ML062540429

Update Agenda November 14, 2003

ML062540429
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	11/14/2003
From:	NRC Region 1
To:
References
1-2003-0110, FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062540429 (8)

Text

Salem & Hope Creek Update Agenda November 14, 2003bI n4 Agenda Package Contents:

1) Update Agenda

2) Attachment A (Interview/Assessment Status Table)

3) Attachment B (Regulatory Action Schedule)

4) Attachment C (Background/Chronology)

5) Attachment D (External Q&As)

L4P~ C9~s~'rvbiv~ dak

1.

ANY EVIDENCE OF UNSAFE OPERATION?

0j Operating review of. Salem & Hope Creek

- No recent reports to NRC or events

2.

Allegations Status

-Review interview progress & results (Attachment A)

3.

Upcoming Regulatory Operations

-Review schedule (Attachment B)

4.

Follow-up Items.

ýa) Explore -conduct of* operations aspects of issue #4 Wperating the Feedwater valve) b) Revise Atl.A Aformat to Include'& column indicating whether 'the issue listed is a technical violation or wrongdoing (50.5 Deliberate Misconduct... willful or careless disrega rd...) as well as a brief statement of status 6W c) Keep External Q&A's up-to-date.... ready for distribution if/when the issues go public' d) inS~~SimH-paegna~p I

ia'~r a eee G:BRANCH13WAiI 1

~ ~~~~in accordanc ithIfomtn Act,~ exemptions.

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NRC ASSESSMENT OF'SIGNIFICANT SALEM/HC ALLEGATION Discreet Issue / Event (Derived NRC Assessment (including Interview results)

Technical Wrn-I I YI'JICIIIUII

-MMIMMAWIU I

1 arch 17, ?003 at Hope Creek -

Interviews to date have suggested that the concern here was betwee 1and his No N/A

-onfide that di"rten heads. He apparently "harassed". (From interviews withý pressured for thorn for four hours on.wh~y a shutdown to repair a TBV was necessary when all restart without force.d outage - bypass of the de'partment heads believe the decision to shutdown was a 'no brainer". Although valve incident; Forced outage & turbine non-conservative decision making is a'possible root cause, there was no TS violation.

bypass valve (TBV) repair occurred.

2 March 17, 2003 at Hope Creek -

Not yetfdeveloped - More ~to follow No N/A n~j1WjjWtold alleger he did not have the authority to st~op the evolution (reactivity excursion during the bypass valve shutdown?) even though he knew it was ill-conceived.

3 June 17, 2003 at Hope Creek - EDG Interviews to date have suggested that there was time pressure to delay the shutdown as No N/A leakage exceeds LCO time; pressure to long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability avoid shutdown; VS directed justification. Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there operator' to not shutdown; was no TS violation. The HC Ris were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.

shutdown commenced within acceptable time frame and met regulations.

4 Sept 24, 2002 at Salen mif Interviews to date have. suggested that this industrial safety issue may have been No N/A santilated q.Mn NOs noted that the-4Iw~ent and the field an WINNOW ithout: an NEO to operate the valve, wearing'the neces.sary Rito~idential report personal safety gear-,an~d without following the work control process. Although this issue substantiates allegation, Third Step may have been substantiated and non-conservative'decision making was a possible root Grievance, cause, this is not a an NRC regulated issue.

5 I

Fal?) 2002 -at Salem - Manager New information received on November 6, indicates this alleged activity may have actually No N/A directed SRO occurred wh~enM

-firected to NAWt"Wa surveillance step for the Ito NA a startu

~

st step.

Reactor Vessel Vent valves, when a single valve indicated dual indication during this 31113RNW-ed to have fired routine'stroking evolution.A N

w'as allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they but was unsuccessful.

"'would not 'NA" the step. Earlier Information from Interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-Ing" a second.verification containm6nt walkdown to be done by a VP-OPS level person step. This-step was added to the S U procedure as a lessons learned from the Davis-Besse Issue..According to'10IWhis walkdown was actually done by himself an SQGff nd startup was delayed by aday becauseof leaks that they found from some SGwet Iayup level indication valves. So, the step was actually completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.I 0%

Predecislonal Information -Not for Release to the Public Atcmn ae1o Attachment A Page 1 of 3

I IDiscreet Issue I Event (Derived dirprtly from 2003-01101 NRC Assessment (including Interview results)

Technical Wrong-S I

I

~

h -

I.6 Salem grassing approach (i.e., heroic efforts) deviated from expected approach Sle rned from 1994 grassing 1ý70-.

1/1

ýM tated that he -

'supported any efforts. t(

during heavy grassingI

,indicated that he may ti

'btaff would have chose

• unit.

~sh during grassing season and would not have Fstation add itional *oper ators in the intake to clean the screens

ýeriods. His approachi would have been to take the unit offline. He ave told -the alleger that he was concerned that some of the outage to augment screen cleaning with operators vice shutting down the No NIA 4

1.

7 Higher Tritiurrl'sample concentra-lion in Spring 2003 - a serious issue that h ad to be handled with kid gloves to keep us

[PSEG] out of troubleAMM 4"ndicated durlnc was being developedb people on how to hand The NRC has a great d inspection activities Inc PSEG managers and s the Interview that he was not in a role in RP at the time this issue it heidid recall having conversations witti PSEG communications a the Issue. He said he may have discussed this with the alleger.

sal of information on this Issue that has been derived from uding numerous face-to-face Interaction~s betw~een inspectors and

-alf.

None from this allegation N/A

Ž~t~ ~PA Excessive use of tem~rary' logs Not yet developed-- More to follow T13D TBD Salem 2 ISI relief request re: piping UT Not yet developed - Mc re to~follow' TBD TBD (coverup?)___________

HO offgas issue afterl~

took I

ndicated some knowledge of this Issue since he believe It pertained to elevated HO No N/A over. Rad safety concerns expressed.

offgas flow rates due t 'excessive air in-leakage into the condenser. He Indicated that but not resolved A@

W'rote a iome at inflammatory notification because the NEOs had to try to identify the location of the leak In higher than normal radiation fields. The location of the leak

_____________________________eventually wfts disc6v red and the offgas leakage reverted to Its pre-In-leakage levels.

HO employee allegedly. asked to modify na dicated some Iknowledge of this Issue since he bealieve it pertained to elevated HO No N/A a

offgas flow fates due to excessi'ie air in-leakage into the condenser. He Indicated that 2Z$.t#

Souber wrote a W~mevhat Inflammat 'ory notification because the NEOs had to try to identify telocation of the leak In higher than normal radiation fields. The location of the leak

______________________________eventually was discov red and the offgas leakage reverted to its pre-in-leakage levels.

144iWo

~

IicXUU1 Predeclisonal Information - Not for Release to the PublicAtahetAPg2o1 Attachment A Page 2 of 3.

S uinm NRC Assessment (including Interview results)

Technical Wrong -I IDiscreet Issue / Event (Derived from Interviews)

NRC Assessment (including Interview results)

Technical Violation?

Wrong-doing? I 1PSEG decision making relative to #14 Steam Generator (SG) Feed

-interviews to date have suggested that this concern related Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3. An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements. Although non-1 7 7 conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.

2 In the Spring 2001 outage, a Salem Unit 1 reactor. trip was caused by Nloi yet developed - More to follow a main generator current transformer failure. The*

iWiW_

told operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by particular, date or their NRC performance indicator was going tb 'go white."0 N*.aleei hrse operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the plant". Operations then told*

lthey would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Althoughat" insisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operation refused to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis.______________________

G:\\BRANCH3Wilegation SCWE\\Salem-H-C-SCWE-Table.wpd Predeclslonal Information -Not for Release to tfie Public Atcmn ae3o Attachment A Page 3 of 3

,Salem & Hope Creek Schedule Nov. 3rd Larry Scholl Special Inspection Onsite/Debrief All week

_____Status/Update Briefing Nov. 7t1h 1 0:00am Nov. 1 0th Inspection Reports Issued Nov. 11t' Nov. 17 1h Status/Update Briefing Nov. 17t1h 9:30am 3rd Quarter Assessment Meeting Nov. 17 1h 1:30pm Nov. 2 4t1h Hope Creek Operator Licensing Meeting Supp lemlental Inspection Exit ?

Special Inspection Exit ?

Nov. 2 4t1h 9:30am Status/Update Briefing Dec. 1 st 1,:30pm Site Visit (9th & 10th ?... 1 day ?)

I_________

G\\B RA*NCH3\\Ategation SCQWE\\Salem-HC-AttB-!Scheduie.wpd Rev. Date: 11/17103AtahetBPe1 i

Attachment B Page I of 1

I

~Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology Issue/Event Date Description Not Specified Not Specified Not Specified Not Specified Spring 2001 Spring 2002 Sept. 241h, 2002 Fall 2002 Nov. 2002 Excessive use of temporary tags

-~(.

Salem 2 In-service Inspection (ISI) relief request re: piping UT (coverup?)

Hope Creek offgas issue afteiiipiitLok over. Rad safety concerns expressed but not resolved Hope Creek employee allegedly asked to modify a Notification re: "in-leakage" In the Spring 2001 outage, a Salem Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a main generator current transformer failure. Th

-NM M t=,.ýold operations that they needed to get the reactor started up by a particular date or their NRC6 performance indicator was going to "go white."

00-alle

_edly harassed operations daily by asking day "when are you going to start the plant". Operations then'told W11Othey would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. AlthoughidN0lnsisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refused to do so because it was contrary to their safety analysis.

Salem grassing ap.proach (iLe., heroic efforts) deviated f rom expected approach /lessons learned from 1994 grassingý This concern relates to a decision to keep one of the Salem unit's 'on during a period of heavy grassing. Interviews have suggested that this may have been done for one day', but when it occurred on a second day the unit was taken off-line.

Based on the size and location of a significant steam~ leak (20' to 40' plume from the bonnet of a Feed Water Pump steam admission vlb'1 agreed with the shift operators that the plant should be shut down to affect ;pairs.,i~g left to speak with "upper management " and, upon his return, subsequentIiIjI M h'ich isolated.the steam leak avoiding a shut d g-0 corifidrntial report substantiates allegation, Third Step.Grievafhcej~PfMperated the valve without regard to his own personal safety, without a Nuc lea r Equipment Oper ato~r.(NEO),

and without the permission/knowledge of control room personnel).

Ma-nager haeiected an SRO~

t NA a startup checklist step.

Sf tried to h

.fired but was unsuccessful1. Information received indicates.

this alleged activity may have a~tally occurred when.,

irecte

~~o "NA" a surveillance step for. the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a single valve indicated dual indication during this routine stroking evolution.

W~as allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step.. Earlier information. from interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a VP-OPS level -person step. This step was added jo the SU procedure as a lessons learned from the Davis-Besse issue. According t 16 hM 'is walkdown was actually done by himself and Rn

~~

nd startup was delayed by a day because of leaks that they found from some SG wet layup level indication valves. So, the step was actually completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.

Higher Tritium sample concentration in Spring 2003 -"

siseta a ob handled with kid gloves to keep us JPSEG] out of trouble"',1 iuis, etahdtob Rev. Date: 11/17/03 Atcmn ae1o Attachment C Page 1 of 3

I Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology"I'll Issue/Event Date March 17t1h 2003 June 170, 2003 Sept. 3 Id &41h, 2003 Sept. 51h, 2003 Sept. 91h, 2003 Description

1. Hope Creek Reactivity Event - Manipulation of Electro Hydraulic Control (EHC) system caused an unanticipated rise in reactor power 6 1/2 % to 13 %... not discovered until Wednesday (3/19/03).

2. Entering a planned shutdown to repair 3 technicallmechanical failures (late Sunday/ early Monday morning).

3. Monday morning (0800) Turbine Bypass Valve (TB V) stuck open (47%). TBV closed fully during subsequent testlng.ý

ý rue withbu whether or not a shut down was required. The concern here was betw~en.and his. department heads. He apparently "harassed" (from interviews with thm fo 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> on why a shutdown to repair the TBV was necessary when all of the department heads believed that shutting down was a "no brainer". Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.

4. Heated discussions about the duration of the forced outage.

Hope Creek - EDJ a e exceeds LCO time; pressure to avoid shutdown;'

directed operator 41.Wto not shutdown; shutdown commenced within acceptable time frame and met regulations. There was time, pressure to delay the shutdown as long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability justif 'ication.

Although non-conservative decision making was :a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. The HO'RI~s were fully engaged with the issue as it unfolded.

Initial allegation contact between RI-2003-A-01 10 alleger & Dave Vito.

Alleger informed of right to file a discrimination complaint with the Dept. of. Labor (DOL).

Initial recorded Interview with alleger & 1S "Allegation Review Board (AR B).

Sept./Oct.

Sept. 2 5 1h' Sept. 2 91h, Sept. 3 0 1h, Oct. 2nd, 2 Oct. 91h, 2i Oct. 111h, 2 Oct. 14', r 2003 PSEG decision making process relative to #14 Steam' Generator (SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open. This concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3., Ati NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have tak~en 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan sholwed that ' FRY was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements. Although non-conservativje decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.

b 0 3 In~ter'views conducted Sept. 25 t throu 'h Oc.0 t 2003 2003 003 003

~003

~003 Alleger filed civil discrimination law suit against PSEG in Morris County, N.J.

Alleger sends a. letter, via email to the NRC. Region 1, Regional Administrator indicating that th

~huh that issues at the'site "aren't going to be Crou-ght up... just like Davi--'

_s-Bes.-"

2 nd ARB More email received from alleger.

More email received from alleger.

Rev. Date: 11/17103 Atcmn ae2o Attachment C Page 2 of 3

Salem/Hope Creek Allegation Background/Chronology I

Issue/Event Date Oct. 16 1h, 2003 Oct. 2 2 nd.2003 Oct. 23d, 2003 Description Certified acknowledgment letter sent.

Oct. 2 4 1h 2003 Interviews c 7

Oct. 2 8 'h, 2003 Nov. 4th, 2003 Nov. 7 h, 2003 Nov. 121, 2003 Nov. 1 3 "', 2003 td ARB

-J 4th ARB Interviews conducted Nov. 1 2 1h 5th ARB G:\\BRANCH3\\Ilegation SCWE\\Salem-HC-AttC-BackgroundChronolog.wpd Rev. Date: 11/17/03 Atcmn ae3o Attachment C Page 3 of 3