ML062540356
| ML062540356 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/2003 |
| From: | Wiggins J NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Barber S NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194, IR-03-003 | |
| Download: ML062540356 (2) | |
Text
S~fiB~ber~ Re Hi~hlights
~terview (1016) on SaIeIiiSCWE l-'age 1
'§-coR`Baib6r - Riý Hi6lili6hts t6M&ýý (16/6) 6ff Salem 8CWE j..j Page 1 From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
James Wiggins Scott Barber Thu, Oct 9, 2003107 AM Re: Highlights o
..m interview (10/6) on Salem SCWE
-1 C__ -
Good report, Scott...... really demonstrates the value of pairing an experienced, knowledgible tech staffer' with our 01 investigators. I'm sure, w/o your help, Eileen would have been drowned by tech detail....
I presume that the tech issues involved were either already know by us and factored into our routine inspections/observations when the problems occurred...... otherwise, we may have to feed items from the interview fwd, as appropriate.
>>> Scott Barber 10/08/03 11:24AM >>>
sensitive pre-decisional information Eileen Neff and I interviewed
- M or approximately 2 V2 hours on October 6. The interview began about 5:30 p.m. at his house. List below are some highlights of the interview.
ReLadi the "NIA'ed step of the startup procedure" - we discovered that this issue involve pti an SRO to N/A a step regarding the need for a containment walkdown by th 0,0prior to startup from a Salem Unit 2 scram from problems in the 500 KV swithchyard in mid-2002.
i: was a redundant step to the normal SRO walkdown that is done after every outage.
According to'"his step was'added as a lessons learned from the Davis Besse event to ensure that th*
highest level omanagement on-site was fully aware of the containment conditions prior to closeout.
Apparently believed that the walkdown done sep a ely by an SRO was sufficient to meet the intent of his proce ?te step and directed that it be N/A'e d..
orrected him and told him that both
~
]were going to do the walkdown which they both dTi&.-
ndicated they identified some minor boron
- wks that had to be corrected prior to restart. This res'uite"nlh a one day delay in their restart schedule.
This concern was unsubstantiated.
- Regarding the March 2003 Hope Creek event involving a degraded turbine bypass valve portrayed a very different picture than what was in the allegation. He indicated that Hope eek ha planned a short duration outage to correct three technical issues (leaky EDG exhaust piping, recirc pump seals, and an RHR valve problem). He stated that the outage went well with all of the previously identifiec issues being successfully addressed. During startup on March 14, 2003 after main generator isynchronization, he was called by During
--who informed him that No. 2 turbine bypass valve (TBV) failed to fully close and that operators had halted power ascension to assess the problem. He indicated tha @rovided a course of action of how to safely proceed with shutdown which is what was imp'lementeon March 16. Ltated that he tol to proceed with course of action he described on how to safe y shutdown the plant. [This descrip ion as derived from IR 50-354/2003-003 - After midnight on March 17, while controlling the TBVs on the bypass jack a perturbation caused the No.1 and 3 BPVs to pulse full shut and back open to their'original position which caused a minor change in -eactor power, pressure, and level. After a quick review by engineering, the depressurization continued and a more significant transient occurred in which the No. 3 BPV cycled from 0 percent to 75 percent open which caused a reactor level decrease of 8 inches and a 7% increase in Sreactor power. Operators stopped using the BPV jack to lower pressure and used pressure set as the pressure control means for the remainder of the shutdown and cooldown sequence. Operators completed the shutdown and cooldown with no further operational challenges. Subsequent BPV jack troubleshooting identified a problem with the BPV jack potentiometer which contributed to the erratic response of the BPV jack. PSEG management initiated corrective action after the second power transient, including prohibiting the use of the BPV jack when the reactor is critical, conducting a self assessment, and initiating an independent review of the transient, including upgrading the initial notification to a significance level 1.]
After the plant was shutdown, the t
raen itivities took approximately six days to complete. In a later discussion, O ndicated that was disappointed that extension of the original shutdown took i.*
10oiati0a in ti,;s record was dell.ed.
in accordance
,itxthe Freedom of InforI tiOn Act, exemption rAft I tZQj
I a3arrier - Re: Highlights 0 i6t&_Ni-eW(1_OT6 Pa*e 2.]
M six days instead of a more reasonable three a time frame to complete and this additional time (extra 3 days) cost the company 25 million dollars.
- main comment on this after the fact discussion was that this was the only negative feedback that he received on the issue, and he took it as a learning experience on how to better manage emergent problems. He indicated that this interaction and others did not cause him to feel that he could not raise safety concerns to senior corporate management.
- Regarding the June 2003 EDG intercooler leak had an interesting view on this issue. He indicated that he thought the organization let him down because of the slowness in the way the operability decision was made. He erroneously believed that the final operability call at the eleventh hour was made when engineering finally concluded that they met the design basis as written. He also indicated that this timeliness problem was exacerbated by some organizations that were involved because they should not have had a part in the decision making.
He attrib
- e. oro nizational delays to the matrixed organizations that were in place at PSEG durin*n enure. He also indicated that.this type of organization diluted accountability whichQ1NPO mentioned as a contribulr-o their third "3" grade in as many years.in reviewing the circumstances at the time, we noted that, nderstanding of the cause of the slowness in making the operability decision was in error since engineering had, in fact, revised the design basis to change the time to take action for a leak from the jacket water system from 7 days to 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). The time frame (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to not credit operator action was consistent with the assumptions in the accident analysis. That revision to the design basis was HC's basis for exitin he LCO, and it was not a lack of understanding of the original design basis. It was interesting that did not fully understand this distinction.
These are some initial highlights that are generally representative of some aspects our interview with*
- To get a full understanding, it would be appropriate to read the full transcript once it is maW*
available.
Please control this information as sensitive pre-decisional information.
sensitive pre-decisional information