ML062210285

Greg Bowman Notes/Comments on the Interview

ML062210285
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/20/2004
From:	Gregory Bowman NRC Region 1
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062210285 (3)

Text

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4i Greg Bowman notes/comments on the J, nterview

[02-20-04)

The following are myobservaons/questions of interview 02-20-04.

Will raise concerns and has done so before?

YES See amplification below.

Raises concerns for others?

N/A Not specifically addressed.

Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?

YES See amplification below.

Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for NO See amplification below.

raising concerns?

Bins for Issues:

1. 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT

1. 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES

1. 3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES

1. 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES

1. 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS

1. 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT (p. 15 - 16) "I'm not aware of any time where I thought that there was an environment where employees didnit have that freedom [to raise safety concerns]. And none of them ever expressed to me that they [felt they did not have] the freedom to... express themselves." He went on the mention that significantly more concerns are raised by NCOs and equipment operators, who are "more passionate' about their Issues than the supervisors.

(p. 21)'... sometimes I'm not sure that the CRSs are as free to express what their opinions are because they're a member of the management team.'

(p. 33) When discussing an issue where the plant computer was losti, the interviewee stated that the CRS originally wanted to lower power. He changed his position after the SM (the Interviewee) convinced him to maintain power.

"Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with it, but this goes back to whether the CRSs are free to bring up concerns, right?

Perhaps he wasn't comfortable with the order and he didn't want to give it, but he felt that that's what I expected and he didn't feel free to express it.V (p. 60 - 62) The Interviewee stated that he and others might be unwilling to raise concerns because management was unwilling to listen to them. '... part of the reason I might be reluctant to raise a concern is because I don't believe that the management that I have was willing to listen and understand the concern that I had.' He said that this was most evident when it comes to fixing non-Tech. Spec. equipment problems (he gave the example of a safety-related control room chiller that has been broken/degraded for the an extended period of time).

(p. 125 - 127) When asked if he feared reprisal for his comments during the 01 Interview and PSEG SCWE review, the interviewee stated, "Do I have concerns that there might be repercussions? Yes. Did I have concerns then? Yes."

a (p. 128 - 131) The interviewee expressed concerns over the effectiveness of the SCWE review done by PSEG. In particular, he was concerned that because of the way the questions were set up/worded, there may not be corroboration for many of the Issues, and they would subsequently be Ignored by PSEG. '[I was concerned that the] company attorneys were going to In the end boll it down to there's no evidence, therefore there's no Issue."

(p. 171 - 174) When asked If he was aware of anyone afraid to come forward for fear of reprisal, the Interviewee stated that raising concerns can cause the perception that an employee Is not' with the program... I mean, If I express some concern and I'm perceived as not being with the program, is anybody going to come back and fire me? No. Are they going to demote me? Not likely... However, do I think that there's a possibility that as a result of it I wouldnrt be considered for future promotions? Absolutely I think that's true. I would not be considered for future promodons."

1. 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES (p. 18 - 28) Discussed the issue where the plant computer was lost, removing the primary indication of reactor power.

The RO was "very vocal about the recommendation to lower power because his most accurate Indication of power was gone." The Interviewee, who was the shift manager at the Ume, decided to keep the plant at Its current power level and use other, less accurate Indications of power. The RO went away from the situation upset that a non-conservative decision had been made.

information in th -Is record Ws deleted Ai accordance With the Freedom of *fogf Pag I of3 Act, exempto a g

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GreM Bowman notes/comments on the..

-,ntrvlew (M2-20-04)

(p. 51 - 52) The interviewee stated that he believes the plant Is moving In a direction toward making more conservative decisions. He gave the example of a steam leak from the turbine In late 2003 where the decision was made to shut down the plant rather than try to fix the leak on-line. "I don't know that we've had a similar decision to make in the past, but I'm not sure that In the past we would have made the same decision."

(p. 74 - 86) Concerning operability calls, the Interviewee discussed an Issue where a crew Identified a jacket water leak on one of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The leak was In excess of the limit given In a past operability evaluation, so the EDG was declared Inoperable. Management feedback was that before a component Is declared Inoperable "we needed to make sure that we fully engage the rest of t

!ry possible alternative Instead of just saying It's Inoperable." This feedback was fro T

his dearly put pressure on the SMs to assume a component Is operable until there was extensive proof that It was Inoperable. The Interviewee discussed the Impact of the above feedback. He stated that recently he had to make an operability call on a degraded rod block monitor. 'And based on the jacket water Incident... okay, I shouldnrt make that decision If.

I0.uht to have e Ineering come In and make the evaluation for me." The SM later received feedback from thN i

that the RBM should have been dedared Inoperable sooner.

(p. 95 - 97) During maintenance on a 500 kV breaker In the switchyard, the load dispatcher contacted the' tro room to reduce reactive loading and power for grid stability concerns. After the crew began lowering power, jmlled from the switchyard and directed the crew to stop lowering power, because the breker would be restored soon. The interviewee felt this was Inappropriate, because 'the training [I] received In the past [emphasized that] when the electric system operator gives me direction, I'm to follow that direction because the electric system operator Is trying to protect the Integrity of the grid."

(p. 101 - 104) The Interviewee discusses an Issue where the plant was In a T.S. Action Statement that required them to be In hot shutdown within six hours (rel the EDG jacket water leak). The crew was about to commence shutting down, when the =pushed them to keep the unit at current power and continue to try to fix the EDG. The interviewee was con lnaugh time to safely shutdown the unit If they were delayed. "I was In a room with ms trying to [convince] me [that shutting down]

was Inappropriate and [that] I didnnt n notomoe" lantyet when my control room crew was saying we need to move the plant so we can get to where we need to go, meet the tec spec and not challenge ourselves by making a mistake by having too much time pressure..." He also stated th a*ll ctually attempted to delay and distract him from taking the actions he felt were appropriate.

(p. 113 - 117) Following theý on BPV, the operating crew was attempting to depressurize the plant so the valve could be repaired, whe called the control room and directed the depressurization. The Interviewee stated that he was Informed that order came fro The Interviewee felt there was often pressure from senidr management, who may not have a fullu e meg situation, to keep the plant at power.

1. 3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES m

.(p. 139 - 147) The Interviewee was th4bift manager Involved in the cooldown following the stuck open Bl sid that he was told at 1600 to report to the simulator In two hours with two NCOs, a CRS, and an STA. He said that the verification/validation of the procedure had not been done and was combined with the crew practice run. The Interviewee stated that at the time, his crew expressed concerns that they were being rushed Into the procedure. He went on to say that he felt there was no one In Operations management with whom he could discuss the concern. 'I dont believe it would have been supported to put the evolution at risk In order to rigorously adhere to [our] process."

(p. 155 - 156) The interviewee was asked to be the test engineer for the starbt followin

11. He was asked at 0800 to have the IPTE paperwork ready for the evolution at 1100. "And I talked And id II'm not going to be ready at 1100. I said I cant follow the process and meet the parts of It and m-d W

R1100.(d him -We need to be ready by 1100. That's when the evolution Is going to happen." The Interviewee pol out at the startup had been planned for a long time, and there was 'no effort prior to that morning to get It ready."

(p. 157) The Interviewee discusses another Instance wheM put pressure on the 0 tors to move faster than they felt corn The operators were preparing to roIl the mafn turbine, and tol they would be ready by 0900. 'And he ll sald you need to be ready to roll at 0700... [even though] we were telling him this Is how long It [takes If done] within the balance of the procedures and standards that we have."

0 (p. 164) In spite of past problems with management rushing operating crews, the Interviewee states tht 'I think If I were to say that this Is what it takes for me to do a job In accordance with the standards I believe the new management team would be supportive of me taking the time I needed to do It safely the first time."

1. 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES Page 2of 3

Greg Bowman noteslcomments on th[nterview (02-20-04)

NONE

1. 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES (p. 218 - 219) Discusses an industrial safety Issue brought up by an operator. There Is steel plating in the service water Intake area that operators have to walk on. The operator was concerned that, because of the corrosive environment, the steel plating may have lost thickness and not be safeto walk on. The Interviewee restricted access to deck plate until It was evaluated. He felt this was a conservative decision, but the only feedback he received was that he should have contacted other members of plant organization.

OTHER UNSPECIFIED ISSUES/COMMENTS (p. 45) The interviewee stated that In an Operations management meeting following the Issue with the loss of the plant computer, It was discussed that management needs to be more compromising In similar situations. He used the example of a recent Increase In shift manning as an example of where management has compromised In an effort to make work easier for the operators and Improve relationships between different layers of management on site.

(p. 65 - 68) The Interviewee discussed Hope Creek's practice of having shift managers develop "start-up affirmations" In the middle to end of the outage. This Is a list of Items that the SMs believe need to be fixed before the outage Is over.

He stated that the SMs never got any feedback on the Items they listed, and items on the list are not always fixed.

Additionally, because the lists are developed late In the outage, there Is a good chance there wouldn't be time to fix something significant if It was Identified.

(p. 207 - 209) Discussed an Issue In the 1989/1990 timeframe where there was a discrepancy regarding lubrication of motor operated valves In the steam tunnel. These were T.S. required, safety-related valves but the plant's position was that lubrication was not required. The planner actually quit over the Issue.

(p. 211 - 213) Discussed an Issue In the 1987 timefi-ame where a containment isolation valve was not properly leak tested.

The valve was disassembled, and on reassembly it was placed directly back on It's seat to help make It pass the test. The Interviewee was concerned that the If the valve was opened and then redosed, It wouldn't realign In the same way It was following reassembly. Additionally, workers put Vaseline on the seat to make It leak tight.

(p. 217) "Rarely, this Is Important here, very Important... Rarely, if ever, have I made an operational decision that meone to e was the right decision. When I shut down the unit that day [following the EDG jacket water leak], when

-id don-t shut It down, It was the right decision. Right? No one has told me It was the right decision.

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