ML062540346

E-Mail from Miller to Blough, Highlights of Interview (10/6) on Salem SCWE

ML062540346
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	10/08/2003
From:	Miller H NRC Region 1
To:	Barber S, Blough A, Farrar K, Marc Ferdas, Mel Gray, Harrison L, Brian Holian, Johnson S, Meyer G, Neff E, Dan Orr, Teator J, Vito D, Wiggins J, Elizabeth Wilson NRC Region 1
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062540346 (4)

Text

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Hglghts 0.

ew(06)o alem S~iCWE Page 41 From:

Hubert J. MillerY To:

A. Randolph Blough: Brian Holian; Daniel Orr; David Vito; Eileen Neff; Ernest Wilson; Glenn Meyer; James Wiggins; Jeffrey Teator; Karl Farrar; Leanne Harrison; Marc Ferdas; Mel Gray; Scott Barber; Sharon Johnson Date:

10/8/03 5:26PM-

Subject:

Re: Highlights-interview (10/6) on Salem SOWE Scott/Eileen Thanks. Very useful. Very interesting.

Hub

>>> Scott Barber 10/08/03 11:24AM >>>>

sensitive pre-decisional information Eileen Neff and I interviewe rmor approximately 2 1/2hours on October 6. The interview began about 5:30 p.m. at his house. Listed below are some highlights of the interview.

- Regarding the "NIA'ed step of the startup procedure" - we discovered that this issue involvedili

.rfirecting an 0R to N/A a step regarding the need for a containment walkdown by theoU,

'ýýýprior to-startup from a Salem Unit 2 scram from problems in the 500 KV swithchyard in mid-2002.-. Th'is'was a redundant step to the normal SRO walkdown that is done after ev'ery outage.

According tolathis step was added as a lessons learned from the Davis Besse event to ensure that the' highest level of management on-site was fully aware of the containment conditions prior to closeout.

Apparently,twelieved that the walkdown done separately by an SRO was sufficient to meet the intent of this procedure step and directed that it be N/e'ed.

ected him and told him that bothu mo Amlere going to do the walkdown which they both di dicated they identified some minor boron leaks that had to be, corrected prior to restart. This resul1tedki!Fa one day delay in their restart schedule.

This concern was unsubstantiated.

-Regarding the March 2003 Hope Creek event involving a degraded turbine bypass valve portrayed a very different pict 'ure than what was in the allegation. He indicated that Hope Creek had planned a short duration outage to correct three technical issues.(leaky EDG exhaust piping, recirc pump seals, and an RHR valve problem)..He stated that the outage went well with all of the previously identified issues being successfully addressed. During startup-on March 14, 2003 after main generator synchronization, he was called by woinformed him that No. 2 turbine bypass valve (TBV) failed to fully close and that operators ha--d hMalted power-ascension to assess the problem. He indicated thatufoprovided a course'of action of how to safely proce. d with shutdown which is what was impemetedonMarh 1.fated that he told proceed with course of action he described on 'how to safely shutdown the plant. [This description wa!ýderived from JR.

50-354/2003-003 - After midnight on March 17, while controlling the TBVs on the bypass jack a perturbation caused the No.1 and 3 BPVs to pulse full shut and back 'open to their original position which caused a minor change in reactor power, pressure, and level. After a quick review by engineering, the depressurization continued and a more significant transient occurred in whic 'h the No. 3 BPV cycled from 0 percent to 75 percent open which caused a reactor level decrease of 8 inches and a 7% increase in reactor power. Operators stopped using the BPV jack to lower pressure and used pressure set as the pressure control means~for the remainder of the shutdown and cooldown sequence. Operators completed the shutdown and cooldown with no further operational challenges. Subsequent BPV jack troubleshooting identified a problem with the BPV jack potentiometer.which contributed to the erratic response of the BIPV jack. PSEG management initiated corrective action after the second power transient, including prohibiting the use of the BPV jack when the reactor is critical, conducting a self assessment, and initiating an independent review of the transient, including upgrading the initial notification to a. significance level 1.)

After the plant was shutdown, the re iratvities took approximately six days to complete. In a later discussioýnndicated that

~as disappointed that extension of the original shutdown took six days instea'of a more rea Fonabl th~ree day time frame to complete and this additional time (extra 3 Information in this record was deleted in accordance with t e, Freedom-of lnforrmatioa Act, exemiptions4 FOWA

D~~avid Vitn

- Re:,Hglghs0 nteriw(06 nSmSW Page 2]

--~days) cost the company 25 million dollars.-

ain comment on this after the fact discussion was that this was the only negative feedback that he -received on the issue, and he took it as a learning experience on how to better manage emergent problems. He indicated that this interaction and others did not cause him'to feel that he could not. raise safety concerns to senior corporate management.

- Regarding -the June 2003 EDG intercooler leak had an interesting vi ew on this issue. He indicated that he thought the organization let him doawn because of the slowness in the way the operability decision was made. He erroneously believed that the final operability call at the eleventh hour was made when engineering finally concluded that they met the design basis as. written. He also indicated that this timeliness problem was exacerbated by some organizations that were involved because they should not have had a part in the decision making.

He attnibuted the or anizational delays to the matrixed organizations that were in place at PSEG during

/

9-1W enure. He also indicated that this type of organization diluted accountability which INPO mentioned as a contributor to their third T'3 grade in as many years. In reviewing the circumstances at the time, we noted that1111Munderstanding of the cause of the slowness in making the operability decision was in error since engineering had, in fact, revised the design basis to change the time to take action for a leak from the jacket water system from 7 days to 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). The time frame (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to not credit operator action was consistent with the assumptions in the accident analysis. That revision to the design basis was HC's basis for exiting the LCO, and it was not a lack of understanding of the original design basis. It was interesting that#W'did not fully understand this distinction.

These are some initial highlights that are generally repr *esentative of some aspects our interview witiM avaiable" T get a full understanding, it would be appropriate to read the full transcript once it is made Please control this information as sensitive pre-decisional information.

sensitive pre-decisional information

David Vito - R : Highlights 0

)e 1/6) on Salem SCWE.

From:

A. Randolph Bloughý'-</

To:

Brian Holian; Daniel Orr; David Vito; Eileen Neff; Ernest Wilson; Glenn Meyer; Hubert J. Miller; James Wiggins; Jeffrey Teator; Karl Farrar; Leanne Harrison; Marc Ferdas; Mel Gray, Scott Barber; Sharon Johnson Date:

10/8/03 1:32PM

Subject:

Re: Highlights

'nterview (10/6) on Salem SCWE right; we would also need to see what others say, i would tik Then make calls on each issues based on the preponderance of the overall evidence.

>>>Ernest Wilson 10/08/03 01:23PM >>>>

Iwould suggest that beforec iq~pll declaring the "N/A'd" concern as "unsubstantiated" that the NRC (staf) ndeendntl vei tkeoth issue hru records and/or procedures, etc. at the site.

Ernie

>>> Scott Barber 10/08/03 11:24AM>>>>

sensitive pre-decisional information Eileen Neff and I interv'iewe dm0r approximately 2 /2 hours; on October 6. The interview began about 5:30 p.m. at his ro07Liste below are some highlights of the interview.

- Regarding the "N/A'ed step of the startup procedure" - we discovered that this issue involve 4K.AUNNN

%ir.

r ctin an SRO to N/A a step regarding the need for a containment walkdown by t nior to startup from a Salem Unit 2 scram from problems in the 500 KV swithchyard lin mpid-20602..T is-as a redundant step'to the normal SRO walkdown that is done after every outage.

According to$

this step was added as a lessons learned from the Davis Besse event to ensure that the highest level of management on-site was fully aware of the containment conditions prior to closeout..

Apaeti lee that the walkdown done sep at~aly by an SRO was sufficient to meet.the intent of this procedure step and directed that it be N/A'ed.

orrected him and told 'him that bot

--and

ýere going to'do the walkdown which they both did.

ndicated they identified some minor boron i Was that had to be corrected prior to restart. This resulted iii a one. day delay in'their restart schedule.

This concern Was unsubstantiated.

- Regarding the March 2003.Hope Cree k event involving a degraded turbine bypass valve -

portrayed a very different picture than what was in the allegation'. He indicated that Hope C_

hka' planned a short duration o 'utage to correct three technical issues (leaky EDG exhaust piping, recirc pump seals, and an RHR valve problem). He stated that the outage went well with all of the previously identified issues being successfully addressed. Djri '

t rtuI on March 14, 2003 after main generator synchronization, he was cale by hoW u

nore hmtaNo. 2 turbine bypass valve TV filed, Q ful ose and th.at operators -had halIted-power ascension to assess the problem. He indicated roied a course of actior of how to safely proc eed with hutdown which is what was imple efln'ed on M~~alrch 16.

stated that he tol proceed with course of action he described on how to safe utdown the plant. [This description was derived from IR 50-354/2003-003 - After midnight on March 17, while controlling the TBVs on the bypass jack a perturbation caused the No. 1 and 3 BPVs to pulse full shut and back open to their original position which caused a minor change in reactor power, pressure, and level. After a quick review by engineering, the depressurization continued and a more significant transient occurred in which the No. 3 BPV cycled from 0 percent to 75 percent open which caused a reactor level decrease of 8 inches and a 7% increase in reactor power. Operators stopped using the BPV jack to lower pressure and used pressure set as the pressure control'means for the-remainder of the shutdown and cooldown sequence. Operators completed the shutdown and cooldown With no further operational challenges. Subsequent BPV jack troubleshooting identified a problem With the BPV jack potentiometer which contributed to the erratic response of the BPV jack. PSEG management initiated corrective action after the second power transient, including prohibiting the use of the BPV jack when the reactor is critical, conducting a self assessment, and initiating an independent review of the transient, including upgrading the initial notification to a significance level 1.]

CDavid Vito - Re: Highlights n

jrvew (10/6) on Salem SOWE Page 2

""<After the plant was shutdown, e<

ivities took approximately six days to complete. In a later discssio, *dicated that as disappointed that extension of the original shutdown took six days inst Lad oamoersnblthe time frame to complete and this additional time (extra 3 days) cost the company 25 million dollars Amain comment on this after the fact discussion was that this was the only negative feed back that he received on the issue, and he took it as a learning experience on how to better manage emergent problems. He indicated that this interaction and others did not cause him to feel that he could not raise safety concerns to senior corporate management.

- Regarding the June 2003 EDG intercooler. leak ý imWyhad an interesting view on this issue. He indicated that he thought the organization let him gwn because of the slowness in the way the operability decision was made. He erroneously believed that the final operability call*at the eleventh hour was made when engineering finally concluded that th ey met the design basis as written. He also indicated that this timeliness problem was exacerbated by some organizations that were involved because they should not have had a part in the decision making.

He atr~tdthe aganizational delays to the matrixed organizations that were in place at PSEG during s tenure. He also indicated that this type of organization diluted accountability which INPO mentioned-ass a contributo to their third "3" grade in as many years. In reviewing the circumstances at the time, we noted that]i nde rstanding of the cause of the slowness in making the operability decision was in error since engineering had, in fact, revised the design basis to change the time to take action for a leak from the jacket water system from 7 days to 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). The time frame (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to not credit operator action was consistent 'with the.

assumptions in the accident analysis. That revision to the design basis was HC's basis for ei*the LCO, and it was not a lack of understanding of the original design basis. It was interesting th dJid not fully understand this distinction.

These ar some initial highlights that are generally representative of some aspects our interview wit~

Mý

ý) To get a full understanding, it would be appropriate to read the full transcript once it is ma *e available.

Please control this information as sensitive pre-decisional information.

sensitive pre-decisional information