ML062540441
| ML062540441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/02/2003 |
| From: | Ted Wingfield NRC Region 1 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML062540441 (2) | |
Text
Ted Wingfield notes/comments on th terview (12-02-03)
The following are my observations/questions of th 462
".iterview held on 12-02-03.
-ASSESSMENTQUErfJ YSN OTEC)
Will raise concerns and has done so before?
YES Also N/A (No longer employed with PSEG)
Raises concerns for others?
YES Did raise concerns Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?
NO Due to lingering affects from
- yelling, etc.
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for YES But, could remember the specifics (documented In a raising concerns?
notification (pg. 109) 0 Page 4 through 6 - Concerns about the work environment began in the 1997/1998 time frame when "basically the entire senior leadership team of the site" was changed out... previously challenging/questioning of operations and the rest of plant personnel centered around "safety and how to run a power station [and] were consistent with the way I was trained In the Navy and at [another nuclear utility]... after this management change-out, the questions were more along the lines of production pretty much at all costs.-. 'What can we do?' 'Is there a way around this requirement?'... consistent...
shocking" 0
Page 8 - Micro-management culture developed... "minuscule operational decisions being made at the highest level of the company '... decisions were questioned all the way down the chain as to whether there were requirements or not" Page 9 through 12 - Recounts an incident ('2000 time frame) where there was a complete loss of station air during scheduled maintenance. Temporary backup diesel air compressors were placed in service but only maintained the air header pressure at -89# which very nearthe -85# or "87# level.requiring a manual reactor trip per Abnormal Operating procedures. The 1V diesel compressor was shut down In an attempt to refuel It but the header pressure degraded too quickly. The decision was made (before the management team was consulted) to refuel the compressors while running with the Fire Company standing by as a precaution.
Page 14 through 27 erates the TARP team leader ("I can't believe you're even thinking about shutting down.-7.
the unit. You justnee to e getting some $&%I# air compressors In here, and keep the units on line") In front of the rest of the TARP team... "He lit off on rhe like a Roman candle... didn't change my course of action... when he came out In the hallway, I said... I'm going to run this the way, as a nuclear professional IWe been trained to run [it]... or you can get somebody else to do it"... {REVIEWER COMMENT - As a former SRO (6 months removed from a different Region I site), an episode like this (coupled with the long 'and steady history of "arbitrary/political" firings) is enough to generate, in my opinion, a chilled environment against takjn" "hto any operational decision because this tirade came directly from them essentially - no one is going to want to risk being the next guy to"get reamed"}
0 Page 27 through 43 - Salem startup In progress with generator complications causing delays greater than a week... Site management directs pursuit of bringing the plant up as far as-possible to make up for the lost time... vaduum was established and the plant was heated up to about.100# with the turbine & generator uncoupled and using a. special substance to seal the turbine glands... senior mana ement was pushing to perform reactor power i
ng (potentially directed frorn riW
... nii arguing for the conservative approach "I erased his 7iwhiteboard and [said] 'let me worEfr*7ithe augmented inspection team backwards'... going to remove decay. ea from the plant... With twosystems [in manual] not in.the normal configuration... because [someone doesn't]
control thesystem right, you cool down a little bit... [cause] the reactor to go more critical... or super critical... go up Into the power range and haVe a reactivity event... talked about verblally to me at my appraisal... that stand for safety cost me In my career at PSEG" Page 44 through 47 - Multiple partial losses of Off-Site Power ("2000/2001)... on one of them the shift manager took conservative action to manually trip one of the units based on plant Circ Water system response... he was second-guessed about the decision... after the third Instance of partial losses of Off-Site Power... It was determined that the lightening arresters in the switch yard needed to be replaced lfTmrinaotiO in this record was deleied
(
in accordance with the Freedom of Information Page 1 of 2 Act, exemptions
Ted Wingfield notes/comments on thi;-
Interview (12-02-03)
"1.
Page 48 through 56 - Reactor Feed Pump turbine Inlet valve steam leak... "Big steam leak. Going to have to shut the unit down. You need to come in... got Into the plant and was told... everything's fine. We got the valve shut... lagging blown all the way across the turbine building... I'e seen steam leaks that scared me that threw a lot less stuff around... 20
[to) 30 ft. steam plume... never a TARP report... TARP didn't exist... operators had sa.
the decision was made to shut the y wn... shift manager making preparations to shut the unit down ent to talk to the vice president... ý[limbed the ladder and shut the valve [while the NEOs h~d said thEy Wo*ld*not shut It because they view it as unsifaiifi-threatening... the response I got [after confronting th was totally unacceptable. It was... 'so what'... " Site guidance dictates that-management individuals are not supposed to operate equipment... "in an emergency, It's allowable, but the way this unfolded, it really wasn't like an emergency" Page 57 through 62 - Discusses meteorological tower loss of power design change package (DCP) Informality In the summer of 2002. Met tower lost power due to an excavation error... station management directed the establishment of a temporary power source without following the "temporary modification" process to avoid the requirement to submit a report to the NRC If power was lost for more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />... the conscious decision was made to do "the paperwork" as a follow-up action once power was restored Page 63 through 65 -"It seemed like the shlft managers were being second guessed on every Tech. Spec. call or every operational decision that they were making... by the senior management... they [Salem Shift Managers] were going to meet off-site to make sure they were In alignmenrton what they would do under certain circumstances when demanded to do things by senior management... It was perating the power station from their offices, and the shift happened to try to put every ounce of their being to posing the questions... what If..; we really can't do that" Page 67 through 69 - Licensed operator re-qualificatlon training hours cut by 1/3 (-90hrs to <60hrs).
P*g* 77 thrninh. ? -
-ta.frt' pfter *_failed-pressurizerpr-lay.-a
-. subsequentreact-*ip-was-direetet-understanding the cause of the trip.... "Typically, the understanding of that whole thing Would have occurred before the plantwould startiup...
was applying significant pressure to get the unit started back up, and later admitted to the fact thal i'e started the reactor up with really no understanding of what occurred at the event... then a whole bunch of new learnings came out the next week after the root cause was done"... the premature startup may not be documented in a notification Page 83 through 85-"... any event that occurred In the plant.;. 20/20 hindsight... takeyour best shot at doing the right thing, but if it wasn't exactly wha wanted... very abrupt and scream and yell.... berate individuals In front of the management team... particularly harsh... would that have affected me in raising a concern? No, but could It have affected somebody. else? Yes... if you... kept your head down, you got less of a chance of geeting your head knocked off... any viewpoint... a different.viewpoint espedally" Page 85 - "....thls guy's got a lot of years'as a senior reactor operator, and he Just flat out wasn't listened to" Page 97 & 98.exerted pressuie on the site QA Manager to revise the QA Issue reporting system to remove grading or theV"sugacoa the grading to remove the negative Implications of poor performance Pa 106 1 a.,Iraduate fm class In mechanical Sle inee~n 1 have a a
' ha on intclear was heard by my management team ti te end? ABSOLUTELY NOT. They could care less what opinion I had on nuclear power and nuclear safety" Page 2 of 2