, draft technical documents describing the work were not available at the time this study was being . completed. Consequently, the committee's understanding of these analyses is based on briefing materials (i.e., PowerPoint slides) presented before the committee by Nuclear 20 There Isan extensive analytic and experimental experienc6 base confirming that spray systems are effective Wi providing emergency coie cooling InBWR reactor cores, which generate much more decay heat than spent fuel. Detailed experiments have shown that some minimum amount of water must be delivered on top of each assembly, and Ifthat is provided, the assembly will be cooled adequately even if there Is significant blockage of the cooling channels. 21 ENTERGY staff mentioned the possible use of a specially equipped fire engine to providd spray cooling. The committee does not know whether this would deliver sufficient spray cooling where it is needed or would provide sufficient protection Ifterrorists are attempting to prevent emergency response, but the strategy is worth further examination.
56 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Regulatory Commission and ENTERGY staff and consultants, discussions with these experts, and the committee's own expert judgment. The committee judges that these analyses provide a start for understanding the behavior of spent fuel pools In severe environments. The analyses were carried out by qualified experts using well-known analytical methods and engineering codes to model
.system behaviors. Although this is a start, the analyses have imoortant limitations.
The aircraft attack scenarios consider one type of aircraft. Heavier aircraft could be used in such attacks. These planes are In common use inpassenger and/or cargo operations, and some of these planes can be chartered. Equally limiting assumptions were made in the analyses of spent fuel pool thermal behavior. To make the analysis tractable, it was assumed that the fuel in the pool was in an undamaged condition when the loss-of-pool-coolant event occurred..This is not necessarily a valid *assumption.Whether such damage would change the outcome of the analyses described In this chapter Is unknown. Simplistic modeling assumptions were made about the fuel assembly geometry (e.g., individual fuel bundles were not modeled In the global effects calculation), convective cooling flow paths and mechanisms, thermal radiation heat transfer, propagation of cladding fires to low-power bundles; and radio~ctivity release mechanisms. In addition, flow blockage due to fission-gas-Induced clad ballooning72 was not considered. The thermal analysis experts on the committee judge that these simplistic assumptions could produce results that are more severe (i.e., overconservative) than would be the case had more realistic assumptions been used. More sophisticated models, which involve clad ballooning and detailed thermal-hydraulics, Includihg radiative heat transfer, have been developed for the analysis of severe in-core accidents. These models can be evaluated using more powerful computers. MELCOR appears to have sufficient capability to evaluate more sophisticated models of the* spent fuel pool and Sandia has access to large, sophisticated computers. State-of-the-art calculations of this type are needed for the analysis of spent fuel pools so that more informed regulatory decisions can be made. The analyses also do not consider the possibility of an attack that ejects spent fuel from the pool. The ejection of~freshly discharged spent fuel from the pool might lead to a zirconium cladding fire if immediate mitigative actions could not be taken. The application of such measures could be hindered by the high radiation fields around the fuel. While the committee judges that some attacks involving aircraft would be feasible to carry out, It can provide no assessment of the probability 6f such attacks. Nevertheless, analyzing their consequences is useful for Informing policy decisions on steps to be taken to protect these facilities from terrorist attack. 2 If a fuel rod reaches relatively high temperatures, the gases inside can cause the cladding to balloon out, restricting and even blocking coolant flow through the spaces between the rods within the assembly.
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE 57 3.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based on its review of spent fuel pool risks, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations. FINDING 3A: Pool storage is required at all operating commercial nuclear power plants to cool newly discharged spent fuel. Operating nuclear power plants typically discharge about one-third of a reactor core of spent fuel every 18-24 months. Additionally, thb entire reactor core maybe placed into the spent fuel pool (offloaded) during outage periods for refueling. The analyses of spent fuel thermal behavior described in this chapter demonstrate that freshly discharged spent fuel generates too much decay heat to be passively air cooled. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission reciuires that this fuel be stored in a pool that'has an active heat removal system (i.e., water pumps and heat exchangers) for at least one year as a safety matter. Current design practices for approved dry storage systems require five years' minimum decay In spent fuel pools. Although spent fuel younger than five years could be stored in dry casks, the changes required for shielding and heat removal could be substantial, especially for fuel that has been discharged for less than about three years. FINDING 3B: The committee finds that, under some conditions, a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials"to the environment. Details are prbvlded In the committee's classified report. It Is not possible to predict the precise magnitude of such releases because the computer models have not been validated for this application. FINDING 3C: It appears to be feasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium cladding firefollowing a loss-of-pool-coolant event using readily Implemented measures. There appear to be some measures that could be taken to mitigate the risks of spent fuel zirconium cladding fires in a loss-of-pool-coolant event. The fbllowing measures appear to have particular merit. Recohfiguring of spent fuel In the pools (i.e., redistribution of high decay-heat
*assemblies so that they are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies) to more evenly distribute decay-heat loads. The analyses described elsewhere in this chapter suggest that the potential for zirconium cladding fires can be reduced substantially by surrounding freshly discharged spent fuel assemblies with older spent fuel assemblies in "checkerboard* patteems. The analyses suggest that such arrangements might even be more effective for reducing the potential for 7irrinniitri nidndinn firis.. than ri.rnnvinn thi. nirpr .- nAnt fit W frnm thco nnnr
I 58 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE be made. The offloading of the reactor core into the spent fuel pool during reactor outages substantially raises the decay-heat load of the pool and Increases the risk of a zirconium cladding fire In a loss-of-pool-coolant event. Of course, any actions that increase the time a power reactor is shut down incur costs, which must be considered in cost-benefit analyses of possible actions to reduce risks. Development of a redundant and diverse response system to mitigate loss-of-pool-coolant events. Any mitigation system, such as a spray cooling system, must be capable of operation even when the pool is drained (which would result in high radiation fields and limit worker access to the pool) and the pool or overlying building, Including equipment attached to the roof or walls, Is severely. damaged. FINDING 3D: The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attacks are plant-design specific. Therefore, specific vulnerabilities can be understood only by examining the characteristics of spent fuel storage at each plant. As described in the classified report, there are substantial differences In the design of PWR and BWR spent fuel pools. PWR pools tend to be located near or below grade, whereas BWR pools typically are located well above grade but are protected by exterior walls and other structures. In addition, there are plant-specific differences among BWRs and PWRs that could increase or decrease the vulnerabilities of the pools to various kinds of terrorist attacks, making generic conclusions difficult. FINDING 3E: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Independent analysts have made progress in understanding'some vulnerabilities of spernt fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks and the consequences of such attacks for releases of radioactivity to the environment. However, additional work on specific Issues listed in the following recommendation Is needed urgently. The analyses carried out to date for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Sandia National Laboratories and by other Independent organizations such as EPRI and ENTERGY have provided a general understanding of spent fuel behavior in a loss-of-poof-coolant event and the vulnerability of spent fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks that could cause such events to occur. The work to date, however, has not been sufficient to adequately understand the vulnerabilities and consequences. This work has addressed a small number
ofplant designs that may not be representative of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants as a whole. It has considered only a limited number of threat scenarios that may underestimate the damage that can be inflicted on the pools by determined terrorists. Additional analyses are needed urgently to fill in the knowledge gaps so that well-informed policy decisions can be made..
RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should undertake additional best-estimate analyses to more fully understand the vulnerabilities and consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events that could lead to a zirconium cladding fire. Based on these analyses, the Commission should take appropriate actions to address any significant vulnerabilities that are identified. The analyses of the BWR and PWR spent fuel pools should be extended to consider the consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events that are described In the committee's classified report.
*1i
SPENT FUEL POOL STORAG'E 59 The consequence analyses should address the following questions:
To what extent would such attacks damage the spent fuel in the pool, and what would be the thermal consequences of such damage?

Is it feasible to reconfigure the spent fuel within pools to prevent zirconium cladding fires given the actual characteristics (i.e., heat generation) of spent fuel assemblies In the pool, even If the fuel were damaged In an attack? Is there enough space In the pools at all commercial reactor sites to Implement such fuel repconfiguration?

In the event of a localized zirconium cladding fire, will such rearrangement prevent its spread to the rest of the pool?

How much spray cooling is needed to prevent zirconium cladding fires and prevent propagation of such fires? Which of the different options ffWr providing spray cooling are effective under attack and accident conditions?
Sensitivity analyses should also be undertaken to account for the full range of variation In spent fuel pool designs (e.g., rack designs, capacities, spent fuel burn-ups, and ages) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. RECOMMENDATION: While the work described In the previous recommendation under Finding 3E, above, Is being carried out, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that power plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events In spent fuel pools that could result In propagating zirconium cladding fires. The committee judges that there are at. least two such measures that should be implemented promptly:
* -Reconfiguringof fuel in the pools so that high decry-haat fuel assemblies are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies. This will more evenly distribute decay-heat loads, thus enhancing radiative heat transfer in the event of a loss of pool coolarnt.
Provision for water-spray systems that would be able to cool the fuel even if the pool or overlying building were severely damaged.
Reconfiguring of fuel in the pool would be a prudent measure that could probably be implement*ed at all plants at little cost, time, or exposure of workers to radiation. The second measure would probably be more expensive to implement and may not be needed at all plants, particularly plants In which spent fuel pools'are'located below grade or are protected from external line-of-sight attacks by exterior walls and other structures. The committee anticipates that the costs and benefits of options for Implementing the second measure would be examined to help decide what requirements Would be imposed. Fu~iher, the committee does not presume to anticipate the best design of such a system-whether It should be installed on the walls of a pool or deployed from a location where it is unlikely to be compromised by the same attack-but simply notes the demanding requirements such a system must meet.
4 DRY CASK STORAGE AND COMPARATIVE RISKS This chapter addresses the second and third charges of the committee's statement of task:
" The safety and security advantages, Ifany, of dry cask storage 1 versus wet pool storage at reactor sites. " Potential safety and security advantages, Ifany, of dry cask storage using Various single-, dual-, or multi-purpose cask designs.
The second charge calls for a comparative analysis of dry cask storage versus pool storage, whereas the third charge focuses exclusively on dry casks.The committee will address the third charge first to provide the basis for the comparative analysis. By the late 1970s, the need for alternatives to spent fuel pool storage was becoming obvious to both commercial nuclear power plant operators and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The U.S. government made a policy decision at that time not to support commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (see Appendix D). At the same time, efforts to open an underground repository for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel were proving to be more difficult and time consuming than originally anticipated? Commercial nuclear power plant operators had no place to ship their growing inventories of spent fuel and were running out of pool storage space. Dry cask storage was developed to meet the need for expanded onsite storage of spent fuel at commercial nuclear power plants. The first dry cask storage facility In the United States was opened In 1986 at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant in Virginia. Such facilities are now in operation at 28 operating and decommissioned nuclear power plants. In 2000, the nuclear power Industry projected that up to three or four plants per year would run out of needed storage space in their pools without additional Interim storage capacity. This chapter Is organized into the following sections:
Background on dry cask storage.

Evaluation of potential risks of dry cask storage.
4, Potential advantages of dry storage over wet storage.
Findings and recommendations.
This storage system is referred to as "dry" because the fuel is stored out of water. 2 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the Amendments Act of 1987 laid out a process for Identifying a site for a geologic repository. That repository was to be opened and operating by the end of January 1998. The federal government now hopes to open a repository at Yucca Mountain, which is located Insouthwestern Nevada, by the end of 2010. 60
DRY CASK STORAGEAND COMPARATIVE RISKS 61
4.1 BACKGROUND
ON DRY CASK STORAGE The storage of spent fuel in dry casks has the same three primary objectives as pool storage (Chapter 3):
Cool the fuel to prevent heat-up to high temperatures from radioactive decay.
0 Shield workers and the public from the radiation emitted by radioactive decay in the spent fuel and provide a barrier for any releases of radioactivity. 0 Prevent priticality accidents. Dry casks are designed to achieve the first two of these objectives without the use of water or mechanical systems. Fuel cooling is passive: that is, it relies upon a combination of heat conduction through solid materials and natural convection or thermal radiation through "airto move decay heat from the spent fuel into the ambient environment. Radiation shielding is provided by the cask materials: Typically, concrete, lead, and steel are used to shield gamma radiation, and polyethylene, concrete, and boron-impregnated metals or resins are used to shield neutrons. Criticality control Is provided by a lattice structure, referred to as a
basket, which holds the spent fuel assemblies within Individual compartments in the cask (FIGURE 4.1). These maintain the fuel In a fixed geometry, and the basket may contain boron-doped metals to absorb neutrons.3 Passive cooling and radiation shield!ng are possible because these casks are designed to store only older spent fuel. This fuel has much lower decay heat thari freshly discharged spent fuel as well as smaller inventories of radionuclides.
The industry sometimes refers to these casks using the following terms:
Single-, dual-, and multi-purpose casks.
" Bare-fuel and canister-based casks.
The terms in the first bullet indicate the application for which the casks are intended to be used. Single-purpose cask systems are licensed 4 only to store spent fuel. Dual-purpose casks are licensed for both storage and transportation. Multi-purpose casks are intended for storage, transportation, and disposal In a geologic repository. No true multi- . purpose casks exist In the United State's (or In any other country for that matter) because specifications for acceptable containeri' for geologic disposal have yet to be finalized by the Department of Energy. Current plans for Yucca Mountain do not contemplate the use of multi-purpose casks. Nevertheless, some cask vendors still refer to their casks as*multi-purpose." These are at best dual-purpose casks, however, because they have been licensed only for storage and transport. Because true multi-purpose casks do not now exist and are not likely to exist in the future, the committee did not consider them further In this study. Criticality control Is less of an issue in dry casks because there is no water moderator present after the cask is sealed and drained. 4Authority for licensing dry cask storage rests with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
62 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE FIGURE 4.1 Photo of NUHOMS canister showing the internal basket for holding the spent fuel assemblies in a fixed geometry. This canister Is shown for illustrative purposes only. SOURCE: Courtesy of Transnuclear, inc., an Areva Company. The terms in the second bullet Indicate how spent fuel is loaded Into the casks. In bare-fuels caiks', spent fuel assemblies are placed directly into a basket that is integrated into the cask itself (see FIGURE 4.3B). The cask has a bolted lid closure for sealing. In canister-based casks, spent fuel assemblies are loaded Into baskets integrated into a thin-wall (typically Y=--inch [1.3-centimeter] thick) steel cylinder, referred to as a canister(see FIGURE 4.1 and 4.3A). The canister is sealed with a welded lid. The canister can be stored or transported if it Is pla6ed within a suitable overpack. This overpack Is closed with a bolted lid. Bare-fuel and canister-based Systems are sometimes referred to as "thick-walled" and "thin-walled" casks, respectively, by some cask vendors. This designation is not strctly correct because the overpacks in canister-based systems have thick walls. The only thin-walled component is the canister, which is .designed to be stored or transported within the overpack. The designation of a cask as single- or dual-purpose often has less to do with its design and more to do with licensing decisions. Indeed, bare-fuel and canister-based casks can be licensed for either single or dual purposes. Consequently, one'should not expect the performance of a cask in accidents or terrorist attacks to depend on its designation as single- or dual-purpose. Rather, performance will depend on the type of attack and constructiori of the cask:For the purposes of discussion in this chapter, therefore, the committee uses the designations "bare-fuel" arid "canister-based," rather than single- or dual-purpose, when referring to various cask designs.. All bare-fuel casks in use in the United States are designed to'be stored vertically. Most canister-based systems also are design'ied for ,ertical storage, but one overpack The term bare fuel refers to the entire fuel assembly, Including the uranium pellets within the fuel rods.
=.
DRY CASK STORAGEAND COMPARATIVE RISKS 63 system is designed as a horizontal concrete module (FIGURE 4.2).6 The principal characteristics of dry cask storage systems are summarizeddin TABLE 4.1, which is located at the end of this chapter. Dry casks are designed to hold up to about 10 to 15 metric tons of spent fuel. This Is equivalent to about 32 pressurized water nuclear reactor (PWR) spent fuel assemblies or 68 boiling water nuclear reactor (BWR) spent fuel assemblies. Although the dimensions vary among manufacturers, fuel types (i.e., BWR or PWR fuel), and amounts of fuel stored, the
casks are typically about 19 feet (6 meters) in height, 8 feet (2.5 meters) in diameter, and weigh 100 tons or more when loaded.
The casks (for bare-fuel designs) or canisters (for canister-based designs) are placed directly into the spent fuel pool for loading. After they are loaded, the canisters or
.casks are drained, vacuum dried, and filled with an Inert gas (typically helium). The loaded canisters or casli are then removed from the pool, their outer surfaces are decontamlnated,'ýand they are moved to the dry storage facility on the property of the .reactor site. Loading of a single cask or canister can take up to one week. The vacuum drying process Is the longest step In the loading process.
In the United States, dry casks are stored on open concrete pads within a protected area of the plant site.'" This.protected area may be contiguous with the protected area of the plant itself or may be located some distance away in Its own protected area (see FIGURE 2.1). According to the Information provided to the committee by cask vendors, nuclear power plant operators are currently purchasing mostly dual-purpose casks for spent fuel storage. The horizontal NUHOMS cask design Is one of the most-ordered designs at present (TABLE 4.3). The vendors Informed the committee that cost is the chief consideration for their customers when making purchasing decisions. Cost considerations are driving the cask industry.away from all-metal cask designs and toward concrete designs for storage. S In addition, there Is one modular concrete vault design Inthe United States: ihe Fort St. Vrain, Colorado, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, which stores spent fuel from a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor. This reactor operated until 1989 and is now decommissioned. Because this Isa one-of-a-kind facility, and the time available to the committee was short, itwas not examined Inthis study. 7 small amounts of radioactive contamination are present Inthe cooling water Inthe spent fuel pool. Some of this contamination Is transferred to the cask or canister surfaces when it Is immersed Inthe tool for loading. There may be exceptions in tHe future. Private Fuel Storabe has requested a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct a dry cask storage facility In Utah that will store fuel from multiple reactor sites. An underground dry cask storage facility has been proposed at the Humbolt Bay power plant InCalifornia to store old, low'decay-heat fuel. The underground design Is being proposed primarily because the site has very demanding seismic design requirements and Is possible only because the fuel to be stored generates little heat. in Germany, dry casks are stored Inreinforced concrete buildings. These buildings were originally designed to provide additional radiation shielding (beyond what Is provided by the cask itself) to reduce doses at plant site boundaries to background levels. Some of these buildings are sufficiently robust to provide protection against crashes of large aircraft. A subgroup of the committee visited spent fuel storage sites at Ahaus and Lingen during this study. See Appendix C for details.
~rMAITFIIPI .~TOPA~F 64 .rAi"I r .Ivu t r-u ij'.'avv7., -a , . ...- *. -.STORAGE FIGURE 4.2 Photo showing a canister being loaded Into a NUHOMS horizontal storage module. SOURCE: Courtesy of Transnuclear, Inc., an Areva Company.
4.2 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISKS OF DRY CASK STORAGE Dry casks were designed to ensure safe storage of spent fuel. 10 not to resist terrorist attacks. The regulations for these storage systems, which are given In Title 10, Part 72 of the Code of Federal Regulations (i.e., 10 CFR 72), are designed to ensure adequate passive heat removal and radiation shielding during normal operations, off-normal events, and accidents. The latter Include, for example, accidental drops or tip-overs during routine cask movements. The robust construction of these casks provides some passive protection against external assaults, but the casks were not explicitly designed with this factor in mind.'-1 The regulationsin 10 CFR 72 require that dry cask storage facilities (formally referred to as Independent Spent Fuel Storage lnstallations, or ISFSIs) be located within a protected area of the plant site (see FIGURE 2.1). However, the protection requirements for these installations are lower than those for reactors and spent fuel pools. The guard force is 'required to carry side arms, and its main function is surveillance: to detect and assess threats and to summon reinforcements. Ifthe ISFSI is within the protected area of the plant
10 Dual-purpose casks also were designed for safe transport under the requirements of Title 10, Part 71 of the Code of Federgl Regulations. The committee did not examine transport of spent fuel in this study.
1'A recent study by the German organization GRS (Geselischaft for Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, MBH) examined the vulnerability of CASTOR-type casks to large-aircraft Impacts.
,r!
DRY CASK STORAGE AND CbMPARATiVE RISKS 65 it would come directly under the protection of plant's guard forces. The protected area is surrounded by vehicle barriers to protect against the detonation of a design basis threat vehicle bomb.' 2 A terrorist attack that breached a dry cask could potentially result in the release of radioactive material from the spent fuel Into the environment through one or both of the following two processes: (1) mechanical dispersion of fuel particles or fragments; and (2) dispersion of radioactive aerosols (e.g., cesium-1 37). As described in Chapter 3, the latter process would have greater offsite radiological consequences. The committee evaluates the potential for both of these processes later in this chapter. In the wake of the September 11,2001, attacks, additional work has been or is being carried out by government and private entities to assess the security risks to dry casks from terrorist attacks. Sandia National Laboratories is currently analyzing the response of dry casks to a numb6r of potential terrorist attack scenarios at the request of the Nuclear Regulatory Comrmission. The committee'was briefed on these analyses at two of Its meetings. Sandia Is analyzing the responses of three vertical cask designs and one horizontal design to a variety of terrorist attack scenarios (FIGURE 4.3): These designs are considered to be broadly representative of the dry casks currently licensed for storage In the United States 'by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (see TABLE 4.1 at the end of this chapter). The committee received briefings on these studies by Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Sandia staff. Several attack scenariaos are being considered In the Sandia analyses. They include large aircraft Impacts and assaults with various types and sizes of explosive charges and other energetic devices. Details on the large aircraft impact scenarios are provided in the classified report. Most of this work Is still in progress and has not yet resulted in reviewable documents. Consequently, the committee had to rely on discussions with the experts who are carrying out these studies and its own expert judgment in assessing the quality and completeness of this work. 4.2.1 Large Aircrift Impacts Sandia analyzed the impact of an airliner traveling at high speed into the four cask designs shown in FIGURE 4.3. These analyses examined the consequences of impacts of the fuselage and the "hard" components of the aircraft (i.e., the engines and wheel struts) into individual casks and arrays of casks on a storage pad. The latter analysis examined the potential consequences of cask-to-cask interactions resulting from cask sliding or partial tip-over. The objectives of the analyses were first to determine whether the casks would fail (i.e., the containment would be breached) and, if so, to estimate the radioactive material releases and their h6alth consequences. 12As noted in Chapter 2. the committee did not examine surveillance requirements or the. placement or effectiveness of vehicle barriers and guard stations at commercial nuclear plants.
66 SAFET 6 ETAND SECURI7Y OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE
~j. / ~T..i~MAi B
Ii 6W? 1'. ,~ ~ 4 p.876m"a ww C D UHOMSm U2P FIGURE 4.3 Four cask systems ti: *ed In the Sandia analyses described in this chapter:. (A) Hi-STORM-I 00, (B)TN-68, (C) V,' .;C-24, (D) NUHOMS-32P. The casks shown in A, C, and D are canister-based casks; the c: -tsk shown in B is a bare-fuel cask. SOURCE: Nuclear Regulatory Commission briefing n -aterials (2004). The aircraft was modeled i *.ising'Sandia-developed Eulerian CTH code (see footnote 15 in Chapter 3). The aircraft man ufacturer (Boeing Corp.) was consulted to ensure that the aircraft model used Inthe analyse - was accurate. The casks were modeled with standard finite element codes using the put -lished characteristics of the casks. The casks were assumed to be filled with high-bur -i-up, 10-year-old spent fuel. The fuel rods were assumed to fail (rupture) Ifthe strains in the cladding exceeded 1 percent, which is a conservative assumption. Sandia evaluated the release of radioactive materials from the spent fuel pellets inside the fuel rods when s uch cladding failures occurred. Radiological consequences of such releases w are calculated for "representative" (with respect to weather and population) site conditions for each cask based on the actual average conditions at the I I
DRY CASK STORAGE AND COMPARATIVE RISKS 67
.iA site that currently stores the most spent fuel in that cask type.' 3 Site conditions differed for each cask.
The effects of jet fuel fires also were not considered in the analyses. Based on an analysis of actual aircraft accidents, Sandia determined that jet fuel would likely be dispersed over a large area in a low-angle impact. Consequently, the resulting petroleum fire would likely be of short duration (generally less than 15 minutes according to Sandia researchers). Long-duration fires that could damage the casks or even ignite the cladding of the spent fuel were not seen to be credible for the aircraft impact scenarios considered by Sandia.'4 The results of these analyses, which are considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be classified or safeguards information, are detailed In the classified report.
.In general, the analyses show that some types of impacts will damage some types of casks.
For some scenarlbs there could be substantial cask-to-cask interactions, including collisions and partial tip-ove-s. Nevertheless, predicted releases of radioactive material from the casks, mainly noble gases, were relatively small for all of the scenarios considered by Sandia. The analyses show that the releases were governed by design-specific features of the casks. Sandia noted that the modeling of such releases is difficult and requires expert judgment for several elements of the calculation. Detailed calculations of the consequences were still in progress when the committee was briefed on these analyses. 4.2.2 Other Assaults Analyses are also being carried out to understand the consequences of other types of assaults on the cask designs shown in FIGURE 4.3. These include assaults using explosives and certain types of high-energy devices. The analyses were still un'derway when the committee was briefed on these analyses, and the results were characterized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as preliminary. Details are provided in the classified report. 4.2.3 Discussion As noted previously, the dry cask vulnerability analyses w6re still underway when the committee's classified study was.completed. Based on the aralyses it did receive, the committee judges that no cask provides complete protection against all types of terrorist attacks. The committee judges that releases of radioactive material from dry casks are low for the scenarios it examined with one possible exception as discussed in the classified report. It is not clear to the committee whether it is credible to assume that this "exceptional" scenario could actually be carried out. 13 As noted in Chapter 1, the committee did not concern Itself with how radioactive materials would be.* transported through the environment once they were released from a dry cask. Rather, the committee confined its examination to whether and how much radioactive material might be released from a dry cask in the event of a terrorist attack. 14 The committee subgroup that visited Germany was briefed on a fire test on the Castor cask that involved a fully engulfing one-hour petroleum fire. The cask maintained its integrity during and after this test. See Appendix C. The results of this test do not necessarily translate to casks having other designs.
68 SAFETYAND SECURI7Y OFCOMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE
. In the committee's opinion, there are several relatively simple steps that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of releases of radioactive material from dry casks in the event of a terrorist attack:
Additional surveillance could be added to dry cask storage facilities to detect and thwart ground attacks.1 5

Certain types of cask systems could be protected against aircraft strikes by partial earthen berms. Such berms also would deflect the blasts from vehicle bombs.
" Visual barriers could be placed around storage pads to prevent targeting of individual casks by aircraft or standoff weapons. 16 These would have to be designed so that they would not trap jet fuel in the event of an aircraft attack. " The spacing of vertical casks on the storage pads can be changed, or spacers (shims) can be placed between the casks, to reduce the likelihood of cask-to-cask Interactions In the event of an aircraft attack. " Relatively minor changes In the design of newly manufactured casks could be made to improve their resistance to certain types of attack scenarios.
4.3 POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF DRY STORAGE OVER WET STORAGE Based on the analyses presented in Chapter 3 and previously in this chapter, the committee judges that dry cask storage has several potential safety and security advantages over pool storage. These differences can best be Illustrated using scenarios for both storage systems based on the Sandia analyses reviewed by the committee. The use of such scenarios should not be taken to Implythat the committee believes that these scenarios are likely or even possible at all storage facilities. They are used only for Illustrative purposes. The following statements can be made about the comparative advantages of dry-cask storage and pool storage based on the Sandia analyses: Less spent fuel Is at risk In an accident or attack on a dry.storage cask than on a spent fuel pool. An accident or attack on a dry cask storage facility would likely affect at most a few casks and put a few tens of metric tons of spent fuel at risk. An accident or attack on a spent fuel pool puts the entire inventory of the pool, potentially hundreds of metric tons of spent fuel, at risk. The potential consequences of an accident orterrorist attack on a dry cask
storage facility iare lower than those for a spent fuel pool. There are several reasons for this difference:
(1)There is less fuel in a dry cask than in a spent fuel pool and therefore less radioactive material available for release. (2) Measured on a per-fuel-assemblybasis, the inventories of radionuclides available 15 As noted in Chapter1, the committee did not examine surveillance activities at nuclear power plants and has no basis to judge whether current activities at dry cask storage facilities are adequate. 6The ISFSI at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant in Arizona, which was visited by a subgroup of committee members, Incorporates a berm Into Its design to provide a visual barrier. ri
DRY CASK STORAGE AND COMPARATIVE RISKS 69 for release from a dry cask are lower than those from a spent fuel pool because dry casks store older, lower decay-heat fuel. (3) Radioactive material releases from a breach in a dry cask would occur through mechanical dispersion.17 Such releases would be relatively small.. Certain types of attacks on spent fuel pools could result in a much larger dispersal of spent fuel fragments. Radioactive material releases from a spent fuel pool also could occur as the result of a zirconium cladding fire, which would produce radioactive aerosols. Such fires have the potential to release large quantities of radioactive material to the environment. The recovery from an attack on a dry cask would be much easier than the recovery from an attack on a spent fuel pool. Breaches in dry casks could be temporarily plugged with radiation-absorbing materials until'permanent fixes or replacements could be
.made. The most significant contamination would likely be confined largely to areas near the cask storage pad-and could be detected and decontaminated. The costs of recovery could be high, however,'especially if.the cask could not be repaired or the spent fuel could not be removed With equipment available at the plant. A special facility might have to be constructed or brought onto the site to transfer the damaged spent fuel to other casks.
Breaches in spent fuel pools could be much harder to plug, especially if high radiation fields or the collapse of the overlying building prevented workers from reaching the pool. Complete cleanup from a zirconium cladding fire would be extraordinarily expensive, and even after cleanup was completed large areas dov'nwind of the site might remain contaminated to levels that prevented reoccupation (see Chapter 3). It is the potential for zirconium cladding fires in spent fuel pools that gives dry cask storage most of its comparative safety and security advantages. This comparative advantage can be reduced by lowering the poterntial for zirconium cladding fires In loss-of-pool-coolant events. As discussed in Chapter 3, the committee believes that there are at least two stepsthat can be implemented imWrediately to lower the potential for such fires. 4.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS With respect to the committee's task to examine potential safety and security advantages of dry cask .storage using various single-, dual-, or multi-purpose.cask designs, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations: FINDING 4A: Although there are'differences In the robustness of different dry cask designs (e.g., bare-fuel versus canister-based),*the differences are not large when measured by the absolute magnitudes of radionuclide releases In the event of a breach. II All storage cask designs are vu lnerable to some types of terrorist attacks for which radionuclide releases would be possible. The vulnerabilities are related to the specific 17 Since the committee's classified report was published, the committee received an additional briefing from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission suggesting that a radioactive aerosol could be released Inone iype of terrorist attack. However, the scenario in question does not appear.to the committee to be credible.
70 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE design features of the casks, but the committee judges that the quantity of radioactive material releases predicted from such attacks is still relatively small. FINDING 4B: Additional steps can be taken to make dry casks less vulnerable to
-potential terrorist attacks.
Although the vulnerabilities of current cask designs are already small, additional,
.relatively simple.steps can be taken to reduce them. Such steps are listed in Section 4.2.3.
RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should consider using the results of the vulnerability analyses for possible upgrades of requirements in 10 CFR 72 for dry casks, specifically to improve their resistance to terrorist attacks. The committee was told by Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff that such a step is already under consideration. Based on the material presented to the committee, there appear to be minor changes that can be made by plant operators and cask vendors to increase the resistance of existing and new casks to terrorist attacks (see Section 4.2.3). With respect to the committee's task to examine the safety and security advantages of dry cask storage versus wet pool storage at reactor sites, the committee offers the following findings and recommendations: FINDING 4C: Dry cask storage does not eliminate the need for 'poolstorage at operating commercial reactors. Newly discharged fuel from the reactor must be stored in the pool for cooling, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Under current U.S. practices, dry cask storage can be used only to store fuel that has been out of the reactor long enough (generally greater than five years under current practices) to be air cooled. The fuel in dry cask storage poses less of a risk in the event of a terrorist attack than newly discharged fuel in pools because there Is substantially reduced probability of initiating a cladding fire. FINDING 4"D: Dry cask storage for older, cooler spent fuel has two inherent advantages oyer pool storage: (1) It is a passive system that relies on natural air circulation for cooling; and (2) it divides the Inventory of that spent'fuel among a large number of discrete, robust containers. These factors make it more difficult-to attack a large amount of spent fuel at one time and also reduce the consequences of such attacks. Each storage cask holds no more than about 10 to 15 metric tons of spent fuel, compared to the 'several hundred metric tons of spent fuel that is commonly stored in reactor pools. The" robust construction of these casks prevents large-scale releases of radionuclides in all of the attack scenarios examined by the committee. Some of the attacks could breach the casks, but many of these breaches would be small and could probably be more easily plugged than a perforated spent fuel pool wall because radiation fields would be lower and there would be no escaping water to contend with. Even large breaches of the cask would
DRY CASK STORAGE AND COMPARATIVE RISKS 71 result only in the mechanical dispersal of some of its radionuclide inventory in the immediate vicinity of the cask. FINDING 4E: Depending on the outcome of plant-specific vulnerability analyses described in the committee's classified report, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might determine that earlier movements of spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage would be prudent to reduce thepotential consequences of terrorist attacks on pools at some commercial nuclear plants. The statement of task directs the committee to examine the risls of spent fuel storage options and alternatives for decision makers, not to recommend whether any spent fuel should be transferred from pool storage to cask storaje. In fact, there may be some commercial plants that, because of pool designs or fuel loadings, may require some removal of spent fuel frona.their pools. Ifthere is a need to remove spent fuel it should become clearer once the vulnerability and consequence analyses described in Chapter 3 are completed. The committee expects that cost-benefit considerations would be a part of these analyses.
-4 TABLE 4.1 Dry Casks Used for Spent Fuel Storage In the United States Cask design License holder Type Fuel type Construction Closure system Number of casks used to used for date; sites; and number storage of casks on order1 .......... ....... . .
A *Am*

IDm mI CASTOR VI21 GNSI (General Bare-fuel, BWR Ductile cast Iron. Primary lid (44 bolts), 25 loaded (Surry); 0 Nuclear Systems, .storage-only secondary lid (48 bolts) purchased Inc.)
CASTOR X133' GNS (Gesellschaft Bare-fuel, PWR Ductile cast Iron Primary lid (44 bolts), i loaded (Surry); 0 far Nuklear-Servlce storage-only secondary lid (70 cup purchased mbH) screws) NAC S/T NAC Intemational Bare-fuel, PWR Inner and outer Closure lid (24 bolts) 2 loaded (Surry); 0 'n storage-only stainless steel purchased shells 0) MC-IO Westlinghouse Bare-fuel, PWR Stainless and
One shield lid hnd two I loaded (Surry); 0 storage-only carbon steel sealing lids, all bolted purchased (number of bolts not 0 available)
Bare-fuel, Carbon steel TN-32, TN-40 Transnuclear Inc. PWR One lid (48 bolts) 61 loaded (4 sites); 22 storage-only purchased 0 TN-68 Transnuclear Inc..: Bare-fuel, BWR Carbon steel One lid (48 bolts) 24 loaded (Peach rn dual-purpose Bottom); 20 purchased Fuel Solution BNFL Fuel Canister- PWR, Reinforced Canister lid, welded 7 loaded (Big Rock W-150 Solutions based, dual- BWR concrete with Inner cask lId (12 bolts) Point); 0 purchased C/) Storage Cask purpose steel shell HI-STORM Holtec International Canister- PWR, Stainless steel Canister lid, welded 58 loaded (7 sites); 177 100 based, BWR shells with un- cask lid (4 bolts) on order C/) storage-only "reinforced module concrete filler HI-STAR 100 Holtec International Canister- PWR, Carbon steel Canister lid, welded 7 loaded (2 sites'); 5 on based, dual- BWR shells with neutron cask lid (54 bolts) order trn purpose absorber polymer
VSC-24 BNFL Fuel Canister- PWR Reinforced Canister lid, welded 58 loaded 13 sites); 4 Ventilated Solutions based, concrete with Inner cask lid (6 bolts) purchased 0 Concrete Cask storage-only steel shell C,, NAC-MPC NAC International Canister- PWR Metal canister Canister lid, welded 21 loaded (Yankee Rowe and CT Yankee); 59 C,, based, dual- surrounded by cask lid over a shield plug -i purpose storage overpack. (6 high-strength bolts) purchased 0 Storage overpack donsists of an Inner steel liner 3.5 In. thick, two rebar rzj cages, and 0 concrete 0*
-u NAC-UMS NAC Intemationa I Canister- PWR, Metal canister Canister lid, welded 80 loaded (2 sites); 165 based, dual- BWR surrounded by cask lid over a shield plug purchased purpose storage overpack. (6 high-strength bolts)
Storage overpack m consists of Inner steel liner 2.5 In. Co thick, two rebar (0 cages, and concrete Holtec MPC Holtec Int6matio nal Canister PWR, Metal canister Canister lid, welded 34 loaded (Trojan); 0 24EIEF based, dual- BWR surrounded by cask lid, shield plug plus purchased purpose storage overpack. 48 bolts Storage overpack consists of Inner and outer steel liners, a double-rebar cage, and concrete NUHOMS Transnuciear In,r. Canister- PWR, Horizontal Canister lid, welded 239 loaded (10 sites); 24P, 52B, based, dual- BWR reinforced storage module lid, >150 purchased 61BT, 24PT1, purpose concrete storage reinforced concrete 24PT2, 32PT module with shielded canister N.4
4~. NOTES: 'The Humboldt Bay Power Plant is licensing a site-speciflic variation of the HI-STAR System called HI-STAR HB. 2Some licensees have purchased additional casks that have not yet been loaded, nor are they planned for loading. SOURCES: Data complied from cask license holders (2004).
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5 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES Implementation of the recommendations in this report will require actions and cooperation by a large number of parties. This chapter provides a brief discussion of two implementation Issues that the committee believes will be of interest to Congress: (1) Timing Issues: Ensuring that high-quality, expert analyses are completed In a timely manner. (2) Communication Issues: Ensuring that the results of the analyses are communicated to Industry so that appropriate and timely mitigating actions can be taken. 5.1 TIMING ISSUES The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks forced the nation to begin a reexamination of the vulnerability of its critical infrastructure to high-impact suicide attacks by terrorists. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was no exception. The Commission began a top-to-bottom review of security procedures at commercial nuclear power plants. This review resulted in the Issuance of numerous directives to power plant operators to upgrade their security practices. The Commission also began a series of vulnerability analyses of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks. These analyses are described in Chapters 3 and 4. More than three years have passed since the September 11, 2001, attacks. Vulnerability analyses of spent fuel pool storage to attacks with large aircraft have been performed by EPRI (Chapter 3), and analyses of vulnerabilities of dry cask storage to large aircraft attacks have been completed by the German organization GRS (Gesellschaft for Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, mbH). However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's analyses of spent fuel storage vulnerabilities have not yet been completed, and actions to reduce vulnerabilities, such as those described in Chapter 3, on the basis of these analyses have not yet been taken. Moreover, some Important additional analyses remain to be done. The slow pace in completing this work Is of concern given the enormous potential consequences as described elsewhere In this report. The committee does not know the reason for this delay, nor was it asked by Congress for an evaluation: It is Important to note that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's analyses ate addressing a much broader range of vulnerabilities than just spent fuel storage. The committee nevertheless raises this issue because it appears to be having an impact on the timely completion of critical work and implementation of appropriate mitigative actions for spent fuel :storage. 5.2 COMMUNICATION ISSUES During the course of this study, the committee had the opportunity to interact with representatives of the nuclear power industry to discuss their concerns about safety and 75
76 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE security issues. The committee received numerous comments from industry representatives about the lack of Information sharing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the vulnerability analyses described In Chapter 3. These representatives noted that information flow was predominately in one direction: from the industry to the Commission. The Commission was not providing a reciprocal flow of information that could help the industry better understand and take early actions to address identified vulnerabilities. Restrictions on information sharing by the Commission have resulted in missed opportunities in at least two cases observed by the committee. Analyses of aircraft impacts into power plant structures described In Chapter 3 were being carried out Independently by Sandia for the Commission and by EPRI for the nuclear power industry. Because of classification restrictions, EPRI was not provided with information about the Sandia work, including the results of physical tests that would have helped EPRI validate its models. Both Sandia and the Industry would have benefited had their analysts been able to talk with each other about their models, assumptions, and results while the analyses were in progress. When the EPRI work was completed the Commission declared it to be safeguards ' information.' As a consequence, some of the EPRI analysts who generated the results no longer had access to them, and the results could not be shared widely within industry. A similar situation exists with respect to the ENTERGY Corp. spent fuel pool separate effects analyses described in Chapter 3. ENTERGY is using similar approaches and models as Sandia but has received little or no guidance from Commission staff about whether the results are realistic or consistent. The ENTERGY analysts told the committee that they would have benefited had they been able to compare and discuss their approaches and results with Sandia analysts. Sandia analysts were pre',ented from doing so because of classification Issues. Sharing of ENTERGY's results within the company or across industry may be problematical if they are determined to be classified or safeguards information by the Commission. Several Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff also privately expressed to the committee their frustration at the difficulty in sharing Information that they know would be useful to Industry. In fact, from the contacts the committee had, there does not appear to be a lack of willingness to share information at theworking staff level within the Commission. Rather, it seems to be an issue of getting permission from upper management and addressing the classification restrictions. Much of the difficulty in sharing this information appears to arise because the information Is considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to be safeguards information or in some cases even classified national security information. Industry analysts and decision makers generally do not have the appropriate personal security clearances 2 to access this Information. The committee learned that the Commission Is making efforts to share more of this Information with some Industry representatives. The industry will be responsible for implementing any. changes to spent fuel storage to make it less vulnerable to terrorist attack. Clearly, therefore, the industry needs to understand the results of the Safeguards Information is defined in section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act and in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 73.2. See the glossary for a definition. Authority for designation of safeguards resides with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2 In fact, a personnel security clearance is not required to access safeguards Information. One only needs to be of good character" and have a "need to know" as determined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 77 Commission's vulnerability analyses to ensure that effective implementation strategies are adopted. The committee also received complaints during this study from members of the public about the lack of information sharing. Commission staff have responded to these complaints by stating that such sharing could reveal sensitive information to terrorists and that the public does not have a "need to know" this information. The committee fully agrees that information that could prove useful to terrorists should not be released. On the other hand, the committee believes that there is Information that could be shared without compromising national security. For example, general information about the kinds of threats being considered and general steps being taken to reduce vulnerabilities could be shared with the public.. Information about specific vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools and dry storage casks to terrorist attacks as well as potential mitigative actions could be shared with industry without revealing the details about how such attacks fnight be carried out. Sharing information with industry Is essential for ensuring that mitigative actions to reduce vulnerabilities are carried out. Sharing information with the public Is essential in a nation with strong democratic traditions for sustaining public confidence In the Commission as an effective regulator of the nuclear industry, and for reducing the potential for severe environmental, health, economic, and psychological consequences from terrorist attacks should they occur. 5.3 FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION FINDING 5A: Security restrictions on sharing of Information and analyses are hindering progress In addressing potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks. Current classification and security practicesappear to discourage Information sharing between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Industry. During the course of the study the committee received comments from power plant operators, their contractors, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff about the difficulties of sharing the information on the vulnerability of spent fuel storage. Indeed, even the committee found it difficult and in some cases Impossible to obtain needed Information (e.g., Information on the desigri basis threat). Such restrictions have several negative consequences: Theyimpede the review and I feedback processes that can enhance the technical soundness of the analyses being carried out; they make it difficult to build support within the Industryfor potential mitigative measures; and they may undermine the confidence that the industry, expert panels such as this one, and the public place in the adequacy of such "measures. RECOMMENDATION: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should Improve the sharing of pertinent Information on vulnerability and consequence analyses of spent fuel.storage with nuclear power plant operators and dry cask storage system vendors on a timely basis. Implementation of this recommendation will allow timely mitigation actions. Certain current security practices may have to be modified to carry out this recommendation.
78 SAFETYAND SECURITY OFCOMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE The committee also believes that the public is an important audience for the work being carried out to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage facilities. While it would be inappropriate to share all information publicly, more constructive interaction with the public and independent analysts could improve the work being carried out and also increase public confi.dence In Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry decisions and actions to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage to terrorist threats.
REFERENCES Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, and F. N. von Hippel. 2003a. Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States. Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, pp. 1-51. Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, and F. N. von Hippel. 2003b. Response by the authors to the NRC review of "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States." Science and Global Security, Vol.11, pp. 213-223. American Nuclear Society. 1988. Design Criteria for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (Water Pool Type): An American National Standard. ANSI/ANS-57.7-1988. American Nuclear Society. LaGrange Park, Illinois. ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers). 2003. The Pentagon Building Performance Report. By P. F. Mlakar, D. 0. Dusenberry,.J. R. Harris, G. Haynes. L T. Phan, and M.A. Sozen. January. Structural Engineering Institute. Reston, Virginia. Available at http'//ire.nist.gov/bfdpubs/buildO3/artlO1ZhtmI. Baker, L., and L C. Just. 1962. Studies of Metal Water Reactions at High Temperatures Ill. Experiments and Theoretical Studies of the Zirconium-Water Reaction. ANL-548. May. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. Benjamin, A. S., D. J. McCloskey, D. A. Powers, and S. A. Dupree. 1979. Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage. NUREG/CR-0649, SAND77-1371. Rev.3. Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Benjamin, A. S. 2003. Comments on "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel Inthe United States." Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, pp. 53-58. Beyea, J., E.'Lyman, and F. von Hippel. 2004. Damages from a Major Release of 137Cs Into the Atmosphere of the U.S. (addendum to "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States" by R. Alvarez, J. Beyea, K. Janberg. E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, and F. von Hippel, 2003. Science and Global. Security, Vol. 11, pp. 1-51). Science and Global Security, Vol. 12, pp. 125-136. . Borenstein, S. 2002. Security Upgrades at Nuclear Plants Are Behind Schedule. Knight Ridder Newspapers. April 11. Available at h*i/Wkww.nCi.orgIO2/04f/12-O1.htm. BNL (Brookhaven National Laboratory). 1987. Severe Accidents In Spent Fuel Pools InSupport of Generic Safety Issue 82. NUREG/CR-4982 and BNL-NUREG-52093. V. L. Sailer, K.R. Perkins, J.R. Weeks, and H. R. Connell. July. Upton, N.Y.: Brookhaven National Laboratory. BNL. 1997. A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently. Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants. R. J. Travis, R. E. Davis, E. J. Grove, and M.A. Azarm. NUREG/CR-6451. August Upton, N.Y.ý Brookhaven National Laboratory. Chapin, D. M., K.-P. Cohen, W. K. Davis, E. E. Kintner, L. J. Koch, J. W. Landis, M. Levenson, 1. H. Mandil, Z. T. Pate, T. Rockwell, A. Schriesheim, J. W. Simpson, A. Squire, C.. Starr, H. E. Stone, J. J. Taylor, N. E. Todreas, B. Wolfe, and E. L Zebroski. 2002. Nuclear Power Plants and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets. Science, Vol. 297, pp. 1997-1999. 79
80 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE Droste, B., H. Vblzke, G. Wieser, and L. Quiao. 2002. Safety Margins of Spent Fuel Transport and Storage Casks Considerinig Aircraft Crash Impacts. RAMTRANS, Vol. 13(3-4), pp. 313-316. Duderstadt, J. J., and L. J. Hamilton. 1976. Nuclear Reactor Analysis. John Wiley & Sons. New York. EPRI. 2002. Deterring Terrorism: Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrate Nuclear Power Plant's Structural Strength. Palo Alto, California [SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION]. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). 2002. World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations. FEMA 403. May. FEMA Region 11,New York. Available at http/vwww.fema.govAibrary/wtcstudy.shtm. Ferguson, C. D., W. C. Potter, A. Sands, L S. Spector, and F. L. Wehling. 2004. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Monterey, California. Available at http;//cns.miis.edu/pubs'books/pdfs/4faces.pdf. GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office). 2003. Spent Nuclear Fuel: Options Exist to Further Enhance Security. GAO-03-426. July. Available at http:/www.gao.govfnew.ftemsldO3426.pdf. HSK (Die Hauptabteilung fOr die Sicherheit der Kemanlagen). 2003. Position of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate Regarding the Safety of the Swiss Nuclear Power Plants In the Event of an Intentional Aircraft Crash. HSK-AN-4626. March. WOrenlingen, Switzerland. Jenkins, B. M. 1975. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? RAND Corporation. RAND P-5541. Santa Monica, California. Jenkins, B. M. 1985. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Orbis, Vol. 29(3), pp. 507-516. Kaplan, S., and B.J. Garrick. 1981. On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis, Vol. 1(1), pp. 11-27. Lamarsh, J. R. 1975. Introduction to Nuclear Engineering. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Reading, Massachusetts. Lange, F., G. Pretzsch, J. Dohler, E. Horman, H. Busch, and W. Koch. 1994. Experimental Determination of UOz-Release from Spent Fuel Transport Cask after Shaped Charge Attack. INMM Annual Meeting. Naples, Florida, Vol. XXIIi, pp. 408-413. Lange, F., G. Pretzsch, E. H6rmann, and W. Koch. 2001. Experiments to Quantify Potential Releases and Consequences from Sabotage Attack on Spent Fuel Casks. Thirteenth International Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials PATRAM. Chicago, Illinois. Lange, F., H. J. Fett, E. Hormann, E. Schrodl, G. Schwarz, B.:Droste, H. Volzke, G. Wieser, and L. Qia6' 2002. Safety Margins of Transport and Storage Casks for Spent Fuel Assemblies and 'HAW Canisters ufider Extreme Accident Loads and Effects from External Events. Report within framework of Project SR 2415. April.Gesellschaft fOr Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Koln; Bundesanstalt fOr Materialforschung und -prnfung (BAM), Berlin, Germany.
REFERENCES 81 Luna, R. E. 2000. Comparison of Results from Two Spent Fuel Sabotage Source Term Experiments. RAMTRANS. Vol. 11(3), pp. 261-265. Marsh, G. E. and G. S. Stanford. 2001. National Policy Analysis #374: Terrorism and Nuclear Power: What are theRisks? National Center for Policy Research. November. Available at httpi/www.nationalcenter.org/NPA374.html. NRC (National Research Council). 2002. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology In Countering Terrorism. National Academy Press. Washington, D.C. RBR Consultants, Inc.. 2003. Terrorist Aircraft Strikes at Indian Point Spent Fuel Pools. February. Heischel Specter's testimony to the New York City Council's Committee on Environmental Protection. February. New York. Thomauske, B. 2003. Realization of the German Concept for Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel-Current Situation and Prospects. Waste Management '03 Conference. February 23-27,2003. Tucson, Arizona. Thompson, G. 2003. Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security. Institute for Resource and Security Studies. Report commissioned by Citizens Awareness Network. January. Cambridge, Massachusetts. Tong, L. S., and J. Weisman. 1996. Thermal Analysis of Pressurized Water Reactors. Third Edition. American Nuclear Society. LaGrange Park, Illinois. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 1975. Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment of Accident Risks In U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. WASH-1400.'August. Washington,. D.C. USNRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1976. Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Ught-Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO). NUREG-0002. Washington, DC. USNRC. 1983. A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues. NUREG-0933. December. Vol. 3.82, pp. 1-6. Washington, D.C. USNRC. 1984. Spent Fuel Heat Generation In an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. Regulatory Guide 3.54 (Task CE 034-4). Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. September. Washington, D.C. USNRC. 1987. Case Histories of West Valley Spent Fuel Shipments. NUREG/CR-4847. -- January, Washington, D.C. USNRC. 1996. Refueling Practice Survey: Final Repoit. May. Washington, DC. Available at httfpY/ww.nrc.gov/reading-rndoc-collecgons/news/1996196-O74.html. USNRC. 1997. Operating Experience Feedback Report. Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling. NUREG-1275. Vol. 12.3. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L..Omstein, S. V. Pullani. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. Washington, D.C. USNRC. 2001a. Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants. .NUREG-1738. Division of Systems Safety and Analysis. January. Washington, D.C. USNRC. 2001b. Review of NRC's Dry Cask Storage Program. Audit Report. OIG-01-A-11. Office of the Inspector General. June 20. Washington, D.C.
82 SAFETYAND SECURITYOF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE USNRC. 2003a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of"Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States." Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, pp. 203-211. USNRC. 2003b. A Prioitization of Generic Safety Issues. NUREG-0933. R. Emat, R. Riggs, W. Milstead, J. Pittman, and H. Vendermolen. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. October. Washington, DC. Available at httpY:/wvw.nrc.gov/reading-rmidoc-collectionsfnuregs'staff/sr0933. Walker, J.S. 2004. Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press. Berkeley, California. Zimmerman, P. D., and C. Loeb. 2004. Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited. Defense Horizons. Vol. 38 (January), pp. 1-11.
A INFORMATION-GATHERING SESSIONS The committee organized several meetings and tours to obtain information about the safety and security of spent fuel storage. A list of these meetings and tours is provided below. The committee held several data-gatheringsessionsnot open to the public to obtain classified and safeguards information about the safety and security of spent fuel storage. The committee also held several data-gatheringsessions open to the public to receive unclassified briefings from industry, independent analysts, and other Interested parties including members of the public. The written materials (e.g., PowerPoint presentations and written statements) obtained by the committee at these open sessions are posted on the web site for this project: http:/dels.nas.edu/sfs. A.1 FIRST MEETING, FEBRUARY 12-13, 2004, WASHINGTON, D.C. The objective of this meeting was to obtain background information on the study request from staff of the House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee. The committee also was briefed by one of the sponsors of the study and by two independent experts. The following is the list of topics and speakers for the open session:
" Background onthe c6ngressional request for this study. Speaker:. Kevin Cook, Professional Staff, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Subcommittee. " Reducing the hazard from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States.
Speakers: Frank von Hippel, Princeton University, and Klaus Janberg, independent consultant, co-authors of the paper entitled "Reducing the Hazard from Stored Spent PoWer-Reactor Fuel in the United States" (Alvarez et al., 2003).
" Nuclear power plants and their fuel as terrorist targets. Speaker:. Ted Rockwell, MPR Associates, Inc., co-author of the paper entitled "Nuclear Power Plants and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets" (Chapin et al.;.2002).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission analyses of spent fuel safety and security.
Speaker:. Farouk Eltawila, director, Division of Systems Analysis and Regulatory Effectiveness, Office of Research, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. On the second day of the meeting, the committee held a data-gathering session not open to the public to obtain classified briefings from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission about its ongoing analyses of spent fuel storage security. A.2 SECOND MEETING, MARCH 4-6, 2004, ARGONNE, ILLINOIS During the second meeting, the committee held a data-gathering session not open to the public to receive classified briefings on spent fuel storage security from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The committee also toured the Dresden and Braidwood Nuclear 83
8'4 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE Generating Stations to see first-hand how spent fuel is managed and stored. The two plants were chosen because of the differences in their spent fuel storage facilities. A.3 THIRD MEETING, APRIL 15-17, 2004, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO During the third meeting, the committee held a data-gathering session not open to the public to receive a briefing from EPRI on Spent fuel storage vulnerabilities. The committee also held a data-gathering session open to the public to receive briefings on dry cask storage systems and radioactive releases from damaged spent fuel storage casks.
" Speakers on dry cask storage systems: William McConaghy (GNB-GNSI);
Steven Sisley (BNFL); Alan Hanson (Transnuclear Inc.); Charles Pennington (NAC International); and Brian Gutherman (Holtec Intemrational, via telephone).
Radionuclide releases from damaged spent fuel. Speaker. Robert Luna, Sandia National Laboratories (retired).
A.4 TOUR. OF SELECTED SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS IN GERMANY On April 25-28, 2004, a group of committee members traveled to Germany to meet with German officials and to visit selected spent fuel storage installations. The agenda of the tour was as follows:
Meeting with Michael Sailer, chairman of the German reactors safety commission (RSK,;Reaktorsicherheitskommission).
" Visit to the dry cask manufacturer GNB (Gesellschaft fOr Nuklear-Beh5lter mbH) headquarters in Essen and the cask assembly facility and test museum in M01heim.
0 Tour of the Ahaus Intermediate dry storage facility.
Meeting with Florentin Lange, GRS (Gesellschaft for Anlagen- und Reaktorsicheheit mbH), co-author of the study entitled "Safety Margins of Transport and Storage Casks for Spent Fuel Assemblies and HAW Canisters Under Extreme Accident Loads and Effects from Extemal Events" (Lange et al.,
2002). 0 Tour of the Lingen.n.uclear power plant and its spent fuel storage facilities. A summary of information gathered during the tour is provided in Appendix C. A.5 FOURTH MEETING, MAY.10-12, 2004, WASHINGTON, D.C. During.tfih fourth meeting, the committee held a data-gathering session not open to the public to hold in-depth technical discussions with SandiaNational Laboratories staff and contractors on their spent fuel storage vulnerability analyses. The committee also received afn intelligence briefing fromDepartment of Homeland Security staff on terrorist capabilities and from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission.staff on terrorist scenarios. The meeting also included a data-gathering session open to the public that included the following briefings:
iNFORMATION-GATHERING SESSIONS 85
Summary of the field trip to Germany. Speaker:. Louis Lanzerotti (committee chair).
" Vulnerabilities of spent nuclear fuel pools to terrorist attacks: Issues with the design basis threat. Speaker:. Peter Stockton, Project on Government Oversight. " Consequences of a major release of "37Cs into the atmosphere. Speaker: Jan Beyea, Consulting in the Public Interest.
A.6 FIFTH MEETING, MAY 26-28,2004, WASHINGTON, D.C. The objective of this closed meeting (i.e., open only to committee members and staff) was to finalize the classified report for National Research Council review. A.7 TOURS OK'SELECTED SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES AT U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS On June 11 and June 14,2004, respectively, committee subgroups visited the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station In Arizona and the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station in New York. A.8 SIXTH MEETING, JUNE 28-29, 2004 The objective of this closed meeting was to complete work on the classified report. A.9 SEVENTH MEETING, AUGUST 12-13, 2004 The objective of this closed meeting was to develop a public version of the committee's report. The committee also held a data-gathering session not open to the public to receive a briefing from the Department of Homeland Security on steps being taken to address the findings and recommendations In the classified report. A.10 EIGHTH MEETING, OCTOBER 28-29, 2004 The objective of this closed meeting was to continue work to develop a public version of the committee's report. The committee also held a data-gathering session not open to the public to receive a briefing from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on steps being taken to address the findings and recommendations In the classified report. I A.11 NINTH MEETING, NOVEMBER 29-30, 2004 The objective of this closed meeting was to continue work to develop a public version of the committee's report.
86 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE A.12 TENTH MEETING, January 24-25, 2005 The objective of this closed meeting was to continue work to develop a public version of the committee's report. The committee also held a data-gathering session not open to the public to meet with three c6mmissioners from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Chairman Nils Diaz and members Edward McGaffigan and Jeffrey Merrifield) to discuss what additional Information the commission might be willing to make available to the committee on human-factors-related Issues. REFERENCES Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, and F. N. von Hippel. 2003a. Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel In the United States. Science and Global Security, Vol. 11, pp. 1-51 Chapin, D. M., K. P. Cohen, W. K. Davis, E. E. Kintner, L. J. Koch, J. W. Landis, M. Levenson, I. H. Mandil, Z. T. Pate, T. Rockwell, A. Schrieshelm, J. W. Simpson, A. Squire, C. Start, H. E. Stone, J. J. Taylor, N. E. Todreas, B. Wolfe, and E. L. Zebroskl. 2002. Nuclea'r Power Plants and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets. Science, Vol. 297, pp. 1997-1999. Lange, F., H. J. Fett, E. Hormann, E. Schrodl, G. Schwarz, B. Droste, H. Volzke, G. Wieser, and L. Qiao. 2002. Safety Margins of Transport and Storage Casks for Spent Fuel Assemblies and HAW Canisters under Extreme Accident Loads and Effects from External Events. Report within framework of Project SR 2415. April. Gesellschaft fOr Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Koln; Buridesanstalt fOr Materialforschung und -pr0fung (BAM), Berlin, Germany.
B. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS LOUIS J. LANZEROTTI, Chair,is an expert in geophysics and electromagnetic waves and a veteran of over 40 National Research Council (NRC) studies. He currently consults for Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, and is a distinguished professor for solar-terrestrial research at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Previ6usly, he was a distinguished member of the techrical staff at Bell Labs. His research Interests include space plasmas and engineering problems related to the impacts of atmospheric and space processes on telecommunications on commercial satellites and transoceanic cables. He has been associated with numerous National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space missions as well,Jncluding Voyager, Ulysses, Galileo, and Cassini, and with commercial space satellite miisions to research design and operational problems associated with spacecraft and cable operations. In 1988, he was elected to the National Academy of Engineering for his work on energetic particles and electromagnetic waves In the earth's magnetosphere, including their impact on space and terrestrial communication systems. He has twice received the NASA Distinguished Public Service Medal and has a geographic feature In Antarctica named In his honor. He was appointed to the National Science Board by President George W. Bush in 2004. Dr. Lanzerotti holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University. CARL A. ALEXANDER Is an expert In the behavior of nuclear material at high temperatures and also in biological and chemical weapons. He Is chief scientist and senior research leader at the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Alexander worked on fuel design and behavior for the aircraft nuclear propulsion program and several space nuclear power projects, including the Viking, Voyager, and Cassini missions. He helped analyze the evolution of the Three Mile Island accident and Is Involved in the French Phebus fission product experiments, which are to reproduce all of the phenomena involved during a nuclear power reactor core meltdown accident..He has served as a consultant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, In the 1970s, worked on the first experiments on the effects of an attack on spent fuel shipping containers using shaped charges. He currently leads research projects on agent neutralization and collateral effects for.weapons of mass destruction for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Navy, and on lethality of missile defense technologies for the Missile Defense Agency. Dr. Alexander has taught materials science and engineering at the Ohio State University and has served as graduate advisor and adjunct professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Southampton In the United Kingdom, and the University of Maryland. He has authored over 100 peer-reviewed articles and technical reports, many of which are classified. He holds a Ph.D. in materials science from Ohio State University.. ROBERT M. BERN ERO is a nuclear engineering and regulatory expert. He is now an independent consultant after retiring from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in 1995. in 23 years of service for the USNRC Mr. Bbmerio held numerous positions in reactor licensing, fuel cycle facility licensing, engineering standards development, risk assessment research, and waste management. His final position at USNRC was as director of the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards. Prior to joining the USNRC he worked for the General Electric Company in nuclear technology for 13 years. He has served as a member of the Commission of Inquiry for an International 87
88 SAFE7YAND SECURI1Y OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE Review of Swedish Nuclear Regulatory Activities, and he currently consults on nuclear safety-related matters; Particularly regarding nuclear materials licensing and radioactive waste management. Mr. Bemero received his B.A. degree from St Mary of the Lake (Illinois), a B.S. degree from the University of Illinois, and an M.S. degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. M. QUINN BREWSTER is an expert In energetic solids and heat transfer. He is currently the Hermia G. Soo Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is Involved In the Academic Strategic Alliance Program, whose objective is to develop integrated software simulailon capability for*coupled, system simulation of solid rocket motors Including Internal ballistics (multi-phase, reacting flow) and structural response (propellant grain and motor case). Dr. Brewster has authored one book on thermal radiative transfer and chapters In four other books as well as several publications on combustion science. He is a fellow of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and associate fellowof the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Dr. Brewster holds a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from the University of California at Berkeley. GREGORY R. CHOPPIN Is an actinide elements and radiochemistry expert. He is currently the R.O. Lawton Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Chemistry at Florida State University. His research Interests Involve the chemistry and separation of the f-elements and the physical chemistry of concentrated electrolyte solutions. During a postdoctoral period at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, he participated In the discovery of mendelevium, element 101. His research and educational activities have been recognized by the American Chemical Society's Award in Nuclear Chemistry, the Southern Chemist Award of the American Chemical Society, the Manufacturing Chemist Award in Chemical Education, the Chemical PioneerAward of the American Institute of Chemistry, a Presidential Citation Award of the American Nuclear Society, the Becquerel Medal, British Royal Society, and honorary D.Sc. degrees from Loyola University and the Chalmers University of Technology (Sweden). Dr. Choppin previously served on the NRC's Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology and Board on Radioactive Waste Management. He holds a Ph.D. in Inorganic chemistry from the University of Texas, Austin. NANCY J. COOKE Is an expert in the development, application, and evaluation of methodologies to elicit and assess individual and team knowledge. She is currently a professor in the applied psychology program at Arizona State University East. She also holds a National Research Council Associateship position with Air Force Research Laboratory and serves on'the board of directors of the Cognitive Engineering Research Institute In Mesa, Arizona. Her current research areas are the following: cognitive engineering,.knowledge elicitation, cogniitive task analysis, team cognition, team situation awareness, mental models, expertise, and human-computer interaction. Her most recent work includes the development and validation of methods to measure shared knowledge and team situation awareness and research on the impact of cross- training, distributed mission environments, and workload on team knowledge, process, and performance. This work has been applied to team cognitiofi In unmanned aerial vehicle and emergency operation center command-and-control. She contributed to the creation of the Cognitive Engineering Research on Team Tasks Laboratory to develop, apply, and evaluate measures of team cognition. She has authored or co-authored over 70 articles, chapters, and technical reports on measuring team cognition, knowledge elicitation, and human-computer interaction. Dr. Cooke holds a Ph.D. in cognitive psychology from New Mexico State University, Las Cruces.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 6F COMMITTEE MEMBERS 89 GORDON R. JOHNSON is an expert in penetration mechanics and computational mechanics. He is currently a senior scientist and manager of the solid mechanics group at Network Computing Services. His recent work has included the development of computational mechanics codes that include finite elements and meshless particles. He has also developed computational material models to determine the strength and failure characteristics of a variety of materials subjected to large strains, strain rates, temperatures, and pressures. His work for the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense has included a wide range of Intense impulsive loading computations for high-velocity Impact and explosive detonation. He was a chief engineering fellow during his 35 years at Alliant Techsystems (formerly Honeywell). He has served as a technical advisor for university contracts with the Army Research Office, and an Industry representative for its strategic planning, and was a member of the founding board of directors for the Hypervelocity Impact Society. Dr. Johnson holds a Ph.D. in structures from the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. ROBERT P. KENNEDY has expertise In structural dynamics and earthquake engineering. He Is currently arnindependent consultant in structural mechanics and engineering. Dr. Kennedy has worked on static and dynamic analysis and the design of special-purpose civil and mechanical-type structures, particularly for.the nuclear, petroleum, and defense Industries. He has designed structures to resist extreme loadings, Including seismic loadings, missile Impacts, extreme winds, Impulsive loads, and nuclear environmental effects, and he has developed computerized structural analysis methods. He also served as a peer reviewer for an EPRI study on aircraft impacts on nuclear power plants. In 1991, he was elected to the National Academy of Engineering for developing design procedures for civil and mechanical structures to resist seismic and other extreme loading conditions. Dr. Kennedy holds a Ph.D. In structural engineering from Stanford University. KENNETH K. KUO Is an expert in comfibustion, rocket propulsion, ballistics, and fluid mechanics. He Is a Distinguished Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University. He Is also the leader and director of the university's High Pressure Combustion Laboratory, a laboratory with advanced Instrumehtation and data acquisition devices. Dr.-Kuo has directed team research projects in propulsion and combustion studies for 32 years. He has edited eight books and authored one book on combustion, published over 300 technical articles, and served as principal Investigator for more than 70 projects, including a Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) grant from the U.S. Army on "Ignition and Combustion of High Energy Materials.' He is now serving as principal Investigator and co-principal Investigator for two MURI programs on rocket and energetic materials. In 1991, hewas elected fellow of American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and has received several awards for his work on solid propellants combustion processes. Dr. Kuo holds a Ph.D. In aerospace and mechanical sciences from Princeton University. RICHARD T. LAHEY, JR., is an expert in multiphase flow and heat transfer technology, nuclear reactor safety, and the use of advanced technology for industrial applications. He is currently the Edward E. Hood Professor of Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) and was previdusly chair of the Department of Nuclear Engineering and Science, director of the Center for Multiphase Research, and the dean of engineering at RPI. Previously, Dr. Lahey held several technical and managerial positions with the General Electric Company, Including overall responsibility for all domestic and foreign R&D programs associated with boiling water nuclear reactor thermal-hydraulic and safety technology. He has chaired several committees for the American Society of Mechanical Engineering, American Nuclear Society, American Institute for Chemical Engineering. American Society
90 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE for Engineering Education, and NASA. His current research is funded by the Department of Energy's Naval Reactors Program, the Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He currently consults on nuclear reactor safety problems and the chemical processing of non-nuclear materials and is a member of the Board of Managers of PJM Interconnection, LLC. In 1994, he was elected to the National Academy of Engineering for his contributions to the fields of multiphase flow and heat transfer and nuclear reactor safety technology. In 1995, he became a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences-Baskortostan and he is a fellow of the American Nuclear Society and of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. He has authored or co-authored over 300 technical publications, Including 10 books or handbooks and 160 journal articles. Dr. Lahey holds a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from Stanford University. KATHLEEN R. MEYER has expertise in health physics and radiologic risk assessment. She is a principal of Keystone Scientific, Inc., and Is currently Involved In risk assessments for public health and the environment from radionuclides and chemicals at several U.S. Department of Energy sites: Other work includes an assessment of the Interim radionuclide soil action levels adopted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Colorado Department of Health and Environment for cleanup at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. She has been a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Historical Dose Evaluation Committee. Dr. Meyer has authored or co-authored several peer-reviewed articles, Including papers on cancer research, historical evaluation of past radionuclide and chemical releases, and risk assessment of radionuclides and chemicals. She holds a Ph.D. in radiological health sciences from Colorado State University. FREDRICK J. MOODY is an expert thermal hydraulics and two-phase flow in nuclear power reactors. In 1999, he retired after 41 years of service at General Electric Company and 28 years as an adjunct professor of mechanical engineering at San Jose State University. Dr. Moody was the recipient of several prestigious career awards, including the General Electric Power Sector Award for Contributions to the State-of-the-Art for Two-Phase Flow and Reactor Accident Analysis. He has served as a consultant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, teaches thermal hydraulics for General Electric's Nuclear.Energy Division, and continues to review tfiermal analyses for General Electric. Dr. Moody Is a fellow of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, which awarded him the George Westinghouse Gold Medal In 1980, and the Pressure Vessels and Piping Medal in 1999. He has also received prestigious career awards from General Electric and was elected to the Silicon Valley Engineering Hall of Fame. Dr.;Moody was elected to the National Academy of Engineering In 2001.for pioneering and vital contributions to the safety design of boiling water reactors and for his role as educator. He has published three books and more than 50 papers. Dr. Moody holds a Ph.D in mechanical engineering from Stanford University. TIMOTHY R. NEAL is an expert in weapons technology and explosives. He began his career at Los Alamos National Laboratory In 1967 and has led programs addressing weapon hydrodynamics, explosions inside structures and above ground, image analysis, and dynamic testing. He also has held several management positions within the Laboratory's nuclear weapons arena, including leadership of the Explosives Technology and Applications Division and of the Advanced Design and Production Technologies Initiative. He spearheaded Los Alamos' Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 91 Environmental Impact Statement and helped establish the U.S. Department of Energy's new Stockpile Stewardship Program. More recently, he has served as a senior technical advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy on nuclear explosive safety, and he has worked closely with the Pantex Plant for nuclear weapons productioii in Amarillo, Texas, in establishing a new formal basis for operational safety. Dr. Neal has received four DOE excellence awards, including one for hydrodynamics, and authored various technical papers and reports as well as one book on explosive phenomena. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Carnegie-Mellon University. LORING A. WYLLIE, JR. Is an expert In structural engineering and senior principal of Degenkolb Engineers. His work has included seismic evaluations, analysis, and design of strengthening measures to Improve seismic performance. He has performed seismic assessments and proposed strengthening solutions for several buildings within the U.S.
.Department of Energy weapons complex and for civilian buildings, some of which have historical significb'nce. Mr. Wyllie's expertise Is also recognized in several countries, Including the forrmer Soviet Union where he worked on an Exxon facility. Mr. Wyllie is a past president of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. His contributions to the profession of structural engineering were recognized by his election to the National Academy of Engineering in 1990 and his honorary membership in the Structural Engineers.
Association of Northern California. In recognition of Mr. Wyllie's expertise In concrete design and performance, the American Concrete Institute named him an honorary member In 2000. Mr. Wyllie also was elected an honorary member of the American Society of Civil Engineers In 2001. He holds a M.S. degree from the University of California, Berkeley. PETER D. ZIMMERMAN is an expert in nuclear physics and terrorism. He Is currently thie chair of science and security and director of the Centre for Science & Security Studies at King's College In London. He previously served as the chief scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where his responsibilities included nuclear testing, nuclear arms control, cooperative threat reduction, and bioterrorism. Previously, he served as science advisor for arms control l6 the U.S. State.Department, where he provided advice directly to Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and the Undersecretary for Arms Control and international Security. His responsibilities Included technical aspects of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, biological arms control, missile defense, and strategic arms control. Dr. Zimmerman spent many years in academia as professor of physics at Louisiana State University. He is the author of more than 100 articles on basic physics as well as arms I control and national security. His most recent publication Is the monograph 'Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited," which was published bythe National Defense University In the Defense Horizons series. Dr. Zimmerman holds a Ph.D. In experimental nuclear and elementary particle physics from Stanford University and a Fil. Lic. degree from the University of Lund, Sweden. He is a fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of its governing council. He Is a recipient of the 2004 Joseph A. Burton/Forumn award for physics in the public interest.
C TOUR OF SELECTED SPENT FUEL STORAGE-RELATED INSTALLATIONS IN GERMANY On April 25-28, 2004, six committee members visited spent fuel storage-related installations in Germany. The following is a summary of some of the pertinent information obtained from that trip. Several organizations and individuals worked with committee staff to make this trip possible. The committee would especially like to acknowledge Alfons L0hrmann and William McConaghy of GNBIGNSI (Gesellschaft for Nuklear-Beh~ilter, mbHIGeneral Nuclear Systems, Inc.), who organized site visits;*Klaus Janberg (STP engineering); Michael Sailer, chairman of RSK (Reaktorsicherheitskommission-reactor safety commission); Holger Broeskamp manager of GNS (Geselichaft fOr Nuklear-Service, mbH-Germany's nuclear industry consortium) and his staff; Wolfgang Sowa, managing director of GNB (Gesellschaft for Nuklear-Beh~lter, mbH) and his staff; Florentin Lange of GRS (Gesellschaft fOr Anlagen-und Reaktorsicherhelt, mbH); and Hubertus FlOgge, vice-president of the RWE Power AG plants in Lingen and his staff, who allowed the committee to visit the reactor building and the site's spent fuel storage facility. C.1 GERMAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Germany currently has 18 operating commercial nuclear power reactors at 12 sites. Approximately one-third of the reactors are boiling water reactors (BWRs) and two-thirds are pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The design for PWR plants is Illustrated schematically in FIGURE .C.1. It consists of a dome-shaped reactor building constructed of reinforced concrete and a spherical Inner containment structure constructed of steel. The reactor core, spent fuel pool, and steam generators are located within the inner containment. The emergency core-cooling systems are located outside the inner containment but within the reactor building. The German BWR reactor building design is'generally similar to a PWR. However, the spent fuel pool is outside the inner containment structure but within the reactor building. The reactor building is also a different shape (rectangular or cylindrical). There are three generations of commercial nuclear power plants in Germany, each having increasingly thick walls:
" First-generation plants have reactor building walls that are less than 1 meter thick. There are four plants Of this type.
Second-generation plants have reactor building walls that are slightly more than 1 meter thick. There are five plants of this type.

Third-generation plants have reactor building Walls that are about 2 meters thick.
There are nine plants of this type.1 1The committee subgroup visited one of these plants (the Lingen power plant) during Its tour. 92
TOUR OF GERMAN SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 93 Some first- and second-generation plants have independent emergency systems in a bunkered building that contains some safety trains and a control room. These systems are capable of delivering water to the reactor after an accident or attack if the pipe systems within the reactor building survive. Second- and third-generation plants were designed to withstand the crash of military fighter jets. Second-generation plants were designed to withstand the crash of a Starfighter jet at the typical landing speed. Third-generation plants were designed to withstand the crash of a Phantom jet at the typical cruising speed. This is considered to be part of the udesign basis threat, for nuclear power plants In Germany. This information on the design basis threat has been made available to-the public by the German government. h.. Siemens Pressurized Water Reacor.. i Readorpressure vessel wn wre supp*'tts-,*1u 2 Stearn ger*ators 3 Reactor coolant pumps
*~ Reactor coatr ppngs 4=Pressuizer ~Is steel c*tawrment MNd*k-$s"38 rnm) a Reactor bulif annuus IA.A FIGURE C.1 Schematic illustration of the Lingen PWR power plant, a third-generation power plant design. SOURCE: RWE Power.
94 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Plant operators must show that of the four safety trains (each train contains 50 percent of the safety system) at the plant, at least two will survive such a crash. The crash parameters (e.g., aircraft type, speed, and angle) have been established by RSK. The crash parameters have been published and the lublic knows about them. Each plant must perform an independent analysis of each reactor building. Sometimes two separate analyses have to be provided for the same site if there are two or more reactors with different designs. In 1998, the German government decided to phase out nuclear energy. Commercial nuclear plants will be allowed to generate an agreed-to amount of electricity before shutdown. Currently, the Lingen and the Neckarwestheim-2 plants have the highest remaining electricity production allowance and will be shut down in 2021 or 2022, should no revision of this political decision be implemented. C.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE Until recently, all spent fuel at German plants was stored in the reactor pools until It could be sent to Sellafield (U.K.) or La Hague (France) for reprocessing. In the 1980s, plants began to re-riack their spent fuel pools to increase storage capacities (the older German nuclear plants were designed to contain one full reactor core plus one third of a core). Relulators became concerned that the emergency cooling systems were not sufficient to handle the Increased heat loads In spent fuel pools from this re-racking. Some plants added additional cooling circuits to address this concern. Only one power plant (an older plant at Obrigheim) has wet interim pool storage in a bunkered building. A discussion of altemative spent fuel storage options began in 1979. A reprocessing plant had been proposed at Gorleben that would have had several thousand metric tons of pool storage. The German government concluded that while there were no major technical Issues for reprocessing, wet fuel storage was a potential problem because cobling systems could be disrupted in a war. GNS decided to shift from wet to dry storage for centralized storage facilities. There are two centralized storage facilities In Germany: Gorleben and Ahaus. Gorleben is designed to store vitrified high-level waste from spent fuel reprocessing and spent fuel from commercial power reactors. Ahaus Is designed to store spent fuel from test reactors and other special types of fuel. Ahaus currently stores 305 casks of reactor fuel from the decommissioned Thorium High Temperature Reactor, three casks of PWR spent fuel from the Neckarwestheim site, and three casks of BWR spent fuel from the Gundremmingen site. The latter shipment prdduced large public demonstrations and required the deployment of 35,000 police officers to maintain security. At the end of 2001, the German utility companies and the German federal government agreed to avoid all transport bf.spent fuel In Germany because of intense public opposition. The German government recently passed a law making it illegal to transport spent nuclear fuel to reprocessing plants in'France and the United Kingdom after June 30, 2005. However, there is no legal restriction concerning the transport of sperit fuel from power reactors to other destinations (e.g., to dry storage facilities). The government and power plant operators have negotiated an agreement to develop dry cask storage facilities at each of the 12 nuclear power plant sites to avoid the need for offsite spent fuel transport.
TOUR OF GERMAN SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 95 These dry cask storage facilities are to be constructed by 2006. They are licensed to store fuel for40 years. There are three dry.cask storage facility designs in Germany:
1. WTI design: The walls and roof are constructed of 80 and 50 centimeters, respectively, of reinforced concrete.

2. STEAG design: The walls and roof are constructed of 1.2 and 1.3 meters, respectively, of reinforced concrete. This design is used at the Lingen Nuclear Power Plant dry storage facility visited bythe committee (FIGURE C.2).

3. GNK design: This is a tunnel design and Is under construction at the Neckarwestheim nuclear power plant.
.The use of reinforced concrete in these facilities was originally intended for radiation protection and sturctural support, not for terrorist attacks.
In 1999, RSK Issued guidelines for dry storage, which were released in 2001 (RSK, 2001). Licensing a dry storage facility in Germany requires several safety demonstrations and analyses. As part of the licensing procedures for a storage facility, the license applicant must do independent calculations that demonstrate how the building features meet the safety standards and the design basis threat. This threat includes an armed group of intruders and-the Impact of a Phantom 2 military jet. It also Includes a shaped charge. The scenario of a deliberate crash of a larg6 civilian airplane has been considered and analyzed as part of the recent licensing of onsite dry storage facilities but Is not established as part of the design basis threat. There are public hearings during which the license applicant explains the safety features of the storage facility. The public is aware of the design basis threat, and It Is provided with the results of the analysis but not with the details. FIGURE C.2 Dry cask spent fuel storage building at the Lingen Nuclear Power Plant. SOURCE: RWE PoWer. I.
96 6 SAFETY AND SECUR17Y OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE There are six temporary (i.e., five- to seven-year) storage facilities In use at reactor sites until these dry cask storage facilities become available. The casks in thesetemporary storage facilities are stored horizontally and are protected by concrete "garages" designed to withstand the impact of a Phantom militaryjet. Spent commercial fuel is stored In CASTOR casks (FIGURE C.3) that were originally designed and developed by.the German utility-owned company GNB. 2 These' casks can store either PWR or BWR spent fuel assemblies. The design consists of a ductile cast iron cylindrical cask body with Integral circumferential fins machined into the outer surface to maximize heat transfer;, Inside, the spent fuel assemblies are inserted In a borated stainless steel basket. The cask has a double-lid system that is protected by a third steel plate. The cask complies with the International regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a type B(U) package. Spent fuel is typically cooled for live years in a pool before It Is put in dry cask storage; some other custom-made cask designs can hold fuel that has been cooled for shorter (minimum two years) or longer times depending on the fuel characteristics and fuel bum-up. Current fuel bum-ups In Germany (52 to 55 gigawatt-days per metric ton) are similar to those in the United States.
FIGURE C.3 Typical features of a CASTOR cask used at the Lingen Nuclear Power Plant.
SOURCE: RWE Power AG Lingen Nuclear Power Plant. 2Gesellschaft for Nuklear-Behblter, mbH.
TOUR OF.GERMAN SPENTFOEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 97 C.3 RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States caused the German government to reassess the security of its nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage facilities. RSK held meetings starting in October 2001 to discuss the implications of the September 11 attacks for German commercial nuclear power plants. It Issued a short statement recommending that an analysis be carried out on each plant to assess Its vulnerability to September 11-type attacks. These analyses have not yet been undertaken. Plant operators assert that terrorist attacks are a general risk of society and should be treated like attacks on other infrastructure (e.g., chemical facilities). The Lander (state) governments, which are responsible for licensing commercial power plants in Germany, do not require these analyses. RSK recommended that the federal government develop a
.checklist for such an analysis, but this also has not been done.
A general inalysis of the Impact of the different civilian aircraft on commercial nuclear plants was requested by BMU 3 and has been carried out by GRS.4 The result of the discussions between RSK and BMU on the basis of this report was that plant specific sensitivity analyses are needed. GRS was also Involved in the framing of the recent German licensing process In the analysis of the consequences of civilian aircraft attacks on STEAG-and WTI-design spent fuel storage facilities using three sizes of aircraft (ranging from Airbus A320- to Boeing 747-size aircraft). C.4 TESTS ON GERMAN CASKS The casks that are ised In German dry cask storage facilities have been subjected to several tests that simulate accidents and terrorist attacks. The following types of tests were performed on these casks or cask materials. Airplane crash test simulations with military aircraft (Phantom type) are part of the licensing requirements for both casks and storage facilities. Between 1970 and 1980 a number of tests on storage casks were carried out at the Meppen military facility in Germany. A one-third scale model of a GNB cask was used to simulate the impact of a turbine shaft of a military aircraft using a hollow-tube projectile. Two different impact orientations were used: perpendicular to upright cask body (lateral Impact) and perpendicular to center of lid system. The projectile completely disintegrated In the test, but the cask sustained only minor damage. The jet aircraft tests were carried out because of safety concerns, but after September 11, 2001, Intentional crashes of airciaft also were considered. Investigations by BAM (Bundesanstalt frr Materialforschung und -parfung ) and GRS concluded that CASTOR-type casks would maintain their.integrity when intentionally hit by a commercial aircraft. 3 Bundesmlnistedum fbr Umwelt, Naturschutz and Reaktorslcherhelt (Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection, and Nuclear Safety and Security). 4Gesellschaft fOr Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), mbH (Company for Installation and Reactor Safety). GRS IsGermany's main research Institution on nuclear'safety. It is an Independent, nonprofit organization, founded In 1977, and has about 450 employees. GRS funds its work through research contracts. Some have compared GRS to Sandia National Laboratories in the United States.
98 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Other types of terrorist attacks have been a long-standing concern to the German government because bf terrorism activities in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. A series of tests simulating terrorist attacks on casks were done in Germany, France, the United States (for the German government), and Switzerland (for the.Swiss government). Additional tests may have been done that are not publicly acknowledged. In 1979-1980 at the German Army facility in Meppen, a "hollow charge' (i.e., shaped charge) weapon was fired at a ductile cast iron plate and fuel assembly dummy to simulate a CASTOR cask. The cask plate was perforated but release fractions from the fuel assembly were not examined. From this experiment, the German government concluded that the wall thickness of the cask should not be less than 300 millimeters. Other tests were carried out at the Centre d'Etude de Gramat in France in 1992 on behalf of the Germany Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety (BMU) (Lange et al., 1994). These tests involved shaped charges directed at a CASTOR cask (type CASTOR Ila, the cask was one third of the regular length) filled with nine fuel element dummies with depleted uranium. The fuel rods were pressurized to 40 bars to simulate fuel bum-up, but the cask Interior was at atmospheric pressure or at reduced pressure of 0.8 bar. The shaped charge perforated the cask and penetrated fuel elements. This damaged the fuel and resulted in the release of fuel particles from the cask. These particles were collected, and their particle size distribution was measured. About I gram of uranium was released in particles of less than 12.5-microns aerodynamic diameter, and 2.6 grams of uranium were released In particles with a size range between 12.5 and 100 microns. Ifthe pressure inside the cask was reduced to 0.8 bar (to simulate the conditions during interim storage of spent fuel In Germany), the releases were reduced by two-thirds: 0.4 gram for particle sizes less than 12.5 microns and about 0.3 gram for particles between 12.5 and 100 microns. In 1998, a demonstration was carried out at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the United States using an anti-tank weapon on a CASTOR cask. The purpose of this demonstration was to show that a concrete jacket on the exterior of the cask could prevent perforation. The weapon was first fired at the cask without the jacket. It perforated the front wall of the cask. The concrete jacket was effective in preventing perforation of the cask. Committee members saw a specimen of this cask at the GNB worksliop (see FIGURE C.4). Also in 1999, explosIon'of a liquid gas tank next to a cask was performed by the German BAM (Federal Office of Material Research and Testing) to study the effect of accidents involving fire or explosions In the vicinity of the cask during transpbrtation or storage. The gas tank and the CASTOR cask Were initially about 8 feet (2.5 meters) apart. Explosion of the tank generated a fire ball 330 to 500 feet (100 to 150 meters) In diameter. The explosion projected the cask 23 feet (7 meters) away and tilted it by 180 degrees, causing It to hit the ground on the lid side. Examination after the explosion showed no change in the containment properties of the lid system.
TOUR OF GERMAN SPENTFJEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS 99
.N.
"i, FIGURE C.4 Section of a CASTOR cask showing the perforation made by a shaped charge at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. SOURCE: Courtesy of GNBIGNSI."
REFERENCE Lange, F., G. Pretzsch, J. DMhier, E. H6rmann, H. Busch, and W. Koch. 1994. Experimental Determination of UOr-Release from a Spent Fuel Transport Cask after Shaped Charge Attack. 35th INMM Annual Meeting Proceedings (Naples, Florida). Vol. 23, pp. 408-413. RSK (Reaktorsicherheitskommission). 2001. Safety-Related Guidelines for' the Dry Interim Storage of Sperit Fuel Elements In Storage Casks. Recommendation of the Commission on Reactor Safety. Aoril 5. Available at httpYAvwww.rskonline. deIDownload/LeiUinien*Eng/ishlRSK-GUIDELIN.ES-DRY-INTERIM-STORAGE.pdf. I ii
D HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT COMMERCIAL POWER REACTOR FUEL OPERATIONS There are 103 commercial power reactors operating in the United States at this time. Almost all of them are operating with spent fuel pools that are too small to accommodate cumulative spent fuel discharges. This short appendix was prepared to provide a historical background for power reactor fuel operations and pool and dry-cask storage of spent fuel. D.1 DESIGN FOR A CLOSED FUEL CYCLE The first large generation of commercial reactors In the United States were almost all light water reactors (LWRs), that'is, nuclear reactors that use ordinary water to cool the core and to moderate the neutrons emitted by fission. The hydrogen atoms in the water coolant moderate, or slow down the fission-emitted neutrons to an energy level that is more likely to cause fission when the neutron strikes a fissile atom. These reactors were designed, developed, and licensed in the 1960s and 1970s, although many were not completed until the 1980s. Their design power output increased rapidly, as it did for non-nuclear power plants, In order to achieve economies of scale. Thus, the earlier plants in this generation were designed to produce 500-900 megawatts of electrical power (MWe) while later units Increased to 1000-1200 MWe. The number of LWRs built and ordered by the U.S. industry began to approach 200.All of these plants were being designed for a closed fuel cycle, that Is, for the uranium oxide fuel, enriched to 2-5 percent uranium-235, to be loaded and "burned" to a level of 20-30 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium (GWdIMTU), then reprocessed in commercial plants to separate the still usable fissionable, or fissile, materials in the spent fuel from the radioactive waste. The reprocessing plants would recover the fissile plutonium-239 formed from uranium-238 during reactor operations and residual fissile uranium-235 for use as fuel in LWRs and later in breeder reactors (USNRC, 1976). By the mid-I 970s commercial reprocessing plants were built, under construction, or planned in New York,. Illinois, South Carolina, and Tennessee, with a .combined projected capacity to reprocess more than 6000 MTU of spent fuel per year. For comparison, a large LWR discharges about 20 MTU of spent fuel at a refueling. By this time the price of fresh uranium was dropping and the cost of fuel reprocessing made it difficult for recycle fuel to compete with fresh fuel. Also, there was controversy about the disk of fissile material diversion if recycled plutonium was moved in commercial traffic. Both existing fuel reprocessing plants withdrew from licensing for technical reasons and then, on April 7, 1977, President Carter Issued a policy statement that "we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced Inthe U.S. nuclear power programs.! -The statement went on to say: "The plant at Bamwell, South Carolina, will receive neither federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as a rep'rocessing facility." After consultation with the White House, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) terminated its Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium In Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO) proceedings. Thus, the U.S. nuclear industry was immediately changed from a closed fuel cycle, with recycle, to an open or once-through fuel cycle with the fuel loaded into the reactor in 100
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT bF CURRENT COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS 101 several consecutive locations-to obtain maximum economic use of the fuel before it was finally removed as waste. The USNRC changed the legal definition of high-level radioactive waste to include the high-level waste from both nuclear fuel reprocessing and spent nuclear fuel. For this study, the significance of this closed fuel cycle design is that this entire generation of more than 100 reactors was designed with small spent fuel pools, relying or! prompt shipment away from the reactor to the reprocessing plant to make room for later discharges of spent fuel. Early spent fuel shipping casks were being designed with active coolirig systems to support shipment of fuel less than a year out of the reactor to a reprocessing plant. BOX D.1 discusses the spent nuclear fuel at reprocessing plants. Supplementary wet and dry storage systems had to be developed to receive the older spent fuel to make room for fresh spent fuel from the reactor. Many plants had to remove and modify the storage racks in their spent fuel pools to accommodate more spent fuel in the pool Itself until licb'nsed supplementary sstems were available. D.2 RETRENCHMENT OF U.S. REACTOR PLANS As noted in Section D.1, in the 1970s the United States was building reactors at a high rate. Then, in the late 1970s, three factors produced a retrenchment in power reactor plans: rising interest rates, reversal of the U.S. fuel reprocessing policy, and the Three Mile Island-2 accident. D.2.1 Effect of Interest Rates Commercial power reactors have characteristically high Initial capital costs. The regulated public utilities have had to raise the capital with various debt Instruments; to build,. license, and operate the finished plant for a time before It can be declared commercial; and to change the electricity rates charged consumers to retire the debt on the capital cost. The soaring interest rates In the United States during the late 1970s drove the costs of new nuclear plants that were under construction to extreme heights. This, combined with slackening demand for electricity, led to the cancellation of many plants, some even in advanced stages of construction. D.2.2 Effect of Reversal of U.S. Fuel Reproces sing Policy President Carter enunciated a change In U.S. policy for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel In early 1977. Those reactors then operating and those under construction had to begin 'modifying their reactorfuel cycle design to go from the closed (reprocessing) cycle to a "once-through" fuel cycle. This inducbd the designers to go to higher levels of uranium-235 enrichment in the new fuel, but still within the 5 percent licensing limit. It also Induced the designers to revise the core loading and operating plans In order to bum or use the fissile content of the fuel to the greatest extent economically possible since the fissile residue could not be retrieved by reprocessing. As a result, spent fuel bumup levels rose to levels that are now almost double the 20-30 GWd/MTU characteristic of the original closed fuel cycle. This results in an increase in the decay-heat power of the spent fuel assembly by the time it is put into the spent fuel pool.-
102. SAFETY AND SECURITY OFCOMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE
,° Power reactors arerefueled, and spent fuel is discharged to the storage pool, every one to two years. The decay-heat power of recently discharged spent fuel dominates the heat load of all the spent fuel in the pool, both freshly discharged and old, since the decay heat from a spent fuel assembly,decreases by one to two orders of magnitude in the first year after it Is removed from the reactor. Increasing the capacity of the spent fuel pool by re-racking, that is, modifying the storage racks to provide for closer spacing of the fuel assemblies,. allows olderfuel to be accumulated in the pool rather than being removed for 1The capacity of spent fuel pools has typically been increased by replacing the original storage racks with racks that hold the spent fuel assemblies closer together. The fuel assembly channels Inthese
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS 103 shipment or dry storage. Re-racking can make it more difficult to cool the freshly discharged fuel if there is catastrophic loss of the fuel pool water. D.2.3 Effect of the Three Mile Island Accident The final factor driving the retrenchment of the nuclear power Industry was the Three Mile island-2 (TMI-2) accident that occurred on March 28, 1979, in Pennsylvania (Walker, 2004). In that accident a small failure in the reactor coolant system was compounded by operator errors to result In catastrophic damage; a partial core melt occurred. The inability of the operators to understand and control the events, and the confusion among the state, the USNRC, and other responsible agencies about public protection had a devastating effect on public trust in the safety of nuclear power. The USNRC escalated safety requirements after the TMI-2 accident. These new requirements substantially modified the operation of licensed plants, delayed completion of new plants, and further increased their construction costs. The accident also reskilted In the retrenchment of nuclear power In the 1980s and led to the cancellation of many plants, decommissioning of some plants, and the sale of some plants to other owners. The fleet of operating U.S. reactors was reduced to the presently operating 103 described here. D.3 COMMERCIAL POWER REACTORS CURRENTLY OPERATING INTHE UNITED STATES All of the commercial power reactors operating In the United States are light water reactors. BOX D.2 describes the LWRs that are currently operating in the United States. D.3.1 Pressurized Water Reactors About two-thirds of the U.S. reactors are pressurized-water reactors (PWRs), dual-cycle plants in which the primary cooling water Is kept under a pressure of about 2000 pounds per square Inch absolute (psia) as It circulates to remove fission and decay heat from the reactor fuel In the core and carry that energy to the steam generators, to generate steam in the lower-pressure secondary loop. The reactor, primary lop piping, and steam generators are all located in the containment structure; the steam lines penetrate the containment carrying the steam to the turbine to generate electrical power. . About one-third of the U.S. reactors are boiling-water reactors (BWRs), single-cycle plants, In which the primary coolant of the reactor core Is operated at about 1000 psia as it recirculates within the reactor core. The fission and decay heat generated in the core cause a substantial amount of the reactor c6olant water to boil Into steam that passes out directly from the reactor pressure vessel to the turbine-generator system. Plant differences stem initially from the different designs of the nuclear steamsystem supplier, the different designs of the architect-engineers that built the plants, and the owners that often specified additional modifications. replacement racks typically have solid metal walls with neutron-absorbing material for nuclear safety reasons. This configuration inhibits water or air circulation more than the earlier configuration.
104" SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE The PWRS operating in the United States were designed by three different nuclear steam system suppliers; Westinghouse Electric, Combustion Engineering, and Babcock & Wilcox. Most PWRs have what are called large dry containments, that is, containment structures of about 2 million cubic feet volume that can absorb the rapid release of steam and hot water from a postulated rupture of the primary coolant system without exceeding an internal pressure of about 4 atmospheres. FIGURE D.1 illustrates a PWR In a large dry containment. Some PWR containments are essentially as large but use ventilation fans to maintain thb Initial containment pressure mildly sub-atmospheric to provide an additional pressure margin. Finally, one set of nine Westinghouse PWRs uses ice-condenser containment structures, In which the containment has about the same pressure capability but is smaller, relying on massive baskets of Ice maintained In the containment to condense steam releases and mitigate the pressure surge. D.3.2 Boiling Water Reactors The BWRs In operation today were designed by the General Electric Company. They all use pressure suppression containments, two-chamber systems with the reactor located in
-a dry well that is connected to a wet well containing a large pool of water.
In the event of a rupture of the reactor system in thedry well, the steam and hot water released. are channeled Into the water in the wet well, condensing and cooling the i steam to mitigate the pressuie surge. BOX D.2 lists the three successive generations of BWR containment design, and the number of each still operating. FIGURE D.2 illustrates three types of BWR containnments: Maik I, Mark II,and Mark III. The Mark I containment is the most common type with 22 in operation.The reactor pressure vessel, containing the
reactor core Is located in a dry well of the containment in the shape of an inverted incandescent light bulb.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS 105 J Taat0ogenerto bu1idin FIGURE D.1 A PWR In a large dry containment. SOURCE: Modified from Dud&rstadt and Hamilton (1976, Figure 3-4). The dry well is connected by large ducts to the wet well, a large toroidal (i.e., doughnut-shaped) part of the containmeht that Is partially filled with water. Gas and steam releases from an accident In the dry well would be passed through the connecting ducts Into the water in the wet well, cooling the gas and condensing the steam to mitigate the accident. pressure rise in the containment. The containment building Mark II BWR Is similar to the Mark I except that In the Mark II containment the conical dry well is directly above the cylindrical wet well..Nine Mark IIreactors are still operating.in the United States. In the Mark III, the dry well around the reactoir vessel is vented to the top of a cylindrical wet well that surrounds it. Four Mark III BWRs are currently operating. The entire dry well-wet we!l system Is p contained within a large steel containment shell and a concrete shield building. D.3.3 Reactor Fuel and Reactor Control TABLE D.1 presents the range of dimensions and weights for a wide variety of the LWR fuel assemblies used in the operating reactors. The spent fuel pools and the dry storage systems used at a reactor must be tailored to the specific fuel design for that reactor.
106 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE I wPRIMARY CONTAINMENT 2 - ORYWELL
3 - WETWELL 4 - SUPPRESSION POOL 3Q MARK I mAR MAW NI FIGURE D.2 Three types of BWR containment system: Mark I, Mark I1,and Mark Ill. SOURCE: Modified from Lahey and Moody (1993, Figure 1-9).
The fission process is controlled by the reactor operators through the use of neutron-absorbing materials. The primary control is an array of control rods or blades that can be withdrawn from the core to the degree needed. In the PWRs, the control rods are moved within selected empty tubes within the assembly. In the BWRs, cruciform (cross-shaped) control blades are moved across the faces of the fuel assembly, typically narrower than those in a PWR fuel assembly. Reactor fuel designers also use burnable poisons within the fuel assembly to control the fission process. These poisons are placed in appropriate amounts within the fuel assembly so that they bum away, making the fuel assembly more reactive, as the continued fission process Is making It less reactive. PWRs"also use neutron control by dissolving neutron-absorbing sodium borate in the reactor coolant, gradually lowering the concentration from the peak after refueling to the minimum before the next refueling. REFERENCES American Nuclear Society. 1988. Design Criteria for an lindependent Spent Fuel Storage
.Installation (Water Pool Type): An American National Standard. ANSI/ANS-57.7-1988. Armerican Nuclear Society.- LaGrange Park, Illinois."
Duderstadt, J. J. and L. J. Hamilton. 1976. Nuclear Reactor Analysis. John Wiley & Sons. New York. Lahey, R..T. and F. J. Moody. 1997. The Thermal Hydraulics of a Boiling Water Nuclear Reactor. Second Edition. American Nuclear Society. La Grange Park, Illinois.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:OFCURRENT COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS 107 USNRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1976. Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO). NUREG-0002. Washington, DC. USNRC. 1987. Case Histories of West Valley Spent Fuel Shipments. NUREG/CR-4847. January. Washington, D.C. Walker, J. S. 2004. Three Mileisland: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press. Berkeley, California. TABLE D.1 Range of Dimensions and Weights for Light Water Reactor Fuel Assemblies Used in Oierating Reactors In the United States.
]Physical Characteristics of Typical LWR Fuel Assernblies lea*tor. ype sWt 3WR1 PWRM PM72 *2"1M2 P" M MR P" MR tWR Foel Deslw GE GE B&W R&W GE GE W W W W W W Fuel Rod A.nay 7W 8:8 1X51 17M17 14%14 16016 14:14 14414 15215 15:15 17:17 17M17 Active Fuel Length (iln) 44 144 144 143 137 150 120 144 121 144 1"4 118 nominal Eavelope (Ci2
5.438 S47 a"36 8536 8.25 62 7.763 7.763 8.449 &42 8"26 8.426 Foel AfembY Lengt* in.)176 176 166 166

157 177 137 161 137 160 160 -
Weight u.) 600 600 1.516 L1 1.502 kg - 501 73 tk 594 k4 &U54 &c S kc - Fuel Rod NHfmbler 49 63 208 264 164 224-236 180 179 204 204 264 264 Length aln.P 163 - 153 - 147 161 127 152 127 152 152 - Pitch. Square 110 0.730 0.640 0.6 0.01 0.380 0.36 0 0.55 0 0.563 0.496 0.96 O.D. flu.) 0.570 0.493 0.430 0.379 0.440 0.182 20.422 022 0.A22 0.422 0.374 0.3W0 c lhukhjw I1L) Taa 35.5 34 26.5 23.5 * *2 2 16.5M 24.3 16.5 24.3 22.5 22. ClaodMaterial .r2 Zr2 Zr4 2,4 Zr4
r4 sat " Zr4. ost 2r4. -4 4 Pelet oD. tin 0.488 0.416 0.370 . 0.r2 0.3o35 0323 0"3435; 0.3653 0o2w &M59 0.5 o0068 Pellet Length 6i -- - - 0.375 w 0.0 0.600 0.600 6.600 A600 0.433 0.530 GOP. .adl-tImfJ -5. 41.5 3.5 3. 4.3 .3.5 2.8. A.- 2.8 3.8 3.3 3.3 Denity ISM)D - - 92.5-95.0 93.-93.0 91.-95.0 '94.7s 93094.0 t" 93.0-94.0 92.0 9S.0 95.0 Poion GdO, CO. None. None .MCAtO, *.CIAIJ.0.. . . . .
Nonfuelod Rods No mber 0 1" *17 25 6 6 16 17 21 21 23. 25 materila - 2,2 2,4 2,4 2,4 Zr4 304sa 2,4 3" set 2,4 2, 4 2,4 Spaeer Grids N'umbe, 7 7 8 a 8 12 .. . .
]sterial Intonel X l*conel X Incoel 218 Ioeael 718 2r.4 2,4 . . . .
SOURCE: American Nuclear Society (1988).
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT'OFCURRENT COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS f07 USNRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1976. Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium In Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors (GESMO). NUREG-0002. Washington, DC. USNRC. 1987. Case Histories of West Valley Spent Fuel Shipments. NUREG/CR-4847.
January. Washington, D.C.
Walker, J. S. 2004. Three MileIsiand: A Nuclear.Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press. Berkeley, California. I.
*n..
TABLE D.1 Range of Dimensions and Weights for Light Water Reactor Fuel Assemblies Used in Operating Reactors In the United States. t :',"oB "M Pbhyical Cbaracterktics of !2I*padLWR JFue Assemblies Reactor Tyrpe Feet Design~er aWn RWR P"R PWlE "M F"Rl-. _JR MR MWR P"l w w w OE GE S.AW SaW GE 0t W 7s? $0 23035~xl ITI7..'-" 144l4 f"lrsl$" 14z44 " w14414 W IS-IS 15X15 17.17 17.17 14 144 143 137 150 120 1" 121 144 MIT 1 344 Nowlal rnvelop. 11302 5.4A33 5.47 8&&36 8.536 8.15 a .25 7.763 7.763 8.449 8.426 8.423 8.426 Fuel Asamemy Length tile 1 T76 16* 14 157 177 137 161 137 IS0 160 Weight nbe.) 6w0 600 1.516 1.50 51 kg -
01 kg 73 I 5 94 kgf G&Sit Fuel Rod Number 40 63 208 264 164 224-236 280 179 204 204 264 264 152 152 Lenagth 111 0J 163 - 253 - 147 161 1i7 152 Pitch. Square flu.) 0.738 0.64 W"
0. 0.01 0w 0106 0.w 0.53w 0.563 0.496 0370 0.49,. 0.430 0.379. 0.440
,..' ý.o0.382 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.374 0496 0.360 Cla 7%kkneseimUL)& 83.5 34 26.5- 23.5- *"2326 -; 16.5 " 24.3 16.5 243 22.5 22.1 clad Maetertia 2,2 Z,2 Zr4.* .. - ,4.. ,.. 2, 4'-j t..I-. "Zr4 set 2,4 Z4 Zr' 0.488 ,- 0.416 0..37 *.0.650 .0 3a " .3 " "o pellet O.). NO*. ,. -- *00 S -- .0.600 o.0.3M "3 0.600 0.38.3 0.3335" .03225.
0.53O elhot Lasith in 0.600 0.530 8; ;5 -. 35 3.2 . 4.3 *3.5 . 2.8.. 3.8 2.8 3.8 3.3
*! Deasty (=1D - -M~D.r gs 9-. .0. 0.o,U.s.-
3,a $3.0.94.0 9s.0 .93.0.94.0 92.0 95.0 95.0 C..O. None None .*.* D.C .,: D .... -.. , Number' 0 .1 *17 , 25 *.. 6 -,.:-. 1 6 ... 17 .21 21 Zr4 25 254 Zr2 Zr4' Z" 4 :'Zr4 " 304s. Zr4 "304 st 2r4 XI~atrla S Zr 4 po. Grtrld :. 7 .. 8 3 ,*,: 1 4." N~umber 7 -
)atriai*
w I le~elICto..91211 tacuee1713 2,4 liw.. 414. SS....
*SouRCE: American "Nuclear Society (1988). - - .9.
a
E GLOSSARY Abtinlde: Any of a series of chemically similar radioactive elements'with atomic numbers ranging from 89 (actinium) through 103 (lawrencium). This grbup includes uranium and plutonium. Alpha particle: Two neutrons and two protons bound as a single particle (a helium nucleus) emitted from certain radioactive isotopes when they undergo radioactive decay. Bare-fuel cask: See Cask. Beta particle: A charged particle consisting of a positron or electron emitted from certain radioactive isotopes when they undergo radioactive decay. Beyond-design-basis accidents: Te6hnical expression describing accident sequences outside of those used as design criteria for a facility. Beyond-design-basis accidents are generally more severe but are judged to be too unlikely to be a basis for design. Boiling water reactor (BWR): A type of nuclear reactor In which the reactor's water coolant is allowed to boil to produce steam. The steam is used to drive a.turbine and electrical generator to produce electricity. Burn-up: Measure of the number of fission reactions that have occurred in a given mass of nuclearfuel, expressed as thermal energy releasedmultiplied by the period of operation and divided by the mass of the fuel. Typical units are megawatt-days per metric ton of uranium (MWd/MTU) or gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium (GWd/MTU). Canister-based cask: See Cask.
* ."Cassk: Large, typically cylindrical containers constructed of steel and/or reinforced concrete -thatare used to store'and/or transpoit spent nuclear fuel. Casks designed for -storagof spent nuclearfuel can be of two types: "bare-fuel* or "canister-based." In ... bare-fuel .".*ad casks, ea-tight spent fuelncnse-based conanr Is stored .in a fuelcasks*
basket thesurrounded by a heavily fuel is enclosed shielded In a leak-tight
" steel cylinder, called b-canister, which has a welded lid. The canister Is placed in a.
heavily shielded cask overpack. Casks can be single-, dual-, or multiple-purpose,
.. indicating that they can be used, respectively, for storage (alsioailled storage-only casks), for storage-and transportation, and for storage, transportation, and geologic
"-." disposal. There are no true multi-purpose casks forspent fuel currently available on thb market.-
'Qeslum-137: Radioactive isotope that-is one of the products of nuclear fission. *-" ".Chain reaction: A series of fission reactions wherein the neutrons released in one fission event stimulate the next fission event or events.
108
GLOSSARY 109 Cladding: Thin-walled metal tube that forms the outer jacket of a nuclear fuel rod. It prevents corrosion of the nuclear fuel and the release of fission products Into the coolant. Zirconium alloys (also called zircaloy,see below) are common cladding
-materials in commercial nuclear fuel.
Cohduction: In the context of heat transfer, the transfer of heat within a medium through a diffusive process (i.e., molecular or atomic collisions). Containment structure: A robust; airtight shell or other enclosure around a nuclear reactor core to prevent the release of radioactive imaterlal to the environment In the event of an accident. Convection: Heat transfer by the physical movement of material within a fluid medium. Cooling time: Tt~e amount of time elapsed since spent fuel was discharged from a nuclear reactor. Core: That portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements. Criticality: Term used in reactor physics to describe the state in which the number of neutrons released by the'fission process Is exactly balanced by the neutrons being absorbed and escaping the reactor core. At criticality, the nuclear fission chain reaction is self-sustaining. Decay heat: Heat produced bythe decay of radioactive isotopes contained in nuclear fuel.
..Decay, radioactive: Disintegration of the nucleus.of an unstable element by the S. sp.ontaneous emission of charged particles (alpha, beta, positron) or photons of energy (gamma radiation) from the nucleus, spontaneous fission, or electron capture.
Depleted uranium: Uranium enriched in the element uranium-238 relative to uranium-235 compared to that usually found in nature. Also, uranium in which the uranium-235 content has been reduced through a physical process. Design basis phenombnna' Earthquakestormadoes, hurricanes, floods, and other events that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss of systems, structures, and components necessary to ensure public health and safety. Design basis threat: In the contekt of this study,,hypothetical ground assault threat against a commercial nuclear power plant.. Some generic elements of the design basis threat are described In Title 10, Section 73.1(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.1 (a)).' Dirty bomb: .See RadiologicalDispersalDevice. Dry storage: Out-of-water storage of spent nuclear fuel in heavily shielded casks.
110 SAFEThYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT FUEL STORAGE Drywell: The containment structure enclosing a boiling water nuclear reactor vessel. The drywell is connected to a pressure suppression system and provides a barrier to the release of radioactive material to the environment under accident conditions. Dual-purpose cask: See Cask. Fissile material: Material that undergoes fission from thermal (slow) neutrons. Although sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material; the term "fissile" has acquired this more restricted meaning in nuclear reactor technology. The three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239. Fission: Splitting of a nucleus Into at least two nuclei accompanied by the release of neutrons and a relatively.large amount of energy. Fissionable: Material that 16 capable of undergoing fission from fast neutrons. Fission products: Nuclei resulting from the fission of elements such as uranium.
.Fuel assembly: A square array of fuel rods.
Fuel pellet: A small cylinder of uranium usually in a ceramic form (uranium dioxide, U0 2), typically measuring about 0.4 to 0.65 inches (1.0 to 1.65 centimeters) tall and about 0.3 to 0.5 inch (0.8 to 1.25 centimeters) in diameter.. Fuel reprocessing: Chemical processing of reactor fuel to separate the unused fissionable material (uranium and plutonium) from waste material.
.Fuel rod: Sometimes referred to as a fuel element or fuelpin. A long, slender tube that holds the uranium fuel pellets. Fuel rods are assembled into bundles called fuel assemblies.
Gamma ray: Electromagnetic radiation (high-energy.photons) emitted from certain radioactive isotopes when they undergo radioactive decay. Half-life (radioactive): Time required for half the atoms of a radioactive substance to
"" undergo radioactive decay. Each radioactive isotope has a unique half-life. For example, cesium-137 decays with a half-life of 30.2 years, and plutonium-239 decays with a half-life of 24,065 years..
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installatl6n (ISFSI): Afacility for storing spent fuel In'wet pools or dry casks as defined In Title 10, Part 72 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Irradiation: Process of exposing material to radiation, for example, the exposure of nuclear fuel in the reactor core to neutrons. Isotope: Elements that have the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons. For example, uranium-235 and uranium-238 are different isotopes of the element uranium.
GLOSSARY III Loss-of-pool-coolant event: A postulated accidental or malevolent'event that results in a loss of the water coolant from a spent fuel pool at a rate in excess of the capability of the water makeup system to restore it. Megawatt: One million watts. MELCOR: A computer code developed by Sandia National Laboratories for use in analyzing severe reactor core accidents. The code has been adapted to modei fluid flow, heat transfer, fuel cladding oxidation kinetics, and fission product release phenomena associated with spent fuel assemblies in spent fuel pools In loss-of-pool-coolant events. Metric ton: Weight unit corresponding to 1000 kg or approximately 2200 pounds. Metric tons of uranium: See MTU. Moderator: Material, such as ordinary water, heavy water, or graphite, used in a reactor to slow down high-energy neutrons. MTU (metric tons of.uranium): Unit of measurement of the mass for spent nuclear fuel, also expressed in metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM). It refers to the initial mass of uranium that is contained In a fuel assembly. It does not include the mass of fuel cladding (zirconium alloy) or the oxygen in the fuel compound. Multi-purpose cask: See Cask. MWe: Megawatts of electrical energy output from a power plant. MWt: Megawatts of thermal energy output from a power plant. Neutron: Uncharged subatomic particle contained in the nucleus of an atom. Neutrons are emitted from the nucleus during the fission process. Open rack: A storage rack in a spent fuel pool that has open space and lateral channels between the cells for storing spent fuel assemblies to permit water circulation. Overpack: Metal or concrete cask used for storage or transportation of a canister containing spent nuclear fuel. See Cask. Owner-controlled area: That part of the power plant-site over which the 6lant operator exercises control. This usually corresponds to the boundary of the site. Pellet: See Fuelpellet. Penetrate: To pass Into, but not completely through, a solid object. Perforate: To produce a hole that goes completely through a solid object. Plutonium-239: A fissile isotope of plutonium that contains 94 protons and 145 neutrons.
112 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE Pressurized water reactor (PWR): A type of nuclear reactor in which the reactor's water coolant is kept'at high pressure to prevent it from boiling. The coolant transfers its heat to a secondary water system that boils into steam to drive the turbine and generator to produce electricity. Probabilistic risk assessment: A systematic, quantitative method to assess risk (see below) as It relates to the performance of a complex system. Protected area: A zone located within the owner.contrOlled area of a commercial nuclear power plant site Inwhich access Is restricted using guards, fences, and other barriers. psla: Unit of pressure, pounds per square Inch absolute, that is the total pressure including the pressure of the atmosphere. Radioactivity: Spontaneous transformation of an unstable atom, often resulting in the emission of particles (alpha and beta) or gamma radiation. The process is referred to as radioactive decay. Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD): A terrorist device in which sources of radioactive material are dispersed by explosives or other means. Also referred to as a dirty bomb. Radiological sabotage: Any deliberate act directed against a nuclear power plant or spent fuel in storage or transport that could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Radionuclide: Any form of an Isotope of an element that is radioactive. Re-racking: Replacement of the existing racks in a spent fuel pool with new racks that increase the number of spent fuel assemblies that can be stored. Risk: The potential for an adverse effect from an accident or terrorist attack. This potential can be estimated quantitatively if answers to the following three questions can be obtained: (1) What can go wrong? (2) How likely Is It? (3) What are the consequences? Safety: In the context of spent fuel storage, measuresthat protect storage facilities against failure, damage, human 'error, or other.accidents that would disperse radioactivity in the environmenLt Safeguards: As used in the regulation of domestic nuclear faciiities and materials, the use
-6f material control and accounting programs to verify that all nuclear material Is properly ciontrolled and accounted for, and also the use of physical protection equipment.and security forces to protect such material.
Safeguards Information: Information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data that specifically identifies a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee's or applicant's detailed (1) security measures for the physical
GLOSSARY 113 protection of special nuclear material or (2) security measures for the physical protection and location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities (10 CFR 73.2). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the authority to determine whether information is "safeguards information." Security: In the context of spent fuel storage, measures to protect storage facilities against sabotage, attacks, or theft. Shaped charge: A demolition and wall penetration or perforation device that uses high explosive to create a high-velocity jet of material. Single-purpose cask: See Cask.. -Special nuclear.material: Fissile elements such as uranium and plutonium. Spent fuel: See Spent nuclearfuel. Spent fuel pool: A water-filled pool that is used at all commercial nuclear reactors for storage of spent (used) fuel elements after their removal from a nuclear reactor. Spent fuel pools are constructed of reinforced concrete and lined with stainless steel. The inside of the pool has storage racks to hold the spent fuel assemblies and may contain a gated compartment to hold a spent fuel cask while it is being loaded and sealed. Spent (or used or irradiated fuel) nuclear fuel: Fuel that has been "bumed" in the core of a nuclear reactor and Is no longer efficient for producing electricity. After discharge from a reactor, spent fuel Is 'stored In water-filled pools (see Wet storage)for shielding and cooling. Storage-only cask: See Cask. Thermal power: Total heat output from the core of a nuclear reactor. Uranium-235: A fissile isotope of uranium that contains 92 protoris and 143 neutrons. It is the principal nuclear fuel in'nuclear power reactors. Uranium-238: An Isotope of uranium that contains 92 protons and 146 neutrons. Vital area: A zone located within the protected area of a commercial nuclear power plant sit6 that contains the reactor control room, the reactor core, support buildings, and the spent fuel pool. It is the most carefully controlled and guarded part of the plant site. Watt: Unit of power. Watt-hour: Energy unit of measure equal to one watt of power supplied for one hour. Wet storage: Storage of spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools.
114 SAFETYAND SECURITYOF COMMERCIAL SPENTFFUEL STORAGE Zircaloy: Zirconium alloy used as cladding for uranium oxide fuel pellets in reactor fuel assemblies. Zirconium cladding fire: A self-sustaining; exothermic reaction caused by rapid oxidation of zirconium fuel cladding (zircaloy) at high temperatures.
°" l
F ACRONYMS ACRS: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
-BAM: Bundesanstalt for Materialforschung und -pr~fung.
BMU: Bundesministerium fOr Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit BNL: Brookhaven National Laboratory BWR: Boiling Water Nuclear Reactor (see Appendix E) CFD: Computational Fluid Dynamics DBT: Design Basis Threat (see Appendix E) DHS: United States Department of Homeland Security DOE: United States Department of Energy EPRI: Formerly referred to as the Electric Power Research Institute GAO: United States Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting
. *Office) ,; GESMO: Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors GNB: Gesellschaft fOr Nuklear-Behblter, mbH GNS: Gesellschaft fOr Nuklear-Service, mbH ." GNSI: General Nuclear Systems, Inc.
GRS: Gesellschaft fOr Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, mbH GWd/MTU: Gigawatt-Days per Metric Ton of Uranium (see Bum-up in Appendix E) INL: Idaho National Laboratory (formerly Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory)
. ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation HSK: Die Hauptabteilung fOr die Sicherhelt der Kemanlagen '.i> MTU: Metric Tons of Uranium (see Appendix E)
MWdlMTU: Megawatt-Days per Metric Ton of Uranium (see Bum-up in Appendix E) NPP: Nuclear Power Plant NRC: National Research Council PFS: Private Fuel Storage PWR: Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor (see Appendix E) .*, RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device (see'Appendix E) RPG: Rocket-Propelled Grenade 115
FUEL STORAGE 114 SAFETYAND SECURITY OF COMMERCIAL SPENT oxide fuel pellets In reactor fuel Zircaloy: Zirconium alloy used as-cladding for uranium assemblies. reaction caused by rapid oxidation Zirconium cladding fire: A self-sustaining, exothermic of zirconium fuel cladding (zircaloy) at high temperatures.
F ACRONYMS ACRS: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards BAM: Bundesanstalt fOr Materialforschung und -prOfung. BMU: Bundesmiriisterium fOr Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit BNL: Brookhaven National Laboratory BWR: Boiling Water Nuclear Reactor (see Appendix E) CFD: Computalonal Fluid Dynamics DBT: Design Basis Threat (see Appendix E) DHS: United States Depirtment of Homeland Security DOE: United States Department of Energy EPRI: Formerly referred to as the Electric Power Research Institute GAO: United States Government Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) GESMO: Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Cooled Reactors GNB: Gesellschaft fOr Nukleai'-Behglter, mbH GNS: Gesellschaft fOr Nuklear-Service, mbH GNSI: General Nuclear Systems, Inc. GRS: Gesellschaft flrAnlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, mbH GWd/MTU: Gigawatt-Days per Metric Ton of Uranium (see Bum-up in Appendix E) INL: Idaho National Laboratory (formerly Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory) ISFSI: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation HSK: Die Hauptabteilung fOr die Sicherheit der Kemanlagen MTU: Metric Tons of Uranium (see'Appendix E) MWd/MTU: Megawatt-Days per Metric Ton of Uranium (see Bum-Lup in Appendix E) NPP: Nuclear Power Plant NRC: National Research Council PFS: Private Fuel Storage PWR: Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor (see Appendix E) RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device (see Appendix E) RPG: Rocket-Propelled Grenade 115
SAFETYAND SECURI1Y OF COMMERCIAL SPENTFUEL STORAGE 116 RSK: Reaktorsicherheitskommission TOW: Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked ; Wire Guided [Missile] (see Appendix E) USNRC: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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VermontYankeeEIS - don't play.with our lives F wdý I-l o6(7q30399l From: "Becca King" <beccaking@crocker.com> To: Date:
-.VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov>
Wed, Jun 14, 2006 7:30 PM
///O6 P/A13r39
Subject:
don't play with our lives
Dear NRC commissioners:
I urgently request that you refuse to re-license the VT Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. I am extremely worried about the dangers of this aging plant and all the harm it can do to us, as residents of the Pioneer Valley. I live immediately downwind, to the S. of Vernon, and I am an educator. We all know we will not be protected from the radiation of a nuclear accident. Yes, we need cheap electrical power. I am unwilling however, to risk our lives for this. I will insure my car, my home, etc, but there is no insurance to protect us from radiation damage to our health, or from a terrorist attack. Already there are radiation and chemical leaks. What are you trying to do to us? Our schools do not have adequate evacuation plans. THere is no safe evacuation plan for us. This is reality. Please do not renew this license. it is an insane plan. Are any of you living downwind from a reactor? If you are, you know what Itfeels like to be so vulnerable. If not, then how can you be so arrogant as to play with our lives by allowing this dangerous reactor to continue for many more years? I hope you will listen to our voices. Becca King 33 Allen St Greenfield, MA 01301 I..-.,
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beccaking@crocker.com 2~ 33 Allen St,Greenfield, MA 01301 413-773-7004 www.beccaking.com
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-S .-fl -I~ '0 Add me to your address book... Want a signature like this?
CC: <mcclinto@verizon.net>, <bostonS@aol.com>, <suzannec@crocker.com>, "Karen Brandow" <kbrandow2@aol.com>, "Bonnie Wodin" <gyarrw@crocker.com>
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Subject:
don't play with our lives Creation Date Wed, Jun 14, 2006 7:29 PM From: "Becca King" <beccaking4@crocker.com> Created By: beccakingP~crocker.com Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS crocker.com gyarrow CC (Bonnie Wodin) suzannec CC aol.corn kbrandow2 CC (Karen Brandow) bostonS CC verizon.net mcclinto CC Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 nrc.gov crocker.com aol.corn verizon.net Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1640 Wednesday, June 14, 2006 7:29 PM TEXT.htm 6327 Mime.822 10697 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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From: To:
"Mike Hebert" <mikehebert@adelphia.net> <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov>
MLo61O'-_q IS Date: Tue, Jun 20, 2006 9:49 AM
Subject:
License extension
Dear Mr. Eads,
I have many more comments on this matter. However, I know how busy you are and that brievity would be appreciated. Thank you for your consideration of this important matter. Respectfully, Mike Hebert Vernon rn ij~)
*1 '.AJ C)
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Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Mailstop T-6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 June 16, 2006
Dear Mr. Eads:
The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant plays an integral role in Vermont's current energy portfolio, and must be part of our future. Vermont Yankee is a clean, emissions free generating facility that provides stable, low-cost power to our state. These are all crucial factors that businesses take into consideration when determining whether to remain here, or relocate to Vermont. If Vermont Yankee goes off-line in 2012 where will we find replacement power that is as clean and reliable? Vermont Yankee is critical to Windham County and Southeast Vermont in particular. Currently; the plant and its contractors employ full time approximately 600 men and women, and provides $80 million to local Vermont businesses through the purchase of goods and services. Its clean power, sound operations, well paying jobs, and community participation and support helps make the region a great place to live and work. For all of these reasons, I encourage the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to extend the license of Vermont Yankee for another 20 years. Sincerely, Mike Hebert
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Subject:
License extension Creation Date Tue, Jun 20, 2006 9:49 AM From: "Mike Hebert" <mikehebert(adelphia.net> Created By: mikchebcrt(a)adelphia.nct Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 224 Tuesday, June 20,2006 9:49 AM TEXT.htm 724 NRC Comments - Environmental Scoping Hebert.doc 19968 Mime.822 30356 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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4.
- - N\L.06 lr73bH2.D From: "Tina Emery-Howe" <tinaemery_.howe@hotmail.com>
To: <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov> Date: Mon, Jun 19, 2006 3:18 PM
Subject:
Support renewing operating license of Vermont Yankee Attached is my letter supporting the license renewal for Vermont Yankee. If you have any questions, please feel free to email me. O/f Thanks, Tina TI C.z N, 4
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Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Mailstop T-6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 June 16, 2006
Dear Mr. Eads:
This letter is in support of renewing the operating license of the Vermont Yankee nuclear facility. I believe the environmental benefits that Vermont Yankee provides are a crucial part of ensuring that Vermont's landscape remains clean and pristine. It has not gone unnoticed that Vermont has one of the lowest emissions ratings in the country, largely because of our nuclear plant in Vernon. Nuclear energy avoids the emissions of harmful toxins or other pollutants into the atmosphere that other large power facilities, like coal or natural gas are guilty of. More and more environmental scientists have concluded that nuclear energy is the only power source that can help combat global warming. Vermont and the entire New England region is in need of this plant, and as long as it maintains its high level of safe operations, there is no reason why this plant should not remain online. Vermont Yankee is a necessary component to this state's current and future energy portfolio, and I hope that the NRC rules in favor of a license extension. Sincerely, Tina Emery-Howe
c:\temp\GW}00006.TMP PagelII Mail Envelope Properties (4496F888.B81 :13 : 7041)
Subject:
Support renewing operating license of Vermont Yankee Creation Date Mon, Jun 19, 2006 3:18 PM From: "Tina Emery-Howe" <tina emery howe(hotmail.com> Created By: tina emery howebhotmail.com Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeElS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 149 Monday, June 19,2006 3:18 PM NRCComments-EnvironmentalScopingEmery-Howe[ 1].doc 22016 Mime.822 32195 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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VVtIITUIIRT'U111CCI-1 - Vt:IIIIUIIIt TU M pIIi* Jdrl frlliuum'liilg rage - vt~rIIIuIIL~ ~ - verijiorit r ill i~~t ~ld~IL rt~iu.~iiS:t1y rage i C M\0 2r1l11T From: Jonathan von Ranson <commonfarm@crocker.com> To: <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov> Date: Wed, Jun 14,2006 3:21 PM
Subject:
Vermont Yankee plant relicensing To reviewers at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 111f111 ý Living within about 14 miles of a nuclear plant weighs on the minds Of people, and my friends and neighbors virtually unanimously feel a strain whenever they think about Vermont Yankee. I am in both the construction trades and farming, self-employed in both fields, and as a 0l -ý 915 contractor, dealing with others in that line of work, I have seen how strongly many people in construction feel an aversion to the Vernon, Vt., area because of uneasiness about the nuclear plant. I have heard builders voice scruples against building spec housing in that area. r They wouldn't want to live there themselves and don't feel right about .~ selling a family a house so close to the potential danger of meltdown, IL-r-- M or the actual, ongoing radiation health hazard from the plant's -- rJ,. operation. The town of Vernon remains quite sparsely populated despite k3 C) taxes being low, and I believe appropriate concern about the nuclear tJJ
T I*'
power plant explains why. ..1
.7"
r- '
The effects of worry don't cease at the town boundary, either-by harming the peace of mind, they negatively influence the choices of home buyers, adders-on and renovators, and of businesses looking to "I relocate in a radius of easily a dozen or perhaps 20 miles. As an organic farmer with livestock and vegetable crops, I consider the radiation emissions from the plant's operation to be one more degrading Influence In the environment, added to a number of others, that affects both crop plants and livestock raised in this area. It is difficult to quantify but I am confident from reading about the experiences of farmers in the area of this plant and others that the radiation stressor exists. For these reasons, I strongly oppose the relicensing of the Vernon nuclear plant beyond 2012. I am willing to use less electricity if the license extension is denied, and to pay more for it. Yours truly, Jonathan von Ranson, Bear Mountain Stonemasonry
-and-The Commonfarm 6 Lockes Village Rd.
Wendell MA 01379 978 544-3758
-a9 -
cAtemD\GW)006( TMP Pagle 1 1 I c:\temD\GWIOOOO1 .TMP Paae 1 Mail Envelope Properties (44906198.EE9: 19: 52969)
Subject:
Vermont Yankee plant relicensing Creation Date Wed, Jun 14, 2006 3:12 PM From: Jonathan von Ranson <commonfarm(icrockcr.com> Created By: commonfarm(@,crocker.com Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 VermontYankeeEIS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 2031 Wednesday, June 14, 2006 3:12 PM Mime.822 3735 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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vermonutanKeewlO - 00n piay witll uur I1vub! F -U- . Aý o06q 11 O1S I From: "Pam Walker <pamwalker@crocker.com> To: "Ellen Brouillette" <ellenchesham@hotmail.com>, <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov> Date: Wed, Jun 14, 2006 6:24 PM
Subject:
don't play with our lives!
Dear NRC commissioners:
7/ ~
I urgently request that you refuse to re-license the VT Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. I am extremely worried about the dangers of this aging plant and all the harm it can do to us, as residents of the Pioneer Valley. I live Immediately downwind, to the S. of Vernon, and I am an educator. We all know we will not be protected from the radiation of a nuclear accident. 0 Yes, we need cheap electrical power. I am unwilling however, to risk our lives for this. I will insure my car, my home, etc, but there is no insurance to protect us from radiation damage to our health, or from a terrorist attack. Already there are radiation and chemical leaks. What are you trying to do to us? Our schools do not have adequate evacuation plans. THere is no safe evacuation plan for us. This Is reality. Please do not renew this license. It is an Insane plan. Are any of you living downwind from a reactor? Ifyou are, you know what it feels like to be so vulnerable. If not, then how can you be so arrogant as to play with our lives by allowing this dangerous reactor to continue for many more years? I hope you will listen to our voices. Pam Walker 48 Franklin St. Shelbume Falls, MA 01370 CC: "Ellen Kaufmann and/or Marc Kaufmann" <Kaufmann@Crocker.com>, "Becca King"
<beccaking@crocker.com>, <adelwalk@nyc.rr.com>, "Mike Brouillette" <mikeb@vcgi.org>. "Liza Walker" <Liza@vlt.org> -TI M r--
.';c*..-9.. C *-4
- Pm F,*, " C)* ~~c~t-~) 2' 00t)LS r,7 /f~'~4 ~
-Papa Pd i*1 nXG
\tm\WOOOOI.TMP Mail Envelope Properties (44908A0B.D9D: 8 :56733)
Subject:
don't play with our lives! Creation Date Wed, Jun 14, 2006 6:13 PM From: "Pam Walker" <namwalker(icrocker.com> Created By: pamwalker(@,crocker.com Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS vlt.org Liza CC (Liza Walker) vcgi.org mikeb CC (Mike Brouillette) nyc.rr.com adelwalk CC crocker.com beccaking CC (Becca King) Kaufmann CC (Ellen Kaufmann and/or Marc Kaufmann) hotmail.com ellenchesham (Ellen Brouillette) Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 nrc.gov vlt.org vcgi.org nyc.rr.com crocker.com hotmail.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 1220 Wednesday, June 14, 2006 6:13 PM TEXT.htm 2395 Mime.822 6110 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard
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RULES AND DORECThIES 202S JIT 23 Pli 1: 45 RFOFI\/ED 9
//vo ,ooe:-t-r.t6-j64-ez.v Unftod S~tatdes ufat(Y CoMMlssloI &uE)
NRC= FOMI5 NRIC FORM 659 A MEG& (eu U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-2003) Category NRC PUBLIC MEETING FEEDBACI K . 3 Meeting Meeting Public Meeting to discuss the Environmental Scoping Process for Vermont Date: 06107/2006
Title:
Yankee Nuclear Power Station, License Renewal Application In order to better serve the public, we need to hear from the meeting participants. Please take a few minutes to fill out this feedback-form and return it to NRC.
1. How did you hear about this meetina?
E] NRC Web Page E] NRC Mailing List 2'e~wspaper O Radio/TV F-' Other No Somewhat Yes (Please explain below)
2. *Were you able to find supporting Information prior to the meeting?
El
3. Did the meetihg achieve Its stated purpose?
L3 El R
4. Has this meeting helped you with'your understanding of thetopic?
11 El
5. Were the meeting starting time, duration, and location reasonably convenient?
R-'00E' FI
6. Were you given sufficient opportunity to ask questions or express your views?
2<00,
7. Are you satisfied overall with the NRC staff who particIpated In the meeting?
COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS: Thank you for answering these questions. Continue Comments on the reverse. OPTIONAL Name v1. Ke* "o Organization )UO1 .- C jL member of NRC staff to contactyou. CUB3NO. *1S0-0197 . Fms: 06,rj012006 PL*Ilc Protection Notificadon: if a rneltas ted to Inos an klfonnaton ~ollectiorn does nlotdlsply a Cws* vali OMS coto ni*r. t NRC fty no of* c or spnr and a peso I not o espond to.itA l collection. nmqlrd A" &A Please told on the dotted lines with Business Reply slde out, tape the bottom, and mall back to the NRC.
COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS: (Continued)
. . .f-- - o . S - " "- . * -. e.
L"" "" I.* 2 4%VOL, P46 o.4 4 P I. A ............ ............ ..... . ......... i.... UNITED STATES NUCLEAIR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
..WASHINGTON DC 20555-0001 M1ANCH iESTERP 14-14, o
09*Of 200Cn-&2oo6P I FIRST CLASS MAIL
~BUSINESS REPLY MAIL PERMIT NO. 12904 WASHINGTON DC POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY YS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .. r" RICHARD L.EMCH JR MAIL STOPi 0-11 Fl*I OFFICEtOF NUCLEAR.RgACTOR REGULATION U S NU!tCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20277-2904
ML061q q 0 From: Jon Block <jonb@sover.net> To: <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov>, Deb Katz <deb@nukebusters.org>, Chris Nord
<chrisnord@netzero.net>
Date: Fri, Jun 23,2006 3:12 PM
Subject:
Citizens Awareness Network's Scoping Comments on EIS for proposed VY License Renewal in Docket 50-271 Attached hereto are scoping comments on the EIS for the proposed VY License Renewal in Docket 50-271 in both WP12 and PDF formats. Also attached is a copy of ISI/an I//LJuis IiOI/bispo i/Mllothers For IIPileace v. NRC/, _ F.3d Docket No. 03-74628 (9th Cir. 2006). The file is called "Mothers v. NRC.PDF" and the contents are referenced in the 4/69/p© scoping comments. If you have any difficulty receiving this transmission or opening and using the attached PDF files, please contact sender Immediately. Thank you. -:C: 1 i-- II-.-. C10
-Ti .
Jonathan M. Block Attorney at Law 94 Main Street .2-' P.O. Box 566 *AJ
÷ C" Putney, VT 05346 802-387-2646 (office) %0-jonb@sover.net VA)$ ",-A- &UF)
JONATHAN M. BLOCK ATTORNEY AT LAW 94 Main Street P.O. Box 566 Putney, VT. 05346-0566 802-387-2646 (vox)
-2667 (fax) jonb(tsover.net June 23, 2006 Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Service Mail Stop T-6D59 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 via email to: VermontYankeeEIS(')nrc.gov RE: Citizens Awareness Network's Written Comments on the Scope of the EIS for Proposed License Renewal of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont, NRC Docket Number 50-271, Scoping Process Notice, 71 FR 20733 (4/21/2006).
The following comments are provided to supplement oral comments of Deb Katz, Executive Director, and Chris Nord, Vice President, of Citizens Awareness Network, made during the public scoping meeting at the Latchis Theatre, Brattleboro, Vermont, on June 7, 2006. The live comments and the comments below are made pursuant to' the regulations governing preparation of Environmental Impact Statements under 10 C.F.R. Part 51. CAN specifically requested to participate in making comments on this matter following direct contact by the NRC. Background of the-Commenting Organization Citizens Awareness Network [CAN] is a non-profit Massachusetts corporation that is concerned with all environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel chain. CAN has members in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont. CAN members utilize the resources of the Connecticut River and Deerfield River ecosystems for living, working,
Citizens Awareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, DkR. 50-271 Uune 23, 2006) Page 2 of 8 aesthetic, recreational and sport-fishing purposes in the areas affected by the proposed relicensing of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont. Executive Director of CAN, Deborah B. Katz, P.O. Box 83, Shelburne Falls, MA 01370-0083, (413) 339-5781, has authorized these comments and representation of CAN in this matter for the limited purposes of filing supplemental written comments on the proper scope of the. EIS in this matter. Comments CAN contends that the following are proper subjects of environmental concern that should be fully investigated prior to renewal of the Vermont Yankee license to operate:
1. Subjects to include in a supplement to the GEIS for Vermont Yankee and analyze in depth:
1.1 Accumulation of low-level radioactive waste on site. 1.2 Accumulation of chemical wastes on site. 1.3 Extent of on and off site contamination due to radioactive materials, chemicals and other VY waste in on and off site locations, including, but not limited to disposal in the Brattleboro and other area landfills that are now part of the Windham Solid Waste Management District and/or out of state landfills utilized by the WSWMD. 1.4 Extent of site contamination due to chemical and other hazardous wastes, including, but not limited to PCB contamination in paint, accumulated TCE, PERC and other organic solvents, lead, and asbestos. 1.5 Extent of groundwater contamination on (and beneath) site, including, but not
CitiZens Awareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, Dkt. 50-271 (June 23, 2006) Page 3 of 8 limited to tritium contamination. 1.6 Extent of any off-site groundwater contamination, including, but not limited to tritium contamination of drinking water wells and other off site ground water locations. 1.7 Extent of radionuclide inventory and location of radioactive waste accumulated in on-site disposal locations for contaminated silt, sand, soil, sewage and other materials. Rationale for including 1.1 - 1.7 within the scope of an EIS for Vermont Yankee license renewal: Were Vermont Yankee to be denied renewal of its license, shut down in 2012, and then begin to undergo decommissioning, each of the listed environmental concerns would be considered in the decommissioning process. In the event that Vermont Yankee is given an additional twenty years (or less) of operation under license renewal, now is the time to access the above listed environmental issues in order to inventory and fully analyze the extent of these problems at the originally contemplated end-of-life for this reactor. This inventory and analysis is appropriate, as the use and improper disposal of many of the environmental hazards listed above, along with on-site disposal of construction waste during construction of the facility, were commonly accepted and customary business and industrial practices during a major portion of the original license period. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the publicly available records for Vermont Yankee that numerous spills occurred during operations under the original license and the facility engaged in shoddy record keeping to document the extent and location of such
CitiZens Awareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, Dkt. 50-271 Oune 23, 2006) Page 4 of 8 events.' Thus, including a complete inventory and analysis of all the items in the list within the The following is just a tiny sample of what a real inspection of records might disclose--let alone an actually complete and comprehensive inspection of the entire reactor facility and grounds. It was, perforce, based on the use of the NRC Public Document collection through "ADAMS" on line. This form of record access is slow, inaccurate and entirely "hit-or-miss"--yet there is still some evidence of a pattern of environmental contamination--on and off the VY site--that an EIS should evaluate: Failure to keep records of spills, unusual events and spread of contaminated material Accession # 9903240281 (Excerpt of a letter from Clifford J. Andersen, Chief, NRC Projects Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, to Gregory Maret, VY Director of Operations, re: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-271/99-01 (March 16, 1999) ('We also reviewed your recent efforts to update your records of spills or other unusual occurrences involving the spread of contamination in and around the facility for decommissioning planniniz purposes. Our review found that in some cases, documentation was not sufficiently detailed to fully assess some locations with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.75 relative to its impact on decommissioning.") (Emphasis added.) Accession # 9508140119 (Abstract excerpt) "Findings of Inspection 50-271/95-18 of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, onJune 20 to 22, 1995." "This inspection consisted of observations regarding the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corporation's controls for radioactive materials and contamination, surveys and monitoring, including review of the following- audits, appraisals and assessments; radioactive surveys and monitoring; radioactive materials and contamination controls; and other related items. During the inspection, one violation of the Tech Specs was identified regarding failure to effectively control personnel access to high radiation areas. (....) A weakness was identified in maintaining records for events or incidents including spills of radioactive materials that are important to decommissioninz. Continued management attention is necessary to ensure that these records are maintained and available for eventual decommissioning of the facility." (Emphasis added.) Permitting on-site disposal of radioactively contaminated silt, sand, and septic sludge Accession # 9706200266(Abstract) "The NRC concludes that the plant site radiological conditions that would result from the onsite disposal of slightly contaminated silt material (as proposed by the licensee under 10CFR20.2002) and the previously approved onsite disposal of slightly contaminated septic waste material are within the applicable boundary conditions for the disposal of licensed material." (Emphasis added.) Tritium in sewage system from unknown causes Accession #9111180022, "Findings of Safety Inspection 50-271/91-24 of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station on September 8 to October 15, 1991" (abstract) ("Root cause and corrective action determinations have not been fully effective in resolving the issue of tritium in the sewage system.") (Emphasis added.) Offsite disposal of radioactive sludge and licensed material Accession #8807250386, "Findings of Inspection 50-271/88-09 of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station on June 20 to 24, 1988" (abstract) (review of VY offsite disposal of sewatge waste containing
Citizenh Awareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, Dkt. 50-271 Oune 23, 2006) Page 5 of 8 scope of the EIS for Vermont Yankee license renewal makes good practical sense based on the historical record for this licensee. Further, as the NRC is aware 2, tritium contamination--which is a part of the historical record for this facility--has become a major issue at reactor sites across the country. Thus, on and off site tritium contamination due to past (and continued) operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station should be thoroughly investigated, including all sources and pathways on and off site, to assure if the NRC renews VY's license it will not permit continued radioactive contamination of groundwater. 1.8 Unique potential for a fuel-pool fire in a GE Mark-I-type Boiling Water Reactor [BWR] due to acts of sabotage and/or terrorism. Rationale: See written comments of CAN VP, Chris Nord, below. licensed material during the period of January to May 1988. During the inspection, one unresolved item was identified regarding the potential improper disposal of licensed material.") (Emphasis added). Spills of radioactively contaminated liquids ADAMS # ML0209303370, Reportable Event Number: 27319 (May 31, 1994) ("220 gallons of reactor coolant were discharge into the RB floor drain system." [C]ontamination surveys near the supplemental fuel pool cooling system (located directly below the RWCU system) identified approximately 30kcpm/100sqcm general area and 800 mRad-beta near one floor drain indicating that the floor drain "backed up" when the relief valve lifted. Lower levels of radioactive concentrations have also been identified on most areas in the RB. The licensee identified a few gallons of reactor coolant and RWCU denineralizer resin in the vicinity of the floor drain.") (Emphasis added.) Accession # 8711100481 (LER documenting a 2,000 gallon spill which was "communicated through the floor drain system" and "which resulted in contaminating local areas of the Reactor Building" with "minor seepages through the interface between the Reactor Building Refuel Floor Paneling and the Reactor Building exterior walls ... detected.") (Emphasis added.) 2 See http://xvw.nrc..ov/reactors/operafingrops-experience/grndwtr-contam-tridum.html. This is the NRC response (to date) to the "tritium petition" filed with the NRC by NIRS, UCS, CAN and many other participating organizations.
CitiZensAwareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, Dkt. 50-271 June 23, 2006) Page 6 of 8 1.9 The nature and extent of environmental harm due to a fuel-pool fire at Vermont Yankee caused by acts of sabotage and/or terrorism. Rationale. See written comments of CAN VP, Chris Nord, below. Written Comments of Chris Nord, Vice President, Citizens Awareness Network: I hereby incorporate by reference my oral comments at the June 7 meeting in Brattleboro, and set forth additionally as follows:
1) The NRC must require that Entergy return to the original Design Basis for Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) rack configuration - that is "Low-Density" racking, which ensures a redundant safety component to SFP cooling. [A low-density pool will theoretically survive a Loss of Coolant (LOCA) accident without catching fire or going critical, due to ambient air-cooling].
Continuation of the High-Density scheme amounts to the sacrifice of an engineered protection for the public - and NRC's own Design Basis - for the sake of an economically driven expediency. This is an issue that could have dire consequences on the natural and human environment in and about the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in the event of a terrorist attack and/or act of sabotage against the SFP. Following the recent 9th Circuit decision, San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. NRC, - F.3d -, Docket No. 03-74628 (9th Cir. 2006) (a copy of which is attached hereto for your convenience), such consideration is properly within the scope of an EIS for the proposed license renewal of Vermont Yankee. It must be noted that NRC regulations on license renewal and related guidance documents, including those relating to the scope of the EIS, were all prepared prior to "9/11".
CitiZens Awareness Network Comments re: Scope of EIS ForENVY License Renewal, Dkt. 50-271 Gune 23, 2006) Page 7 of 8
2) Because much of current inventory of SF must be removed for Low-Density Storage, NRC must create and enforce regulations regarding "robust storage" of this out-of-water inventory, per Dr. Gordon Thompson's supporting declaration of the contentions of the State of Massachusetts in the matter of the relicensing of Vermont Yankee. See ADAMS location file: ML061640065 (legal and factual arguments, contention), at Pp. 5-50 (which are incorporated by reference herein); see also reports and declarations of Dr. Gordon Thompson and Dr. Jan Beyea, attached thereto, which are incorporated herein by reference. The evidence in the cited contention filing makes it clear that failure to place the fuel in "robust" storage could have dire consequences on the natural and human environment in and about the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in the event of a terrorist attack and/or act of sabotage against the SFP. Following the recent 9th Circuit Decision of the Mothers and Others case, such consideration is properly within the scope of an EIS for the proposed license renewal of Vermont Yankee.

3) In light of the unquestionable vulnerability of the GE Mark-I type-BWRs to airborne terrorist attack (and the accessibility of Vermont Yankee from Canadian airspace), and because of the catastrophic consequences of such an attack, the NRC must expand the scope of emergency preparedness out to the boundaries of the Ingestion Pathway - a 50 radius. I hereby incorporate by reference my comments at the NRC's Plymouth, Massachusetts, meeting earlier in the spring (for Pilgrim), at the Brattleboro meeting, and in a meeting with NH Governor Lynch of New Hampshire on June 13, 2006, in which I recommended that the EPZ be extended to 50 miles. Governor Lynch acknowledged that his Capitol is within the 50-mile
C'ti~,jAw,*en %etw,* Co*~ ,re Sspe . EI$ Fe, E,'! 1" Dace, &se Re,. Dkt. 0.27'1 (June23.2006) Page 8 0 f8 radius of Vermont Yankee and just outside the 50-mile radius of Seabrook. WYemen he indicated that he recognized this point, he was holding bull's-eye target maps showing the proximity of Vermont Yankee and Seabrook to Concord, New Hampshire. Again, this consideration flows from the recent 9th Circuit Decision of the Mothers and Others case and is properly within the scope of the EIS for the proposed Vermont Yankee relicensing for the reasons set forth above.
4) In light of evidence that terrorists targeted a least two nuclear reactors, the recent arrests of a terrorist cell in Canada, the accessibility of Vermont Yankee to Canadian airspace along the Connecticut River (a pilot would not need to be able to navigate - just follow the river right to their target), the enormity of the consequences of such an attack on the elevated Spent Fuel Pool at Vermont Yankee, and in light of the 9,h Circuit Court of Appeals decision in this matter, ihe NRC's scope of the EIS for Vermont Yankee license renewal must include an evaluation of the environmental consequences of sabotage and/or terrorist attack on the Vermont Yankee fuel pool and/or dry cask storage facility to be constructed there, and the Design Basis Threat must be expanded to include the threat of airborne and robust terrorist attack.
Respectfully submitted: Jonathan M. Block Attorne" at Law ForGitirnw Awamnwss Network cc: Deborah B. Katz, Executive Director, CAN. deb@nukebusters.org Chris Nord, VP, CA-N, chrisnordanetzero.net I
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE; SANTA LUCIA CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB; PEG PINARD, Petitioners, No. 03-74628 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC NRC No. COMPANY, CLI-03-01; Intervenor, CLI-02-23 V. OPINION NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Argued and Submitted October 17, 2005-San Francisco, California Filed June 2, 2006 Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges, and Jane A. Restani,* Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade Opinion by Judge Thomas
*The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
6063
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6067 COUNSEL Diane Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for the petitioners. Charles E. Mullins, United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission, Washington, D.C., for the respondents. David A. Repka, Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for respondent-intervenor PG&E. Sheldon L. Trubatch, Esq., Offices of Robert K. Temple, Esq., Chicago, Illinois, for amicus San Luis Obispo County. Kevin James, California Department of Justice, Oakland, Cal-ifornia, for amicus States of California, Massachusetts, Utah and Washington. Jay E. Silberg, Shaw Pittman, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for amicus Nuclear Energy Institute. OPINION THOMAS, Circuit Judge: This case presents the question, inter alia, as to whether the likely environmental consequences of a potential terrorist
6068 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC attack on a nuclear facility must be considered in an environ-mental review required under the National Environmental Policy Act. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion ("NRC") contends that the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is so remote and speculative that the potential consequences of such an attack need not be consid-ered at all in such a review. The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and other groups disagree and petition for review of the NRC's approval of a proposed Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part. I The NRC is an independent federal agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials. Intervenor Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E") filed an application with the NRC under 10 C.F.R. Part 72 for a license to construct and operate an Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation ("Storage Installation" or "ISFSI") at PG&E's Diablo Canyon Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon") in San Luis Obispo, California. The NRC granted the license. The question presented by this petition for review is whether, in doing so, the NRC complied with federal stat-utes including the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4437, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("AEA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g, and the Admin-istrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. NEPA establishes a "national policy [to] encourage produc-tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-ment," and was intended to reduce or eliminate environmental damage and to promote "the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to" the United States. Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321). The Supreme Court has identified NEPA's "twin aims" as "plac[ing] upon an agency the obliga-tion to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action[, and] ensur[ing] that the agency
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6069 will inform the public that it has indeed considered environ-mental concerns in its decisionmaking process." Baltinore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Rather than mandating particular results, NEPA imposes on federal agencies procedural requirements that force consider-ation of the environmental consequences of agency actions. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 756. At NEPA's core is the require-ment that federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS"), or: include in every recommendation or report on pro-posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible offi-cial on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv)'the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Id. at 757 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). As an alternative to the EIS, an agency may prepare a more limited environmental assessment ("EA") concluding in a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("FONSI"), briefly pre-senting the reasons why the action will not have a significant impact on the human environment. Id. at 757-58 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13). If, however, the EA does not lead to the conclusion that a FONSI is warranted, the agency remains obligated to prepare an EIS. Id. at 757.
6070 SAN Luis OBIsPo MOTHERS V. NRC While NEPA requires the NRC to consider environmental effects of its decisions, the AEA is primarily concerned with setting minimum safety standards for the licensing and opera-tion of nuclear facilities. The NRC does not contest that the two statutes impose independent obligations, so that compli-ance with the AEA does not excuse the agency from its NEPA obligations. The AEA lays out the process for consid-eration of the public health and safety aspects of nuclear power plant licensing, and requires the NRC to determine whether the licensing and operation of a proposed facility is "in accord with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a). The NRC is not, however, required to make this determina-tion without assistance; federal law provides a framework for hearings on material issues that interested persons raise by specific and timely petition. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a); 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.308-.348; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. The initial hearing is held before a three-person Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Licensing Board"). 10 C.F.R. § 2.321. The Licensing Board's findings and decision constitute the agency's initial determination, although a party may file a petition for review with the Commission within 15 days of the Licensing Board's decision. 10 C.F.R. § 2.341. If the petition is granted, the Commission specifies the issues to be reviewed and the par-ties to the review proceedings, 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(c)(1), and renders a final decision. 10 C.F.R. § 2.344. A party may then petition this court for review of the Commission's final deci-sion. 28 U.S.C. § 2344. II With this general statutory background, we turn to the facts underlying the petition for review. On December 21, 2001, PG&E applied to the NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 72 for a license to construct and operate a Storage Installation at Diablo Canyon. The Storage Installation would permit the
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6071 necessary and on-site storage of spent fuel, the byproduct of the two nuclear reactors at that site. PG&E expects to fill its existing spent fuel storage capacity at Diablo Canyon some-time this year. Therefore, unless additional spent fuel storage capacity is created, the Diablo Canyon reactors cannot con-tinue to function beyond 2006. PG&E proposes to build a dry cask storage facility. The basic unit of the storage system is the Multi-Purpose Canister ("Canister"), a stainless steel cylinder that is filled with radio-active waste materials and welded shut. The Canisters are loaded into concrete storage overpacks that are designed to permit passive cooling via the circulation of air. The storage casks, or the filled Canisters loaded into overpacks, are then placed on one of seven concrete pads. The Storage Installation would house a total of 140 storage casks, 2 more than the 138 projected to be required for storage of spent fuel generated at Diablo Canyon through 2025. On April 22, 2002, the NRC published a Notice of Oppor-tunity for Hearing. Under the regulatory scheme, interested parties could then request a hearing or petition for leave to intervene. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a). A written hearing request, which must contain the contentions the party wants litigated at the hearing, will be granted if the petitioner has standing, and has posed at least one admissible contention.' Id. On July 19, 2002, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, a non-profit corporation concerned with Diablo Canyon's
'In order to be admissible, a contention must: be set forth with particu-larity, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1); provide a specific statement of the disputed issue of law or fact, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i); provide the basis for the contention, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(ii); demonstrate that the issue is within the scope of the proceeding, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii); demonstrate that the issue is material to the findings the NRC must make, 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.309(1(1)(iv); provide supporting references and expert opinions, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f1(1)(v); and provide sufficient information to show the existence of a genuine issue of law or fact, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi).
6072 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC local impact, the Sierra Club, a non-profit corporation con-cerned with national environmental policy, and Peg Pinard, an individual citizen, (collectively "Petitioners") submitted a hearing request and a petition to intervene, asserting conten-tions for admission. In Licensing Board Proceeding LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413 ("LBP 02-23"), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board addressed the admissibility of the July 19 petition's five Tech-nical and three Environmental Contentions.2 One Technical Contention, TC-1, dealing with the state of PG&E's finances, was deemed admissible; the acceptance of at least one conten-tion meant that the petition was granted. Although the Licens-ing Board deemed two Environmental Contentions, EC-1, dealing with the failure to address environmental impacts of terrorist or other acts of malice or insanity, and EC-3, dealing with the failure to evaluate' environmental impacts of trans-portation of radioactive materials3 inadmissible, the Licensing Board nonetheless referred the final ruling as to the admissi-bility of these two contentions to the NRC, "in light of the 2 Technical Contention Number One ("TC-1") alleged Inadequate Seis-mic Analysis. TC-2 alleged PG&E's Financial Qualifications Are Not Demonstrated. TC-3 alleged PG&E May Not Apply for a License for a Third Party. TC-4 alleged Failure to Establish Financial Relationships Between Parties Involved in Construction and Operation of Installation. TC-5 alleged Failure to Provide Sufficient Description of Construction and Operation Costs. Environmental Contention Number One ("EC-I") alleged Failure to Address Environmental Impacts of Destructive Acts of Malice or Insanity. EC-2 alleged Failure to Fully Describe Purposes of Proposed Action or to Evaluate All Reasonably Associated Environmental Impacts and Alternatives. EC-3 alleged Failure to Evaluate Environmental Impacts of Transportation. 3 Because the Storage Installation is not a permanent repository, this contention assumes the eventual transport of the materials stored there to a permanent site. Among the materials submitted to support the contention were some dealing with possible terrorist or other malicious attacks on the spent fuel while in transit. The ruling on the contention was "referr[ed] ... to the Commission to the extent terrorism and sabotage matters are proffered in support of its admission." 56 NRC at 453.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6073 Commission's ongoing 'top to bottom' review of the agency's safeguards and physical security programs." 56 NRC at 448. In a memorandum and order, CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1 ("CLI 03-01"), the NRC accepted the Licensing Board's referral of its decision to reject the environmental contentions related to terrorism. Although the Commission affirmed the Licensing Board's rejection of the contentions, it based its decision on a different rationale. The NRC relied on four prior decisions in which it held that the NEPA does not require a terrorism review.' These decisions, most particularly PrivateFuel Stor-age, CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002), outlined four reasons for this holding: (1) the possibility of terrorist attack is too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require study under NEPA; (2) because the risk of a terrorist attack cannot be determined, the analysis is likely to be meaningless; (3) NEPA does not require a "worst-case" analysis; and (4) NEPA's public process is not an appropriate forum for sensitive security issues. The NRC concluded: Our decision today rests entirely on our understand-ing of NEPA and of what means are best suited to dealing with terrorism. Nonetheless, our conclusion comports with the practical realities of spent fuel storage and the congressional policy to encourage utilities to provide for spent fuel storage at reactor sites pending construction of a permanent repository. Storage of spent fuel at commercial reactor sites offers no unusual technological challenges. Indeed, it has been occurring at Diablo Canyon for many
'Those cases include: PrivateFuel Storage, LLC., CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002) (Storage Installation); Duke Cogenma Stone & Webster (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-24, 56 NRC 335 (2002); Domin-ion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Nuclear Power Station), CLI-02-27, 56 NRC 367 (2002); and Duke Energy Corp. (Nuclear Power Station), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358 (2002). All four cases were decided on December 18, 2002.
6074 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC years and will continue whether or not we license the proposed Installation. 57 NRC at 7. In September of 2002, prior to the NRC's decision on the first petition, Petitioners submitted a second petition, this time requesting suspension of the Storage Installation licensing proceeding pending comprehensive review of the adequacy of Diablo Canyon's design and operation measures for protec-tion against terrorist attack and other acts of malice or insan-ity. Unlike the July 19 petition, this one addressed security measures for the entire Diablo Canyon complex, not merely the Storage Installation. Petitioners explained that 10 C.F.R. § 2.335, which prohibits challenges to any NRC rule or regu-lation in an adjudicatory proceeding involving initial or renewal licensing, prevented the raising of contentions con-testing the adequacy of NRC safety requirements protecting against terrorist or other malicious attacks on the entire com-plex in the July 19 Petition. Petitioners also stated that 10 C.F.R. ý§ 72.32 prevented them from raising emergency plan-ning contentions in the earlier petition. Thus, Petitioners insisted that the second petition "d[id] not constitute a request for rulemaking, nor... for enforcement action," and instead defined it, without reference to any particular hearing-granting provision of the regulations, as "a request for actions that are necessary to ensure that any licensing decision made by the Commission with respect to the proposed Diablo Can-yon Installation complies with the Commission's statutory obligations under the Atomic Energy Act." In a memorandum and order, CLI-02-23, 56 NRC 230 ("CLI 02-23"), the NRC denied the September 2002 petition. Because the petition did not, according to the NRC, "fit com-fortably in any specific category, [the Commission] treat[ed] it as a general motion brought under the procedural require-ments of 10 C.F.R. § 2.730."' In rejecting the petition, the 5 Since renumbered as 10 C.F.R. § 2.323, this regulation provides, sim-ply, for "motions".
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6075 Commission reasoned that by not suspending operating licenses at installations and power plants following the Sep-tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, it had demonstrated its implicit conclusion that the continued operation of these facil-ities neither posed an imminent risk to the public health, nor was inimical to the common defense. Further, the Commis-sion concluded that because it had already initiated a thorough review of its safeguards and physical security program, there was no reason to suspend the Diablo Canyon licensing pro-ceeding to address the terrorism-related concerns raised by the Petitioners. It stated that "[tihere certainly is no reason to believe that any danger to public health and safety would result from mere continuation of this adjudicatory proceed-ing," given that the proceeding was in its initial stages, that construction was not scheduled to begin for several years, and that the Petitioners would be able to comment on any changes in the rules resulting from the Commission's ongoing review of terrorism-related matters if and when they were to occur. In a memorandum and order, CLI-03-12, 58 NRC 185 (2003) ("CLI 03-02"), the NRC denied the petitions for agency review of the Licensing Board's decisions that "cumu-latively, rejected challenges to [the PG&E] Installation appli-cation." This denial thus became a final order, reviewable by this court on petition for review. 28 U.S.C. § 2344. In October of 2003, the Spent Fuel Project Office of the NRC's Office of Material Safety and Safeguards released its Environmental Assessment Related to the Construction and Operation of the Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Stor-age Installation. The 26-page document contains the NRC's conclusion "that the construction, operation, and decommis-sioning of the Diablo Canyon Installation will not result in significant impact to the environment," and therefore that "an [EIS] is not warranted for the proposed action, and pursuant to 10 C.F.R. [§] 51.31, a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate."
6076 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC The EA is not devoid of discussion of terrorist attacks. Indeed, the document contains the Commission's response to a comment submitted by the California Energy Commission in response to an earlier draft that "there is no discussion in the EA of the potential destruction of the casks or blockage of air inlet ducts as the result of sabotage or a terrorist attack .. . [nor is there] a description of how decisions are being made regarding the configuration, design and spacing of the casks, the use of berms, and the location of the ISFSI to mini-mize the vulnerability of the ISFSI to potential attack." The NRC responded: In several recent cases, . . . the Commission has determined that an NRC environmental review is not the appropriate forum for the consideration of terror-ist acts. The NRC staff considers the security of spent fuel as part of its safety review of each applica-tion for an ISFSI license. In addition to reviewing an ISFSI application against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, the NRC staff evaluates the proposed security plans and facility design features to deter-mine whether the requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," are met. The details of specific security measures for each facility are Safeguards Information, and as such, can not be released to the public. The NRC has also initiated several actions to fur-ther ensure the safety of spent fuel in storage. Addi-tional security measures have been put in place at nuclear facilities, including ISFSIs currently storing spent fuel. These measures include increased secur-ity patrols, augmented security forces and weapons, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and additional limitations on vehicular access. Also, as part of its comprehensive review of its security pro-gram, the NRC is conducting several technical
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6077 studies to assess potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel storage facilities to a spectrum of terrorist acts. The results of these studies will be used to determine if revisions to the current NRC security requirements are warranted. Petitioners argue that, in denying their petitions, the NRC violated the AEA, the APA, and NEPA. Although we reject the AEA and APA claims, we agree with Petitioners that the agency has failed to comply with NEPA. We have jurisdiction over those final orders of the NRC made reviewable by 42 U.S.C. § 2239, which includes final orders entered in licens-ing proceedings, under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). III We turn first to Petitioners' AEA argument. Specifically, Petitioners argue that the NRC violated its regulations imple-menting the AEA, as well as the AEA's hearing provisions, when it denied Petitioners a hearing on whether NEPA required consideration of the environmental impact of a ter-rorist attack on the Storage Installation; they also argue that the NRC violated the AEA's hearing provisions in denying Petitioners a hearing on post-September 11th security mea-sures for the entire Diablo Canyon complex. Both of these challenges fail. A [1] The NRC did not violate the AEA or its implementing regulations when it failed to explain its rejection of Petition-ers' contentions by addressing each of their arguments. Noth-ing in the regulations or the ABA requires the NRC to provide such an explanation. Section 189(a) of the AEA grants public hearing rights "upon the request of any person whose interest may be affect-ed" by an NRC licensing proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2239. The
6078 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC NRC public hearing regulations, at 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, "pro-mulgated pursuant to the AEC's" power to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of' the AEA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 2201(p), specify the procedures required of both petitioners and the NRC in making and deciding hearing petitions.
[2] Petitioners correctly observe that the NRC, in its deci-sion, did not discuss whether Petitioners satisfied the regula-tory standard. They are mistaken, however, in their unsupported contention that this omission amounts to the agency's failure to follow its own regulations and thus is "re-versible error." The regulations simply do not require the NRC to explain its decisions in any particular manner. Although the NRC regulations are specific and demanding in what they require of petitioners, they demand far less of the NRC in responding to a petition: the regulations require only a timely "decision." See 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(i) ("Decision on request/petition. The presiding officer shall, within 45 days after the filing of answers and replies .. . issue a decision on each request for hearing/petition to intervene."). Because Peti-tioners do not claim that the NRC violated this requirement, we must reject this challenge. B [3] The NRC's denial of a hearing on whether NEPA requires consideration of the environmental effects of a terror-ist attack on the Storage Installation did not violate the AEA's hearing provisions. [4] Petitioners contend that the NRC relied on an improper ground in denying their request for a hearing on whether 6 1n 1974, Congress eliminated the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC"). Regulatory functions went to the NRC, and promotional func-tions to the Energy Research and Development Administration. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5814.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6079 NEPA requires the Commission to consider the environmen-tal impacts of terrorism - namely, the ground that it had determined in earlier decisions that NEPA imposes no such obligation. Thus, Petitioners do not challenge the substantive validity or coherence of those earlier opinions in making their AEA claim, but rather the reliance upon a prior determination of the merits in order to reject a petition presenting the same issues. As such, Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988), on which Petitioners rely, does not apply. In that case, the NRC rejected the petitioners' contentions as lacking in reasonable specificity, and yet went on to analyze the merits of those supposedly unacceptable contentions. Id. at 228. Here, however, where the agency is rejecting the contentions as contrary to a prior decision, the "merits" and the reason for the inadmissibility of the contention collapse. Put differently, the NRC did not reach the merits of the petition as much as it assessed the issues raised against issues resolved by prior decisions. We hold that in doing so, the Commission com-plied fully with the AEA. To hold otherwise would unduly restrict the agency's evaluation of hearing petitions, by requir-ing it to grant a hearing on issues it has already resolved whenever a petitioner claims to have new evidence. We can find, and Petitioners point to, nothing in the AEA that would require this result. C [5] The NRC's denial of a hearing on security measures for Diablo Canyon as a whole also did not violate the AEA. Peti-tioners argue-that the AEA requires the NRC to grant petition-ers a hearing on all issues of material fact, including the security of the entire Diablo Canyon complex. Petitioners therefore conclude, citing Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), that the NRC violated the AEA when it denied a hearing on that issue. Petitioners' argument misreads Union of ConcernedScien-tists, in which the D.C. Circuit held only that the agency can-
6080 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC not by rule presumptively eliminate a material issue from consideration in a hearing petition. Union of Concerned Sci-entists requires the agency to consider a petition; it does not require that the agency grant it. The NRC in CLI 02-23 did not deny that security require-ments for the entire complex might need to be upgraded, but rather maintained that a licensing proceeding hearing (and one regarding an installation, not the entire complex) was not the correct forum in which to address the issue. The Commission directed Petitioners to participate in a rulemaking or to raise their concerns in a hearing then pending before the Licensing Board. Petitioners contend that these alternative fora are illu-sory, and that rejection of their petition amounted to the denial of any opportunity to participate in the consideration of post-9/1 1 security measures for the Diablo Canyon complex. Petitioners argue "[i]f the NRC were going to resolve Peti-tioners' concerns that grossly inadequate security made the Diablo Canyon facility vulnerable to terrorist attacks generi-cally, through a rulemaking, such a rulemaking would have been initiated as a result of the 'comprehensive security review' undertaken by the NRC." Thus, Petitioners argue that it would have been futile to submit a rulemaking petition. This argument must fail, as Petitioners did not use the avail-able procedures for initiating a rulemaking. Petitioners cannot complain that NRC failed to institute a rulemaking they never requested. [6] Given that rulemaking may have been an avenue for Petitioners' participation, had they chosen to pursue it, their argument that they had no forum in which to raise their con-tentions loses its force. However, even were Petitioners cor-rect in their assertion that they were unfairly denied the opportunity to participate in a rulemaking proceeding, the argument that the Licensing Board hearing was similarly illu-sory would fail. In fact, Petitioners were attempting to use the present Storage Installation licensing proceeding as a means
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6081 of launching a much broader challenge to the Diablo Canyon complex. The NRC correctly observes that a petition alleging that existing NRC regulations are "grossly inadequate to pro-tect against terrorist attack, and therefore must be supple-mented by additional requirements" cannot in fact be raised before the Licensing Board, which cannot hear challenges to NRC rules. The limited scope of licensing proceedings does not, however, amount to the arbitrary denial of a forum, as Petitioners claim. While Petitioners could have raised site-specific issues "relating to the 'common defense and securi-ty' " that were not controlled by existing rules or regulations to the Licensing Board, they are not entitled to expand those proceedings to include the entire complex, and issues already covered by agency rules. D In short, the NRC did not violate the AEA in denying the petitions for a hearing. Neither the AEA nor its implementing regulations required the NRC to grant Petitioners a hearing on whether NEPA required a consideration of the environmental impact of a terrorist attack on the Storage Installation or the security measures adopted for the entire Diablo Canyon com-plex. IV [7] The NRC's reliance on its own prior opinions in its decision in this case does not violate the APA's notice and comment provisions. Petitioners argue that the decisions in CLI 03-01 and PFS amount to the announcement "of a gen-eral policy of refusing to consider the environmental impacts of terrorist attacks in Environmental Impact Statements." Peti-tioners rely on Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 1987) to claim that this policy depends on fac-tual determinations not found subsequent to an evidentiary proceeding, and constitutes a "binding substantive norm," the promulgation of which, without a public hearing, violates the
6082 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC APA notice and comment provisions contained in 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(b), (c).7 The flaw in Petitioners' argument is the mis-taken assertion that the NRC's decisions were factual and not legal. If the NRC's conclusion that terrorism need not be examined under NEPA were factual, then Petitioners would be correct that its determination would have to comply with APA rulemaking requirements, including notice and com-ment, or else the agency would have to permit petitioners to challenge it in every proceeding where it was disputed.
[8] That NEPA does not require consideration of the envi-ronmental impacts of terrorism is a legal, and not a-factual, conclusion. Cf. GreenpeaceAction v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that a challenge to the ade-quacy of an EA turned on factual, not legal, principles where both NEPA's applicability and the requirements it imposed were uncontested); see also Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that although "challenges to agency actions which raise predominantly legal, rather than technical questions, are rare," the court was there required to address "just such a challenge"). Petitioners' analysis is therefore inapposite. The agency has the discretion to use adjudication to establish a binding legal norm. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 199-203 (1947) ("[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation, is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."). We therefore agree with the NRC's characterization in its brief to this court: having come to the legal conclusion that NEPA does not require consideration of the environmental consequences of terrorist attacks, "[w]hen 7U.S.C.
§ 553(b) states that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register," and outlines the requirements that such notice must meet. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) states that after such notice has been given, "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation."
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6083 petitioners in this case presented a proposed contention seek-ing an EIS that analyzed the impacts of possible terrorist acts at the proposed Diablo Canyon Installation, the NRC reason-ably concluded that this request was sufficiently similar to the request in PFS to justify the application of that decision here." V Although we hold that the agency did not violate the APA when it relied on the prior resolution of a legal issue through adjudication, we come to a different conclusion as to that determination's compliance with NEPA. Because the issue whether NEPA requires consideration of the environmental impacts of- a terrorist attack is primarily a legal one, we review the NRC's determination that it does not for reason-ableness. See Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass'n, 67 F.3d at 727 (reviewing predominately legal issue for rea-sonableness because "it makes sense to distinguish the strong level of deference we accord an agency in deciding factual or technical matters from that to be accorded in disputes involv-ing predominately legal questions"); Ka Makani'o Kohala Ohana, Inc. v. Water Supply, 295 F.3d 955, 959 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Because this case involved primarily legal issues ... based on undisputed historical facts, we conclude that the
'reasonableness' standard should apply to this case.").
Here, the NRC decided categorically that NEPA does not require consideration of the environmental effects of potential terrorist attacks. In making this determination, the NRC relied on PFS, where it "consider[ed] in some detail the legal ques-tion whether NEPA requires an inquiry into the threat of ter-rorism at nuclear facilities." 56 NRC 340, 343 (2002). In that case, intervenor State of Utah filed a contention claiming that the September 11 terrorist attacks "had materially changed the circumstances under which the Board had rejected previously proffered terrorism contentions by showing that a terrorist attack is both more likely and potentially more dangerous than previously thought." Id. at 345. The NRC concluded that
6084 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC even following the September 11th attacks, NEPA did not impose such a requirement, reasoning: In our view, an EIS is not an appropriate format to address the challenges of terrorism. The purpose of an EIS is to inform the decisionmaking authority and the public of a broad range of environmental impacts that will result, with a fair degree of likelihood, from a proposed project, rather than to speculate about
'worst-case' scenarios and how to prevent them.
Id. at 347. The NRC determined that four grounds "cut[ ] against using the NEPA framework" to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist attack: (1) the possibility of a terrorist attack is far too removed from the natural or expected conse-quences of agency action; (2) because the risk of a terrorist attack cannot be determined, the analysis is likely to be mean-ingless; (3) NEPA does not require a "worst-case" analysis; and (4) NEPA's public process is not an appropriate forum for sensitive security issues. Id. at 348. We review each of these four grounds for reasonableness, and conclude that these grounds, either individually or collectively, do not support the NRC's categorical refusal to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist attack. A [9] The Commission relied first on finding that the possibil-ity of a terrorist attack is too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action. Id. at 347. Section 102 of NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare "a detailed statement... on the environmental impact" of any proposed major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(C)(i). The ques-tion thus becomes whether a given action "significantly affects" the environment.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6085 The NRC claims that the appropriate analysis of Section 102 is that employed by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Power, 460 U.S. 766, 773 (1983). In MetropolitanEdison, the Court noted that "[t]o determine whether Section 102 requires consideration of a particular effect, we must look to the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical environment caused by the major federal action at issue," looking for "a reason-ably close causal relationship.., like the familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law." 460 U.S. at 774. The Com-mission claims that its conclusion that the environmental impacts of a possible terrorist attack on an NRC-licensed facility is beyond a "reasonably close causal relationship" was a reasonable application of this "proximate cause" analogy. The problem with the agency's argument, however, is that Metropolitan Edison and its proximate cause analogy are inapplicable here. In Metropolitan Edison, the petitioners argued that NEPA required the NRC to consider the potential risk of psychological damage upon reopening the Three Mile Island nuclear facilities to those in the vicinity. Noting that NEPA is an environmental statute, the Supreme Court held that the essential analysis must focus on the "closeness of the relationship between the change in the environment and the
'effect' at issue." 460 U.S. at 772.
The appropriate analysis is instead that developed by this court in NoGwen Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). In NoGwen, the plaintiffs argued that NEPA required the Air Force to consider the threat of nuclear war in the implementation of the Ground Wave Emergency Network ("GWEN"). We held "that the nexus between construction of GWEN and nuclear war is too attenuated to require discussion of the environmental impacts of nuclear war in an [EA] or [EIS]." 855 F.2d at 1386. [10] The events at issue here, as well as in Metropolitan Edison and NoGwen, form a chain of three events: (1) a major
6086 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC federal action; (2) a change in the physical environment; and (3) an effect. Metropolitan Edison was concerned with the relationship between events 2 and 3 (the change in the physi-cal environment, or increased risk of accident resulting from the renewed operation of a nuclear reactor, and the effect, or the decline in the psychological health of the human popula-tion). The Court in Metropolitan Edison explicitly distin-guished the case where the disputed relationship is between events 1 and 2: "we emphasize that in this case we are consid-ering effects caused by the risk of accident. The situation where an agency is asked to consider effects that will occur if a risk is realized, for example, if an accident occurs ... is an entirely different case." Id. at 775 n.9. In NoGwen, we fol-lowed the Court's admonition and, in addressing the relation-ship between events 1 and 2, we held that the Metropolitan Edison analysis did not apply "because it discusse[d] a differ-ent type of causation than that at issue in this case... [which] require[d] us to examine the relationship between the agency action and a potential impact on the environment." Id. at 1386. NoGWEN relied on our decision in Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980), which held that "an impact statement need not discuss remote and highly speculative consequences." Applying that standard to the plaintiffs' claims that the military GWEN system's installation would "increase the probability of nuclear war," and "that GWEN would be a primary target in a nuclear war," we held both propositions to be "remote and highly specula-tive," and, therefore, NEPA did not require their consider-ation. [11] In the present case, as in NoGwen, the disputed rela-tionship is between events 1 and 2 (the federal act, or the licensing of the Storage Installation, and the change in the physical environment, or the terrorist attack). The appropriate inquiry is therefore whether such attacks are so "remote and highly speculative" that NEPA's mandate does not include consideration of their potential environmental effects.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6087 [12] The NRC responds by simply declaring without sup-port that, as a matter of law, "the possibility of a terrorist attack.., is speculative and simply too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action to require a study under NEPA." 56 NRC at 349. In doing so, the NRC .failed to address Petitioners' factual contentions that licensing the Storage Installation would lead to or increase the risk of a terrorist attack because (1) the presence of the Storage Installation would increase the probability of a terrorist attack on the Diablo Canyon nuclear facility, and (2) the Storage Installation itself would be a primary target for a terrorist attack. We conclude that it was unreasonable for the NRC to categorically dismiss the possibility of terrorist attack on the Storage Installation and on the entire Diablo Canyon facility as too "remote and highly speculative" to warrant consider-ation under NEPA. [13] In so concluding, we also recognize that the NRC's position that terrorist attacks are "remote and highly specula-tive," as a matter of law, is inconsistent with the government's efforts and expenditures to combat this type of terrorist attack against nuclear facilities. In the PFS opinion, the NRC emphasized the agency's own post-September lth efforts against the threat of terrorism: At the outset, however, we stress our determination, in the wake of the horrific September 1lth terrorist attacks, to strengthen security at facilities we regu-late. We currently are engaged in a comprehensive review of our security regulations and programs, act-ing under our AEA-rooted duty to protect "public health and safety" and the "common defense and security." We are reexamining, and in may cases have already improved, security and safeguards mat-ters such as guard force size, physical security exer-cises, clearance requirements and background investigations for key employees, and fitness-for-duty requirements. More broadly, we are rethinking
6088 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC the NRC's threat assessment framework and design basis threat. We also are reviewing our own infra-structure, resources, and communications. Our comprehensive review may also yield perma-nent rule or policy changes that will apply to the pro-posed PFS facility and to other NRC-related facilities. The review process is ongoing and cumu-lative. It has already resulted in a number of security-related actions to address terrorism threats at both active and defunct nuclear facilities. 56 NRC at 343. Among these actions is the establishment of an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, "re-sponsible for immediate operational security and safeguards issues as well as for long-term policy development[,] work[- ing] closely with law enforcement agencies and the Office of Homeland Security[,] ... coordinat[ing] the NRC's ongoing comprehensive security review." Id. at 344-45. We find it difficult to reconcile the Commission's conclu-sion that, as a matter of law, the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is "remote and speculative," with its stated efforts to undertake a "top. to bottom" security review against this same threat. Under the NRC's own formulation of the rule of reasonableness, it is required to make determina-tions that are consistent with its policy statements and proce-dures. Here, it appears as though the NRC is attempting, as a matter of policy, to insist on its preparedness and the serious-ness with which it is responding to the post-September l1th terrorist threat, while concluding, as a matter of law, that all terrorist threats are "remote and highly speculative" for NEPA purposes.!
"The view that a terrorist attack is too speculative to be a required part of NEPA review would seem to be inconsistent with the NRC's pre-9/l 1 security procedures. Since 1977, the NRC has required licensed plants to have a security plan that is designed to protect against a "design basis
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS v. NRC 6089 [14] In sum, in considering the policy goals of NEPA and the rule of reasonableness that governs its application, the possibility of terrorist attack is not so "remote and highly speculative" as to be beyond NEPA's requirements. B [15] The NRC's reliance upon the second PFS factor, that the Risk of a Terrorist Attack Cannot be Adequately Deter-mined, 56 NRC at 350, is also not reasonable. First, the NRC's dismissal of the risk of terrorist attacks as "unquantifi-able" misses the point. The numeric probability of a specific attack is not required in order to assess likely modes of attack, weapons, and vulnerabilities of a facility, and the possible impact of each of these on the physical environment, includ-ing the assessment of various release scenarios. Indeed, this is precisely what the NRC already analyzes in different con-texts. It is therefore possible to conduct a low probability-high consequence analysis without quantifying the precise proba-bility of risk. The NRC itself has recognized that consider-ation of uncertain risks may take a form other than quantitative "probabilistic" assessment. In its "Proposed Pol-icy Statement on Severe Accidents and Related Views on Nuclear Reactor Regulation," 48 Fed.Reg. 16,014 (1983), the Commission stated that: threat" for radiological sabotage. See General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be Strengthened, GAO-030752 (2003) at 6. "The design basis threat characterizes the elements of a postulated attack, including the number of attackers, their training, and the weapons and tac-tics they are capable of using." Id. Thus, the NRC-even before the terrorist attacks of 9/1 1-did not con-sider such attacks too "remote and speculative" to be considered in agency planning. To the contrary, the agency has long required analysis of means and methods of hypothetical attacks against specific facilities, with the goal of establishing effective counter-measures.
6090 S AN Luis 0131SPO MOTHERS v. NRC In addressing potential accident initiators (including earthquakes, sabotage, and multiple human errors) where empirical data are limited and residual uncer-tainty is large, the use of conceptual modeling and scenario assumptions in Safety Analysis Reports will be helpful. They should be based on the best quali-fied judgments of experts, either in the form of sub-jective numerical probability estimates or qualitative assessments of initiating events and casual [sic] linkages in accident sequences. 48 Fed.Reg. at 16,020 (emphasis added). [16] No provision of NEPA, or any other authority cited by the Commission, allows the NRC to eliminate a possible envi-ronmental consequence from analysis by labeling the risk as "unquantifiable." See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 754 (3rd Cir. 1989) (J. Scirica, dissenting) (finding no "statutory provision, no.NRC regulation or policy statement, and no case law that permits the NRC to ignore any risk found to be unquantifiable"). If the risk of a terrorist attack is not insignificant, then NEPA obligates the NRC to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of that risk. The NRC's actions in other contexts reveal, that the agency does not view the risk of terrorist attacks to be insig-nificant. Precise quantification is therefore beside the point. Even if we accept the agency's argument, the agency fails to adequately show that the risk of a terrorist act is unquantifi-able. The agency merely offers the following analysis as to the quantifiability of a potential terrorist attack: The horrors of September 11 notwithstanding, it remains true that the likelihood of a terrorist attack being directed at a particular nuclear facility is not quantifiable. Any attempt at quantification or even qualitative assessment would be highly speculative. In fact, the likelihood of attack cannot be ascertained
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6091 with confidence by any state-of-the-art methodology. That being the case, we have no means to assess, usefully, the risks of terrorism at the PFS facility. 56 NRC at 350. The agency nonetheless has simultaneously shown the ability to conduct a "top to bottom" terrorism review. This leaves the Commission in the tenuous position of insisting on the impossibility of a meaningful, i.e. quantifi-able, assessment of terrorist attacks, while claiming to have undertaken precisely such an assessment in other contexts. Further, as we have noted, the NRC has required site-specific analysis of such threats, involving numerous recognized scenar-ios.' [17] Thus, we conclude that precise quantification of a risk is not necessary to trigger NEPA's requirements, and even if it were, the NRC has not established that the risk of a terrorist attack is unquantifiable. C The NRC's third ground, that it is not required to conduct a "worst-case" analysis, is a non sequitur. Although it is a true statement of the law, the agency errs in equating an assess-ment of the environmental impact of terrorist attack with a demand for a worst-case analysis. The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") regula-tions, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1 - 1518.4, promulgated with the "purpose [of] tell[ing] federal agencies what they must do to comply with [NEPA] procedures and achieve the goals of
'The NRC's assertion that a risk of terrorism cannot be quantified is also belied by the very existence of the Department of Homeland Security Advisory System, which provides a general assessment of the risk of ter-rorist attacks. See, e.g., World Market Research Centre, Global Terrorism Index 2003/4 (offering a probabilistic risk assessment of terrorist activities over a 12-month period).
6092 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC [NEPA]," have been interpreted by the Supreme Court as "en-titled to substantial deference." Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)). These regulations mandated worst-case analyses until 1986, when CEQ replaced the for-mer 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22, requiring an agency, when relevant information was either unavailable or too costly to obtain, to include in the EIS a "worst-case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence," with the new and current version of the regulation, which requires an agency to instead deal with uncertainties by including within the EIS "a summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonable foreseeable sig-nificant adverse impacts on the human environment, and... the agency's evaluation of such impacts based upon theoreti-cal approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community." 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.22(b)(3), (4). The current requirement applies to those events with potentially catastrophic consequences "even if their probability of occur-rence is low, provided that the analysis of impacts is sup-ported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (b)(4). The Supreme Court held in Robertson that the amendment of the regulations had nullified the worst-case analysis requirement. 490 U.S. at 355; Edwardsen v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 268 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 2001). The Commission is therefore correct when it argues that NEPA does not require a worst-case analysis. It is mistaken, however, when it claims that "Petitioners' request for an anal-ysis of [the environmental effects of] a successful terrorist attack at the Diablo Canyon ISFSI approximates a request for a 'worst-case' analysis that has long since been discarded by the CEQ regulations . . . and discredited by the Federal courts." According to the NRC, "[m]aking the various assumptions required by [P]etitioners' scenario requires the NRC to venture into the realm of 'pure conjecture.' "We dis-agree.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6093 [18] An indication of what CEQ envisioned when it imposed the worst-case analysis requirement can be gleaned from a 1981 CEQ memorandum, Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regu-lations, reprinted at 46 FR 18026-01 (March 23, 1981). CEQ answered one of those questions, "[w]hat is the purpose of a worst-case analysis? How is it formulated and what is the scope of the analysis?" with the following: The purpose of the analysis is to ... cause agencies to consider th[ ]e potential consequences [of agency decisions] when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or gaps in available information. The analysis is formulated on the basis of available infor-mation, using reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences of a proposed action. For example, if there are scientific uncertainty and gaps in the available information concerning the numbers of juvenile fish that would be entrained in a cooling water facility, the responsible agency must disclose and coniider the possibility of the loss of the commercial or sport fishery. In addition to an analysis of a low probability/catastrophic impact event, the worst-case analysis should also include a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic impact. 46 FR 18026, 18032. While it is true that the agency is not required to consider consequences that are "speculative,""1 the 0
" Because we disagree with the agency's interpretation of worst-case analysis, we do not reach the agency's characterization of the possibility of terrorist attack as "speculative." We note, however, that this character-ization stands out as contrary to the vigilant stance that Americans are encouraged to take by the Department of Homeland Security. See www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29 (urging that "[a]ll Americans should continue to be vigilant" and noting that "[t]he country remains at an elevated risk ... for terrorist attack.")
6094 SAN Luis OBIsPo MOTHERS V. NRC NRC's argument wrongly labels a terrorist attack the worst-case scenario because of the low or indeterminate probability of such an attack. The CEQ memo, by including as worst-case scenarios events of both higher and lower probability, reveals that worst-case analysis is not defined solely by the low prob-ability of the occurrence of the events analyzed, but also by the range of outcomes of those events. See also GreaterYel-lowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing a witness's testimony that the loss of bald eagle nesting sites was both "likely" and "a worst-case sce-nario"). Petitioners do not seek to require the NRC to analyze the most extreme (i.e., the "worst") possible environmental impacts of a terrorist attack. Instead, they seek an analysis of the range of environmental impacts likely to result in the event of a terrorist attack on the Storage Installation. We reject the Commission's characterization of this request as a demand for a worst-case analysis. D [19] The NRC's reliance on the fourth PFS factor, that it cannot comply with its NEPA mandate because of security risks, is also unreasonable. There is no support for the use of security concerns as an excuse from NEPA's requirements. While it is true, as the agency claims, that NEPA's require-ments are not absolute, and are to be implemented consistent with other programs and requirements, this has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court as excusing NEPA's appli-cation to a particularly sensitive issue. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (holding that the Navy was required to perform a NEPA review and to fac-tor its results into decisionmaking even where the sensitivity of the information involved meant that the NEPA results could not be publicized or adjudicated). Weinberger can sup-port only the proposition that security considerations may per-mit or require modification of some of the NEPA procedures, not the Commission's argument that sensitive security issues result in some kind of NEPA waiver.
SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC 6095 The application of NEPA's requirements, under the rule of reason relied on by the NRC, is to be considered in light of the two purposes of the statute: first, ensuring that the agency will have and will consider detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; and, second, ensuring that the public can both contribute to that body of information, and can access the information that is made public. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 768. To the extent that, as the NRC argues, certain information cannot be publicized, as in Weinberger, other statutory purposes continue to mandate NEPA's application. For example, that the public cannot access the resulting infor-mation does not explain the NRC's determination to prevent the public from contributing information to the decisionmak-ing process. The NRC simply does not explain its unwilling-ness to hear and consider the information that Petitioners seek to contribute to the process, which would fulfill both the information-gathering and the public participation functions of NEPA. These arguments explain why a Weinberger-style limited proceeding might be appropriate, but cannot support the NRC's conclusion that NEPA does not apply. As we stated in NoGWEN: "There is no 'national defense' exception to NEPA . . . 'The Navy, just like any federal agency, must carry out its NEPA mandate to the fullest extent possible and this mandate includes weighing the environmental costs of the [project] even though the project has serious security implica-tions.' " 855 F.2d at 1384 (quoting ConcernedAbout Trident
v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
E [20] In sum, none of the four factors upon which the NRC relies to eschew consideration of the environmental effects of a terrorist attack satisfies the standard of reasonableness. We must therefore grant the petition in part and remand for the agency to fulfill its responsibilities under NEPA. [21] Our identification of the inadequacies in the agency's NEPA analysis should not be construed as constraining the
6096 SAN Luis OBISPO MOTHERS V. NRC NRC's consideration of the merits on remand, or circumscrib-ing the procedures that the NRC must employ in conducting its analysis. There remain open to the agency a wide variety of actions it may take on remand, consistent with its statutory and regulatory requirements. We do not prejudge those alter-natives. Nor do we prejudge the merits of the inquiry. We hold only that the NRC's stated reasons for categorically refusing to consider the possibility of terrorist attacks cannot withstand appellate review based on the record before us. We are also mindful that the issues raised by the petition may involve questions of national security, requiring sensitive treatment on remand. However, the NRC has dealt with our nation's most sensitive nuclear secrets for many decades, and is well-suited to analyze the questions raised by the petition in an appropriate manner consistent with national security. VI We deny the petition as to the claims under the AEA and the APA. However, because we conclude that the NRC's determination that NEPA does not require a consideration of the environmental impact of terrorist attacks does not satisfy reasonableness review, we hold that the EA prepared in reli-ance on that determination is inadequate and fails to comply with NEPA's mandate. We grant the petition as to that issue and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-ion. PETITION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART; REMANDED.
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Citizens Awareness Network's Scoping Comments on EIS for proposed VY License Renewal in Docket 50-271 Creation Date Fri, Jun 23, 2006 3:11 PM From: Jon Block <ionb(sover.nct> Created By: jonb(3@sover.net Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS netzero.net chrisnord (Chris Nord) nukebusters.org deb (Deb Katz) Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOOI nrc.gov netzero.net nukebusters.org Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 644 Friday, June 23, 2006 3:11 PM TEXT.htm 1916 CANENVYEIS_WrittenScopingComments.wpd 58243 CANENVYEIS_WrittenScopingComments.pdf 129856 Mothers_.v_NRC.pdf 67777 Mime.822 355561 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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!~Lo6iYiocs2 From: "Sherman, William" <William.Sherman@state.vt.us>
To: <VermontYankeeElS@nrc.gov> Date: Fri, Jun 23, 2006 4:24 PM
Subject:
VT Dept of Pub Service Comments - License Renewal EIS for Vermont Yankee Please accept the attached comments from the Vermont Department of Public Service for the EIS for License Renewal of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
<<Vr-DPS Comments -VY-EIS.pdf>> 'I4'/o ý Bill Sherman 7/irX -247,7.
State Nuclear Engineer Vermont Department of Public Service (802) 828-3349 DI t .. ,
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June 23, 2006 Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Office of the Administration Mailstop T-6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555-0001 Re: Vermont Yankee, 50-271, License Renewal Vermont Department of Public Service comments on the Environmental Report Vermont Department of Public Service comments on the scope of issues to be addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are provided on Attachment A to this letter. These comments are provided in accordance with Federal Register Notice, Vol 71, No. 77, Friday April 21, 2006, pages 20733-20735. The Department of Public Service appreciates the opportunity to make these comments. Please call if there are questions. Sincerely, William Sherman State Nuclear Engineer
Attachment A Vermont Department of Public Service Comments EIS for License Renewal for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Category I item - Onsite Land Use
1. 10 C.F.R. §54.23 requires the Applicant to submit an environmental report that complies with Subpart A of 10 C.F.R. Part 51.

2. 10 CFR §51.53(cX3)(iv) provides that the" [t]he environmental report must contain any new and significant information regarding the environmental impacts of license renewal of which the applicant is aware."

3. New and significant information exists regarding the time for which onsite land will be removed from other uses, and whether such land use is irretrievable, which was not provided in the ER by the Applicant in accordance with 10 C.F.R. §51.53(c)(3)(iv). The current estimate in the Generic Environment Impact Statement (GEIS) is on-site storage of spent fuel will not last beyond 30 years after the end of the license period (including an extended license period). GEIS, Sections 6.4.6.2, 3.

4. The GEIS evaluates the impacts associated with onsite land use as Category 1, SMALL. The basis for this assessment is the assumption that the land used for storage of nuclear wastes at the reactor site will not exceed 30 years after the end of the license term. GEIS, Section 3.2 (referring to GEIS Chapter 6). That assumption, in turn, relies upon the assumption that a permanent high level waste repository, and perhaps even a second repository, will be in place by that time to receive the reactor wastes. GEIS, Section 6.4.6.2 Based on those assumptions the use of the reactor site for storing spent fuel, in this case for a period ending in 2062, has been deemed to be a small impact. GEIS, Section 3.2.

5. However, as summarized below, these assumptions are flawed. Recent evidence, not evaluated previously in the GEIS, now discloses that: 1) the likelihood that a permanent high level waste repository will be in place by 2062 is slight due to unanticipated technical problems uncovered at the Yucca Mountain site coupled with changes in national policy-, 2) the only currently contemplated high level waste repository can accommodate the quantity of spent nuclear fuel expected to be produced by Vermont Yankee through the end of its originally licensed life, but it would not have space for at least a part of the additional spent nuclear fuel generated by VY during extended licensing; 3) no present plans exist for building a second high level waste repository nor has any site been identified for consideration for such a facility; 4) the United States is now embarking upon a changed policy for waste disposal which will make all the current schedules obsolete and for which there is no reliable time frame for its implementation; 5) there is not now nor has there been any reasonable prospect that the federal government or any third party will take title to the license-renewal spent fuel waste and remove it from the site; and 6) it follows that it is reasonable to expect that at least a part of spent fuel to be generated at VY during the period of an extended license will remain at the site for a much longer time than evaluated in the GEIS and perhaps indefinitely.
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 2 of 8
6. Since this new information, not available at the time of development of the GEIS, demonstrates that the commitment of onsite land for storage/disposal of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal will be substantially longer than assumed in the GELS, and may be indefinite, this results in an irretrievable commitment of onsite land with a MODERATE or LARGE impact.

7. As demonstrated below, Vermont and its communities have firmly established values associated with land use such that the long-term or indefinite use of a portion of the VY site for spent nuclear fuel storage should clearly be evaluated as a MODERATE or LARGE impact in the VY supplement to the GEIS.

8. Entergy identifies in Environmental Report (ER) Section 6.4.2, that the land required to dispose of spent nuclear fuel as a result of operation during an extended license represents a irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources. Entergy does not qualify the irreversible or irretrievable nature of this land use to a limited time period. Therefore, Entergy is identifying this use as indefinite. This identification is in conflict with the GEIS which does not identify such land use as irreversible and irretrievable. This difference from the GEIS requires should be addressed in the EIS for the impact of onsite land use.

9. In ER Section 4.0, Entergy refers to 10 CFR 51, Appendix B, Table B-i, which identifies onsite land use as Category 1, SMALL impact. But this identification only refers to the portion of land from license renewal as being "a small fraction of any nuclear power plant site,"
and does not include evaluation of the indefinite removal of the land from any beneficial use.
10. Entergy demonstrates in the Environmental Report (ER) Section 4.0 a flawed application of its obligations to identify new and significant information. Section 4.0 contains the statement, "Entergy reviewed the NRC findings on these 52 issues and identified no new and significant information that would invalidate the findings for VYNPS."
The flaw is the identification of items in Table 4-2, which are purported to be the Category I issues applicable to VYNPS. Land Use (license renewalperiod)is listed in Table 4-2. But the adverse impact is from the land use beyond the license renewal period, caused by the actions during the license renewal period. If Table 4-2 has been stated correctly, then perhaps Entergy would have provided the new and significant information related to onsite land use.
11. The EIS should take into account that the nation's policy with regard to spent fuel management has changed since the GEIS. The current administration and Congress have 2
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 3 of 8 announced a major shift in policy called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Refer in general to the Administration's GNEP website - http://www..Pnep.energy.zov - which contains the announcement and much information regarding this new policy direction. Proponents of this new policy hope this new approach will not separate out plutonium products. However the referenced website shows that this technique has neither been developed nor demonstrated.
12. This shift in policy will remove attention and resources from repository development such that the basis and conclusions that spent fuel will not have to be stored on site beyond 2062 are no longer valid. For example, see the report of comments below from Sen. Pete Domenici:
MOVEMENT OF SPENT FUEL IN THE US COULD BE FURTHER DELAYED, according to Senator Pete Domenici, the New Mexico Republican who chairs the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Domenici indicated during a status hearing on DOE's repository program at Yucca Mountain, Nevada that it was unrealistic to proceed with a status-quo repository project and later factor in spent fuel reprocessing waste and recycling activities associated with DOE's new fuel-cycle initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. It ought to be pretty clear to everyone that spent fuel rods won't be put into Yucca Mountain, Domenici said in an apparent reference to GNEP, which is aimed, in part, at closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the US and abroad. Recycling will determine what kind of repository the US needs, he added. "It's a mess," Domenici said, of the Yucca Mountain program as reporters approached him after the hearing. He said that he believes any legislation on Yucca Mountain would have to include language on spent fuel recycling. Draft legislation DOE sent to Congress last month did not include language on spent fuel reprocessing. Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Tuesday, May 16, 2006, Copyright McGraw Hill Publications 2005, reprinted with permission
13. In addition, the EIS should consider that the previous assumption regarding the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a permanent waste disposal site is no longer valid. At Yucca Mountain, contrary to the assumptions underlying the GEIS, it has been discovered that the disposal area is subject to water in-leakage. Therefore the design must be changed from that previously assumed and it is not clear a new design can be developed which will meet dose and integrity requirements. Partially in response to this discovery, DOE has abandoned previous cask designs and now proposes a concept called the TAD (transportation, aging and disposal) standard canister for which there is not presently even a preliminary design.
3
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 4 of 8
14. Further, the EIS should stated that these changes have occurred in an increasingly hostile political environment. Senate minority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) strongly opposes development of Yucca Mountain and is able to use his position as minority leader effectively to advance this opposition and would do so even more forcefully as majority leader if the Senate leadership changes parties. And, the Western Governor's Association (WGA) has the following active resolution (03-16):
On December 1, 1989, the Western Governors' Association adopted Resolution 89-024 which stated that spent nuclear fuel should remain at reactor sites until a state has agreed to storage and DOE provides reasonable transportation, safety, and emergency response assurances to the western states. The resolution was readopted in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999. All of the new information identified above provides additional arguments and evidence to bolster the opposition of Senator Reid and the WGA and undercut the assumed completion date for a usable high level waste repository.
15. In addition, the EIS should evaluate, because the GEIS was prepared before September 11, 2001, it does not factor in the impact of viable terrorist threats into an evaluation of the socioeconomic impacts of indefinitely storing spent fuel at the reactor site. The extended long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel at Vermont Yankee after permanent shutdown means a defined terrorist target will be present for the long-term or indefinitely. In its news release No. 03-053 (April 29, 2003), NRC stated:
The Commission believes that this DBT [Design Basis Threat] represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private security force should be expected to defend under existing law. (Emphasis added). The phrase, should be expected to defend, means there is a limit on the expectation on Entergy, and that state resources will be expected to provide additional security responses beyond Entergy's capability. The very presence of this target creates an effect on that land, contiguous lands, and the surrounding area, creating the need for continuous augmented emergency preparedness plans and security response from the State. The EIS should evaluate this increased, long term burden on state resources. See also the decision of San Luis Obispo Mothersfor Peace V. NuclearRegulatory Commission, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 03-74628 (June 2, 2006).
16. Entergy has stated that all of the spent fuel projected to be generated by Vermont Yankee through the end of its current operating license (including increases of spent fuel from power uprate) will be within the 70,000 metric tons storage limits of the "first" repository. The 4
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 5 of 8 EIS should identify that at least some part of the spent fuel from license renewal will exceed the 70,000 metric ton limit (when all spent fuel being generated nationally is considered) and must go into a second repository, and that this entry of Entergy into the second repository is specifically the result of the license renewal.
17. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in 2003, performed a study: The Future ofNuclearPower: An InterdisciplinaryMIT Study. Entergy should have identified that it sponsored the co-chair of the study, Dr. Ernest Moniz, Director of Energy Studies, Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, MIT Department of Physics, as a witness in PSB Docket No. 7082, regarding authorization for dry cask storage. In that docket, Dr. Moniz testified:
[T]he MIT Study argues that "interim" storage of spent fuel (which can be carried out either at reactor sites or in consolidated facilities, possibly under federal control) for fifty to seventy years is in any case a preferred approach for design of an integrated spent fuel management system. The implication of Entergy's testimony through Dr. Moniz is that the first repository will not be available for "fifty to seventy years." If the schedule for the first repository is "fifty to seventy years," a time period greater than evaluated in the GELS, then the schedule for a second repository is indefinite at best, if such a repository could ever be built. The EIS should take note of this fact.
18. The EIS should identified how Vermont would evaluate the onsite land use which would occur if license renewal were granted. Vermont assigns a high value to land and its use within the state. The values are codified in the form of environmental protections in permitting criteria in 10 V.SA Chapter 151, State Land Use and Development Plans (see Exhibit Vermont-
~5).
19. Criteria No. 7 of 10 V.S.A §6086 (a) states:
[Before granting a permit, the district commission shall find that the subdivision or development:] (7) Will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of the local governments to provide municipal or governmental services. The long-term or indefinite storage of license renewal spent fuel at VY would trigger long-term burdens on local governments for emergency management and security services. It is highly likely that long-term or indefinite storage of the spent fuel created by license renewal would not 5
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 6 of 8 comply with Criteria No. 7. Therefore, this would suggest the impact of the proposed onsite land use should be determined to be LARGE in the VY supplement to the GEIS.
20. Criteria No. 8 of 10 V.S.A §6086 (a) states:
[Before granting a permit, the district commission shall find that the subdivision or development:] (8) Will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area, aesthetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas. Under this criteria, the District Environmental Commission would evaluate the effect of spent nuclear fuel being left long-term or indefinitely on a riverbank site that would otherwise be fully returned to greenfield condition. It is highly likely the long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuels following decommissioning of VY would be deemed to create an undue adverse effect. Considering this criteria, the proposed onsite land use should be evaluated as MODERATE or LARGE in the VY supplement to the GEIS.
21. In addition, Vermont's land use law requires a finding that land uses are in conformance with local or regional plans:
(10) Is in conformance with any duly adopted local or regional plan or capital program under chapter 117 of Title 24. In making this finding, if the district commission finds applicable provisions of the town plan to be ambiguous, the district commission, for interpretive purposes, shall consider bylaws, but only to the extent that they implement and are consistent with those provisions, and need not consider any other evidence. 10 V. S.A. §6086 (a)(10).
22. The Windham Regional Plan of October 30, 2001, which is applicable to VY, establishes land use requirements, and has the following provision:
LAND USE POLICIES Rural Residential Lands
1. Ensure that any development of rural residential lands will be at densities that will serve to contain rural sprawl, and that are compatible with existing land uses and sensitive to the limitations of the land.
6
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 7 of 8 Once the bulk of the siteis returned to a greenfield condition, it is doubtful that long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal would be considered "compatible with existing land uses". This provision suggests the onsite land use impact should at least be evaluated as MODERATE in the VY supplement to the GELS.
23. The Windham Regional Plan also has the following provision:
COMMUNITY RESOURCE POLICIES High Level Radioactive Waste
1. Encourage a requirement that permanent spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage be resolved prior to any consideration of extending or reviewing the operating license of Vermont Yankee.
It is highly likely that a land use evaluation under 10 V.S.A. §6086 (a)(10) would find the proposal for long-term or indefinite storage of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal did not conform with the regional plan with regard to the item above. Thus, this provision suggests a LARGE impact from the onsite land use from the proposed license renewal.
24. There is also a Vernon Town Plan, Nov. 3, 2003, which is applicable to VY. This plan contains the following:
Section III: Resource and Economic Development Recommendations:
#3 The Town should pursue discussions with appropriate representatives of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear power Company regarding the possible re-use of the power plant site for other commercial and industrial development following decommissioning.
The long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal has the potential for preventing "other commercial and industrial development following decommissioning." If the spent fuel storage completely prevented the use of the site for other developments, it is highly likely the impact from license-renewal onsite land use would be LARGE. If the spent fuel storage allowed some additional development but hindered other possible commercial and industrial uses, the impact would likely be MODERATE.
25. The extended long-term presence of spent fuel will prevent use of the immediate land 7
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 8 of 8 it occupies and will deter other possible uses of larger contiguous areas because of societal and commercial concerns regarding the proximity of radioactive material. From the foregoing, it is shown that the EIS should identify that Vermont has existing land use evaluation criteria, which establish the basis under which the impact from additional long-term or indefinite onsite land use resulting from the spent nuclear fuel generated from license renewal should be evaluated as MODERATE or LARGE in the VY supplement to the GEIS. 8
Fc--M6mý\-6-Moo 66 1.Tm P Pageil F~:\temD\GW1O0OQ1.TMP - Mail Envelope Properties (449C4DE1.3C9 :21: 58313)
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VT Dept of Pub Service Comments - License Renewal EIS for Vermont Yankee Creation Date Fri, Jun 23, 2006 4:23 PM From: "Sherman, William" <William.Sherman(istate.vt.us> Created By: Will iam.Sherrman(a-)state.vt.us Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 VermontYankeeEIS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 282 Friday, June 23, 2006 4:23 PM TEXT.htm 941 VT-DPS Comments -VY-EIS.pdf 56395 Mime.822 80897 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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To:
"Mike Hebert" <mikehebert@adelphia.net> <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov>
ML o6 1Oq IS Date: Tue, Jun 20, 2006 9:49 AM
Subject:
License extension
Dear Mr. Eads,
I have many more comments on this matter. However, I know how busy you are and that brievity would be appreciated. Thank you for your consideration of this Important matter. Respectfully, Mike Hebert 1/1,21106 Vernon C= r-Ti
*1 ~AJ --r :l r--
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Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services Mailstop T-6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 June 16, 2006
Dear Mr. Eads:
The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant plays an integral role in Vermont's current energy portfolio, and must be part of our future. Vermont Yankee is a clean, emissions free generating facility that provides stable, low-cost power to our state. These are all crucial factors that businesses take into consideration when determining whether to remain here, or relocate to Vermont. If Vermont Yankee goes off-line in 2012 where will we find replacement power that is as clean and reliable? Vermont Yankee is critical to Windham County and Southeast Vermont in particular. Currently, the plant and its contractors employ full time approximately 600 men and women, and provides $80 million to local Vermont businesses through the purchase of goods and services. Its clean power, sound operations, well paying jobs, and community participation and support helps make the region a great place to live and work. For all of these reasons, I encourage the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to extend the license of Vermont Yankee for another 20 years. Sincerely, Mike Hebert
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License extension Creation Date Tue, Jun 20, 2006 9:49 AM From: "Mike Hebert" <mikehebert(adeIphia.net> Created By: mikehebertP~adelphia.net Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 224 Tuesday, June 20,2006 9:49 AM TEXT.htm 724 NRC Comments - Environmental Scoping Hebert.doc 19968 Mime.822 30356 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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tAL06q1-"OQ1 I From: <sunny@traprockpeace.org> To: <vermontyankeeeis@nrc.gov> Date: Fri, Jun 23,2006 11:57 PM
Subject:
Scope of environmental assessment S..) 4111/1204 ;ij Proper Scope of o:. 2 Environmental Assessment ) C-Predicting Impacts of
~ I End-Stage Operation of the Vernon Reactor
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Sunny Miller, Executive 0 Director Traprock Peace Center 103A Keets Road Deerfield, MA 01342 413 773-7427
Background
Traprock Peace Center was founded In Deerfield, Massachusetts 1979 to promote nonviolent resolution of local, national and International conflicts, to work for economic justice and disarmament. Traprock Peace Center staff, volunteers and supporters join with elders and consultants nationwide cautioning against excessive risks associated with continuing operations at our oldest nuclear reactors. In the early 1990's we took a close look at embrittlement at the nation's oldest reactor in Rowe, Massachusetts when they proposed 20 additional years beyond their 40 year license. Thanks to the scrutiny of nuclear engineer Bob Pollard, Pollard left the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after many years of service, distressed because the NRC would not enforce their own regulations. Using only NRC documentation, he showed that the chances of having a melt-down were unacceptably high
– we had a greater chance of having a melt-down than winning the Mass Millions lottery. And we didn't have to buy a ticket to play. Regular users of nuclear electricity, and neighbors off the grid had a chance.
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FemntYankeeEIS- Scope of environmental assessmentP When public scrutiny helped the NRC and Yankee Rowe operators consider the full details, economic realities helped the operators decide to close that facility. Managers, staff and regulators stayed to work on years of clean-up, retired, or moved on to work at other reactors. No blot of a melt-down smears their resumes, and no suicides that I know of reflected remorse over their decision. Inadequate Inspections and Oversight at the Vernon reactor Only after owners and managers of the Vernon reactor asked for the remarkable 20% increase in output, 20 excess years of operations and permission to store radioactive waste in the cheapest containers legally available, did we begin to turn our attentions to the problems at the Vernon reactor. Proper assessment will take into account that: For twenty-two years four pumps did not have adequate capacity to pump coolant. We needed this reliability. Neighbors to this nuke, and every other in the country, had perpetual assurances of quality control but no reliable control mechanism. I accepted long ago that people make mistakes. Does your job require that you engage in the fantasy that people won't make mistakes? On August 23, 1996, regulators said a VY violation (of theoretical requirements) involved the failure to include an analysis of the most damaging single failure vulnerability for certain loss of coolant accidents. This condition existed for 22 years without being identified during any of the Cycle analyses, even though a number of reactor and industry operating events and activities related to the RHR system had been reviewed and evaluated by Vermont Yankee staff, again and again during this twenty-two year period. This is just one example that thoroughly illustrates that REALITIES of operations bear only limited resemblance to the theoretical management of reactors. Our proper scope of environmental assessment will fully accept the many ways human beings make mistakes. Proper assessment will review the history of errors, enumerate them and calculate the predictable continuation of human error. The history of mishaps and failures, exposed in public record is only shameful if we do not respond honorably and respectfully to its reality. In July of 1975, did faulty valves discharge radioactive water into the Connecticut River and Atlantic fisheries? In 1995 did faulty fuel assemblies interfere with valve closing? An adequate scope of environmental assessment will require an extensive period for assessing contamination levels in air, water,
F~erontynkeeLs-scopeofenvironmental assessment P~age 3l soil, plant, animal tissues. Adequate scope will establish radiation monitoring in a 100-mile radius of the Vernon reactor in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont, on an ongoing basis for the remainder of the license period. The assessment team will have no fear of retribution for a report that constrains reactor operations. The assessment team will compare the environmental impact of wind, solar, hydro and geo-thermal alternatives as ifthey enjoyed the full insurance and financial benefits enjoyed by nuclear energy utilities, and report those comparisons year by year for operations for 10,000 generations- or for the length of time future generations will need to manage our waste without benefit. Assessors will compare cultural willingness to isolate materials no longer in use, when those materials pose a health risk, whether is no longer interest in those materials, or whether substantial bribes are available to sell nuclear remains illegally, in both prosperous and desperate times. An adequate assessment team will include sociologists who can assess the human factors relevant for environmental protection for the length of time needed for isolating wastes produced in a twenty year period, not the environmental protection needed in a twenty year period. Corruption in the age of Enron Futhermore, adequate assessment will accept that excess profits entice excess corruption. The assessment team will not fear a conclusion that advocates for replacement of nuclear technologies with sustainable and renewable technologies that pose far fewer health and safety risks, and can reduce the economic hardship of storing radioactive wastes, for generations to come. We believe that a thorough safety assessment will uncover numerous problems at New England's oldest operating nuclear reactor. An effective assessment team will urge all
[VemonffankeeEIS - Scopý ofýeqvironmental assessment ag- 4 VermontYankeeElS-Scopeof environmental assessment Page local, state and federal officials to insist that a thorough, independent safety assessment must be done. As we have learned from Rosa Parks and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., thorough discourse and thoughtful, persistent nonviolent action are often needed to attain justice -- and some great songs might help us sustain our community, our commitment and our common understanding until we do. CC: <charles~traprockpeace.org> CC:
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Scope of environmental assessment Creation Date Fri, Jun 23, 2006 11:56 PM From: <sunnv0,travrockPeace.orR> Created By: sunnvO~tranrockneace.orL2 Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 VermontYankeeEIS traprockpeace.org charles CC Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov traprockpeace.org Date & Time Files Size MESSAGE 6266 Friday, June 23, 2006 11:56 PM TEXT.htm 7872 Scoping comments, June 23, 2006.odt 16156 Mime.822 38842 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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"Q* 4 VermontYankeeEIS - Stop Vermont Yankee From: "Dory Zee" <doryzee@hotmail.com> ML 61 6 110) Q'1*
To: <VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov> Date: 06/26/2006 7:53 AM
Subject:
Stop Vermont Yankee j~f3.5
Dear Sirs/Madams,
(iý!) I am writing to express my grave concern about the re-authorization of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. I want the plant closed. Cheap, renewable and alternative sources of power need to be supported by the government. Nuclear power is not the answer. I do not want to be irradiated. Nor my rivers, farmlands, children. I am a fisherman, an organic gardener living a wholesome rural lifestyle. You may not know what this lifestyle is like. It is about connecting with the land, with the seasons, with the ways of the earth. I am honored to work with children with special needs. Don't you realize that all these environmental insults cause diseases in our children? Why do you think so many have diseases like autism, mental retardation, cancer? It is no coincidence, our modern practices of poisoning earth, air and water have made us sick, literally. Wemust learn to live with greater integrity. Please stop this nuclear madness. There is no safe way to store the spent fuel rods. There is no safe way to mine the uranium. There is no safe level of radiation sent down our rivers and streams. There is many other ways to address energy needs. Please help us protect our beautiful valley from further harm. Close the plant. Now. Most sincerely, Dory Zelman, MS, OTR/L Occupational therapist -3 JJ Ti .- 7) CT) C=.
*n F'i Find.just'whatypu're after with the new, more precise MSNSearch -yitnow!
6cbL/93 A7e
c-\temp\GW)00001.TMP Paae:ll Paae 1 :1 c:\temp\GWIOOOO1 .TMP Mail Envelope Properties (449FCAB3.AE4: 20: 15076)
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Stop Vermont Yankee Creation Date Mon, Jun 26, 2006 7:53 AM From: "Dory Zee" <dorzee hotmail.com> Created By: dorvzee(ihotmail.com Recipients nrc.gov TWGWPO03.HQGWDO01 VermontYankeeEIS Post Office Route TWGWPO03.HQGWDOO1 nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time TEXT.htm 1723 Mime.822 2880 Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard ReplyRequested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
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-. 1 112 STATE STREET FAX: (802) 828-2342 DRAWER 20 TrY (VT): 1-800-734-8390 MONTPELIER VT 05620-2601 TEL, (802) 828-2811 Internet: vtdpsupsd~stat.vtus --http:/Avwwwstatc.vt~us/psd n=f:
STATE OF VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE June 23, 2006 I-C= r-
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Chief, Rules and Directives Branch .0 Division of Administrative Services I, Office of the Administration Mailstop T-6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-n Washington D.C. 20555-0001 *9 Re: Vermont Yankee, 50-271, License Renewal Vermont Department of Public Service comments on the Environmental Report Vermont Department of Public Service comments on the scope of issues to be addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are provided on Attachment A to this letter. These comments are provided in accordance with Federal Register Notice, Vol 71, No. 77, Friday April 21, 2006, pages 20733-20735.
The Department of Public Service appreciates the opportunity to make these comments. Please call if there are questions. Sincerely, William Sherman State Nuclear Engineer
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Attachment A Vermont Department of Public Service Comments EIS for License Renewal for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Categor I item - Onsite Land Use
1. 10 C.F.R. §54.23 requires the Applicant to submit an environmental report that complies with Subpart A of 10 C.F.R. Part 51.

2. 10 CFR §51.53(c)(3)(iv) provides that the" [t]he environmental report must contain any new and significant information regarding the environmental impacts of license renewal of which the applicant is aware."

3. New and significant information exists regarding the time for which onsite land will be removed from other uses, and whether such land use is irretrievable, which was not provided in the ER by the Applicant in accordance with 10 C.F.R. §51.53(c)(3)(iv). The current estimate in the Generic Environment Impact Statement (GETS) is on-site storage of spent fuel will not last beyond 30 years after the end of the license period (including an extended license period). GETS, Sections 6.4:6.2, 3.

4. The GETS evaluates the impacts associated with onsite land use as Category 1, SMALL. The basis for this assessment is the assumption that the land used for storage of nuclear wastes at the reactor site will not exceed 30 years after the end of the license term. GETS, Section 3.2 (referring to GETS Chapter 6). That assumption, in turn, relies upon the assumption that a permanent high level waste repository, and perhaps even a second repository, will be in place by that time to receive the reactor wastes. GETS, Section 6.4.6.2 Based on those assumptions the use of the reactor site for storing spent fuel, in this case for a period ending in 2062, has been deemed to be a small impact. GETS, Section 3.2.

5. However, as summarized below, these assumptions are flawed. Recent evidence, not evaluated previously in the GETS, now discloses that: 1) the likelihood that a permanent high level waste repository will be in place by 2062 is slight due to unanticipated technical problems uncovered at the Yucca Mountain site coupled with changes in national policy- 2) the only currently contemplated high level waste repository can accommodate. the quantity of spent nuclear fuel expected to be produced by Vermont Yankee through the end of its originally licensed life, but it would not have space for at least a part of the additional spent nuclear fuel generated by VY during extended licensing; 3) no present plans exist for building a second high level waste repository nor has any site been identified for consideration for such a facility;, 4) the United States is now embarking upon a changed policy for waste disposal which will make all the current schedules obsolete and for which there is no reliable time frame for its implementation; 5) there is not now nor has there been any reasonable prospect that the federal government or any third party will take title to the license-renewal spent fuel waste and remove it from the site; and 6) it follows that it is reasonable to expect that at least a part of spent fuel to be generated at VY during the period of an extended license will remain at the site for a much longer time than evaluated in the GEIS and perhaps indefinitely.
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 2 of 8
6. Since this new information, not available at the time of development of the GELS, demonstrates that the commitment ofonsite land for storage/disposal of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal Will be substantially longer than assumed in the GEIS, and may be indefinite, this results in an irretrievable commitment of onsite land with a MODERATE or LARGE impact.

7. As demonstrated below, Vermont and its communities have firmly established values associated with land use such that the long-term or indefinite use of a portion of the VY site for spent nuclear fuel storage should clearly be evaluated as a MODERATE or LARGE impact in the VY supplement to the GELS.

8. Entergy identifies in Environmental Report (ER) Section 6.4.2, that the land required to dispose of spent nuclear fuel as a result of operation during an extended license represents a irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources. Entergy does not qualify the irreversible or irretrievable nature of this land use to a limited time period. Therefore, Entergy is identifying this use as indefinite. This identification is in conflict with the GELS which does not identify such land use as irreversible and irretrievable. This difference from the GELS requires should be addressed in the EIS for the impact of onsite land use.

9. In ER Section 4.0, Entergy refers to 10 CFR 51, Appendix B, Table B-1, which identifies onsite land use as Category 1, SMALL impact. But this identification only refers to the portion of land from license renewal asbeing "a small fraction of any nuclear power plant site,"
and does not include evaluation of the indefinite removal of the land from any beneficial use.
10. Entergy demonstrates in the Environmental Report (ER) Section 4.0 a flawed application of its obligations to identify new and'significant information. Section 4.0 contains the statement,
'Entergy reviewed the NRC findings on these 52 issues and identified no new and significant information that would invalidate the findings for VYNPS."
The flaw is the identification of items in Table 4-2, which are purported to be the Category 1 issues applicable to VYNPS. Land Use (licenserenewalperiod)is listed in Table 4-2. But the adverse impact is from the land use beyond the license renewal period, caused by the actions during the license renewal period. If Table 4-2 has been stated correctly, then perhaps Entergy would have provided the new and significant information related to onsite land use.
11. The EIS should take into account that the nation's policy with regard to spent fuel management has changed since the GEIS. The current administration and Congress have 2
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 3 of 8 announced a major shift in policy called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Refer in general to the Administration's GNEP website - http://www.gnop.enerry.gov/= which contains the announcement and much information regarding this new policy direction. Proponents of this new policy hope this new approach will not separate out plutonium products. However the referenced website shows that this technique has neither been developed nor demonstrated.
12. This shift in policy will remove attention and resources from repository development such that the basis and conclusions that spent fuel will not have to be stored on site beyond 2062 are no longer valid. For example, see the report of comments below from Sen. Pete Domenici:
MOVEMENT OF SPENT FUEL IN THE US COULD BE FURTHER DELAYED, according to Senator Pete Domenici, the New Mexico Republican who chairs the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Domenici indicated during a status hearing on DOE's repository program at Yucca Mountain, Nevada that it was unrealistic to proceed with a status-quo repository project and later factor in spent fuel reprocessing waste and recycling activities associated with DOE's new fuel-cycle initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. It ought to be pretty clear to everyone that spent fuel rods won't be put into Yucca Mountain, Domenici said in an apparent reference to GNEP, which is aimed, in part, at closing the nuclear fuel cycle in the US and abroad. Recycling will determine what kind of repository the US needs, he added. "It's a mess," Domenici said, of the Yucca Mountain program as reporters approached him after the hearing. He said that he believes any legislation on Yucca Mountain would have to include language on spent fuel recycling. Draft legislation DOE sent to Congress last month did not include language on spent fuel reprocessing. Platts Nuclear News Flashes, Tuesday, May 16, 2006, Copyright McGraw Hill Publications 2005, reprinted with permission
13. In addition, the EIS should consider that the previous assumption regarding the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a permanent waste disposal site is no longer valid. At Yucca Mountain, contrary to the assumptions underlying the GEIS, it has been discovered that the disposal area is subject to water in-leakage. Therefore the design must be changed from that previously assumed and it is not clear a new design can be developed which will meet dose and integrity requirements. Partially in response to this discovery, DOE has abandoned previous cask designs and now proposes a concept called the TAD (transportation, aging and disposal) standard canister for which there is not presently even a preliminary design.
3
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 4 of 8
14. Further, the EIS should stated that these changes have occurred in an increasingly hostile political environment. Senate minority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) strongly opposes development of Yucca Mountain and is able to use his position as minority leader effectively to advance this opposition and would do so even more forcefully as majority leaderif the Senate leadership changes parties. And, the Western Governor's Association (WGA) has the following active resolution (03-16):
On December 1, 1989, the Western Governors' Association adopted Resolution 89-024 which stated that spent nuclear fuel should remain at reactor sites until a state has agreed to storage and DOE provides reasonable transportation, safety, and emergency response assurances to the western states. The resolution was readopted in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999. All of the new information identified above provides additional arguments and evidence to bolster the opposition of Senator Reid and the WGA and undercut the assumed completion date for a usable high level waste repository.
15. In addition, the EIS should evaluate, because the GEIS was prepared before September 11, 2001, it does not factor in the impact of viable terrorist threats into an evaluation of the socioeconomic impacts of indefinitely storing spent fuel at the reactor site. The extended long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel at Vermont Yankee after permanent shutdown means a defined terrorist target will be present for the long-term or indefinitely. In its news release No. 03-053 (April 29, 2003), NRC stated:
The Commission believes that this DBT [Design Basis Threat] represents the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private security force should be expected to defend under existing law. (Emphasis added). The phrase, should be expected to defend, means there is a limit on the expectation on Entergy, and that state resources will be expected to provide additional security responses beyond Entergy's capability. The very presence of this target creates an effect on that land, contiguous lands, and the surrounding area, creating the need for continuous augmented emergency preparedness plans and security response from the State. The EIS should evaluate this increased, long term burden on state resources. See also the decision of San Luis Obispo Mothersfor Peace V. NuclearRegulatory Commission,U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 03-74628 (June 2, 2006).
16. Entergy has stated that all of the spent fuel projected to be generated by Vermont Yankee through the end of its current operating license (including increases of spent fuel from power uprate) will be within the 70,000 metric tons storage limits of the "first" repository. The 4.
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 5 of 8 EIS should identify that at least some part of the spent fuel from license renewal will exceed the 70,000 metric ton limit (when all spent fuel being generated nationally is considered) and must go into a second repository, and that this entry of Entergy into the second repository is specifically the result of the license renewal.
17. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in 2003, performed a study:. The Futureof NuclearPower: An InterdisciplinaryMIT Study. Entergy should have identified that it sponsored the co-chair of the study, Dr. Ernest Moniz, Director of Energy Studies, Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, MIT Department of Physics, as a witness in PSB Docket No. 7082, regarding authorization for dry cask storage. In that docket, Dr. Moniz testified:
LT]he MIT Study argues that "interim' storage of spent fuel (which can be carried out either at reactor sites or in consolidated facilities, possibly under federal control) for fifty to seventy years is in any case a preferred approach for design of an integrated spent fuel management system. The implication of Entergy's testimony through Dr. Moniz is that the first repository will not be available for "fifty to seventy years." If the schedule for the first repository is "fifty to seventy years," a time period greater than evaluated in the GEIS, then the schedule for a second repository is indefinite at best, if such a repository could ever be built. The EIS should take note of this fact.
18. The EIS should identified how Vermont would evaluate the onsite land use which would occur if license renewal were granted. Vermont assigns a high value to land and its use within the state. The values are codified in the form of environmental protections in permitting criteria in 10 V.S.A Chapter 151, State Land Use and.Development Plans (see Exhibit Vermont-5).

19. Criteria No. 7 of 10 V.S.A §6086 (a) states:
[Before granting a permit, the district commission shall find that the subdivision or development:] (7) Will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of the local governments to provide municipal or governmental services. The long-term or indefinite storage of license renewal spent fuel at VY would trigger long-term burdens on local governments for emergency management and security services. It is highly likely that long-term or indefinite storage of the spent fuel crated by license renewal would not 5
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 6 of 8 comply with Criteria No. 7. Therefore, this would suggest the impact of the proposed onsite land use should be determined to be LARGE in the VY supplement to the GELS.
20. Criteria No. 8 of 10 V.S.A §6086 (a) states:
[Before granting a permit, the district commission shall find that the subdivision or development:] (8) Will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area, aesthetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas. Under this criteria, the District Environmental Commission would evaluate the effect of spent nuclear fuel being left long-term or indefinitely on a riverbank site that would otherwise be fully returned to greenfield condition. It is highly likely the long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuels following decommissioning of VY would be deemed to create an undue adverse effecL Considering this criteria, the proposed onsite land use should be evaluated as MODERATE or LARGE in the VY supplement to the GELS.
21. In addition, Vermont's land use law requires a finding that land uses are in conformance with local or regional plans:
(10) Is in conformance with any duly adopted local or regional plan or capital program under chapter 117 of Title 24. In making this finding, if the district commission finds applicable provisions of the town plan to be ambiguous, the district commission, for interpretive purposes, shall consider bylaws, but only to the extent that they implement andare consistent with those provisions, and need not consider any other evidence. 10 V. S.A. §6086 (a)(10).
22. The Windham Regional Plan of October 30,2001, which is applicable to VY, establishes land use requirements, and has the following provision:
LAND USE POLICIES Rural Residential Lands
1. Ensure that any development of rural residential lands will be at densities that will serve to contain rural sprawl, and that are compatible with existing land uses and sensitive to the limitations of the land.
6
Attachment A June 23. 2006 Page 7 of 8 Once the bulk of the site is returned to a greenfield condition, it is doubtful that long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal would be considered "compatible with existing land uses". This provision suggests the onsite land use impact should at least be evaluated as MODERATE in the VY supplement to the GEIS.
23. The Windham Regional Plan also has the following provision:
COMMUNITY RESOURCE POLICIES High Level Radioactive Waste
1. Encourage a requirement that permanent spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage be resolved prior to any consideration of extending or reviewing the operating license of Vermont Yankee.
It is highly likely that a land use evaluation under.10 V.S.A. §6086 (aX10) would find the proposal for long-term or indefinite storage of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal did not conform with the regional plan with regard to the item above. -Thus, this provision suggests a. LARGE impact from the onsite land use from the proposed license renewal.
24. There is also a Vernon Town Plan, Nov. 3, 2003, which is applicable to VY. This plan contains the following:
Section III: Resource and Economic Development Recommendations:
#3 The Town should pursue discussions with appropriate representatives of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear power Company regarding the possible re-use of the power plant site-..r other commercial and industrial development following decommissioning.
The long-term or indefinite presence of spent nuclear fuel from license renewal has the potential for preventing "other commercial and industrial development following decommissioning." If the spent fuel storage completely prevented the use of the site for other developments, it is highly likely the impact from license-renewal onsite land use would be LARGE. If the spent fuel storage allowed some additional development but hindered other possible commercial and industrial uses, the impact would likely be MODERATE.
25. The extended long-term presence of spent fuel will prevent use of the immediate land 7
Attachment A June 23.2006 Page 8 of 8 it occupies and will deter other possible uses of larger contiguous areas because of societal and commercial concerns regarding the proximity of radioactive material. From the foregoing, it is shown that the EIS should identify that Vermont has existing land use evaluation criteria, which establish the basis under which the impact from additional long-term or indefinite onsite land use resulting from the spent nuclear fuel generated from license renewal should be evaluated as MODERATE or LARGE in the VY supplement to the GEIS. 8
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Vermont Yankee License Renewal Public Scoping Meeting Docket Number: (050-00271) Location: Brattleboro, Vermont Date: Tuesday, June 6, 2006 Work Order No.: NRC-1 071 Pages 1-7 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 .++++ 4 PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENTAL SCOPING 5 FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, 6 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION 7 +++++ 8 TUESDAY, 9 JUNE 6, 2006 10 +++++ 11 BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT 12 +++++ 13 The Public Meeting was convened at the 14 Quality Inn at 1380 Putney Road in Brattleboro, 15 Vermont, at 2:00 p.m. 16 SPEAKERS: 17 MICHAEL MULLIGAN 18 NANCY CROMPTON 19 ELLEN KAYE 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
2 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 2:34 p.m. 3 MR. MULLIGAN: Hello. I'm Mike Mulligan. 4 I live in Hinsdale, New Hampshire, P.O. Box, 161, 5 Hinsdale, New Hampshire 03451. And my concern is with 6 global warming. What I understand is that the 7 Connecticut River, upstream of Vermont Yankee has been 8 heating up slightly, especially during the summers. 9 It's been turning up for a decade or so, the peak 10 summertime temperatures, as an example. 11 Or how about river low-flows in a drought 12 situation? So the question is will the re-licensing 13 of Vermont Yankee have -- will they consider what 14 global warming could potentially do with the river 15 temperatures? Will Vermont Yankee have to power down 16 at times for that? Will the environmental 17 temperatures inside the buildings and stuff, are they 18 -- the design environmental temperatures, are they 19 adequate enough so that we wouldn't be confronted with 20 shutting down the plant during the summer, summer 21 time? 22 I'm concerned about say we're in a drought 23 in the summer time and the plant -- and we approach 24 their limits. Probably around that time other plants 25 would be stressed and the grid of New England would be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005.3701 (202) 234-4433
3 1 stressed. So the question is well, do you want to 2 make the grid worse at its most vulnerable time with 3 shutting down Vermont Yankee? Do you want to push the 4 grid electric prices to astronomical prices? Do you 5 want to de-stabilize, the grid maybe, because of not 6 enough voltage or whatever it is. 7 So I'm generally concerned about 8 projecting out what global warming could potentially 9 do and make sure that there's an adequate margin so 10 that you wouldn't have to cycle down the plant during 11 the summer times. That's it. I talked about cycling 12 down the plant. I meant reducing power. So that's 13 either shutting down the plant or reducing power to 50 14 percent or some sort of percent type of thing and 15 stuff. 16 (Off the record.) 17 MS. CROMPTON: Hi. I'm Nancy Crompton, a 18 resident of Brattleboro, Vermont. I live four miles 19 from Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. My concerns 20 about living so close to the power plant are concerns 21 that, in fact, would not be alleviated even if I were 22 living far away from the nuclear power plant which I 23 have over the past few months been contemplating. The 24 fact is that there are people, there are 103 nuclear 25 power plants in the United States, all of them NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
4 1 generating nuclear waste for which we have no long-2 term disposal solution. 3 I've been told that the Federal Government 4 is supposed to have a plan in place by 2025 and I wish 5 to state that that is utterly unacceptable. It is on 6 our watch right now. It is our generation that is 7 responsible for the creation of the nuclear waste and 8 we need a solution, not soon, not tomorrow, but 9 yesterday, decades ago. 10 We have no moral right to create a poison 11 that can affect the earth and all living creatures for 12 a half life of 25,000 years, if I remember that 13 correctly. We have no moral right to do this. 14 We also do not have to demand so much electricity. We 15 don't really require it. Our inflated desires for the 16 expansion of electrical power have been -- are a 20th 17 century notion of progress at any cost. The cost is 18 now coming due and we are going to have to begin 19 paying for the expansion and -- oh dear, I'm starting 20 to ramble. Can we turn it off? 21 (Off the record.) 22 And I very much want to hear the NRC, the 23 Regulatory Commission and other leaders in our country 24 talking about conservation. This is indeed a war. 25 It's as if we are at war against our unchecked desire NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
5 1 to progress at the expense of other nations and at the 2 expense of the environment. And we can indeed change 3 our ways and show a willingness to conserve. 4 I'm concerned about also climate change. 5 Although the nuclear power plant was probably built to 6 withstand a 500-year storm and its effects on the 7 Connecticut River, since we have been seeing 100-year 8 storms in this area and in Boston over the last six 9 months, perhaps the infrastructure is indeed not 10 adequate to be worse worst case scenario, the kinds of 11 storms that we perhaps should be anticipating will 12 happen in the future. 13 And therefore, I'm very concerned about 14 dry-cask storage, alongside the Connecticut River 15 which flows through Massachusetts and Connecticut to 16 the Long Island Sound and just the idea that nuclear 17 radioactivity could be carried by that water all the 18 way to Long Island Sound should give us great pause. 19 I believe we have to take responsibility right now for 20 the effect that we are having because we are already 21 seeing its effects upon our children and 22 grandchildren. 23 We know that mercury in the ponds in the. 24 fish that we happily go out and catch on a Sunday 25 already in Vermont, we can't allow the children to eat NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
6 1 more than four ounces a month and we have seen the 2 effects of children who have miore than that. The 3 illnesses and cancers and neurological damage already 4 caused by different kinds of pollutants in Vermont is 5 staggering. We certainly don't need any more. 6 (Off the record.)
7. MS. KAYE: I'm Ellen Kaye. I live in 8 Brattleboro, right on the edge of the evacuation zone, 9 the 10-mile radius of Vermont Yankee. My comments 10 about environmental issues regarding Vermont Yankee 11 that I think should be given serious consideration:
12 (a) maybe the only issue is the waste. We're having 13 an increase in production and a relicensing and a 14 lengthening of the time that Vermont Yankee can 15 operate. 16 What we're getting is more and more waste 17 which we have no way to deal with. That waste is
18. going to last for many, many, many generations. We 19 have no idea what the health effects are going to be.
20 We have no idea what the effects on humans, animals, 21 plant life, everything that makes this place this 22 place. And I am tired of hearing everybody associated 23 with the nuclear power industry and the NRC talk about 24 nuclear power generation without ever addressing 25 waste. So what we have is a hazardous waste dump, a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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7 1 nuclear waste dump on the banks of the Connecticut 2 River. 3 I'm raising a child here. I hear that 4 cancer rates near the plant are higher than in other 5 places. There's some studies. I hear that Strontium-6 90 turns up in baby teeth. So this is an experimental 7 thing and we're being experimented on and I don't 8 think it should continue. It should be closed down. 9 We should be looking for safer forms of energy 10 production and we should be conserving. 11 But what I want the NRC to weigh heavily, 12 it's the waste issue, environmentally, and the cancer 13 issue. Are there cancer clusters around nuclear power 14 plants? Are there elevated rates of breast cancer 15 around nuclear power plants? I read reports that say 16 that there are and it is unfair to experiment with a 17 population when these are questions hanging in the 18 air. It's unconscionable. 19 I think that's all I need to say today. 20 (Whereupon, at 7:12 p.m., the public 21 meeting was concluded.) 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Public Meeting: Afternoon Session Docket Number: (050-00271) Location: Brattleboro, Vermont Date: Wednesday, June 7, 2006 Work Order No.: NRC-1072 Pages 1-1.16 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 4 PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENTAL SCOPING 5 FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, 6 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION 7 AFTERNOON SESSION 8 +++++ 9 WEDNESDAY 10 JUNE 7, 2006 11 12 BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT 13 +++++ 14 The Public Meeting was convened at the 15 Latchis Theater at 50 Main Street in Brattleboro, 16 Vermont, at 1:30 p.m., F. "Chip" Cameron, Facilitator, 17 presiding. 18 NRC STAFF PARTICIPATING: 19 F. "CHIP" CAMERON 20 RANI FRANOVICH 21 RICHARD EMCH 22 ERIC BENNER 23 FRANK GILLESPIE 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. (202)
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2 1 SPEAKERS: 2 BETH ADAMS 3 SHAWN BANFIELD 4 JOHN BLOCK 5 CAROL BOYER 6 CORA BROOKS 7 BILL BURTON 8 JOHNNY EADS 9 ROBERT ENGLISH 10 ANN ELIZABETH HOWES 11 SARAH KOTKOV 12 DAN MACARTHUR 13 DAVID MCELWEE 14 EVAN MULHOLLAND 15 JILL NEITLICH 16 NANCY NELKIN 17 JANE NEWTON 18 DEBRA REGER 19 GARY SACHS 20 RAY SHADIS 21 SALLY SHAW 22 CHRIS WILLIAMS 23 MEGAN 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
3 1 P-R-0-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 1:35 p.m. 3 MR. CAMERON: Good afternoon, everybody. 4 If we could ask you all to take your seats and we'll 5 get started with this afternoon's meeting. 6 Okay, Ray, Evan, would you like to join us 7 down here? Are we going to have a lot of continuing 8 feedback with this thing? If we do, let's try to fix 9 it. It seems like there is a lot of feedback. 10 Again, good afternoon and welcome 11 everybody. My name is Chip Cameron, I'm the Special 12 Counsel for Public Liaison at the Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission, which we'll be referring to as the NRC, 14 today. 15 And it's my pleasure to serve as your 16 Facilitator for today's meeting. And our subject 17 today is the environmental review that the NRC 18 conducts as part of its evaluation of a license 19 application that we received from the Entergy Company 20 to renew the operating license for the Vermont Yankee 21 Reactor. 22 And I just wanted to cover three items of 23 meeting process for you, very quickly, before we get 24 to the substance of our discussions today. And I'd 25 like to talk a little bit about what the format for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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4 1 the meeting is. Secondly, some simple ground rules 2 for running the meeting, and, lastly, I'd just like to 3 introduce the NRC staff who are going to be speaking 4 to you today. 5 In terms of format, we're going to start 6 out with some brief NRC presentations, to give you 7 some background on the license renewal process. What 8 we look at, what we evaluate in making a decision 9 about whether to renew a license for a reactor. 10 And we'll have time for some brief 11 questions after those presentations on the license 12 renewal process, to make sure that you understand it 13 before we go to the primary purpose of today's 14 meeting, which is to hear from all of you on this 15 process. 16 This meeting, as the NRC staff will tell 17 you, is a scoping meeting. That's a term that's used 18 in connection with the preparation of environmental 19 impact statements. 20 And, basically, what we would like to hear 21 from all of you on, is what issues should be looked 22 at, as the NRC prepares the draft environmental impact 23 statement. What methodology should be used? What 24 alternatives? 25 And we're looking forward to hearing from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
5 1 you on that today. And we are taking written comments 2 on these issues, and the staff will tell you how to 3 submit written comments, but we wanted to be here with 4 you in person today to talk with you and to listen to 5 you. 6 In terms of ground rules, they're pretty 7 simple. When you do speak, please introduce yourself 8 to us and give us an affiliation, if you're affiliated 9 with a group. 10 If that's appropriate, tell us that. And 11 I would ask that only one person speak at a time. 12 Most importantly, so we can give our full attention-to 13 whomever has the floor at the moment. 14 Also, so that our Court Reporter, Pete 15 Holland, up here, can get a clean transcript. So that 16 he knows who is talking. That transcript is the 17 public record of this meeting. 18 It's our record of the comments and it's 19 your record of what was said here this afternoon. And 20 that will be available to anybody who wants it. 21 I would ask everybody to try to be brief, 22 so that we can give everyone an opportunity to talk 23 this afternoon. And I'm asking everybody to follow a 24 five minute guideline, when they come up here to the 25 podium to give us their comments. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
6 1 If you could limit it to five minutes, 2 that would be helpful, and when it gets close to five 3 minutes I may ask you to summarize your comments for 4 us, so that we can go on to the next person. 5 Five minutes may not seem like a lot of 6 time, but it does accomplish a number of important 7 things. One, it's usually enough time for people to 8 summarize their main points that they want us to hear. 9 Secondly, it alerts us to issues before 10 written comments come in, so that we can start working 11 on those issues right away. And, lastly, it alerts 12 everybody in the audience, in the community, to what 13 some of the concerns are that people have with the 14 renewal application. 15 So, we'll be following that five-minute 16 rule. There is an ability to follow up with more 17 extensive comments in writing. There's also an 18 ability to talk to the NRC staff, who are here from 19 our Headquarters Office and from Region, after the 20 meeting. 21 And we'll also be giving you some contact 22 information so that you can contact people, from the 23 NRC staff, if you have concerns or questions. 24 And I guess, finally, I just would ask all 25 of us, everyone, to just extend courtesy to everybody NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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7 1 else. We may hear different opinions on the issues,
2 different opinions from the ones that we hold today.
3 And I would just ask everybody to respect 4 those opinions. In terms of the NRC speakers, we're 5 going to start out this afternoon with an overview of 6 the license renewal process. 7 And we're going to have Rani Franovich, 8 who is right here, to start out for us. And she's the 9 Chief of the Environmental Projects Branch, within the 10 License Renewal Program. 11 And Rani and her staff manage the 12 Environmental Review for all License Renewal 13 Applications, including this one for Vermont Yankee. 14 And Rani has been with the NRC for 14 15 years, in a number of positions and areas of 16 responsibility. She was a Resident Inspector, these 17 are the NRC staff who are at every reactor that we 18 licensed throughout the country, to make sure that NRC 19 regulations are complied with. 20 She also was a Project Manager on the 21 Safety Review for several plants, I believe, that came 22 in for license renewal. She was also the Coordinator 23 of Reactor Enforcement, which was a position that 24 ensured that compliance steps were taken against 25 companies that may have violated the regulations. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
8 1 And, in terms of her educational 2 background, she has a Bachelor's Degree and a Master's 3 Degree from Virginia Tech. And the Master's Degree 4 was in Industrial and Systems Engineering. 5 And after Rani is done, we're going to go 6 right to Mr. Rich Emch, who is right over here. And 7 Richard is the Project Manager for the Environmental 8 Review for the Vermont Yankee License Renewal 9 Application. 10 And he'll be talking about the specifics 11 of the Environmental Review, and how to submit 12 comments. And Rich is an old hand at the NRC. He's 13 been with us for 32 years, and a lot of different 14 positions, mostly related to radiological health and 15 protection. 16 And his background is in Health Physics. 17 He has a Bachelor's in Physics from Louisiana Tech 18 University, and a Master's in Health Physics from the 19 Georgia Institute of Technology. 20 And Rani is going to introduce a number of 21 people, but I just wanted to introduce two people 22 before we get started. 23 One is Eric Benner. And Eric is the, is 24 a Branch Chief of the Branch that does the technical 25 review of the environmental issues that are in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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9 1 Environmental Impact Statement. And he'll be talking 2 to us tonight and I'll give him a full introduction at 3 that time. 4 And, also, we have Mr. Frank Gillespie 5 here. He is a Senior NRC Manager. Frank is the 6 Division Director of the Division of License Renewal 7 at the NRC in our Office of Nuclear Reactor 8 Regulation. 9 And I just would thank you all for being 10 here to help us with this decision. Rani. 11 MS. FRANOVICH: Thank you, Chip. You guys, 12 can everyone hear me? Is this better? Alright. 13 Thank you, Chip. I just wanted to open up the meeting 14 by thanking you all for coming here. 15 It's nasty weather outside and I 16 understand Vermont has had quite a bit of that 17 recently, and so I'm sorry we couldn't arrange for a 18 prettier day for the meeting, but we're really glad 19 you took the time out of your busy schedules to come 20 and talk with us today. 21 I hope the information that we provide 22 will help you understand the process we will be going 23 through in renewing the application for renewal for 24 Vermont Yankee. 25 And help you understand the role that you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005o3701 (202) 234-4433
10 1 can play in helping us to make sure that the 2 Environmental Impact Statement we prepare for Vermont 3 Yankee License Renewal, is complete and accurate. 4 Next slide, please, Sam. I'd like to 5 start off by briefly going over the purpose of today's 6 meeting. We'll explain the NRC's license renewal 7 process for nuclear power plants, with emphasis on the 8 environmental review process. 9 And we'll talk about the typical -- is 10 this better? Okay. We'll talk about the typical 11 areas included in the scope of our review. We'll also 12 share with you the License Renewal Review Schedule. 13 And really the most important part of 14 today's meeting, is to receive any comments that you 15 have on the scope of our review. They will' also give 16 you some information about how you can submit comments 17 to us, outside of this meeting. 18 At the conclusion of the staff's 19 presentation, we will be happy to answer questions and 20 receive comments that you may have on the process and 21 the scope of our review. 22 However, I must ask you to limit your 23 participation to questions only, and hold your 24 comments until the appropriate time during today's 25 meeting. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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11 1 Once all questions are answered, we can 2 begin receiving any comments that you have on the 3 scope of our Environmental Review. Next slide, 4 please. 5 Before I get into a discussion of the 6 License Renewal Process, I'd like to take a minute to 7 talk about the NRC in terms of what we do and what our 8 mission is. 9 The Atomic Energy Act is the legislation 10 that authorizes the NRC to issue operating licenses. 11 The Atomic Energy Act provides for a 40-year license 12 term for power reactors. 13 This 40-year term is based primarily on 14 economic considerations and anti-trust factors, not on 15 safety limitations of the plant. The Atomic Energy 16 Act also authorizes the NRC to regulate civilian use 17 of nuclear materials in the United States. 18 In exercising that authority, the NRC's 19 mission is three-fold. To ensure adequate protection 20 of public health and safety. To promote the common 21 defense and security, and to protect the environment. 22 The NRC accomplishes its mission through 23 a combination of regulatory programs and processes, 24 such as conducting inspections, issuing enforcement 25 actions, assessing Licensee performance, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
12 1 evaluating operating experience from nuclear plants 2 across the country and internationally. The 3 regulations that the NRC enforces are contained in 4 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which is 5 commonly referred to as 10 CFR. Next slide, please. 6 As I've mentioned, the Atomic Energy Act 7 provides for a 40-year license term for power 8 reactors. Our regulations also include provisions for 9 extending plant operation for up to an additional 20 10 years. 11 For Vermont Yankee the operating license 12 will expire March 21"t, 2012. Entergy has requested 13 license renewal for Vermont Yankee. As part of the 14 NRC's review of the License Renewal Application, we 15 will perform an environmental review to look at the 16 impacts on the environment of an additional 20 years 17 of operation. 18 The purpose of this meeting is to give you 19 information about the process, and to seek your input 20 on what issues we should consider, within the scope of 21 our review. Next slide, please. 22 NRC's License Renewal Review is similar to 23 the original licensing processes, in that it involves 24 two parts. An Environmental Review and a safety 25 review. This slide really gives a big picture NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
13 1 overview of the License Renewal Process, which 2 involves these two parallel paths. I'm going to 3 briefly describe how these two review processes work, 4 starting with the safety review. Next slide, please. 5 Two guiding principles form the basis of 6 the NRC's approach in performing its safety review. 7 The first principle is that the current regulatory 8 process is adequate to ensure that the licensing basis 9 of all currently operating plants provides and 10 maintains an acceptable level of safety, with the 11 possible exception of the effects of aging on certain 12 structures, systems and components. 13 The second principle is that the current 14 plant-specific licensing basis must be maintained 15 during the renewal term, in the same manner, and to 16 the same extent, as during the original license term. 17 Next slide, please. You might ask what 18 does the safety review consider? For license renewal, 19 the safety review focuses on aging management of 20 systems, structures and components, which are 21 important to safety, as determined by the license 22 renewal scoping criteria, contained in 10 CFR, Part 5. 23 The license renewal safety review does not 24 assess current operational issues, such as emergency 25 planning and safety performance. The NRC monitors and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
14 1 provides regulatory oversight of these issues on an 2 ongoing basis, under the current operation license. 3 Because the NRC is addressing these current operating 4 issues, on a continuing basis, we do not re-evaluate 5 them in license renewal. Next slide, please. 6 As I have mentioned, the license renewal 7 safety review focuses on plant aging. And the 8 programs that the Licensee has already implemented, or 9 will implement, to manage the effects of aging. 10 Let me introduce Mr. Johnny Eads, the II Safety Project Manager. Thank you, Johnny. Johnny is 12 in charge of the staff's safety review. The safety 13 review involves the NRC staff's evaluation of 14 technical information that's contained in the License 15 Renewal Application. 16 This is referred to as the Safety 17 Evaluation. The NRC staff also conducts audits as 18 part of its Safety Evaluation. There's a team of 19 about 30 NRC Technical Reviewers and Contractors who 20 are conducting the Safety Evaluation at this time. 21 The Safety Review also includes plant 22 inspections. The inspections are conducted by a team 23 of Inspectors, from both Headquarters and the NRC's 24 Region 2 Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. 25 A Representative from Inspection Program NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
15 1 is here today. The Resident Inspector of Vermont 2 Yankee is Beth Sienel. Beth, thank you. As Chip 3 mentioned, the Inspectors work at the plant 40 hours1.667 days 0.238 weeks 0.0548 months 4 a week. They live in the community, and they are the 5 eyes and the ears of the NRC. 6 We have at least two, Nuclear Regulatory 7 Commission Inspectors at every plant in the United 8 States. The results of the inspections are documented 9 in separate inspection reports. 10 The staff documents the results of its 11 review in a safety evaluation report. That report is 12 then independently reviewed by the Advisory Committee 13 on Reactor Safeguards or the ACRS. 14 The ACRS is a group of nationally-415 recognized technical experts that serve as a 16 consulting body to the Commission. They review each 17 License Renewal Application and Safety Evaluation 18 Report. 19 They form their own conclusions and 20 recommendations on the requested action, and they 21 report those conclusions and recommendations directly 22 to the Commission. Next slide, please. 23 This slide illustrates how these various 24 activities make up the Safety Review Process. I'd 25 like to point out that these hexagons, the yellow NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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16 1 hexagons on this slide, represent opportunities for 2 public participation. Also, the staff will present 3 the results of the Safety Review, to the ACRS, and 4 that presentation will be open to the public. 5 Next slide, please. The second part of 6 the review process involves an Environmental Review 7 with scoping activities and the development of an 8 Environmental Impact Statement. 9 As I have said, we're here today to 10 receive your comments on the scope of that review. 11 We'll consider any comments on the scope that we 12 receive at this meeting, or in written comments. 13 Then, in December of this year, we expect 14 to issue the draft Environmental Impact Statement, for 15 comment. Next slide. So, the final Agency decision 16 on whether or not to issue a.renewed license, depends 17 on several inputs. 18 Inspection Reports and a confirmatory 19 letter from the Region 1 Administrator. Conclusions 20 and recommendations of the ACRS, which are documented 21 in a letter to the Commission. The Safety Evaluation 22 Report, which documents the results of the staff's 23 Safety Review. 24 And the final Environmental Impact 25 Statement which documents the results of the staff's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
17 1 Environmental Review. Again, the yellow hexagons on 2 the slide indicate opportunities for public 3 participation. 4 An early opportunity is during the scoping 5 meeting today. A meeting on the draft Environmental 6 Impact Statement is another opportunity. The 7 opportunity to request a hearing ended on May 2 7 th. 8 I understand that three Petitions to 9 Intervene were proffered, and among those three there 10 are about ten issues that are in contention. As I 11 mentioned, the ACRS meetings, also, are open to the 12 public. 13 That completes my overview of the License 14 Renewal Review and the Environmental Review in more 15 detail, and Richard Emch, the Project Manager is going 16 to discuss the Environmental Review in a little more 17 detail now. 18 MR. EMCH: Next slide, please. As this 19 slide indicates, we perform our environmental review 20 along the guidelines of the National Environmental 21 Policy Act of 1969. 22 What that Act requires is that Federal 23 agencies use a systematic approach to consider the 24 environmental impacts of major projects. The 25 environmental impact requirement or Environmental NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
18 1 Impact Statement is required any time one of those 2 major Federal actions is going to significantly affect 3 the quality of the human environment. 4 In this particular case for a license 5 renewal, the Commission made the decision that we 6 would issue an Environmental Impact Statement for all 7 License Renewal Applications, and that's what we're 8 about in this process. Next slide, please. 9 This is a, so to speak, a flowchart of the 10 analysis process that we follow. In the 1996 and 11 1999, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission developed 12 something we refer to as the GEIS, the Generic 13 Environmental Impact for License Renewal. 14 This statement evaluated the 92 aspects of 15 environmental impact for all 103 plants in the United 16 States. Of those, 69 of those impact issues were 17 considered to be Category 1 issues, which in our 18 parlance means they were the same, essentially, for 19 all plants and they were small. 20 The rest of the issues are what we call 21 Category 2 issues. The Category 1 issues we do not 22 have to do a plant-specific in-depth evaluation of 23 those issues for each plant. 24 The Category 2 issues we do have to do a 25 plant-specific review for each plant. For Category 1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
19 1 issues, even though we don't do a plant-specific, in-2 depth review, we do what we call a search for new and 3 significant information. 4 That means we look to see if there's any 5 information that is new and significant, that would 6 cause us to want to reconsider that generic conclusion 7 on the Category 1 issues. 8 On the Category 2 issues, as I said, we do 9 a complete in-depth review. An example of a Category 10 1 issue is radiation protection. The effect on humans 11 of radiation from the plant, releases from the plant. 12 The reason that's a Category 1 issue, is 13 because the NRC has regulatory requirements and has 14 standards and limitations for doses to the public, and 15 the conclusion is, it's a generic conclusion. Because 16 as long as the plant continues to meet those 17 regulations, the impact is considered to be small. 18 An example of a Category 2 issue, is what 19 we call impingement. When the plant is drawing in 20 water from the Connecticut River for their cooling 21 systems, this water comes in through screens and there 22 is the chance that some aquatic organisms will be 23 trapped on those screens and die. 24 And that's an example of an Environmental 25 Impact that we do a plant-specific review for. For NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
20 1 the new and significant information, that's the one 2 that has the little yellow arrow on it. 3 If we find, if in the course of doing our 4 review, if we find that there is new and significant 5 information, that would cause us to question the 6 applicability of the Category 1, the generic 7 conclusion, then, if we find that information then 8 that causes us to change our mind and to do an in-9 depth review of that issue for the plant. 10 Next slide, please. This is the decision 11 standard that wqe are reviewing against. Basically, my 12 version of it is, we are evaluating the plant to 13 determine if the environmental impact of an additional 14 20 years of operations is acceptable, is okay. 15 Next slide, please. When I say the 16 environmental impact of an additional 20 years, it's 17 important to remember here, I think, that the 18 evaluation that we are doing, is the impact from year 19 2012 to year 2032. 20 In order to do that, though, we have to 21 examine a lot of what is going on today in the 22 environmental impact from the plant. This slide has 23 a, is a schedule for the entire process. 24 I believe you folks all have this slide, 25 but I'm just going to hit a few of the high points. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
21 1 Obviously, the scoping meeting today is part of our 2 scoping process. The scoping process, in the parlance 3 of NEPA, is we come into the community and we ask the 4 people who live and work near the plant, I sometimes 5 refer to you folks as our local environmental experts 6 because you live and work here. 7 We ask you if there's any information that 8 you think we need to know about. Any issues that you 9 think we need to review, in the environmental impact, 10 and any information that you think we need to be 11 available, that we need to be aware of. 12 That's our purpose, our stated purpose for 13 being here tonight. My purpose for being here tonight 14 is to hear what you folks have to say about that 15 issue. 16 There are other ways to give us those 17 comments. You can send them to us in writing. You 18 can send them by e-mail. And if you choose to do 19 that, instead of speaking tonight, we need to receive 20 those comments by June 2 3 rd. 21 After we get those comments, we'll 22 evaluate them all, along with all the other 23 information that we have, and we'll develop a draft 24 Environmental Impact Statement. 25 We'll issue that. The current schedule NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
1 22 1 for that is December of this year. After we issue 2 that draft Environmental Impact Statement, we will 3 come back, probably to this same theater, in January, 4 and hold another public meeting where we will ask you, 5 the public, to give us your comments about that draft 6 Environmental Report. 7 You can tell us what you like, what you 8 don't like; what you think we missed, that sort of 9 thing. And, to help you with that, those of you who 10 are attending tonight, there were blue and yellow 11 cards. 12 If you filled out one of those cards, 13 hopefully you gave us your address, and when we 14 publish the draft Environmental Impact Statement, 15 we'll send a copy of it to you, so that you will know 16 that the process has started and you'll have good head 17 start on the process. 18 After we collect the public comments, 19 we'll then issue, we'll take those into consideration, 20 make adjustments as necessary in the draft, the draft 21 statement, and issue the final statement in August of 22 2007. Next slide, please. 23 This is a depiction of all the various 24 areas that we draw information from. First is, of 25 course, the Licensee's Application. There's a piece NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005.3701 (202) 234-4433
23 1 of the Application called the Environmental Report. 2 There's copies of it outside, if you want 3 to take a look at it. If anybody wants to get a copy 4 of it, if you'll so note, on that little yellow or 5 blue card, we'll send you a copy of it. 6 We'll probably send you a cd, it's kind of 7 heavy, the whole report is. We also do, we have a 8 team of people from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 and our Contractor, Argonne National Laboratory. 10 The head of the team, the Lab Team, is 11 David Miller. David Miller is the Head of the Lab 12 Team from Argonne National Laboratory. They are a 13 team of experts in various areas, that help us do the 14 review for the environmental aspect, for the 15 environmental impact. 16 When we do an audit, we come out to the 17 site for a week-long look at the facility, at the 18 environs, we examine documentation. We meet with 19 people who we need to consult with, such as in the 20 state of Vermont, one is the Agency for Natural 21 Resources. 22 We met with the State Radiation Protection 23 people. We'll be meeting with others as time goes on. 24 We met with the State Historic Preservation Officer. 25 And we meet with local government officials, as well. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
24 1 We meet with Social Services. One of the 2 issues that we look into is socio-economics. We 3 talked to permitting authorities in the state of 4 Vermont. 5 The state is responsible, has been 6 delegated the responsibility by EPA, to issue what we 7 call the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 8 System Permit. 9 This is a permit that talks about what 10 level of heat and chemicals are allowed to be released 11 by the plant. And then finally, the thing that we're 12 here for tonight, is the public comments. 13 To get information from you folks to help 14 us with our review. Next slide, please. This is a 15 depiction of all the various areas, in a broad sense, 16 that we look at. 17 We look at environmental justice. We look 18 at socio-economics, air quality, water quality, 19 terrestrial and aquatic ecology, radiation protection, 20 hydrology, and archeology and culture resources. And 21 if I missed any, they're on the chart behind me. 22 Now I'd like to talk directly, give you 23 some additional information. First, as I said, my 24 name is Rich Emch. The phone number that you can 25 reach me at is on that slide up there. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
25 1 We have made arrangements to have the 2 documents involved in the review, the Environmental 3 Report, any letters that we sent to the Licensee, any 4 requests for additional information, and, indeed, when 5 we issue the draft Environmental Statement, it will be 6 sent to these four libraries. 7 The Vernon Free Library in Vernon, the 8 Brooks Memorial Library here in Brattleboro. The 9 Hinsdale Public Library in Hinsdale, New Hampshire, 10 and the Dickinson Memorial Library in Northfield, 11 Massachusetts. 12 All four of these public libraries 13 graciously volunteered to make the documents available 14 so that members of the public can see them, just in 15 case you don't have access to a computer, to the 16 Internet. 17 If you do have access to the Internet, the 18 documents can also be viewed at the web site on the 19 slide up here. To send us written comments on, during 20 this scoping process, you can send them, by mail, to 21 the address that's up here. 22 You can send them by e-mail to the address 23 that'.s up there, VermontYankeeeis@NRC.gov. My staff 24 and I will be checking that web address everyday. Or, 25 you can deliver them in person to our offices in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
26 1 Rockville, Maryland. 2 Again, as I mentioned before, we need to rd 3 receive the comments by June 23r. If you don't quite 4 meet the June 23 rd, date - anything that we get by 5 June 23 e will consider. wrd 6 Anything that we get after June 2 3 rd, 7 we'll consider if there's time to do it. With that, 8 that completes my presentation. Actually, it 9 completes the NRC!s presentation, and Chip, are you 10 ready for questions? 11 MR. CAMERON: Yes, I think we are. Are 12 there questions on, that will help you to understand 13 this process a little bit more clearly, before we go 14 into the comment part of the meeting. Yes, ma'am, if 15 you could just introduce yourself to us, please. 16 MS. NEITLICH: Yeah, my name is Jill 17 Neitlich. And I have a question about the democratic 18 process, and I did ask you before, Rich. And 19 basically what I think you said to me was that you 20 have a script and there's no room for the democratic 21 process. 22 But I'm kind of concerned about the 23 democratic process within the NRC. Because what I've 24 noted is that you haven't really turned down an 25 application for an uprate or for a license renewal. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234.4433 _ o
27 1 So that's a little confusing to me. 2 So does that mean that actually there is 3 no democratic process within the NRC? 4 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Jill, and Rich, 5 there's a number of issues there, and one is the 6 turning down of applications, and I'm not sure what 7 Jill is referring to by a democratic process within 8 the NRC. 9 But you might talk about what that process 10 is, for her. 11 MR. EMCH: Okay. Yes, Jill, and I did talk 12 before the meeting. Sort of a paraphrase of what I 13 said, Jill, but I'll try to be a little more complete 14 here. 15 MR. CAMERON: Rich, excuse me for 16 interrupting you, but this is for everybody. When you 17 come down to this mic, I guess it's not projecting 18 back, so you really sort of need to speak into the 19 mic, so that everybody can hear you. 20 This one is, but you can't hear this one, 21 at all. 22 MR. EMCH: You can't hear me when I talk. on .23 this mic? Oh, you have to be really close to it, 24 okay. 25 MR. CAMERON: Try to do it with that one, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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28 1 and then if it doesn't work, then we'll figure this 2 out. Go ahead. 3 MR. EMCH: All right, I'm going to try to 4 hold it up real close, without actually inhaling it. 5 All right. 6 MR. CAMERON: Closer and louder. 7 MR. EMCH: Okay, I'll see what I can do. 8 What I was trying to say earlier was the democratic 9 process, if you will, occurs before we get to this, 10 here, okay. 11 The democratic process, if you will, is 12 when you go, when you as a community vote for the 13 members of your select board, your state 14 representative, your congressmen and state senators. 15 Your elected officials are the democratic 16 process. They're the ones who you rely on to make 17 decisions about what you, how things are going to work 18 in your state. The process that we're involved in is, 19 the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions's process is the 20 Licensee makes an application and the Nuclear 21 Regulatory Commission reviews it and makes decisions 22 based on its review of that application. 23 We do not, as part of that review process, 24 we, our review is against a set of technical review 25 standards, both either on the safety side or the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
29 1 environmental side, and we don't, there is nothing in 2 our process that calls for a vote, by the people of 3 Brattleboro, about whether or not they want this plant 4 to be re-licensed. 5 As I said, the democratic process occurs 6 when you go to the polls, the voting booths, to vote 7 for your elected officials, and then they're the ones 8 who you rely -on to make your decisions for your state 9 and your community. 10 MR. CAMERON: And, Rich, something that I 11 think, a point that Jill raised that's of interest to 12 everybody, is the status of our review of other 13 License Renewal Applications, and not just direct 14 answer to, well how many have we approved or denied, 15 but what that process is like in terms of a License 16 Application coming in? 17 Is there enough information in it to 18 request for additional information? If you could just 19 address that briefly, and then we'll go to other 20 people. 21 MR. EMCH: When an application is first 22 sent in, we do what we call an Acceptance Review. 23 Those of you who were here on March Ist, heard Johnny 24 describe the Acceptance Review. 25 Basically, that review is just to make NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
30 1 sure that there's enough of the appropriate kind of 2 information in the application to allow the NRC staff 3 to start its review. 4 Later on, as we go through the review, we 5 do our review against published technical standards, 6 both in the safety and environmental area. You've 7 heard Rani talk about the audits, the inspections. 8 And what we're doing in our review 9 process, is we're doing our review to make sure that 10 whatever the Licensee has put forward as their 11 application, meets our standards. 12 And if it meets our standards, the 13 Commission is probably going to accept the application 14 and probably going to approve the application, because 15 that's the way we do our work, we use standards. 16 Along the way, we're going to ask a lot of 17 questions. We refer to them as a request for 18 additional information. There will be hundreds of 19 them on Vermont Yankee, if it's anything like the 20 other plants. 21 There will be times along the way when we 22 will tell them that they, that what they have given us 23 does not meet our standards. And we will say you need 24 to consider, you either need to go back to the drawing 25 board in that particular area, but whatever you do, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
31 1 you're going to have to do something, because you're 2 not meeting our standards in that area. And the 3 Licensee, the Applicant, will almost undoubtedly, as 4 all the 42 that have followed before them have done, 5 in all those areas the Licensee will go back and make 6 adjustments and eventually give us plans and 7 information that meets our standards and then the 8 application will be approved. That's the process that 9 we follow. 10 MR. CAMERON: Okay, other, thank you, Rich. 11 Are there other questions on process that we can 12 answer for you, before we go to comments? Evan, if 13 you could just introduce yourself. 14 MR. MULHOLLAND: My name is Evan 15 Mulholland. You had a slide, information gathering. 16 And my question is does the NRC, on the environmental 17 front, does the NRC passively take information that's 18 submitted, or there are staff members that go out and 19 do extra studies and assessments and that sort? 20 MR. EMCH: We consult with a wide range of 21 people, Fish and Wildlife Service, NOAA Marine Fishery 22 Service, the Agency for Natural Resources in the state 23 of Vermont, with the state organizations in New 24 Hampshire and Massachusetts. 25 We consult with a wide range of experts NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
32 1 and people who are in the know. We don't go out and 2 actually count fish, no. But we talk to the people 3 who do. 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay, and part of the purpose 5 of the scoping and comment process on the draft 6 Environmental Impact Statement, is to the extent that 7 we have not found information on our own, we look for 8 people to submit information that may be relevant to 9 our review, right? 10 MR. EMCH: Correct. 11 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Anybody else have a 12 question on the License Renewal Process? Okay, let's 13 go over there and find out what the questions is. And 14 if you could just introduce yourself to us now. 15 MS. NELKIN: Hi, I'm Nancy Nelkin. Well, 16 referring to the democratic process question before, 17 one of the issues is, you know, you are saying well we 18 elected our representatives. 19 This plant is in Vermont, just miles from 20 the Massachusetts border. Those of us in 21 Massachusetts and in New Hampshire, don't have a 22 democratic process. 23 Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory 24 Commission, you know, you guys have this whole 25 bureaucracy and lawyers, and it's really not fair, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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33 1 it's not a fair fight. 2 MR. EMCH: I'm not sure what your question 3 is, ma'am? 4 MS. NELKIN: Actually, I have a number of 5 questions, so bear with me. It was said early in the 6 presentation that the 40-year license was not based on 7 a safety concern, it was based on an economic concern. 8 How do we know when a plant is no longer 9 safe to operate? That's a question I have. One of 10 the speakers went over and said, oh, we're going to do 11 assessments and inspections, and inspections and 12 almost counted how many times she said the word 13 inspections, but it's never been an independent safety 14 assessment that we have asked for. 15 And, essentially, has been rammed down our 16 throats. So, you know, my feeling is that the idea of 17 assessments, you know, as long as you're going over 18 paperwork and talking to people who, you know, aren't 19 taking a fresh look at it, we don't feel safe. 20 MS. FRANOVICH: Let me address -- 21 MS. NELKIN: And I have another question. 22 And that is -- 23 MS. FRANOVICH: Before you ask, before you 24 ask -- 25 MS. NELKIN: -- this is the third NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
34 1 question. 2 MS. FRANOVICH: -- but let me answer that 3 one, so I don't lose track of it, before you get to 4 your third one, and then, Rich, can we come back and 5 get our third one, after I answer the -- 6 MR. CAMERON: Yeah, and I just want to say 7 is that we welcome your comments and hope that you 8 make some of your conclusions, give those to us when 9 we go to the speaking part. 10 But if you could just give us the 11 questions and we'll try to answer them. And, Rani, 12 you want to go to the second question? 13 MS. FRANOVICH: If it's okay, I'd like to 14 go on and answer the 40-year license term, and then 15 the reliance on inspections. And then we'll get to 16 your third one. 17 The 40-year license term is based on 18 economic considerations and anti-trust factors. When 19 it comes to plant aging, and when a plant becomes too 20 old to safely operate, it's really not so much about 21 the plant, it's about the systems, the structures and 22 the components that are relied on to make sure the 23 plant can operate safely. 24 And so we don't look at it on a plant 25 basis, we look at each individual structure, component NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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35 1 and system, that's important to safety. And we make 2 sure that either it's replaced, it's refurbished, or 3 they test it or they monitor it, or they do something 4 to manage the aging of that structure, component or 5 system. So that's how -- 6 MS. NELKIN: So you're suggesting that a 7 plant will never be obsolete as long as you can 8 replace the parts? 9 MS. FRANOVICH: I'm suggesting that for 10 license renewal, what we look at is the management of 11 aging of structures, components and systems, rather 12 than when does the magic day happen when the plant is 13 no longer safe. 14 As to the inspections, yeah, we do conduct 15 inspections. We send people to the plant to look at 16 the material condition. To look at aging management 17 in place, aging management programs the Applicant is 18 relying on today, to manage the effects of aging. 19 And so it's not just a paper review. We 20 actually do -- 21 MS. NELKIN: But the people from the NRC, 22 who already have a track record -- 23 MS. FRANOVICH: Right. 24 MS. NELKIN: -- don't we know, to let 25 things go -- NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
36 1 MS. FRANOVICH: And so, the NRC -- 2 MS. NELKIN: -- in lieu of the 3 regulations. 4 MS. FRANOVICH: Could I please answer your 5 question. The NRC's position is that it's an 6 independent Federal agency that has the role and 7 responsibility of regulating nuclear material use in 8 this country, including operators of nuclear power 9 plants. 10 There's also the Advisory Committee on 11 Reactor Safeguards, that then independently reviews 12 the work of the staff and reports its recommendations 13 and conclusions directly to the Commission. 14 MS. NELKIN: Okay, one more question, and 15 that is why are we looking at this license renewal in 16 2006. You know, I would like to see the track record 17 of Vermont Yankee between now and at least 2010, 18 before we make this decision. 19 MS. FRANOVICH: The regulations require 20 that an Applicant have about 20 years of operating 21 experience before they can come in for renewal. But 22 in order to ensure that there is a timely review of 23 their application, because this is, it's a significant 24 capital investment for an Applicant to apply for 25 license renewal. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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37 1 They want to know the outcome of the 2 Regulators decision process in a timely manner. So, 3 we require that they submit their applications within 4 five years of the end of their 40-year license term. 5 So anywhere between 20, year 20 and year 6 35, an Applicant can come in for renewal. And when 7 they decide to do that, it is really kind of an 8 economic decision of there's of their choosing. 9 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you. Thank you 10 for those questions and, thanks, Rani and Rich. Yes, 11 sir. 12 MR. BLOCK: I have two questions that are 13 connected. My name is John Block, that's B-l-o-c-k. 14 The first question is how often does the input that 15 you receive from the public, actually effect the scope 16 of a GEIS? 17 And the second is,. please cite for me 18 which specific cases I could look up and find, in a 19 GEIS, or a draft GEIS, evidence of the effect of the 20 public comments upon that process. Thank you. 21 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, Jonathan. 22 Richard. 23 MR. EMCH: I don't know that I can tell you 24 how many, you know, on every single one, but I'll give 25 you an example, sir. I was the Project Manager for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
38 1 the Millstone Plant review in Waterford, Connecticut 2 that ended last year. And during scoping a number of 3 local citizens provided us, during the scoping 4 meeting, they provided us copies of studies about 5 radiation heath effects. 6 Most of them we already knew about, but 7 there were a couple of them that were fairly local, 8 that we were not aware of. And so they provided those 9 to us. 10 And in Section 4.7 of the Final 11 Environmental Impact Statement that we wrote, we 12 discussed the status review of those studies. 13 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, John. We're 14 going to take two final questions here and then we're 15 going to go to public comment. Yes. 16 MEGAN: My name is Megan, and I was 17 wondering if the Hinsdale Evacuation Point is in 18 Keene, and is it part of the evaluation assessment? 19 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Rich, could you, 20 there's a, did you hear the question? 21 MR. EMCH: I did, Chip. 22 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 23 MR. EMCH: As Rani mentioned in her 24 presentation, license renewal does not really address 25 emergency preparedness. As Rani also mentioned, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
39 1 reasons why it doesn't and is, that it's just not 2 considered to be something that we would, it's a today 3 issue. 4 If there was a problem, it's a today 5 issue. If there is a problem with an Emergency 6 Preparedness Plan, it's not something that we want to 7 be waiting until 2010 or 2012, to be assessing. 8 If there's an issue with emergency 9 preparedness, it's something that needs to be 10 addressed now, for the current operating plant. And 11 there are processes in place to do that. 12 The Nuclear Regulatory has processes. 13 FEMA has processes. The state of Vermont, the state 14 of New Hampshire have processes to do that. They have 15 regular drills and exercises where they identify 16 places in the plan that need to be improved, and that 17 is indeed what is happening here. 18 I understand there were some questions 19 about school buses, during the last exercise in New 20 Hampshire, and the state of New Hampshire is taking 21 actions to address those. 22 MR. CAMERON: Okay, and that answers the 23 question about the relationship of emergency planning 24 to license renewal. 25 But just as an emergency planning issue NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-443 3
40 1 for Megan's benefit, Hinsdale is part of the emergency 2 planning review? I guess I'm asking a question? 3 MR. EMCH: Hinsdale is inside the ten mile 4 EPZ, yes sir. 5 MR. CAMERON: Okay, all right, thank you. 6 And let's go to Gary. If you could just introduce 7 yourself to us. 8 MR. SACHS: Gary Sachs, Brattleboro. I 9 heard you say that you look to these environmental 10 impact meetings to determine the scope of your impact, 11 to learn things from us. 12 And this is a partial comment and a 13 partial question. For the most part, we, in the local 14 environment are volunteers. And very few of us have 15 enough time, very, very few of us have the dedication 16 to this issue that we certainly would expect from you, 17 as the NRC, and from individuals who work with 18 Entergy. 19 And, so I think it's an awful lot to ask 20 the locals to come to you with how we should approach 21 the environmental scope and how it affects the 22 environment. 23 My other question is more direct. How 24 many NRC paid employees are here today, given the 25 number of us, residents, who are not paid here? Thank NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
41 1 you. 2 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, Gary. And, 3 Rich, in regard to Gary's first point, you did 4 mentioned that you talked to state and local 5 government agencies about issues, right? 6 MR. EMCH: Let me give a slightly broader 7 answer than that, Chip.
8. MR. CAMERON: Okay, all right.
9 MR. EMCH: As I mentioned earlier, we have 10 the Generic Environmental Impact Statement, and what 11 we did was we found approximately, we searched and 12 found approximately, decided approximately 92 issues 13 that are always part of the scope of the review. 14 And we do a search, an exhaustive search 15 for additional information. And when I said that 16 we're here to ask you for your help, we can do the 17 review without your help, if that's what you're 18 driving at, sir. 19 But we think it's important for us to come 20 out and ask you for your help, just in case there is 21 some information that you have that we don't. And 22 that's why we're here. 23 MR. CAMERON: And I guess there was a 24 question. Gary asked about the number of NRC 25 employees, and I would say that all of the NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
42 1 employees who are here tonight, or today, are paid as 2 employees of the government. And I don't know 3 approximately how many people we have here, but Rich? 4 MR. EMCH: Approximately 25. 5 MR. CAMERON: Okay. We're going to go to 6 public comment now, and thank you for those questions, 7 and thank you Rich. We're going to go to Mr. Ray 8 Shadis, first, to lead off for us. 9 And Ray is with the New England Coalition 10 and he'll tell you more about that. And I don't think ii we, Deb Katz is not here right now. So, I'll let you 12 know who is going to speak next. 13 MR. SHADIS: The New England Coalition 14 intends to file written comments. We have a number of 15 comments. I pulled out four to address in the two 16 meetings this afternoon and this evening. 17 And by agreement with the NRC folks, just 18 as to not take up too much time, I'm going to deal 19 with two of them this afternoon and then the other two 20 this evening. 21 Basically, the four issues are the off-22 site spent fuel pool accident consequences, 23 radiological consequences. The cumulative off-site 24 radiological impact of routine operations, as well as 25 the radiological impact of routine operations on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
43 1 eventual decommissioning. 2 And the cumulative off-site impact of 3 chemical releases unplanned. And, finally, 4 consideration of the advances in the discipline of 5 seismological evaluation. 6 And I would just start with the spent fuel 7 pool accident off-site consequences. I don't know if 8 a spent fuel pool accident or act of sabotage, is 9 within the design basis accident that are considered 10 in the environmental assessment or not. 11 The credibility of such accidents was 12 roundly studied by NRC staff in NUREG 1738, on the 13 accident risk and decommissioning nuclear power 14 stations. And that study, in turn, referenced a 15 number of other NRC studies, many of them having to do 16 with operating plants. 17 Two of those studies specifically 18 considered Vermont Yankee on a site-specific basis. 19 One of those studies dealt with the seismic fragility 20 of two spent fuel pools. One in a PWR, and then one 21 in a boiler water reactor that happens to be Vermont 22 Yankee. 23 NRC's consultant, seismic consultant, Dr. 24 Robert P. Kennedy, in an appendix to NUREG 1738, says 25 that the postulated critical failure mode for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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44 1 Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool, would be a plane sheer 2 failure of the floor slat. Then it goes on to say, 3 possibly, the entire floor will drop out. 4 But I think such a gross failure is 5 unlikely. And then he goes on to say, that in his 6 opinion, a more likely failure would be a wall 7 failure, in that case leaving as much as four feet of 8 water in the bottom of the pool. 9 And, of course, you gentlemen know that if 10 there is some water left in the pool, it is a far more 11 dangerous situation, then if the pool was drained 12 completely. 13 Because that water will then block cooling 14 up through the fuel assemblies. And I need to point 15 out that, from our perspective, that the issue that 16 probably needs to be addressed, in your environmental 17 impact study, or in a supplement to it, would be the 18 consequences. 19 And the appendix, let's see, where is it 20 now. Just one moment. Yeah, Table A4-7, this is in 21 Appendix 4. Using the base case of Millstone 1, which 22 is a reactor almost identical to Vermont Yankee, with 23 just three and a half cores in the spent fuel pool. 24 Vermont Yankee has probably twice that or 25 close to twice that. It speculates that with 95 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)o 234-4433
45 1 percent evacuation, the Table includes an estimate of 2 26,800 cancer fatalities within a distance of zero to 3 500 miles. 4 Whether that's strictly speculative, 5 postulated or whatever, they're at six, in the Table, 6 in a referenced NRC study, NUREG CR-5176. And those 7 numbers have not be repudiated, they have not been put 8 out there in speculative space. 9 I think, when the original license was 10 issued, for Vermont Yankee and estimates were made, 11 public representations were made as to the potential 12 for consequences of a design-basis accident, we had 13 certain numbers given to us. 14 And, since that time, of course there's 15 been a lot of representation from the industry and 16 also from NRC, in essence, diminishing those numbers, 17 putting all of those numbers away. 18 I guess it's New England Coalition's 19 position that NRC really needs to reconcile the 20 numbers from the original license time, license 21 period, and the representations that are being made by 22 NRC spokespersons today. 23 By the Utility spokespersons and the 24 numbers in this report, which I think are quite 25 outstanding. So, that is, that is one comment. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
46 1 And the, on the second topic, cumulative 2 off-site radiological impact of routine operations and 3 also the cumulative impact of routine operations and 4 radiologically on decommissioning. 5 There are two things that we would like 6 you to consider. One is that, as you know, the state 7 of Vermont posts radiation measuring devices, TLDs, 8 around the plant perimeter. 9 And the state reports that three times in 10 the last decade or so, that the state limit of 20 11 millirem per year has been exceeded at the fence line. 12 And we took a quick look at those reports 13 for those three years, and then also at a study, I 14 believe, done by Duke Engineering for Vermont Yankee, 15 and found that the TLDs in the same sector were the 16 ones that read high in each of those instances. 17 And, you know, this is not an anomaly for 18 a bad detection instrument, because they are changed 19 out quarterly, and the excess is the average over a 20 year. 21 The other thing that we noticed is that 22 the only other abnormally high reading, that occurred 23 in each of those three instances, was at the interior 24 of the Vernon Elementary School. The other thing that 25 we noticed was that the turbine hall and the offending NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
47 1 TLD, and the elementary school, line up axially. 2 There's a straight line to be drawn from the turbine 3 hall, to the one monitor that read high, to the 4 elementary school reading high. 5 The state folks thought this might be an 6 artifact of excess of radon in the school. But, of 7 course, we don't generally use TLDs to go chasing 8 radon. The other thing that we noticed, was that 9 there was no correlation between the measured amount 10 of radon in the school, for those instances, and the 11 high TLD readings. 12 From an amateur science point of view, we 13 believe there's enough here to warrant real 14 investigation. 15 (Applause.) 16 MR. SHADIS: I should point out to you that 17 we have not looked for correlation on weather or 18 meteorological conditions, but it might well be a 19 consideration that these high readings are a result of 20 temperature inversion and downdraft from the release 21 stack. 22 In any case, just for the sake of these 23 little nuclear workers over there in the elementary 24 school, we really do think this shall be part of the 25 environmental scoping. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
48 1 The other thing, very quickly, in terms of 2 cumulative radiological impact, I discussed this 3 briefly with Dr. Masnik, here from NRC, earlier. 4 Vermont Yankee had gotten permission to 5 store contaminated soil on site, starting back, I 6 think in 1998, maybe a little earlier. And, at the 7 time, the amount was some excavated soil from a 8 construction project, about 135 cubic yards. 9 And then roughly at 35 or 40 cubic yards 10 per year, they anticipated generating through 11 contaminated sanding salts from the roads from silt in 12 the cooling towers, and also from waste sludge. 13 And, in 2004, Entergy received permission 14 to increase that amount. They had accumulated, they 15 thought, about 500 cubic meters of contaminated soil 16 on site, and they wished to dispose of, on-site, an 17 additional 150 cubic meters per year. 18 That's about ten big dump truck loads. 19 And this disposal site or, excuse me, this storage 20 site is on the south end of the site, just south of 21 the cooling towers. 22 It is constantly sprayed down with what is 23 called drift, sideways spray from the cooling towers. 24 It is on the riverbank. We believe that the 25 phenomenon of bio uptake, of sedimentary separation, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234.4433
49 1 of chemical combination, can leach and separate and 2 concentrate the radioactive material in that disposed 3 of or stored soil, complicating decommissioning, 4 polluting the river, winding up in the biota. 5 And so we believe that should also be 6 investigated as part of the environmental assessment. 7 Those are the two topics. Thank you for listening 8 that long. 9 MR. CAMERON: Well, great, and thank you 10 for those specific comments, Ray. 11 MR. SHADIS: And we'll provide documents. 12 As I said, we will be doing written comments. 13 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Ray. Let's 14 go to Evan, Evan Mulholland. And then we'll go to 15 Chris Williams and then Shawn Banfield. Evan 16 Mulholland. 17 MR. MULHOLLAND: I have written comments, 18 I'm just going to read them. My name is Evan 19 Mulholland. I'm an attorney representing the New 20 England Coalition in its appeal in Vermont 21 Environmental Court of the Clean Water Act Permanent 22 Amendment recently issued for the Vermont Yankee Power 23 Plant, as full disclosure. 24 I'm here today, though, as a member of the 25 public and I'm concerned about the impact on our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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50 1 environment of 20 more years of operation of the 2 Vermont Yankee reactor. 3 Specifically, I've got concerns about the 4 effect on the Connecticut River and on the fish and 5 other wildlife that live in and on the river. 6 According to the environmental report drafted for this 7 license renewal process, Entergy states that it 8 withdraws water to cool the reactor, from the river, 9 at a rate of up to 360,000 gallons per minute when 10 using once through cooling. 11 The majority of this water is discharged 12 back into the river at temperatures that can reach 100 13 degrees Fahrenheit, at the point of discharge. The 14 recently issued NPDES Permit Amendment, which New 15 England Coalition is appealing, allows for Vermont 16 Yankee to increase the temperature of the river by an 17 additional one degree Fahrenheit over what it was 18 previously allowed. 19 The environmental impact of this extra 20 thermal waste discharged into the river, is 21 potentially significant. Temperature is critical for 22 American Shad and other fish species, particularly 23 during migration and spawning. 24 Even this one degree increase in water 25 temperature may adversely effect the Shad and other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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51 1 species, reducing their population in the river 2 system. In its report, however; Entergy does not 3 assess these impacts. 4 Entergy's conclusion that the impact on 5 the environment is small, is based on the fact that 6 the discharge complies with state and Federal 7 pollution limits. 8 There's no further discussion of what 9 effect another 20 years of increased thermal discharge 10 will have on the eco-system. Whether or not the 11 discharge from Vermont Yankee is in compliance with 12 its State and Federal permits, Entergy should be 13 required to take a hard look at, and assess a direct, 14 indirect and cumulative impacts on the river eco-15 system of 20 more years of increased thermal 16 discharge. Thanks. 17 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Evan. 18 Is Chris Williams here? Chris. 19 MR. WILLIAMS: My name is Chris Williams. 20 I live in Hancock in Addison County. And I'm not 21 certain that my unprepared remarks here are going to 22 be completely on point, but I believe that the safe 23 operation and safe oversight of any operating nuclear 24 power plant in this country, or in the world, has a 25 significant long-term impact on the environment in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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52 1 area where the plant is located. And, just for the 2 record, standing here in Brattleboro, I want to point 3 out some experiences I've had in two locations in the 4 United States. 5 The first is in the state of Ohio. I 6 lived in the Midwest for quite a while, doing battle
.7 with the nuclear industry, as well as the coal-fired 8 electric industry.
9 In Port Clinton, Ohio, the Davis Besse 10 Nuclear Power Plant is operated by First Energy 11 Corporation. Several years ago, with significant 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission on-site oversight, it 13 was discovered that a boric acid leak had eaten a hole 14 in the reactor vessel lid, which is about 18 inches 15 thick. 16 That hole came within several millimeters, 17 several millimeters of breaching. The whole thing 18 happened, as I said, under the oversight of the 19 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 20 Outside that plant, there's a big sign. 21 It has safety is Job One. What happened at Davis 22 Besse was criminal. That the Nuclear Regulatory 23 Commission allowed them to go get another vessel head 24 from Midland Plant, which was canceled, up in 25 Michigan, and put that plant back in operation, was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
53 1 nothing short of criminal. The second reactor that I 2 had quite of a bit of experience with in the Midwest 3 was in Bridgeman, Michigan. 4 It was the DC Cook Nuclear Power Plant, 5 owned by then, American Electric Power. The Bridgeman 6 Plant was shut down after it was discovered that 7 significant safety features in the plant were not 8 operating, in some cases, for more, not operating 9 properly, for some cases, for more than ten years. 10 Outside that plant there's another sign 11 that said safety is Job One. Those safety systems 12 were non-operational with significant daily oversight, 13 on-site, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 14 Here at Vernon, as in the rest of the 15 country, it's part of the operating license that the 16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission gives the companies that 17 operate these power plants, as part of that process 18 and part of that license, they're allowed to routinely 19 emit radioactive releases, in both the air and water. 20 I'm sure everybody in this room knows 21 that. Long-term, that's a problem. We'd like to know 22 how much has been released'by the operation of Vermont 23 Yankee, year-to-date, or operational lifetime to date. 24 And how much is projected under routine 25 operational conditions? How much is going to be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
o
54 1 released over the proposed license extension? 2 I want to close with just one other 3 observation. Recently, several people, four from 4 Vermont, traveled to Kiev to attend a conference, 5 marking the 20 th Anniversary of the accident at 6 Chernobyl. 7 There were probably 150 of us that took' 8 the conference organizers up on the opportunity to go 9 visit the Chernobyl site. And I have to say, we've 10 all seen the pictures. And the pictures actually, 11 they do the situation justice. 12 What struck me the most was that the 13 people living 30, 40 kilometers away, from the 14 accident site, very basic, poor, agrarian folks. They 15 were people that depend on their land for everything. 16 And what's just painfully obvious, when 17 you visit there? Is that their lives have been 18 destroyed by the technology that was arrogantly placed 19 and operated 30 to 40 kilometers away. 20 And the folks that lived in Pripyat, the 21 community that built and operated Chernobyl, well, you 22 know, they're not there anymore. Pripyat is a ghost 23 town. 24 But the one thing that the locals, the 25 non-nuclear locals had, was their land. And it was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) _ o 234-4433
55 1 taken away from them. So as we look to re-license 2 Vermont Yankee, we have to draw a parallel. 3 We're not so different from the, from the 4 people in the Ukraine or in Belarus. And when these 5 companies tell us that safety is their Number One job 6 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission assures us that 7 they're on the job all the time. 8 I don't believe we can take those claims 9 seriously, and have to do everything we can to ensure 10 that arrogance doesn't prevail. Just because you're 11 scientifically smart, doesn't mean you have your act 12 together. And I'll just leave it at that, thanks. 13 (Applause.) 14 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Mr. Williams. 15 Shawn Banfield. 16 MS. BANFIELD: Good afternoon. My name is 17 Shawn Banfield and I'm here today as an active member 18 and an Officer of the Board of Director for the 19 Vermont Energy Partnership. 20 I'd first like to thank the NRC for 21 hosting this meeting today. I do have a prepared 22 statement, which I will read from. And I'll start 23 with the Vermont Energy Partnership was founded in 24 2005, shortly after the state report warned the series 25 of energy challenges they will face in Vermont. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
56 1 Our founding members came together because 2 they recognized the importance of making sure we have 3 adequate electricity, so Vermont continues to be a 4 great place to live and work. 5 The Partnership is a diverse group of more 6 than 50 business, labor, community leaders, committed 7 to addressing the immense electricity supply issues 8 that we are going to face in Vermont, in the very near 9 future. 10 Our members include a cross-section of 11 experts of the energy sector. Our members employ 12 thousands of Vermonters. They run big and small 13 businesses. 14 They represent Union workers, some of whom 15 devote their professional lives to upgrading the 16 Vermont Yankee Plant safely. The Partnership fully 17 supports the re-licensing of the Vermont Yankee 18 Nuclear Power Plant in Vernon, and I will explain to 19 you why. 20 It is no secret that Vermont's demand for 21 energy is continuing to grow. It may be a less known 22 fact, however, that Vermont faces uncertainty over its
23 future energy supply.
24 Currently, one-third of Vermont's electric 25 supply comes from Hydro Quebec. These long-term NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
57 1 contracts with the state will begin to expire in 2014, 2 and there is no guarantee that these contracts will 3 either be renewed or renegotiated given the company's, 4 Hydro Quebec's more local business opportunities in 5 the province.. 6 Another approximate one-third of our 7 supply here in Vermont, is made up of a wide array of 8 both in-state and out-of-state sources, renewable and 9 non-renewable. 10 The Partnership supports the in-state 11 development of renewable sources, and we encourage the 12 increased used of energy efficiency in the expansion 13 on conservation measures. 14 However, the fact remains a reliable 15 energy portfolio, here in Vermont, must be made up 16 elsewhere, of base load sources of power. Vermont 17 Yankee accounts for the last one-third of our Vermont 18 portfolio. 19 About 34 percent of Vermont's total 20 electricity supply needs are met by the Vermont Yankee 21 Plant. So let me put this debate into proper context. 22 Vermont has not brought on a single, significant power 23 generating facility in over 20 years. 24 And there are no plans to do so in the 25 near term. To make matters worse, proposals to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
58 1 develop small scale generation in Vermont, have been 2 met with sharp criticism and serious opposition. In 3 a time when energy costs are at their highest, Vermont 4 Yankee will not only play an essential role in our 5 state's energy portfolio, it is critically important 6 to the Vermont economy and environment. 7 From an economic standpoint, I would just 8 quickly say that a stable, relatively low-cost power 9 provider will help to maintain and expand businesses 10 here in Vermont, while at the same time providing for 11 an opportunity to bring and attract new businesses to 12 the state. 13 In a time where Vermont faces an 14 increasing, aging population, the plant provides 15 employment to 600 highly skilled men and women. These 16 individuals and the company provide more than 200 17 million in economic benefits to the Windham County 18 Region and the state as a whole. 19 According to the Vermont Public Board, I'm 20 sorry, the Public Service Department, the company, 21 through the State's Power Purchase Agreement, will 22 provide customers in Vermont, approximately 250 23 million dollars in savings over the life of the 24 contract. 25 But aside from the important economic NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
59 1 benefits, the Vermont Yankee's continued operation, 2 I'm sorry, there are also some relative environmental 3 benefits from this in-state power generation source. 4 In 2005, alone, according to the Nuclear 5 Energy Institute, Vermont Yankee avoided emissions of 6 7,700 tons of sulphur dioxide, 2,000 tons of nitrogen 7 oxides, and 2.5 million tons of carbon dioxide. 8 Emissions of sulphur dioxide, lead to the 9 formation of acid rain. Nitrogen oxide is the 10 precursor to both ground-level ozone and smog. And 11 greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, contribute to 12 global warming. 13 We live in a country where half the 14 electricity generated comes from coal-burning sources. 15 Yet, in Vermont, we can be very proud to say that 16 that's not the case. 17 Vermont Yankee does not release harmful 18 greenhouse gases or other toxins into the atmosphere 19 which are the primary cause for global warming. The 20 issue of global warming, a climate change, has rapidly 21 reached alarming levels. 22 And power-generated facilities have been 23 at the heart of that crisis. In the United States, 24 coal is the leading power provider with over 600 25 plants operating. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
60 1 Of these plants, of the 600 plants, 36 2 percent of all U.S. emissions are accounted by those 3 plants' generation. It has become abundantly clear 4 that the nuclear energy is the only emission-free 5 source that can meet consumer demand, reliably and at 6 a reasonable cost. 7 Leading environmentalists, from around the 8 world, like Dr. Patrick Moore, Co-Founder of Green 9 Peace, have come to the conclusion that nuclear power 10 is the only source that can help remedy and save the 11 planet from catastrophic climate change. 12 Just last month, Dr. Moore said in the 13 Washington Post, nuclear energy is the only large 14 scale, cost effective energy source that can reduce 15 these emissions, while continuing to satisfy the 16 growing demand for power. 17 And these days, in these days it can do so 18 safely. He went on to say that it's extremists who 19 fail to consider the enormous and obvious benefits of 20 nuclear power, also fail to understand that nuclear 21 energy is practical, safe and environmentally 22 friendly. 23 Without Vermont Yankee, Vermont utilities 24 would be forced to buy additional power on the spot 25 market that would be less reliable and certainly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
61 1 considerably more expensive. 2 So 'the Partnership asks, do Vermonters 3 really want to pay more and to depend on power from 4 fossil fuel sources, such as natural gas and coal, 5 which contribute to the global warming and the earth's 6 degradation? 7 The Vermont Partnership thinks not. In 8 closing, the Vermont Yankee has an important and 9 crucial role to play in the future of your state. 10 It is both environmentally and 11 economically appropriate to grant the plant a license 12 extension. We know that there is a wide array of 13 support for the continued operation of this plant, for 14 the reasons I have articulated here today. 15 Its essential economic benefits. Its 16 environmentally sound operations, and its important 17 role as a component of the Vermont energy portfolio. 18 On behalf of the Partnership, we would 19 like to thank you for taking the time to hear from us 20 today. 21 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Shawn. Is Dan 22 MacArthur here? Dan. 23 MR. MACARTHUR: Hi, my name is Dan 24 MacArthur, I'm the Emergency Management Director for 25 the town of Marlboro. I want to make several points NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
62 1 here. 2 First of all, Marlboro has actually, is 3 one of those formal petitions for hearing that the NRC 4 should have received, and we are requesting that 5 Marlboro be included in the EPZ. 6 It's the only town with any property 7 within the ten mile radius, which was not included 8 when the original license was granted in the 1960s, I 9 guess. And we are formally requesting that if there 10 is going to be an extension of the license, that the 11 license be changed so that Marlboro can be included. 12 It's only fair, and there's no, as far as 13 we're concerned, there's no other possible way to 14 reconfigure the EPZ. I've drawn a little map of it 15 and I will, if the current license that the NRC has 16 granted to Vermont Yankee shows a really funny shaped 17 EPZ with Marlboro just completely hacked out of it. 18 So we would like to be included in that, 19 and that will be part of an ongoing formal request 20 that we have. As for the purpose of the meeting here 21 today, the environmental scoping, I'd like to follow 22 up a little bit on comments that Ray Shadis made and 23 Chris Williams, as well. 24 We, there's many of us in the local 25 citizenry know that our environment, our homes, our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
63 1 farms, our entire livelihood are at risk here. If 2 there's ever a sizeable release of radioactivity, then 3 our property values will plummet. Our ability to 4 sell, possibly even eat our own produce, will be 5 diminished. 6 And I can't imagine a greater 7 environmental impact than that. I mean we're talking 8 about all or nothing, here. And I don't know whether 9 you want to try to do a mathematical analysis of all 10 or nothing, or not. 11 But from my perspective, it doesn't make 12 any sense. If there's any possibility, that there's 13 going to be any kind of impact like that, then I think 14 that the NRC can only include that in the 15 environmental scoping. 16 And this goes on. I understand that the 17 NRC is only looking at environmental impact until the 18 year 2032, but that doesn't do much good for those of 19 us who live in this area, and I think more and more 20 are coming to grips with the fact that the waste 21 that's being generated is going to be stored here, in 22 our backyard. 23 And it's going to be incredibly dangerous 24 for thousands of years. So, unless the NRC can 25 promise us that we aren't going to be the ones who NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
64 1 monitor that material, then we're going to have to 2 insist that the effect of that material be included in 3 any environmental scoping review. 4 (Applause.) 5 MR. MACARTHUR: As I said earlier, I can't 6 imagine any greater environmental impact, and I can't 7 imagine the NRC extending the license if there's any 8 possibility of this happening. 9 I was interested, the person before me was 10 going through the benefits of nuclear energy, but, as 11 we all know, there are many, many hidden costs 12 included in producing energy from nuclear power. 13 One of them being that there is a sizeable 14 payroll at the Federal level, paid for by our taxes, 15 which is specifically for the purpose of seeing that 16 nuclear energy continues to operate fairly cheaply. 17 So just think of that. The people who are 18 here today getting paid by us, the citizenry, we're 19 paying for that in our taxes, but it's really a cost 20 that should be associated with the electric costs of 21 nuclear power. 22 Now somebody asked earlier, how many 23 people are here from the NRC. And it occurred to me 24 and I think this is the reason that you're all here 25 today, is to try to establish some sort of comfort NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
65 1 level with those of us who live here, with the fact 2 that there is in fact a good and a quality oversight 3 of this process. 4 I, my question is this. There are 5 approximately 25 people here who work for the NRC now. 6 Of those 25 people, and I was at all of the previous 7 meetings and I heard distinguished scientists stand up 8 and say well I worked in the nuclear industry, and now 9 I work for the NRC. 10 Of the people here today, who work for the 11 NRC, how many people have been in the nuclear industry 12 and are currently working for NRC? I wonder if we 13 could have a show of hands on that? 14 MR. CAMERON: Dan, I'm sure that some of 15 our people have worked for the nuclear industry, 16 others have not. But we're not going to conduct a 17 poll right now, okay? 18 So if you could finish up with your 19 comments, we'd appreciate it. 20 MR. MACARTHUR: I don't think I need to say 21 anymore. That seems to have said it very well, 22 thanks. 23 (Applause.) 24 MR. CAMERON: I don't think it did say it 25 fairly well, but I did have a question for you, to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
66 1 make sure that your request, formal request that 2 Marlboro be considered in the Emergency Planning Zone. 3 I want to make sure that doesn't get lost, and you 4 said you had filed a Petition to Intervene and that 5 there would be perhaps something other coming in as a 6 formal request. 7 Should we, should we consider your 8 comments today the formal request, or is there another 9 written request that's going to follow? I guess 10 that's my question for you, just so that I know what, 11 we know what to respond to. 12 MR. MACARTHUR: Yeah, thanks. I will ask 13 that you include my today's comments as a follow up to 14 that request. I also understood that having 15 petitioned by the 2 7 th of May, or whatever it was, 16 that we wouldn't need to follow up. 17 Just today's comments are just to 18 reinforce our official request, which I believe has 19 already gone in. So if there's more needed, let me 20 know. 21 MR. CAMERON: Okay, and the reason that I 22 wanted to distinguish this, is that your request to 23 participate in the Hearing and the request to be part 24 of the Emergency Planning Zone, can also be treated 25 separately, so that if your Petition to Intervene, is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
67 1 not granted, that your request is still before the 2 agency to be part of the Emergency Planning. John, 3 and okay. John, do you have something to say on that? 4 John Eads. 5 MR. EADS: Sure, let me just acknowledge 6 first that by letter dated April 27 Li, the town of 7 Marlboro submitted a request, as they. put it a 8 Petition for a hearing. 9 That request was postmarked by envelope, 10 I think it was May 15th. I don't know the two week 11 time difference there, but we did receive your 12 request. 13 It did not specify that it was submitted 14 in accordance with 2.309, which is the formal hearing 15 request process. I know that it was addressed to the 16 Secretary for their review, and I believe it's under 17 the review process as we speak. 18 I don't know that it fell under the formal 19 Petition for Hearing Process, submitted in accordance 20 with 2.309, which was specified in the Federal 21 Register Notice. 22 But we did receive your letter dated April 23 27 h, and it is being processed. 24 MR. CAMERON: Okay, and we heard your 25 additional request today. Okay. Is Claire Chang with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
68 1 us? Okay, let's go to, how about Sunny Miller and 2 Ischa Williams next. Sunny Miller? Ischa Williams? 3 (No response.) 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Elizabeth Wood? And 5 let's go to, let's go to Bill Burton. Bill? 6 MR. BURTON: Good afternoon. My name is 7 Bill Burton, I'm not an expert on energy, but I have 8 had some experience dealing with energy. 9 I'm a retired educator. I taught Physics, 10 Chemistry, Environmental Science, and a course 11 entitled Energy Economics and the Environment, for 12 about 35 years. 13 I taught in the public schools in Bellows 14 Falls(Phonetic), Vermont. I also did some teaching in 15 the Vermont State College System, and have been a 16 visiting lecturer at the University of Massachusetts, 17 Lowell. 18 I'm probably one of the few people here 19 from Windham County that endorses the re-licensing of 20 Vermont Yankee, and its, and hopefully looks upon with .21 the environmental issues, favorably. 22 In my experience as an energy teacher, I 23 probably visited almost every conceivable form of 24 electrical energy generation that exists. I've been 25 to large nuclear plants, coal-fired plants, oil-fired NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)o 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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69 1 plants, wood chip, solar, wind. You name it, I've 2 been there to learn more about the issues. 3 I feel that in any electrical generation, 4 no matter what type of process you are using, there 5 are benefits and risks. And I firmly believe that the 6 benefits of nuclear power, greatly exceed the risks. 7 I know a lot of you are in disagreement. 8 The main reason that I feel this way is other than 9 hydro-electric power, all of the other forms of 10 electrical generation involve carbon fuels. 11 Either coal, oil, natural gas, biomass, 12 you name it. All of these are going to produce gases 13 that are going to be harmful to the environment. They 14 are going to produce greenhouse gases. 15 And I know some people don't believe in 16 global warming, certainly the President of the United 17 States doesn't agree about global warming, but it does 18 exist. And I originally came from the state of Maine, 19 where we used to go fishing a lot in northern lakes. 20 Now there are no fish. Acid rain from 21 coal-fired plants. In those coal-fired plants there 22 is also -- I heard a comment from someone? 23 Would you like to come up and make, I 24 don't believe I bothered you while you were making 25 your comments, right, sir? NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. . (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
70 1 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 2 MR. BURTON: Okay, thank you. 3 MR. CAMERON: All right. 4 MR. BURTON: All right. I knew the people 5 when they were called the Clam Shell Alliance, way 6 back. 7 All right, now getting back to the issues 8 that I want to deal with, I've been involved with a 9 lot of environmental issues. I'd like to consider 10 myself an Environmentalist. 11 Many of my students lived off the grid. 12 I've had students that have driven in wood-fired cars. 13 I have students who are living in straw houses. So 14 I've seen it all, and I believe that we have to have 15 nuclear power in order to exist, especially here in 16 the Northeast. 17 When I started teaching, oil was $2.00 a 18 barrel, now it's $70 something. When I was heating my 19 house with oil, it used to be 16 cents a gallon. I 20 pre-bought for $2.76 the other day. So the cost of 21 these fossil fuels that we use here in the Northeast, 22 are increasing so that I feel this year, many people 23 in Vermont, are going to freeze to death. 24 It's just going to be pretty bad when you 25 have to burn 1,000 gallons of oil in your house and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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71 1 it's going to cost almost $3.00 a gallon. Who is 2 going to be able to afford it? 3 We've had no national energy policy. 4 We're talking about 20 years down the road. That's 5 short-term, 40 years down the road is short-term. I 6 started out dealing with energy in 1962, and one of my 7 students made a hydrogen fuel cell, that's how I got 8 enlightened in this thing. 9 1962, that's a lot of years ago. And I've 10 been involved in learning about energy for all these 11 years. All right, now, what's going to happen? I 12 really feel we not only need to re-license Vermont 13 Yankee, but we need more nuclear power plants 14 throughout the country. 15 Because fossil fuels are going to 16 diminish. China wants them, everybody else wants 17 them. They're polluting the atmosphere. They're 18 going to kill the earth in just a very, very few 19 decades. 20 Now with nuclear power we have the ability 21 to get the fuel right here in North America. We can 22 use nuclear power to generate electricity. We can use 23 nuclear power to electrolyze water and get hydrogen. 24 And hydrogen is going to be the fuel of the future. 25 And granted, there's a lot of things about NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
72 1 getting hydrogen from the source, the production, to 2 its use. It's a very small molecule, but we can drive 3 cars with hydrogen. We can heat with hydrogen, you 4 can do a lot of things. 5 So once we get a long-term energy policy, 6 it doesn't matter if you're a Republican or Democrat, 7 I don't know when it's going to come down the road, 8 but we need a long-term energy policy with nuclear 9 power, and hydrogen replacing gasoline. 10 Because I know, right here in town, we 11 have soybean oil for diesel and people are burning it. 12 That's fine, you're not using gasoline, but you're 13 polluting the atmosphere, just the same, with those 14 greenhouse gases. 15 So I'm convinced that we need a long-term 16 policy and I hope that some, it won't be in my 17 lifetime, but I guaranteed if you can look forward, 18 150 years from now, you're going to be driving around 19 in your hydrogen cars. 20 That's all I have to say, oh, by the way, 21 concerning fishing and so forth. I spent the last 22 weekend stocking salmon in the tributaries of the 23 Connecticut River, so I'm not, you know, a polluter. 24 I'm an Environmentalist, I'm a Fisherman, but I am 25 concerned about our energy future, not only in Vermont NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
73 1 but the United States. Thank you. 2 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you very much, 3 Mr. Burton. How about Mr. English, then Bernie 4 Buteau, and Dan Jeffries. Is Bob English here? Okay, 5 this is Mr. Robert English. 6 MR. ENGLISH: Hello. About 30 years ago 7 the Union of Concerned Scientists developed a program 8 that provided the way that the United States could be 9 70 percent solar-powered by the year 2000. Well, here 10 it's 2006, and we're talking about energy problems and 11 energy shortages. 12 Well, for the last 25 years, I've lived in 13 a solar home that I built, and I've lived off the grid 14 with solar electricity from portable tag panels. If 15 you came into my house, you wouldn't notice much 16 difference from your house. 17 I have computers, I have monitors, I have 18 televisions, I have a microwave. I have a washing 19 machine. I cook on electric hot plates in the summer 20 and I cook on a wood cook stove in the winter. I 21 don't use any oil to heat my house. 22 So when people tell you that we need to 23 risk the very ground that we stand on, that we need to 24 risk making it uninhabitable for 15 generations, in 25 order to heat our homes and have, electricity, it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
74 1 simply isn't true. 2 (Applause.) 3 MR. ENGLISH: Technologically we can solve 4 energy problems, we can do it without destroying the 5 environment. The problem is political and social. We 6 need to say we want renewable energy, we are not 7 willing to pay the price of the destruction of the 8 earth, to heat our homes. 9 We do not need to do that. Thank you. 10 (Applause.) 11 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Mr. English. Is 12 Bernie here, Mr. Buteau, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing 13 that correctly. 14 (No response.) 15 MR. CAMERON: Okay, how about Mr. Jeffries, 16 Dan Jeffries? And Ted Sullivan? John Dreyfus? 17 (No response.) 18 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Carol, Carol Boyer. I 19 think Carol is here, isn't she? Carol, do you want to 20 come down and talk to us? 21 MS. BOYER: Hello, everyone, can you hear 22 me. This is my first experience attending a hearing 23 of this sort, and I had actually not planned to speak. 24 What I would like to say is to build on 25 what the last speaker described, which is his NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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75 1 experience living with a solar home. 2 I'm imagining how good it must feel to 3 know that you're meeting your basic needs without 4 adding anything to the debt that we, as humans, have 5 accumulated in our attempts to meet our needs, and 6 also in our, really, we're so full of ideas and we can 7 do so many things, we seem to have lost track of our 8 relationship to the larger circle of life. 9 And I would like to suggest that we follow 10 up and that each of us become responsible for learning 11 that, for example, our own Department of Energy has 12 very firm studies that clearly tell us that if we 13 exerted the political and social will, we would have 14 no need for any of the risky enterprises that we use 15 now to meet our needs for energy and heat. 16 I'm not going to repeat what was just said 17 about the time table on this, but I would like to say, 18 say it this way. That we need to be forward thinking. 19 And my sense is that nuclear power is kind of passe. 20 We've all looked at this. We see what the 21 risks are, and there are huge chunks in Russia that 22 have been, in their terms, withdrawn from public use, 23 for the foreseeable future because of an accident. 24 And, as far as I know, nobody has repealed 25 Murphy's Law. So I'd like to suggest that we be NEAL R. GROSS
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76 1 responsible and that we get this message today that we 2 are asking all of you to look beyond what has become 3 an old mantra, and make use of the, truly up-to-date 4 technology, that could allow all of us to feel good 5 about living *our lives without adding to the 6 environmental burdens. Thank you. 7 (Applause.) 8 MR. CAMERON: We thank you, Carol. Nancy, 9 Nancy Nelkin. 10 MS. NELKIN: Hi, I'm Nancy Nelkin, I'm from 11 Western Mass, I'm an educator. I guess I wanted to 12 start out with the comment, I think it was Rich. He 13 said something about us being, referring to us as the 14 public experts. 15 That was flattering, however, I think 16 there are really only a few true experts among us, 17 like Ray Shadis. I think part of the problem is, as 18 taxpayers, we're paying the NRC as our employees, to 19 be the knowledgeable representatives of public 20 interest. 21 The NRC is responsible for overseeing the 22 nuclear industry. And when they do a poor job, they 23 risk our health and well being, when you do not 24 rigorously and objectively evaluate the impacts of 25 nuclear power on us. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
77 1 And my understanding with this license 2 renewal process, there's a safety review. And you're 3 talking about looking at aging management. And I 4 still ask when will you determine when a nuclear plant 5 is not environmentally or otherwise, fit to continue. 6 I get the feeling that as long as you can 7 put a band aid on this or tighten a screw here, that 8 you will continue to run the nuclear reactors, which 9 really has more benefits for the corporations that run 10 them, than for us, as the people who live in the area. 11 Because we have to live with the effects 12 on the Connecticut River. We have to live with the 13 effects on our health, increased cancers. These are 14 things that need to be looked seriously, by the NRC, 15 in this process. 16 Not to mention the nuclear waste that's 17 stored in our backyard. It's bad enough that it's 18 already there, it's at risk by an accident. It's at 19 risk by criminal act. 20 And the company is resisting taking 21 measures to make that more safe. I want that to be 22 considered in this process. And if we continue to re-23 license the plant, we will have that much more nuclear 24 waste. 25 In fact, it will be, the nuclear waste NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
78 1 will reach its capacity and go beyond. I want to add 2 that I question this assumption that we need more and 3 more energy and that the only choices are centralized 4 forms of energy that use fossil fuels, coal that uses, 5 uranium. 6 This is not an automatic assumption. One 7 aspect of this renewal, as I understand it, is to 8 consider alternatives. And I want to ask my 9 neighbors, who live in this area, to really look 10 seriously at alternatives. 11 There are so many renewable options. 12 There's solar, there's wind, and people have a way of 13 making it sound like, oh, well you know you really 14 can't do that, that's not practical. That's not true. 15 It's very practical, it's very doable. 16 This is an article that's very low researched. It's 17 being done in other countries. It's being done in 18 Western Europe. 19 People are putting solar panels on their 20 homes and getting paid by the utility for producing 21 that electricity. So we need to open our minds and 22 not get into an either/or situation where people 23 saying well coal plants are so bad for the environment 24 and it's making, causing global warming. 25 So we have to run the other way to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
79 1 nuclear. You have to really think hard about all of 2 the nuclear waste that's going to be with us forever. 3 And will Entergy be with us forever. 4 Will they be footing the bill to take care 5 of that, forever. As long as it takes for the 6 radiation to dissipate. 7 So I just, I'm pleading with the NRC to 8 take a really objective and rigorous approach to this. 9 I think that, you know, all of the areas that we have 10 to look at are out there. Thank you. 11 (Applause.) 12 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Nancy. Is Mike 13 Hame here, by any chance? Or a Mr. Peyton? 14 (No response.) 15 MR. CAMERON: Let's go to, Sally, Sally 16 Shaw, do you want to talk? 17 MS. SHAW: (off mic.) 18 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Sally, for 19 sending, you're going to send the comments and then 20 we'll go to Sally, Sally Shaw, thank you. 21 MS. SHAW: In the interest of full 22 disclosure, I work for New England Coalition, but I'm 23 speaking here today as a Resident of the ten mile EPZ. 24 I live in Gill, Massachusetts. 25 As an ecologist, I'm.compelled to point NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
80 1 out that environmental impacts are multi-variate 2 impacts. They are not generic. Life is not generic. 3 And although biological systems are resilient and they 4 recover from damage, radiation exposure causes genetic 5 impacts that will change life forever. 6 Genetic damage can be passed on to our 7 offspring and theirs. It can change biological 8 communities forever. I submit that the very idea of 9 a GEIS is sheis. In NRC's Executive Summary of their 10 Generic Environmental Impact Statement, which I 11 consider an oxymoron. 12 They state that among the 150 million 13 people who live within 50 miles of a U.S. Nuclear 14 Power Plant, I prefer to call it a reactor, not a 15 plant. About 30 million who will die of spontaneous 16 cancers. 17 That's one in five people, by their 18 calculations. And they say that since we can't prove 19 a one of them was caused by radiation, therefore the 20 NRC doesn't have to worry about them, note bene. 21 They admit that five calculated fatalities 22 associated with nuclear powered induced cancers will 23 occur. So I ask which one of us, or our children, 24 living within 50 miles, will die of radiation induced 25 cancer, over the lifetime of this plant. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
81 1 That's the cost of progress. Tough luck, 2 sucker. Most of the people who die of radiation 3 induced cancers, will live within ten miles. 4 Thus, there's a very good possibility that 5 we will know, we in this room, will know some of them. 6 At last count, my husband and I counted, between us, 7 28 people we know who have died or are living with 8 cancer, in our extended community. 9 Can I prove that their cancers are 10 radiation related? No. Therefore, the effects, the 11 impact of these deaths, on our life, is considered by 12 the NRC to be of small significance. 13 The Executive Summary of the 600 some odd 14 page Environmental Impact Statement, is full of little 15 items like that. Here's another. The staff concludes 16 that the generic analysis of a severe accident, 17 applies to all reactors. 18 The probability weighted consequences of 19 atmospheric releases fall out onto open bodies of 20 water, groundwater releases and the societal and 21 economic impacts are of small significance, for all 22 reactors. 23 That, with the stroke of a pen, wipes out 24 all our concerns. They also conclude that the 25 environmental impacts of design-basis accidents, are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202)o 234-4433
82 1 of small significance for all plants. 2 And, because additional measures to reduce 3 such impacts would be costly, don't worry, they won't 4 burden the Licensee with extra mitigations. 5 At a recent ACRS hearing in Rockville, 6 Maryland, NRC staff, I think maybe it was NRR staff, 7 testified that in a design-basis accident or loss of 8 cooling accident, under upgraded conditions, which 9 they're not looking at, of course, with this re-10 licensing thing. 11 The entire quantity of the core would be 12 released in about 30 seconds. And accident impacts 13 after uprate, are greater than the 20 percent uprate, 14 they may approach 40 percent, maybe more. 15 And this might result in a 500 roentgen 16 exposure at the limiting location, which happens to be 17 very near a residence, which happens to be on the 18 plant perimeter. 19 I submit that such an accident would have 20 a significant impact on the person or family living 21 there. So I would ask the NRC to recalculate. That 22 goes on and on, I'm going to skip. 23 In the Appendices of the GEIS, your 24 estimates of risk quantities, for early fatalities, 25 normalized doses and cost, were made using an aptly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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83 1 named crack code. We know about cracks. 2 Our steam dryer has 62 of them, at last 3 count. And it uses the middle year of current 4 license, or the flat part of the bathtub curve that 5 nuclear scientists know represent the stability or the 6 stable running of nuclear plants. 7 Experience shows that Vermont Yankee 8 exceeded radiation release limits, several times 9 during the early part of its life. Theory predicts, 10 as it ages, it will release more again. 11 NRC variances, such as doubling the 12 allowable main steam line leak rate, exempting Entergy 13 from doing the ten-year primary containment leak rate 14 test that was supposed to have been done in 2005. 15 All of that implies to me that the theory 16 is correct, and they don't want to find out. And then 17 there's the small fact that Entergy is negotiating 18 with Vermont and the NRC to mask their actual 19 releases, with a 29 percent discount. 20 That's been discussed at other meetings. 21 I think the jury is still out on that one, but I can 22 take a really good guess how it will go. I propose to 23 the NRC that you come up with a more realistic way to 24 model dose, since the bathtub is overflowing and with 25 the uprate and the license extension, you're going NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
84 1 beyond the rim of the bathtub. 2 So your middle year of current license 3 criteria, seems to me, flawed. New and significant 4 information. 5 I would like to submit the BEIR 7 Report 6 of the National Academy of Sciences. The biological 7 effects of ionizing radiation. The National Academy 8 of Sciences told us that, in fact, there is not a 9 threshold dose phenomenon. 10 The GEIS presupposes a threshold dose 11 phenomenon. Therefore, it claims that it does make 12 sense to normalize early fatalities. That's based on 13 the BEIR 5 Report, not BEIR 7. 14 I would like to suggest that you 15 recalculate using the conclusions of BEIR 7. What 16 does BEIR 7 say about radiation risks to workers under 17 exposure of one REM per year. That was another little 18 nugget in the Appendices of the GEIS. 19 I'm just curious. I would love to see 20 that calculated. I think your Appendix E.4.1.2 is 21 faulty,* also based on BEIR 7, because it's based on 22 the notion of a.threshold of effects. That does not 23 seem to be the case. 24 Your Appendices E.8.2, these Appendices 25 show the tables and the calculations behind a lot of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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85 1 their conclusions in the GEIS. 2 Quantities and units, assumes non-3 stochastic effects will not occur if the dose 4 equivalent from internal and external sources 5 combined, is less than 50 rems or fewer in a year. 6 This, too, contradicts the conclusions of 7 the BEIR 7 Study. Your cost estimates also use BEIR 8 5, not 7, and the costs are based on 1980 costs, or 9 maybe they were updated'to 1994, 12 years ago. 10 In my experience, prices have changed 11 quite a bit in that 12 years. The other thing, 12 quarrel I have with your cost estimates, is that you 13 skip Indian Point, hypothetical accident costs for 14 Indian Point. 15 I don't blame the NRC for skipping Indian 16 Point. Lots of folks live down there. The cost of an 17 accident would be astronomical, but it's not good 18 science to leave out a big outlier like that, in this 19 case. 20 I would just like to pause for a second, 21 to say this is really crazy. No other power 22 generation source comes close to having to expend so 23 much money and so much energy, just to convince us 24 that it won't kill thousands of us. 25 If Entergy, Excelon and others just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
86 1 invested in wind and solar, none of this would be 2 necessary. 3 (Applause.) 4 MS. SHAW: I do hope that you will consider 5 that possibility in your NEPA required look at 6 alternatives to re-licensing ENVY. 7 The tax-funded labor costs of the NRC, 8 ACRS, ASLB, etcetera, etcetera, would be eliminated. 9 Please, save our tax dollars, we need them. In 10 Appendix E, I think it was Page E-43, we talk about 11 ALARA limits. 12 That stands for As Low As Reasonably 13 Achievable. These are radiation exposure limits for 14 workers. And they were derived using analytic 15 techniques to identify the approximate point at which 16 the cost of providing additional protection, would 17 exceed the risk averted. 18 You see, it sounds like apples and oranges 19 to me, so I'm just curious what, this is a question, 20 I guess I missed the question part, I should have 21 asked it then. 22 But what dollar value do you place on a 23 workers life? I'm just curious. I guess I'll 24 conclude with saying that it seems to me that your 25 Generic Environmental Impact Statement is fatally NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
87 1 flawed, in many ways. 2 Recalculations of early fatalities and 3 latent fatalities, are biased. They are based on old 4 information, BEIR 5, not BEIR 7, and I humbly request 5 that you recalculate them based on the most currently 6 available knowledge on the effects of radiation. 7 Particularly, low level radiation. Thank 8 you, Chip. 9 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Sally. 10 (Applause.) 11 MR. CAMERON: Could we, could we have 12 someone from the NRC staff answer Sally's question? 13 Not right now, but at the end of the meeting. She has 14 a question, if anybody can answer that for her, I 15 would appreciate it. 16 Our next speakers are going to be, first 17 we're going to go to Mandy Arms, then to Sally Kotkov, 18 and then to Bill Wittmer. Mandy? Okay, how about 19 Sarah, Sarah Kotkov? And then we'll go to Mr. 20 Wittmer. 21 MR. KOTKOV: Hi, I'm on the Board of New 22 England Coalition, but my comments are my own personal 23 views. At the outset, Rani said that, apologized for 24 the weather. And I like to say that I don't think the 25 *that the weather is the reason that a larger number of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
88 1 people have not come out this afternoon. 2 I think that many of us are quite 3 disgusted by the fact that the Atomic Safety and 4 Licensing Board has recently refused to hear, or 5 refused to accept the contentions, the new contentions 6 of New England Coalition, based solely on their lack 7 of timeliness in filing. 8 And yet, in a few weeks, we'll have 9 another one of these public meetings. We think that 10 these decisions, the decisions on uprate and on re-11 licensing, are based, and should be based on science 12 and engineering, and to have a show of soliciting the 13 views of the citizens, many of us believe is a sham 14 and a travesty and I think that is why people have not 15 shown up today, not because it's a little bit rainy. 16 As a citizen living here in Guilford, 17 frankly I didn't think much about the power plant 18 until 9/11, and then I thought a lot about the fuel 19 pool and the risk of terrorism here. 20 Frankly, my only hope is that a terrorist 21 would find this area too boring. The NRC, I think, 22 thinks that the low population density here is a 23 reason not to pay more attention to the safety of this 24 outdated and aging structure. 25 The Mark 1 containment requires that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
89 1 fuel pool be high up in the air, where it is not 2 shielded by being below grade, as some other plants 3 are. Here it's 70 feet in the air and it's, of 4 course, highly vulnerable to attack by aircraft. When 5 this plant was built, it was intended to hold the 6 fuel, what's called spent fuel, which is, of course, 7 highly, highly radioactive and dangerous. 8 It was intended to hold this fuel for six 9 months. Now, of course, there's 33 years of fuel in 10 the pool, there will be another seven by the time the 11 license expires. 12 And now we are looking at the prospect of 13 another 20 years beyond that, of fuel. And, of 14 course, when the fuel, after the fuel is in the pool 15 for five years, and then it's cooled sufficiently to 16 put in dry casks, we're looking at the prospect of 17 many, many more casks on the banks of the Connecticut 18 River, where this, of course, also a terrorist target. 19 Especially if Entergy gets its way and 20 does not even have to provide berms around the casks. 21 And, of course, there's also a flooding danger. In 22 1991, there was a study regarding the construction of
23. a low-level waste repository down on the plant 24 grounds, and it was deemed not wise.
25 Now we're, of course, looking at high NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
90 1 level waste on the plant grounds. I think that's all 2 I have to say, thank you. 3 (Applause.) 4 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. We're going to go 5 to Mr. Wittmer, then Joyce Morin, then Linda Madkom. 6 Is Mr. Wittmer still here? 7 (No response.) 8 MR. CAMERON: Okay, how about Joyce Morin? 9 Mr. Madkom? 10 (No response.) 11 MR. CAMERON: Gary? Gary Sachs. And then 12 after Gary we'll go to Ann Elizabeth Howes. Gary 13 Sachs. 14 MR. SACHS: Nuclear is not cheap 15 electricity. Protect the waste for 100,000 years, 16 tell us how much that's going to cost. Spend some of 17 that money to protect that waste, and then tell us 18 it's cheap, affordable or inexpensive electricity. 19 I challenge you on that. To anyone who 20 claims that there was a benefit to nuclear power, 21 please show me this cost benefit analysis, including 22 the price of dealing with this waste. 23 Because the rate we're given as for the 24 power purchase agreement, from 2002, does not tell us 25 the true cost of the economics behind this. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
91 1 It was great for you to hear Ms. Banfield 2 refer to the Department of Public Service Studies. I 3 intend tonight, at tonight's meeting, to bring.more 4 economic data on how that Department of Public Service 5 Study breaks down and to actually how much per person 6 that will cost, if we didn't have Vermont Yankee 7 starting in this year or in a couple of years. 8 And one of my concerns, when I hear the 9 NRC at this meeting, in regard to the data that they 10 use for their studies, is that they take much of their 11 data, not from their own sources, but from the 12 Licensee. And, in my opinion, that's poor practice. 13 (Applause.) 14 MR. SACHS: For those people here, who have 15 less experience than some of us who live locally, 16 who've been following this issue for quite a while, 17 this re-licensing issue is actually about no moving 18 parts. 19 It's not about dry cask storage. It's not 20 about the uprate. It's not about the evacuation plan. 21 And it's not about any moving parts in the reactor 22 itself. Just so you know. 23 And to relate to that man who spoke 24 earlier, who was the teacher in Bellows Falls. In 25 order for nuclear to cover the carbon-based emissions, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) _ o 234-4433
92 1 better used in coal and in natural gas plants, 2 etcetera, we would have to have a new nuclear power 3 plant built every two weeks, between now and 2050. I 4 don't think that's going to happen, sir. 5 Last Friday, the Ninth Circuit Court in 6 California stated the NRC, in doing these 7 Environmental Impact Statements, must take into 8 account risk of terrorism. 9 And here' at Vermont Yankee we have a 10 radioactive water pond, that is 60 feet up, covered by 11 basically an aluminum, corrugated aluminum roof that 12 has a breakaway roof with a pound and a half pressure 13 per square inch. 14 To me that, I'm not sure what level of 15 containment we have at Vermont Yankee, and I'd like 16 that addressed in whatever this Environmental Impact 17 Study is that you all are planning. 18 Richard Monson of the Harvard School of 19 Public Health stated, quote, the scientific research 20 base shows that there is no threshold below which low 21 levels of ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be 22 harmless or beneficial. 23 I'm going to repeat that. There is no 24 threshold below which low levels of ionizing radiation 25 can be demonstrated to be harmless or beneficial. The NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
93 1 health risks, particularly the development of solid 2 cancers in organs, rise proportionately with exposure. 3 At low doses of radiation, the risk of inducing solid 4 cancers is very small. 5 As the overall lifetime exposure 6 increases, so does the risk. Every nuclear reactor 7 emits small amounts of radiation. Even, supposedly, 8 zero-emission reactors. 9 On March 31 st, 2004, the NRC arrived in 10 Vernon, Vermont to inform us that they would not be 11 performing the independent engineering assessment that 12 had been a requirement, put on the uprate by the State 13 Public Service Board. 14 For anybody who knows that they did do the 15 independent engineering assessment, in my opinion, the 16 NRC is not to be trusted. 5-4-04 the NRC changed its 17 tune and announced that it had long been planning such 18 an independent engineering assessment. 19 You, the NRC, say that Three Mile Island 20 was a wake up call for the industry. That was March 21 2 8 t", 1979. That same year the NRC publicly stated 22 that there was no such thing as a safe amount of 23 radiation. 24 Since 1979, I'm going to list some of the 25 events that have occurred. February 11 th 1981, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
94 1 Tennessee Valley Authorities, Sequoia One Plant in 2 Tennessee. A rookie operator caused a 110,000 gallon 3 radioactive coolant release. 4 January 25 th, '82, the Ginna Plant near 5 Rochester, New York, a steam generator pipe broke. 6 Fifteen thousand gallons of radioactive coolant 7 spilled. Small amounts of radioactive steam escaped 8 into the air. 9 January 15t and 16 , 1983, Brown's Ferry 10 Station. Nearly 208,000 gallons of low level 11 radioactive contaminated water was accidently dumped 12 into the Tennessee River. 13 1981, '82, and '83, Salem One and Two in 14 New Jersey. Ninety seconds from catastrophe when the 15 plant was shut down manually, after the failure of an 16 automatic shut down system. 17 A 3,000 gallon radioactive water leak in 18 June of '81. A 23,000 gallon leak of mildly 19 radioactive water, which splashed onto 16 workers by 20 -the-by, in February of '82. 21 And radioactive gas leaks in March of '81, 22 and September of '82. Then, in 1996, NRC Chairperson 23 Shirley Jackson, speaking of Millstone in Time 24 Magazine, quote, clearly the NRC dropped the ball. We 25 won't do it again. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
95 1 1997, Yankee Rowe, 20 miles of here. In 2 the process of closing it, they determined they had 3 found that they had dumped, for 30 years, radioactive 4 water into the Deerfield River. Many people swim 5 downstream from that river. 6 February 15 th, 2000, New York's Indian 7 Point Two, aging steam generator ruptured, venting 8 radioactive steam. The NRC initially reported no 9 radioactive material released. 10 They later changed their report to say 11 there was a leak, but not enough to threaten public 12 safety. Wait, didn't the NRC in 1979, say there's no 13 such thing as a safe amount of radiation? Hmm. 14 2004, new NRC Chairman Nils Diaz, about 15 Davis Besse, said the Agency, quote, dropped the ball 16 again. Hmm. A lot of balls getting dropped by the 17 NRC. 18 If Three Mile Island was a wake up call, 19 were you guys asleep at the control panel during these 20 other events, or just napping. I heard someone refer 21 earlier to the fact that Mr. Emch has been involved 22 with the NRC for 30 years. 23 That means he's been involved since before 24 you guys knew what you're doing to apparently the mid 25 to late '80s, when you claimed to have a handle on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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96 1 these events and not be making mistakes any longer. 2 Okay, so here we are in a NRC meeting. 3 Please tell me how the NRC does not stand for nobody 4 really cares? The environmental impact of Vermont 5 Yankee. 6 We have an ineffective evacuation plan, 7 which has been untested in its entirety. What about 8 those people who don't have vehicles? What about the 9 daycare centers and all the schools being tested 10 together? 11 What about the transient local members in 12 the community who are in hotels? A worst case 13 scenario accident at Vermont Yankee would lead to an 14 area the size of western Mass, Vermont and New 15 Hampshire, being uninhabitable for possibly 30 or more 16 years. 17 The plumes from the National Aeronautics 18 and Atmospherics Administration, shows plumes going as 19 far north as deep into Canada, over Montpelier. As 20 far south as North Carolina, and as far east as over 21 Cape Cod. 22 Getting the Ninth Circuit Court's decision 23 last week, it appears that the NRC has some excuses to 24 make. In 2001, just a month before 9/11, Vermont 25 Yankee failed the Operational Safety Response NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
97 1 Evaluation Drill of the NRC. 2 In this drill, mock attackers, who work 3 for the NRC, tried to enter the Control Room by 4 getting over the fence and past security at Vermont 5 Yankee. 6 Prior to the test, the time and where the 7 mock attackers would be coming from, was told to the 8 Security. The mock attackers were able to enter the 9 Control Room, got past the Security and VY won the 10 notoriety, calling itself the least secure nuclear 11 station in the country. 12 Needless to say, the NRC no longer does 13 that test. I have a question that comes up, that I 14 didn't ask in the beginning of the meeting, which is, 15 on what do you base radiation exposure? Is it the 16 ICRP? International Committee on Radiological 17 Protection? 18 Or is it on the European, on the European 19 Committee on Radiation Risk? Thank you. 20 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, Gary. 21 (Applause.) 22 MR. CAMERON: So that we can go on with 23 other speakers I would just ask, again, if any of the 24 NRC staff has the information about, that Gary is 25 asking about, please talk with him. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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98 1 We have a few more speakers and then I'm 2 going to ask one of the Senior NRC people to close out 3 the afternoon meeting. And I believe this is, this is 4 Ann Elizabeth Howes, and then we're going to go to 5 David McElwee, Debra Reger, and Cora Brooks. Ann 6 Elizabeth. 7 MS. HOWES: I'm a common citizen with 8 relatively low technical education. And I haven't 9 pursued the subject at all. 10 I guess it was last week when we had the 11 17 low level warning system and we had to replace the 12 blower. But, you know, I rarely stay up late and I 13 was watching movies, and at about 5:00 I went upstairs 14 and I could see the dawn approaching and I thought, 15 well, I mean it was probably 4:00. 16 I was feeling, it's dark out. Like we've 17 lost power somewhere, it's very quiet and still. And 18 that's kind of like a tiny, little feeling of fear, 19 but that the experts are taking care of it, and I went 20 to bed as I usually do. 21 And I really think I probably will, I 22 don't really think that I'm an important member of the 23 experience. I kind of compare it to the feelings I 24 had when the World Trade Towers collapsed, that I sort 25 of felt as though I was an American adult and, you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
99 1 know, with nothing to stress my life. 2 I was experiencing stress, and when the 3 Towers collapsed I felt something has been shut off. 4 And when experiencing a profound natural peace. 5 And I run on little dreams, every once in 6 a while, like an indication in my house, I have a 7 kitchen leak. And I think we had cracks in the blower 8 or something like, cracks in the towers that we had to 9 think about. 10 And I'm like, just a little animal out 11 there and I'm getting the same poetic feeling that 12 there's, you know, stretch marks in the towers and 13 people are concerned about the foundation. 14 And this afternoon I hear, you know, it's 15 sitting on the Connecticut River, and I have an odd 16 dream. That the Connecticut River runs on top of a 17 little shell that is a dirt shell. 18 And that a disruption the size of Vermont 19 Yankee, would cause the river to disappear into a 20 gorge and emerge further downstream. I haven't 21 verified that, though I do think that we're 22 technologically capable enough to check on that. 23 This afternoon is the first time, maybe 24 the second time I've heard that the reactor is 70 feet 25 in the air, which is a decision as to whether or not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
100 1 any kind of explosion would suck water and dirt into 2 the air and emit, you know, to the hills, but it would 3 probably be buffeted. Like there is a higher rate of 4 survivor-hood, on the other side of the mountains from 5 Hiroshima. 6 That it's at, you're buffeted by the 7 earth. There's one other detail. I feel as though we 8 have gotten excited to secure the strength of the 9 foundation. 10 But I also feel as though it's in our own, 11 honest, personal assessment, as animals working in the 12 reactor, that it's an older, radioactive installation. 13 And my feeling is that we would experience a kind of 14 removal of the radioactive jewelry. 15 A reduction of the vin diagrams of 16 overloaded electromagnetic force fields that is 17 causing a depression of our circulatory systems, our 18 blood chemistry. 19 But if we were to stop the creation of 20 nuclear waste, and stop our mental dependence on 21 extremely bright street lights. Over, hugely over 22 air-conditioned environments and brought our 23 electrical usage, personally at home, down to 24 seriously conservative levels, that we would feel some 25 relaxation of social economic status stress, that is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)o 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
101 I the equation of the success of industrial America. 2 And it's, you know, you're at that big 3 decision point in your life, where you straighten up 4 and start respecting incredible simplicity, and really 5 learn solar panel. 6 Really contemplate wind farms and harness 7 the hydro-electric potential in the rivers and streams 8 and waterfalls. And gauge down to accepting that as 9 the amount of electricity that you can look at and 10 use. 11 I grew up in the automotive industry, I 12 don't drive a car. I haven't gotten it together. But 13 I know that I have to respect the integrity of the 14 industry, the transport of food, I mean, dependent on 15 stores and supermarkets and the refrigeration factor. 16 But I had also another dream. And it's 17 sort of coming around to, you know, this last week of 18 level low emergency, that there is a metallic fatigue 19 that's like you know you have an automobile, and you 20 have seen three of them in ten years. 21 Because you have a job, you can shift out 22 of one automobile into another one, but there's that 23 rest factor that's going on all the time. 24 MR. CAMERON: I hate to interrupt you, but 25 could you finish up for us, please, so we can get in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
102 1 all the speakers. 2 MS. HOWES: So my fear, my point is to get 3 behind security as the fun end that you're capable to 4 cope with that puzzle. 5 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. Thank you very 6 much, Ann Elizabeth. We're going to go to David 7 McElwee, at this point, and then we have Debra Reger, 8 Cora Brooks and Beth Adams. 9 MR. MCELWEE: My name is David McElwee and, 10 in this spirit of full disclosure tonight, I'm an 11 Engineer at Vermont Yankee, and I also live in the ten 12 mile EPZ. 13 I could talk about the safe operation of 14 the plant, as an Engineer at Vermont Yankee. But 15 today I'd like to talk as a resident of the area, not 16 as an employee of Vermont Yankee, but to talk a little 17 bit about 20 additional years of the operation of 18 Vermont Yankee. 19 Because 20 years in the future, we need to 20 do something about the environment, about greenhouse 21 gases. My wife and I have lived in West Brattleboro 22 for nearly 30 years. 23 We own and operate a small business in 24 town. I've raised two children here and feel very 25 lucky that we have been able to join the rural country NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
103 1 setting and lifestyle that's been afforded to us. 2 Prior to working at Vermont Yankee, I 3 taught school in a public school system in a local 4 high school. Part of my teaching was in the area of 5 science, where my students and I would look at the 6 environment and the effects that fossil fuels had on 7 it. 8 Greenhouse gas emissions are a real 9 problem and we need to do something about it. We need 10 to stop relying on fossil fuels for the generation of 11 electricity and turn more towards nuclear energy. 12 Nuclear energy is safe, clean and readily 13 available for use in this country, and it does not 14 contribute to the greenhouse gas emissions and helps 15 keep our green mountains green. 16 To not allow Vermont Yankee to operate an 17 additional 20 years, would be a significant impact on 18 our environment. I'm very proud to be a member of 19 this community, and also to have spent the last 25 20 years working at Vermont Yankee. 21 Vermont Yankee is a safe, well run plant 22 and is a great asset to the area. It provides good 23 paying jobs, provides an infrastructure to attract new 24 businesses to the area. 25 To help, and help eliminate tons of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
104 1 pollutants that would otherwise be put into the air 2 that we breathe. And I look forward to another 20 3 years of operation at Vermont Yankee, and hope that 4 the NRC will approve the license renewal application. 5 Thank you. 6 MR. CAMERON: Okay, Debra Reger, I'm not 7 sure I pronounced that correctly. Is this Debra? 8 MS. REGER: Yes. 9 MR. CAMERON: Oh, good, okay. So we have 10 a duo or duet? 11 MS. REGER: Martha is part of my Affinity 12 Group and I asked her to just stand with me for 13 support, if that's okay. 14 MR. CAMERON: This is Leftover Affinity? 15 MS. REGER: Yes, we're leftovers and since 16 it's our turn to talk, I just want to have the 17 appropriate banner. Shut It Down Now, it says. I'm 18 from central Vermont, near Montpelier, and I think 19 this is so important that I drove two hours, with my 20 Affinity Group, to be here. 21 (Applause.) 22 MS. REGER: So, I did want to start with, 23 I really believe that we are trespassing with this 24 nuclear power plant on a fragile web of life on our 25 dear planet, the Mother Earth. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
105 1 So I speak from my heart, with these 2 concerns. I think the uranium that's mined to operate 3 this nuclear power plant, is coming from native land, 4 from very, people that have lived for over 30, what, 5 40 years, with the tailings of the uranium mining. 6 And why doesn't the environmental scoping 7 include the people that live, you know, with these 8 tailings, with the still births and the water, from 9 the water, from the polluted water, from the polluted 10 air. 11 And now we're going full cycle with 12 storing of radioactive waste back on the Indian 13 Reservations. I don't think this is fair. I don't 14 think there's been any, you know, where does the. 15 generic scoping, you know, where does that fit in. 16 (Applause.) 17 MS. REGER: You want to use coal. What is 18 this group, Vermont Energy Partnership, you know, they 19 want to use coal that's that's taken from the Mother 20 Earth. The water in the slurry. The Peabody Coal has 21 been doing this for like 20 years, using all that 22 precious water. We're running out of water. 23 You know here we have the threat of the 24 radioactive, you know polluting the Connecticut water. 25 You know they'd rather use coal but they're gonna, you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
106 1 know transport it by coal slurry. You know, it's not 2 fair that the corporations, you know get away with 3 this. 4 I want to thank all the grandmothers, and 5 the mothers, since November, have risked arrest here 6 in Brattleboro, and have stood, you know in the lobby 7 of Entergy* [phonetic], and have stood at the gates of 8 Vermont Yankee, and where is it that we have to send 9 our grandmothers and mothers to risk arrest? What 10 does that say? 11 And maybe we don't have the auditorium 12 full today, but I know that people don't want to live 13 with this risk anymore, and it's really not fair. 14 Okay. I want to speak to alternatives. In my home 15 town of Corinth, we publish Northern Woodlands 16 magazine. Last month--I want to give these, I don't 17 have enough for all 25 employees, but I want to give 18 you all a copy to read tonight in your hotel. "Energy 19 From Wood: Turning Woodchips Into Power, Heat and 20 Ethanol." We have the answers. We have the 21 alternatives. We've listened to Amory Levans* 22 [phonetic], Rocky Mountain Institute, and other 23 experts. We can use energy efficiency. 24 Finally, Vermont just passed a bill that 25 we will be selling appliances that really turn off NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
107 1 when you turn them off. You know it seems like a 2 little thing but all this stuff will really add up. 3 We have the program in Vermont, Vermont Efficiency. 4 We can like use this and we don't need the 5 power from this nuke; we really don't. So I want to 6 give you all a copy of this to read tonight, and I 7 guess in closing, I just want to thank my affinity 8 group for coming down, especially to Martha, this is-- 9 and Monica, and Sal. 10 MR. [off-microphone comment] 11 MS. REGER: Yeah. It is really difficult 12 to--you know, workers do have a choice. We protested 13 a lot, as the New Hampshire Women's Peace Network, at 14 Sanders, in New Hampshire, in Nashua, New Hampshire. 15 They were making parts for the cruise missile. 16 And, .you know you do have a choice. Every 17 worker has a choice. I don't think it's our job to 18 provide alternative jobs, but we can convert that 19 plant, we can still have a good economy, we can 20 convert that plant, run it on gas, like I said we can 21 use alternatives and provide the same amount of 22 energy. 23 I do feel that people need to look within 24 when--and all you guys that work for the Nuclear 25 Regulatory Commission, you know, I don't know how you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
108 1 can sleep at night. I really don't. 2 So that's all I'm gonna say. 3 MR. CAMERON: All right. Thank you very 4 much. And thank you for the magazines too. 5 Cora. So we have Cora and Beth, and then 6 we're going to have Rani Franovich close the meeting 7 for us. 8 Cora. 9 MS. BROOKS: I found a country journal 10 from 1980, and I thought, well, I wondered why I had 11 saved it. There was a nice article about mushrooms in 12 it. And then I kept looking through it--and I just 13 found it this week, and there's an article about 14 Vermont Yankee from 1980, about the town of Vernon, 15 and how much anxiety--1980, we're talking about. How 16 much anxiety exists in the communities around this 17 plant. And not only does this plant--let's say it-- 18 causes cancer, causes cancer of unborn, yet unborn 19 children. Not only does it cause cancer, it causes 20 heart attacks for the anxiety that people live with. 21 People are in denial as much as possible, 22 the way you. are when somebody dies. In some 23 religions, you come back a year later to make sure no 24 one has seen that person. Because it's hard to 25 believe when somebody dies. It's hard to believe that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
109 1 the nuclear plant that's serving your community and 2 the state of Vermont, and is gvting jobs to a lot of 3 the people that you know and care about, that's hard, 4 to feel that it's a shaky situation. 5 Now Copernicus and Galileo suggested the 6 most outrageous thing. They said, you know, the sun 7 doesn't rise in the east and set in the west. The 8 world turns around.. Now we also know that the world 9 wobbles. I'm not making this up. 10 The scientists: I have a New York Times 11 headline that says the world wobbles, the sun rings 12 like a bell. The scientists know that. We know that 13 there are volcanoes that erupt. We know that there is 14 lightning that strikes. We know that this year alone, 15 there have been three or four significant coal mine 16 operations that have faltered and killed people. 17 The light isn't very good for me here but 18 I am going to try and read to you from this article 19 that was written by David Riley in 1980. 20 Country Journal. A few of the Vermont 21 Yankee, up until 1980, wobbles. High-pressure turbine 22 leaks shut down 82 hours3.417 days 0.488 weeks 0.112 months . That was in 1973. 4-27-74, 23 following scheduled shutdown, plant restricted to 80 24 percent power output due to excessive radioactivity 25 levels in off-gas system. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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110 1 5-24-74. Leaks in drywall exterior, 2 containment vessel shut eleven days. Again '74. 3 Multiple lightning strikes, shut down 75 hours3.125 days 0.446 weeks 0.103 months . That 4 was on 7-5-74. 5 3-23-75. Operator error, high reactor 6 water level, shut down three days. 7 6-5-75. Failure of start-up transformer, 8 power source for cooling tower fans, shut down ten 9 days. 10 1975. Vibration problems in nuclear 11 reactor, shut down 23 days. 9.1 million cost passed 12 on to consumers. This is our cheap electricity. 13 11-12-75. Vermont Yankee given seven 14 months to begin building a gamma radiation shield to 15 protect people at elementary school across the street 16 from plant. 17 1-27-76. General Electric company, 18 manufacturer of reactor, indicates that the torus 19 could lurch upward under pressure, causing major 20 damage. The torus is a donut-shaped pool inside the 21 containment vessel. Shut down 18 days. 22 5-14-76. Lightning causes fire and 23 radiation releases. 24 I don't care how good the workers are in 25 the plants. May they stay alive and not become NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
il 1 angels. I don't care how good they are. They're 2 human stuff. It doesn't matter that we're on a world 3 that wobbles, lightning and earthquakes. 4 7-18-76. Plant releases 83,000 gallons of 5 water containing low levels of radioactive tritium 6 into Connecticut River. Yankee settles with state of 7 Vermont for $30,000. 8 Now it goes on. But I want to say that I 9 had a grandmother who was related to her sister, who 10 was once married to a governor of Vermont, and I came 11 up here as a child because there was no electricity 12 when we came up to the place that we came up to, and 13 I loved that, and I came back, and my grandmother, the 14 sister of one of the governor's old wives, she died in 15 childbirth, but she said when you come to a place, she 16 said, you take care of it and leave it a little better 17 than you found it. 18 When you come to visit a place, you leave 19 it a little better than you found it. And what she 20 said about her land in Vermont. She said this isn't 21 my land. This isn't our land. This is land that we 22 take care of while we have it. And we take care of it 23 and make it a little bit better than it was. 24 So I'd like to ask the NRC to take a 25 really close look, and I would like to reverse the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
112 1 understanding. You asked us to help you. I'm asking 2 you to help us. 3 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Cora. We 4 actually have two speakers and then I'm going to go to 5 Rani. And we have Beth Adams from Citizens Awareness 6 Network and then Jane Newton will be our final 7 speaker. 8 I think this is Beth coming down now, all 9* right, and then we'll go to Jane. 10 MS. ADAMS: Hi, there, how are you? I'm 11 a new resident of Greenfield, which is ten miles away 12 from Vermont Yankee. I came down in February, not 13 really knowing about Vermont Yankee. So I must say 14 that I'm not up to speed on all the details, and I 15 appreciate all the research that people that have 16 spoken before me have shared. 17 I've been an anti-nuclear activist, 18 however, since 1979, and at that time I opposed 19 nuclear power plants and I still any nuclear power 20 plant, and I do not believe that Vermont Yankee should 21 be open one more day. 22 We need to close Vermont Yankee, not just 23 think about extending licensing for 20 years. How 24 foolish is it to develop an energy that we don't know 25 what the waste, what we're going to do with the waste, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
113 1 we're just going to let it sit there, and, in fact, 2 others that have spoken before me have shared that 3 this waste puts us in greater danger. Not only does 4 it put us in greater danger. Not one of you yet has 5 spoken about the people that have died already in 6 Kosovo, in Vieques, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, having 7 been poisoned by depleted uranium on the tips of the 8 missiles that were dropped there, either by protests, 9 as in Vieques, or so that we could, so that 10 corporations could control their profits. 11 It is time, as others have shared before 12 me, that we take a hard look at what. we are doing. 13 Taking a different course now, I'd like to go in a 14 direction of what we can do, and others have shared 15 about this already as well. 16 We can, as Citizens Awareness Network well 17 knows, we can develop the technology at a reasonable 18 price, relatively much more reasonable price than 19 creating nuclear, keeping this plant alive, create 20 wind power, geothermal, which hasn't been mentioned. 21 Geothermal energy and hydro energy to create 22 sustainable energy resources. 23 I came from Maine. We closed Vermont 24 Yankee. They have a viable renewal energy plan in 25 Maine. They have a dam that actually has little NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
114 1 elevators that lift the fish uphill and people can buy 2 into energy produced by that type of energy. 3 Geothermal. There's a lot of hope in what that can 4 do. 5 We have a heated core from the center of 6 the Earth, that we're not utilizing, we're not 7 resourcing ourselves with that yet, except in areas 8 of--when I say "we" I'm thinking of this area. But 9 other areas of the world and other parts of the 10 country rely on geothermal energy for electricity and 11 fuel already. 12 So there are things that we can do and 13 that's what I think we should be focusing on, and it 14 should be a regional discussion since it affects 15 regional issues. Thank you. 16 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Beth. Our 17 final speaker is Jane Newton. 18 MS. NEWTON: I really didn't plan to speak 19 at all but I sort a can't help it. I have no real 20 qualifications, except that I'm a really terrified 21 mother and grandmother, and I can tell, I can 22 recognize a corporate con, corporate lies, and what I 23 believe is a corporate crime against humanity, and for 24 the people who are trying to tell us that nuclear 25 energy is clean and it doesn't contribute to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
115 1 greenhouse -gases, are not taking into consideration 2 the amount of nonrenewable energy used to dig up and 3 process the uranium, to make it into a fissionable 4 form. 5 And as the person before me mentioned, the 6 side product of making uranium fissionable is what's 7 known as depleted uranium which is not depleted at 8 all, and it's providing free, it has been providing 9 free, since about 1990, the means for the U.S. 10 military to fight a secret ongoing nuclear war. 11 Therefore, nuclear energy is fueling war, which is 12 just one more way to destroy the world. 13 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Jane, and 14 thank all of you for your comments today, and I'm just 15 going to have Rani Franovich close the meeting for us. 16 Rani. 17 MS. FRANOVICH: Thank you, Chip. I just 18 wanted to thank you all for coming again. I know a 19 lot of you don't necessarily feel that the NRC takes 20 your comments into consideration. I can assure you we 21 do. Not all of you may be happy with how we change or 22 incorporate the comments, depending on how they fit 23 into the process, but I can assure you that we will 24 respond to the comments that we receive at this 25 meeting and in writing. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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116 1 So thanks again for coming. Those of you 2 who registered and met our attendants at the front 3 table out here, they have meeting feedback forms, that 4 we're hoping you will out, if you have any suggestions 5 for how we can improve the conduct of our public 6 meetings, things we can do better, how we may serve 7 you better. Please let us know. The forms are 8 addressed, pre-paid. All you have to do is fill them 9 out and mail them in, or you can deliver them to a 10 member of the staff. 11 And I just want to remind everyone that we 12 will be receiving comments, in writing, until June 13 23rd, as Rich Emch mentioned, and he is the point of 14 contact for receiving those comments. 15 Any comments received after that time, we 16 will do our best to consider, and again, thanks for 17 attending our meeting. 18 One other thing. The NRC staff will be 19 around here for a few minutes, if there are any 20 questions that people have, that we weren't able to 21 discuss with you during the meeting. Thank you. 22 (Off the record.) 23 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Public Meeting: Evening Session Docket Number: (050-00271) Location: Brattleboro, Vermont Date: Wednesday, June 7, 2006 Work Order No.: NRC-1 072 Pages 1-143 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 +++++ 4 PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS ENVIRONMENTAL SCOPING 5 FOR THE VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, 6 LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION 7 EVENING SESSION 8 +++++ 9 WEDNESDAY, 10 JUNE 7, 2006 11 12 BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT 13 +++++ 14 The Public Meeting was convened at the 15 Latchis Theatre at 50 Main Street in Brattleboro, 16 Vermont, at 7:00 p.m., F. "Chip" Cameron, Facilitator, 17 presiding. 18 NRC STAFF PARTICIPATING: 19 F. "CHIP" CAMERON 20 ERIC BENNER 21 RICHARD EMCH 22 FRANK GILLESPIE 23 SPEAKERS: 24 SHAWN BANFIELD 25 BERNIE BUTEAU NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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2 1 SPEAKERS (continued): 2 CLAIRE CHANG 3 ELLEN COTA 4 JOSHUA DOSTIS 5 JOHN DREYFUSS 6 JOHNNY EADS 7 DART EVERETT 8 MIKE FLORY 9 DENNIS GIRROIR 10 MIKE HAMER 11 JOAN HORMAN 12 GEORGE ISELIN 13 DAN JEFFRIES 14 DEB KATZ 15 MARIAN KELNER 16 LARRY LAKENS 17 BETH MCELWEE 18 SUNNY MILLER 19 EVAN MULHOLLAND, ESQ. 20 KAREN MURPHY 21 CHRIS NORD 22 BILL PEARSON 23 GARY SACHS 24 GOV. THOMAS P. SALMON 25 RAY SHADIS NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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3 1 SPEAKERS (continued): 2 EMMA STAMAS 3 TED SULLIVAN 4 EMILY TINKHAM 5 CLAY TURNBULL 6 SHERRY ZABRISKIE 7 BETH 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
4 1 IN. DEX 2 Welcome and Purpose of the Meeting, 3 Francis "Chip" Cameron, NRC 5 4 Overview of License Renewal Process, 5 Eric Benner, NRC 10 6 Overview of Environmental Review Process, 7 Richard Emch, NRC 18 8 Audience Questions 27 9 Public Comments 43 10 Closing/Availability of Transcripts, 11 Francis "Chip" Cameron, NRC 12 Adjourn NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
5 1 PROCE ED I NGS 2 7:00 P.M. 3 MR. CAMERON: If you could take a seat, 4 we're going to get started with the meeting tonight. 5 (Pause.) 6 Good evening, everyone. Nice to see all 7 of you and thank you for coming out tonight on a rainy 8 night and my name is Chip Cameron and I'm the Special 9 Counsel for Public Liaison at the Nuclear Regulatory 10 Commission which we're going to be referring to as the 11 NRC tonight. 12 Welcome to the meeting. The subject of 13 the meeting tonight is going to be the environmental 14 review that the NRC conducts as part of its evaluation 15 of an application that we received from the Entergy 16 Company to review the operating license for Vermont 17 Yankee and it's my pleasure to serve as your 18 facilitator tonight. And in that role, I'll try to 19 help everybody to have a productive meeting this 20 evening. 21 I just wanted to cover three items of 22 meeting process before we get to the substance of the 23 discussions. And one is the format for the meeting 24 tonight. Secondly, I'd like to talk about some very 25 simply ground rules and last, I'd just like to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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6 1 introduce the two NRC speakers who will be giving you 2 some background information tonight. 3 In terms of the format for the meeting, 4 we're going to start out with a couple of brief NRC 5 presentations to give you some background on license 6 renewal at the NRC and on the environmental review, 7 specifically that part of license renewal so that you 8 know what we look at in deciding whether to grant a 9 renewal for any particular reactor and so that you 10 know how to get information about the process, the 11 schedule for the license renewal and how you can 12 participate. 13 We'll have time for a few questions on 14 process after those presentations, to make sure that 15 we've explained things clearly to you, but the most 16 important part of the meeting tonight is to hear from 17 all of you, to hear your views. 18 This particular meeting is called a 19 scoping meeting and very simply, that's to ask for 20 public comments, advice, recommendations on what the 21 scope of the draft environmental impact statement 22 should be. The NRC is going to prepare a draft 23 environmental impact statement and we'd like to know 24 what issues we should look at, what alternatives 25 should be considered as we develop the environmental NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
7 1 impact statement. 2 The staff will tell you about submitting 3 written comments. We're taking written comments as 4 well as meeting with you tonight, but we did want to 5 be here in person to talk with you. 6 Any comments you give tonight are going to 7 carry the same weight as any written comments that we 8 receive. 9 In terms of ground rules, they're very 10 simple. When you speak, please introduce yourself and 11 give us any affiliation, if that's appropriate. And 12 I would ask that only one person speak at a time. 13 Most importantly, so that we can give our full 14 attention to whomever has the floor at the moment, but 15 also so that we can get a clear transcript. We have 16 a court stenographer, Mr. Peter Holland, who is up 17 here. He's going to be recording all the comments 18 tonight. And that's going to be our record. It's 19 also going to be your record of what transpired here 20 tonight. 21 I would also ask you to try to be brief, 22 so that we can have an opportunity for everybody who 23 wants to talk to speak tonight and I'm asking you to 24 follow a five-minute guideline. When you come up here 25 to give us your comments and I'll ask you to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
8 1 summarize, as we get close to the five-minute 2 guideline. 3 And I found that five minutes is usually 4 enough for someone to summarize their major points for 5 us and you can elaborate, if you want to with 6 detailed, written comments that you submit to us, but 7 even though it's only five minutes, it does two 8 important things. One, it alerts the NRC staff to 9 what they should begin looking at immediately, even to 10 exploring that in more detail with you after the 11 meeting. And secondly, it alerts everybody else in 12 the audience to what concerns people might have about 13 the license renewal. 14 And finally, I would just, as usual for 15 any meeting, is to just display courtesy to those that 16 might have different opinions from you tonight. And 17 I want to introduce the NRC speakers this evening and 18 we're going to Mr. Eric Benner who is right here. 19 Eric is the Chief of the Technical Review Branch 20 within the.License Renewal Program. And Eric and his 21 staff, they are responsible for looking at the 22 technical review issues in the environmental impact 23 statement. 24 And just to give you some background on 25 Eric, he's been with the Agency for about 15 years.
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9 1 He's been a reactor inspector in one of the NRC 2 regions. He's also been on the staff of the 3 individual Commissioners who make up the Nuclear 4 Regulatory Commission and has been an advisor to the 5 NRC and the United States in terms of the development 6 of the international convention, the Treaty on Nuclear 7 Safety. He has a Bachelor's in nuclear engineering 8 from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and he has a 9 Master's in environmental engineering, I believe, from
10. Johns Hopkins University.
11 Eric will be giving you an overview of 12 license renewal and then when Eric is done, we're 13 going to turn to Mr. Rich Emch who is right here. 14 He's the project manager for the environmental review 15 on Vermont Yankee. And he'll be providing some of his 16 detailed contact information to you in a few minutes.' 17 But Rich has been with the Agency for over 30 years 18 with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He's been 19 involved in all aspects of reactor regulation, 20 focusing on radiological protection and safety and his 21 academic background is a Bachelor's in physics from 22 Louisiana Tech University, and a Master's in health 23 physics from the Georgia Institute of Technology. 24 And with that, I would just thank you all 25 for being here with us tonight and I'll turn it over NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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10 1 to Eric. 2 MR. BENNER: Thank you, Chip. I'd like to 3 begin by thanking all of you for taking the time to 4 come out and talk to us tonight. I hope the 5 information we provide will help you understand the 6 NRC's license renewal process and your role in 7 ensuring that our environmental impact statement that 8 we prepare for the Vermont Yankee license renewal is 9 accurate and complete. 10 Next slide, please. 11 (Slide change.) 12 MR. CAMERON: I think you need to raise it 13 and -- 14 MR. BENNER: Can everyone hear? Okay. 15 No? 16 MR. CAMERON: Well, say something and then 17 we'll be able to tell. 18 MR. BENNER: Can everyone hear now? Okay, 19 I see heads nodding in the back, so I'm going to take 20 that as affirmative. 21 We have several purposes for tonight's 22 meeting and this is going to reiterate some of what 23 Chip said. First, is background. We'll discuss the 24 NRC's mission and process for renewal of nuclear power 25 plant licenses with particular emphasis on our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
11 1 environmental review process, including the typical 2 areas we look at in the environmental review and the 3 schedule for the Vermont. Yankee review. 4 Well, I'm sure that many of you are 5 familiar with the NRC's mission and some of our 6 processes. I'll ask you to be patient with me as we 7 go through this for the people who are not familiar 8 with these processes. 9 At the conclusion of the presentations, 10 we'll have some time, as Chip said, for questions 11 about the process. After the question and answer 12 portion is complete, then we'll move into what we 13 consider one of the more important purposes of the 14 meeting and that is to receive any comments that you 15 may have on the breadth and depth, commonly called the 16 scope of our environmental review. I'd ask you to 17 hold your comments until that time because for 18 purposes of the transcription, it's easier to have the 19 presentation portion, the Q & A portion and then the 20 comment portion all discrete. 21 Additionally, we'll also give you some 22 information about how you can submit comments outside 23 of this meeting. 24 Next slide, please. 25 (Slide change.) NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
12 1 MR. BENNER: Before I discuss the license 2 renewal process, I'd like to take a minute to talk 3 about the NRC in terms of what we do and what our 4 mission is. 5 The Atomic Energy Act is the legislation 6 that authorizes the NRC to, among other things, issue 7 operating licenses for nuclear power plants. The 8 Atomic Energy Act allows for 40-year license for power 9 plants. This 40-year term is not based on safety 10 limitations, but is instead based primarily on 11 economic considerations and anti-trust factors. 12 The Atomic Energy Act also authorizes the 13 NRC to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials 14 in the United States. In exercising that authority, 15 the NRC's mission is three-fold: to ensure adequate 16 protection of public health and safety; to promote the 17 common defense and security; and to protect the 18 environment. 19 The NRC accomplishes this mission through 20 a combination of regulatory processes such as 21 conducting inspections to verify compliance with our 22 regulations; evaluating operating experience from 23 power plants domestically and internationally; and 24 issuing enforcement actions when licensees are found 25 to be not in compliance. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
13 I The regulations that the NRC enforces are 2 contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 3 Regulations which is commonly referred to as 10 CFR. 4 Next slide, please. 5 (Slide change.) 6 MR. BENNER: As I have mentioned, the 7 Atomic Energy Act provides for a 40-year license term 8 for nuclear power plants. The NRC's regulations also 9 include provisions to allow for an extension of the 10 license for up to an additional 20 years. For Vermont 11 Yankee, the current operating license will expire on 12 March 21, 2012. The licensee for Vermont Yankee, 13 Entergy, has requested license renewal for the plant. 14 As part of the NRC's review of the license 15 renewal application, we'll perform an environmental 16 review to look at the potential impacts of the 17 environment associated with an additional 20 years of 18 operation. As I stated earlier, the purpose of this 19 meeting is to give you information about this process 20 and to seek your input as to what issues we conduct in 21 our environmental review. 22 Next slide, please. 23 (Slide change.) 24 MR. BENNER: The NRC's license renewal 25 review involves two parts: an environmental review NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
14 1 and a safety review. This slide really gives a big 2 picture overview of the license renewal review process 3 which involves these two parallel paths. I'm going to 4 briefly describe these two review processes, starting 5 with the safety review. 6 Next slide. 7 (Slide change.) 8 MR. BENNER: Two guiding principles form 9 the basis of the NRC's approach in performing its 10 safety review. The first principle is that the 11 current regulatory process is adequate to ensure that 12 the licensing basis of all currently operating plants 13 provides and maintains an acceptable level of safety 14 with the possible exception of the effects of aging on 15 certain structure's systems and components. 16 The second principle is that the current 17 plant specific licensing basis must be maintained 18 during the renewal term in the same manner and to the 19 same extent as during the original license term. 20 Next slide. 21 (Slide change.) 22 MR. BENNER: The safety review for license 23 renewal focuses on aging management of systems, 24 structures and components that are important to safety 25 as determined by the license renewal scoping criteria NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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15 1 contained in 10 CFR Part 54. The license renewal 2 safety review does not assess current operational 3 issues such as security, emergency planning and safety 4 performance. The NRC monitors and provides regulatory 5 oversight of these issues on an on-going basis, under 6 the current operating license. Because the NRC is 7 addressing these current operating issues on an 8 continuing basis, we do not re-evaluate them during 9 license renewal. 10 Next slide, please. 11 (Slide change.) 12 MR. BENNER: As I mentioned, the license 13 renewal safety review focuses on plant aging and the 14 programs that the licensee has already implemented or 15 will implement to manage the effects of aging. Let me 16 introduce Mr. Johnny Eads. Johnny is the safety 17 project manager and he's in charge of the safety 18 review. 19 The safety review involves the NRC staff's 20 evaluation of technical information that's contained 21 in the license renewal application. This is referred 22 to as a safety evaluation. The NRC staff also 23 conducts audits as part of the evaluation, and there's 24 a team of about 30 NRC technical reviewers and 25 contractors who are conducting the safety evaluation NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
16 1 at this time. 2 The safety review also includes plant 3 inspections. The inspections are conducted by a team 4 of inspectors from both headquarters and NRC's Region 5 1 office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. A 6 representative from our Inspection Program is here 7 today, Senior Resident Inspector Dave Pelton. And the 8 Resident Inspector lives in this area, works at the 9 plant 40 hours a week conducting independent 10 inspections of the licensee's activities to ensure 11 compliance. The result of inspections are documented 12 in separate inspection reports. 13 The staff documents the results of its 14 review and safety evaluation report. That report is 15 then independently reviewed by the Advisory Committee 16 on Reactor Safeguards or ACRS. The ACRS is a group of 17 nationally-recognized technical experts that serve as 18 a consulting body to the Commission. They review each 19 license renewal application and safety evaluation 20 report, form their own conclusions and recommendations 21 on the requested action and report those conclusions 22 and recommendations directly to the Commission. 23 Next slide, please. 24 (Slide change.) 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
17 1 MR. BENNER: This slide illustrates how these 2 various activities make up the safety review process. 3 I'd like to point out that the hexagons on the slide, 4 the yellow hexagons, indicate opportunities for public 5 participation. Also, the staff will present the 6 results of its safety review to the ACRS and that 7 presentation will be open to the public. 8 Next slide, please. 9 (Slide change.) 10 MR. BENNER: The second part of the review 11 process involves an environmental review with scoping 12 activities and the development of an environmental 13 impact statement. As I've said, we are here today to 14 receive your comments on the scope of that review. 15 We'll consider any comments on the scope that we 16 receive at this meeting or any written comments. Then 17 in December, we expect to issue a draft environmental 18 impact statement for comment. 19 Next slide, please. 20 (Slide change.) 21 MR. BENNER: So the final Agency decision on 22 whether or not to issue a renewed operating licenses 23 depends on several inputs, inspection reports, and an 24 associated confirmatory letter from the Region 1 25 Regional Administrator, conclusions and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
18 1 recommendations of the ACRS which are documented in a 2 letter to the Commission, the Safety Evaluation Report 3 which documents the result of the staff's safety 4 review, and the final environmental impact statement, 5 which documents the results of the environmental 6 review. 7 Again, the yellow hexagons on the slide 8 indicate opportunities for public participation. An 9 early opportunity is during the scoping meeting today. 10 The meeting on the draft EIS is another opportunity. 11 The opportunity to request a hearing ended on May 27 12 of this year, and three petitions were proffered 13 containing about 10 separate issues. As I mentioned, 14 the ACRS meetings also are open to the public. 15 Now I will turn it over to Richard Emch, 16 who will discuss the environmental review in more 17 detail. 18 MR. EMCH: I'm Rich Emch. I'm the 19 Environmental Project Manager for the Nuclear 20 Regulatory Commission for the Environmental Review of 21 the license renewal application for Vermont Yankee. 22 Next slide, please. 23 (Slide change.) 24 MR. EMCH: We conduct this review under 25 the guidelines of the National Environmental Policy NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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19 1 Act of 1969. NEPA requires that Federal agencies use 2 a systematic approach to consider environmental 3 impacts. They also require that an environmental 4 impact statement be prepared anytime there is a major 5 Federal action which has the potential to 6 significantly affect the quality of the human 7 environment. 8 The Commission decided that we would issue 9 an environmental statement for any license renewal 10 projects. In 1996 and revised in 1999, the Commission 11 prepared a generic environmental impact statement that 12 looked at the 92 aspects of environmental impact for 13 the 103 operating reactors in the United States. This 14 generic environmental impact statement was for license 15 renewals specifically. 16 Next slide, please. 17 (Slide change.) 18 MR. EMCH: I mentioned that there were 92. 19 issues that were evaluated in that generic 20 environmental impact statement. Approximately 69 of 21 those issues were labeled as what we call Category 1 22 issues which means that we concluded that the impact 23 was essentially the same at all power plants in the 24 United States and that it was small. For the other 25 issues, the decision was made that there was enough NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
20 1 variability in the impacts of those areas from power 2 plant to power plant that we needed to do a plant 3 specific analysis of those aspects of the 4 environmental impact. 5 Going back again for the Category 1 6 issues, in addition to the plant specific reviews, we 7 do it for the Category 2 issues. For Category 1 are 8 the ones where we made the generic conclusion. We do 9 what's called a search for new and significant 10 information. What that means is we're looking for any 11 information, we will look for any information 12 affecting that particular plant that would cause us to 13 want to decide whether or not, or cause us to think 14 that there might be some challenge to that generic 15 conclusion. 16 If we find such new and significant 17 information after evaluating, then we come to the 18 conclusion that it is new and significant, and then it 19 does challenge the conclusion, then we need to do a 20 plant specific review for that issue for that plant. 21 That's that first yellow arrow on my right-hand side 22 there. 23 For the issues that are in Category 2 24 issues, we do conduct a plant specific review. All 25 that goes into this generic, all this goes into what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
21 1 we call a supplement to the generic environmental 2 impact statement. It's a plant-specific supplement 3 for each plant, in this case, Vermont Yankee. 4 Next slide, please. 5 (Slide change.) 6 MR. EMCH: The purpose of all this review 7 is against this decision standard. In simple 8 language, to me, this decision standard says what 9 we're trying to do is determine whether it is 10 acceptable, whether the environmental impact of an 11 additional 20 years of operation of the plant is 12 acceptable. 13 Next slide, please. 14 (Slide change.) 15 MR. EMCH: Now that we talked about what. 16 we're going to do, let's talk about the schedule. As 17 you can see from -- I'm not going to read the entire 18 schedule, but let me just hit a few of the high 19 points. 20 The first high point I'm going to hit is 21 tonight, this scoping meeting. In the parlance of 22 NEPA, this is a scoping meeting. In other words, this 23 is where we come talk to the public, the people who 24 live and work near this plant and ask you if you have 25 any information about issues or if you have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
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22 1 information that you want us to be specifically aware 2 of as part of our review of this plant. 3 We already know we're going to be looking 4 at the 92 Category 1 and 2 issues, but it's possible 5 that you might have some issue that we need to know 6 about or you might have some information that we need 7 to know about. 8 On June 23 is when the end of the scoping 9 period occurs. There are a number of ways to do -- to 10 give us comments. One is by speaking tonight. You 11 can send it in by email. You can write them by 12 letter. We'll talk a little bit more about that at 13 the end of my presentation. 14 The next big events are the public 15 meeting. After we take your scoping comments and all 16 the other information that we find as part of our 17 review, we will develop a draft environmental impact 18 statement and we will send that draft environmental 19 impact statement out with preliminary conclusions. 20 We'll send it out to the public for review. When you 21 signed up tonight, we asked you to sign up on a yellow 22 or blue card. If you put your address on either one 23 of those cards, we'll send you a copy of that draft 24 environmental impact statement when we develop it. 25 Then we'll come back in January, probably NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-.4433
23 1 at this same theater for another meeting where we will 2 ask you, give you the opportunity to give us comments 3 about that draft environmental impact statement. You 4 can tell us what you like, what you don't like, what 5 you wished we had changed, what you think we missed. 6 And then finally, and the comment period 7 will run into March and then in the end we'll issue a 8 final environmental impact statement in August of 9 2007. 10 Next slide, please.
11. (Slide change.)
12 MR. EMCH: This depicts all the various 13 areas where we gather information. The first area of 14 information -- place where we get information is from 15 the licensee's application. The licensee includes an 16 environmental report in the application that they send 17 in for license renewal. That environmental report 18 does a couple of things. First, it includes plant-19 specific analyses for the Category 2 issues. The 20 other thing it does is it includes licensee's 21 description of the extent that they went to try to 22 find new and significant information that might affect 23 the Category 1 issues. 24 We also have our staff audit. I have a 25 team of people from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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24 1 I also have a team of various environmental science 2 experts from the Argonne National Laboratory, led by 3 Mr. Dave Miller. 4 Together, we do on-site audit activities. 5 We've done some. We'll be doing additional ones where 6 we look at the site. We look at the site environs. 7 We go out andtalk to various government agencies. We 8 consult with them about information that we need in 9 order to carry out our review. That kind of moves 10 down to the next box. We talk to the Agency for 11 Natural Resources here in Vermont. We talk to the 12 people, the Historic Preservation Officer. We talk to 13 the State Health people. Talk to a wide range of 14 Federal agencies such as Fish and Wildlife Service, 15 NOAA Fisheries Service and gather all the information 16 that we need to do the review. 17 We also talk to -- what we call permitting 18 authorities. In the State of Vermont, EPA has 19 delegated the responsibility for issuance of what we 20 call a national pollutant discharge elimination system 21 permit and that's been delegated to the State of 22 Vermont and we talk with the officials in the State of 23 Vermont who are responsible for issuing that permit to 24 make sure we understand what's going on there. 25 We also will talk with social services in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
25 1 the State or in the community near the plant. And 2 finally, what we're here for tonight, as I mentioned 3 before, is to get comments from you folks about the 4 issues that we need to look at and information that 5 you believe we need to look at as part of our review. 6 Next slide, please. 7 (Slide change.) 8 MR. EMCH: This picture depicts in a broad 9 sense the areas that we look at as part of the review. 10 You'll see terrestrial and aquatic ecology there. 11 You'll see water quality, air quality, socio-12 economics, environmental justice, radiation 13 protection, and looking at archeological and cultural 14 resources -- I believe I covered all of them. 15 That's a kind of a broad view of the things that 16 we do as part of our review. 17 Next slide, please. 18 (Slide change.) 19 MR. EMCH: This is some additional 20 information about how to contact us or to get more 21 information about the review. As I said, my name is 22 Rich Emch. There's the phone number up there that you 23 can contact me at. Four libraries in the local area 24 have agreed to make the documents involved in the 25 review available. This is the licensee's application. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)° 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
26 1 The draft environmental impact statement, when we 2 issue it, those can be found at these libraries: the 3 Vernon Free Library in Vernon, Vermont; the Brooks 4 Memorial Library here in Brattleboro; the Hinsdale and 5 the Dickinson Memorial Library in Northfield, 6 Massachusetts. You can also find these documents on 7 the web at the web address that's up there. 8 Let's talk again about how to submit 9 comments. First and foremost, of course, you can give 10 us comments by making a presentation here tonight. 11 You can also send them to us by mail at the address 12 that's up there. You can email them to us. The email 13 address that's been set up specifically for that 14 purpose is VermontYankeeEIS@nrc.gov and then if you 15 wish, you can deliver them to us in person in 16 Rockville, Maryland. 17 Again, the scoping comments, we need to 18 receive them by June 23rd or they need to be 19 postmarked by June 23rd. If they are, I assure you we 20 will consider them. If they come in after that, we'll 21 consider them to the extent that we have time to do 22 so. 23 With that, I'm finished with my 24 presentation. 25 Chip, are you ready to take some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
27 1 questions? 2 MR. CAMERON: Yes, thanks, Rich. And 3 thanks, Eric. 4 Unfortunately, we don't have a lot of time 5 for questions, but if there are a few that we could 6 address at this point, we'll be glad to do so and the 7 staff will be here after the meeting to talk to you, 8 if we don't get to your questions. 9 Let's go right here and please, just 10 introduce yourself to us. 11 MS. MILLER: Yes, I'm Sunny Miller. I 12 live and work at Trap Rock Peace Center in Deerfield, 13 Massachusetts. 14 I'd like to ask why at the nrc.gov website 15 I can't select Vermont Yankee and get simply all the 16 reports for this reactor separate from the myriad 17 collection of reports at all reactors? I find it very 18 difficult to isolate the information that I'm looking 19 for. It takes me hours and hours to look at what's 20 there and I can't select easily what I want to find. 21 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Sunny. 22 MR. EMCH: If you go to the website and 23 select Vermont Yankee under license renewal you can 24 find fairly simply a number of the documents, but if 25 you're talking about -- I'm not sure what range of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. (202)o 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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28 1 documents you're talking about. 2 MS. MILLER: I'm specifically interested 3 in emissions, in mishaps, in irregularities of all 4 kinds and that is blended into -- it looks like it's 5 blended into the entire national history of thousands 6 of mishaps and problems nationwide. 7 MR. EMCH: Yes, I understand what you're 8 talking about, ma'am. In fact, I understand it can be 9 difficult. I don't really have a good answer for 10 that. We can take your name and number and I can get 11 in touch with you and I can try to help lead you to 12 some of those documents, but -- do you have something 13 to add? 14 MR. EADS: Yes, like you, I face that same 15 challenge. If you'll end your search on ADAMS, 16 there's a place where you put in a docket number. If 17 you'll insert the number 05000271, that docket number, 18 that is the docket number for Vermont Yankee and it 19 will only pull up those documents related to Vermont 20 Yankee. 21 You can then do a key word search and find 22 those items particular to VY that you'd like to see. 23 You can also specify a day range. 24 MR. CAMERON: And Johnny, are there -- 25 when you talk about key words for Sunny's search and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)234-4433
29 1 you heard the types of things that she's interested 2 in, are there particular terms of art that the NRC 3 uses that cover things like that? 4 MR. EMCH: Yes. As a matter of fact, 5 thank you, Johnny, for that. Yes, as a matter of 6 fact, when I'm doing searches like the ones you're 7 talking about, ma'am, one key word that I often use is 8 effluent and another key word that I often use is 9 environmental. Those will usually pull up their 10 effluent reports and those will usually pull up their 11 environmental -- radiological environmental monitoring 12 reports. 13 MR. CAMERON: Great, thank you for that. 14 Yes, sir?. 15 MR. NORD: You-mentioned a couple of 16 minutes ago that you anticipate that the generic 17 environmental impact statement is going to show small 18 effects. And so my question is directed at those 19 small effects. In light of the recent publication of 20 the National Academies of Science BEIR VII report, 21 Biological Effectives of Ionizing Radiation which has 22 finally shown something that many people have 23 suspected for decades which is that there is no 24 threshold below which radiation doses are safe. So I 25 want to know how the NRC has taken this new finding of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
30 1 BEIR VII from our own national academies into account 2 in their assessment? That's one half of the question. 3 The other half is I've always thought that 4 environmental impact statementsrelating to specific 5 sites would have to be specific and so why is it that 6 we're talking about generic environmental impact 7 statements? 8 MR. CAMERON: This is Chris, right? Chris 9 Nord, okay. 10 Rich, can you answer the question? II MR. EMCH: Right. I want to answer in 12 reverse order, if that's all right with you. The 13 first one which -- or the second one rather was why 14 generic, right. Okay. 15 When we say Category 1 issue, that means 16 that we've already examined it for all the plants and 17 we've determined it's small and it's the same for all 18 plants. An example of an issue that is considered a 19 Category 1 issue is, indeed, exposure to the public of 20 radiation. The reason it's considered to be a 21 Category 1 issue and to have a small impact is because 22 the NRC, the EPA issue radiation standards for the 23 public and the plants follow those standards, stay 24 within those standards and therefore our conclusion is 25 that if they're within those standards, that the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
31 1 impact is small. 2 Now let's move to the other part of your 3 question. Actually, that particular aspect of BEIR 4 VII wasn't entirely new and actually BEIR I, BEIR III, 5 BEIR V and BEIR VII all talk about similar issues and 6 from the very beginning, the BEIRs have always said 7 and all the international agencies and indeed the NRC 8 has always taken the approach that there is some 9 health risk associated with any amount of radiation 10 exposure. 11 Excuse me, sir, I'm talking. There is 12 some health risk associated with any amount of 13 radiation exposure. Now BEIR also talked about how 14 small that risk is for very small doses, but basically 15 in that respect BEIR VII, it's not new. We have known 16 that for some time. We have used that theory for some 17 time. 18 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, Rich. 19 Let's go to Evan and please introduce yourself. 20 MR. MULHOLLAND: My name is Evan 21 Mulholland. I have a question about the slide 22 decision standard for environmental review. You 23 mentioned that standard and my question is can you 24 give us some examples of what environmental impacts 25 might be unacceptable so that it would result in a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
32 1 non-issuance of the new license? What types of 2 impacts might cause that decision to happen? 3 Thank you. 4 MR. EMCH: It's fairly difficult for me to 5 answer that because we haven't run into it yet, but we 6 use the standards or the descriptors, if you will, 7 from NEPA which is small, moderate and large. If one 8 -- if we were to find a large impact, that would 9 certainly -- we would certainly be in a category where 10 we'd have to give serious consideration to whether 11 that was acceptable or not. 12 Now there are other ways of dealing with 13 it. There are mitigating measures and things like 14 that, but if we ran into that, we would be in that 15 kind of a range. 16 I will mention that in all the 42 that we 17 have finished up to date, the impacts were all small 18 with the exception of the impact of entrainment on the 19 winter flounder fishery at the Millstone Plant in 20 Connecticut which was a moderate. 21 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you, Rich. I 22 think Gary has a question over here. Your question, 23 Gary? 24 MR. SACHS: The question is what is the 25 basis the NRC uses to determine radiation exposure? NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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33 1 MR. EMCH: That's a pretty broad subject. 2 I'm going to kind of put that together with the 3 question that you asked when you were here earlier 4 today. 5 Basically, the NRC uses not only standards 6 from EPA. We look at broad range of. standards that 7 have been published. ICRP, you mentioned that earlier 8 today, International -- I'm never quite sure exactly 9 -- International Committee on Radiation Protection, I 10 think it is. There's also the NCRP, National 11 Committee on Radiation Measurements and Protection. 12 There's the BEIR report. There's a fairly 13 wide range in number of the National Academy of 14 Sciences, etcetera and after we look at all of those, 15 the NRC uses information from all of those to base the 16 radiation standards. In the case of EPA, the overall 17 standard from EPA is 25 millirem per year to any 18 member of the public from the entire fuel cycle, 19 including reactors. 20 MR. SACHS: The follow-up question would 21 be given BEIR VII, BEIR I, III, V and VII, all of 22 which say that any radiation is damaging to the 23 public, how can you as officers, so to speak, of the 24 public good, expect us to say oh, sure, fine, extend 25 the license for 20 more years, keeping putting out NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
34 1 radiation? It is damaging to the public. 2 MR. EMCH: You said "damaging". I said 3 there is some health risk from any amount of radiation 4 exposure. As I said, BEIR VII also talked about the 5 very, very low risk at very low doses at the kinds of 6 doses that we're talking about for public exposure 7 here. 8 MR. CAMERON: We don't have time for an 9 extended dialogue, but to the extent that we're saying 10 things here, let's make sure we get it on the record, 11 and Gary, you said? 12 MR. SACHS: You mean hurting us a little 13 bit. Thank you, sir. 14 MR. EMCH: I mean there is a certain 15 level, small though it may be, of risk associated with 16 any radiation exposure at the levels that we are 17 talking about. The levels that the NRC has defined 18 for nuclear power plants, we regard those doses as 19 being relatively safe for humans. 20 MR. CAMERON: Rich, can you just -- it's 21 not just the NRC in terms of -- I mean there's the 22 EPA. Can you just talk a little bit about other 23 Federal agencies? 24 MR. EMCH: Chip, we just went through the 25 whole thing. I said there's an EPA standard. There's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
35 1 an ICRP -- 2 MR. CAMERON: All right. 3 MR. EMCH: BEIR. 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Let's go right here 5 for a question. Yes, ma'am. And please introduce 6 yourself. 7 MS. MURPHY: My name is Karen Murphy. I 8 have a question. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 9 just made a ruling in California and it said that the 10 NRC must consider the consequences of acts of 11 terrorism and all licensing proceedings as part of the 12 environmental impact statement under NEPA. So will 13 you be doing that for VY? 14 MR. BENNER: As you indicate, that's a 15 very recent decision and there is an appeal and review 16 process associated with that decision. Right now, the 17 NRC lawyers are reviewing that decision to see whether 18 or not we would make any appeal attempts, but I would 19 say that there will be some movement on that decision, 20 either implemented or appealed well before the draft 21 environmental impact statement would be published for 22 Vermont Yankee. 23 MR. CAMERON: I guess it should be noted 24 that that decision did concern the consideration of 25 terrorism in the environment assessment and it should NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
36 1 be clear to people that does not mean that the NRC was 2 not considering terrorism as part of its safety 3 review. 4 Yes, sir? 5 MR. DOSTIS: I'm the waffle man. My 6 question is about background radiation. Do we have a 7 baseline that we can compare background radiation as 8 currently happening on the planet to, a baseline 9 perhaps 10, 20 years ago and to note what our 10 background radiation levels are now? That's my first 11 question. 12 Second question, it's known that ionizing 13 radiation occurs through solar, occurs through rocks, 14 through -- occurs TV and computers. Do you think that 15 sitting in front of your screen, your computer screen 16 is as safe or safer than being in a nuclear power 17 plant? 18 MR. EMCH: Let's do the first part of it 19 first and I'll get to the second part of it. The 20 first part of it is, not exactly sure what it was all, 21 but I'll try to hit some -- and you'll let me know if 22 I don't get it, okay. I think I got it. I'll try it. 23 If I miss something, you let me know. 24 Currently, what we saw and there's a chart 25 out in the hallway that talks about this, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)o 234-4433
37 1 approximately, everybody as a member of planet earth 2 gets about 360 millirem per year of background 3 radiation. Now that includes cosmic radiation which 4 you mentioned. It includes radiation from naturally 5 occurring radionuclides in the crust of the earth such 6 as granite and building materials. It includes 7 radionuclides that are in your body as a course of 8 nature. It includes medical x-rays, things like that 9 and usually included in that 360 we have the line that 10 says "less than one millirem per year from the nuclear 11 fuel cycle". 12 So that's -- approximately 360 that 13 includes radon in your homes, that sort of thing. 14 There's a wide range of sources of radiation. 15 Now I don't know -- I don't recall reading 16 anything that that number has gone up in the last 20 17 to 25 years what you were asking earlier. What I can 18 tell you though as far as a background, before Vermont 19 Yankee ever started operation, they did a pre-20 operational radiological environmental monitoring 21 program for I think it was approximately three years 22 to establish what the background levels of radiation 23 were in.the same areas they were going to be taking 24 measurements during operation. 25 So they established their background, yes. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
38 1 There's a baseline around the plant to the 2 extent that they had monitoring stations in 3 Brattleboro, yes. 4 MR. CAMERON: Okay. 5 MR. EMCH: Pardon? 6 MR. CAMERON: We've got to get this on the 7 record, so -- and it is the waffle man, right? 8 MR. DOSTIS: Yes. 9 MR. CAMERON: Can you just ask that and 10 then we're going to take two more questions and we're 11 going to go the public comment. 12 Yes sir. 13 MR. DOSTIS: Okay, you have a baseline 14 that was formed 33 years ago, I would say. Has that 15 been updated to recent times? 16 MR. EMCH: Okay, well, at the locations 17 right at the plant, it's obviously very difficult to 18 do that because the plant is now operating, but as 19 part of their environmental monitoring program, they 20 do still have what they call control stations, what we 21 refer to as control stations. They have indicator 22 stations that are very close to the plant, control 23 stations that are a sizeable distance from the plant. 24 The assumption is that those control stations at a 25 sizeable distance from the plant, where they're taking NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
39 1 measurements, that there is absolutely no influence 2 from the plant on those, so you can watch for 3 variations in natural background which there are 4 variations. You can look for variations in natural 5 background that way, sir. 6 MR. CAMERON: Okay, thank you. We're 7 going to take this gentleman and then this lady down 8 here and then I think other questions are going to 9 have to wait until after the meeting.
10. Yes sir. Please introduce yourself.
11 MR. JEFFRIES: Thank you. My name is Dan 12 Jeffries. I'm an engineer at the Vermont Yankee 13 nuclear power plant. The question relates to this 14 matter of personnel exposure to ionizing radiation. 15 We have about 100 nuclear power plants in the country 16 and roughly with retirements, I'm just going to make 17 an estimate that maybe we've had a thousand people 18 work at those nuclear power plants. So we've got 19 about 100,000 people who have been working at nuclear 20 power plants for about the last 30 years. Does the 21 NRC or does any agency that you're aware of evaluate 22 the health condition of those 100,000 employees in 23 regard to any adverse effects on their health as a 24 result of their having worked at these nuclear power 25 plants for all this time? NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
40 1 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Dan. 2 Rich? 3 MR. EMCH: There have been some studies. 4 There was one completed fairly recently that was 5 published in the British Medical Journal, I believe it 6 was. It was a study of -- with using records of 7 occupational exposure, plant workers, etcetera, for 15 8 nations. It was led by a Dr. Cardis, C-A-R-D-I-S. 9 The NRC is still evaluating it, but I think, in 10 general, what it showed was that by and large, no, 11 there was no excess cancers amongst that group. 12 MR. CAMERON: Okay,' thank you. Yes ma'am. 13 MS. KELNER: I have a question. The woman 14 back here said that there was a decision to take into 15 account terrorist threats to nuclear plants and the 16 response that you gave immediately was the NRC is 17 thinking of appealing it and I'm wondering why that 18 would be the first response to something like that 19 instead of wow, we better take this more seriously or 20 what are the valid points in that? 21 So I'm a little concerned with that 22 initial response. I'm wondering why. 23 MR. BENNER: Like Chip said, the Court's 24 ruling was not directed at whether or not the NRC was 25 doing a good job at assessing terrorism at nuclear NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
41 1 power plants. The Court's decision was specific to 2 does the NRC need to talk about the environmental 3 impacts of terrorism in our environmental -- in that 4 case it was environmental assessment. For this 5 activity, it would be for the environmental impact 6 statement. 7 Now going into that decision, the NRC had 8 arguments of why it felt that terrorism did not need 9 to be considered in the environmental impact 10 statement. So certainly we are going to do whatever 11 the Courts instruct us to do, but weneed to look at, 12 we need to go through the ruling of the Court to see 13 if there was a misunderstanding, we didn't convey what 14 we intended to convey or whether there's something we 15 can learn from it. 16 MR. CAMERON: That's right, but let me try 17 -- your name is? 18 MS. KELNER: Marian Kelner. 19 MR. CAMERON: Marian, can I just try to 20 answer your question? 21 MS. KELNER: Why do you think terrorism 22 shouldn't be part of the environmental impact 23 statement? 24 MR. CAMERON: That wasn't your first 25 question. You were upset about the fact that why NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
42 1 should the NRC think about appealing this. And with 2 any agency that gets a negative ruling on something 3 from Federal Court, one of the things that the agency 4 has to do and in concert with the Department of 5 Justice is just to consider that option. So that's 6 just sort of a matter of course. It doesn't mean that 7 because the NRC, the Commission is considering that 8 that the NRC thinks that terrorism shouldn't be part 9 of the licensing review. And we do have one of our 10 members of the General Counsel here who can talk to 11 you a little bit more about that after the meeting. 12 Steven Hamrick. 13 If you could explore that further with 14 her, Steve. 15 I think we need to go to public comment. 16 We've got a lot of speakers which is good, but we want 17 to make sure we hear from all of you and I'm going to 18 just list the first few speakers so that you know when 19 to expect to speak and I guess I'm just going to ask 20 you all to try to be as brief as possible so we can 21 get everybody on. 22 But our first speaker is former Governor 23 of Vermont, Governor Thomas P. Salmon, who we're going 24 to ask to speak and then we're going to go to Debbie 25 Katz and Sunny Miller. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
43 1 So Governor? 2 And we're going to ask everybody to come 3 up here and use the podium. Thank you. 4 GOV. SALMON: Thank you, Mr. Cameron, 5 ladies and gentlemen. My name is Thomas P. Salmon. 6 I've lived in this county for 47 years. I was 7 privileged to serve as Governor of Vermont for two 8 terms in the 1970s. More recently, for much of the 9 1990s, I served as president of the University of 10 Vermont. I currently am a member of the Vermont 11 Energy Partnership which is represented here this 12 evening here. 13 Let me try to be mercifully brief, if I 14 may. It was my understanding that the environmental 15 considerations were the primary focus of this meeting 16 and I've tried to structure my brief remarks on 17 environmental concerns. First among equals is that 18 since 1972, when the Vernon plant came online, the 19 State of Vermont has avoided some 100 million metric 20 tons of fossil fuel pollution and that's not an 21 inconsequential environmental effect of life, 22 particularly given the realities of potential 23 replacement power later in this century with the 24 candidates principally being natural gas and coal, 25 both of which cause gaseous greenhouse emissions into NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
44 1 the environment. 2 Point two is the fact that we're in the 3 midst of a global warming debate in this country. And 4 in my view, decisions ultimately made by regulatory 5 bodies such as the NRC must factor in the realities of 6 global warming and the clear and present danger 7 suggested by unnecessary and unwanted ingestions of 8 improper pollution into the Vermont and the 9 environment of the country. 10 Now I have an old-fashioned view, having 11 watched this plant grow, having been in the 12 legislature of Vermont when it was authorized many 13 years ago and that view is not likely accepted by all, 14 maybe viewed as heresy in some quarters, but it speaks 15 to the notion that this plant has been both safe and 16 environmentally friendly over these many years and in 17 that context in terms of its contribution or I should 18 say noncontribution to pollution in this state, has 19 helped make Vermont a cleaner place in which to live. 20 Now we're engaged in our state in a 21 conversation about energy a-s we speak and this meeting 22 tonight is an exceedingly important meeting on that 23 subject. Now there are some interesting participants 24 in this discussion and I'm aware of one. The Sharon 25 Academy up in Sharon, Vermont, senior class, this past NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
45 1 winter, put together an energy plan and they went up 2 to Montpelier and introduced the plan before the House 3 Natural Resources Committee. We had opportunity in 4 the Vermont Energy Partnership, myself and Amanda 5 Eiby, got to visit with the students and offer a 6 critique of their remarkable work, but what we learned 7 is this. These students in their analysis of 8 Vermont's energy future included that nuclear energy 9 is "clean, reliable, affordable and long lasting." 10 And in opting for renewal of the license issue before 11 us tonight and beyond, to describe the "cultural 12 negativity about nuclear power as unjustified." That 13 was the students' view in their words. 14 The point is this. People of all ages and 15 perspectives are entitled to participate in this 16 debate and maybe, just maybe, our kids might teach us 17 a lesson or two on this important subject. 18 Now this Commission will travel many miles .19 before it sleeps on these issues. You begin the 20 process here in Brattleboro tonight and I for one wish 21 you well in your profoundly important work. 22 (Applause.) '23 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Governor Salmon. 24 And next, we're going to go to Deb Katz of Citizens 25 Awareness Network. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
46 1 MS. KATZ: The NRC is here tonight to talk 2 about it's environmental impact study. Now you'd 3 think this is a no brainer, right? To store toxic 4 waste along the banks of the Connecticut River is 5 dangerous and vulnerable and to store more of this 6 waste would be even more dangerous and vulnerable for 7 another 20 years. And yet, that's exactly what 8 they're talking about doing. 9 And the waste confidence rule of the NRC 10 which at this point is a commitment that this waste is 11 going to move somewhere is basically bankrupt, giving 12 the legislative problems with getting waste anywhere. 13 And it's a no brainer, isn't it, to store 14 toxic waste, 35 million curies of cesium alone, 70 15 feet in the air, outside of containment. That seems 16 pretty dangerous and vulnerable as well, and yet, they 17 want to do more of this. And they don't have a 18 solution to what to do with the stuff they have now. 19 This all seems like a no brainer, but it 20 doesn't seem to be a no brainer to Entergy or the NRC. 21 They think all of this potentially makes a lot of 22 sense and in this post-9/11 world, this isn't just 23 dangerous, this is irresponsible and unconscionable. 24 And although the NRC continually says we can't talk 25 about terrorism, we can't talk about terrorism because NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
47 1 they're dealing with it every day. 2 The truth is the California Appellate 3 Court said we can and we must and they rejected NRC's 4 arguments that looking at a terrorist attack in terms 5 of licensing was too speculative, that it was looking 6 at a worse case scenario, that it was secrecy and so 7 we couldn't ever talk about it. 8 The truth is we better start talking about 9 it be cause if this reactor is here and it's a prime 10 target for terrorism, we're all affected by it and 11 even if it's not attacked by terrorism to have nuclear 12 waste that will be dangerous for 250,000 years stored 13 on this site for decades, if not hundreds of years is 14 something that should not be allowed. Without a 15 solution to the waste problem, there should be no 16 relicensing. And that should be it, cut and dry. 17 The truth is the 9th Circuit, in its 18 decision won't save us. It acknowledges our fears and 19 our concerns, but remember, the NRC is in the 20 permitting business. It believes in safe nuclear 21 power. We do not. 22 To create a sustainable energy future, we 23 can't just put ourselves in the hands of the NRC 24 although we want to thank New England Coalition, the 25 Massachusetts AG and the State of Vermont for, in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)o 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234.4433
48 1 fact, intervening to hold Vermont Yankee and the NRC 2 accountable. It is the Vermont legislators that will 3 decide our future. They will decide what is best for 4 all of us and we must keep this process open and 5 honest. 6 In New York State, Congresswoman Nita 7 Lowey commissioned a study by the National Academy of 8 Sciences about whether Indian Point could be replaced, 9 the Indian Point reactors. And it, in fact, found 10 that Indian Point reactors could be replaced in the 11 State of New York. It wouldn't be easy, but it was 12 possible. 13 But why don't we have a National Academy 14 of Science study here? Why haven't our legislators 15 called for that so that we can have an independent 16 look at what it would take to replace Vermont Yankee, 17 not done by the NRC as part of their environmental 18 impact study which is set up to permit Vermont Yankee 19 to go ahead, not done just by the Public Service 20 Commission which has mixed loyalties in terms of this, 21 but a real independent study. It is the will that we 22 have to exert on our legislators to do what's right. 23 We need a clear vision at this point of a safe energy 24 future, a future that we know is safe for our 25 children. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
49 1 I want to end with this notion of a
2. vision. We envision a future of safety, prosperity 3 and health for all. People generate their own 4 electricity in their own homes. Local energy 5 production is easy and accessible for all. We live in 6 a world where safety, prosperity and human health are 7 what we value above all and it is something that we 8 have to hold sacred for all of us, not relicensing 9 Vermont Yankee.
10 Thank you. 11 (Applause.) 12 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Deb Katz. We're 13 going to go to Sunny Miller now. Then we're going to 14 go Mike Flory and Shawn Banfield. 15 Sunny? 16 MS. MILLER: Thank you, neighbors, for 17 coming. I note that the relatively sparse number of 18 people here. A large number of us, willing to come 19 out on a dreary night, but many others unwilling to 20 come and hear a charade because we don't believe that 21 this environmental review will adequately investigate 22 the details that need to be investigated. 23 First of all, a point of order. These are 24 plants. On the shores of the Connecticut River, we 25 have a nuclear power station and if our friends in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
50 1 Washington aren't willing to notice that plants are 2 green, we, in Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts 3 are going to revise our language and quit calling the 4 nuclear power station a plant, because it's a 5 euphemism that obscures the reality. 6 Smell them. They are sweet. 7 Secondly, radiation monitoring is now 8 inadequate and will be inadequate. In Western 9 Massachusetts, the Department of Health is doing no 10 radiological monitoring. When I called them and asked 11 how long would it take to find out my levels in 12 Deerfield, they said well, one to two hours. But of 13 course, that's a theoretical possibility. If the call 14 comes in the middle of the night, will the response be 15 prompt? If there's uncertainty about whether the 16 person who called was a little daft, will the response 17 be prompt? It will not be adequate because government 18 likes for us to remain calm. Government likes for us 19 to conspire with the illusion that everything is under 20 control. 21 And we tolerate and are polite to listen 22 and to consider things together, but there will come 23 a time when the process is failing, that the people 24 arise and insist as they did on Cochibamba, Bolivia, 25 when Bechtel came and announced that they had made a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
51 1 deal and owned all the water. The people of 2 Cochibamba came to the streets and asserted 3 successfully using little more than conch shells, that 4 the water belongs to the people. This air, this land, 5 this water belongs to the people and with all due 6 respect, former Governor, I don't know where you went, 7 Salmon, the 250,000 years of radioactive waste storage 8 and management which, of course, will be fraught with 9 problems has an untold greenhouse effect. So please 10 don't imagine that nuclear power is saving us from 11 greenhouse effects. 12 Thirdly, health monitoring is inadequate. 13 And it will be inadequate, except that where there's 14 a will, there's a way and we have been successful in 15 collecting a number of baby teeth. At Traprock Peace 16 Center, at the Radiation Health Project, Radiation and 17 Health Project -- radiation.org is their website. 18 Ours is traprockpeace.org. You can download a form to 19 mail in baby teeth. We need more baby teeth from the 20 10-mile radius and we can assess Strontium-90 levels
21. to actually see the differences. Mothers who were 22 carrying their children while they lived within the 23 10-mile zone and breastfeeding while they lived in the 24 10-mile zone are particularly important. Please ask 25 your neighbors if they've been saving baby teeth and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 there are forms outside. If all of you who care, even 2 if you work at the reactor, please, I invite you to 3 participate in this science project to see what our 4 levels are. I don't expect the environmental group to 5 be doing that for us. We have to do it for ourselves. 6 Fourth, thank you, Deb, for mentioning the 7 future because down in Franklin County, Massachusetts 8 and the rest of Western Massachusetts, there's a group 9 called Co-op Power is working to form a biodiesel co-10 op and you have a chance to invest, so that the people 11 own this co-op and determine that after the biodiesel 12 factory, not a plant, is successful, those investments 13 will turn to solar and wind power because where 14 there's a will, there's a way, whether government sees 15 it or not. 16 Fourthly -- that was number four. Number 17 five, do we have an in-depth -- defense-in-depth? Do 18 we expect environmental impact in detail and in depth? 19 No, I'm sorry, I don't expect it, but I do expect that 20 on father's day when Citizens Awareness Network and 21 Traprock Peace Center and probably the New England 22 Peace Pagoda, I hope and others will join together in 23 a walk to the Entergy Headquarters. Some will gather 24 at Entergy, the reactor site. Others will gather 25 beginning at 10. Others will gather at noon at the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
53 1 Brattleboro Common and come together to the Entergy 2 offices. Let's bring our plants, our strawberries and 3 anticipate the success of our people who are willing 4 to endure and persevere for what is right. 5 Thank you all for envisioning that bright 6 future together. 7 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Sunny, 8 and-- 9 (Applause.) 10 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. And I wanted to 11 switch the order to allow two people to come up next 12 who perhaps need to leave early. One is Beth McElwee 13 and the other one is Ellen Cota. So if we could have 14 Beth come and then Ellen. 15 Beth? And Ellen, you're right there. 16 Okay, good. 17 MS. McELWEE: Good evening. My name is 18 Beth McElwee and I'm here tonight to share a unique 19 perspective on the socio-economic benefits of Vermont 20 Yankee to our surrounding communities. I was born and 21 raised in Brattleboro and have had the opportunity to 22 interact with Vermont Yankee in a variety of 23 capacities over the past 24 years. 24 As a young teenager, I worked alongside 25 other kids my age at Vermont Yankee functions, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
54 1 preparing rooms, serving meals and distributing 2 materials to attendees. By providing these 3 opportunities to responsible youth, Vermont Yankee 4 introduced us to a *high standard of work, while 5 encouraging us to further develop our interpersonal 6 communication skills. 7 As an active member of my high school 8 class, I approached Vermont Yankee on several 9 occasions to request their sponsorship of various club 10 activities and events, including Register to Vote Day 11 and High School Day Under the Dome. With enthusiasm 12 and generosity, Vermont Yankee went above and beyond 13 my requests with their donations to both of these 14 community-oriented activities. 15 As a college business student, I served as 16 a part-time summer intern for Vermont Yankee Nuclear 17 Power Corporation during their transition to Entergy 18 Vermont Yankee. The internship and co-op 19 opportunities provided by Vermont Yankee are highly 20 utilized and greatly beneficial to students of all 21 disciplines throughout many regions of the country. 22 The contacts and experience gained in this internship 23 helped me to excel academically and gave me the 24 credentials to obtain a highly sought position in the 25 Boston area following graduation. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202)f 234-4433
55 1 Two years later, I 've made the decision to 2 return to the Brattleboro area and pursue my 3 professional and personal aspirations in this 4 beautiful rural community. As I suspected, the job 5 market in this area is significantly different than 6 that of Greater Boston and I found it difficult to 7 find professional employment opportunities, to utilize 8 the experience and skills I've worked so hard to 9 obtain. 10 Vermont Yankee is one of the few 11 organizations in this area at which these skills could 12 be fully realized. In addition, Vermont Yankee 13 provides the needed infrastructure to attract other 14 businesses to this area, so that young adults like me 15 will be able to stay in Vermont and enjoy the area 16 we've grown to appreciate. 17 We need to make sure that there are jobs 18 available here to support those who wish to make this 19 area our home. Vermont Yankee goes a long way in 20 helping to secure this future for Vermonters. 21 Vermont Yankee should stand tall in this 22 community. In addition to providing the most 23 reliable, clean and safe source of energy throughout 24 New England, their commitment to community 25 involvement, youth development, and vast employment NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
56 1 opportunities makes them a crucial and highly 2 beneficial component of this community. A renewal of 3 their operating license is integral to the 4 continuation of the flourishing New England rural 5 communities that we've all come to love. 6 Thank you. 7 (Applause.) 8 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Beth. We're 9 going to go to Ellen Cota. Then we're going to 10 continue with Mike Flory, Shawn Banfield, Claire Chang 11 and Ray Shadis. 12 Ellen Cota. 13 MS. COTA: Yes, I'm Ellen Cota. I am a 14 mother. I work at Vermont Yankee and I live in the 15 Emergency Planning Zone and it make sense to approve 16 the license renewal. 17 Entergy is committed to being 18 environmentally and socially responsible and has given 19 a lot to this community. 20 The financial impact of not extending the 21 license would affect Vermont negatively for many 22 years. But more importantly, the environmental impact 23 of closing Vermont Yankee would pose even greater 24 threat. People have been told not to eat the fish out 25 of the Connecticut River because of the mercury NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
57 1 levels. Well, Vermont Yankee and other nuclear power 2 plants do not emit the poisons or greenhouse gases 3 which are slowly devastating our environment. 4 In addition, Vermont Yankee has a proven 5 record of safe operations. Safety is and has been its 6 number one priority. Entergy is a business. 7 Corporate Entergy is a business. And I can assure you 8 that Corporate Entergy would not put money into this 9 license renewal process if they did not believe that 10 Vermont Yankee was a well run, well maintained, safe 11 facility. 12 Vermont Yankee is committed to safe 13 operation and if I did not believe this, I would not 14 work there. 15 The environmental benefits of generating 16 electricity without emitting greenhouse gases is a 17 wonderful legacy for our children and our 18 grandchildren. I believe that we should approve the 19 license renewal process. 20 Thank you. 21 (Applause.) 22 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Ellen. Please, 23 you're going to hear opinions that are different than 24 yours and just, you know, just respect those opinions, 25 that's all. Thank you. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
58 1 Next four speakers, Mike Flory, Shawn 2 Banfield, Claire Chang, Ray Shadis. 3 Mike Flory. 4 MR. FLORY: Thank you for the opportunity 5 to be here and speak this evening. My name is Michael 6 Flory. Some of you may have read about me a few weeks 7 ago. I was the fire brigade member reported as 8 injured in our unusual event and I'm happy to say that 9 reports of my demise were just a bit exaggerated. 10 (Laughter.) 11 I am the chairman of Unit 8, Local 300 of 12 the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 13 I work at Vermont Yankee along with more than 120 IBEW 14 members. I'm proud to say that I was born and raised 15 here in Vermont and I currently live just a few 16 hundred yards from the front gate. 17 We are proud to work at Vermont Yankee 18 because of the essential power it produces. We-know 19 that our work at the plant helps to make Vermont a 20 cleaner, more prosperous place to live. Without 21 Vermont Yankee, the 620 megawatts that we currently 22 supply to the New England grid would have to come from 23 a fossil fuel power plant. Wind power, the 24 Connecticut River hydro project and energy 25 conservation, while all nice ideas, simply cannot NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
59 1 replace the steady, reliable, baseline power that we 2 produce. 3 Since opening in 1972, Vermont Yankee has 4 prevented more than 100 million tons of fossil fuel 5 emissions from entering the atmosphere. This has been 6 prevented not only by rendering an in-state coal plant 7 unnecessary, but also from reducing the amount of out-8 of-state electricity that we have to purchase, most of 9 which would come from coal plants, as coal still 10 accounts for half of the power produced in America 11 today. 12 In 2005, Vermont Yankee avoided the 13 emissions of 7,700 tons of sulphur dioxide; 2,000 tons 14 of nitrogen oxide and 2.5 million metric tons of 15 carbon dioxide. Emissions of sulphur dioxide lead to 16 the formation of acid rain. Nitrogen oxides are a key 17 precursor of both ground level ozone and smog and 18 greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide contribute to 19 global warming. 20 The 2,000 tons of nitrogen oxide prevented 21 by Vermont Yankee last year is the equivalent of what 22 would have been generated by 105,000 vehicles. For 23 comparison, in Vermont, we have 280,000 registered 24 cars. Let me repeat. We at Vermont Yankee are proud 25 of what we do, proud to produce power cleanly and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
60 1 safely and safety is our highest priority. 2 We would not work in the plant, let alone 3 live near it with our families, if we felt that that 4 place was not safe or that safety was not a priority 5 at Vermont Yankee. 6 We have seen and been instrumental in the 7 plant's continued enhancements and upgrades, most 8 recently during the power uprate process. The cost of 9 Vermont Yankee's power to Vermont consumers like 10 myself is also far below regional market prices. As 11 a baseload generator, we are able to provide lower 12 cost power which is so critical for this state. 13 I respectfully submit that if you like 14 having lights that go on at the flick of a switch, if 15 you like computers that don't fry as a result of 16 rolling brownouts, if you enjoyed air conditioning 17 during last week's heat wave or heat during last 18 month's cold snap, you should like Vermont Yankee's 19 low cost, clean, safe power. 20 Vermont Yankee's value to my home state 21 can only become more valuable as time goes on. As 22 global warming becomes more and more destructive, we 23 can remain an environmentally friendly source of power 24 with zero greenhouse gas emissions. As the world 25 energy market has become more competitive, we can NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
61 1 continue to be a source of reliable, economic, 2 baseload power and that is why we encourage the NRC to 3 renew Vermont Yankee's license. 4 Thank you. 5 (Applause.) 6 MR. CAMERON: Okay. Thank you, Mike. And 7 is Shawn -- Shawn is here. Shawn Banfield. And I 8 would just encourage everybody -- I would thank 9 everybody for following the guidelines and just 10 encourage everybody to be as brief as possible. Thank 11 you. 12 Shawn. 13 MS. BANFIELD: Thank you. Good evening. 14 My name is Shawn Banfield. I'm here tonight as an 15 active member and officer of the board of directors. 16 for the Vermont Energy Partnership. I'd like to thank 17 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for holding this 18 hearing tonight. 19 The Vermont Energy Partnership was founded 20 in January of 2005, shortly after the state report 21 warned of a serious energy challenge facing us in the 22 near future. 23 Our founding members came together, 24 because they recognized the importance of making sure 25 that adequate electricity was available so Vermont NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
62 1 could continue to be a great place to live and work. 2 The partnership is a diverse group of more than 50 3 business, labor and community leaders, committed to 4 addressing the immense electricity supply gap issues 5 facing Vermont. Our members include a cross section 6 of experts in the energy sector. Our members employ 7 thousands of Vermonters. They run businesses, large 8 and small. And represent union workers, some of whom 9 devote their professional lives to the operation of 10 Vermont Yankee in a safe manner. 11 The partnership fully supports the 12 relicensing of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant 13 in Vernon and I will explain why. It is no secret 14 that Vermont's demand for energy is continuing to 15 grow. But it may be a less known fact that Vermont 16 faces uncertainty over its future energy supply. 17 Currently, one third of Vermont's electric supply 18 comes from the Hydro Quebec -- from Hydro Quebec. And 19 these long-term contracts will begin to expire 20 starting in 2014. There is no guarantee that the 21 contracts will either be renewed or renegotiated, 22 given the other more local business opportunities. 23 Hydro Quebec has in the province. 24 Another approximate one third of Vermont's 25 electric supply is made up of a wide array of both in-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
63 1 state and out-of-state renewable sources and 2 nonrenewable sources. The Partnership supports the 3 in-state development of renewable energy supplies, 4 encourages the increased use of energy efficiency and 5 the expansion of conservation measures. However, the 6 fact remains a reliable energy portfolio must be made 7 up of a baseload source of power. 8 Vermont Yankee accounts for the last one 9 third of the Vermont portfolio, energy portfolio. 10 About 34 percent of Vermont's total electricity supply 11 needs are met by Vermont Yankee today. 12 So let me put this debate in further 13 context. Vermont has not brought online a significant 14 power generating facility in over 20 years and there 15 are no plans to date to do so in the near future. To 16 make matters worse, proposals to develop small-scale 17 generation in Vermont have been met with sharp 18 criticism and severe opposition. 19 In a time when energy costs are at their 20 highest, the Vermont Yankee plant will not only play 21 an essential role in our state's energy portfolio, it 22 is critically important to Vermont's economy and 23 environment. 24 From an economic standpoint, a stable, 25 relatively low-cost power provider helps to maintain NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
64 1 and expand businesses in Vermont, while at the same 2 time providing an opportunity to attract new business. 3 In a time when Vermont faces an increasing, aging 4 population the plant provides employment to 600 highly 5 skilled men and women. Those individuals in the 6 company provide more than $200 million in economic 7 benefits to the Wyndham County region and the State of 8 Vermont as a whole. 9 According to the Vermont Public Service 10 Department, the company through the power purchase 11 agreement, will provide Vermont customers 12 approximately $250 million in savings over the life of 13 the contract. This estimate, it should be noted, was 14 made when energy prices were far lower than they are 15 today. And in fact, at 3.95 cents per kilowatt hour, 16 Vermont Yankee power today costs Vermonters 40 percent 17 less than other sources of electricity. This matters 18 most to Vermont's elderly and the poor. 19 But aside from the important economic 20 benefits of Vermont Yankee's continued operation, 21 there are also relative environmental benefits from 22 this in-state generation source. Today, we live in a 23 country where half of the electricity generated comes 24 from coal-burning sources, yet Vermonters can be proud 25 to say that that is not true here. Vermont Yankee is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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65 1 a clean, emissions-free facility. Unlike fossil fuel-2 generating facilities, nuclear power does not release 3 harmful greenhouse gases and other toxins into the 4 atmosphere that are the primary cause for global 5 warming. 6 It is becoming abundantly clearly that 7 nuclear energy is the only emissions-free source that 8 can meet consumers' demand for reliability and at a 9 reasonable cost. 10 Leading environmentalists around the 11 world, like Dr. Patrick Moore, co-founder of 12 Greenpeace, have come to the conclusion that nuclear 13 power is the only source that can help remedy and save 14 the planet from catastrophic climate change. Just 15 last month, Dr. Moore said in the Washington Post 16 "nuclear energy is the only large-scale, cost-17 effective energy source that can reduce these 18 greenhouse emissions while continuing to satisfy a 19 growing demand for power. In these days, it can do so 20 safely." 21 He went on to say, "the extremists who 22 fail to consider the enormous and obvious benefits of 23 nuclear power also fail to understand that nuclear 24 energy is practical, safe and environmentally 25 friendly." NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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66 1 In closing, without Vermont Yankee, 2 Vermont utilities will be forced to buy additional 3 power on the spot market that would be less reliable 4 and considerably more expensive. 5 Do Vermonters really want to pay more and 6 be dependent on power from fossil fuel sources such as 7 natural gas and coal which now contribute to global 8 warming and the earth's degradation? The Vermont 9 Energy Partnership thinks not. 10 Vermont Yankee has an important and 11 crucial to play in the future of our state. It is 12 both economically and environmentally appropriate to 13 grant the plant's license extension. We know there's 14 a wide array of support for the continued operation of 15 this plant for the reasons I have articulated here 16 tonight: its essential economic benefits, its 17 environmentally sound operations and its important 18 role as a component in the Vermont energy portfolio. 19 On behalf of the Partnership, I'd like to 20 thank you for the time here today and I appreciate the 21 opportunity. 22 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Shawn. 23 (Applause.) 24 MR. CAMERON: Claire Chang is going to 25 join us down here and then we're going to go to Ray NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
67 1 Shadis and then to Sky Churchill. 2 This is Claire. 3 MS. CHANG: Hi, I'm Claire Chang. I 4 recently saw a very interesting movie. It was called 5 "Enron, the Smartest Guys in the Room." And in this 6 movie, the movie was based on a book that was written 7 called The Smartest Guys in the Room and these -- 8 Enron is an energy company. They were dealing with 9 originally natural gas and then they moved into a 10 number of other energy sources including electricity. II And what they were doing was -- I don't know how to 12 explain it. It's very complicated. But the 13 California energy crisis, quote unquote, which we all 14 knew a little bit about, but didn't really know a lot 15 about, is covered pretty heavily in this film in which 16 Enron, Duke Energy and a number of other utilities, 17 which Entergy is also a utility -- it is a power 18 company that sells energy, electricity and other forms 19 of energy at the highest cost that it can possibly get 20 to reap the highest profits that it can possibly get. 21 However much they're paying their workers 22 or they spend on publicity or community groups or high 23 school soccer clubs or whatever else, Entergy is a 24 profit-making company. 25 (Applause.)] NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
68 1 So in this movie, it turns out that the 2 utilities colluded with the electrical generating 3 plant to restrict and divert and artificially reduce 4 the demand -- I mean reduce the supply causing an 5 increase in costs and therefore an increase in profit 6 to the amount of $9 billion in one year. California 7 paid out $9 billion that it didn't need to pay out. 8 Entergy, because it's also a public -- not 9 a public, but a privately-owned utility company, also 10 sells its electricity out on the market and trades. 11 Traders buy it and compete for whatever can be 12 generated. So for Vermont Yankee, all of its 13 electrical generating capacity has been planned out 14 for 2006. That's the rest of this year and for part 15 of 2007. All that electricity has already been sold 16 and paid for, speculatively, by traders, by the 17 national grid, by whoever Entergy can sell the power 18 to. 19 So there isn't any way that they can now 20 change the cost of that electricity that they've sold 21 it for and I don't know the numbers. I just know that 22 it was sold. 23 So it's committed to this generation of a 24 set price of baseload power and baseload power means 25 that it's running 24/7 at a very even amount and I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
69 1 think Vermont Yankee is now at 650 kilowatt hours or 2 something -- huh? Megawatt hours, right, sorry. 3 So they've already sold all this to the 4 grid and the grid has already agreed to a price, but 5 the national grid or the regional grid actually for 6 New England currently has a surplus. There's extra 7 electricity out there. We don't actually have to have 8 part of the electricity that's coming from VY right 9 now. And I don't know the technical aspects of how 10 the grid works, what happens to this extra 11 electricity. But what we need to do is to investigate 12 other ways of producing this electricity and to make 13 it economically unfeasible for Entergy to continue 14 running Vermont Yankee at its rate right now, which 15 does not mean firing all the workers. 16 All the workers at Vermont Yankee right 17 now will be employed for decades when Vermont Yankee 18 gets shut down, whether it's tomorrow, in 2012 or 19 whatever year it is because there is decommissioning. 20 The plant doesn't just -- nobody just goes through the 21 plant and turns out the lights and says "we're done, 22 goodbye." No, there's an awful lot of work that needs 23 to be done at that power plant. 24 So anyone who says that by turning off 25 Vermont Yankee means losing your job, it's not true. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
70. 1 There's no need for that to happen. So one of the 2 ways that we can economically make it unfeasible to 3 Entergy to not run Vermont Yankee is to reduce our 4 energy demand. 5 Energy efficiency and conservation are the 6 easiest and lowest cost ways of reducing that energy 7 demand. It's already been estimated that even in 8 Vermont, if we replace five lightbulbs with compact 9 fluorescents and a refrigerator or other major 10 appliance like an air conditioner or home heating, 11 other large electrical demand with energy-efficient or 12 EnergyStar-rated appliances, we could reduce the 13 demand in Vermont by 25 percent. Now this does 14 require the participation of every household or double 15 participation by half the households. But I don't 16 think that that's an unreasonable goal to have, 17 especially since it would mean that we would no longer 18 have to depend on Vermont Yankee's electrical 19 generation. 20 Another thing that you can do is you look 21 at your electric bill. The average kilowatt hour per 22 day usage is approximately 21 kilowatt hours a day. 23 So 25 percent of that would be about 5 kilowatt hours 24 a day. This is on your electric bill that you get 25 every month. So if you look at that, that would be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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71 1 about 16 kilowatt hours. You can use that monthly 2 bill that you get to gauge how well you're doing in 3 reducing your energy demand. It's not something 4 that's-,impossible. It's not something that's so 5 beyond our own personal efforts, we can all take it 6 upon ourselves to make something, to effect a change 7 here and to do something different. 8 Lots of simple things that you can do, 9 just changing your light bulbs, putting your 10 appliances on power strips and turning them off when 11 you're not using them. A lot of television sets and 12 radios, stereos and appliances have a pre-heat on them 13 which means that they instantly turn on with the 14 remote control. But if you put them on a power strip, 15 it's amazing how much electricity you'll actually save 16 by not having these appliances warming 24 hours1 days 0.143 weeks 0.0329 months a day, 17 7 days a week. 18 The power strip also, amazingly enough, 19 can save your appliances because you're then no longer 20 susceptible to power surges and lightning strikes. I 21 know that we don't get those around here very much, 22 but -- you can turn your hot water down to 125 degrees 23 or 120 degrees and if you have an electric hot water 24 heater, it will also reduce your demand. 25 So in order to think about what other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
72 1 choices we have and what we need to do, as 2 individuals, it's really hard to think about wind 3 power and solar power and what can we do as 4 individuals.- 5 The best thing that I can think of that we 6 need to do is to read. Read books, read magazines, 7 read articles, go to the web and Harvey Wasserman has 8 a wonderful book out called Solar Topia which is a 9 fantasy, but it gives you something to hold on to and 10 something to dream about and something to think about 11 of how you can apply it to your every day life. In it 12 he says that basically wind power right now, as it is 13 technologically developed is capable of replacing a 14 majority of the electrical generation in the United 15 States from fossil fuels and nuclear power. We're not 16 just talking about only nuclear. 17 Now some of the complaints about wind 18 power are that it kills birds. Well, the first wind 19 towers that went up and I can't remember where the 20 path in California where they went up, those wind 21 towers were placed -- yes -- those wind towers were 22 designed without thinking about the birds. They were 23 like the erector set towers that have lots of braces, 24 four legs and cross bracing and then finally the wind 25 turbine at the top. Well, what was happening was that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
73 1 the birds were resting on these bracings and then when 2 they'd see a squirrel or a chipmunk or whatever they 3 wanted to get, these birds of prey would then fly down 4 and get knocked out by the blades as they were coming 5 around. 6 Well, now the towers are not built like 7 that. They're single pole structures, so there's 8 nothing the birds can rest on. The other thing is 9 that the turbines turn so slowly now that you'd really 10 have to have a suicidally-depressed bird to fly into 11 one of these and get knocked out. So the arguments 12 about birds is really un -- my brain is fried, I'm 13 sorry. Unfounded. Good. 14 And the other thing about nuclear power, 15 not nuclear power, wind power is that it's not 16 something that's just a dream. In 2002, the 17 Conference on American Wind Power Generating 18 Association, was attended by maybe 1500 people. Last 19 year, it was attended by more than 5,000 people. It 20 had grown so much that it is not something that's just 21 a pipe dream. You can go and visit wind towers that 22 are installed in Vermont, in New Hampshire and in 23 Massachusetts right now and see how they operate. 24 You can listen that they're not noisy and 25 you can talk to the residents there who live next to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
74 1 them who really like their wind power and really like 2 that they are in charge of and they are the ones who 3 control their own electricity generation which is 4 another issue here, is that Entergy is the company 5 that's owned and operated out of Louisiana. It's not 6 local. It's not based in Vernon. It's not based in 7 Vermont. It's very far away and they own nine nuclear 8 power plants. So they're not some little small 9 player. But we need to take control of our lives here 10 in our local area and decide for ourselves how we're 11 going to live, how we're going to generate our 12 electricity and how we're going to control it because 13 we don't want somebody else from far away saying what 14 we're going to do and how we're going to live. 15 And I think that that's really important 16 to think about those kinds of issues. 17 MR. CAMERON: Claire, are you done? Could 18 you sum up for us, please? 19 MS. CHANG: Sure. I can be done. I sense 20 there's some -- I have nothing else. 21 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much. 22 (Applause.) 23 We're going to go to Ray Shadis and then 24 Sky Churchill and then Eesha Williams. 25 Ray? NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
75 1 MR. SHADIS: My name is Raymond Shadis. 2 I work for the New England Coalition. From 1982 to 3 1997, I served on the New England Coalition Board of 4 Trustees and from 1997 through to the present, I had 5 served as their Staff Technical Advisor. 6 I was very concerned in presenting some 7 scoping issues earlier that they met strict criteria 8 for examination by the NRC and the criteria are 9 strict, no active components and so on. But then 10 after hearing the presentations this evening, I feel 11 a little more at ease to address them and to address 12 at least one externality. 13 In the uprate proceeding before the 14 Vermont Public Service Board, Entergy presented quite 15 a remarkable witness, Dr. Ernest Moniz, M-O-N-I-Z, 16 from MIT and he is a former Assistant Secretary of 17 Energy and I had the privilege of cross examining the 18 good doctor and he made some startling admissions. 19 Number one is that all of the fuel, commercial nuclear 20 fuel produced in the United States to his best 21 recollection was produced at the Portsmouth enrichment 22 plant and the Paducah enrichment plant and both of 23 those plants, which absorb enormous quantities of 24 electricity in the process, are supplied by coal-fired 25 stations. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
76 1 My question for Dr. Moniz was well, then 2 the pollution gets here ahead of the fuel, doesn't it? 3 And in fact, the mercury that some speaker referred to 4 earlier, those heavy, heavy coal-fired plants in Ohio 5 and the ones that provide electricity to enrich 6 nuclear fuel, among the dirtiest, do send their 7 mercury to our waters and our fish. 8 The other thing that I brought to Dr. 9 Moniz' attention and got his say on, were two 10 publications from the early 1980s when a lot of us 11 were beginning to be real concerned about global 12 warming, greenhouse gases. One, a book by Senator 13 George Mitchell and I want to call it The World is 14 Burning-, but then again I keep thinking of Billy 15 Graham's, World Afire and I can't remember which one 16 is which. And the other was a publication by World 17 Watch Institute and their numbers more or less 18 reconciled. And it was this, that in order to offset 19 the growth in greenhouse gases, the world would need 20 to undertake an unprecedented construction of nuclear 21 power stations amounting to about a thousand on an 22 average of one every three days for start-up, over the 23 next 20 years. 24 And their net effect would be to reduce 25 the growth in greenhouse gases by 20 percent, not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
77 1 reduce greenhouse gases by 20 percent. Please 2 understand the difference. Reduce the rate of growth. 3 And I asked Dr. Moniz if he thought that 4 was correct and he did a little bit of back of the 5 envelope calculation and he said yeah, that would be 6 approximately correct. The other figure that was 7 astounding was that if we were to undertake that type 8 of programming, we would then require the launching of 9 another Yucca Mountain every two to three years. We 10 can't seem to get the first one off the ground in 50 11 or 60. So those are some externalities, environmental 12 effects that I regret to say I don't think NRC can 13 consider them. 14 Going to some elements for potential 15 scoping in the environmental impact statement, in the 16 afternoon session I presented on spent-fuel pool 17 accident off-site consequences, much, much worse than 18 a reactor meltdown; much worse because the amount of 19 fuel accumulated is much more than the fuel in the 20 reactor. And what I neglected to mention in my 21 summation on that was that NRC Staff in their study, 22 NUREG-1738, said it really didn't make any difference 23 how old the fuel was. You could not eliminate 24 completely the potential for a nuclear fuel fire, 25 zirconium-cladding fire. And that's of critical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
78 1 importance here because Vermont Yankee, like so many 2 plants, has undertaken to checkerboard their fuel to 3 segregate new and old fuel. 4 However, with the uprate, the fuel going 5 in the fresh of floads are so hot that they have to 6 integrate their reactor cooling system with the spent-7 fuel pool cooling system and actually run the residual 8 heat removal pumps for the reactor at least for the 9 first several days that they put the new fuel in. And 10 this is a borderline critical situation. And I don't 11 mean critical in the nuclear sense, but I mean 12 critical in terms of the thermal considerations. 13 The other thing that NRC Staff said which 14 goes to earlier conversation on this was that you 15 could not assign probabilities to an act of terror or 16 an act of malevolence. And the conservative 17 regulator, protector of human health and safety, would 18 then have to assign a probability of 1, absolute would 19 be the scenario you would work under. Not one in a 20 thousand or one in 250 or some other made up number, 21 but if you can assign probabilities and you want to be 22 proactive and protective of human health, then you go 23 to 1. And it's absolute and you must protect 24 absolutely. 25 And now I will get to the two scoping NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005o3701 (202)
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79 1 issue items that we reserved for this evening. Number 2 one, I want NRC Staff to be aware and take into 3 consideration that the science of seismic assessment, 4 seismology has evolved to a remarkable extent since 5 1971 when the plant was licensed. And to that effect, 6 we're going to leave them a letter from Mr. Lawrence 7 Becker, who is the Vermont State Geologist. This was 8 a letter provided to our State Nuclear Engineer and 9 entered into evidence in the Vermont Public Service 10 Board case. But Mr. Becker points out that there are 11 a number of new reports including among the more 12 recent, 1995, a report on seismic vulnerability of the 13 State of Vermont and then 1996, we have the real 14 emergence of probabilistic risk assessment for seismic 15 events. 16 NRC loves probabilistic risk assessment 17 ever since Three Mile Island and here we have this 18 risk assessment being developed for seismic events. 19 NRC has in its routine inspection activities 20 acknowledged the emerging changes in the science. In 21 1987, they issued a notice on an unresolved Safety 22 Item A-46 which is essentially the beginning of 23 applying this kind of risk assessment to various 24 components within the plant and I want to direct their 25 attention to a couple of critical components. One is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
80 1 the core shroud at Vermont Yankee. Like so many 2 boiling water reactors, the core shroud after a decade 3 in service began to crack and at Vermont Yankee, like 4 other plants, it has this single monolithic, if you 5 will, structure has not been bolted back together. If 6 you can imagine large threaded pipe clamp-type 7 structures. It's been gerry-rigged, bolted together. 8 The question is has it been reanalyzed seismically 9 using the new seismic investigation regimen? 10 The other item that I want to point to 11 very quickly is the torus -- torus is a huge water 12 tank shaped like a donut. It sits underneath the 13 reactor. The task of the torus is to receive steam in 14 the event of an accident and condense that steam and 15 reduce pressure on the primary containment. 16 The torus at Vermont Yankee has been 17 modified many, many times. The modifications began 18 with an issue called torus lifting back in the very 19 early days of this plant. Since then we have 20 anecdotal accounts from workers, people in in-service 21 inspection, who describe the welding of gussets on 22 that torus and the abandonment of that project and the 23 grinding away of those gussets. 24 We don't know if the torus has been 25 properly heat treated and annealed to relieve stresses NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
81 1 that are induced whenever you weld anything on a big 2 steel structure like that or not. We don't know if it 3 has been seismically reanalyzed, given those 4 modifications or not. 5 One of the problems that citizens have and 6 citizen-intervenors have is that when issues like this 7 are found within a plant, typically a condition report 8 will be written. That is not public. That does not 9 go into the NRC public document room. And then the 10 item may or may not be entered into the company's 11 Corrective Action Program. That's a place where NRC 12 buries a lot of issues too. They sort of hand it back 13 to the company and say you guys fix it and make sure 14 you keep records. But those records are not public 15 and there's really no way to access them unless you 16 get involved in a legal proceeding and then maybe you 17 can touch them. 18 MR. CAMERON: Ray? 19 MR. SHADIS: Yes sir? 20 UNIDENTIFIED AUDIENCE MEMBER: Let him 21 speak. 22 MR. CAMERON: I just want to talk to Ray 23 and not to the waffle man. Ray, it's been about 15 24 minutes and we have about 25 people left to go. So if 25 you could just give us your point. I mean it's all NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
82 1 wonderful, wonderful on-point stuff and we appreciate 2 it. 3 MR. SHADIS: We will provide written 4 comments. NRC really needs to delve into the 5 seismicity issues for all of these components and that 6 would include switch yard stuff as well. We had our 7 problems. 8 The other thing I wanted to point to very 9 quickly is the cumulative off-site impact of chemical 10 releases. The cooling towers that you're familiar 11 with at Vermont Yankee put out those huge clouds of 12 vapor and for our purposes that is not the issue or 13 the problem. Clouds of vapor are clouds of vapor. 14 It's pretty much clean stuff. However, the cooling 15 towers are not 100 percent efficient. There are big 16 fans. There is water tumbling down corrugated 17 material called fill. Fans blow across it and the 18 result is that a lot of droplets are blown sideways 19 out of the towers. When you tour the plant, you can 20 feel these little droplets hitting your skin as you 21 walk around the plant. People wonder if it's 22 drizzling or what. 23 The company uses an oxidizer called 24 glutaraldehyde in small parts, two-tenths of a part 25 per million. It triggers asthma. Two-tenths of a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
83 1 part per million exceeds California's occupational 2 exposure standards. In all the regulation, we don't 3 find any place that the regulation anticipates spray. 4 It anticipates fumes. It anticipates skin contact, 5 but I don't think any regulator ever figured you would 6 spray people with this stuff. 7 The glutaraldehyde plus, surfactant, anti-8 rust compounds, other pesticides, other biocides, and 9 fluorine and bromine compounds are used by the 10 company. The water gets circulated in the cooling 11 towers. It flows out in spray. It goes up to a mile 12 downwind. And I just want to point out that in terms 13 of concentrations as those droplets travel, they dry 14 and we don't know what the concentrations are when 15 they land on the skin, but unless it's quantified, we 16 have to assume that it's toxic. Unless it's 17 quantified, we have to assume that there are health 18 effects and those things need to be measured in the 19 Village of Vernon and across the river in Hinsdale. 20 And that's my comments and thank you. 21 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Ray. Thank you 22 very much. 23 (Applause.) 24 MR. CAMERON: Sky Churchill and Eesha 25 Williams. Is Sky here? How about Eesha. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
84 1 Bob Catlon? How about Joyce, Joyce 2 Warren. Mandy Arms. I see people leaving when I call 3 your name. Hopefully, they're not the people I'm 4 calling. 5 Bill Whitmer. Bernie Buteau? 6 This battery is going, so we'll do our 7 best. 8 MR. BUTEAU: Bernie Buteau, good evening. 9 Nuclear engineer by training. Worked up at Vermont 10 Yankee for 30 years in a number of different jobs. 11 And a citizen of the planet, along with all of you. 12 Inhaler of fossil-fueled effluence, 24/7/365. 13 Thank you for the opportunity to speak 14 tonight on the operation of VY beyond its current 15 license lifetime. 16 I see your consideration of Vermont 17 Yankee's request for license renewal as very straight 18 forward and to some degree we've done the same 19 homework and so I'm going to repeat a few of the 20 things that you mentioned earlier because I'd like to 21 recite a couple of excerpts right from your own 22 website, that I think help support the position to 23 allow Vermont Yankee to consider operation. 24 It's the NRC primary mission to protect 25 the public health and safety and the environment. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
85 1 That's what we're talking about tonight is the 2 environmental effects. In the environment, the 3 effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials 4 and waste facilities and you also regulate these 5 nuclear materials and facilities to promote the common 6 defense and security. 7 There's also a section there that talks 8 about reactor license renewal overview. And it states 9 that the Atomic Energy Act and the NRC regulations 10 limit commercial power reactor licenses to an initial 11 40-year -- 40 years, as you said, but also permits 12 such licenses to be renewed. That original 40-year 13 term for reactor licenses was based on economic and 14 anti-trust considerations and not on limitations of 15 nuclear technology. 16 Due to this selective period, however, 17 some structures and components may have been 18 engineered on the basis of a 40-year service life. 19 The NRC has established a timely license renewal 20 process which we've heard something about tonight and 21 clear requirements codified in 10 CFR parts 51 and 54 22 that are needed to assure safe plant operation for 23 extended plant life. 24 The timely renewal of licenses for an 25 additional 20 years, where appropriate to renew them, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
86 1 may be important to ensuring an adequate energy supply 2 for the United States during the first half of the 3 21st century. 4 In surfing the web recently, I found an 5 interesting article. It was an excerpt from Physics 6 Today. It was dated June 4th. It states, "Some two 7 dozen power plants are scheduled to be built or 8 refurbished during the next five years in Canada, 9 China, several European Union countries, India, Iran, 10 Pakistan, Russia, South Africa. In the U.S. and U.K., 11 government preparations are underway that may lead to 12 15 new reactor orders by 2007. The new interest in 13 civilian nuclear energy results from attempts to 14 reduce carbon dioxide emissions and increasing 15 concerns about energy security." 16 Considering what I've presented, the 17 worldwide recognition of the need for additional 18 nuclear power to help save our environment from the 19 effluence of fossil fuels and to help establish energy 20 security and I would go on to say world peace, and 21 considering the existing guidance for granting license 22 extensions, I would submit that it would be arbitrary 23 and in defiance of the rules and guidelines already in 24 place to not grant Vermont Yankee an operating license 25 extension if all requirements established in 10 CFR NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
87 1 Parts 51 and 54 are met. 2 Finally, I'd just ask that when all. the 3 input that you receive is considered, you separate the 4 facts from the rhetoric. Thank you very much. 5 (Applause.) 6 MR. CAMERON: We're going to go to Marian 7 Kelner and then Ted Sullivan, John Dreyfuss and Mike 8 Hamer. 9 This is Marian Kelner. Marian. 10 MS. KELNER: Hi. This is just one brief 11 point that I'd like to make. Nobody knows what's 12 going to happen in the future. There are people who 13 believe that this plant is safe. There are other 14 people who believe that it's not safe. There's no way 15 to determine this, I guess. Time will tell, but the 16 criteria that I'd like to present is what happens for 17 each side if that side is wrong? If the people who 18 believe the nuclear power plant is safe and they're 19 wrong, the land becomes polluted, thousands of people 20 die. This will be an effect that will be in effect 21 for hundreds of thousands of years. If the people who 22 believe that the nuclear power plant is unsafe and 23 they're wrong, what will be the effect? The effect 24 will be that there will be other sources of power, 25 conservation and nobody gets hurt. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
88 1 So since nobody on the planet knows which 2 side is correct, I think that using this criteria 3 might guide us in the right direction. That's all, 4 thank you. 5 (Applause.) 6 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Marian. Mr. 7 Sullivan? There he is. This is Mr. Ted Sullivan, and 8 then we'll go to John Dreyfuss. 9 MR. SULLIVAN: Good evening, thank you for 10 the opportunity to speak. My name is Ted Sullivan and 11 I'm a resident of West Chesterfield and I do work at 12 the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant and West 13 Chesterfield is within the 10 mile emergency planning 14 zone. So what goes on at that plant is very important 15 to me as a professional and me as a family man because 16 my family lives in West Chesterfield. 17 There's a couple of things, a couple of 18 points I want to talk about tonight. One is that the 19 economic impact of shutting down or not granting a 20 license extension for Vermont Yankee is very, very 21 severe. To take one third of the electricity out of 22 the state, one third of what it needs to run, that 23 electricity has to be generated somewhere and come 24 from some other means. And if it is a fossil means, 25 whether it's oil, coal or gas, it's going to increase NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
89 1 the pollutants that are going in the air. It will 2 affect the environment, much, much, more worse than 3 what the effect is of nuclear power. 4 The 100 million tons that the government 5 talked about, that is a very, very significant amount 6 of pollutants in the air and there's empirical data 7 that supports that that has caused global warming and 8 that is now causing the oceans to heat up and that is 9 having a dramatic effect on things like hurricanes. 10 The number of hurricanes that we're having now is a 11 direct result of this global warming. 12 Go talk to the people that lived through 13 Katrina and Rita, and the intensity of that storm. 14 There's empirical data that proves that that effect 15 made those hurricanes much more severe than what they 16 really are. That's one point I want to make. 17 Another point is that we are regulated in 18 this industry and when you're regulated, there's rules 19 that you have to follow and those -- and we are 20 governed by the NRC and we have to follow all those 21 rules. As we apply for this application, the look 22 that is given to the site and to all the processes 23 that it has is exhaustive. It's a mess. And all of 24 those rules have to be met. So let's let the facts 25 decide what it is. If the NRC after their NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
90 1 investigation into what's going on at the plant and 2 whether or not we're following the rules, if they 3 conclude that we will have an effect on the 4 environment that are of such a nature that it doesn't 5 meet the regulations, then they need to not approve 6 this license application. But if it does meet the 7 rules and regulations, then it needs to be approved. 8 That's the last thing I really want to 9 say. The facts will speak for themselves and all the 10 rhetoric and all the scare tactics and all the threats 11 and things have to come out of that. Just let the 12 facts speak for themselves. Thank you for the 13 opportunity. 14 (Applause.) 15 MR. CAMERON: This is Mr. Dreyfuss. 16 MR. DREYFUSS: Good evening, my name is 17 John Dreyfuss. I also work at Vermont Yankee. I'm 18 the Director of Engineering at the plant. Thanks 19 everybody for coming out. The rain kept probably a 20 few people away, but it's good to see a lot of faces 21 out here expressing opinion as well as, you know, 22 quite a few more people I think in support of renewing 23 the license of Vermont Yankee. 24 You know, we're very proud of the 25 impeccable environmental record that this plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
91 1 currently enjoys. We've had a sustained, safe, 2 operational record with excellent environmental 3 stewardship. We pledge to continue that going 4 forward. I'm also very proud of the people and the 5 processes we have in place that helps sustain that 6 environmental performance. The scope of the 7 environmental audit conducted by the NRC was very 8 broad. It touched on many subjects. There were many 9 people here, both NRC staff and the contractors. They 10 were very challenging. They were very rigorous. They 11 were very thorough. And we've resolved the issues and 12 we're answering questions, many questions that came 13 up. 14 Again, I am satisfied that the process 15 will hold true and the questions will be answered. 16 And if we can provide satisfactory record and good 17 answers to the questions that came up, the license 18 should be renewed. 19 Another thing I wanted to touch on here, 20 just very briefly, is that there was a report by the 21 National Academy of Sciences that talked about Indian 22 Point. One of the key conclusions of that report are 23 that the economic and environmental impact of closing 24 those plants, shutting those plants down, was very 25 significant. And that was the key conclusion of it. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
92 1 So I urge you to educate yourself, read about it, and 2 understand, you know, the impact of closing down a 3 plant like Vermont Yankee. Thank you. 4 (Applause.) 5 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Mr. 6 Dreyfuss. We're going to go to Mike Hamer, Mr. 7 Peyton, and then to Chris Nord from Citizens Awareness 8 Network. Is this Mike Hamer coming down? All right. 9 MR. HAMER: Good evening. First I'd like 10 to thank the NRC for putting on this meeting tonight 11 for giving us all a chance to come out and talk about 12 our community and the future. I'd also like to thank 13 the police officers here tonight that are missing 14 dinner with their families to come out here and ensure 15 our safety. And for all of you, I mean, we had a lot 16 more people in this room when we started tonight, it's 17 gone down a little bit, but for everyone who stayed 18 here to the bitter end to speak out about the 19 community, round of applause for all of us. Come on, 20 here we go. 21 I have one point, one simple point to talk 22 about, 620 megawatts thermal. It's a lot of power. 23 That's not what I'm going to talk about. I'm going to 24 talk about the evolution of technology. When we first 25 started making power in this country, a lot of heavy NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
93 1 polluters. We're all ruining the environment. We're 2 damming up rivers for hydro, a lot of coal-fired power 3 plants, the most abundant source of electricity in 4 this country is coal. Fifty-eight percent of our 5 power in the United States is made from coal. We're 6 the largest coal burning country in the world, as a 7 matter of fact. 8 We're starting to see a lot of the results 9 of that over the years. You can't take a hike into 10 the mountains without finding a little mountain stream 11 or a little run-off on the side. You'll see 12 fluorocarbons, you see little rainbows in the water. 13 My daughter pointed it out to me one day and said 14 "Daddy, look at the pretty rainbows". I said "well, 15 that's pollution, honey, at its best." 16 We're looking at 20 more years of 17 operation from this facility right here. I believe 18 that there will be a better technology one day and 19 than our current technology for making power. I 20 honestly believe that. We're on the verge of a lot of 21 those things right now to this. Hydrogen cell power, 22 but scientists are predicting right now that maybe ten 23 years, possibly twenty years to be able to make 24 megawatts of hydrogen cells. Ironically, nuclear 25 power plants produce hydrogen. But then we use some NEAL R. GROSS
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94 1 more energy to take that hydrogen and re-combine it 2 back with the oxygen and make water out of it and put 3 it back to the power plant. 4 So imagine if you have a hydrogen cell 5 sitting outside a nuclear power plant to make power 6 from that hydrogen. Stepping stones of technology. 7 I think that we can't get from one point to another 8 point to being completely nuclear free without going 9 through that process. We started out with plants 10 years ago, but we've improved on those technologies. 11 We've made them more efficient. We've learned from 12 our lessons of the past and made better plants to 13 continue on in the future with. 14 Our station here, I work for Entergy by 15 the way. Our station here we made significant 16 upgrades to the station since I've been here in the 17 last eight years and worked as a contractor for four 18 or five years before that, including major jobs like 19 replacing the entire LP turbine 10 years ago, 20 replacing the HP turbine. Those things are the size 21 of football fields and we did that safely with no 22 injuries on the job, employing a lot of people in the 23 surrounding communities to help do these things. 24 One day, we'll reach that point where we 25 can probably start shutting down these plants. But NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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95 1 that day isn't today. Six hundred twenty megawatts of 2 power electric. What scares me is how are going to, 3 if we shut this plant down in 2012, where are going to 4 produce that power from right now? That's baseload 5 electricity. That's not wind power with a 20 percent 6 efficiency factor. Those numbers you can look them up 7 on NEPAX. It's a website that tells how much power 8 the capacity, how much those places actually stay 9 online. 10 I'll support any power made from any 11 source that's safe like that. I believe Vermont 12 Yankee is a very safe plant having worked there for as 13 long as I have. But I don't believe that we're going 14 to be ready in the next 10 or 15 years to get away 15 from nuclear power. It's not feasible. We're not 16 going to be able to produce 620 megawatts without 17 going to coal, without going to gas power, which gas 18 has been touted as being the clean source of energy, 19 it's not. It produces half of the amount of waste 20 that our coal plants produce. 21 Oil is out of the question. Oil is like 22 less than 10 percent, less than 5 percent of the 23 entire production of power in this country, just 24 because of the unavailability of it and that we need 25 it for automobiles and other things like that, other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
96 1 smaller, small-type things. But consider that. 2 Consider where we're going to get our power from if we 3 shut this plant down. We have to get it from 4 somewhere. It's not in my back yard. It's here. 5 It's safe. We have a proven track record of being 6 safe. Why not continue for 20 more years. 7 This license renewal team, the application 8 can be viewed at any library and online. It's huge. 9 They have a very, very large team of inspectors 10 looking at every possible aspect you can look at for 11 aging management, for how we're going to handle aging 12 management. It's the future replacement of certain 13 parts that wear out, things like that, based on 14 operating experience, etcetera and everything. It's 15 a very involved process. It's not taken lightly by 16 the NRC or Vermont Yankee. 17 Something you can consider also too is if 18 you look at Entergy, go to their website. You can 19 look at their portfolio of all the power they have. 20 You probably heard about nine nuclear plants that 21 Entergy has? We have percentages in wind power, coal, 22 gas, oil, you name it, right across the board and once 23 solar takes off or anything like that, believe me, 24 Entergy as a power company, will be on it,one of the 25 first companies on it. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
97 1 So consider that when you think about it. 2 Look at the facts. Have we been operating safely? 3 And where are we going to get our power in the future 4 if we shut this plant down now in 2012. 5 Thank you. 6 (Applause.) 7 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Mr. Hamer. Is 8 there a Mr. Peyton here? Then we're going to go to 9 Chris, Chris Nord from Citizens Awareness Network. 10 MR. NORD: Well, thank you to those who 11 have stuck around. My name is Chris Nord. I'm the 12 vice president of the Citizens Awareness Network. I'm 13 also on the board of the C10 Foundation over in 14 Newbury Port, Massachusetts which runs one of the two 15 state-of-the-art real-time radiation monitoring 16 systems in the United States. 17 I wanted to address first an issue that 18 has come up over and over again that Governor Salmon, 19 I think was the first to speak to the issue of global 20 warming and how nuclear is purported to be a solution, 21 a.near-term solution for global warming, just to say 22 that it has been shown in numerous studies, chief 23 among them, out of Rocky Mountain Institute which is 24 run by world renown Emory Lovins and his wife, Hunter, 25 a couple of researchers back in the late 1990s looked NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
98
1. at global carbon mitigation strategies, using nuclear 2 and using renewables as two alternative paths. And 3 they discovered a finding that they put two different 4 ways which I think are provocative. One, that for 5 every $100 spent on nuclear that could otherwise have 6 been spent on what we call renewables, an extra ton of 7 carbon is released to the atmosphere that would have 8 otherwise been prevented. And that's because, as Ray 9 Shadis pointed out earlier, it's going to take many, 10 many years of many, many hundreds of nuclear plants to 11 begin to cut back on the acceleration of global carbon 12 using nuclear. And the energy efficiency and 13 renewable strategy is a much simpler, more direct, 14 cost-effective way to go about it.
15 The other way that they put it, I'm 16 drawing a blank on it. I'll leave it alone. Let's 17 see. Someone mentioned nuclear as a method of 18 retaining world peace and maintaining world peace in 19 the world and I just had to speak to that because it's 20 obvious to all of us, if we allow ourselves to think 21 about it because of current controversies on the 22 international scene where there is a country that is 23 claiming that they just want to have a nuclear power 24 system, that it is impossible to separate the 25 production of electricity through the fission process NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
99 1 from nuclear bomb technology. And we are engaged in 2 a long-term Faustian bargain to think that nuclear is 3 a way to a cleaner environment and that it's going to 4 somehow protect world peace. 5 In fact, if we are to go that way, then we 6 would be nothing but hypocritical to not allow other 7 nations of the world to do that, but that is precisely 8 what we're attempting to do in the international 9 sphere right now. 10 Okay, as to my original plan, I really 11 wanted to address my comments tonight to the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission and that's why we're here. I 13 have'no doubt that the workers of Vermont Yankee 14 believe that they're doing the absolute best job that 15 they can and I applaud that. I do the best possible 16 job I can at my work as well, so I have no doubt that 17 you're proud of what you do and you deserve to be 18 proud of what you do. 19 The NRC has returned to the homeland of 20 the democratic process, to come to New England. 21 They're in New England at Plymouth for the Pilgrim 22 plant. They're in New England at Seabrook for the 23 Seabrook nuclear power station. And they're here for 24 Vermont Yankee. And I really have one question and I 25 think that many people who are concerned citizens have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
100 1 one question that we can create permutations for and 2 that is who do you work for? And who do you serve? 3 Who do you actually serve? 4 The permutations that I'm talking about 5 have to do with many things that fall within this 6 larger category of design basis. And the first one I 7 want to mention is the design basis for spent-fuel 8 pools. Okay, the design basis for the spent-fuel pool 9 at Vermont Yankee originally was what is called low-10 density racking. Now low-density racking was created 11 originally as a way to configure spent fuel because it 12 guaranteed a redundancy in the safety system for spent 13 fuel. 14 Now I hope that the NRC is actually paying 15 attention because I drove all the way over here from 16 Newton, New Hampshire, in order to speak to the NRC 17 hoping that the NRC would, in fact, take these 18 comments seriously. You have high-density racking at 19 Vermont Yankee because the NRC was willing to 20 sacrifice the redundant safety system because there's 21 no place to put the fuel. 22 What that has meant though is that were 23 there a fire -- I'll back up. Were there to be a loss 24 of coolant accident by any means in the spent-fuel 25 pool that is racked in high-density racking, that fire NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
101 1 cannot be put out. A fire in a high density pool will 2 burn until it burns itself.out. And when you're 3 talking about radionuclides that extend as much as 20 4 times the extent of radionuclides that were released 5 during the Chernobyl accident, sitting in a spent-fuel 6 pool 70 feet off of the ground, not within a concrete 7 dome, but underneath sheet metal, we're looking at a 8 terrorist catastrophe in the making. 9 So first step, design basis. I call upon 10 the NRC to return nationally to the original design 11 basis configuration for spent fuel. Spent-fuel pools 12 should not be allowed to be racked in high-density 13 racking. You're giving away the safety system that 14 was originally built in that would allow that spent 15 fuel to be cooled with ambient air were there a loss 16 of coolant accident. That no longer exists at Vermont 17 Yankee. So that's number one, design basis. 18 Following that, and because of this 19 extraordinary threat of terrorism in this post 9/11 20 world, and because of the unusual way that Vermont 21 Yankee sits in relationship to the top of this country 22 right along the Connecticut River that goes all the 23 way to the Canadian border, there's a scenario that we 24 need to consider. And along with that scenario comes 25 my second request that we need in this new age of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
102 1 terrorism to remake the emergency planning zone so 2 that it is not ten miles, that it extends to the full 3 extent of the ingestion pathway. 4 That means a 50 mile radius. And that is 5 too little, but it's a start. We need to have 6 contingency plans for what is going to be done out to 7 the city of Keene, and actually all the way out to the 8 city of Concord and out to Rutland, in many different 9 directions, because were there a loss of coolant 10 accident at that spent-fuel pool for any reason, the 11 calamity that would be created as a result of that 12 would definitely reach major cities far away depending 13 on which way the wind blows. So point two, extend the 14 emergency planning zone. 15 At Plymouth, at a license extension 16 meeting before the NRC earlier this year, I asked the 17 NRC for any features concerning their emergency plans, 18 emergency response plans, for the greater Boston area 19 in light of the possibility of an awful event, a 20 terrorist attack, catastrophic event, at their also 21 highly densely racked, highly overfull 35 million 22 curies of just Cesium in their spent-fuel pool at 23 Pilgrim, and there was no answer. I got blank stares. 24 That's because there are no contingency plans for the 25 children, for the mothers, of the greater Boston area. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
103 1 And in this age of terrorism, it's only going to take 2 one terrorist attack against one U.S. nuclear reactor 3 for this to all be a very bad idea. And we need to 4 wake up, smell the coffee, and start to do something 5 about this. 6 Remember that a 20-mile an hour wind 7 blowing out of the south from the Pilgrim plant would 8 reach the greater Boston area in two hours. At 9 Hampton, in New Hampshire earlier this year, I heard 10 an NRC on-site inspector say to the audience that when 11 he puts his children to bed at night he realizes, he 12 believes, that he and his children are as safe as they 13 can possibly be. And-so I had to point out to him a 14 scenario that I'm going to bring up tonight, because 15 it bears directly on the plant that we are talking 16 about, the Vernon plant that the workers here and the 17 owners and those that work for Entergy are so proud 18 of. And that is a terrorist cell hijacking a plane in 19 airspace Canada. They don't have to be able to 20 navigate very well. All they got to do is follow the 21 river under radar, 500 miles an hour, straight down 22 the Connecticut River right into the spent-fuel pool 23 of Vermoht Yankee. It would happen so fast and so I 24 said to him I want you to not go to sleep at night 25 thinking how safe you are. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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104 1 I. want you to be lying in bed at night 2 awake being worried about this stuff until you, the 3 NRC, decides to actually take the public health and 4 safety into consideration and start making good on all 5 of these promises that you're making of protecting the 6 environment and protecting public health. We can't go 7 on like this any longer. This has to change. So 8 that's the third one. 9 We need to revise the design basis threat 10 as the 9th Circuit Court has indicated. And I think 11 it's actually, I have to say, NRC members, that it's 12 deplorable that you're considering appealing it. Like 13 why is it not in your interest to just assume the 14 responsibility? In other words, the way that we need 15 to be living, en masse, is by what is known as the 16 precautionary principle. 17 We need to learn the precautionary 18 principle, we need to teach the precautionary 19 principle, and we need to act the precautionary 20 principle on the part of our regulators so that we can 21 hand off a clean, safe, healthy environment to future 22 generations. If we don't act the precautionary 23 principle, one day, one bleak day we're going to wake 24 up and some awful event is going to happen and we will 25 have gotten caught not having been prepared for it, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
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105 1 and that's what this is all about. 2 I don't know how to state it any more 3 strongly. I'll go back to my original question, who 4 do you actually work for? Are these meetings, these 5 public meetings, merely an appeasement so you have the 6 general public come up to the microphone, make a few 7 statements, and then they go away and you get to go on 8 your merry business and decide in collusion with this 9 industry how it's going to go. Or are you actually 10 taking into account the real concerns that are 11 obvious, if you just sit and think about them, we're 12 talking about 35 million curies of Cesium-137 sitting 13 in that spent-fuel pool. 14 It' s deplorable that there' s nothing being 15 done. And I think that it's high time that something 16 be done and the license extension hearings for Vermont 17 Yankee are a great time to do it. 18 I will finish by saying that once that is 19 returned to low-density storage, what that 20 necessitates is that the fuel that is taken out of the 21 spent-fuel pool must be put in interim storage that is 22 robust which means that' it is a hardened, cast 23 structure. It is a dispersed structure so that they 24 can't be all hit with one terrorist attack and it 25 probably should be put in a berm. I mean there's a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
106 1 technology for this and you're going to be hearing all 2 about it because the .State of Massachusetts is 3 bringing their contentions on the Vermont Yankee issue 4 exactly on the basis of what I've been describing, 5 robust storage for spent fuel at Vermont Yankee and 6 the rest of the boiling water reactors for a start, 7 for a start. 8 Those are my comments. Thank you for 9 listening. 10 (Applause.) 11 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. Thank you very 12 much. 13 Is Dart Everitt still here and Bill 14 Pearson? While Dart is coming down and Bill Pearson 15 still here? 16 Let's go to Dart. This is Dart Everitt 17 and then we're going to go to Emily Tinkham. 18 MR. EVERITT: I will be brief. According 19 to Rich Smalley, who is a Nobel Peace Prize winner for 20 chemistry in 1996 for his work on nanotechnology by 21 mid-century the world will require a doubling of its 22 current world-wide energy demand of 14 terawatts of 23 power. To achieve this demand will require the 24 equivalent of one 1,000 megawatt power plant going 25 online every day for nearly 38 years. And this is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
107 1 from Discover of February 2005 and I have it in the 2 testimony here. 3 Although I assume the initial mandate of 4 the NRC regarding environmental issues 30 to 40 years 5 ago concerned the rather micro impact that is of the 6 areas immediately surrounding a nuclear plant, 7 certainly now the issue is equally a global concern of 8 greenhouse gases, foremost carbon dioxide. 9 I'm not an expert. I am a concerned 10 citizen, concerned about the future of energy for the 11 State of Vermont, the future energy requirement for 12 the world, and the environmental impact the sources of 13 that energy will have. 14 Dr. Arthur Westing, a resident of Putney, 15 Vermont, 10 miles up the road, is an expert. He has 16 served on the faculty or been a research fellow at 17 several education institutions, including Harvard 18 University, the Stockholm International Peace Research 19 Institute. He has served as the director of the 20 United Nations Environmental Program Project, Peace, 21 Security and the Environment, and is the author of 22 many articles and several books on the environment. 23 At the moment, unfortunately, he is in Sweden. 24 He told me he wished he could be here to 25 testify on the importance of Vermont Yankee to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
108 1 energy future of Vermont and give his wholehearted 2 supported to the relicensing. I am submitting an 3 email from him to me giving me the authority to give 4 you two letters he has written on energy and the 5 environmental issues, as well as his r6sum6. His 6 latest letter cites a British report on the role of 7 nuclear power and low carbon economy which he uses to 8 calculate the impact shown on the following page. 9 Thank you for beginning this lengthy 10 process for the relicensing of Entergy and Nuclear 11 Vermont Yankee Power Plant. I hope the evidence 12 supports a positive decision. 13 I think this is very important. It shows 14 that for CO2 production from various sources of power, 15 that kilograms of CO2 per kilowatt of electricity for 16 cradle to grave or a full production cycle. Coal, 17 it's 891. Natural gas is 356. Photovoltaics, 18 interestingly enough is 50, while wind and nuclear are 19 16. Nuclear power is very important to the future 20 energy of this world and this state and please, I hope 21 you consider relicensing it. 22 Thank you. 23 (Applause.) 24 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. If you could 25 just give that to Eric and we'll try to -- for those NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
109 1 of you who might be* interested in reading these 2 documents, we'll see if we can get put on the 3 transcript for people to look at for their 4 information. 5 Bill Pearson. Bill. 6 MR. PEARSON: Bill Pearson. I live in 7 Brattleboro. I appreciate the opportunity to speak. 8 Can you hear me now? 9 Bill Pearson. I live in Brattleboro. I 10 appreciate the chance to speak tonight. 11 I went to Brooks Memorial Library in 12 Brattleboro to read Entergy's environmental impact 13 statement. I found a six-page glossary of 14 abbreviations and acronyms. I couldn't find any 15 section on ethics and morality. 16 We are fixated on Vermont Yankee's 17 production of 30 percent of Vermont's electrical 18 energy needs without comprehending that Vermont Yankee 19 also produces high level radioactive waste that will 20 be hazardous for thousands, tens of thousands, 21 hundreds of thousands of years. Is there something 22 genetic about our mental makeup that causes us to not 23 take this into account? 24 The typical commercial reactor contains 25 around 15 billion curies of radioactivity during NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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110 1 operations. Those dry-cask storage units can hold 2 hundreds of thousands to millions of curies. Smaller 3 truck-sized casks for highway use each contain 40 4 times the radiation released at Hiroshima. After 60 5 years of blustering by the Federal Government, there 6 still is not any safe way to deal with dangerous spent 7 fuel from nuclear power plants. 8 How ethical is it then to continue making 9 it? What system of morality allows us to condemn 10 hundreds, perhaps thousands of future generations the 11 worry and expense of safeguarding radioactive waste 12 material? Also protection from natural disasters or 13 terrorism. Replacing those Holtec dry casks every 20 14 years or is it 50 years, I don't remember, for 100,000 15 years? That's not going to be cheap. 16 That consideration alone ought to be 17 enough to shut down our nuclear power plants. One 18 product of the Iranian enrichment process is so-called 19 depleted uranium. The United States has been using it 20 by the thousands of tons in munitions in Iraq. The 21 United States has now sold depleted uranium to 29 22 other countries. When DU explodes, it produces tiny 23 ceramic uranium oxide particles that easily invade the 24 body. And eventually produce a variety of cancers and 25 other illnesses. Human DNA is affected. Deformed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
III 1 babies are born. 2 The United Nations has called DU a weapon 3 of mass destruction. How ironic. 4 It is also genocidal. Global winds are 5 wafting DU dust all over the world. It's half-life is 6 4.5 billion years. How much DU was produced over the 7 years in enriching uranium for Vermont Yankee's fuel 8 rods? How complicit is Vermont Yankee, and are we, in 9 the weapons industry? 10 Vermont Yankee routinely emits radioactive 11 material into the air, soil and water. Presumably 12 these emissions are permissible. But who knows? 13 Permissible emissions are not the same thing as safe 14 emissions. 15 In July of 2005, and this has already been 16 brought up tonight, the U.S. National Academy of 17 Sciences released its latest biological effects of 18 ionizing radiation report, otherwise known as BEIR 19 VII. Basically what it pointed out was that no amount 20 of radiation can be considered safe. 21 How ethical and moral is it then to site 22 an elementary school directly across the street from 23 Vermont Yankee? Children are far more vulnerable to 24 radiological damage that adults. 25 Nuclear power plants, especially geriatric NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
112 1 ones like Vermont Yankee, are prone to accidents and 2 leaks. We've seen this in recent history. Let me 3 give you a quick review of some results from accidents 4 at other nuclear facilities. 5 A 400 percent increase in leukemia 6 incidents in the population living downwind of the 7 Pilgrim nuclear power reactor in Massachusetts in the 8 first five years after fuel was known to have leaked 9 excess radioactivity. 10 Three to 400 percent increase in lung 11 cancer in the general population within the plume of 12 the Three Mile Island accident. 13 Six to 700 percent increase in leukemia in 14 the general population within the plume of Three Mile 15 Island. 16 Eight thousand percent increase in thyroid 17 cancer in Belarus children living near Chernobyl, 18 reported six years after the meltdown. 19 Further effects found in victims of the 20 Chernobyl accident, less than 10 years after the 21 meltdown include the following. A 500 percent 22 increase in thyroid cancer in children in Ukraine. A 23 75 percent increase, incidence of heart disease. 24 A 200 percent increase in respiratory and 25 digestive disease. A 200 percent increase in birth NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
113 1 defects. 2 Among atomic workers, a 250 percent 3 increase in all cancers. And finally, a 1200 percent 4 increase in all cancers exist around the Sellafield 5 reprocessing facility in England. 6 I would urge us not to take too seriously 7 Entergy's environmental impact statement. Despite the 8 hard work of lots of people--and this is the point-- 9 they forgot to deal with ethics and morality. 10 They were also in error to dismiss as, 11 quote, inadequate, alternative energy sources. 12 We need to understand that solar wind, 13 biomass, geothermal and others are safe, clean, 14 dependable, and most important, sustainable. 15 Conservation and efficiency should also be added to 16 the list. 17 If given the billions in Federal subsidies 18 that nuclear has enjoyed over the years, these 19 alternative energies could easily meet our energy 20 needs without harming the environment. 21 Until and unless we can ensure the health 22 and safety of human beings, and of all the 23 environment, and all forms of life, we shouldn't even 24 be using nuclear power. Let me register my vote as 25 not being in favor of a 20 year extension of Vermont NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
114 1 Yankee. Thank you. 2 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Mr. Pearson. 3 We're going to go to Emily Tinkham, if she's still 4 here, and then to Mr. Turnbull. 5 Emily. 6 MS. TINKHAM: Good evening. My name is 7 Emily Tinkham and I live in Keene, New Hampshire. I 8 am a daughter, a sister, and an Entergy Vermont Yankee 9 employee. I truly believe that the only way to keep 10 this amazing area that we live in environmentally 11 friendly, while producing 34 percent of Vermont's 12 electricity is to continue the safe and reliable 13 operation of Vermont Yankee. 14 PARTICIPANT: (speaking from an un-miced 15 location) 16 MS. TINKHAM: Vermont Yankee produces 17 enough-- 18 MR. CAMERON: Could you just let people 19 talk. Okay? Thank you; thank you. 20 MS. TINKHAM: Vermont Yankee produces 21 enough electricity to power about 620,000 homes and it 22 does not burn fossil fuel. Over the years, this has 23 avoided millions of tons of fossil air pollution. If 24 Vermont Yankee were to close, it would be replaced 25 with large amounts of fossil fuel generation and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
115 1 greenhouse gas emissions that lead to global warming. 2 Thank you. 3 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. 4 Mr. Turnbull. 5 MR. TURNBULL: After a while it starts 6 feeling like a family reunion at these meetings, and 7 I extend that to everyone here. 8 Hi, my name is Clay Turnbull. I'm a 9 resident here of Windham County. I own a home in 10 Townsend. There's some level of emotional energy 11 around the environment impacts of operation of Vermont 12 Yankee, and I know that emotions can lead to unclear 13 and unobjective thinking. 14 Global warming. Are you concerned about 15 global warming? Twenty years ago, folks were, 16 scientists were making quite a bit of noise about it, 17 and the administrator at the time said, nah. Do you 18 believe it? And if you do believe global warming is 19 an issue, and you think it's upon us, do you want your 20 power coming from coal-burning facilities that 21 generate greenhouse gases and smog? 22 We know that our use of electricity 23 contributes to global warming. If you believe we can 24 fulfill our electric needs in Vermont without Vermont 25 Yankee's baseload electricity, if you want economical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
116 1 power, then please listen closely. 2 If you are concerned about greenhouse 3 gases, we can't afford this distraction of dangerous, 4 dirty, expensive source of electricity. Low cost, 5 safe, clean power, zero greenhouse gases emissions. 6 That must be wind and solar. 7 Slide 17. Can we get slide 17, or is that 8 all torn down? 9 MR. CAMERON: I think it probably would be 10 difficult. If you could just summarize what was on 11 it, Mr. Turnbull. 12 MR. TURNBULL: Sure. It was an image of 13 a nuclear power station with some green grass and blue 14 river, and puffy white clouds. It was a very serene 15 place you'd want to go picnicking, and I thought 16 because we're looking at environmental impacts, the 17 slide would be more appropriate to show what are the 18 forms of effluent from a nuclear power station. 19 You know, through the effluent discharges, 20 emissions, radiation, chemicals, other pollutants. 21 Now that's just my opinion. I'm not 22 saying anyone in this room is bad or anyone in this 23 room is better than someone else. We are all in this 24 together. From my perspective, I want to share 25 something with both sides of the aisle, if we're gonna NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234.4433
117 1 play politics and be like so much of the rest of the 2 world. 3 I look in these white boxes up top, these 4 lights, and I assume that they're incandescent lights 5 because I see that there's a number of them burned 6 out, and they probably are a hassle to replace, and 7 the two lights on top of each box I can see are 8 clearly incandescents. 9 That light's incandescent. We're in a 10 room filled with incandescent lights. The most 11 inefficient light source that you can use. The only 12 thing inefficient way to light this room would be to 13 have torches. And actually that might be more 14 efficient, to tell you the truth. 15 So we need more power. We won't be able 16 to survive without the nuclear power station! 17 Well, geez, you know if I look in my sap 18 bucket and I see there there's a hole in the bottom of 19 it, most Vermonters aren't gonna look at that and say, 20 oh, there's a hole in the bottom of the bucket, I 21 better tap more trees. 22 They'll say, well, I should start by 23 plugging the hole. That's not to say that we could 24 shutter Vermont Yankee tomorrow. But I do believe 25 that in the long run, we really need to embrace safe, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
118 1 clean energy--wind, Solar, and other sustainable long-2 term renewables. 3 And I see him walking up to the side here. 4 Let me just take a quick scan. A reliable source of 5 power must include baseload power, so let's buy 6 windpower from New York, if Governor Douglas won't get 7 out of the way and let the public get their wind 8 generation in Vermont, when the wind's not blowing 9 we'll use hydro, and as a last resort, we'll use the 10 power that we get off the open market, not spot 11 market, though. 12 Vermonters overwhelmingly embrace 13 renewable energy. 75 percent want wind. There's 14 probably even more that want solar. Small-scale 15 renewables. When the first incentive program came out 16 in Vermont two years ago, they thought it would last 17 for two years. In seven months, it was all used up. 18 People wanted solar. People wanted wind. 19 Our elderly, who must choose between 20 electricity, or food, or medicine, they need solar hot 21 water systems. They need energy audits. They need 22 efficiency upgrades of their homes and their 23 apartments. 24 And there's jobs in doing that. Lots of 25 jobs. Vermont needs jobs. We need plumbers, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
119 1 carpenters, engineers, concrete workers, electricians, 2 energy planners, and that's exactly why we need to 3 implement a clean, renewable energy program today, 4 putting nice tradespeople to work. 5 Thanks for listening. Those are my 6 thoughts. 7 MR. CAMERON: Thank you very much, Mr. 8 Turnbull. Thank you. 9 How about Hattie Nestor and Joan Horman, 10 Vedrana Wren? Karen Murphy? Shaun Murphy? George 11 Clain. Dennis Girroir? George? 12 MR. GIRROIR: Good evening. My name is 13 Dennis Girroir. I will try to keep it simple and 14 relatively brief. This is pretty familiar to me here. 15 Tom Salmon is pretty familiar. I'm a Vermont Yankee 16 employee for better than 30 years, almost like Bernie 17 Buteau is. But my roots are here in Brattleboro. I 18 was born in this town, frequented this theater, 19 graduated from the local schools here, and never 20 really left. Came back after going off to school. 21 I know the area exceptionally well; 22 intimately. I grew up north of here. I raised a 23 family a little bit south of here, all within the EPZ. 24 I've observed how the environment has changed over the 25 last 50 years. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
120 1 In many areas it hasn't changed at all. 2 In many areas it's quite improved. Being down in 3 Vernon, working for Entergy, I've watched how we've 4 conducted business down there and the effect on the 5 very local environment down there, the changes taking 6 place and the effect on the plant. 7 I've watched as we've operated very, very 8 well, and have witnessed the very, very exceptional 9 operation we have down there. 10 I see the impact on me personally, the 11 impact on my family and friends, and my peers. 12 I look at the overall impact of Vermont 13 Yankee, environmentally, economically, and very 14 personally, and I've got some pretty significant 15 observations over the last 30-35 years, and I'm still 16 waiting to identify one that is truly negative, truly 17 negatively impacting all of us. All of us. My 18 family, my friends, all of you, and me, personally. 19 I don't plan on leaving this area. I love this area. 20 This is home. It's beautiful everywhere but it's 21 really beautiful to me here, and because of that, I 22 have that very vested interest. 23 I'm very much in favor of alternate 24 powers, power generation. I'm very much in favor of 25 conservation. I'm very much in favor of acknowledging NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
121 1 reality, and the reality is that Vermont Yankee has a 2 very, very positive influence on this area, and all of 3 us. I need this continued operation of Vermont Yankee 4 for myself, for my children that are grown now, and 5 most certainly for my grandchildren. I thank you 6 very much. 7 MR. CAMERON: Thank you; thank you, 8 Dennis. Is Emma Stamas? And then we'll go to George 9 Iselin and Michael LaPorte. This is Emma. 10 MS. STAMAS: I'm a citizen of this area, 11 actually in Massachusetts, I live just outside the ten 12 mile limit, and I know dozens of farmers, retired 13 people, students that live in that area, some within 14 the ten mile limit, that are very concerned about 15 allowing the plant to have its life extended even five 16 more years, let alone twenty. 17 And the reason is this. If I had been 18 driving a car for 32 years, which is the life of this 19 plant, and I had never had an accident, would that 20 mean that over the next five, ten, fifteen, twenty 21 years, you could guarantee that that same car would 22 drive me safely through life without a single mishap 23 or accident? I do not think that we are being very 24 logical if we think that our technology is so 25 wonderful, that we can stand here and say we are not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
122 1 gonna have any problems over the next 20 years, 2 because we know exactly what we're doing, how we're 3 going to present any kind of crack or malfunction from 4 developing into something more serious. 5 I don't think any of you could make that 6 *bet, that I'm gonna be fine in my 32 year old car for 7 the next .20 years, and we're all sitting here betting, 8 if we approve this plant to be, have its license 9 extended for 20 years, we'll all making that bet, not 10 just with my life but with the lives of every single 11 citizen, child, mother, father, whatever, and every 12 plant and animal that lives in this area. 13 We're making that bet, and I think that 14 that's a foolish bet because I. think we're not so 15 dumb, that we're willing to take that risk, and I also 16 think we're not so dumb that we can't create better 17 technologies, safer technologies, other than 18 continuing to rely on fossil fuels and nuclear power 19 and all the old standbys that we've continued to try 20 to pretend are our only choices. 21 We have lots of choices to make, lots of 22 decisions to make, and they can create jobs, they can 23 create energy, they can create a better life for the 24 future inhabitants of this region. 25 If we're so smart to create this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202)
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123 1 technology, so well, that we can be positive it's 2 gonna be safe over the next 20 years, why aren't we 3 smart enough to make it better, to create safer 4 nuclear power plants,with safer designs, and to close 5 those that are no longer capable of operating safely? 6 And why aren't we capable of beginning to 7 create more wind and solar and conservation 8 technologies that could create immediate jobs for many 9 more people who wouldn't have to be as highly educated 10 as the people who build nuclear power plants or 11 decommission them? 12 I don't think we are so dumb, that we have 13 to sit here and listen to, oh, the plant has worked 14 great for 32 years, and believe that we're never going 15 to have any problems in the future. 16 I think we're smarter than that and I 17 think we can do better than that, and I think that in 18 every meeting that the NRC is a part of, they had 19 better rethink who they're working for and start 20 thinking about the children and grandchildren who are 21 going to have to get out of this technology of nuclear 22 energy and nuclear waste proliferation, and get into 23 something safer and more sustainable. 24 And I ask everyone to go home and urge 25 people to write letters, those of you who left early, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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124 1 or those that know people who left early, write 2 letters, get them in by June 23rd, make your comments 3 known. 4 This isn't about, oh, the plant is great, 5 let's just continue it. It's about a lot more than 6 that. Thank you. 7 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Emma. 8 George Iselin, Michael LaPorte, and 9 Sherry? Okay. This is Mr. Iselin? Okay; great. 10 MR. ISELIN: We live just 17 miles 11 downwind of the nuclear plant. Anyways, I'm concerned 12 mainly about the effects of waste storage of the 13 nuclear industry not having any known way to not have 14 to have this material guarded for, virtually forever. 15 And the dry cask storage, the new way of storing it, 16 isn't something that's really viable to continue 17 renewing and guarding for the next 250,000 years, and 18 it's being stored in an unstable situation. 19 The cement pad it sits on has a geologic 20 formation that's virtually mud underneath it, and it's 21 on the edge of a river, and this is considered the 22 solution. 23 Meanwhile, we have the problem of re-24 racked spent fuel storage. Anyway, I think the 25 solution, even better than soft-path technology of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
125 1 windmills and solar and photovoltaics, which we need, 2 is conservation. 3 Like Clay said about the incandescent 4 lights, if anyone's flown in an airplane at night down 5 on the Eastern seaboard, just the streetlights alone, 6 that we don't need to keep burning everywhere. I 7 mean, certainly it's nice to have some in the inner 8 city for safety, but there's just so much lifestyle 9 change that we need, like mainly outfitting our own 10 homes to be energy efficient. 11 And get away from the economics of 12 centralized power, which these large power stations 13 lend themselves to, get more into diversified means of 14 sustaining ourselves. 15 Anyway, I think that the main issue is 16 whether we are gonna let this outfit produce more 17 waste, contributing hot water to the rivers, and 18 things that actually do contribute to the global 19 warming, and we need to decide whether it's suicidal, 20 actually murderous, to allow these wastes to be put on 21 to future generations. Thank you. 22 MR. CAMERON: Thanks, Mr. Iselin. 23 Is Mr. LaPorte here? we're going to go to 24 Sherry and then we're going to go to Gary Sachs. 25 Sherry. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
126 1 MS. ZABRISKIE: Hello. I'm Sherry 2 Zabriskie. I live in Guilford, Vermont. I've come to 3 many hearings regarding the sale of Vermont Yankee, 4 the operator, the license extension. I feel like I've 5 spoken many times against nuclear power and I'm at the 6 point where I feel like nobody's listening as far as 7 Vermont Yankee or Entergy. 8 The government, the NRC for sure. And so 9 I'm not here to speak to those people. I'm here to 10 speak to the people. I feel like it's time--it's 11 wonderful when ten people get arrested protesting 12 here, and five people on Tuesday got arrested, 13 standing up for what we believe in. But we know that 14 this is not clean, there's no answer for the waste. 15 You know Vermonters don't want this. We know there's 16 other answers. 17 I, for one, live off the grid. I don't 18 rely on this power, we don't need it, and like Clay 19 said, 75 percent of Vermonters know this, and we can 20 move on. 21 So what I'm here to say is it's time for 22 us to gather as the masses, people, like a thousand of 23 us at the same time, in the same place, to stand at 24 Vermont Yankee's doors or wherever. I don't know what 25 the answer is but let's make a date with thousands of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
127 1 us, because I know, personally, hundreds of people in 2 this community that are fed up, that don't want this. 3 So let's get together. Let's make a date 4 with thousands of people. I don't know where we're 5 gonna be but we're gonna like block the road at the 6 power plant, or something, for days, and stand 7 together, until they're willing to sign something 8 saying they'll close, at least in 2012. 9 It takes massive--like in the sixties, or 10 whatever--it takes us altogether at the same place, at 11 the same time, to say we don't want this, and stand 12 together. I know Citizens Awareness Network gets 13 together every other Thursday night at Greenfield's 14 Market in Greenfield, Mass.1 5:30 tomorrow night. 15 5:30, they have a meeting and it happens every other 16 Thursday. 17 And I don't go. I send them money and I 18 get their newsletter, but I'm fed up and I'm ready for 19 us all, hundreds, thousands of us to be at the same 20 place at the same time, to be strong together at once. 21 So let's do it, people. I'm going tomorrow night, 22 5:30, Greenfield. That's it. Thanks. 23 MR. CAMERON: All right. Thank you. 24 Gary. Is Gary still here? Here he is. 25 Gary Sachs. NEAL R. GROSS*
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128 1 MR. SACHS: Well, I'm gonna briefly 2 respond to the woman from the Vermont Business 3 Partnership who spoke earlier and mentioned the 4 Department of Public Service, and how they said how 5 much money we would lose if Vermont Yankee were to
6. close.
7 So let's take Commissioner David O'Brien 8 who's the head of the state department of Public 9 Service. He put a $60 million figure on the cost that 10 would come to Vermont ratepayers if VY closed in 2008. 11 Vermont Yankee provides roughly 250 megawatts to 12 Vermont. That represents one-third of our Vermont 13 total energy demand, which is about 750 megawatts. 14 A recent PSB study determined that energy 15 efficiency measures could reduce Vermont's total 16 electricity use by 20 percent, or 150 megawatts. 17 Let's apply that savings to what VY provides. Then 18 we'd reduce the amount of power needed to replace VY 19 .to 100 megawatts. That's 250 minus 150. 20 If it would cost Vermont 60 million bucks 21 to replace the 250 megawatts over four years, it would 22 cost us 40 percent of that or $24 million to replace 23 the 100 megawatts that would remain, if we implemented 24 all the efficiency measures we could. 25 Now we're down to $24 million. Spread NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
129 1 that over four years. That's $6 million a year, 2 divided by 250,000 households in Vermont, and the 3 increase in each household's electricity bill for the 4 entire year would be roughly $24.00. That's not even 5 considering the contribution from industrial and 6 commercial users. 7 That doesn't sound like a lot of money to 8 invest in freeing Vermont from this role in the 9 production of hundreds of tons and millions, hundreds 10 of tons of radioactive waste, millions of curies of 11 deadly nuclear substances created by the Vermont 12 Yankee nuclear reactor, stored on the banks of the 13 Connecticut River. It doesn't sound like a lotta 14 money to spend to get rid of Vermont Yankee. 15 Now I'm gonna repeat what I said earlier 16 today for the few of you who are left in this 17 evening's event. Richard Monson, Harvard School of 18 Public Health, stated: "The scientific research base 19 shows that there is no threshold below which low 20 levels of ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be 21 harmless or beneficial." 22 There is no threshold below which low 23 levels of ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be 24 harmless or beneficial. The health risks, 25 particularly the development of solid cancers in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
130 1 organs, rise proportionally with exposure. 2 At low doses of radiation, the risk of 3 inducing solid cancers is very small. Low doses. It 4 sounds like what the NRC was giving me earlier in 5 tonight's case. 6 As the overall lifetime exposure 7 increases, so does the risk. Every nuclear reactor 8 emits small amounts of radiation, even so-called zero 9 emission reactors. 10 3-29-2004 was two days before the NRC 11 arrived in Vernon, when they came to inform us that 12 they would not be performing the independent 13 engineering assessment which had been considered a 14 requirement on the proposed uprate by the Vermont 15 Public Service Board, the state's regulatory body. 16 5-4 of 04, the NRC changed its tune and 17 announced that it had long been planning such an 18 independent engineering assessment. They must have 19 been planning it since at least March 15th. 20 You, the NRC, say that Three Mile Island 21 was a wake-up call for the industry. That was March 22 28th, 1979. That is the same year the NRC publicly 23 stated there was no such thing as a safe amount of 24 radiation. 25 Since 1979, these are some of the events. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
131 1 February 11th, 1981, Tennessee Valley 2 Authority's Sequoia One Plant in Tennessee, a rookie 3 operator caused a 110,000 gallon radioactive coolant 4 release. 5 February 25th 1982. The Ginna Plant near 6 Rochester, New York. Its steam generator pipe broke, 7 15,000 gallons of radioactive coolant spilled, small 8 ambunts of radioactive steam escaped into the air. 9 January 15th and 16th, 1983, the Browns 10 Ferry Station, nearly 208,000 gallons of low-level 11 radioactive contaminated water was accidentally dumped 12 into the Tennessee River. 13 1981, 1982, and 1983, Salem One and Two in 14 New Jersey, 90 seconds from catastrophe when the plant 15 was shut down manually, after the failure of an 16 automatic shutdown system. A 3000 gallon radioactive 17 water leak in June of '81, a 23,000 gallon leak of 18 mildly radioactive water, which did splash on to 16 19 workers in February of '82, and radioactive gas leaks 20 in March of '81 and September of '82. 21 Let's go to 1996. NRC Chairperson Shirley 22 Jackson, speaking of Millstone in Time magazine. 23 Quote. "Clearly the NRC dropped the ball. We won't 24 do it again." End quote. 25 1997. Yankee Row, 20 miles from here, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
132 1 roughly, out west, was closed. It's in Rome, 2 Massachusetts. The NRC had allowed Yankee Row to dump 3 radiation, for about 30 years, into the Deerfield 4 River. 5 February 15th, 2000, New York's Indian 6 Point Two, aging steam generator rupture, venting 7 radioactive steam. The NRC initially reported no 8 radioactive material to have been released. Later, 9 they changed their report to say that there was a 10 leak, oh, yes, but not enough to threaten public 11 safety. 12 2004. New NRC Chairman Nils Diaz, about 13 Davis Besse, said--catch this--"The agency," quote, 14 unquote, "dropped the ball," end quote. Again. Hmm. 15 I thought you said it wouldn't happen again. I guess 16 it did. Accidents do happen. That's our NRC. 17 If Three Mile Island was a wake-up call, 18 what exactly was happening at Davis Besse? I do, I 19 would like to know that. Oh, so here we are in an NRC 20 meeting. The environmental impact of Vermont Yankee. 21 We have virtually an ineffective evacuation plan, 22 untested in its entirety. What about those people 23 without vehicles? What about day care centers and all 24 the schools together? What about the transient hotel 25 guests? NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
133 1 A worst-case scenario accident at VY would 2 lead to an area the size of western Mass., Vermont, 3 and New Hampshire being uninhabitable for possibly 30 4 years or more. 5 The plumes, from the National Oceanic and 6 Atmospheric Administration, shows plumes going as far 7 north as deep into Canada. That's over Montpelier. 8 As far south as deep into North Carolina and as far 9 east as over Cape Cod, into the ocean. 10 Then in 2001, on top of that, there's 11 this, something called an Operational Safety Response 12 Evaluation. This was just a test--Operational Safety 13 Response Evaluation test. It occurred about a month 14 before 9/11. In this test, the NRC would stage mock 15 attackers to test the security of nuclear reactors. 16 They came up here to Vermont Yankee and they let the 17 security system at VY know where the people would be 18 attacking from, when they'd be attacking. 19 But that of course is to make sure that if 20 there were some real attacks at the same time, the 21 security agents would know. That's not what they 22 said. So they knew the whereabouts of where these 23 attackers were coming from. 24 And the test was to make sure that the 25 attackers could not get into the control room. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
134 1 Obviously, stop them at the fence line would be the 2 logical thing to do. 3 Vermont Yankee failed. Oh, I'm sorry. 4 The NRC doesn't use that word. I think there's some 5 jargonistic terminology, I can't get my grip around. 6 They certainly had a low security rating on that one. 7 So the mock attackers were able to enter 8 the control room, and VY, one of the least secure 9 nuclear stations in the country--notoriety. 10 Around Vermont Yankee, numerous engineers 11 looked at me and said after 9/11, we fortified our 12 security, we invested $8 million into our security 13 system. Well, here's a question for an environmental 14 impact. Has anybody, any other reactors invested 15 after 9/11? Did everybody have to invest $8 million? 16 And if that is the case, let's say that's a given--if 17 everybody's adding $8 million to their security 18 systems but yet VY was already behind the eight ball, 19 where does that put us today? 20 I think we're still behind the eight ball because we 21 saw the same amount invested. 22 I wonder if the fact that there have been 23 no legislators to speak here tonight, speaks to the 24 futility of this event. 25 MR. LUKENS: Good evening. My name's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
135 1 Larry Lukens. I live in Vernon, in the emergency 2 planning zone, and I work at Vermont Yankee. We've 3 heard a lot tonight, there've been a lot of really 4 eloquent speakers. I'm not going to try to match 5 that. 6 This is about the scoping for the 7 environmental review, as I understand it, and we've 8 heard a lot of things that weren't really about the 9 environment. One of the tests says, I recall from the I0 slide, is that NRC has to look at environmental 11 effects and determine whether these environmental 12 effects constitute a new and significant change in 13 things that have already been evaluated. 14 I haven't heard anything tonight that says 15 there's anything new and significant. Actually, I 16 haven't heard anything new, and I haven't heard 17 anything that sounds significant. 18 We have met all the requirements. We have 19 exceeded many of them. We continue to meet the 20 environmental requirements. We continue to be, as 21 John Dreyfus said, good stewards of our environment. 22 This plant emits no carbon dioxide. In fact it emits 23 nothing that would be considered a hazard. We don't 24 emit radioactivity. 25 And the people who have spoken tonight NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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136 1 have, as far as I can tell, not raised a substantive 2 issue that identifies a new or significant 3 environmental impact that would be an obstacle to the 4 renewal of this plant's license. 5 Thank you. 6 MR. CAMERON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 7 Lukens. 8 Joan, and then we have Beth, and is there 9 a Mr. Bosquet, Paul Bosquet? Okay. 10 Joan, thank you, and then Beth, and then 11 I'm going to ask Frank Gillespie to close out the 12 meeting for us. 13 MS. HORMAN: I'm just a concerned citizen 14 and I'm here in the interest of safety, as I hope we 15 all are. I don't want to talk to you as a group or 16 corporation but as people, people who have a choice in 17 how we will proceed in a world that often has 18 conflicting interests. 19 Although I value my comfort and the ease 20 nuclear power provides, my concern about our safety 21 and the safety of our future generations brings me 22 here. 23 It is easy to slip into denial, or pray to 24 God to take care of our problems. What is more 25 difficult is to take responsibilities for what we, as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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137 1 a group, and as individuals, are doing. 2 At what point do we take responsibilities 3 for the damage we are doing with nuclear energy and 4 radiation? At what point do we say to ourselves, that 5 we have gone too far, and that this is not about 6 profit or power or comfort but about safety for us, 7 our world, and its future? 8 Do we want to risk another Chernobyl, or 9 another Three Mile Island? Safety is defined as a 10 state of being safe, freedom from injury or damage, 11 the quality of ensuring against hurt, injury, danger 12 or risk, or the state of being protected from harm. 13 Do we want to risk our safety with toxic 14 nuclear byproducts that jeopardize our future 15 generations and ourselves? Please. I hope you can 16 take a moment and hear me from my heart to your heart, 17 and then act from that place. 18 Do our personal comforts, and your 19 profits, justify the risk of proceeding with nuclear 20 power, particularly at this staging facility? Thank 21 you. 22 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Joan. 23 Beth, would you like to come up. 24 BETH: Hi there. Thank you very much for 25 holding this public comment session tonight. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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138 1 I am a citizen of, a new citizen, 2 actually, of Greenfield. I moved from Maine, where I 3 lived eight years, and prior to that I lived in 4 Princeton, Massachusetts, for 18 years, and just going 5 back to the beginning of my time in Massachusetts, in 6 18 years in Princeton, all those years we have a 7 windmill, thanks to the citizens of that town, and 8 they've now decided to improve on the windmill that 9 has been there, and it has provided well for, without 10 any pollution at all, for 30 percent of the energy 11 needed for that community. 12 And I believe they're adding another 13 windmill. I'm not sure of the statistics. But I then 14 went to Maine. Maine got rid of its nuclear power 15 plant, Maine Yankee, I'm not sure what year, and the 16 governor of Maine has led the people that work for the 17 government to create a plan, a 50-point plan of 18 creating renewable energies in the state of Maine. 19 They're encouraging cities and towns to 20 develop renewable energies that they will market 21 elsewhere, that universities can use, that can provide 22 jobs for people, that can be safe and viable for the 23 next generations. 24 Why don't we go that direction? I 25 attended a recent conference at Smith College at which NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
139 1 there was all different kinds of renewables presented, 2 and for the first time, I found out about geothermal 3 energy and that people in Massachusetts, at least 4 there, I'm not sure about Vermont or anywhere else,
.5 are utilizing geothermal energy for commercial 6 buildings as well as residential properties, either by 7 going straight down to the center of the Earth, not 8 the center, but down where it's hotter than it is on 9 the surface--I'm not sure how many feet down you have 10 to go--but going straight down or else spreading out 11 along a piece of land next to your building and 12 creating energy right from the Earth itself, with of 13 course no pollutants in that process at all.
14 I believe that this problem of renewables 15 has to be regional and that we do need to contact our 16 legislators and take actions in our cities and towns, 17 and together that we can change the dependence on 18 nuclear and fossil fuels, and gas that have caused 19 such terrible devastation all over the world and in 20 our own communities. 21 I was a nuclear activist back in 1979, in 22 Princeton. We were asking the same questions then 23 that we're asking the NRC now, and that is, why 24 produce power when you don't know what to do with the 25 waste? When you don't know what to do with the waste. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
140 1 When you don't know what to do with the waste. When 2 the waste, now, has become subject to the possibility 3 of a terrorist attack. 4 We can do better than this. We can join 5 together and do better than this, and I think we 6 should and I think this plant should be closed as soon 7 as possible, and that planned into the closing of it 8 should be planning for jobs for the people that have 9 worked so well at Vermont Yankee. 10 Thank you. 11 MR. CAMERON: Thank you, Beth. 12 I'm going to ask Frank Gillespie, who's 13 the director of the Division of License Renewal to 14 close the meeting for us, and I think he has some 15 important things to say to all of you. 16 Frank. 17 MR. GILLESPIE: I think besides thanking 18 the few that have struggled through, the people I 19 really wanted to thank actually had to leave early, 20 and that's people who exercised the system from the 21 first day we came out here. 22 We got three sets of petition with 23 contentions from the state of Vermont, state of 24 Massachusetts, and from the New England Coalition, and 25 it actually is gratifying, as hard as this may sound, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
141 1 to see people actually exercise a system where we came 2 out and talked to these people and talked to the 3 governments, way before the application even came in, 4 to make sure that they were fully aware and had full 5 knowledge of what was going on, to make the time frame 6 to get those contentions in. Which leads me to 7 tonight's meeting. 8 Please give us your comments after this 9 meeting, in writing. We've got them on a transcript, 10 we'll try to pick them out, and I think I got two 11 things from this. Besides the concerns of the 12 citizens who came to talk is also potentially the 13 NRC's ability to communicate why we do what we do, to 14 some extent. 15 Questions on the BEIR VII report, we've 16 looked, as an agency, at the BEIR VII report, and done 17 written evaluations on it. 18 Obviously you haven't read those written 19 evaluations, but that's not your fault, if we hadn't 20 made them available. So in answering some of the 21 questions, I think we're going to have to string 22 together these references. We may not agree, but all 23 we can do is at least understand and see the basis for 24 why we're coming to those conclusions we come to. 25 So we may not get to agreement but we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433
142 1 should at least achieve understanding and read each 2 other's justification and backgrounds. 3 So with that, thank you for the about 4 twenty people who are still left in the room. Yeah? 5 PARTICIPANT: (speaking from an un-miced 6 location) 7 MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. It'll be sent out, 8 but how is it available to him? 9 MR. EMCH: I got it. First, it'll be on 10 our Web site, or it'll be in the ADAMS, but the other 11 thing is, we'll make copies available, we'll send it 12 out to anybody. If you're interested in us sending it 13 to you, we can do that. If you give us your address, 14 you gave us your address when you signed in. If you 15 send me an e-mail or whatever, and I'll make sure that 16 you get it. But it will be publicly available through 17 the NRC's Web site. 18 PARTICIPANT: (speaking from an un-miced 19 location) 20 MR. EMCH: RLE@NRC.gov. 21 PARTICIPANT: (speaking from an un-miced 22 location) 23 MR. CAMERON: We're going to have to go on 24 the transcript; okay. 25 PARTICIPANT: (speaking from an un-miced NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202)
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143 1 location) 2 MR. CAMERON:. You want to close. Let's 3 close down and you guys can talk. 4 MR. EMCH: I'll talk to you, sir. 5 MR. CAMERON: Yeah; he can let you know. 6 Okay. With that, thank you very much, everybody. 7 [Whereupon, at 10:36 p.m., the proceedings 8 was closed.] 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
DART W. EVERETT 41 Sycamore St., Brattleboro, VT 05301 802-254-9258 deverett@sover.net 802-257-2627 FAX TO: Nuclear Regulatory Commission DATE: June 7, 2006 FROM:* Dart W., Everett. It is estimated that by mid-century, the world will require a doubling of the current worldwide energy demand of 14 terawatts of power. To achieve this demand will require the equivalent of one 1,000 megawatt power plant going on line every day for nearly 38 years (article from Discover, February 2005, pp 16-17 attached). Although I assume the initial mandate to the NRC regarding environmental issues 30 to 40 years ago concerned the rather micro impact, that is of a limited area surrounding a nuclear plant, certainly now the issue is equally the global concern of greenhouse gasses, foremost carbon dioxide. I am not an expert. i am a concerned citizen,-concerned about the future of energy for the State of Vermont, the future energy requirement for the world and the environmental impact the s6urcesoof that energy Will have-. Dr. Arthur Westing, a resident of Putney, VT, 10 miles up the road, is an expert. He has served 6n the faculty of, or been a research fellow at several education' institutions, including Harvard University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, served as the director of the ..United Nations Environmental Programme project on 'Peace, Security, &the Environrmfent," and is the author of many articles and books on the environment. At the'moment, Dr. Westing is in Sweden. He told me he wished he could be here to testify on the importance of Vermont Yankee to the energy future of Vermont, and give his wholehearted support to the relicensing. I am submitting an e-mail from Dr. Westing to me giving me the authority to give you two letters'he has written on energy and environmental issues, as wellf"as his:resLisme'. ` His'laiestiletter citeseia British repoft'oh'The Role of Nuclear Poserin a Low CarbonEconomy which he uses to calculate the impacts shown on the following page. Thank you for beginning this lengthy process for the relicensing of the Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant. I hope the evidence supports a positive decision.
CO 2 PRODUCTION FRQM.. F VARIOUS SOURCES OF POWER. Kilograms of: CO 2 per.kiloWatt -of Electricity for "Cradle-t- Grave" or a fulllprodudi6n cycle." '. ' COAL. N AT U R NA U.... A
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3 t.. PHOTO-NVOLTAICS 50: WIND. 16. NUCLEAR *16 . Source: . . .. : . . http://www~sd-commission..*rg.uk/publications/downloads/SDC-NuclearPosition-2006.pdf .* I
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DISCOVER DIALOGUE* che'mistrick smalley Interviewed by edward rosenfeld A chemist's.+
PlanItoSave "PlanetEarth
We are used to a world where we are "ch Inenergy, driven by low-cost oil..
r : 'That will not go on for much longer RJICK SMALLEY SHARE THE I4OBEL PRIZE IN Chernistryin 1996 forhis pioneering re-search in nanotichnology. He discovered carbon 60,which he named buckninster-fullerine-buciybals for shori--because. the molecule carries the stiuctureofgeo-' desic domes created by Buckr.inster S 'Fuller. Buckybahls hývv led to the devel --
" opment of carbon nanotubes, used in . ".many contemporary developments in nanotechnology. Smalley, who teaches.
at Rice University in Houston, is using his Nobel P1izels aibifly'}pulpit to dis-cuss energy, an issue he calls the riost;- important problem facing humanity. " - What Is the energy problem, and why are you, a chemisty professor, so cerned about It S.The core of the energy problem Isthat we have a lot more people on this planet than we used to have. Right now most of the billions of people In . Why are you the right person to take this on? ment and Ultimately replace oil, natural gas, and the underdeveloped world are not conisuming en- S:T'he answer to these problems has to come out eventually coal. it's a huge enterprise. Worldwide, ergy at any signIfficant rate yet they ciertainly will t physical sciences and engineering. tI can't "ofUe energy Is a $3-tillion.-a-year operation, twice the . as time goes on. FAtherwe find away of enabling 'sieethe answer, *ho can7 ". zeofglobal agrculhire midfourorfietimes larger energy prosperity for everyone on this planet, or ' " """ tha'al theiworld'smtary penses.
*we will Inherit a plague of troubles. Why don't more people seem to Sr. e about this? What about the energy companies?
Such as? . S.: Cheap oil. Our biggest p'roblem forthe past2O *S: Many,popie working Inthe big energy com-S.Prosperity Isdetermi*ied by the abundance, has been low oil prices. . panies have great hopes that there are vast re-quality, and cdst of energy. We are ued to liv-." sources of natural gas.around theplanet that will lng in'a world where we are inc'redibly rich in Do you think Itwill require another us olng ikeepfor many decades, Ishare their e:ergy driven prinarily by low-cost oji.That will shocking event like the 1970s oil crisis? hope, but I believe ItIswishful thinking.
"not go on for mich longer. Itcaniiot because S:rmfraiditwil.have dedicated much of mytime. "
rapid economic development InChina, India, and tottyg tp bring this Issue to the top of the agen*d So where sho-uld research be focused now? Africa, combined with Increaslng demand for hoping that the Bush administration'would realtze ..S: One area Isinthe transmission and storage of
*fuel Inthe developed world will soon outp'acc the political p'oety of launching agrand new chal- elecrical energy. Itwould be transforming to have "worddwideill production. . lenge to solvi the energy problem. Ifthat doesn't much more efficient electrcalenergy tra.nsport by hapenthen we vr111 wt~iy or~eventstbrfrý wire oveircontinental distances Inhundredisof giga- *What will happen as energy costs climb? thiS issue.to.a raging 0.ls. watts. Itwould also be transforming to have clec-cst oS:The of energy going up will cause pros- trical energy storage on a vast scale. I believe it's perity to go down.There wil be Inflation as billions What should we be doing? best to do this locally Inour houses and small busi-oftpeople cmpete for Insufficient resources..here S: We sh*ud concentrate ohnfndng anew energy nesses. We need to be able to pull electrical power wl be famine.There wil be terrorism and war. resource and a new energy nfrastructureto aug- off the grid when Itis cheapest and tuck Itaway *5IsISCOV/ER FEBR~UARY 2005
somewhere so that It Is a*vailable for use later, program, we can have the necessary enabling sci- in the 1980s.The challenge we face is to provide whenever that'home or business needs It.Long- entific discoveries-4-Itle miracles and big mira- for a doubring of worldwide energy production by dcstance electrical power transfer would allow pd- des--within the next 1"to 15 yea=. . -midcentury. Right now the world runs on about mary energy producers to market their energy 14 terawatts of power,the equivalent of 220 mil-thousands of miles away. Imagine vast solarfarms Solar doesn't work very well now. ::lion barrels of oil per day. By midcentury, most Inthe deserts. You know, Ifyou look at the planet, Why are you so keen for It?. analysts agree you have to at least double thatto % *Wrtally ,ev orn t has deserts.'hose deserts S: Ifyou survey the sioures for primary energy more than 440 million barrels of oil equivalent per - , have tremendous energy resources I the form of the massie scalethatwe'regoing to need, there day, or 28 terawatts. sunlight Even Ifwe find a way ofgenerating the areonlyafewplacesyoucanfindenergy ofthat S electricity, youve got to tra t that energy from magnitude. Nuclear fission power plants, Ifyou Can we do that? the deserts, where people don't live, to other plces were willing to have thousands of breeder reac-.-. S: Not by burning things that put CO 2 Into the at-C'arbon nanotubes are capable of
handling incredible levels of electrical cu.rent, as much as a billion amps per s.quare centimeter' on the continents where they o Iv and you've tors around the world, would 6e perfectly ade- mosphere-too much risk to the planet. What we gotto sif the time when the energy Isavailable. quate. Hydrogen fusl.i would be perfectly ade- need is clean energy that Ischeap enough to per-Im confident that the best answer is going to be . quate. Both are probably going to be too epensi mit the development of IndA, China, sub-Saharan enabled by niot ogy. . but we ought to push them anyway. Africa, and South America. We need itat no more than three cents a kilowatt hou. If I knew how to What can nanotechnology do? Can any other energy sources help us until do that now, and Iturned on one such new car-SLet's tak first about transmris*"iolhe angle I've . we develop solar better?. bon-free 1,090-megawatt power plant tomorrof ,
been devoting my efforts to Isa new kind of con- " &CoaLButwecannotburncoalmuchlongerw'th- .andthen the next day anotherplant and the next ducting cable made of what are called armchair out somehow sequestering the resultant COk Un- day anothler pl.ant, I would have to do that for 27 quanturn wires: single-walied carbon nanotubes fortunately, Idoubt that 'wewill ever be able to do years each and every day in order to just get 10 [buckytubes] with a particulasruct.re..hese am. that on a global scale ina practical, relimble way at more terawatts.And we need more than that quantum wave guides for electrons. I am confi: the required rate ot tens of billions of tons per year, dent overtime we will be able to find new ways year after yar.That sends us right back to solar It seems hopeless.... of spinning continuous cables using such tech- There Isthousands of times more solar Ming the S: Addressing this challenge will be good for us. nology. 7bis approach could yield cables with the earth than we will need to power 10 billion people. Even If we fall to find the miracles that allow us condutctiv'of copper btf with a strength greater The only way to do it cheaply is with photovtalcs to make and then transport hutdreds of gigawatts than steel at one-sixth the weight Carbon nano- or a photocatalytic agent that is as cheap as paint of power over 3,000 miles at pennies per Idlowatt-tubes are capable of handling Incredible levels of There's a lot of buzz arond about nano entities that hour, and even If we can never find photovoltaics electrical curýrent as much as a billion amps per can be coated onto photovoltaic films cheaply. that are as cheap as dirt, the enterprise of trying square centimeter.lbtas compared with conven- d I push our Science and our engineering tional cabling material, which can carry onlyacou- So research doilars should.go to solar first? so far forward that we'll generate a conucopia of piethouad amps per s9 #i....centimet Instorage S: Yes, together wih electVzl power transmission unexpected new technologies that will be the ba-our hope Is to develop new batteries.The chem- and local storage.We oughtto stomp on It.Ireal- sis of vast new industries. islryofbatterlesneeds tobelmprovedatthenarm lze that we'll need miracles to get there, andwe "level and brought up to the macro leveL The best . can't guarantee that all those miracles are possi- What will Inspire us to do It? candidates Include buckytubes Inlithium ion bat- ble Within the laws of phjysics and chemistry as S: Presidential leadership. Apresident could Inpire tedes, flowcells, and hydrogen fuel cells. we now knovi them, bkut have faith that somehow., a new generation of scientrits and engineers, a new w "r ay a. " fm b g ae t we will find a way to make it w-ork. ... Sputnik generation tha would be of tremendous
.Howfarawayarew~e. fro. beingableto ... "benefit to this county and to the world. This bold "" S:1be1i.and transmit store energy u we launicha if these ways?
mijornational research" How muchshould S:Well,we time -do haveyoudealt thinkwith weallhave? of this back *new Itics, enterprise would be good and most lmportant goodbusiness, mgood pol-for'the souL l PIOTOGRAPHS BY BETH PERKINS DISCOVER FEBRUARY 2005 17
In Pagel of1 From: "Westing" <westing@sover.net> To: "Dart W. Everett" <deverett@sover.net>
Subject:
Energy matters Dr Arthur H. Westing. Westing Associates in En vironment, Security, & Education 134 Fred Houghton Rd; Putney, VT 05346; USA T&F: 1-802-387-2152; E: westing@sover.net
Dear Dart,
Thank you for your call of this momrning. .As requested, attached (in WordPeifect) you will find three items: (1) My very recent letter on global warming and C02 (B'ttleb6rb Reformer, 1 Jun 06); (2) My earlier letter on electricity for Vermont (Brittlebor Reformer, 22-23 Mar 03); and (3) a brief Vermont-oriented bio. As requested, you are welcome to submit these on my behalf to the Nficlear Regulatory Commission or similar Vermont energy-related hearings and meetings. I shall be out of town and unreachable from*4 to 24 June. Sincerely yours, Arthur "AHW blurb 13 (Local).3jpd' ms - Electrical op-ed.wpd
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WESTING ASSOCIATES :. ; IN ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, & EDUCATION . 134 Fred Houghton Rd Putney, VT 05346 USA ARTHUR H.WESTING, M.F., Ph.D. 11802-387-'152 (ph. &'fax) CAROL E. WESTING, M.Ed. .- westing@skver.net : ARTHUR H. WESTING - BIOGRAPHY
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Westings undergraduate training was in botany (Columbia, AB, . After'twoyears in the United States Marine Corps (serving as.an artillery officer in the Korean War) he became a forest ecologist (Yale, MF, 1954; PhD, 1959). Hpehas.b.een a.Research Forester.with the United:- States Forest Service, has taught forestry, ecology, and conservation at.various colleges and: .. universities, has twice been a Research Fellow at Harvard, and has been a Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Peaci:Re'sarch Institute Osl6. :For eight * :" years he directed the United Nations Envir"onmefit Pro'gramme pr6jet oi"Pe'ace' Secty, & the-Environment', a position which took him to many countries throughout the world; and is'the author of numerous articles and several books in that subject area. * .. ,., Westing has been on the faculty of the European Peace University, a member of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) World Commission on Protected Areas, Vice-President of the International Society of Naturalists (INSONA), and also a member of or advisor to a number of other international environmental nongovernmental organizations and scholarly journals. He has been awarded an honorary doctorate (DSc, Windham, 1973) and a medal from the Newý York Academy of Sciences (1983); and he is one of the 500 individuals worldwide't ohave beenn appointed to the United Nations 'Global 500 Roll of Honour' (1990). He has been a Consultant in Environmental Security since 1990, variousiy to the World Bank, UNEP, UNIDIR, and
-UNESCO, to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the Internati6nal:Or~nizitinn for Migration, the Government of Eritrea, and to several other national and international agencies.
Westing moved to Vermont in 1965, and has been on the faculties of Middlebury and" Windham Colleges, and an outside examiner at Marlboro College. He has served on the Governor's Environmental Control Advisory Committee, has been a Contributing Editor of the Vermont Freeman, and on the statewide Boards of the Vermont Wild Land Foundation, Vermont Academy of Arts & Sciences, and Vermont Coverts. Locally he has served on the Boards of the Windham Regional Commission, Windham World Affairs Council, Brattleboro Museum & Art Center, Woodland Owners' Association, and Windmill Hill Pinnacle Associationi.
-AHW/060603
ELECTRICITY. FOR VERMONT. Arthur H. Westing Putney (20 March 2003) According to the Vermont Department of Public Service, roiughly 40% of Vermont's electricity currently derives from hydro-power, 35% from nuclear power, 15% from fossil fuels, and 5% from wood (the remaining 5% being imported with source unspecified)."Wind and solar power currently contributenegligible amounts to Vermont's electricity (each under 0:1%). Moreover, the use of electricity in Vermont has in recent decades been rising quite steadily since 1980 at the rate of about 2.6% per year, and the State projects that this trend will continue. In this regard it is important to note.that the increase in electrical use has been three times as rapid as Vermont's increase in population during that same period. Various of my friends and acquaintances in the area are outspoken in their opposition to nuclear power plants, and seem baffled that I do not join them in their anti-nuclear activities. There is no denying that a nuclear power plant has arisk associated with it, namely the exceedingly remote possibility of catastrophic releases to its surrounding area'of airborne radioactive contamination; either from faulty operation or malicious act. However, tunder normal operation the radioactive releases of a nuclear power plant are below those of a fossil fuel plant" (especially so when coal is used; w1~ich generally contains more thorium and urinium than oil); and its contributionis to greenhouse gases and immediately dangerous air pollutants are virtually non-existent. In terms of thý energy obtaixed, uranium mininmg is orders of magnitude less environmentally intruiive than coal mining or oil extraction. The ultimate disposal of spent fuel and other radioactive -wastes does present a problem that remains to be solved to complete satisfaction, presumably by a combination of reprocessing and burial at some remote and tectonically stable site, either in this country or elsewhere. By contrast, the use of fossil fuels nevitably results in huge ongoizik iniults to dhe human and natural environments in'at least two major'forms: "icid precipitationi an'.d greenhouse gases. The-former seriously debilitates'our terrestiial *andfr-eshivatei' ecoiystemii and the latter'is a major contributor tb the global warming'that is on its way'to be'6om.i.ng thd.izimraate ifisult to both the global biosphere and 'global sociosphere. Moreover, thU oil (whi'chn6w accou.nt'for about one-third of the fossil fuels used for ge'nra.ýig Verfibnt's" etricit) leads our couintry to deal with such ruthlessly totalitarian states as Saudi Arabia aid Ira'q, or.mightovll lead'to ihe despoliation of Alaska's still relatively'pristine north shoie:.' And then to"cohsider iri the blighted liv es and landscapes where theco'l we 'Use oiigintes. As to hy dro-power, more than two-thirds of what Vermont now uses comes from Canada, for which the James Bay region has paid dearly.
That ectricity.comes t" uslvith the legacy of a :dev&a'tated envkironmit"ent oyer huge "areas of die "
taiga ecosystem, and the utter disruption ýnd social breakdown'o'f the indig'enous Ciee p'ojulation. If nuclear-generated electricity is curtailed, this will be at the inexorable expense of almost comparable increases in the use of fossil fuels. Substitution by wind turbines - a non-polluting source of electricity that could replace modest amounts of the loss - is currently being fought
% S with extraordinary vehemence, especially for aesthetic reasofis, wheirever' attempts "inWin'dham County and elsewhere in Vermont are now being made to introduce them (and this despite the largely trouble-free Searsburg pilot operation). Vermont is already using wood to a larger extent;.
than any of our neighboring states. Indeed, greater use of wood (now plentiful in Vermont). should be encouraged, but if substantially increased our air must be monitored for the possibility of significant contributions to its pollution. . . . .: . Substitution by.water power generated in Vermont could in theory replace another 1%. modest amounto.f,the loss. 'However, to obtain.the electricity.for'.Vermont from the eight . Connecticut and Deerfield River dams nowa.vailable for sale (if not dismantled, as environmental. considerations m~ight suggest) would require a fundamental change in the State's relationship with the:New England Power Pool, or.even.withdrawal from it. -And any construction of new dams (if suitable sites could be found) would be at the expense of further .disruptions to what relatively little remains of Vermont's free-flowing stream ecosystems. Effidency, frugality,.retrenchment, and population limitations could alleviate some of the: strains of any.electrical .depriyation - and sho.uld certainly be encouraged by all means at hand ..... But the simple fact remains that moft of the electricity lost by eschewing nuclear power is sure to be made up by.fossil fuels - and thus at a terrible continuing actual (not hypothetical) cost to. humans and nature, in both the short and long terms. Regrettably, I do not have much hope for significant help from this direction, given that per-capita use of electricity in the State has increased by about 40% since 1980 despite a huge .amountof publicity urging us al to be more conservative in our use of electrical (and other) energy. It is no slip of the lip that "energy use" is usually referred to as "energy demand". And even the thought.of population limitations for Vermont (or the nation) is anathema to many people. In short, I would be ready to support the phasing out of nuclear power plants in the. unlikely situation that such action were unfailingly linked to replacement - as needed beyond savings from efficiency, frugality, retrenchment, and population limitations -,bysources that were medically and environmentally benign.(fossil fuels certainly not among them). Moreover, it is useful to recognize that electricity makes up less. than one-fifth of the total energy currently being Tsed in Vermont - transportation and space heating together accounting for the lion's share - so any energy conservation efforts must certainly take this differential into account... Finally, it is clear that Vermont does not, and cannot, act in isolation regarding many of the energy challenges we face. today. Even if we direct a blind eye toward the distant unpleasantries:.. associated with the sources of the electricity we import, we cannot forget that we also'import most of our air pollution from electrical-generation plants more or less distant from Vermont.. [This appeared in the Brattleboro.Reformer91(18):S; 22-23 March 2.003, under the .title Why I support nuclear power", and also otherwise.slightly edited.]: ) ... -... ... . ......
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GLOBAL WARMING, ENERGY PRODUCTION, AND CARBON DIOXIDE The most serious long-term threat to the well-being and survival of the plants and animals with which we share the earth is global warming. And the major cause ofglobal warming is the carbon dioxide gas we humans release into the atmosphere. That carbon dioxide is largely a byproduct of our profligate use of coal, oil, and natural gas (and, among other lesser sources, the manufacture of cement). Our output of carbon dioxide has been steadily increasing since the late 19th century, and about 50 years ago surpassed the earth's ability to absorb it. None of the ways in which we produce energy is fully benign, so clearly the most sensible way to address the problem of global warming is some combination of using less energy and of using the energy we do need more efficiently. Next it becomes important to know how the several ways of producing energy compare in their production of carbon dioxide. To be meaningful, such comparison must take into account the full production cycle, including fuel extraction, plant construction, routine plant operation, energy distribution, ultimate decommissioning, and so forth (a "cradle-to-grave" analysis); moreover, the comparison must be done on an energy unit basis (for example, per kiloWatt-hour of electricity generated). It turns out that, on top ofits staggering immediate environmental and health impacts, coal is by far the worst carbon dioxide- that is, global-warming - culprit. An authoritative study comparing several means of producing electricity throughout western Europe was published in March of this year by the British Sustainable Development Commission (see pages 21-22 at www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications/downloads/SDC-NudearPosition-2006.pdf). For each kiloWatt-hour generated, coal produced, on average, 891 kilograms of carbon dioxide; natural gas 356 kilograms; and wind turbines and nuclear power stations each about 16 kilograms. In other words, in a cradle-to-grave analysis nuclear produced only about 2% of the carbon dioxide of coal, only about 4% of natural gas, and about the same as wind. I might add that a recent separate German report found that nuclear produced about 30% of that produced by photo-voltaics (solar panels). There is no denying that nuclear power has drawbacks associated with its use, including the remote possibility.ofa catastrophic accident, thesafe disposal of the still radioactive spent fuel rods, and the potential facilitation of nuclear-weapon proliferation. But to suggest that nuclear contributes significantlyto our awesome global warming crisis -more so than wind or even natural gas, as recently reported by the Vermont Public Interest Research Group of Montpelier (VPIRG) on page 11 of its booklet "Global Warming in Vermont" -is slovenly ifnot disingenuous advocacy. Finally it should be of interest to note that the electricity we currently obtain from our local provider, Green Mountain Power, contributes relatively little to global warming. About 92% comes from low carbon dioxide producers (45% nuclear, 43% hydro, 4% wood) and the remaining 8% from high carbon dioxide producers (5% natural gas, 3% oil) - our local low/high breakdown being about twice as favorable as for the state as a whole. Arthur H. Westing Putney, Vermont [Published in: Brattleboro[Vt] Reformer94(78):4. 1 June 2006]
Union support for Vermont Yankee Re-licensing Brattleboro, VT/June 7, 2006- Mike Flory, Chairman of Unit 8, Local 300, of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which is also a member of the Vermont Energy partnership, issued the following statement at this evenings re-licensing hearing. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. My name is Michael Flory. Some of you may have read about me a few weeks ago. I was the fire brigade inember reported as injured in our Unusual Event, and I'm happy to say that reports ofmy demise were a bit exaggerated. I am the Chairman of Unit 8, Local 300 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. I work at Vermont Yankee, along with more than 120 IBEW members. I am proud to say that I was born and raised in Vermont, and I currently live just a few hundred yards from the front gate. We are proud to work at Vermont Yankee because of the essential power it produces. We know that our work at the plant helps to make Vermont a cleaner and more. prosperous place to live. Without Vermont Yankee the 620 megawatts that we currently supply to the New England grid would have to come from a fossil fuel power plant. Wind Power, Connecticut River hydro power and energy conservation, all nice ideas, simply cannot replace the reliable, steady, baseline power we produce. Since opening in 1972, Vermont Yankee has prevented more than 00 million tons of fossil fuel emissions from entering the atmosphere. This has been prevented not only by rendering an in-state coal plant unnecessary, but also from reducing the amount of out-of-state electricity we have to purchase, most of which would come from coal plants as coal still accounts f6r half the power produced in America.today. In 2005, Verhnont Yankee avoided the emission of
7,700 tons of sulfur dibxide, e 2,000 tons ofnitrogen oxides, 0 2.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.
Emissions of sulfur dioxide lead to the formation of acid rain. Nitrogen oxides are a key precursor of both'ground level ozone and smog. Greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide, contribute to global warming. The 2,000 tons ofnitrogen oxides prevented by Vermont Yankee last year is the equivalent of what would have been generated by 105,000 vehicles. In Vermont, we have 280,000 cars. n -C-
I-7 2 Let me repeat, we at Vermont Yankee are proud of what we do - proud to produce power cleanly and safely. Safety is our highest priority. We would not work in the plant, let alone live near it with our families, if we felt that the plant was not safe or that safety was not a priority at Vermont Yankee. We have seen, and been instrumental in the plants continual enhancements and upgrades, most recently during the "power uprate" process. The cost of Vermont Yankee's power to Vermont cohsumers like myself is also far below regional market prices. As a base-load generator we are able to provide lower-cost power which is so critical for the state. I respectfully submit that if you like having lights that go on at the flick of a switch, if you like computers that don't fry as a result of rolling brownouts; if you enjoyed air conditioning during last weeks heat wave, or heat during last months' cold snap you should like Vermont Yankee's low-cost, clean, and safe power. Vermont Yankee's value to my home state can only become more valuable as time goes on. As global warming becomes more and more destructive, we can remain an environmentally friendly source of power with zero greenhouse gas emissions. As the world energy markets become more competitive, we can continue to be a source of reliable, economic baseload power. That is why we encourage the NRC to renew Vermont Yankee's license. Thank you.
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The Town of Marlbopro Vermont hereby (again) formally requests that Maribor be included in thje EPZ for tyhe Vermont nuclear power plant. Marlboro is the only Town with property
-within the ten-mile'radius of the power plant which Is not inclhded, and in all other cases where part opf a town falls Within the ten-mile radius ther entiretown is included in the EPZ.
A map showing this discrepancy is a part of the original Vermont Yankee license with the NRC. I have made a similar but less detailed map for inclusiuon with his request.
*.e entitled .t6 the same prote6tions as otherresidents whh .e-near'fie power plant e,, and bei-g'-exl!uded from the EPZ does not allow uyehese protections. Items such as o Ar-{eV .,.,otification, tr-tngin ut Into environmenta and etc. will all be addressed when -'-"Mariboro Is included in the . a sts that as.the NRC looks over the license I .. ,pextension, a change manda ar"boro's inclusion hebfily-reasonab[e'\V-stance for the'NRC to ae t all, th NRC O Issues the'license and the gdal of the NRC is tot protect the ~~citiz ,.~ of this country ~ ~~ýfrom ~undue.exposure to risk.
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introcuctuon Since then, there has been mixed success with 1.1 Why the SDC the policy measures put in place to deliver is re-examining these goals.'Carbon emissions have been rising for the past three years, mainly as a result of its nuclear Increased use of coal in power stations due to high gas prices, but also due to increased position demand for energy, despite the effect of a number of energy efficiency measures. Progress with renewables has been reasonably The SOC's previous position on nuclear encouraging, and despite concerns over delays power was agreed in 2001 as part of our Inthe offshore wind sector, It Isstill considered input into the Energy Review conducted possible for the UK to meet or get close to its by the Performance and Innovation Unit 10% renewables target by 2010. of the Cabinet Office. This formed the basis of our input to the Energy White However, rising oil and gas prices have put Paper (EWP) process. pressure on consumers, and there is Increasing concern that, over the longer term, the The 2003 Energy White Paper was a watershed inevitable decline in the UK's North Sea inenergy policy, and was unique Internationally reserves will lead to energy security problems. for committing the UK to a 60% cut InCO, Inthe electricity sector there are worries that emissions by 2050. Although it is now possible *the decline of the UK's nuclear power capacity, that this target will need to be Increased, in order due to scheduled closures, will reduce total to meet the international obligation to avoid generating capacity and could increase CO, dangerous dimate change, the EWP contained emissions unless this capacity Isreplaced by a bold vision for future energy supply and carbon-free generation. demand. The four primary goals were: Inresponse to these concerns, the Government
> Putting the UK on a path to cut CO, has announced a new Energy Review, which emissions by 60% by 2050, with real will report after the Climate Change Programme progress by 2020 Review finishes, inmid 2006. As the Government's > To maintain the reliability of energy supplies. advisor on sustainable development, the SDC > To promote competitive markets in the decided during 2005 that it needed to revisit UK and beyond Its position on nuclear power so that It was well placed to advise the Government on this > To ensure that every home is adequately Important and controversial issue.
and affordably heated. The EWP outlined a vision for energy supply in 2020, which saw electricity supplies still based on a market-based grid, but with Increasing
1.2 Nuclear.
commitment to more local 'geieration and mlcrogeneration. With a strong focus on power in context energy efficiency, renewables, and greater. use of combined heat and power (CHP), Nuclear power currently provides around 20A the EWP stressed the need for technological of the UK's electricity. This translates Into 8% and economic Innovation to help bring new of the UK's energy needs once other sources of technologies to the market, thereby creating energy, such as transport fuel and non-electric future options. heating, are taken Into account. Our evidence base shows how this contribution is scheduled to decrease over the next 30 or so years, assuming no plant lifetime extensions. Since the 2003 Energy White Paper the fundamentals have not radically changed, and many of the measures introduced since 2000
polarised, with heavily entrenched positions J.., , .PL on both sides. This does not help with a considered analysis of nuclear power, and approach tends to result in reports that seek to justify a pre-determined position. Such reports are InMarch 2005 the UK Government and the easily dismissed by opponents and will be Ddvolved Administrations jointly published regarded with suspicion by those that are truly a shared framework for sustainable
'neutral'. they are therefore of limited value development, .'One future - different paths',
to the public debate. Inwhich five new principles of sustainable Our stand-alone evidence base ispublished development were agreed across Government alongside this paper, as a separate resource. for all policy development, delivery and evaluation -.see Figure 1. Based on these principles, the UK Government published Its Sustainable Development Strategy, 'Securing the future' to guide its policy-making process across different departments. We have therefore examined new nuclear development against these five principles. Inthis paper we have not followed the five principles slavishly, as some are more significant for the nuclear Issue than others. We have dealt with 'environmental limits' and
'sound science' together; we have looked in considerable depth at 'sustainable economy".
we have covered 'good governance' in relation to public engagement and Inconjunction with
'a healthy and just society'.
Inexamining the evidence base, and taking into account the context of the five principles and the 2006 Energy Review, we have Figure 1: UK sustainable development principles Securing the Future- delivering UK sustoinoble development strotegy
z. zustainarne Development Analysis This section will look at the case for nuclear power based on three areas of analysis, and using the five principles of sustainable development. The analysis below draws exclusively on the SDC's evidence base, which consists of eight separate reports that are published alongside this paper.
However, emissions from decommissioning and 2.1 Environment the treatment of waste also need to be assessed but this is difficult for two main reasons: 2.1.1 Low carbon statuse IIn the UK, decommissioning of existing No energy technology iscurrently carbon free. plant is highly complex and involves plant Even renewable technologies will lead to that was not designed with fossil fuels being burnt at some point In their decommissioning in mind construction due to the high levels of fossil " the UK has not decided on its approach fuel usage Inalmost every transport mode to waste management, which makes and industrial process, including electricity it difficult to assess the associated generation. For example, wind turbines are CO, emissions. built of steel, and fossil fuels are therefore consumed In their construction either directly, The carbon impact associated with the 'back-during manufacture, and also from petroleum end' of the nuclear fuel cycle is spread across usage when the parts are transported to the -all of the UK's nuclear power plants (active construction site. However, the fossil fuel used and decommissioned) and includes all of the over the life of the turbine is 'repaid' in less electricity generated over their lifetime. Newly than 10 months, as the turbihes themselves commissioned plants are likely to have lower generate zero carbon energy3. lifecycle carbon emissions than for previous reactor designs, because of improvements in Nuclear power stations are no different, with plant design (for example, smaller size, and large up-front energy requirements during : . improved thermal efficiency and use of fuel), construction', although this Isbalanced by the and because new plant is designed so that high power output of each plant. However, it can be dismantled and decommissioned nuclear diffeis from many renewables Inits more easily. requirement for mined fuel (uranium ore). Al.though the total volume of fuel used is low A number of commentators have expressed compared to the volumes of fossil fuel required concerns that any move to low-grade uranium in gas or coal plants, uranium mining and -ores could substantially Increase the carbon the subsequent fuel processing Isan energy intensity of nuclear power. Our evidence on intensive activity that must be included for full uranium resource availability' shows that
lifecycle emissions analysis. Decommissioning predicting if and when this might happen is
'Paper 2- Reducing CO, emission. and waste activities are also likely to require very difficult to do with any accuracy. Resource nucleor ond the olternotives . energy Inputs, and therefore their long-term .availability is discussed in more detail below, Sustainable Development impact on nuclear power's CO emissions will but it is by no means certain that all the high Commlsslon (ZOOS). Wind Power grade ores have been discovered, and any In the UK. depend on the carbon Intensity of future energy supplies. increase Inthe price of uranium could trigger 'In addition to carbon emissions from the production of concrete. renewed interest in uranium prospecting.
Our evidence shows that taking into account 'These figures are for carbon (C) It is worth noting that the CO 2 emissions rather than CO%.They have.been the emissions associated with plant construction and the fuel cycle, the emissions associated with many of the construction inputs converted from the data used in into a nuclear power plant could be subject our evidence base by multiplying associated with nuclear power production are the CO, figures by 12/44. relatively low, with an average value of to emissions trading schemes, depending on 4.4tC/GWh, compared to 243tC/GWh for coal their country of origin. This presents a possible
programme would deliver sizeable reductions long-term so as to protect people and the in CO2 emissions. However, it is also Important environment. Adominant challenge of much to realise that cuts of at least 50% would still nuclear waste Isthe period of hundreds of be needed from other measures to meet the thousands of years over which it must be 2050 target, even with a doubling of nuclear effectively Isolated from people and the capacity from current levels. Nuclear power environment. This raises issues that are unique can therefore be seen as a potential carbon to nuclear waste, such as the long-term reduction technology, but this must be viewed stability of our civilisation and climate, and the within the context of the much larger challeng e extent to which future technological advances we face. We will need a wide variety of might bring forward solutions so-far unknown. solutions; those that decrease our demand for Nuclear wastes in the UK are divided into three energy, and those that can deliver low or zero categories: carbon energy supplies.
> High level wastes (HLW) are those Inwhich the temperature may rise significantly as 2.1.3 Waste and decommissioning issues' a result of radioactive decay. This factor has There is a need to distinguish between the to be taken Into account in the design of legacy Impacts of decommissioning and waste storage or disposal facilities. HEW comprises management of the existing nuclear capacity, the waste products from reprocessing spent to which the UK Isalready committed, and nuclear fuels.
the Impacts that would result from a new > Intermediate level wastes (ILW) are those nuclear programme. exceeding the levels of radioactivity for Low The current legacy for decommissioning Level Waste (LLW), but which do not require existing nuclear power plants is not directly heat production to be taken Into account relevant to decisions about whether to progress In the design of their storage facilities. with nuclear new-build. However, such a legacy ILW include nuclear fuel casing and nuclear Isone of public concern, particularly Inrelation reactor components, moderator graphite to the cost. Arecent review by the NDA from reactor cores, and sludges from the suggests that their accelerated approach for treatment of radioactive effluents. the decommissioning of existing sites will cost > Low level wastes ([LW) are wastes not approximately t56bn. Much of this covers a suitable for disposal with ordinary refuse large number of non-power producing facilities, but do not exceed specified levels of but certainly the costs of decommissioning old radioactivity. Most LLW can be sent for Magnox reactors are substantial. Our evidence disposal at the National Low Level Waste points to costs of £1.3bn and £1.8bn Intwo repository at Drigg. LLW that Isunsuitable cases, and this is before waste disposal. for disposal is mostly reflector and shield The proposed new nuclear plant designs are graphite from reactor cores, which contains expected to require much less expensive concentrations of carbon-14 radioactivity decommissioning, as unlike most existing above those acceptable at Drigg. plants, decommissioning has been given Spent fuel, which contains uranium and more consideration in the design process. plutonium, Iscurrently.not classified as waste They are also expected to produce less In the UK because It contains resources that waste by volume. Our evidence estimates can be'reprbcessed and used again as fuel decomrmissioning costs at between £220m or for other uses. If,however, the UK decided and £440m per GW ofcapacity, but this to abandon reprocessing as part of Its waste Isbefore long-term waste disposal costs. %management strategy, then spent fuel would Anew-build replacement programme (10GW) need to be reclassified as HLW. would add less than 10% to the total UK The Committee on Radioactive Waste nuclear waste Inventory (by volume). Assessing. Management (CoRWM) has established a the increase in radioactivity, of the Inventory baseline Inventbry, based on planrned closure Is complex and depends on reactor design and of existing plant, no new-build, reprocessing use, and the time chosen for the comparison. of spent fuels, and continuation of current Thus, ten years after removal, the Increase in practices for the definitions of waste. All activity could be a fact6r of nine, declining to radioactive wastes, Including spent fuel, are a factor of 0.9 of current total activity 100 years packaged so that they are ina form suitable after final fuel removal. for storage, volume estimates are based on The role of reprocessing as a waste packaged wastes. The baseline Inventory management tool Is complex because of the Includes all wastes both in existence and ,Paper S- Waste management costs (relative to the price of primary uranium) forecast to arise In the future (for example ond decommrssioning and safety and security issues (for example, from decommissioning). The baseline inventory the risks of proliferation - this Isdiscussed shows that over 90% of radioactivity is arnriitped with HIW %ndcnant fholc Noat
self-regulation is appropriate for tackling climate change, but as we state ongoing surface and ground-water in Section 1.3, for the UK.it is a choice whether pollution issues both for current it is part of the overall energy supply mix, and future activities. rather than a necessity. Some of these problems can be managed Nuclear waste and decommissioning raise a through regulation and management, but this set of complicated Issues with very long-term can be compromised by, for example, poor impacts. Considering the Impact of nuclear governance, short-term cost considerations new-build in isolation, we accept that future and possible conflict with economic goals and nuclear plant designs will be far easier to development aims. This can result in products decommission and that it is possible to do this being brought to world markets at prices that Ina way that limits the environmental Impacts. do not reflect the full social and environmental However, the long-term management of costs of their production.* nuclear waste poses significant environmental problems that are difficult and costly to resolve. However, any mining impact from nuclear power activities needs to be balanced against We look at intergenerational considerations the potential environmental and health impacts InSection 2.3.6, but on the environmental of the energy sources It might displace. The side It is difficult to be completely confident health and safety Impacts of coal, for example, that the solution proposed for long-term are significant, as are coal's environmental waste management will avoid any adverse Impacts In the form of air and groundwater environmental Impacts over the time pollution. Oil and gas exploration also have periods Involved. environmental and health impacts. On reprocessing; there remain serious concerns There is general agreement that any new over the long-term security and economic nuclear power programme would try to make viability of this form of waste management, use of existing nuclear sites, thereby limiting with many Inthe Industry now calling for a landscape and visual impacts. It is also the case 'once-through' fuel cycle. The evidence would that nuclear power plants are very similar to seem to support this conclusion, although there conventional fossil fuel plants in terms of local remains the question of dealing with the UK's environmental and landscape impact, so the plutonium stockpile. net Impact of additional nuclear capacity Is Other environmental impacts from nuclear likely to be minimal". power centre on uranium mining, which can However, some coastal sites may not be have a number of adverse effects in producer suitable for new nuclear power stations and countries. However, such Impacts must be flood-risk criteria may lead to a preference for balanced against the environmental and health new Inland sites. This is because of the need. f safety concerns related to alternatives to 'climate change-proof' decisions on where sources of energy, especially fossil fuels. to'locate new plant to be sure they take into account changes inclimate that are already Inthe pipeline. The criteria that were used to select the current mainl, coastal locations 2.2 Economy are up to 50 years old and will need to be reviewed, as many nuclear power stations What is the public good for our economy? and other facilities are vulnerable to sea-level (Achieving a'sustainable econ6my) rise, storm surges and coastal erosion over the 2.2.1 Total cost of nuclear poweru.. next few decades. Our evidence'strongly suggests that attempts Inview of the need to reassess the suitability to estimate the cost of a new nuclear of existing sites, further consideration needs to programme are unlikely to be accurate. This be given to their viability over the longer term. is primarily because there Isnot enough reliable, Independent and up-to-date 2.1.6 Summary Information available on the nuclear plant designs available for such calculations to be Our evidence shows that nuclear power could made. Inaddition, waste and decommissioning theoretically make a substantial contribution costs are, at present, not fully known. "Paper S - This Isunder the to efforts to reduce CO. emissions, as a viable assumption that nuclear capacity The levelised cost of nuclear power (the p/kWh would most likely be replaced by low carbon technology. However, the evidence fossil fuel plant, with or without also shows that even by doubling our existing cost of output) Isheavily dependent on capital carbon capture and storage nuclear capacity, a neW nuclear power costs. This makes the cost of nuclear output technologies. programme can only contribute an 8%cut In very sensitive to both construction costs, and Paper 4 -Economics of nudeor emissions on. 1990 levels, so a wide variety the discount rate used (the required rate of power of other measures will be needed. return for the project).
the next decade also highlights a'lotential The concept of specifying the Ideal proportion weakness in the uranium market.: the long lead of each single technology in the UK's times for developing new resources. generating mix belongs to a previous regime, For domestic electricity supply, nuclear power where electricity supply was a nationalised may offer a hedge against high fossil fuel industry. Ifliberalised markets are to be the prices or temliorary supply disruptions, but primary mechanism for the delivery of cannot offer complete security due to its electricity supplies, then this constrains the reliance on imported uranium. in this regard, ability of Government to centrally plan the fuel nuclear power is not a domestic source of mix, without major interventions Inthe market. electricity Inthe same way as renewables.- Energy policy aims such at CO, emission Uranium resources may also show price reductions and security of supply can be volatility, particularly in the short-term when delivered by markets Ifthe right structures shortages are expected. However, evidence are put in place. The market has so far on portfolio theory suggests that greater performed well on security of supply, and diversification of supply sources tends to the Incentives are Inplace to ensure that new reduce price risk, particularly when fuel costs capacity Isdeveloped before shortfalls in supply are zero (as in the case of most renewables) develop - this Isdone through a simple price or low (as Inthe case of nuclear)". mechanism. To deliver this new capacity whilst On balance, nuclear power has positive reducing CO emissions requires the electricity attributes for security of supply consideration, market to take account of national or but these should be viewed on a portfolio International carbon constraints, and to factor basis and are not exclusive to this technology. these in to long-term Investment decisions. Diversification Into any basket of electricity The current market for carbon is based on the generating options will help to reduce price EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), which risk and Increase security. Iscurrently designed to run in three year It is also frequently claimed that nuclear 'periods, with caps set by national governments power Isnecessary to provide baseload power. Inadvance of each commitment stage. This However, there is no justification for assuming Inherently short-term system provides no that other plant cannot also perform a baseload long-term framework for investors, and function, and contrary to popular perception, Iscurrently based on emissions cuts from the increased variability (sometimes termed projected baselines rather than absolute
'intermittency') of some renewable cuts from current levels.
technologies does not increase the need for The SDC believes that the EUETS should aim more 'firm, or baseload, capacity". Therefore, towards total downstream emissions trading, nuclear plant will need to be assessed against which would eventually need to include the the long-term wholesale price of electricity whole economy -business, transport (including within the confines of a carbon constrained, aviation), the public sector, agriculture and, and environmentally sensitive, economy. very Importantly, Individuals. EU-wide caps on emissions should be determined by a long-term emissions reduction target, which should 2.2.3 Market delivery then be divided Into annual decreases which Our evidence suggests that nuclear power would form the basis of the EUETS or Its may find it difficult to compete in the UK's successor. This system would give near liberalised energy market without some form compleie certainty of Intention, and should of public sector support. This is due to the assist Investors In taking long-term decisions long lead times of nuclear power and Its high on low carbon Investments. risk profile, which may discourage Investors. There are two alternatives to this approach: "Shimon Awerbuch (University of However, the Government has made it clear Sussex) has done extensive work develop mechanisms which Intervene In the In this area. that any new nuclear programme will need market to encourage specific technologies ori to be delivered solely by the private. sector. "A large percentage of variable technology groups, or reform*the eurrent'rharket renewables would Increase the This does not rule out the possibility that design to allow for more centralised planning. need for 'balancing services', but the Government may decide to help support would not lead to the need for The Renewables Obligation Isan example of additional baseload capacity, as the development of new-build plant, either market Intervention, and was justified by the the Increase in reserve requirement financially or through 'practical measures'. Government as necessary to promote the Ismet from remaining plant. Our evidence points to a number of financial innovation and scale needed to create a viable, inaddilon, diversity of sources support options that the Government may large-scale renewables sector. Inthis regard, will always reduce the need for consider, but there is uncertainty over whether reserves. This Issue Is explained renewables were Identified as suffering from In detail In the SDC's publication, they wo[ld bM both legal (under EU state aid market failure due to their lack of collective Wind PowerIn the UK (200S). rules), or compatible with the Government's technological maturity. Can the same be said "Paper 4 - Economics of nudeot stated belief in liberalised markets. about nuclear power? power
disagreement over these costs, but if they are the price of carbon, which is likely to be central high, there is the potential for conflict. This is to their business case. because the transmission and distribution of There are still a number of outstanding costs electricity in the UK is a regulated Industry, and that, unless internalised, may not allow a full all investments need to be approved by Ofgem reflection of the cost of nuclear power in those as part of the district network operators' (DNO) investor calculations. There Isalso the issue of price control agreements. Faced with calls for moral hazard, and the impact that might have large Investments across the network, Ofgem on reducing the apparent cost of nuclear power might have to prioritise what it allows, unless it by increasing the financial risks to the taxpayer. Iswilling to accept higher costs for consumers. The case for nuclear power tends to be viewed There is also the related problem that continued in isolation, but this takes no account of the. reliance on centralised supply may exacerbate Impacts that a nuclear development route the current institutional bias towards large-scale might have on other alternatives, and on generation, and the reluctance to really embrace the prospects for a level playing field for the reforms necessary to ensure a more all technologies. Although the measurable decentralised and sustainable energy economy. economic impacts may be limited, the political The role of Ofgem is central to this Issue. Implications of a shift in emphasis towards The lack of flexibility, or 'lock-1n, associated nuclear could be to further weaken the with Investment In large-scale centralised commitment of Government, and therefore supply like nuclear power is also a concern. the Investment community, to renewables This relates to the Issue of sunk costs. Anew and specifically microgeneration technologies. nuclear programme would commit the UK On balance, the economic case for nuclear to that technology, and a centralised supply power Isheavily dependent on Its position Infrastructure, for at least 50 years. In relation to other low carbon alternatives, During this time there are likely to be and the effect It might have on the long-term significant advances In decentralised ability of the UK to meet its emission reduction technologies, and there Isa risk that continued targets. Ifnuclear power can prove Itself to dependence on more centralised supplies be an economically viable competitor In a low may lock out some alternatives. Decentralised carbon economy, without leading to a drain supply is generally more flexible because It of Investment for other alternatives, then Its is modular, and can adapt quicker and at less contribution to a sustainable economy may be cost to changed circumstances. More locally- positive. If,however, nuclear power requires based energy provision may also be conducive public support (whether immediately or In the to the sustainable communities agenda, a long-term) and/or It diverts funds away from key part of the UK Government's Sustainable other viable alternatives, then Its contribution Development Strategy. may well be negative. Any bias towards one mode over another It Isof little doubt where the UK's current essentially prevents a level playing field, and nuclear capacity stands. The burden of proof does not therefore encourage true competition. would now seem to be on the nuclear Industry It may be hard for the microgeneration sector to'show that updated deslgns, combined to overcome such bias, and this may prevent with private sector financing and project or slow it from reaching the economies of scale management, could lead to.a different necessary to show its full potential. outcome. However, this must take place on a truly equal and transparent basis, so that costs are internalised and the taxpayer isprotected 2.2.6 Summary from long-term liabilities. An assessment of the Nuclear power may be able to make a useful cost - and public acceptance - bf nuclear waste contribution to the UK's economy, by providing policy Isessential for this to take place. low carbon electricity at a competitive price. However, our evidence shows that it is very difficult to assess the total cost of the available nuclear technologies, particularly as the only recent development that Isrelevant to the UK (in Finland) has a number of hidden subsidies that obscure its true cost. Inour view commercial investors are best placed to make a real assessment of the risks, Sustainable Consumption Roundtable and will have much better information on likely (2005). Seeing the light. construction costs and therefore the final cost of power produced. They will also be able to
attack would not lead to significantly advers e of the implications of developing new nuclear consequences. capacity, particularly Inthe context of Use of nuclear fuel (reactor grade and spen t international treaties such as the Framework fuel) by terroristsis raised as a concern. Rea ctor Convention on Climate Change. if nuclear grade fuel must be processed to produce power is part of the UK's chosen solution to weapons-grade material to raise it from 4-59 Va climate change, then it would be considered uranium-235 to over 90% uranium-235. Sper it a suitable solution for all countries. The UNFCCC fuel is an even more difficult starting materid explicitly encourages "the development, because it contains much less Uranium-235 application and diffusion, including transfer than fresh reactor fuel. of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic However shipments of spent fuel for emission of greenhouse gases" (Article 4.1 c). reprocessing could be attacked en route frorr Reprocessing nuclear reactor fuel can raise it to the station to the reprocessing plant, either with the Intention to spread contamination over the quality required for nuclear warheads, most a wide area or to steal the material for futuri easily from light water reactors. Pressurised use Ina nuclear weapon. Reactor grade fuel water reactors would have to be closed down could be used to make a 'dirty bomb'. for several months, but in a country that wishes to do this the only barriers are political, The Industry assessment Isthat spent fuel as there is no engineering constraint. containers are robust and undergo stringent testing and that the spent fuel pellets they Several international treaties have been contain are not easily dispersed even under concluded with the aim of making sure either severe Impact and fire. But an alternative vie,w that civil nuclear power is not used for military Isthat stolen spent fuel would be valuable as purposes or that any attempts to do so are a dirty bomb in Itself and Istherefore of valui detected. The two principal treaties that to terrorists. It would appear, therefore, that concern the UK are the 1970 Treaty on the the potential use of nuclear fuels by terrorists Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains a risk, and therefore a concern. and the Euratom Treaty, to which the UK became a partner on joining the European Nuclear accidents are recorded and ascribed Community in 1973. levels on a scale 0-7 (Chernobyl was level 7), and most accidental releases in the UK are at Out of the 188 states that have signed the NPT, levels 0,1 or 2. While major accidents are rare the UK Isone of five declared Nuclear Weapons evidence from Sellafield and Japan reveals States (NWS), the others being France, the USA, that human error and management lapses are the USSR and China. The only states that have most often responsible - circumstances which not signed the NPT are India, Pakistan and undermine public confidence In the industry, Israel, all of which are known to have nuclear even Inindustrialised countries with tight weapons, while North Korea has chosen to regulatory regimes. withdraw from the NPT. Public confidence In the regulatory regimes The provisions of the NPT are Implemented for nuclear power stations In all countries, by the International Atomic Energy Agency not Just the UK, Is also Important because (IAEA). Following the'difficulties of carrying unplanned discharges can have serious out inspectionsin Iraq before 2003, additional transboundary effects. This raises a number protocols were developed giving IAEA of problems, including the difficulties of Inspectors greater rights of access and requiring ensuring that the regulatory Institutions Inless administrative procedures to be streamlined developed countries are sufficiently resourced, so that, for Instance, states cannot delay the and for Identifying and dealing with poor issuing of visas as a means of delaying an health and safety practices which could lead to unwanted Inspection. transboundary environmental or health risks. States also have to provide significantly more Information, including details of nuclear-related Imports and exports, which the IAEA is then 2.3.4 Proliferation risksus able to verify. The IAEA concludes that without Terrorist organisations, almost by definition, the NPT, there might be perhaps 30 to 40 operate outside national and international law, Nuclear Weapon States, whereas more states and therefore safeguards to protect against have abandoned nuclear weapons programmes proliferation are almost irrelevant to such than started them. groups. Similarly it is very difficult to protect Nevertheless, a number of difficulties In against civil nuclear power being developed the relationship between civil and military "' Paper 6 -Safety and security into a military nuclear capability where applications continue to cause concern motivations are strong enough, as has been among many commentators, Including: shown Ina number of countries.
has to be taken in'the context of the current waste legacy, albeit that future waste arisings are likely to be considerably smaller than existing volumes. 2.3.7 Summary Our eVidence shows that it is essential for the Government to allow the fullest public consultation Indeveloping a policy 9n nuclear power. Not doing this would compromise the principle of good governance, and risks a huge public backlash against top-down decision-making. The Government needs to engage the public in a wider debate where nuclear power Isconsidered as one of the many options that could be required for a sustainable energy policy. We are satisfied that any new nuclear power plant Inthe UK would be built and operated to the highest safety and security standards. However the same level of confidence cannot always be applied to other countries, and this remains a cause for serious concern. In addition, nuclear power facilities and processes are vulnerable to attempted exploitation by terrorist groups, and although standards may be high, this does not rule out the possibility of a successful strike. The proliferation of nuclear materials is equally a cause for concern In this context. A decision to develop nuclear power in the UK essentially removes our ability, both rriorally and legally, to deny the technology to others. The widespread adoption of nuclear power would greatly Increase the chances of nuclear proliferation, both through the efforts of nation states and possibly terrorist organisations. Whilst the health impacts of a well-regulated nuclear power Industry are low, the risk of a low probability, but high Impact event must be considered, especially in the context of the International. concerns raised above. Finally, we remain deeply concerned about the intergenerational impacts of the legacy of nuclear waste. Considering the current uncertainties over total c~osts and the science of long-term waste management, we find it difficult to reconcile these issues with sustainable development principles.
renewables %3,w0 AMU %~,,;A !;CMCL The UK's renewable resources are some of the power: our best in the world, and could provide all the UK's electricity ovei the longer term. Despite advice some significant developments, our current approach remains half-hearted, and the levels It is clear that nuclear power could generate of public investment needed to bring forward large quantities of electricity, contribute new technologies are inadequate when materially to stabilising CO 2 emissions and compared to our International competitors. add to the diversity of the UK's energy supply. However, even if we were to double our It is critical that the Government should now existing nuclear capacity, this would bring an invest far more (both politically and financially) 8%cut on total carbon emissions from 1990 Inrenewables, particularly microgeneration and levels by 2035, and would contribute little biomass technologies, and marine renewables before 2020. Nuclear cannot tackle climate and offshore wind, where the UK has a clear change alone. natural advantage. Akey issue that the Commission explored through the evidence base was whether the 3.2.3 The clean and more efficient use UK could have.a viable energy future without of fossil fuels nuclear power. Or Inother words, whether It Isclear to us that fossil fuels will remain nuclear power isa choice, or whether IsIt an a necessary part of our energy mix for some absolute necessity. time. We fully support the Government's stated The conclusion from the analysis was that the target for 1OGW of good quality CHP by 2010 UK could meet our CO, reduction targets and as a way of increasing the overall efficiency energy needs without nuclear power, using a of energy supply. However, based on our lack combination of demand reduction, renewables, of progress on this target, the foundations for and more efficient use of fossil fuels combined expanding the use of this energy efficient with carbon capture and storage technologies. technology are not strong. In this context, the Sustainable Development We also support the recent interest from Commission assessed whether nuclear power Government Incarbon capture and storage has a role to play Infuture UK electricity supply. (CCS) technologies, which could effectively We have a number of serious concerns: remove the CO 2 emissions that come from Intergenerational issues burning fossil fuels such as gas and coal. These could provide a bridge to a more sustainable The intergenerational impacts of a new nuclear energy future whilst providing the UK with. programme are of great concern, particularly significant export potential Inanother area of with regard to decommissioning and the expertise. Of course we must recognise that disposal of nuclear waste. Even if a policy for CCS is as yet an unproven technology, and long-term nuclear waste Isdeveloped and its development could allow a future role for Implemented, the timescales Involved (many coal, about which we have concerns both for thousands of years) lead to uncertainties over reasons of sustainability and human health. the level to which safety can be assured. We
.are also concerned that a new nuclear programme could impose unanticipated costs on future generations without commensurate benefits.
Cost There is very little certainty over the economics of nuclear power. Anew nuclear power programme could divert public funding away from more sustainable technologies that will be needed regardless, hampering other long-term efforts to move to a low carbon economy with diverse energy sources. Nuclear power Is also prone to moral hazard, which could lead to forced public subsidy regardless of the Government's original Intentions.
A-Forest Full of [ I] Wood Grows as a Major Fuel (hot spells and cold snaps), public policy makers at both the state and federal levels are once again encouraging development of in the Northeast renewable energy. Blomass energy In the region BY ERIc KINGSLEY In travels around the North Woods, it's hard not to occasion-ally end up behind a truck full of wood chips. Where are they ce the time of the first humans, wood going, and to what end? Most will shed their loads at one of many has served as an important fuel wood-fired power plants scattered across New England and New source. We relied upon it first for York, which each year turn millions of tons of low-grade wood heat, today for electricity, and into electricity to p ( ver homes and businesses. tomorrow maybe for liquid fuels.Wood In the power grid that serves most of New England, biomass is
used simply as a fuel source - not as a small but important electricity source. Natural gas serves as the lumber, pulp, or other value-added fuel for almost 40 percent of the electricity generated in the products - is known as biomass and today still accounts for half of all wood harvested worldwide. The northeastern U.S. has long been' a leader in the use of wood as a source of energy, and efforts continue to keep the region at the vanguard of biomass energy and bio-product development..
Wood energy has been a meaning ful part of our region's elec-tricity mix for about 20 years, and it was a part of many paper - mills' electricity supply long before that. It has seen its ups and downs over the last decade, but today, wood energy is looking as .-. attractive as ever. . " The region's wood energy industry developed in-reiponsetd the last energy crisis in the 1970s. Wood A;s recognized as a local,. renewable, and abundant energy source, and fabilities to turn this'. resource into power were built. When projeqions of oil shortage' made in the late 1970s and early 1980s turned out to be wrong (or at least premature), these wood-fired plants became high-cost producers in comparison to nuclear, coal, and oil. Toda); we are coming full circle, with biomass power plants around the region operating at full-tilt, long-idle plants back online, and developers scouring the region for suitable locations to build new facilities. Why? While wood energy hasn't gotten any cheaper, the com- 2 petition (particularly natural gas) has become much more expen-sive. Faced with very real concerns about the current capacity to meet the peak electricity demand during extreme weather events. 22 Norhiemrcixxlhands /Spring 2006
region, with nuclear supplying a quarter. Coal-fired and oil-fired factors, it could cost nearly four times that. power accounts for a little over 20 percent, leaving the rest- about In the present environment, wood energy is competitive, and 15 percent - to renewable types of electricity generation. Of this, many facilities are operating at or near capacity. Biomass energy hydropower makes up more than half, with the rest coming from facilities, long thought of as too expensive, are suddenly.looking biomass, landfill gasses, and a few wind farms. attractive when compared to some of their competitors. Couple Five years ago, construction of new natural gas power plants this with a demand that is growing faster than supply, and there is was all the rage. Proponents argued that the use of natural gas dearly a spot for biomass power. would significantly decrease the cost of electricity in the region, and a wave of new plants was builL Just like previous forecasts of Public policy encourages biomass power cheap power, this one, too, was wrong. Today, natural gas pro- In addition to the underlying energy market, public policy vides some of the most expensive electricity and often sets the plays a significant role in the retention and growth of renewable price for the power you buy. power, including biomass. On the public policy side, the desire for The cost to produce electricity varies widely, depending on cleaner fuels, energy security, and local economic development is fuel costs, debt service, economy of scale, maintenance require- causing leaders to evaluate ways to encourage renewable energy ments, technology used, and emissions controls. It can cost development. Non-market benefits of wood energy include: $40 per megawatt (MW) or, in a perfect storm of complicating Biomass power plants have very low emissions when com-pared with other fuels. At Public Service of New Hampshire's Northern Wood Power Project, conversion of an existing 50 MW. coal-fired unit to wood will result in significant reductions in sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury emissions. (In the interest of full disclosure, the company I work for, Innovative Natural Resource Solutions, has served as a consultant on this project.) Clockwisefrom left: Adam Mock Logging chipping trees and tops
for fuel" A&B Logging's log loader and chipping pile at Twiin Mountain in the White Mountain NationalForest,some operations use delimbersin the woods.
Northernmbodlands I Spring 2006 23
" As we station troops around the world, it's hard not to wonder Besides requiring renewable energy production, an RPS can which domestic fuels can help meet our energy needs. While oil improve the ec6nomics of the biomass power plants themselves.
is a verysmall part ofour national and regional electricity mix, For example, a biomass plant that qualified for the Massachusetts adding renewables to the mix helps diversify energy supplies RPS in 2005 would have received around $50 per megawatt-hour and cushion price swings. Energy sources found here - wood, produced, in addition to revenue from the sale of the electricity wind, water, and some coal - are buffered from the complexi- itself.With some long-term eletricitycontracts paying producers ties of foreign trade and dipblomacy. as much as $80 per megawatt-hour, adding the federal credit and
Wood energy can provide a significant economic boost to our the RPS payment can combine to make biomass energy look region's rural areas and help support loggers, landowners, and attractive to developers.
wood-using industries.A 2002 study in New Hampshire found Of course,"Iook"is the keyword in theprevious sentence, and that the state's six then-operating wood-fired power plants pro- it is important to note that renewable energy payments are in vided up to 400 jobs and had an economic contribution of their infancy; and as in any developing market, prices can swing nearly $100 million. I,'h6d fuel dollars stay in the local econo- quickly. In Connecticut, RPS payments dropped from near $40 to my; the same can't be said for coal, oil, or natural gas. near $2 per megawatt-hour in 2005 alone when a new supplier Recognizing the public benefits associated with biomass unexpectedly entered the market and helped create an oversup-power production, the federal and state governments have ply. Additionally, qualifying to participate in the Massachusetts responded with incentives. On the federal level, support for bio- RPS is not easy; with stringent technologyand emissions require-mass comes in the form ofa confusing mix of loans, grants, tech- ments that few plants can meet. nical expertise, and tax credits. Dividing these programs between the U.S. Forest Service, the Department of Energy; and others The next generation of renewables doesn't do much to clarify things, 'but one incentive - the Today, biomass electricity is generated with wood chips from Production Tax Credit - is easily accessible to a broad range of timber harvesting operations. With state and federal incentives, as biomass and renewable energy projects. This tax credit allows well as the rise in overall energy costs, we will generate even more power plant owners to receive $9 per megawatt-hour in financial tomorrow. But what's beyond that? support, a significant help to the economics of a biomass facility. For decades; researchers and developers have heralded the Additionally, at the state level, New Ybrk, Massachusetts, "bio-refinery revolution," where the myriad of products made Connecticut, Rhbde Island, and Maine have adopted a"Renewvable today from oil (gasoline, 6hemicals, plastics, and more) will be Portfolio Standard," or RPS. In essence, tn RPS requires electricity made from wood. In fact, production of ethanol from wood was providers (the folks you send a check to'each month) t6 get a cer- common in World War II Germany, when access to oil was tain, and often growing, percentage of their power from renewable severely limited. In the U.S., a wood-ethanol project was active in energy suppliers. These programs vary widely from state to state the South during World War 1.The technology exists, but it has-but have proven to be a true incentive for new and existing biomass n't yet proven competitive with oil in an open global marketplace. power plants. The funding comes from electricity providers, who The U.S. economy; and to a lesser extent the world economy, pay a little extra to comply 'J with the renewable energy mandate and pass the cost on *p to every customer, including" the large ratepayers. CIockrkisfron ileft. Night view 6fBurlington Flcctric's McNeil GeneratingStation,'. a wood-fircdpowerplant. K PublicService of New Hampshire'sNorthern Wbod Power Projectinvolves. replacinga coal-firedpowcr plant with a wnod-burning faciliot, shown here uinder cointruction. This mcihodgets chips out of trailersin ajfjl3 24 NorthcmN~I~xilands
runs on oil. Our ships, cars, trains, and even loggers' skidders The Impact on forests and forest landowners rely on oil to operate. The U.S., ever the consumer, accounts for The resurgent biomass industry, and the prospect of a new and a quarter of global oil consumption, more than the next five growing bio-product industry, may have some foresfland owners highest-consuming countries combined. This huge appetite is seeing dollar signs. It's important they not see too many. Biomass nearly all based on imports - we oivn "only two percent of the as an electricity source has historically paid little (if anything) to world's known oil reserves. the landowner; this will likely continue for the foreseeable future. In recent years, developers have proposed facilities making Landowner and logger profits are made on sawlogs and, to a less-ethanol, diesel additives, bio-oH, plastic, and other products that er extent, pulpwood. Biomass provides landowners with a low-would use wood as the feedstock. Many of these proposals died grade market for their tops, branches, and cull trees. It allows on the drawing board because investors were tinwilling to take foresters to use an important management tool, and it can provide the risk with a new technology competing against low-cost oil. true benefits to landowners, making it possible to remove poor-With oil momentarily topping $70 a barrel in 2005, however, and quality growth that would otherwise dominate a stand's future. no return to the days of $35 barrels in the forecast, many bio- Just don't expect to count the benefits in a large stack of bills. product business plans are being dusted off and updated. For loggers, biomass prices are now as high as they have ever Biomass does have real potential to substitute for or compete been, even adjusted for inflation. However, input costs - includ-with fuels and products currently made exclusively from oil; the ing diesel to run the feller-buncher, skidder, chipper, and truck - corn-to-ethanol industry has demonstrated that. Ne know that are at their highest levels in 20 years. Most increases in wood price some products can be made in the lab, so today's considerable have been quickly eaten up by cost increases, so loggers aren't challenge is moving these io commercial production. Maine, necessarily seeing increased profits. Wisconsin, New York, New Hampshire, and others are racing to Add to this the increased competition from other wood develop this emerging industry, in the hope that this could revo- sources, including paper cubes (pelletized paper that can't be lutionize the region's forest industry. It may,but it's also dear the economically recycled) and construction and demolition waste, revolution will be gradual, will build upon existing industries and whiose use is highly controversial, and it doesn't appear that infrastructure, and will see a large number of failures for each further price increases are coming for supplying biomass (at least commercial success. when adjusted for the cost of oil).. For bio-products, develop-ers have been heard to prom-ise they will pay untold fortunes to landowners. Without production facilities. these promises are worth little. When factories are built, we can expect them to pay market price for wood, and - like everyone else - seek ways to limit wood costs. They may grow the market, and there-fore raise the price or wood, but don't expect $200 a cord on the stump. g The Northeast has an abundant and sustainable sup-
= ply of biomass, a landowner and logging infrastructure pre-paredto meet supply needs, public policy that favors biomass energy, and a population"that recognizes the many benefits that wood-derived electricity and fuels can provide. As a region, we are well positioned to continue a leadership role in the adoption and advancement of biomass energy.
EI.C kiNGSLEY, WCE-PRESWDwr OF IfE coNsUTfNG FIRMI INNOVATivE NATURAL RrsouRcE So.uwioNs LW (w.,NLSc.c.*oIm), t.*s BEEN INVOLVED IN THE SrrTNG, CONVERSION. OR UPGRADING OFA NIAtBER OF BIOAASS POWER PLANTS IN' 7n1E REGION AND ACROSSnTHE COUNTRY. NorthernVbodiands I Spring 200e 25
Wood" Chips Keep- Schools Warm By HmilLTON E. DAvIs I tention
*ing, a tractor-trailer unit wheels out of the in a financially strapped system.
yard firstClaire at the elI before light onLathrop sawmill an icy winter in morn- According total to Cathy of more than Hilgendorf,
$600,000, the gets a figure that school a lotconst of at ruction Bristol, Vermont, and heads for Barre Town coordinator for the Vermont Department of Education, several Elementary and Middle School atop Quarry more communities have approved or are actively cons idering .Hill. Dawn is just breaking as the rig pulls installing wood chip systems in their schools. "it's such a slam into the still-empty school parking lot and dunk, especially for larger schools," she says. "These syste ms pay backs up to one of the twin bays in a small for themselves in a few years. They're an easy sell, partiicularly building adjacent to the school itself.When the since the state will reimburse the community for 90 percient of a bay door *opens, the driver activates the moveable floor of the renewable energy system' In contrast, the state pays just 30 per-truck, and 30 tons of wood chips cascade into the storage bin. cent of other elements of construction projects, includirag con-Throughout"the week, the chips will move in a herky-jerky ventional heating systems.
fashion out of thi bin onto a conveyer system, across the floor of While Vermont is poised to take even greater advantag eof the the building, up above head height to a hopper, and then into a abundant fuel its extensive forests provide, other states actoss the hugeboiler,where theyareburned to heat water inaheat exchang- Northeast have thus far mostly ignored wood heat's poten tial for er. The hot water is then pumped through the school to heat the their schools. New York has no wood-heated schools; Maline, the main building. most heavily forested state in the country, has just one, in Turner, This system, which cost about half a million dollars, was in the middle of the state; New Hampshire has two, one olfrwhich installed in 1996 to replace electrical heat that had been installed is in a twin-state district with Norwich, Vermont. in the 1970s, when electricitywas so cheap that people said it was- Massachusetts has just one high school with wood chipJheat,in n't'worth metering. By the mid 1990s, however, electricity was Athol, in the northern part of the state. Cooley Did k-enson ferociously expensive, so as soon as the wood chip system went Hospital in Northampton uses wood heat, as does tile Mt. online, the school's fuel costs droppcd by 90 percenL They saved lVachusett Community College in Gardner. Joe Smith, whc heads
$100,000 the first year, the system paid for itself in five years.
Ted Riggen, the principal at Barre Elementary, loves everything-about the system. He likes the reduced hating bill, of course, but he isalso a former forester,and the idea ofa sustainable fuel source has tremendous appeal to him. Administrators considering wood heat in their schools often visit, and Riggen likes giving them the tour himself'. He especially likes taking them out to the storage bin and smelling the raw chips.
"Sometimes I think I could pour milk over a bowl of these chips and eat them like cereal,"he says.
The most powerful appeal, of course, is the relatively low cost of the chips. Twenty-five Vermont elementary anid high'schools, serving roughly 10 percent of the state's students, use wood heat.: In the last several years, they have saved 35 to 40 percent over oil heat, the most common alternative fuel. And that margin has, been rising with the run-up in oil prices over the last year or two. According to the Vermont Superintendents Association, Vermont schools using wood in the last full school year saved a PrincipalTed Riggen shows off his schoolr wood-chip boiler. 28 Northcrn bcllannds /Spring 2006
the Forest and Wobod Products Institute at the college, says that wood-heat advocates in his region had to overcome considerable original resistance to heating with wood. There was the simple fact that they had to I cut trees, which some people thought was bad, he says. Moreover, the shift to wood heat entailed significant changes in infra-structure, especially retrofitting an electric-heat campus. Just the planning and implementation of the conversion required the addition of full-time staff. Yet the con-version has paid off handsomely. The proj-ect cost was about two million dollars, but according to Rob Rizzo, the facilities chief at Mt ',ichusett, the $35-per-ton cost of wood chips is just one-tenth the cost of electricity and a fifth the cost of oil. This performance, according to Smith, has
*inspired Massachusetts state education officials to launch a major study of the .advantages of converting elementary and secondary schools to wood heat.
It was 20 years ago that wood chip heat first came to.schools in Vermont. It started. in the little town of Calais, in the north-cefitral part of the state. In the mid 1980s, Calais was paying a fortune for electric heat for its elementary school, so the town set up an ad hoc committee of volunteers to look for a solution. After considering a range of alternatives, the committee settled on wood heat; it estimated the town could save 80 per&nt of'its fuel costs by switching from electric heat to chips and convinced the town to go ahead and install a system. One of the local volunteers was Tim Maker, who had worked in the residential energyauditprogram run by.the University of Vermont Extension Service and then, when that program lost its funding, estab-lished his own energy consulting company. Now 59, Maker grew"up in Springfield, Vermont, and earned a Tim Marker (left) of the Bionmass Energy Resource Center and degree in engineering physics at Cornell University.After working principalTed Riggen stand outside of BarreTown Elementaryand on the Calais project, Maker went on to serve as project manager Middle School's wood-chip boilersmokestack. for wood installations in 10 Vermont schools." And in 2000, he set up the'Biomass Energy Research Center cation officials to consider extending wood heat in their schools. (BERC),with offices in Montpelier, Nrrmont. BERC isa nonprofit Maker is an unabashed advocate for wood chips; he also cororation that carries ouit a*wide range ofstudies and projects on" believes that.the best.way to advance this interest is by the most wood energy. One of the most important of these efforts has been rigorous technical analysis of all of the issues involved - technical, to serve as midwife to the installation of wood systems in schools. .scientific, enironmhntal, political, economic. At the root of this In addition to the Vermont projects, Maker has served as a con- analysis is Maker's conviction that the use of wood chips for heat sultant to school districts in Idaho, Montana, and New Mexico. The isgood for everybody in the Northern Forest. Center isnow functioning as a partner with the Massachusetts edu- It is good for rural communities because it turns a byproduct NorthernWoodlands I Spring 2008 39 I
into public use and produces both revenues and jobs; ii saies The three types ofwood chips,front high-gradesanmillchips (left). school systems large amounts of money- it improves the forest by to medium-gradebole chips (center), to low-grade whole tree chips encouraging the weeding out of low-quality trees; and it slows (right). Many schools arelimited to using sawmill chips, which are global warming because it backs out the use of fossil fuels, whose also the most expenshe, but some arestartingto use bole chips. consumption only adds carbon to the atmosphere. The only ambiguous area is air quality.Wood chip heat in small institutions opposed to papermaking-grade "dean chips.' produces lower sulfate emissions thanoil heat and about the same In between is a third category called "bole chips," which are level of nitrate emissions. But its particulate emissions are higher. similar to whole-tree chips except that they come from the tree's These tiny particles are a problem because they can get into peo- bole - there are no small branches, only trunks and large limbs. ple's lungs. The school projects deal with this by building tall The chips aren't screened, but since there are no small branches, enough smoke stacks to get the particulates away from the school there are fewif any stringers. site-, and in any event, the school system boilers are far less of a It is ironic that schools, the smallest systems and by far the small-problem than wobdstoves in homes, Maker argues. est consumer of chips, have to use the highest-quality chips. The The use of wood chip heat in schools has been pretty much an reason is that the delivery systems in tlic schools, which move the unalloyed succdss, but now the system is coming under some pres- chips from the storage conveyer systems and from the hoppers into sure, with chip prices drifting up after remaining low for more the boilers themselves, have relatively small augers. These augers are than a decade, and with somie of the advocates beginning to worry easily jammed by stringers, so schools will have nothing to do with about the stability of the chip supply. No shortages have appeared whole-tree chips, thotigh they are the most readily available kind. yet, but technical issues and the health of the forest products Despite these stringent requirements, nobody has worried industry itself have become a concern to people like Maker. about the supply of these chips to schools - until now. In the last The key to the whole system is the %,*ood chip itself. The chips year, the price of chips to schools has begun to rise, and there is conic from two sources: sawmills like Lathrop's and mobile chip- considerable concern about the supply.One of the problems isthat pers used on log landings. By far the highest-quality chips come the schools use such a small piece of the chip stream,just 16,000 to from sawmills. The mills acquire logs, mostly hardwood, remove 18,000 tons of the million or so tons that are harvested in NWrmont the bark, and saw the clean logs into lumber. Turning an imperfect each year, so they haive little pricing power with the chip suppliers. round log into sound, square-edged lumber produces some waste In fact, Bob DeGeus of Vermont Department of Foiests, Parks and wood - slabs and edgings - which is then passed through a chip- Recreation, sa's that the mills essentially supply the schools as a per and then run through a screen to ensure uniform size. The community service. "They have a good-neighbor policy," he says. result is a pale, tan piece of hardwood about two-thirds the size of *Moreover, the special equipment needed to supply the schools a paper book of matches. Paer mills buy these chips to augment is expensive. The big users, such as electric power plants and pulp the chips they produce themselves from debarked logs. And they and paper companies, have massive infrastructure to process are coveted bythe schools:As Steve.Murray, the operations chief at wood, but most schools have only simple, below-ground storage Barre Town Elementary, says, "These are the Cadillac of chips:' bins. Jim lathrop says the walking-bottom trailers needed to get At the other end of the spectium are chips that are not even chips to schools cost $45,000 apiece; he has two. Also, the tractors of Kia quality: whole-tree chips that come from logging jobs and that pull the trailers have to have special hydraulics to operate the land-clearing operations. In these circumstances, whole trees are walking bottoms; he has five of those. Then there is the screening fed into a chipper, and the resulting biomass is shipped off to and the extra work to guarantee the highest-quality chips. "You've wood-fired power plants. The chips include bark, twigs, and got a million-dollar deal to stay in this business," he says. leaves, and they are not screened, so that there are lots of odd Finally, wood-heat advocates worry about gathering stresses sizes, including long, skinny stringers that often result when and crosscurrents within the forest products industry itself. From small branches are chipped. These are called "dirty chips," as the perspective of the schools, the biggest threat is erosion in the 40 Nordtern Woolands I Spring 2006
financial outlook for loggers and mills. One problem is the strug- However that works out, there appears to be one step that the gle going on in the pulp and paper industry, one of the biggest schools can make themselves: they could persuade the manufac-purchasers of wood. The Northeast segment of that industry is turers of the wood boilers to beef up the augers and otherelements being pressured by competitors in other parts of the US., South of the delivery system so that the schools could routinely use bole America, Europe, and now Asia. chips. Jim l~athrop strongly supports that. "They would be a bit The sawmills are also in a financial squeeze. Their costs are more expensive," he says,"but theywould be much more flexible." going up steadily, and the price of lumber is not keeping pace. And Though most schools prefer sawmill chips, some are making the loggers who supply them have their own set of challenges, the gradual shift to bole chips. This year, about half of the supply including high workers' comp rates and high fuel costs that erode at Barre To.vn is bole chips, supplied by.Limlaw Chipping, one of profitability. According to Tim Maker, this dynamic can eat away the largest chip suppliers. Adam Sherman, who works with Maker at the infrastructure needed to keep the wood chip stream flowing. at BERG, says, "Ithink the future for the schools is bole chips.'
"If the paper mills go out and the number of sawmills declines, Despite these caveats, Vermont school officials at all levels con-the infrastructure that supports the industry likewise begins to *tinueto be upbeat about wood chip heat. Cathy Hilgendorf at the contract- the chipping machines and the log trucks, and the spe- state education department is pushing it as hard as she can. And cial equipment gets scarcer," he says. The chip supply for schools is principals like Ted Riggen do likewise. Riggen, in fact, is talking critically at risk from this perspective. about how to use the 88 acres of woods surrounding his school as BERG now has a $50,000 grant from the federal and state gov- *a source ofsustainable fuel. He thinks that the local vocational high ernments, along with some contributions from private industry, school should consider adding a forest products course to its aca-to seek a solution to this gathering problem. Maker says they are demic offerings.
looking for ways to tweak the business model for chip producers "You manage the forest well," he says, "and you can sustain this in a way that would bolster the chip supply."We now see an advan- flow forever!' tage to higher chip prices," he says. "Schools would still save a lot of money over oil, and it might be possible for someone to make HA1unurON DAVIS Is A WRrIER AND Poucr AmL S BASED L4 BufRu.*v N, a living in this business." VE.%tomrr. Unlikexhools,'wood-c"p-fircdpowerplantslike the McNeil GeneratingStation in Burlington, Vermont, bu9y largequantitiesof chips. Northern Woodlands I Spring 2006 41
Putting Wood in. Your Gas Tank U Wood Fiber Could Be Important Source of Ethanol BY GAIL DUTrON he Midwest is making a reputation for parts of trees and plants. In virtually all research labs, this process itself turning corn stalks and husks has been replaced with the second, and more efficient, method - into bioethanol, while the South iseye- called hemicellulose conversion - which extracts the sugars from ing rice husks. wood and uses them to make other products, including bioethanol. The Northeast, however, has a biomass that Cellulose comprises about 45 percent of the wood, but, may be more valuable than either wood. The Amidon says, "cellulose is very hard to take apart." Basically, the United States Department of Agriculture wood is ground into fine particles and fermented, yielding about r(USDA) estimates that woody biomass could 8 percent bioethanol and 92 percent water. That mixture is dis-replace as much as 30 percent of the petroleum tilled three times - using considerable fossil-fuel-based energy-used in the U.S. Much of that would come from to produce 100 percent bioethanol. the Northeast, where forests tend to be rich with In the more efficient hemicellulose conversion, biorefineries hardwoods, and "hardwoods are better than softwoods for this," convert hemiceltiloses (wood sugars, especiallyxylan) to ethanol. saysThe LeeNortheast Lynd, an engineering professor at Dartmouth College. has a long history of converting wood to paper Xylan is the second largest component in hardwood fiber, and paper companies dissolve and bum most of it in the process of and, in the past fewdecades, ofconverting some ofthesteam pro- making chemical pulp. But xylan can be readily captured by duced in papermaking into electricity.'Wood-fired power plants extracting it from the wood prior to pulping. It can then be purl-have been burning chips to make electricity in the region for a fled and concentrated with a membrane and then fermented to couple of decades. Now wood chips, along with wastes from the make ethanol. To top it off, energy produced in the process can pulp and paper mills, have another possible use. Researchers have' "help power the ethanol converision and concentration process. found a way to convert them into liquid fuel - specifically, into By using a biorefinery model and by using energy generated bioethanbl that can be mixed with gasoline and used to reduce during the conversion process to operate the conversion plant, our dependence on hydrocarbon-based fuels and also help those much peer-reviewed research is ihowing a net energy gain, notes fuelsbum cleaner. .- Lynd. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory in 2004 esti-The term "bioethanol" is commonly used to describe ethanol mated that uswig enzymes to convert biomass into sugars could
.0, 'that is made exclusively from carbohydrates, such as corn or result in'cost reductions of more than 20-fold per gallon of wood, that are found in the biosphere. This distinguishes it from bioethanol produced,'compared to the cellulpse conversion.
ethanol in general, which can be manufactured from petMroleum. - "The idea of biorefineries is that [similar to oil refineries] you There are two broad - and very different - approaches to con- make multiple products at once," Lynd says. A biorefinery, for
'verting wood to bioethanol, according to Thomas Amidon, direc- example, could produce steam for power generation, acetic acid, tor of the Empire State Research Institute. Neither is in commercial and biodegradable plastic, as well as bioethanol.
use yet. One process - called cellulose conversion - makes "Ethanol is one of the earliest products.that will be made, but bioethanol from cellulose, which, with lignin, makes up the woody it's'not the most Waluable," Lynd says. Acetic add, at about 45 cents per pound for its use in making acetates, has nearly twice A mountain of chips, Inset: Lee Lynd, engineering professor the value of ethanol, and you don't have to ferment it, he says. at Dartmouth College, and some of his bioethanol-con'ersion Using biorefineries could more than double the value of the equipment. energy extracted from wood waste products in the forest industry, t.. NorthernWoodlands I Spring 2006 55
4 from the equivalent of 300 million barrels of oil in 1990 to more paper and bioethanol is a bit tricky, Jeffries says, because the acids than 600 millions of barrels of oil by 2030, according to a report used to break down the wood can destroy some of the cellulose, by the American Forest & Paper Association. and the resulting degradation products reduce fiber yield.and Hardwoods will play a particular role in this conversion. strength. "The toxic byproducts also inhibit fermentation of the "Different species of trees have different utilities," explains sugars into ethanol," he says.
Thomas Jeffries, a microbiologist who works for the USDA Forest The hemicellulose conversion process, however, overcomes Service's Forest Products Labs. "Hexose sugars - glucose and that problem and complements the way paper is made today. galactose, for instance-are abundant in softwoods, but softwoods Currently, the pulp and paper industry extracts hemicellulosic aren't as easy to convert to liquid fuels." Sofiwoods are more diffi- sugars as one step in converting cellulose into paper, but treats cult to degrade, and their sticky pitch makes them more difficult them as waste. Those wasted dollars can be converted into 1 to process than hardwoods. Although technology to degrade soft- bioethanol, either by fermenting the sugars in solution, or by con-wood is being developed simultaneously in the US., Canada, and verting the waste sludge using either enzymes or microbes. Sweden, conifers currently are more valuable for their fiber. Processing it is economical, too, particularly when viewed against Hardwoods, in contrast, have shorter fibers and more-readily the price of oil. It can boost a paper mill's bottom line without degraded cellulose crystals, which allows the fibers to be taken significantly changing operations. apart by enzymes more easily than softwood fibers. Among hard- Economically, as a source of energy, "wood-based ethanol is a woods, the l6wer-density woods, such as poplar, cottonwood, and fifth the cost of oil," Lynd says. Currently, he explains, the raw willow, are easier to convert to bioethanol. In such species, the material costs about $40 per ton for cellulosic biomass or $20 per lignin is less cross-linked and the wood has a higher hemicellu- wet ton for wood chips. Converting biomass to ethanol using a lose content, lower bark content, and lower extractive compo- biorefinery is the equivalent of buying oil at $13 per barrel, he says. nents - features that make them more amenable to conversion. . That figure doesn't include the capital costs of establishing biorefincries or distribution systems, however. When those and Boon for the paper Industry? other related costs are added into the equation, wood-based bio-The still-emerging hemicellulose-conversion method offers a mass could compete with oil that costs $30 to $35 per barrel - distinct advantage for the pulp and paper industry in the form of about half the peak cost of a barrel of oil in 2005. a new revenue stream. Traditionally, converting wood to both Those numbers sound good, but starting a wood-to-bioethanol Low-grade wood could become an importantfeedstockforbloclhanolrefincrics.
* .... : Z
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56 - Northern*,bodands I/Spring 2006
W Ethanol Is essentially alcohol, made through a variety of processes. The feedstock can be either biological or fossil fuel. Ethanol made from biological sources (wood chips or corn husks, for example) is called bloethanot. plant means risk and involves a large amount of capital, Lynd says. quantities and identify potential markets:" according to David No commercial entity is as yet using wood to produce bioethanol. BonDurant, Lyonsdale plant manager. The goal is to determine To build a viable wood-to-bioethanol market,"we need two com- whether it's financially feasible for Lyonsdale to produce plementary actions: to lower the investment hump for new plants bioethanol as a byproduct of its normal operations. Lyonsdale's and to do breakthrough research and development." participation gives SUNY-ESF researchers real-world samples Most existing bioethanol plants in the U.S. rely upon corn and feedback. Bioethanol, to BonDurant, is a value-added prod-stover- the stalks and other materials not used as food -and corn uct that could help his plant and others become more viable. grain. Theoretically, according to the Naiional Renewable Energy Depending on the results of the testing, bioethanol production Laboratory, one dry ton of feedstock would produce nearly 125 could augment revenues from generating electricity. gallons of bioethanol from corn, or 113 gallons from corn stover. "Anyway of keeping the facility open is in my best interest, and It estimates that a ton of forest thinnings processed through the best interest of the Northeast:' he says. "Until recently, bio-hemicellulose conversion would produce nearly 82 gallons of mass plants weren't competitive. The cost of fuel was high, so bioethanol. many biomass plants shut down in the past five years.' If we can Grain is the main feedstock for bioethanol now,but wood has make a value-added product from the wood - like sugars for some benefits over competing biomass sources that will boost its bioethanol - the plants could become more competitive, he says. use. Unlike such seasonal biomass crops as corn, 'soybeans, or Making the plants more competitive could in turn result in switcigrass, wood can be harvested throughout the year, stored better forestry in the region by providing stable markets for low-for months as chips without degrading (longer if left in log form), grade wood, which would be chipped as a fuel source for biore-and can be left growing in the forest until it's needed, thus fineries. The presence of that market, in turn, encourages enabling just-in-time delivery systems. Wood also is denser than woodlot owners to improve their timber stands by removing alternative biomass sources and so on a volume basis contains poor-quality trees because they can recoup at least part of the more potential energy. expense of their removal. Thinning out the low-grade wood Researchers agree that more itudy is needed to increase wood- improves the long-term value of the forests. But without that conversion efficiency. In the. meantime, Jeffries says, bioethanol market, improvement work is an expense that many landowners plants are likely to be designed to handle multiple fuel types, such will not choose to incur. as trees, corn stover, rice hulls, and other biomass. "A rising tide raises all boats," Lynd says, noting that small Other issues must also be resolved before wood-based landowners could sell the thinnings directly to biorefineries and bioethanol plants become a reality, including guaranteeing long- then eventually get a higher price for their mature timber in the term feedstock supplies for the plants, Lynd says. The feedstock future because it will be of higher quality. issue isn't trivial, Jeffries emphasizes. "Plants want 20-year con-* Lynd's optimistic.outlook for bioethanol is partially based on tracts but can't get even 5- or 10-.year contracts"with suppliers of the existing fuel market. Several states are requiring that ethanol biomass. Despite these hurdles, tThere's every reason to believe be added to gasoline and diesel to help those fuels bum hotter, we can be very successful," Lynd adds. and thus more completely, which reduces air pollution The interest in bioethanol extends beyond the fuel and paper Right now, more than 30 percent of all gasoline in the U.S. is indusiries. Lyopnsdale. Biomass LLC, a division of Catalyst blended *with ethanol, according to ithe Renewable Fuels Renewyables C6rporation, runs a 19-megawatt wold-fired power Association. In early 2005, the U.S hWd 81 ethanol plants in 20 plant ;in Lyonsdale, New York, on the western side of the states, with the capacity to produce more than 4 billion gallons Adirondacks. It currently bmrns upwards of 200,000 tons of wood annually. Another. 16 -plants are in construntion and will add each year. Lyohlsdale is working with the state government to another 750 million gallons of capacity, according to the develop a renewable portfolio project that provides an incentive to Renewable Fuels Association, thus indicating the growing market help develop the wood-to-biomass industry. Like other biomass for bioethanol. If the current research can turn wood as a fuel-companies, Lyonsdale burns oily low-grade woods - tops, limbs, stock for bioethanol into a commerdal reality, northeastern and poorly formed trees - in its existing wood-to-energy plant. motorists could find themselves filling their tanks with a fuel Lyonsdale is participating in biomass research being done by that's at least partly made from the forest that surrounds us. the State University of New York's College of Environmental Science and Forestry (SUNY-ESF).'This year, we're sending sam- GAIL DUTTON FOCUSES ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, WRITING FROM HER ples [of our wood biomass] to SUNY-ESF to determine potential FAMILY'S TREE FARM IN WASHINGTON STATE. NorthernWoodlands I SprIng 2006 57}}

v t e Letter Sequence Acceptance Review
TAC:MC2297, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: BVY 06-022, 2006/03/15-Vermont Yankee - License Renewal Application, Amendment 1, BVY 06-043, 2006/05/15-Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, License Renewal Application Amendment No. 2, Additional Information, ML060300082, ML060300085, ML062780244, ML062780255, ML062780296, ML070530366
MONTHYEAR2006-06-19 [Table View]

ML062890050

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