ML062330307
| ML062330307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/2006 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Keenan J Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-012 | |
| Download: ML062330307 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000275/2006012
Text
August 21, 2006
John S. Keenan
Senior Vice President - Generation
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 770000
Mail Code B32
San Francisco, CA 94177-0001
SUBJECT:
ERRATA FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000275/2006012 AND 05000323/2006012
Dear Mr. Keenan:
Please remove the first page of the cover letter and enclosures page 5 and 10 of NRC Problem
Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000275;323/2006012 and replace with the
pages enclosed with this letter. The purpose of the change is to make editorial corrections to
reflect that no findings of significance were identified and that a telephonic re-exit was
conducted.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Linda J. Smith, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket: 50-275, 323
Enclosures:
As stated
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
-2-
cc w/enclosure:
Donna Jacobs
Vice President, Nuclear Services
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
James R. Becker, Vice President
Diablo Canyon Operations and
Station Director, Pacific Gas and
Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424
Sierra Club San Lucia Chapter
ATTN: Andrew Christie
P.O. Box 15755
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406
Nancy Culver
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
P.O. Box 164
Pismo Beach, CA 93448
Chairman
San Luis Obispo County Board of
Supervisors
County Government Building
1055 Monterey Street, Suite D430
San Luis Obispo, CA 93408
Truman Burns\\Robert Kinosian
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Ave., Rm. 4102
San Francisco, CA 94102-3298
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, CA 93940
Director, Radiological Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
-3-
Richard F. Locke, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
P.O. Box 7442
San Francisco, CA 94120
City Editor
The Tribune
3825 South Higuera Street
P.O. Box 112
San Luis Obispo, CA 93406-0112
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, CA 95814
Jennifer Tang
Field Representative
United States Senator Barbara Boxer
1700 Montgomery Street, Suite 240
San Francisco, CA 94111
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
-4-
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (TWJ)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (FLB2)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
V. Dricks, PAO (VLD)
J. Lamb, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JGL1)
ROPreports
DC Site Secretary (AWC1)
SUNSI Review Completed: __LJS
ADAMS: / Yes
G No Initials: LJS
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive
/ Non-Sensitive
R:\\_DC\\2006\\DC2006-012RP-RWD.wpd
RIV:SRI/EB2
C:EB2
C:PSB
C:EB2
DLProulx
LJSmith
WBJones
LJSmith
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
8/18/06
8/18/06
8/18/06
8/21/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
August 9, 2006
John S. Keenan, Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Mail Code B32
P.O. Box 770000
San Francisco, California 94177-0001
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND
RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2006012 AND
Dear Mr. Keenan:
From June 5 through 22, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted the
onsite portion of a team inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The enclosed report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with your staff as described in
Section 4OA6 of this report.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the
identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and
regulations and the conditions of your operating license. The team reviewed approximately
280 action requests, associated non-conformance reports and apparent cause evaluations, and
other supporting documents. The team reviewed cross-cutting aspects of NRC and
licensee-identified findings and interviewed personnel regarding the condition of a safety
conscious work environment at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that, in general, your
processes to identify, prioritize, evaluate, and correct problems were effective; thresholds for
identifying issues remained appropriately low and, in most cases, corrective actions were
adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, a relatively high
number of self-revealing and NRC identified findings were noted at your site during the
assessment period. Ineffective and incomplete corrective actions led to a number of repeat
problems that could have been prevented, with a notable number of repeat findings of
previously documented NRC-identified and self-revealing findings. Overall however
performance had improved in the all areas of your corrective action program since the last
problem identification and resolution inspection. The team concluded that a safety-conscious
work environment existed at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
Enclosure
-5-
Example 4: The licensee failed to correct the population of Rockwell-Edwards valves in
safety-related and risk-significant system that were susceptible to failure of the packing
gland follower flange because they did not properly identify all of the potentially affected
valves. (IR 2003008)
b.
Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
(1)
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed ARs, work orders, and operability evaluations to assess the
licensees ability to evaluate the importance of adverse conditions. The inspectors
reviewed a sample of ARs, apparent and root cause analyses to ascertain whether the
licensee properly considered the full extent of causes and conditions, generic
implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also attended
various meetings to assess the threshold of prioritization and evaluation of issues
identified.
In addition, the team reviewed licensee evaluations of selected industry operating
experience reports, including licensee event reports, NRC generic letters, bulletins and
information notices, and generic vendor notifications to assess whether issues
applicable to Diablo Canyon Power Plant were appropriately addressed.
The team performed a historical review of ARs and notifications written over the last 5
years that addressed the emergency diesel generators, safety related switchgear
ventilation, the auxiliary feedwater system, and the component cooling water system.
(2)
Assessment
The team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in
accordance with the licensees corrective action program guidance and NRC
requirements. The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the
licensee was generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant
conditions adverse to quality. Notwithstanding the above, ineffective prioritization and
evaluation of issues resulted in a relatively high number of self-revealing and NRC
identified findings during the period. One of these findings culminated in a plant trip.
Others were related to equipment deficiencies, some of which resulted in inoperable
safety-related equipment.
The team found that for the sample of root cause reports reviewed, the licensee was
generally self-critical and thorough in evaluating the causes of significant conditions
adverse to quality. The team noted that the quality and rigor of root causes had
improved when compared to the previous problem identification and resolution
assessment. Additionally, the trend of NRC identified findings with problem
identification and resolution aspects in evaluation of problems has been improving since
2004, with six findings in 2004 and two in 2005. The team concluded that the licensee
had improved in performance in the area of prioritization and evaluation
Enclosure
-10-
(I)
Oil Found in the Vicinity of Residual Heat Removal Pumps
During a walkdown of the residual heat removal pumps during the weeks of
June 5 and June 19, 2006, inspectors noted oil in the vicinity of the drain plugs
for the motors for Residual Heat Removal Pumps 1-1, 2-1, and 2-2. The team
questioned the licensee as to the source of the oil, specifically questioning
whether the motors were leaking from the motor oil drain plugs during operation.
Additionally, the inspectors discovered that the licensee was not performing the
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cure time for the drain plug sealant recommended by the vendor which
would ensure proper sealing characteristics. The team noted that any small
leakage combined with the required lengthy mission time for the pumps could
result in a situation where a loss of adequate inventory of motor oil could occur
and challenge long term operation of the pumps.
The licensee performed a prompt operability assessment to provide reasonable
assurance of operability of the pumps based on the observed conditions.
Additionally the licensee made plans to measure leakage from the pumps during
the next pump runs. Because the inspectors could not ascertain the source and
the rate of the oil leakage until the pumps are run and could not determine the
effect of a shortened sealant cure time, the team treated this issue as an
unresolved item: URI 05000275,323/2006012-01, Oil Found in the Vicinity of
Residual Heat Removal Pumps.
4OA6 Exit Meeting
On June 22, 2006, at the end of the onsite portion of the inspection, the inspection
findings were discussed with Mr. J. Keenan and other members of the licensees staff.
The licensee acknowledged the findings.
A telephonic re-exit was conducted on August 9, 2006 with Mr. S. Ketelson, Regulatory
Services Manager, and other members of your staff.
The team asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. The licensee did not identify any proprietary
information that may have been reviewed by the team.
Attachment: Supplemental Information