Text

OI Interview Transcript of Witness
	ML061810059
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/16/2003
From:	; NRC/OI
To:	;
References
	1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1267
	Download: ML061810059 (150)
	v • d • e

Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview Docket Number: 1-2003-051 F Cý)

Location:

Date: Tuesday,. December 16, 2003 Work Order No.: NRC-1267 Pages 1-148 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.

Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

ýP-i accuidafc.- with tne freedom okiniormation Act, exemptions "2 . ,,

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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + ++ + +

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6

7 ---------------------------- X 8 IN THE MATTER OF:

9 ".INTERVIEW OF Docket No.

10 1-2003-051F 11 (CLOSED) 12 --------------- x 13 Tuesday, December 16, 2003 14 15 16 17 18 The above-entitled interview was conducted 19 at 9:40 a.m.

20 21 BEFORE:

22 Special Agent EILEEN NEFF, NRC/RI/OI 23 Sr. Special Agent JEFFREY TEATOR, 24 NRC/RI/OI 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

2 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 (9:40 a.m.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is 4 December 16, 2003. The time is approximately 5 9:40 a.m.

6 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, 7 U.S. NRC, Region I, Office of Investigations. Also 8 present from the same office is Senior Special Agent 9 Jeffrey Teator.

10 This interview is going to be conducted ii with currently 12 employed as a 'by PSEG Nuclear at the 13 Salem facility.

14 The interview is taking place at 15 16 And, we talked about before going on 17 the record the purpose of this interview today is just 18 part of an inquiry that the region is conducting into 19 concerns that have beehn raised regarding the safety 20 conscious work environment at Salem and Hope Creek.

21

Okay.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: My understanding is 23 that your work experience at the site is limited to 24 Salem. We'll be pretty much sticking to the Salem 25 site.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

3 1 That's correct.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I also 3 explained to you that you are not the subject. You're 4 being approached as -- more or less as a witness to 5 the work environment based on your experience there.

6 Not only are you not the subject, there are no 7 specific violations associated with the safety 8 conscious work environment issues that we're looking 9 at.

10 Okay 11 hCIC-AGENT NEFF: Before we go into any 12 questioning, what I'd like to do is place you under 13 oath. If you would raise your right hand, please. Do 14 you swear that the testimony you are about to provide 15 is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 16 truth, so help you God?

17 1 do.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Could you 19 provide some background information for the record, 20 some identifying information such as your date of 21 birth and Social Security Number?

22 23 24 .. _

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And education NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

4 1 background ?

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8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did you start at 9 - ni

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I 16 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And in *ý 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did you (4,9 112 IM &

25 become NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS Inl m"L^flI 101 Aklffl AMC KI lAI

5 1 It would have been the 2 summer three years ago, so it would have been the 3 summer of(

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible) 5 SRO?

6 Yes.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 MW 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Your management structure back at -- when you came on board i 1-4 Can.you recall?

15 The first one I recall is 16 I believe he became 17 shortly after -- oh, no, no, I'm sorry It wa 18 ma**I- guess was the .. e 19 moved up. at that 20 point, and then we've gone through a succession of ops 21 managers since. I believe it goes something like --

22 let's see, it was -- it was*gfbi iMK 23 .Oh, I'm 24 sorry,rr , think or--

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Might have been NEAL R. GROSS 2 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

6 2 I -think it was -- yeah, 3 Who's after 6 He's a relatively new arrival.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So there was at least 8 five up until --

9 i i Yeah, that I can --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: --

ii -- that I can -- that I can 12 recall. A portion of that time I was in license 13 class.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And how about 15 AOMs?

16 We've had quite a few of 17 those. The structure has changed several times. It's 18 really -- the people I can think of is -- do you mean 19 there has -- there has been at times three AOMs.

20 There is currently --

21 - SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 When there 23 were -- amongthe r - at 24 times. . .was an (S at a point, 25 although I think the title was actually different NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

7 1 there, because he was quite a while ago.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this specifically 3 for the operating shifts?

4 The operating shift ones 5 that I recall are 6 afl .m.....

Those are the ones that come 7 to mind.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: in 9 place now.

10 '*4iP,*,Cor orect.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about in 12 terms of you know, your peers? Were 13 you seeing as much change at your peer level, too?

14 Well, yeah. Actua:lly, the is -- I've been in position three and a half years 16 approximately. And I -- among the ,on 17 shift, I'-ve probably been on shift longer than anyone except forP I who has been on shift for like 18 19 So that gives you a r il&tiye timeline.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It goes from 16 down 21 to three ahd a half?

22 To three and a half.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then, less than 24 that.

25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

8 1 a month of becoming a* so he might be --

2 you know, three -- whatever I am minus a month.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 1, There's --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He's close to 6 your --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Same --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- experience?

9 LPI Yeah. S l b 10 -. . -- 1... 'He came from .. He was 11 an RO there. And then behind us are

....2 N who became 13 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the real 15 length of experience is with then.

16 ills" Yeah. I mean, he's got 17 more experience as -than probably almost 18 anybody I've run into in the industry.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What we're 20 interested in talking about is what I explained to you 21 -- is the safety conscious work environment. That's 22 kind of a broad concept and a title that -- you may be 23 thinking of issues that don't necessarily fall under 24 -- you know, get titled that all the time.

25 Sure.

NEAL R.. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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9 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What we're 2 considering as part of that are the ability for 3 individuals to raise concerns of a nuclear safety 4 nature, their ability to do so without fear of 5 retaliation, and the response to the concerns that 6 they get when -- if and when a concern is raised.

7 And also, for someone at your level, we're 8 also interested in the decisionmaking that goes on 9 primarily about, you know, plant operations.

10 Sure.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In considering that, 12 have you seen any changes in what we'll term the 13 safety conscious work environment from the time that 14 you started -- let's go back the three and a half 15 years as the Have you seen any changes 16 in the work environment in that timeframe until now?

17 Well, the biggest change 18 I've seen in that time period is the relationship 19 between the -- primarily equipment operators and 20 management has deteriorated. I think there is -- it's 21 not a very good relationship. I think it has gotten 22 -- it has actually gotten worse over the last six or 23 eight months in light of, you know, hirings and people 24 coming back to work, and things like that. There's 25 some animosity there.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

10 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When did you see it 2 start to deteriorate?

3 2 Probably two or three years 4 -- probably a couple years ago, I'm guessing. I mean, 5 the -- I mean, my -- my perception is I'm sure 6 significantly different than the equipment operators, 7 but the -- part of my perception and my biggest worry 8 is that lots of people will -- some people in 9 management think that safety is being used as a 10 weapon.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By the union?

12 BBy the union. And I've got 13 some -- some absolute examples of it. And my fear is 14 not that, because, you know what? They can use it as 15 a weapon, and we'll deal with that as -- as it comes.

16 But that somewhere along the line somebody is going to 17 make a decision saying, well, that's just another 18 example of them beating us over the head with safety, 19 and they make the wrong choice.

20 You know, they say -- they say, oh, 21 there's ulterior motives here. And my supervisor 22 says, "Ah, you know, I disagree with you. You're just 23 -- you're just beating me over the head with safety."

24 And he makes the wrong choice because of it. I think 25 that's the real organizational risk.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

ii 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you seen 2 an example where that happened?

3 No, I haven't, because I 4 talk to my guys about it a lot. I mean, my -- and 5 I've got -- I've got actually some -- some pretty 6 level-headed fellows on my shift. But nobody can say 7 that it doesn't color their opinions somewhat or color 8 their actions, because, you know, if you're -- one 9 thing you're thinking is, boy, I wonder what this guy 10 is angling at.

11 You're not thinking, geezl,:you know, this 12 guy is -- this guy has got -- let me look into it.

13 You know, if your first response is, geez, let me look 14 into this, I assume this is a valid concern.

15 Then you're coming from not a very good 16 place, and that's -- that's my primary concern, that 17 management allows themselves to be put in that 18 position. They make wrong assumptions, and then 19 something -- something unfortunate happens, and it's 20 -- it's certainly a potential.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Have you had 22 situations where your management has thought that way 23 -- you know, this is just another union, the way the 24 union is trying to get at us?

25 Well, I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

12 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That kind of 2 seems like what you were hinting at?

3 Yeah. I 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was the --

5 I'M I've got examples where I 6 think that was -- it was used, I would say, 7 unethically, safety was used to create an advantage.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: By the union.

9 By the union. By the union 10 or by union --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What kind of 12 issues are you talking about?

13 Let's see, the first month 14 I was in position -- so this was over three years ago 15 -- we had a feedwater leak. And the feedwater leak 16 was on the turbine-building roof. It had water with 17 hydrazone in it, and it was going at I'm guessing 18 hundreds of gallons a minute. You know, we're on the 19 order of 100 gallons a minute into the storm drain 20 system.

21 We stabilized the plant low in power, and, 22 you know, late in shift, you know, the shift -- the 23 crew is working very hard to get this under control, 24 get everything stabilized. And it was pretty hair 25 actually stabilizing the unit where we wanted it.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

13 1 But it came down to the point where the 2 leak was still not isolated. The valve was up there, 3 it was still leaking, and we had to get -- send people 4 up there to isolate the leak. We had already tried 5 several times. There was probably 100-degree water up 6 there spraying on the roof, and we're trying to get 7 the leak isolated.

8 I had been up in the water; so had a 9 number of my supervisors and a lot of the workers. So 10 pretty much everybody was soaked by the end of the 11 day.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Clean water or 13 contaminated?

14 No, it was clean. It was 15 -- it was feedwater, but it had hydrazone in it, like 16 five or ten parts per billion. Low levels, but stuff 17 that we didn't want to release to the environment.

18 So we're trying to get this leak isolated, 19 and then the steward on my shift comes up and we're 20 doing tagging associated with getting the leak 21 isolated. And he basically says, "Hey, we worked 22 really hard tonight. I'd like to -- I'd like to just 23 -- you know, we're all wet. We'd rather just not work 24 the last hour of shift." You know, it was like an 25 hour2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months and a half before the end of shift. "We'd like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

14 1 to just stop," you know, and I said, "Well, this isn't 2 a night we can do that. We need you to keep working 3 and keep -- keep tagging."

4 And there became a safety issue that the 5 -- that they didn't know what was -- the health 6 effects of the hydrazone-laden water, which is true.

7 So what I -- the way I handled it was, okay, we'll 8 call a safety committee together, we'll handle the 9 safety -- so this leak is ongoing for this whole 10 period of time.

11 Ideally, you can go up there with two 12 supervisors and we isolate. And about that time the 13 safety committee says, "Hey, you just need rain gear."

14 Now, there could have been a health effect 15 there. I wouldn't send anybody into an environment 16 that I was concerned about, but we're talking five ppm 17 that, you know, we've been in all night.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You knew that 19 going in.

20 Right. And it only became 21 an issue after I tell the guys to go back to work, we 22 really can't take the last hour off, because we've 23 worked really hard. /I 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the 25

that came to you with that request?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

15 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

3 "0 And then, when I go to the 4 guys, I heard this safety concern. So I go out and 5 talk to the workers that we're asking to do this, and 6 I say, "Hey, what's the concern?" And they're like, 7 "Hey, we don't have a concern." I go, "What do you 8 mean?" "The union told us not to do it."

9 I said, "What do you mean?" And they said 10 -- they said, "There's a concern, and we shouldn't --

11 we shouldn't go up there. I'm sorry." They 12 apologized to me. It was like, hey, I've got to --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes. They've 14 got to do it; they're union people.

15 That's certainly their 16 perspective. I said, "Okay. I'm not going to put you 17 in that position, but we'll get to the bottom of it."

18 So we started this safety thing. And the whole thing 19 is?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we take a quick 21 break?

22 Okay. I'm releasing 23 hydrazone water above the --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Excuse me.

25 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the NEAL R. GROSS ii COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

16 1 foregoing matter went off the record 2 briefly.)

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and then 4 I'll follow up.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately 6 9:57.

7 I mean, it's too 8 conservative, right, I don't want to put my people at 9 risk, at least not unreasonable risk. There's risk 10 associated with operating a powerplant.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 But then again I've got a 13 responsibility to the environment, and I'm 14 releasing --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

16 001" And I think they ended up 17 releasing -- it was something like a 250,000 gallon 18 release to the environment that went on several hours 19 longer than it absolutely had to, because of this 20 issue. And that was -- and that was my -- you know, 21 I was like (inaudible).

22 You can talk safety, but the timing is 23 what it was. If they had called up the first time and 24 said, "Hey, we didn't understand about the -- don't 25 know about this hydrazone," I go, "Hey, good point.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

17 1 We're not going to send you up there until it's, you 2 know, resolved." But, you know, it wasn't -- that 3 wasn't the case, so that was -- that was like my first 4 month in the position. So that kind of left a bad 5 taste in my mouth.

6 But it's been relatively uneventful up 7 until the time -- well, the most recent one I can 8 think of was a number of guys were asked to come back 9 to shift from training. They clearly didn't want --

10 the union did not like the fact that they were brought 11 back from training.

12 So when they got -- got to the shift to 13 help the shift out -- so they were in the plant to do 14 some training and they said, "Hey, if you're done with 15 your training, go help the shift out." They go to the 16 shift, and 17 and they started throwing up safety issues.

18 Well, that's a confined space, and, you 19 know, it had never been a confined space before. This 20 is an issue that was brought up during our previous 21 week of training. I talked to the safety rep and 22 said, "Hey, you know, they kind of have a different 23 opinion or a different definition of confined space.

24 We've got some spaces out there in the plant. Are you 25 going to address this?" And the safety guy says, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

18 1 "Yeah, I'll take care of that."

2 Well, then he -- the next week he goes to 3 the plant when he's assigned to the plant and says, 4 "No, we can't" -- you know, he waits until after the 5 brief is done and says -- they're sending him out and 6 the plant says, "Oh, can't do that. That's a confined 7 space."

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When did this 9 happen?

10 This happened, I don't 11 know, the summer.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Of this year?

13 Yeah, of this year. So --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was involved 15 in that? Was it --

16 17 . And I -- you know, the truth of the matter 18 is I didn't disagree with him doing that, but his --

19 part of his job function is resolving it ahead of 20 time. He told me a week before that he would resolve 21 this issue, and he waits until he's going out into the 22 field to basically throw it as a -- okay, now you deal 23 with it, you know. And, you know -- -- 7 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that done on the 25 same day that they were pulled out of training and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

19 1 placed --

2 Ys 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- on shift?

4 It was done that afternoon.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 So effectively they got no 7 work done. It was only like-an hour and a half they 8 were going to help the shift out. So after they --

9 you know, there were enough of these -- you know, that 10 kind of issue brought up, but basically nothing got 11 done, and all it did is frustrate the on-duty shift 12 manager and, you know -- and I had talked -- and it 13 was frustrating because I had talked to him the day 14 before.

15 I go, "Hey, look, I know this is not 16 popular, but, hey, you know, just go down there and 17 chip in for -- for -- you know, for the rest of the 18 afternoon." You know, maybe we -- you know, we'll 19 call an early day on the end of the week, and, you 20 know, the union wanted to make a point that --

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Well, 22 you've talked about -- you've given us two examples of 23 the union guys raising safety issues which you feel 24 were somewhat unethical.

25 Right. You know, in both NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

20 1 case, though, I don't feel that the safety issues 2 themselves were really wrong.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 I just feel that they were 5 -- they were used as political weapons as opposed to, 6 you know, trying to make sure the job was safe.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To stop 8 working.

9 Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They were legitimate, 12 but it was the timing.

12 Right. Right. Absolutely.

13 And what I'm afraid of is if somebody says --

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 -- same situation, right?

16 "Hey, I think that's a confined space." The guy goes, 17 "Oh. It's you again, and you're raising this -- this 18 concern."

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Has that 20 happened?

21 IOWAm m Not to my knowledge.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

23 Not. to my knowledge. But 24 -- and if it did, I think that would be a big problem.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It could. Some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

21 1 of (inaudible).

2 Right, exactly. I mean, 3 and you could -- the fact of the matter is you can put 4 people at risk and not injure them. All right. You 5 can be putting them at risk and not injure them. No 6 harm, no foul, right?

7 But the truth of the matter is I don't 8 want my supervisors coloring their safety decisions on 9 shenanigans -- for lack of a better word -- that are 10 being -- being played with, you know.

11 But no, to reiterate, I don't know of that 12 happening, and I don't know if any of my supervisors 13 would, you know, make a decision that would put 14 somebody at physical risk.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Let 16 me ask you this question before Eileen goes on to 17 something else. You indicated that your management 18 knows that you're being interviewed by 01 today?

19 Ys 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT -TEATOR: Is that 21 correct?

22 Yes.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And who did you 24 talk to again? Who did you --

25 I talked to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

22 1 and then I was at a grievance response with 2 IM And the grievance is associated with raising 3 concerns, actually -- and I'd be happy to give you 4 whatever documentation on that if you want. But the 5 grievance and -- he said,. you know, that this 6 investigation was ongoing. I said, "I know. I 7 realize that. And I just was asked to be 8 interviewed." And he said, "Okay," you know, that was 9 his --

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did W 11 approach you and ask you if you were being 12 interviewed, or did you --

13 .i No, I offered -- I offered 14 that up to him. I just -- it was a surprise to me 15 that I would be interviewed, so I asked him, I said, 16 "Is this something that we expected? Is ops 17 management, you know, being asked?" And he said 18 you're the first that he -- he was aware of. You 19 know, I was the first that he was aware of.

20 And he said -- he said the resident had 21 been given a list of names, and maybe they're starting 22 to work their way through the list of names. ..

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you given 24 any direction how you should respond to questions we 25 ask?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

23 i ,W -. No.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Any type of 3 coaching?

4 No.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Prepping?

6 No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you have a 8 group meeting with any of your other shift managers to 9 talk about this investigation?

10 No No 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You 12 mentioned something about the grievance.

13 Right.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What is that?

1s Well, I mean, timing is 16 poor, but basically it amounts to this.

17 on several occasions -- in fact, since his last 18 appraisal he was talked to about this. He'll take it 19 upon himself to do what I would consider 20 investigations.

21 You know, if he hears about somebody else 22 doing, you know, something, he won't raise the concern 23 to management, but he'll look into it. And he'll be 24 on a duty station, but he'll be looking into 25 something. In this particular case, he was the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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24 1 primary watch, so his watch would have been in the ops 2 building.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 The secondary watch raised 5 a concern to him over prereqs that were signed off and 6 a procedure. One safety -- you know, wasn't a safety 7 significance to it. It's just, hey, technically, 8 should he -- should it be signed off? Should -- how 9 should it be documented? That kind of thing. Really 10 had very little impact on the actual completion of the 11 task.

12 But it looks like they're trying to 13 collect data that -- you know, that this -- this sign 14 up which we have (inaudible) all our procedures is --

15 is poorly implemented.

16 So it gets toL -11Lojis 17 walking around with a copy of the procedure in the 18 control room and asking questions. The supervisor 19 says, "What are you doing?" and he says, "Nothing."

20 And then the supervisor gets agitated, 21 comes in and talks to me, I said -- I said, you know, 22 "Let me talk to him." I said, "This is" -- he said, 23 "This is exactly what I talked to him about on his 24 appraisal. You know, if he's got concerns, raise 25 them, with whatever means he wants. But don't --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

25 1 don't just walk around, do an investigation, and not 2 tell anybody what you're doing, especially if you've 3 got an assigned duty somewhere else."

4 So I sat down with him and talked to him 5 about it. I said, "Hey, look, you know, we want you 6 to raise concerns," and I used those words. "We need 7 to do some coaching if you're going to -- if you're 8 going to use your time away from your watch station to 9 perform impromptu investigations. That's not your 10 job. Raise the concerns however you want. You know 11 -- you know, no -- write a notification, tell your 12 supervisor, tell somebody else" --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Put it in 14 process.

15 Put it in process.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

17 But I don' t -- I don' t want 18 you, you know, taking time away from your duty station 19 and making my -- my supervisor feel like, you know, 20 geez, you know, what's he investigating on me now?

21 And he -- my supervisor was pretty agitated by it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was the 23 supervisor?

24 And it's 25 happened to him before with this same individual. Now NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

26 1 *lside of it is, "Hey, people bring me 2 concerns. I don't want to go off half-cocked, so I 3 look into them." I said, "That's fine." I said, "But 4 tell us what you're doing. And if we think it's s worthwhile, we'll give you the nod. If not, just put 6 it in the system and let the system work."

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he grieved 8 your coaching of him?

9 He grieved my coaching, 10 primarily that I put it in his file.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. You gave 12 him a letter?

13 No. I just documented the 14 conversation I had with him. I gave coaching, which 15 is -- which is not discipline. It's just, hey, you 16 know, I'm giving you some feedback on how you're 17 behaving. You know, I felt like it undermined the 18 supervisors and, you know, there's other ways to raise 19 -- raise the concerns.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he grieved 21 to the union on that?

22 He brought a grievance--

23 oh, yes -- associated with that.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And how did his 25 talk about our investigation come up as part of that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

27 1 'Well, it -- he basically in 2 the grievance said that, you know, I was discouraging 3 him from raising concerns. And actually, I've got a 4 copy upstairs of the response if you want it -- of the 5 response to the grievance.

6 And the response to the grievance says, 7 "No, I'm not -- I'm not" -- you know, first of all, 8 when he raised it, it says, "Hey, you know, I'm being" 9 -- he said, "I was being harassed, and that I'm being 10 discouraged from raising concerns." I said, "Oh, 11 that's a big deal." I brought it right to our -- to 12 our employee concerns guys,,- -7 13 I brought it right over to him, I said, 14 "Hey, this is the grievance. This is the coaching I 15 gave him." I go, "Am I out of line?" I said, 16 "Because if I am, I want to tell the guy right away 17 and make things right." And he looked at it, and he 18 gave me his opinion on it, and then we sent it over to 19 -- to the legal guys and said, "Hey, you know, are we 20 putting our -- you know, am I putting the company at 21 risk by coaching somebody on this?"

22 Because I know right -- it's a fine line 23 between regulating somebody's -- where they're 24 spending their time of the day, and, you know, am I 25 discouraging them from raising concerns. So I knew it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

28 1 was kind of a hot potato.

2 So that goes through the first step of the 3 grievance response, which, like I said, I can provide 4 for you is -- is given to him that basically says, 5 "No, we want you to raise concerns via whatever 6 mechanism you want, but it doesn't mean that you're 7 paid to do, you know, investigations and formal 8 (inaudible).

9 That goes --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So.nd legal 11 took the same position? Did they support --

12 Yeah, they supported --

13 they said -- they said that seems reasonable, it seems 14 like a reasonable measured response to his activity.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was this decision to 16 coach -- was this made by you?

17 Yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you alone? Or 19 did you have input from anywhere else?

20. I talked to th 114 21 within several hours of it. I don't know if I talked 22 to him before or after it, but he was aware within an 23 hour or two of me coaching him, because -- mostly 24 because I felt like knowing.', his 25 propensity, he kind of goes to the when NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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29 1 he's got issues.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would be 3

then?

4 Ye. S-was aware of 5 it. I don't thinki* was onsite that day.

6 I'm not positive. But he was aware of it the next 7 time I saw him, so --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 - talked to 10 So that gets us to the point where a 11 second step grievance, basically says, "Hey, I 12 want this to go away. We've got this investigation 13 going on, and I want this grievance to go -- you know, 14 basically make it go away. And so what I want to do 15 is just pull it out of his file.",

16 And I said, "I disagree." I said that the 17 actions he was taking weren't -- I mean, specifically, 18 if you look at contractually, in the contract it says 19 that you will perform union investigations. I 20 wouldn't say this is a union investigation he was 21 doing because it was associated with operational 22 activities.

23 But he won't do union investigations 24 without management approval. You know, somebody is, 25 you know, taking time away from your duties without --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4 un* Q akin A%/I l~l M W

30 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible) 2 job.

3 Right. So I used the same 4 kind of logic. I go, "Look, I'm not saying don't do 5 it. Just tell -- be up front and tell the supervisor 6 what you're doing." He -- but the supervisor -- if 7 you ever talk to him -- very direct, 8 not -- and he'll tell you exactly what he's saying.

9 I said, "Look, this guy is a direct guy.

10 Give him the same -- same respect. Be direct with 12 him. Say hey, look, I've got a concern about how you 12 signed off this step, not a safety issue, but, you 13 know, how to do this." And then let him deal with it.

14 And if you don't like his response -- this is what I 15 told him, "If you don't like his response, you come to 16 me. And if you don't like my response, you go to my 17 boss," and any other way you want. And that's where 18 the open door policy comes in.

19 But if you don't give them an opportunity 20 to broach the issue, then it kind of undermines him 21 for you to be going around investigating. You know, 22 so that was my -- my coaching and my request to him.

23 We're still in the process of discussing how we're 24 going to handle the second step.

25 But kind of similar discussion of what we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

31 1 were previously holding, the fact that things are 2 going on that are coloring people's decisions. And I 3 think this is a -- it was a reasonable and measured 4 response to this guy's behavior. He doesn't want it 5 in his file, and we're considering pulling it out of 6 his file, which personally I don't really support, but 7 we'll see.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you saying that 9 that's in part due to what's going on, the things that 10 are going on, that that related in part to this 11 inquiry?

12 Well, 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: didn't 14 want it in his file?

15*** ... .1 think in -- well, 16 actually, yeah, he said that in light of, you know, 17 recent things, he said that, you know, that was just 18 -- and he also, I think more strongly than that, he 19 felt that, you know, he said I -- he didn't feel that 20 it would hold up going forward to arbitration. And I 21 said, "Well, I respectfully disagree."

22 I said -- I said, "This is something I 23 doubt that you go to arbitration," but he said, "Well, 24 you know, it's" -- he wanted to make sure he both got 25 -- he both got the message that we want his concerns, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

32 1 but he also got the message that we don't want him 2 performing impromptu investigations of the 3 supervision.

4 So how he gets to that point, he wants to 5 make -- he's the new guy in a position, and he's 6 trying to make a relationship with the union. So he's 7 trying to -- he's trying to basically get to the point 8 where they are happy, but they also get the message.

9 And I can understand that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

11 *So he may pull the words 12 out.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. When we were 14 asking -- I was asking you before about any changes-15 that you noted since you've been on as a mmwhmm 16 , and you went immediately to this -- the union

,17 management issue. I wanted to ask you, what do you 18 attribute that to? Did you see changes from one 19 direction or the other, or --

20 Well 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- what does that 22 come from?

23 . 'mm not sure I'd attribute 24 it to -- to some strong personalities in the union.

25 There are also some very strong personalities in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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33 1 management that are trying to make some changes that 2 are not popular.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What kind of changes?

4 Just efficiency kind of 5 things, like how you handle overtime, how you call 6 overtime, how many operators you need on a shift, you 7 know, do you can those -- the NCOs to relieve inside 8 the control room. You know, all things that, you 9 know, you're comparing your organization with, you 10 know, benchmarks, and you say, you know, we're kind 11 of--

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Try and be more 13 efficient.

14 . Right. Right. We're kind 15 of out of line on this one, and it -- it does affect 16 people's pocketbooks ultimately.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Staffing changes that 18 affect their pay.

19 Correct.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about 21 anything else?

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about at --

23 Well, firing 24 probably was the biggest incendiary device, the thing 25 that was done.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

34 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was fired -- if 2 I'm -- if I'm accurate, it was a fitness for duty 3 issue, and he was later reinstated or --

4 Yeah. I'd categorize it as 5 an integrity issue. more than anything else. But it 6 was about a fitness for duty thing, so --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about at 9 your level, though. Maybe not just between NEOs and 10 management, but changes in what you see and the way 11 people react at your level. And the SROs -- they're 12 considered management at the site I guess. They're 13 not union people.

14 Hmm. I don't know. The 15 SROs -- more was expected of the SROs over the last 16 few years. Coming out of the extended outage -- and 17 I was not -- I did not work here prior to the extended 18 outage of both units. But apparently the NCOs did 19 much more. The SROs were more supervisors, did less 20 signing off of procedures.

21 There was basically a decision made that, 22 hey, we want the -- we want the supervisor's fingers 23 in the procedures. Fingers -- you know, actually 24 doing -- being task-oriented less than supervisors.

25 It wasn't what I was used to when I came here, but, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

35 1 you know, you do what the status quo is.

2 We're moving kind of -- we're kind of 3 doing a gradual shift to try to get the CRSs to be 4 more -- more supervisory nature, less -- less, you 5 know, hey, I'm signing off the prereqs of a procedure.

6 Here, I'm going to brief you on this procedure, go do 7 it. Letting the NCOs who are certainly capable of 8 doing that --

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The reactor 10 operators.

11Right 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. What 13 about from like a work environment perspective, 14 though? People at your level and the SRO level. I 15 think that's kind of what we want to get into.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. And when you 17 -- we were asking about whether you observed any 18 changes, consider in the work environment but at your 19 level. One thing you mentioned was the union 20 management issues. Did you see changes in other ways?

21 - Hmm. No. I mean, I 22 certainly I certainly had some disagreements with 23 management along the way -- you know, decisions that 24 were made, things like that. But most of those 25 disagreements were not in the -- they were in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

36 1 (inaudible) and conservative ops envelope, were we 2 going to operate, you know.

3 I'm thinking you have to be here, and it's 4 a management -- you know, if you're within your 5 license and within -- within, you know, reasonable 6 reliability standards, you've got a pretty wide 7 envelope. Most of my disagreements were, hey, we're 8 in that envelope where we're going to operate.

9 And I -- and I've argued, you know, the 10 more conservative, and I've argued the less 11 conservative from time to time; But we've had --

12 we've had issues where we were starting up with how 13 many circulators we want. We had a grassy season. We 14 had units shut down because of our circulators. And 15 it really comes down to you need like one circulator 16 to start the plant up. Probably not the best thing to 17 do, presumably then to -- you know, find your MS-10s, 18 and --

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's when the 20 plant was up, there was a grassy --

21 Right. Well, actually, it 22 was up, and then it -- Unit 2 was down. We were 23 deciding -- we had said, "Hey, we want this many 24 circulators to start up." But, really, you need one, 25 and what it was coming down to is how many did we want NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRI3ERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

37 1 for defense in depth.

2 And we had said we wanted four, I mean, 3 reliably, and then we said, you know, we're going to 4 get one back in a couple of hours, let's go anyway.

5 So we started out with three.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So where were 7 you on that equation? Were you on the more 8 conservative side?

9 On that particular one, I 10 was on the more conservative side. I said, you know, 11 if you draw a line in the sand that says, you know, 12 four is what we want, I said four is what we should 13 have.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 And there was -- there was 16 very lively discussion --

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

18 -- it could be with senior 19 management associated with that, and --

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, let's 21 talk about who. Let's rewind.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say "we,"

23 who are you --

24 - IThat particular discussion 25 involved m e-- I don't want to say NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

38 1 anybody that wasn't there. There -- I wasn't on 2 shift, so the and I'm trying 3 to remember who that was. I think it was 4 , ,-, 111I--

_.*was 3 on the phone with us, 5 and there might have -- there was probably a couple 6 other people involved.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Who was 8 on what side here?

9 Well, me andf 10 thought that we should -- we should hold the line and 11 wait until we got more circulators back before 12 starting -- starting the plant up.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was 14 title at that point?

15 H a h 16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he the 17 license holder for the shift then?

18 po you mean was he the 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

21 No, I think it was -f 22 I think it was that shift.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was his 24 position on that --

25 --as the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

39 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, I mean his 2 position on this issue.

3 He was on the fence, and I 4 think he supported -- it's kind of hard to say. I 5 think he -- he basically could have been -- he said --

6 you know, he could go either way. He didn't feel real 7 strongly one way or another as far as I could tell.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was the 9 input from 10 His input was, is this a 11 management -- is this a safety decision or a 12 management decision was the kind -- the way he was 13 approaching it. And basically what it came down to 14 was, well, it's a safety management decision. It's 15 like how much safety do we want to go forward.

16 And my thinking was, hey, we should not go 17 forward without having (inaudible) that we will not 18 have to go back. In other words,. we -- we -- I don't 19 have any problem with moving the plant forward.

20 If you go there and you've got enough 21 defense in depth that, you know, hey, something fails, 22 or a couple of things fail, whatever you -- based on 23 equipment reliability, you have a number of failures 24 that you think are reasonably possible, and you can 25 still keep the plant where you're moving it to, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

40 1 that was my position.

2 The decision I think on that issue was 3 that they'd move forward with -- with one fewer 4 circulators than I wanted.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They were both 6 forward three.

7 Right. I think that was --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: One was going 9 to come up, is that what --

10 What?

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: One was going 12 to come up soon --

13 Right. One was going to 14 come up, and I -- and I told in this 15 case, I go, "Look," I go, "I will personally go out 16 and make sure the circulator comes back in the 17 earliest possible time. But let's just hold the plant 18 for it." And he said, "Well, you know, basically the 19 decision was made." It's like, hey, you know -- and 20 the on-duty shift manager went along with this.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The question 22 here is: who made that decision? And if it's 23 :why is he doing it?

24 ,Well, I think the 25 ade it.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

41 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

3 I think he at that 4 point, eft because of frustration, and 5 I left because I was going to go get the (inaudible) 6 back, thinking that we were going to wait for the 7 circulator to come back. I went and, you know, worked 8 at getting this, you know, maintenance moving on the 9 circulator and getting them the support they needed.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 And it turned out that they 12 started moving forward with the startup.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which after you 14 and left -- I know I'm laughing, but it seems 15 like after the opposition left --

16 I don't know if it wasn't 17 a fait accompli at that point anyway. I mean, I don't 18 think -- like I said, Mr, who was really the 19 decisionmaker, that's his unit.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 Right. He was the 22 decisionmaker. He was on the fence. He was getting 23 -- he was getting people saying that this was the 24 right decision. He was getting other people saying 25 this was the right decision. And then he had to make NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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42 1 the decision, and --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Wa' 3 out of line in his persuasion of people during these 4 discussions on that? This is an opinion question.

5 But, I mean, did he cross the line there on what he 6 was trying to put forward?

7 W.il I didn't agree with his 8 position. I mean, I did not agree with his position.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was his --

10 I don't think -- I don't 11 think his position was the wrong -- I don't think it 12 was wrong. I just don't think it was in my comfort 13 zone.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What reasons 15 was he getting for his position?

16 .. Basically saying -- and 17 it's actually a fairly persuasive argument. It's 18 like, hey, how many circulators do you need to start 19 up? You know, the answer is a very low number. How 20 many -- so any number above that is -- we're in the 21 conservative ops space, and we're making a management 22 decision. It's not a plant safety decision. It's a 23 management decision, and ..

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You saw that it's 25 different. You saw that -- you thought that was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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43 1 safety and management.

2 Well, right. And I've got 3 a philosophy of operating the unit that you don't set 4 the unit at a place that you can't have some defense 5 in depth.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 The fact that -- actually, 8 I'm fairly proud of the cultural change that has 9 happened, and this is a different event altogether.

10 But last year we had a shutdown going into this outage 11 due to circulators. And the on-duty shift managers 12 and the AOMs and the ops managers continued to move 13 the unit down right offline ahead of being forced to, 14 which is the behavior that got us into the April 7th 15 event.

16 So, and that's -- it's a safe philosophy 17 to come from. If you are in a position where, hey, a 18 circulator can go away and you're not going to have to 19 necessarily move the plant, that's a good place to be.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 So the whole -- the way it 22 went last spring when we had our heavy grassy 23 spring --

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

25 -, actually, just an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

44 1 unprecedented grassing --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. That's 3 what we've heard.

4 : -- we -- we had like five 5 of the top ten grassing measurement days in. our 6 history. We did not have a situation where all of the 7 circulators went away, or we -- we did not have the 8 unit where it needed to be ahead of it needing to be 9 there.

10 We moved it down 85 percent, and when we 11 didn't get circulators back in time we moved it down 12 further. But we didn't go up to 100 percent even 13 though we got circulators back.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15*We kept -- we -- and we 16 ultimately ended up walking the unit down to the point 17 where, hey, if we get down to this many circulators, 18 we're going to'move it down to here because we can --

19 we'll have a little defense in depth here.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. You're 21 talking about a different incident here now.

22 Well, actually, it was 23 leading into the shutdown --

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

25 -- that we're coming out NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

45 1 of.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's go back 3 to the initial discussion we were having about 4 nyou*an 5 Right.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I -- my mistake.

7 I think I --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We want to 9 finish that.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And then we'll 12 move on.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sorry about that.

14 What you were saying was from where was 15 coming from, you needed the one circulator --

16 circulator to be where you were, and it was safe to 17 have less than the four. So he was seeing it --

18 FO Sure 19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- as a management 20 decision.

21 Right.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there more to it 23 than that? Did he articulate more than that during 24 this discussion?

25 . Well, he certainly applied NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRAMSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

46 1 pressure and there was -- he clearly did not agree 2 with the decision that was being made.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you say 4 "he appl:ied pressure," what did he do? What did he 5 say?

6 I think the term "holding 7 the plant hostage" was used, which is-- which is a 8 catch ph rase for ops isn't being reasonable, ops 9 making ur.reasonable demands.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He used the phrase.

11 I believe so. I'm not 12 positive.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: This is 14 Yes. If he did not use the 15 phrase, he used words to that effect. But that --

16 that is consistent with what he was saying. He's 17 like, hey, it's a management decision. Why are you 18 asking for the world? You know, I'm not going to give 19 you the world -- what has --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And holding the plant 21 hostage on this management decision.

lw IRight. What Imean, 22 --

23 what is a reasonable -- what is reasonable? And there 24 was disagreement over what reasonable was.

--7K 25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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47 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had indicated 2 that left over frustration. What 3 specifically caused that? Was there some sort of 4 turning point where --

5

He didn't think we were 6 communicating. There was a phone -- it was a phone 7 conversation with and he did not feel 8 that he was being listened to. That was my take on 9 it. He felt that he -- he verbalized his opinion, and 10 it was not -- not given value.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long did the 12 conversation last?

13 Twenty minutes, half an 14 hour.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Total from -- from 16 the time that the four of you were present, him on the 17 phone i'w on the phone, and you, 18 m mhere. k.-

19 It's pretty vague at this 20 point. But, yeah, it might have been 15 minutes, you 21 know. I don't have a real clear idea of how long it 22 was. It was -- it was a phone conversation in the 23 control room with the doors closed, with some people 24 on the phone, and, like I said, a bunch of people and 25 a couple of them I don't actually -- I'd throw some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

,11fn1)%1)"7A AA2J2 %AIAC3UlKl*'*^hl M' '*r n- l/ ý)- r^4.... .. i... . .

48 1 names out there, but I'm not sure that they were 2 there.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let me ask you 4 this. If what was 5 your --

6 I was like an extra guy 7 that was just there to help. During shutdowns we 8 would bring in extra people.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Just --

10 . So I was not in the 11 decisionmaking at all.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you have 13 conversations with about this 14 decision?

is Yeah. Yeah, we did. I 16 mean, he -- he -- my recollection is that he said, you 17 know, he wanted us basically to -- he was comfortable 18 moving forward is what he gave -- he gave me the sense 19 that he was comfortable with moving the unit forward.

20 And he was the decisionmaker, I said, "Okay."

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he give you any 22 indication that .comments pressured him in 23 any way?

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To doing 25 something he didn't want to do or didn't feel was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

49 1 right.

2 SNo. I -- I mean, we were 3 all trying to persuade each other. So pressure and 4 persuasion is -- certainly, I've got to believe he was 5 - -persuaded.-- - - -

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

has 7 got the power here, though, from his position.

8 F* Oh, certainly. Certainly.

9 He's certainly a -- he was the 20 SR. --S-EC-I-AL-AGEN-T-TEATORRig*ht_

21 iI' I can't speak for.

12 Obviously, it was apparent to me from the beginning,

-* 13 though, thaLmý as-more of -- well, more of a, hey,

.. ee could9 Wtart it with three, and I -- I'm saying 15 ------- three-,- maybe -it-was -f our, -maybe -it--wa s -five, _Im-not-16 sure. But, hey, maybe we can start it with three 17 mind-set out of the gate.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So he differed 19 with you right from the beginning.

20 I think he was -- he was 21 more accepting of that, you know. His comfort zone 22 was a little bit wider than mine, I should say. So it 23 was apparent to me at that -- I think we all went into 24 that room having our own opinion of, hey, what the 25 right -- you know, what the right line in the sand is, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

50 1 what the right, you know, requirements to put on 2 ourselves was. And, you know, we -- I put out as 3 strongly as I could, you know, what my opinion was, 4 and at the end of it, you know --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the end 6 there was no license violation or tech spec violation.

7 No. No.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You just needed 9 one, and you had one.

10 Well, I mean, for license 11 you -- I don't think technically you need any. You 12 could probably go up -- start up on your MS-10s, which 13 are your steam belts. I don't think that would be an 14 unacceptable choice, but -- but -- so from that 15 perspective, you know, it's -- you know, four is --

16 having four times as many circulators as you need 17 enough?

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

19 Is three -- right, is three 20 enough? So, I mean, it was -- it was -- like I said, 21 it was a rather -- a rather strong -- strong 22 discussion. But, I mean, from both sides -- I mean, 23 I 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is there 25 another issue like that?

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51 1 Another issue.

2 (End of Tape 1, Side A. Beginning of Tape 1, Side B.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're beginning 4 Side B -- it's approximately 10:32 a.m. -- after just 5 a brief break.

6 On the grassing issue, had!'

7 not been on the telephone and the discussion been 8 among the three of you, how long would the 9 conversation have lasted? Or do you think the 10 decision would have been made?

11 I don't think it would have 12 been as lengthy, because we wouldn't have had a strong 13 opinion -- as strong or persuasive an opinion on the 14 other side of the argument. So the decision might 15 have been -- might have been different, and certainly 16 this wouldn't have been as protracted.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And we were 18 talking about kind of what you portrayed that you're 19 in an area -- a gray area, your comfort level being on 20 one side and that particular issue somebody else's 21 comfort level was on the other side of it.

22 And I'm not trying to 23 portray myself as the guy that always is on that side 24 of the argument, because there's not -- -_

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's fine.

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52 1 . -- there's times when I'm 2 on the other side saying, you know, it's a management 3 decision, and it's not reasonable to ask for the 4 world, because it --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And let's talk 6 about that. Let's go into both aspects of it -- areas 7 where that has happened -- again, where you're over 8 here, and then there's some senior management 9 intervention on -- or difference of opinion, and then 10 we'll go the other way and capture all of it.

11 All right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you think of 13 'anything in that area, conservative thinking, where 14 you had that difference of-opinion again?

15 There was one about an SJ 16 -- there's two -- two sets of two valves in the 17 series. I believe this is Unit 2, SJ-4, 5, 12, and 18 13. They're injection valves. 1--7 19 And-we've since redesigned them, so that 20 you don't need to have these valves closed or -- sorry 21 -- open. So we -- at the time we were checking on 22 them, we couldn't tell -- we -- the way these check 23 valves from the RCS leak back, you -- you have to 24 measure several valves at a time, and you get a 25 number.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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53 1 The tech specs between Unit 1 and Unit 2 2 are different on how much leakage you're allowed to 3 have. But we got some significant leakage on one set 4 of these valves, and could not determine which valve 5 it was from without some additional testing.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 Now, my opinion was I had 8 some evidence that said I had some significant 9 leakage. In other words, it was more than one gpm, 10 which could (inaudible).

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. If it 12 was all from one valve.

13 My perspective was we --

14 we'd go and do the required testing, even if it takes 15 some significant effort. This decision --

16 and I were of this -

17 at the time.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is the timeframe 19 that we're looking at here?

20 This was probably two years 21 ago. was, th, and he agreed 22 with me. We went into a meeting thinking that we were 23 going to try to figure out how to do this testing, to 24 determine it.

25 I came in on a day off to try to -- you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

54 1 know, to -- because I had been on through the weekend 2 where this issue came up. So I came in like a -- it 3 was like a Monday. We went into the meeting, and then 4 apparently had been talked to that we 5 weren't going to test -- he's -- he came into that 6 meeting saying we weren't going to test them, and that 7 surprised me at the meeting.

8 I thought we were at a meeting, and so did 9 -- I think it was was the engineering rep.

S ....... as there and a number of 11 other people. We came -- I thought the meeting was 12 they were going to figure out how to test this valve.

13 And we don't have a test procedure written for it, 14 because we just didn't proceed as confluence of 15 events.

16 We tried to make operability calls, use 17 9118 that says, hey, you kind of measure the timeframe 18 based on, you know, the timeframe of the tech spec 19 that you'd have to assume it was inoperable. So I 20 said, you know, it's something we should get on 21 relatively quickly. We should figure out where we 22 are, at least do some research on it.

23 So I thought we were going to go in this 24 meeting to make a decision -- make a technical plan to 25 test -- test, and then basically I came into the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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55 1 meeting, and basically it was -- that was not what the 2 meeting was about. The meeting was about we're not 3 going to test, and we're going to -- we're going to 4 figure out a way to engineer it away.

___ SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was on the 6 this is proffering that position. Who 7 was on his side of the equation there?

8 I believe it was 9

SPECIALGEN-T--NEF F+----i- ou place everybody who was at that meeting?

12 N 16Absolutely not I can 13 certainly place some of the key players -- myself and LLi Taid, there was --- , was the 20 -I-was-the- -over--the -weekend.

16 211 that came in, because I knew as much as anybody on it.

17 I am almost positive was there.

18 who iwas-there.

19 14 I mean, my logic went something like this.

20 I've got data that says I had leakage. You don't know 21 which valve it's from, don't know which valve to call 22 inoperable, don't know how to even determine which 23 valve would be inoperable. Got an action that says 24 isolated, you know --

SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

56 1 action froi we're going to isolate it?

2 .. No, no, no. That's --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh.

4 -- the action -- tech spec 5 actions.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7

If you have a leaking 8 containment isolation check valve --

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's prescribed.

10 -- you prescribe -- you 11 isolate it; And I said we should at least be taking 12 continuous action to resolve the issue, and I thought 13 the resolution was going to be do some kind of testing 14 and isolate it.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But it went the other 16 way.

17 Yeah, it did. And I was 18 surprised.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the 20 justifications or the reasons given for what you're 21 calling engineering it away?

22 :* You know, I -- it's been so 23 long ago, I think what it came down to is there are a 24 number of valves that are required to be open in 25 accident conditions. So it makes very little sense NEAL R. GROSS *'

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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57 1 that they isolate during an accident --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Close.

3 -- close and hold, because 4 you'd be injecting via that path. I think they -- I 5 think we -- we reengineered the valve some. I'm sure 6 it's all documented. i even went -- if he's 7 still-- he' there shortly. They did some 8 analysis, some evaluation that says, hey, this is --

9 this is okay and why..

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was 11 licensing in on this?

12 . Yeah. Yeah, it was.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

14

Yeah, I'm pretty sure-he ---

15 was -- he was aware. Yeah. I mean, there was 16 somebody there from Licensing. I don't recall who.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, would this 18 testing that you and, q *-- that was the path 19 you thought was going to be taken, would that testing 20 have caused the plant to come down to do that testing?

21 Well, I don't -- I mean, I 22 think we were talking about hooking up a hydraulic 23 pump. It wasn't risk-free stuff. We were talking 24 about hooking up hydraulic pumps to -- to (inaudible) 25 break things.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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58 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would the 2 testing have required the plant to come offline?

3 No, I don't think so.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

5 I think the only thing it 6 could have required is you could have said, yeah, this 7 valve is leaking, and it's leaking this much.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've got to 9 call in op.

10 And then you call in op, 11 and then you bring the plant down because you -- you 12 need that -- you need those injection (inaudible).

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So losing one 14 of those valves would cause the plant to -- to come 15 down?

16 ., Well, it -- I guess it 17 depends which check valve. There are some single 18 check valves in the lines. You know, like one check 19 valve goes to four. You know, those kinds of things, 20 depending on what was leaking.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But you didn't 22 know.

23 We didn't know.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. And 25 to follow up on Eileen's question, what was -- was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

59 2 Well, that was what was --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- leading --

4 Ml. -- that's what kind of 5 upset me on that -- that particular occurrence -- was 6 he was with us all week, and we were making the 7 decisions, hey, what are we going to do? Trying to 8 get our brains around it was -- it was a relatively 9 complex technical issue.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like II it is.

12 .. And we were going into, 13 hey, you know what are we going to do to test this?

14 What is our responsibility here? And I thought at the 15 end of Sunday that we'd kind of come to a meeting of 16 the minds that, hey, we're going to figure out how to 17 test this. We're going to have a meeting first thing 18 tomorrow morning. can you come in? Yeah, I'll 19 come in, and we'll -- we'll figure out a way to make 20 it happen.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And was on 22 board with that?

23 . Yes. I believe he was. He 24 changed the way he --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was, at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

60 1 the meeting on Monday morning?

2 I believe he came at the 3 end.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why 5 .,*did the 180?

6 I don't know why for sure.

7 I suspect --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What do you 9 suspect?

10 I suspect talked to him 11 and expressed his opinion on the matter.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know 13 what ,opinion was.? Had he -- had you heard that

-14 through the weekend, whatjr Opinion, your 15 position was on that? It sounds like he was involved 16 in this.

17 .1 don't know how I --. I 18 knew it, and I'm not sure if I'm speaking -- I'm 19 taking a guess here. But I'm fairly confident that 20 .spoke with *you know, in the interim, 21 and then. changed his opinion. So --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that a tech 23 spec violation in your opinion? I know they probably 24 had to have some kind of justification for what they 25 did.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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61 1 Well, if it was -- it was 2 -- if it was, I wouldn't have -- I wouldn't have sat 3 by. At the time --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's fair.

5 -- I -- I thought it was --

6 we -- we were playing with something that could be --

7 that could turn into a tech spec violation. I mean, 8 it -- you're responsible for testing your equipment.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 . If you have a concern about 11 the condition of your equipment, you're responsible 12 for ensuring that you know the condition of it, and 13 then you can justify its operability or inoperability.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 : My opinion was that the 16 responsible thing to do was to test it. I was not on 17 shift when that decision was made. But tU 18- - o ;*at the time was I 19 thought he was of the same position as I was..

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was he at the 21 Monday meeting?

22 He was at the Monday 23 meeting, and he and I both -- were both rather taken 24 aback by the -- by the results. And basicall 25 took it upon himself -- he basically said he was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

62 1 making the decision. And I don't know what -- I know 2 that L -had words with .after the meeting. I 3 went back and tried to have words with him.

4 But my -- my main concern was, you know, 5 if we're going to a meeting -- his -an 6 that if we have a meeting of the minds beforehand, so 7 that we could -- you know, we can have a united front, 8 we don't waste people's time. I went into that 9 meeting, and I felt like I had two choices. I could 10 go along or just keep quiet, or I could in a public 11 setting defy the 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

13 Right. And at that point 14 I -- I just -- well, I was quiet, and I talked with 15 him outside the meeting and expressed my displeasure 16 about how the meeting went.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did you 18 say? How did he respond to that?

19 -1 He says that he thinks he 20 -- you know, he basically thought that the problem was 21 that it's a technical engineering issue, and he'll get 22 Licensing and Engineering to resolve it.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So he gave you 24 an impression that's what 'wanted? Did he say 25 that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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II 63 1 I don't think he -- I don't 2 recall him saying that.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But that differed 5 from where he was just the day before.

6 .. Significantly, yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you need a break 8 or--

9 No, I'm fine.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 I'm just going to stand up 12 for a minute.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A MN a 14 you seen that happen before where he -- he would take 15 -- is that normal for him or is that -- that was 16 normal for him?

17 He was a 18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you shake your 19 head, I have to--

20 1 mean, he 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- I have to describe 22 it.

23 W N- What?

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It won't be picked up 25 on the recorder. You're nodding your head, but --

I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 12 DWflfl= M~ Akin' A%/I= Pi %A1

64 1 Yes, I am. I -- nice guy, 2 not a very strong personality. I mean, I'm used to --

3 most operators have fairly strong views. I mean, 4 right or -- we may be wrong, but we're never in doubt.

5 You know, the -- those kind of people, right? But 6 -- -was a -- 1M.clearly was a representative of 7 his bosses. That was my opinion.

8 I mean, he reflected -- he reflected their 9 views and would -- did not hesitate to change his 10 views to reflect their views. If, you know, we'd talk 11 to him about one thing, he would change -- he'd 12 reflect --

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he wasn't a part 14 of this united front that you're talking about. If 15 Operations was on board with one idea here, he would 16 -- he flipped to the senior management position.

17 A "All He typically was -- he was 18 typically a representative of the senior management.

19 He was not -- he was not one of the --

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're talking 21 about O Is that what you're talking about?

22 When you say senior management --

23 Well, he was the -- he was 24 the most senior decisionmaker, I would say, in the ops 25 chain. I mean, he's (inaudible), although titles NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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65 1 changed over the last several years, but --

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But there 3 wouldn't have been anybody between 4

I wouldn't think.

5 No, there wouldn't -- would 6 not have been.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You put a timeframe 9 on this as about two years ago. Do you think it was 10 late 2001, or was it later than that?

11 I think it was -- you know 12 what? I don't recall. I think it was -- I think it 13 was in wintertime, early 2000.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does it help if you 15 think - W left that position. Can you put it 16 in timeframe to -- how much longer did he work there?

17 Six months maybe before he 18 left.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About six months 20 before he retired.

21 He would remember, 22 and is -in onsite again as a 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: jis 25 back onsite as a Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

66 Well, he lives up ina 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about -- this 4 was the second issue that you portrayed in this 5 decisionmaking, in the gray area.

6 Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does anything else 8 come to mind?

9 No, not really. I know 10 that there was a lot of discussion and scuttlebutt 11 going around about _decision to isolate 12 a steam leak. That was -- that was brought up like 13 immediately as a -- an example of for -- or non-14 conservative decisionmaking, although not being there 15 to see the steam leak I think it was more a case where 16 I Wwould not have sent somebody else into the 17 position to isolate the steam leak. Shutting the 18 plant down would not have isolated the steam leak 19 directly.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It would not 21 have?

22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

24 The main steam isolating, 25 which is a pretty traumatic event, to the primary and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

67 1 the secondary would have. So you would have had to 2 trip main steam line isolate, which I think --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible) 4 safety injection.

5 I'm not sure, but -- but 6 pretty -- what his choice was is he had to put the 7 plant through an extremely big transient or -- and 8 that takes some personal risk, and I -- and I -- and 9 he looks up and he thinks he can, you know, get to the 10 valve and do it safely, and he did without burning 11 himself.

12 That was -- that was raised as an example 13 of non-conservative decisionmaking on part.

14 Not having been there to see the steam leak, I really 15 can't make a call what kind of risk he was taking. I 16 -- wants to go home just like the rest of us. I 17 see IMas the kind of guy that he would be hesitant 18 to send other people and take risks he would not 19 himself take.

20 So I think it was more or less a case of, 21 hey, this was on the fence. I'll go and not put 22 somebody else (inaudible).

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's pretty 24 unusual for someone his level to go into the plant and 25 manipulate quick like that.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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68 1Yeah, it is.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right?

3 Yeah, it is, and I don't 4 think he did it lightly. But --

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He did it.

6 -- he did it. I mean, 7 that's what I hear an awful lot of witness 8 (inaudible), but that's certainly what I hear.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you say 10 someone raised as an example of non-conservative 11 decisionmaking --

12 4 Well --

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: --. what were 14 you referring to?

15 Well, I heard that, you 16 know, the equipment operators had concerns of, hey, 17 why would you take it upon yourself to close a valve 18 in the plant.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at that point, 21 he's the -- he's the . ._ .

22 1 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would have been 24 the input from the Who is th 25 'on there?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

69 1ihhmrsow believe. I 2 think _-had looked at it and thought he was just 3 going to shut the plant down. I think that was 4 opinion. I think, had walked away from the valve 7

5 thinking, you know what, we just need to shut down.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So he had three 7 choices -- shut the plant down, isolate the main steam 8 line --

9 Well, I think that you shut 10 down and isolate main steam.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Come together, okay.

12 Right.

13 SPECIAL, AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 i Or --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Manipulate the valve.

16-- manipulate the valve.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay., went 18 the other way, then.

19 - . Well, think 20 from what I understand -- and like I said, I'm 21 definitely a third party here --

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

23 - - because this was 24 discussed at length. You know, hey, you know, are --

25 you know, are -- are we behaving poorly here? You NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

70 1 know, should we have done something different? And it 2 was just, you know, I think every shift had 3 discussions about the chain of events to -- you know, 4 to discuss (inaudible), you know, the whys and 5 wherefores and how you guys feel about it.

6 But what I understand is and this 7 is from discussions with 4 actually -- had 8 walked away after looking at the leak, saying, "No.

9 It's too big. Don't feel comfortable sending one of 10 my guys up there to isolate it. We're just going to 11 have to shut down and isolate the other mains."

12 think- from what I understand is 13 in parallel, you know -- isA walking away, li 14 you know, comes up, looks at it, says, "Yes, I 15 think (inaudible) somebody else here. Let me see if 16 I can get to the valve." Goes up there and gets to 17 the valve, looks around, doesn't see anybody, and 18 isolates it. Something along those lines. So --

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That is really 20 -- I'm sorry. I mean, that -- reason to do that would 21 be to keep the plant up.

22 Well, it's also to isolate 23 a leak.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

25 ,, I mean, the risk NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

71 1 I think, thinking also was that shutting the valve 2 won't isolate the leak.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 jW felt that shutting the 5 valve would isolate the leak.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And he was 7 right.

8 :; And he was right.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 If your opinion is that, 11 hey, shutting the valve may or may not isolate the 12 leak, why would you send somebody into a risky 13 situation if you didn't think it would even have an 14 effect anyway. The decision there is -- the equation 15 is pretty -- pretty one-sided.

16 If your equation is I'm almost positive if 17 I can get to that valve it will stop the leak and stop 18 this steam -- this steam from getting into my space --

19 and I think they were getting like electrical grounds, 20 and things like that. So it was having an effect on 21 plant equipment, you know, because it was -- you know, 22 the switch gear -- the secondary switch gear is out 23 there, which powers the RCPs and all kinds of other 24 things.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The understanding is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

72 1 it was a fairly large flume --

2 Yes it was 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the leak.

4 It was very large flume, 5 but apparently once -- like lots of steam flume.

6 Apparently, on one side of the valve it was large.

7 The other side of the valve it wasn't, you know, where 8 the handwheel was. So large flume going that way.

9 Yeah, you've got steam around you. He felt that he 10 could -- he could get it closed.

11 And, I mean, ýýcould -- I'm sure can 12 tell you exactly what was going through his mind, but 13 my -- my opinion is that he might have hesitated 14 sending somebody else up to do it, but would -- would 15 -- since it was one of those (inaudible) situations, 16 but he said that, you know, I think he would have been 17 more apt to put himself in that situation.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you become aware 19 at any point that anybody else weighed in on his 20 decision? Was that his decision to manipulate the 21 valve, or did he have additional --

22 I don't know. Like I said, 23 I think -- I think had kind of just, you know, 24 said, "Okay. Well, you know, it's time to just do --

25 do the other -- option A, shut the plant down, isolate NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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73 1 it" -- you know, the remote valves.

2 I don't know if they had discussions.

3 Didn't know if told "Hey, I'm shutting down 4 the plant," andMW Iwent out there and was --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You didn't know what 6 happened?

7 No, no. Don't know 8 exactly. And the timing is everything, right? If 9 says, "Okay, I'm going to shut down a plant," walks 10 off, doesn't talk to comes up and says, 11 "Hey, I can get to it," goes up and shuts it, says, 12 "Hey, man, I shut the valve." "You did?" I don't 13 know what the timing was like.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you talk to 15 after the event about why he did what he did?

16 Did you talk to him?

17 P Yeah, on a number of 18 occasions. I don't know how much detail I got into, 19 but basically his -- the gist of it was that he felt 20 he could safely get to the valve.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he --

22 The valve could be safely 23 reached, and there was some urgency to get it closed. p 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he give you 25 any indication that he was getting his direction from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

74 1on that issue?

2.. No. I -- I hadn't heard 3 that.

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I don't 5 know.

6 . No.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm asking you.

8 No, I -- I don't think so.

9 I think I've always said that at a powerplant 10 where you've got a system that is leaking, you don't 11 need a procedure to tell you to close -- isolate the 12 leak. You know, if there's a valve between -- you 13 know, that isolates the leak, you don't need any 14 procedure necessarily to isolate the leak. You -- you 15 do what's responsible. You isolate it, and then you 16 -- and then you use your processes to document it.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

18 .* I think he was thinking, 19 hey, the way to stabilize the plant and to stop this 20 condition is to close the valve.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 And I think, from what I 23 understand, walked away thinking, hey, you know, the 24 way to do it is to, you know, main steam line isolate.

25 I think that's the way you kind of have to do it.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

75 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, if not 2 anybody else in senior management?

3 or anybody else?

4 I don't -- like I said, not 5 being there, I -- I have very little knowledge about 6 anything like that. I know that the -- the equipment 7 operator expressed, hey, what kind of pressure is' 8 under to make this kind of decision?

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 _ You know, I don't think 1 -I don't think anybody outside of ops -- my 12 personal opinion is that anybody outside or above him 13 in ops could have forced him, or would have, you know, 14 to -- to make that choice.

15 I think it was a choice that he made at a 16 moment's notice thinking that he had a window of 17 opportunity, and he seized on it. Whether in 18 retrospect he regrets not -- you know, not sending 19 p, whether he regrets not -- I mean, -0 can 20 speak to those. I don't think anybody was saying, you 21 know, you'd better get up there and isolate 22 that leak." You know, I wouldn't -- I may have 23 disagreed with management, but I've never seen that 24 kind of behavior. -t 25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

76 1 ROOM . And certainly keeping the 2 unit -- you know, taking the unit offline to stop the 3 steam leak would have been supported wholeheartedly.

4 I just think in this case; _ felt that the best way 5 and the most'direct way to stabilize the plant was to 6 shut a valve, which certainly put the plant through 7 much less trauma, although it put himself at some risk 8 to do.

9 How much risk? Hey, your guess is as good 10 as mine. I wasn't there.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. What 13 about any other incidents that come to mind where the 14 perception could have been left in somebody's mind 15 that, you know, you're pushing conservative 16 decisionmaking into the non-conservative edge.

17 That -- I don't -- not much 18 comes to mind. I mean, those are the only ones that 19 stick out in my mind.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let me ask you this.

21 You made a statement before about having a meeting, 22 and I'm trying to quote it as closely as I can, so 23 that you're more or less on the same page, and that 24 you had a unified front -- the shift managers, the 25 operating shift managers were trying to present a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

77 1 unified front.

2 . Which topic are you talking 3 about?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You were talking 5 about that -- it came up when you were talking about 6 the valve and testing the valves.

7 Oh. Well --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under 9 and your concerns on that.

10 Well, I mean, if you go 11 into -- that's more or less just a -- just I didn't 12 mean it that, hey, you know, we're all going to get --

13 I think if we're going into a meeting, we shouldn't be 14 -- necessarily be in a position to -- if we go into a 15 meeting, it's a waste of everybody's time if you're 16 making decisions whether the meeting should even be 17 taking place. And that was my -- that was what I was 18 getting at.

19 Effectively, came in with his decision 20 made that, hey, this meeting we're having right now 21 really doesn't need to happen. And I went in there 22 thinking, hey, this meeting here has a purpose, and 23 we're driving towards that purpose. And it -- it was 24 a dysfunctional meeting.

25 If he had sat down with me beforehand and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

78 1 said, "Hey, I don't think we need this meeting because 2 XYZ," I would agree or disagree with him in private, 3 and then we could have cancelled the meeting or had 4 it. I don't see any reason to call a bunch of people 5 in the first thing on Monday morning to have a -- you 6 know, a critical, very important meeting, and then --

7 and then, you know, by the way say, "Hey, you know, we 8 were wrong."

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You came in on 10 your day off for that.

11 1 Right. Right. So --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of 13 meetings where shift managers wanted to get together 14 to decide issues, had it happened before where it was 15 necessary to -- to have a meeting in terms of where 16 you wanted to be in the face of management's 17 instructions? Can you recall other situations where 18 -- where the shift managers were concerned enough that 19 they wanted to get unified on the position they were 20 going to take in regard to specific direction?

21 No. I mean, the grassing 22 is the closest thing I can come to. We had had shift 23 manager meetings, which are just periodic meetings we 24 have with the ops manager present and the AOMs 25 present, and we -- and we discuss philosophy. You NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

79 1 know, hey, where do we want to move the units?

2 You know, where I was talking about, hey, 3 what should be our strategy -- our strategy for 4 operating the plant. You know, if you get down to 5 this many circulators, where should the unit be power-6 wise? So it's mostly a -- what I would call table-7 topping a strategy session. You know, hey, this is --

8 this is our philosophy on approaching, you know, loss 9 of circulators. This is our thoughts beyond 10 approaching the loss of vacuum in the face of loss of 11 circulators.

12 Had similar discussions when we had loss 13 of offsite power, exactly how -- how we address them.

14 And, you know, the lessons learned from this 15 everything -- you go through a complicated electrical 16 transient like that, you get -- you know, something is 17 going to surprise you. I don't know that went away.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

19

I didn't know that 20 responded that way. And by having those strategy 21 meetings, some of that information gets disseminated.

22 But I don't think that really is -- it's kind of a 23 different -- I'm not answering your question. The 24 question is basically, did we have strategy sessions 25 about how to manage our managers? i NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

8o 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How to counter -- how 2 to counter direction that caused the shift manager 3 some concern.

4 Well, on the day that 5 ,and I had that meeting with I had some 6 discussions with him on most -- mostly like, hey, you 7 know, how could I have been more effective to get an 8 outcome that I -- I could have more easily lived with.

9 You know, part of my function is not 10 making decisions, but it's influencing others to make 11 the right decision. Are my opinions right? I talked 12 with' about, you know, hey, what's your input on, 13 you know, how I could be more effective so this 14 doesn't happen again? Because I didn't like the fact 15 that I go into the meeting thinking that we're heading 16 -- heading north, and we're heading south.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What did he 18 say?

19 He -- he was -- I think he 20 was taken aback or surprised as I was. So he was 21 having the same kind of internal conversation himself.

22 I think I walked away from it thinking, well, you 23 know, I've just got to be ready, more ready in the 24 future, that, you know, went out (inaudible), be 25 strong in my opinion and my position.

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81 1 And when I'm an opinion-maker, I've got to 2 be able to -- I have to be a strong personality and 3 hold my ground.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So if the 5 information is reported that there were particular 6 meetings where shift managers got together to discuss 7 how to counter unsafe direction from senior 8 management, is --

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Non-10 conservative direction.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- non-conservative 12 direction, things of that nature, is anything --

13 . I don't know if I -- we --

14 I don't think I'd characterize any meetings we had 15 along those lines, more or less, you know, kind of 16 along the lines of what I was talking with4M -- it 17 like, hey, how can I be more effective in getting --

18 you know, getting my -- my voice heard, my -- my 19 opinion, you know, taken -- .a~ken_ into account 20 effectively, to get to an outcome I'm more pleased 21 with, and that was really what it came down to.

22 Strategy sessions -- no, nothing comes to 23 mind specifically. I don't know, maybe there were, 24 but I -- I can't think of anything that would be 25 (inaudible) of the strategy against senior management.

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A-A

82 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about in 2 terms of what you were asking jabout? Did 3 you get a chance to practice that? Did you have --

4 did you come up against an 180-degree turn or a 5 decision that you had to voice your opinion strongly?

6 a Well, I thought the circ 7 water was the next thing that came to mind, and it was 8 -- I'm not sure if -- I think1 might have 9 -- might have or was involved in that.

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The grassing 11 issue?

12 - The grassing issue.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 Right. And --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was earlier this 16 year, is that right?

17 . Yeah, I think that was last 18 March.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Spring of this year?

20 ~ :I Yeah, the spring of this 21 year.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So this other 23 issue was --

24 Well before that.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- you're thinking NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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83 1 late 2001.

2 Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in 2002?

4 - Nothing comes to mind.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There is an issue in 6 2002 that we've heard about, and you're at a 7 disadvantage in terms of (inaudible). But I'll try 8 and refresh your recollection. You can tell us if you 9 have --

10 ._ I'd like to tell you you're 11 the first person to ever accuse me of that. Having a 12 disadvantage (inaudible).

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's -- well, we're 14 going back two years or so and some incidents. Coming 15 -- in the spring of 2002, coming out of the Salem 16 outage, there' s an issue regarding startup without the 17 generator at full normal.

18 , .. Oh. Starting up without 19 vacuum.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Without vacuum.

21 Systems -- the heat removal systems were not --

22 apparently not normal.

23 Well 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not normal 25 conditions.

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84 i .. -- we didn't have our gland 2 ceiling steam, but we had vacuum. So effectively we 3 -- I believe we brought the unit to mode 2, I'm 4 thinking. I think we brought it to mode 2, which is, 5 you know, low in the power range.

6 Without gland seal on the shaft of the 7 main turbine, which is usually required to -- to keep 8 vacuum, or once you have air and leakage problems, 9 what they did -- what we did was stuffed packing 10 material under the shafts. Apparently, this has been 11 done elsewhere in the industry. And come up and sit 12 like that.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you the 14 Me --

15 I was on shift for periods 16 when that was -- when that decision was made.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that a 18 considered way to go?

19-.J Probably not, but you 20 always had your MS-10s. I mean, really, what it got 21 down to is your MS-10s are your atmospheric dumps.

22 Well, it's conservative -- no, it's not the most 23 conservative thing to do. I mean, it's -- but coming 24 out of an outage it does sort out some secondary 25 problems.

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85 1 Was I comfortable with it? No, I wasn't 2 the most comfortable with it, because I had never done 3 it before, and I didn't know it had been done 4 successfully. Did it work? Yes, it worked fine, and 5 -- and it didn't hurt anything by doing it that way.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 7 about that again. Is that another case where most of 8 the shift people were on your side of the equation and 9 maybe senior management was on the other?

10 (Inaudible.) Is that another example of that or --

11 Well, yeah. But I probably 12 would have been on the -- on the don't do it side of 13 the fence, but only out because I've never been there 14 before. It's something I've never done, and there --

15 you know, I -- it wasn't out of a well-reasoned, hey, 16 I don't think this is the right thing to do because of 17 X, Y, and Z. It was, hey, I don't know if this will 18 work, first of all; and, secondly, I'm not sure why 19 we're pushing this hard.

20 So, yeah, if I were to -- if the decision 21 were left up to me, it probably -- probably would have 22 stayed down longer.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Who 24 made the decision to go the way it went?

25 I'm thinking it was the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

86 1 Ynanager§and above, with some input from below. I 2 mean, I don't remember any, you know, concrete 3 decision or concrete conversations on that particular 4 one.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was the.;

6 10"W19then?

7 .,iI think it was.J!

8 I think.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Woul 10 have been in his position then? Or was it somebody 11 else?

12 It might have been 13 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

15 You know, we -- that was 16 doing something differently. But, you know, we didn't 17 do upfront mid-loops for a while either, and there is 18 risk associated with doing mid-loops at the beginning 19 of outages -- you know, very early in the outage. And 20 we're doing those routinely now.

21 So if,*had his druthers would we do hot 22 -- hot mid-loop for upfront mid-loops? I'm 23 comfortable with them now. Three or four years ago I 24 probably wasn't. Maybe that's the insidious creep of 25 non-conservatism. But we certainly effectively NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

87 1 managed them for a while, and I guess the industry as 2 a whole took a lot of upfront mid-loops.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 I 1_ don't recall any 5 conversations associated with gnashing of teeth or 6 associated with that. I -- I know that there was some 7 angst, because it was just something we had never done 8 before. I would have just -- personally, I would have 9 just as soon sat on the tens.

10 But that is non-conservative in its own 11 sense, because now you have basically, you know, your 12 tubes between you and the release to environment, and 13 the management didn't want to do that. They wanted to 14 maintain the heat sink to the main condenser. So in 15 a sense, by stuffing the packing, it's more 16 conservative than doing what some plants do, which is 17 just blow your tens to the atmosphere.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was there to 19 gain by doing that -- by packing them?

20 *a I Myou think what it was is you 21 shake out any problems. You do some -- you do some 22 mode changes that shake out any problems coming up, so 23 you get the plant up to, you know, the -- you know, 24 full power ops, and if there are any problems that 25 you're going to run into, maybe you'll run into them, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

88 1 and I think that was the thinking.

2 Do I think the risk-benefit is all that 3 great? Nah, probably not. So --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was --

5 <might have 6 them. He's the He's I think L_

7 Salem Unit 2 .W&

but he's -- he's been 8 involved in lots of those. He probably is more 9 involved in the discussions of that kind of nature 10 than I would-- think would 11 might have been involved. But --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that, 13 14 He is now -- he's in the 15 central outage group. I believe he's likefi 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:...

19 was in the outage group. He's now I believe in 20 engineering, but he was in the outage group, I 21 believe, back in that timeframe. So he might have had 22 some conversations associated with that.

23 It's certainly not the most conservative 24 thing I've ever done, but it certainly isn't the --

25 the risk -- the worst thing that happens is you -- is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

89 1 you damage the shaft. And on your main turbine, if 2 you don't rotate it enough, then that's really -- you 3 know, if we're willing to take a large -- tackle an 4 investment like that, and think we can manage the risk 5 associated with it, well, I guess you can do that.

6 The safety risk to people is probably 7 relatively small. I mean, the worst case is you --

8 you lose vacuum, you reduce power, sit on your tens, 9 or you could just shut the -- shut the reactor down.

10 That's pretty -- pretty straight -- pretty simple from 11 that -- what power level to do, doesn't matter -- if 12 you want to do it or not.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have anything 14 else on that line?

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:, Not on that 16 one, but I have -- if we're done with that, I had some 17 -- little bit older.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead.

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Coming out of 20 Salem 1, spring 2001 outage, an issue where you're at 21 power for a very short time, and the generator turbine 22 tripped, the reactor tripped. And I think it was an 23 electrical kind of issue.

24 9 Which unit?

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Salem 1.

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90

-\ Unit 1.

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The spring of 3 2001 outage.

4 okay.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You're at full 6 power for a very short time, and the reactor -- the 7 generator tripped, the turbine tripped, the reactor 8 tripped. Something about a -- not wanting to start 9 the reactor, but the main steam stopped, shut per the 10 safety analysis. Do you remember that issue?

11 . Not wanting to start the 12 reactor, the main steam.--

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or you wanted 14 the reactor to -- management wanted the reactor to 15 come back up, but the shift people are saying, "We're 16 not going to do that with the main steam stopped 17 shut," because that was -- you know, the safety 18 analysis wouldn't allow that.

19 A Yeah. I think I remember 20 some decision on that. I don't think -- did we start 21 up with them? We didn't start up with the main steam 22 line isolation.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, you didn't.

24 Yeah. I remember some 25 discussion on that. To me that's a no-brainer. We --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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91 1 you know, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't at all support that 2 kind of decision. I don't know --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Tell me what 4 you remember about that issue.

5 Very little.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why? Because 7 it's so long ago, or because you weren't --

8-2 No. Because I probably 9 didn't spend much mental energy deciding on it, 10 because to me it was such -- such a wrong thing to do.

11 I think -- I think there was -- there might have been 12 some discussion over, hey, should we start up with the 13 main steam? And I'm not even -- I don't even recall 14 why that discussion was --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So let me ask 16 you, if that discussed occurred --

17 Well 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- where is it 19 coming from?

20 I don't know. Like I said, 21 I have a very vague recollection of it. And like I 22 said, I would not spend a lot of my mental energy 23 trying to decide that, because I do not think that is 24 a response. Starting up -- starting up with maybe the 25 secondary -- that might have been the same part of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

92 1 discussion with the vacuum. Was that vacuum that 2 was --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I don't think 4 so. This is the Salem 1 issue. I think the other one 5 you're telling me was a Salem 2 issue.

6 Yeah, that's right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The following year I 8 think, too.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There was an outage 11 in the spring of 2002.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And the point 13 the shift was making that they aren't going to start 14 the reactor until they were -- they were within a day 15 of actually bringing steam into the turbine building, 16 bringing steam into the turbine.

17 Yeah, I don't -- I don't 18 see -- there's nothing technically wrong with -- like 19 I said, some plants start up on their atmospheric 20 dumps. That has not been our philosophy. And if 21 we're not going to use the dumps, I mean, it --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you recall 23 there being some -- some discussion about that issue, 24 about an NRC performance indicator changing if the 25 plant didn't come up within a particular period of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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93 1 time? Do you recall that being talked about at all?

2 I know this is a while ago, but --

3 , No, I really don't -- this 4 one -- that one I don't have much recollection, 5 period. But no, I don't -- I don't remember any 6 discussion about performance here. We do discuss 7 performance indicators, and we do try to manage them.

8 So, I mean, I'm not saying that that is out of the 9 realm of possibility, but --

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 9F -- people do keep an eye 12 out to performance indicators saying, hey, how are we 13 doing against them? Are we making decisions that 14 support keeping the colors --

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 N-- favorable? And it's--

17 I think the NRC wants us to do that to some extent.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I must 19 say I -- you heard my question.

20 Yeah. I -- not that I 21 recall --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

23 - is my answer.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just want to take NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

94 1 a quick break, okay?

- Sure.

2 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's about 11:15 a.m.

4 This is -- I'm going to go ahead and end this side B, 5 because it's going to run out in a minute.

6 So we'll go off the record at 11:15.

7 (End of Tape 1, Side B. Beginning of Tape 2, Side A.)

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's 11:18 a.m.

9 What we were asking you about were these 10 general situations where -- what's been brought to our II attention are situations that caused the damaged work 12 environment, in that particularly things like the --

13 the steam like, that the perception is. that there is 14 -- this is non-conservative, it's a production 15 pressure, and it left that kind of a mark.

h Yeah.

16 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In terms of all that 18 we've discussed so far -- I think we've been through 19 at least four incidents -- is there anything else that 20 comes to your mind along those lines?

. No, not really. Not 21 22 really. I mean, a steam -- steam leak was the one 23 that I knew that we had discussed the most, you know, 24 at crew meetings and such, because of the -- because 25 of the perception that was out there on it.

J V NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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95 1 Really, of all the things that happened, 2 I really don't think that that -- and certainly 3 could speak to this better than anybody -- I don't 4 think that -- I think that was a case of him seeing, 5 you know, what the -- making a decision based on 6 immediate concerns and taking an action.

7 I certainly don't think there's any 8 pressure put on him to do that, and that would be my 9 perception. I don't --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 i--s there -- is there 12 pressure to produce electricity? Sure. There is some 13 -- some pressure to produce electricity. Do I agree 14 with all of their decisions? No. Can I live with 15 them? Yes, I pretty much can live with them. There 16 are certain ones I have trouble with living with, but 17 I expressed those to them, you know, privately.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And did you 19 express those to us this morning?

20 Yes Yes.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or no?

22 The specific situations 23 that I had the most trouble getting my arms around 24 were the things I spoke with you today about.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about anything NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

96 1 more recently, 2003 issues? We've gone from 2001, 2 2002, up through the grassing of 2003. But I don't 3 think anything later than that.

4 You know, the only thing to 5 happen that I was involved with -- and it's probably 6 the worst thing that has happened to me in my nuclear 7 career -- is I had a -- one of my workers get -- lose 8 the tips of two of his fingers during a -- replacing 9 a strainer basket, and they turned the (inaudible) 10 point and he -- you know, he wound up getting two of 11 his fingertips crushed.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fall outage?

13 !1 No, this is -- this is 14 post-outage. I mean, someone on night shift, a 15 weekend I think.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just recently?

17 No. No. This was like 18 going on two years ago.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Does he still 21 work at the plant?

22 Yes. A guy named 23 Ha great guy. But, you know, it was --

24 I think from a safety perspective, that's certainly 25 the -- by far the worst thing that has happened to me.

7-K NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

97 1 That's the first time any of my guys have gone home in 2 a different condition than they came to work in.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 Some we've done for 25 5 years and no -- no incident whatsoever, you know, and 6 that happened. So certainly I felt sort of 7 responsible for that, so -- but other than that, 8 nothing -- nothing significant. That particular 9 incident wasn't schedule pressure. It was just I 10 think we were having guys out there doing things, one, 11 that we didn't necessary have to do, and, secondly, 12 you know, there's some personal responsibility being 13 careful when you're doing it.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Personal safety 15 error?

16 Yeah. Yeah, in that case.

17 I mean, you do it successfully for 25 years, there's 18 risk involved with things in general, and you can do 19 it for 25 years without anybody getting, you know, 20 right -- one mistake.

21 Now, were we lucky? Yeah, maybe. Maybe 22 we were just being lucky. Certainly, if you look at 23 things in general, and one thing that made great in-24 roads is our job hazards analysis, which that 25 particular injury precipitated. We do job hazard NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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98 1 analyses on a lot of things in operations.

2 I think of all the things done on site, 3 obviously, 16 of our people on site, probably about 4 100 of them on the operating crews, we've probably got 5 60 or 80 percent of the job hazards analysis done 6 within Salem operations. Of all the -- of all the 7 things going on onsite that have risk, 60 percent of 8 the analysis of evolutions are done within Salem 9 operations.

10 And I think there's something like 80 11 people qualified to do these job hazards analyses.

12 Sixty of them are in Salem operations, because we 13 really take it seriously from that perspective, and we 14 really -- really work hard at it. It's unfortunate 15 that something bad has to happen.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Want to get that?

17 jNot really, but pardon me.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a quick 19 break.

20 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the 21 foregoing matter went off the record 22 briefly.)

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're back on the 24 record. It's approximately 11:24.

25 1 mean, we've done -- as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

99 1 far as personnel safety, we've worked pretty hard 2 since that injury. There was an injury over at Hope 3 Creek before that where a guy was almost killed.

4 There was a hydraulic, pneumatic thing, and it hit him 5 in the head, and he was -- and he was almost killed.

6 But between those two events, certainly I 7 think Salem I think should be proud of our -- of our 8 personal safety --

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

10 1* -- culture which we've 11 tried to develop. We've come a long way. We've got 12 a ways to go yet. Our use of PPE is -- in the field 13 is still -- as a site is somewhat -- is somewhat 14 lacking. I think it's rarely that I can go out and 15 not find somebody that's not wearing a PPE, which is, 16 you know, your last line of defense. I always 17 (inaudible) mine. -

18 But other than that, I think Salem 19 operations has a few things to be proud of as far as 20 personnel safety. It seems like this discussion is 21 more or less along the lines of, you know, management 22 decisions associated with where -- where (inaudible) 23 units and why. So in that realm, yeah, I think 24 they're -- I think we've discussed there's been a 25 couple of issues which -- which there have been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

100 1 disagreements, which I think are to some extent 2 natural.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's another 4 issue. It was brought out fairly recently. The 5 BF-19, a stuck BF-19 valve, does that ring a bell?

6 Yeah. I was on shift for 7 that. It happened on a night shift. I was the-8 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can you just discuss 10 what occurred there?

11

Sure. On night shift they 12 tried to manipulate it. Let's see. Actually, they 13 determined that it wasn't moving. Exactly how do you 14 determine that? I'm not sure if they were doing a 15 partial search on -- the bottom line is they 16 determined that it didn't look like it was moving from 17 its current position.

18 Got valve engineering involved. They said 19 based on what they're seeing, they think the valve 20 would close, but it's a controller problem. I came in 21 on day shift, and I said, "I'm not absolutely 22 convinced it's a controller problem. We need to run 23 this to ground. But we'll stick with your -- your 24 determination that it's a controller problem because 25 I'm coming in here first thing on day shift, and I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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101 1 -- we're going to make the best decision, you know, we 2 can based on the best possible information."

3 So at that point, I started keeping a log, 4 which I ended up giving to all the --

5 you know, at least a number of the meetings we held.

6 And as quickly as we could, got people together, got 7 a troubleshooter together, to go out to determine what 8 the condition of the valve was.

9 I think really what it comes down to, 10 coming out of night shift, they were mistaken in that 11 they thought it was a controller problem, although 12 that was their best estimate of what -- that was their 13 reasonable --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Could you just 15 explain what would be the difference -- I mean, what 16 -- if it's a controller problem, how does it get 17 handled?

18 Well 19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And if it's not, 20 what --

21 Well, if it's a controller 22 problem, and the demand is demand -- it's not 23 responding to demand, well, that's a problem with 24 feeding the steam generators and keeping the unit 25 online. I mean, where you want to -- how you want to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

102 1 handle the unit, which is a lot of what our discussion 2 was. Hey, if we have to move the unit, how are we 3 going to do it with this valve in this condition? So 4 it's a problem from that perspective.

5 But if it'll isolate, it'll meet its 6 design safety function, which is to close on a 7 feedwater isolation signal. So from a tech spec and, 8 you know, well, if there's design function, you're in 9 good shape. So they're thinking, okay, well, it's a 10 controller problem. We've got a -- you've got a plant 11 transient problem here if we have to move the unit for 12 some reason, but we think it's operable, although we 13 still have some troubleshooting to do to refine that 14 position and confirm it.

15 So it came in a day shift. We all kind of 16 said, you know, not convinced, we still need to do 17 some troubleshooting on this. So I guess between 3:00 18 in the morning, it's about time that -- it took us 19 until 3:00 in the afternoon to develop a 20 troubleshooting plan, which, I mean, this is a feed 21 valve to main generator. So --

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An important 23 valve?

24 It's a very important 25 valve. And, I mean, it -- talk about cause a

... / ..

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103 1 transient. You can cause an overfeed transient, which 2 has some pretty serious repercussions. You can, you 3 know, have an underfeed (inaudible), which has pretty 4 serious functions from a design basis perspective.

5 So, really, what we want to do is put the 6 plant in stable condition, figure out a troubleshoot 7 that we could do without causing a transient, to 8 refine the position and confirm what we've thought to 9 be true, and then take the appropriate actions 10 directed by tech specs.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was your shift 12 allowed to proceed as -- as you wanted it to? Being 13 conservative, reviewing things?

14 Well, I mean, I'll tell you 15 my gut feeling coming in on that day was I wasn't 16 convinced it was a control problem.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But you 18 told --

19 But. that was a gut feeling.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But 21 then, you come in with your plan, and you're moving 22 forward through your shift--

23 .] I wasn't happy with the 24 speed at which the troubleshooter was developed.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

104 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But (inaudible) 2 that.

3 But beyond that, really, 4 what -- the only thing that I wasn't happy with was --

5 was at 3:00 in the afternoon we said, "You know what?

6 We've done what we can do to confirm or deny it's a 7 control problem. It really appears that there is 8 something preventing this valve from closing." ---

9 Okay. The time of discovery is now.

-- WeLr-e- a--1ing-thi-s-inoperahle I forgettbe exact 119 time, but it was sometime in the early to mid 12 afternoon.

13 We called it inoperable. We called that I the time of discovery. In fact, when I was going I 15 through the troubleshooting development, I said, "At 16 what point am I going to be able to say this valve is 17 operable is inoperable?" And they said, "At this step 18 right here in this troubleshooter." I said, "Okay.

19 Well, that's our job to get to this step is -- as 20 expeditiously and safely as we can."

21 So we got to that step. We tried -- we 22 tried to do what the step directed, and it didn't 23 work. We said, okay, now -- now it's a valve problem.

24 Something is causing the valve not to go closed, which 25 is its design function. So we started the tech spec NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

105 1 clock at that point.

2 Then we started to shut -- then we started 3 shutting down. Now, during the day one additional 4 thing we did is like, hey, we've got this valve that 5 could be stuck. That's one of the possible outcomes.

6 We sent guys out to the simulator to run a shutdown 7 with the valve stuck.

8 So they spent a good part of the morning 9 running it in the simulator to find out how you 10 operate- the-plant with it stuck, because we didn't --

...--.-- it--ts-not-something we-t-rain-on.--Its -pretty ---- pretty ---

12 o..-ut-side-o*urnormaing.

13 So we trained on it, got the guy -- the hifa -b-ri e-frheshifon ht hei results were, 16 and then they were in there for the -- and part of the 17 troubleshooting, we got to the point where it's 18 inoperable.

19 Okay. Well, now we need to figure out 20 where we're going to put the plant and how we're going 21 to get it there, because right now the valve is

. .. 22 __inoperable,and we've go-si-x hours I think to -- to 91 - g t it isolated.

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who made the 25 call that it was inoperable? Whose decision was that, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

106 1 yours?

2 3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you get any 4 pushback from people at that level?

5 4-I -- -.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Okay.

7 All right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you weren't happy 9 with the time for the trouble -- troubleshooting on 10 that, where -was the delay? Where did you see the

.... . .... 11-. .. delay-coming -from?-- -_ - - -- _

i=2 ..........

_--from

Ou~r -rocesb-:*-bt=ey_

13 quick. It's got the 50.59 connotations, and all I can 1t4-- -t-e--ll--qyo~u--_.isI'd -. look at kt it..

-5 -- mit errs in the look dL -- Iuok at uor~e, a+/-al?-Ze 16 more, as opposed to expedience.

17 So the -- we usually get a pretty decent 18 product, although this time I didn't think the 19 troubleshooter was that good.

I 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you talk 21 about troubleshoot, it's like the plan that was 22 _put together.

1-I.in -. g ws iI& ----------. ~l~A,.

24 troubleshooter, I mean, they do the 50.59 25 applicability review. It tells you to do some things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

107 1 and hopefully gets you to where -- the point where, 2 hey, I've got the information I need to make my 3 judgment, you know, make my -- make my call on the 4 valve.

5 We did as well as we could. I think we 6 should expect better of ourselves to get to that 7 point. I would have expected to have been there 8 sometime in the late morning -- you know, been to the 9 point where it's, you know, two or three hours earlier 10 than we were.

11 But, you know, you wait until guys get in, 12 you know, it's 7:00 or 8:00 in the morning, you get 13 guys up, you get them briefed on where the conditions 14 are, they start writing paperwork up, they bring you 15 -- they bring you a rock, you say, "That's the wrong 16 color rock. Go back and -- you have a rock that's a 17 different color." And you do that a couple of times, 18 and the next thing you know it's noon and you haven't 19 gone in the field yet.

20 So it's a question of, you know, how hard 21 do you push to get people in the field? And how much 22 time do you take to make sure that the product and 23 what you're doing is well thought out? Probably here 24 on the -- you know, making sure the cannonball was --

25 because used to call it polishing the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TPANSCRIBERS i323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

108 1 cannonball, you know. If you're going to shoot the 2 thing, don't spend all your time polishing it. Just 3 shoot it. But --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was the slowing 5 down or the slowness of that -- of that plan, was it 6 being driven by senior management?

7No 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The slowdown, 9 just to make sure --

10 i No. Well, I think 11 everybody -- me included -- was intent on whatever 12 we're going to do here, I take an action, I'm going to 13 know what the possible outcomes are and how to respond 14 to those possible outcomes.

15 In other words, you know, hey, if I go 16 down there and bang on the valve with a mallet, a 17 rubber mallet, and the valve goes shut, how are my 18 operators going to respond to that? So I had to have 19 those contingencies all set -- laid out before I did 20 it. I wasn't going to go and do -- and cause a 21 transient.

22 I mean, what -- it was a real possibility 23 knowing in retrospect that it was -- it was FME in the 24 valve. You hit it, and the FME falls out and goes 25 into the steam generator, you know. What happens NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

109 1 then? You know, the valve -- the valve swings around.

2 Now I've got a rattle in my steam generator. Now what 3 do I do?

4 You know -- or, you know, the valve -- the 5 valve just, you know, fails open or fails closed. My 6 guys -- I -- my expectation as a troubleshooter was 7 that those guys knew, you know, what were the 8 potential repercussions? How? And then my supervisor 9 had them briefed on how to respond to those 10 potentials. That took some time.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And they did do that, 13 didn't they? They went out and struck the valve 14 with --

15 Oh, yeah. Yeah, we did.

16 We did all of those things, which is what they wanted 17 to do first thing in the morning, and I said, "Well, 18 I want something more structured than we're going to 19 go out and beat on the valve."

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the timing 21 in there was on the prep for what happens if -- if you 22 do that and something dislodged.

23 - Well, it was two things.

24 It was getting a troubleshooter that was -- that was 25 in accordance with our procedures and met my needs.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

110 1 And my -- my needs were, you know, I could understand 2 what they were getting at, and it was well reasoned.

3 Some of the -- and like I said, they'd 4 come up with something like, well, this makes no sense 5 here, redo it, bring it back to me, because I wasn't 6 going to send somebody out with a troubleshooter that 7 wasn't going to work.

8 And in parallel with that, I had my 9 supervisor saying, "Okay. Well, this is what I think 10 they're going to bring us. How are you going to 11 respond?" So he's working that troubleshoot, and in 12 parallel we've also got a guy going to the simulator 13 saying, okay, we've got to assist -- let's say it's 14 stuck. How do we shut down the plant like we're going 15 to have to?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were all of those 17 initiated at the same time, the simulator practice --

18 -J In the morning. Yeah, in 19 the morning timeframe. I mean, it was --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That was day shift 21 for you?

22 Yes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You came on it?

24 .... Yeah. It was day shift.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

Iii

1. . . So, I mean, it was -- all 2 of those things were moving forward at the same time.

3 you know, asked that I try to 4 keep a rough log of, you know, the meetings that were 5 held, and I gave that to him at the end of the day, 6 because he said, you know, "Hey, down the road if we 7 -- if we get to a point where it's -- you know, we 8 find out it is inoperable down the road" -- and we had 9 this discussion first thing in the morning -- "we're 10 going to have to be able to say, hey, look at all the 11 stuff we did," you know?

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 1 Look at how hard we've been 14 working to get to this point. It might look like it 15 took us 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of sitting on our hands to say, you 16 know, it's operable, but really we worked very hard in 17 that 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to get to the point where we made the 18 decision.

19 Like I said, to summarize, I wasn't real 20 happy with the speed at which we got to the point of 21 troubleshooter. It's been my experience that 22 troubleshooters take a lot longer than I -- I like to 23 get to (inaudible). Maybe that's because they --

24 maybe it's because they're slowing me down, you know, 25 because I would say, you know -- I would probably just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

112 1 do a little bit more without -- maybe not thinking it 2 through all the way. I suppose that's what the 3 process does.

4 But I think we -- we certainly had 5 continuous activity all day long with -- with, you 6 know, dedicated supervisor, dedicated operators all 7 day long, with guys in the simulator working more or 8 less continuously until we got -- the (inaudible) 9 said, okay, we've now got enough information; it's 10 inoperable.

11 And then we had a fairly well thought out 12 plan of how to move the unit, although I think once 13 11took the watch after me, I think there became 14 -- there came out, hey, we think we can try this.

15 They modified the troubleshooter a little bit to try 16 some other things as the unit was coming down, none of 17 which worked.

18 And so there were some -- I think as they 19 were coming down there were some pauses. But the unit 20 got where it needed to be safely in a controlled 21 manner. And actually, if you think about it, you've 22 got a feed valve stuck open, and you're trying not to 23 overfeed the generator. Stuck open in a position 24 where it competed at full power.

25 And to shut the unit down and control the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW.

(2021 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrross.com

113 1 feed so that you don't over -- and you control the 2 level in the steam generator, the guys did a really 3 good job. I mean, it was -- it went from the 4 simulator recommendation, the simulator training. We 5 would have ended up tripping at a much higher power 6 level, which would have been more of a transient on 7 the plant. So I think the guys did a good job 8 shutting the unit down.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And it was 10 smart to do that.

11 Yeah. I think 12 made the recommendation.

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was a very 14 good recommendation.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thanks for 16 your perspective on that.

17 Sure.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's an issue that 19 has been pointed to as one that's a production 20 pressure, in that there was a hesitancy to declare the 21 valve inoperable and to bring the plant into shutdown.

22 But from what you're saying is there was no pressure 23 on you to do that. You had other considerations going 24 on.

25 . Yeah, I -- I thought to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

114 1 be honest with you --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that was your 3 call, to do it without outside influence.

4 There was no pressure put 5 on me to call it inoperable or not. But I thought it 6 would have been irresponsible to -- based on the scant 7 information coming from night shift, to make a a decision yet. I didn't -- I just didn't have it. And 9 I certainly did not hesitate, once it became apparent 10 that it was. So --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

12 . -- like I said, I still 13 don't think that we're -- we're operating as 14 effectively in the creation of troubleshooters as we 15 should be. But that's the best part we could do with 16 our processes as they are now.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Earlier we 18 started talking about this issue, these gray areas 19 where you're on this -- this one side of it, and at 20 certain times management was -- was on another side of 21 that gray area, the less conservative approach. Have 22 you examples where you do flip that? Where you would 23 say that management took the more safety-oriented 24 approach? Can you think of any examples of that?

25 I can't think of specific NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

115 1 examples, but I -- I'm sure I've had discussions with 2 both -Thhere --- you -know,--I ......

3 was saying, no, I think we -- we can continue to 4 operate this way, or, you know, I feel comfortable 5 with this.

6 And they're like, no, I really don't think 7 that that's the right thing to do. We're going to be 8 a little more conservative than that. So they 9 certainly talked me into a more conservative position.

i0~ SPECIALAGENT NEFF: So that's going up to the ops manager level.

I--2 I

- S51ý1_f __ __

I L---

13 you - -

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: level. I'm 16 Usually those decisions get 17 made at our level. I mean, we -- we typically, you 18 know, have those discussions. And if we come to an 19 agreement, I think we're generai'ly-sJin -- in -- you 20 know, enough in the ballpark that we don't get second-21 guessed. You know, we're -- it's, you know, a conservative decision. -It's defensible, and-we needed..

to move forward.~

7C 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about from 25 senior management? Had you seen the position from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

116 1 senior management being more conservative than that, 2 where you were?

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

4 level and --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And 8 i~right.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I guess 10 as well as_

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 It's not impossible, but 13 nothing comes to mind. I mean, I -- like I said, I've 14 been on both sides of the coin. So it would have been 15 -- nothing comes to mind. Certainly, nothing he did 16 that I remember, because generally if -- if I --

17 although I don't recall situation, I -- if I could 18 make a situation up in my brain, if somebody came up 19 to me and says, "No, I think we really need to be a 20 lot more conservative," I don't usually struggle too 21 much. I say, "Okay. Well, you know what? That's 22 defensible. I'm okay to go in that direction 23 usually." I usually fight harder in the other 24 direction, it seems.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I'd like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

117 1 to cover now is the issue of raising concerns, and 2 specifically we're talking about concerns of a nuclear 3 safety nature. It doesn't seem that there is any 4 hesitancy on the union's part to bring to your 5 attention industrial safety concerns, it seems.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

7 Personal --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think you gave two 9 examples -- personal, industrial safety. In the 10 beginning of the interview you gave us some examples 11 of that.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 (Inaudible.)

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of 15 operational decisions and those that would affect 16 nuclear safety, is there -- let me ask it from your 17 point of view. Are you comfortable in raising 18 concerns of that nature?

19 Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The issue where you 21 described -- where it was yourself and . .

22 took one position, and you went into that meeting and 23 had flipped around, and that was 24 involving the -- I think that was a valve issue, 25 wasn't it? -

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118 1

SJ-4, 5, 12, and 13, 1 2 think.

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. And you kind 5 of indicated -- this is what I wanted to follow up on.

6 You were of one mind, you had one position, and you 7 went into the meeting and _ had taken 8 another position. But you didn't -- you didn't raise 9 it to him there, that you --

10 Well, I did, but I didn't 11 -- I didn't dig my heels in. I didn't, you know -- I 12 mean, I wasn't confrontational about it. I was like 13 -- you know, I was like I thought he had already made 14 a decision on this and --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You kind of said you 16 pulled him aside individually.

17 "* Afterwards I pulled him 18 aside and basically said I didn't appreciate being put 19 in that situation. But at the meeting I basically 20 said I -- you know, I expressed that I still think we 21 need to test it reasonably.

22 O asically said it was his decision, 23 and he was making it, he was making a management 24 decision. And once that was said, to be honest with 25 you, it caught -- it took me aback to the point where NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

119 1 I did not go into that meeting, you know, ready to --

2 ready to basically say, well, you know what? This is 3 my position, and I'm sticking to it.

4 I guess I -- I was just taken so aback by 5 it that at that point I just kind of said, "Oh, okay.

6 Well, you're theý-

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's what 8 prompted you to talk to, *about being more 9 influential I think it was in terms of making those 10 arguments in the future?

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have that --

13 do you have a comfort level with being able to express 14 concerns? If you had a nuclear safety concern, can 15 you do that with -- with senior management? Your own 16 immediate management and senior management.

17

i-w Yeah. Yeah, I think I can.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that something 19 that has always been for you? Has it changed over 20 time, or has it been -- is that consistent since 21 you've been there?

22 I'm more comfortable -- I'm 23 more comfortable now than I was in the -- in the 24 recent past.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why is that?

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120 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just 3 (inaudible) personnel?

4 . Yeah, mostly.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is the response 6 different if you raise a concern now?

7 Well, I -- I haven't come 8 into that situation yet.

9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You've got 10 Wild" back now.

11. The proof is in the 12 pudding. But I haven't.-- I haven't been put in that 13 position, which says something. And I have not -- if 14 I have found myself in that position, I haven't --

15 since I haven't, I'm just supposing. So I haven't 16 found myself in that position, and I don't expect to.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But your comfort 18 level is in with -- with who you're approaching now as 19 opposed to who you were approaching -- having to 20 approach before?

21 DREW I guess that's one way to 22 put it, yeah.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But is that the 24 way you'd put it?

25 Yeah. That's the way I'd NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

1-1n' 'A A A-" 1AIAOC IKIf-T- KI rl t' )rnn;27n1 I r ,.no . m

121 1 put it.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were the 3 individuals that would have given you the most 4 concern?

5i iIi Well, I mean, the 6 situations that I mentioned were involving our 7 management and So I guess -- I guess 8 that was one of them.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's0 10 too, or --

11 12 -- I think I said with -- with I don't think he 13 was -- he was much more than a reflection of his boss.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

15 Correct. That's my --

16 that's my perception of him.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Anybody else?

18 No. No. I mean, to be 19 honest with you, I think my AOMs have always been very 20 receptive to conservative decisions. They will on 21 occasion challenge -- challenge my -- my logic. You 22 know, hey, this is your logic; why is that?

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's to be 24 expected, though, I would think -- to a certain 25 extent.

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mnrvf 'fsAAAQ2 %IAIASR11IfITfl n r. 9(01nA A7A1 vwnw nPnIrnrnssorm

122 1 I expected it. And it --

2 my opinion has always been -- been to my recollection 3 respected by my direct superiors. So from that 4 perspective, I certainly have no problem, you know, 5 raising concerns t-0.0A and 6 so far to And they have always been 7 receptive and --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What about 9e iadifferent position now.

10 A He's -- I guess he might 11 have been involved in some of those same decisions as 12 MR But-it -- they -- it usually comes from 13 a fairly good safety perspective. I mean, I -- I 14 generally found that I agreed with him on most cases.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that 16 your comfort level is shared by your peers? Let's 17 just address at this point in time. Are the people 18 that you work with comfortable in raising --

19 Yeah.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- concerns if they 21 have them?

22 My peers or my 23 subordinates?

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, your peer level.

25 My peers? Yeah, I think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

...................... - *m

123 1 they share my perspective more or less.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you become aware 3 that they had a hesitancy to raise concerns under.

5 No. I mean, like I said, 6 we were dealing with some strong personalities. I 7 think people were aware of -- when confrontations took 8 place, you know, just, you know, heated disagreements, 9 those rumors spread fast, and people discuss them. So 10 those -- those are fairly widely known.

11 But I think we've got enough strong 12 personalities, and I think most -- most people will 13 still raise them and still fight for their position, 14 you know, and argue their position openly. I don't 15 think anybody -- there's no -- the ops managers aren't 16 a shrinking violet, so I don't think there's anybody 17 that's going to, you know, shrink back from raising 18 concerns.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the other part of 20 that is, are people able to raise concerns without 21 fear of retaliation? Is that anything that you've 22 ever become aware of, that somebody has expressed 23 concerns and been retaliated for having done so? I 24 should say retaliated against for having done so.

25 . Not to my knowledge. I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

124 1 not saying that -- there are people that their 2 perceptions are that they are retaliated against.

3 I raised the grievance o He 4 thinks that, you know -- that that's a form of 5 retaliation for him raising a concern.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

8 I respectfully disagree 9 with him on that. But, you know, that is his 10 perception.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What about 12 people at your level, theQ level? Have 13 any of them ever --

14 R No, I don't think so.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- felt that 16 some action has been taken against them because 17 they--

18 There was a period when 19 there was a.-- you know, the only thing that comes to 20 mind is there was a period of time when we had a coach 21 -- a lady that was -- that was a leadership coach, you 22 know, a communication coach. And I'll tell you what, 23 she got a lot of people-- people were in for her --

24 their jobs when she was around.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

125 1 _ Kim Hardin.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And why did that --

3 *Well, because she had the 4 ear of senior management, and it was felt, whether 5 rightly or wrongly, that if you got out of line, if 6 you didn't have the right attitude, and she -- she, 7 you know, spoke to the right people, that, you know 8 what? You wouldn't be shift manager for very long.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there a basis for 10 that? I mean, did something happen there, or was it 11 a feeling?

12 " Well, we had some -- we had 13 some meetings that -- and then, one on one and in 14 groups that basically she said, you know, hey, I'm --

15 I'm, you know -- we expect a lot from you guys, and, 16 you know, she never threatened my job specifically.

17 But I know that I talked to .M and she 18 basically said that, you know, hey, you guys -- you 19 guys -- you guys tow the line or, you know, I'll get 20 somebody who will.

21 But that's management, you know? If 22 you're not --

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which way was 24 she talking about, tow which line? Being conservative 25 or --

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126 1 . Well, it wasn't even 2 conservative. it was just -- it was behaving in 3 accordance with their -- which had nothing really to 4 do with conservative ops or non-conservative ops. It 5 just had to do with, you know, relationships and 6 things. It was odd.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What was her goal?

8 . I think her spoken goal was 9 to make us better leaders.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So she had 11 behaviors in mind that would get you there?

12 Right.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

14 And to be quite honest with 15 you, I had no trouble with her. She gave me some 16 advice. I took some of it. I didn't take others of 17 it. But certainly people were worried, you know, that 18 they -- they'd say the wrong thing around her, and it 19 would get to, you know, the wrong ->-te right ears or 20 the wrong ears, whichever you (inaudible), and they 21 wouldn't be in their position very long. That was 22 just -- it was just an odd situation in general.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that's what comes 24 to mind when you're thinking of retaliation.

25 Yeah. I mean, and I don't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

127 1 even know if that's -- it's not really retaliation.

2 It has nothing to do with raising concerns or 3 anything. It's just --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And not operations 5 either so much, right?

6 Yeah. Well, I mean, I 7 certainly wouldn't have bad-mouthed senior management 8 in front of her. I mean, but I wouldn't do that in 9 front of almost anybody. So if you did, it could be 10 career-ending, because it would go from, you know, 11 hear ear to, you know, other people's ear, you know.

12 But that was -- that was it. She was, 13 like I said, a leadership coach sort of, but --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of --

15 you're looking at that as management pressure on do it 16 this way, or potentially --

17 Oh, yeah. Right. We want 18 you to be, from their perspective, the best leader you 19 can be. And if you don't want to try to do that, 20 well, then, we'll find somebody who will try to.

21 From other people's perspective, it was, 22 hey, we want you to think like us. And if you don't 23 want to think like us, we'll get somebody to replace 24 you. So --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

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128 1 -- I1 mean, depending on 2 where your brain is.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Does anything else 4 come to mind in that -- in terms of people being able 5 to raise concerns? Does the environment work to 6 encourage that?

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Encourage that, 8 support that. You've got a change of people now, too.

9 We recognize that.

10 w wYeah.

I1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But if you 12 could think before and now under the new -- new 13 leadership.

14 - M, You know, I--people hear 15 stories. I don't know. I mean, I hear stories about 16 .. but that's just hearsay. That's just 17 rumors.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: About what?

19 Oh, I -- I heard that 20 people -- people, you know, write notifications and 21 he'd read them the riot about it, or some such thing.

22 You know, but --

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did that ever 24 happen to you?

25 ,eNo N. No. But, I mean, I'll NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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129 1 tell you, I don't write the notifications the way some 2 people -- some people, they'll write notifications, 3 you know, that -- that imply things that are just, you 4 know, wild exaggerations or, you know, and -- and some 5 people get upset about that. I mean, I would never 6 write a notification that didn't -- wasn't based on 7 fact. So I don't think anybody would ever come to --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, it should 9 be based on fact, right? I mean, it's --

10 . Absolutely. I think if 11 you're putting suppositions in a notification, your 12 likelihood of getting an outcome that you desire is 13 much more remote because you end up getting -- and I 14 tell my guys, it's like, you put supposes in there, 15 and people say, well, you know, the supposition is 16 wrong, the whole thing goes away. Or, you know, they 17 throw out --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

19 'PECiAL AGEN TMA*ltr -- the baby 20 with the bath water. I go -- I go, can you just stick 21 to the facts? Let them draw their own conclusions, 22 and hopefully it comes to the right -- right decision.

23 People use e-mail -- I mean, my soap box, people use 24 e-mail as a weapon. You know, they say, such and such 25 is wrong, yada, yada, yada, (inaudible), you know, it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

130 1 goes to everybody on site.

2 And I said, you know, hey, you might be 3 right when you do that. What you said in your e-mail 4 might be right, but you just pissed off everybody that 5 would do anything about it. So everybody else is 6 going to say, well, you know, forget you. And I said, 7 you know, if you want that, you know, do it through 8 the right channels, and you're more likely to be 9 successful. But --

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The notifications 11 that you had heard that , responded to, 12 were they of that nature? Were they supposed to be 13 something that was a legitimate concern?

14 Like I said, it was a 15 rumor, and that's why I hesitate to even mention it.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.

17 -- Because I --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about timeframe 19 for that? Recently?

20 No. I don't know, last 21 year or so. I think I heard it from a ,,you know, 22 who says, "Hey, what about this? I heard did 23 such and such." You know, it's -- rumors are --

24 rumors are a dime a dozen, and most of them are at 25 best half true.

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131 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A Salem! 1 2 Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just so we don't run 4 into anything that we haven't -- you know, we can 5 clarify as we go through it, because we do talk to a 6 lot of people --

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- wha *- was that 9 involving.?

10 1~ w Ii SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

12 Yes. He's got--

13 so he hears things that -- rumors 14 and things that, you know, we had different channels 15 than W or the rest of (inaudible). So every once 16 in a while you hear something like -- oh, that sounds 17 interesting, sounds juicy, but --

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Just so 19 there's no dead space, let me take a quick break, 20 because I want to check my notes.

21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure. I think 22 we're almost done.

23 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the 24 foregoing matter went off the record 25 briefly.)

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132 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on.

2 It's 12:00.

3 And you just gave us the company -- it's 4 your -- your response or the company response to that 5 grievance filed by * *MM" 6 It's the response that I 7 gave to the first-level grievance.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

9 ,That I discussed earlier, 10 which was associated with perception 11 that we did not want to hear his concerns and that we 12 were harassing him.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Thank you.

14 I had -- there's one other incident I 15 wanted to mention to you to see if you had any 16 knowledge of this. Apparently, this was sometime in 17 2002. There was some questionable direction to a 18 shift manager to NA a startup checklist. And this was 19 supposed to have come from a manager.

20 Did you hear anything like that? It 21 caused some kind of a problem. Our understanding is 22 it caused some type of a problem in that the 23 instruction was to NA the startup checklist.

24 4 responded to that, in that he was -- he was 25 upset by it when he heard about it, and this was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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133 1 supposed to be in 2002.

2 kg - .* JDo you know what the 3 startup checklist was?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I don't have the 5 specific on it. It may have involved -- and I'm not 6 sure if this was the direction to or involved somehow 7 in it - Do you recall anything in --

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Something that 9 came out of Davis-Besse, is that where it was?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Potentially that, and 1I it -- and maybe:not. It could have been. Had you

12 heard anything --

~No.

13 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- like that that 15 MK responded to? And I believe it could have 16 involved It was 17 instructions.

18 No, not -- not that I 19 recall. Not that I recall. Somethinig seems vaguely 20 familiar, but I -- I certainly -- nothing comes to 21 mind. As you mentioned, I might be memory challenged, 22 but I don't recall --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It doesn't seem like 24 you had any involvement in something like that first 25 hand?

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1 ...-

134

1. . Nothing sticks out in my 2 mind. Not that I can remember. I mean, if you have 3 some more particulars, maybe I can -- I could --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The only other thing 5 I could add to it is, if you can't recall, there was 6 a -- anything specific, it had maybe to do with the --

7 a walkdown prior to startup.

8 .1 Oh. Like a containment 9 walkdown?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Exactly. Do you 12 recall anything like that?

12 l No. I mean, it 13 \"_might -- might recall something along those 14 lines. mean, you see, NA'ing -- we do NA things.

15 Our procedures allow us to NA things.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, this is 17 something that apparently caused a reaction, though.

18 The instruction was to NA the step and --

19 - 1 That sounds so familiar.

20 I'm just trying to --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: --

22 reacted to that. And if it had to do with the 23 walkdown and the containment --

24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That directly 25 relates to Davis-Besse and --

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135 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. It was an 2 added -- procedures that were added as a result of the 3 Davis-Besse situation.

4 It would have been this 5 year?

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: 2002. Nothing is 7 really coming to mind?

8 .... No.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

10 . Nothing is coming to mind.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just a couple 13 more things to finish up. We've talked to a lot of 14 people during the course of --

15Su re.

16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- trying tok 17 figure out this work environment, if there's a work 18 environment problem down here. From our questions to 19 you, you probably can figure out we've talked to a lot 20 of people, because of the information we got, some of 21 the detail anyway.

22 What's been told to us is a statement that 23 was provided that you had said something to this 24 effect, maybe in one of these frustrating incidents 25 we've talked about. Like you made a comment --

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136 1 On quote?

2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I don't 3 know if it's a quote.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To the effect of.

5 All right.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's -- yes, to 7 the effect of like, look, I'm the one who is licensed 8 here, you're not. I'm the one who is responsible. My 9 license is on the line every day. Would you have 10 made --

11 .i Made that to a manager?

12 Made that statement to a manager?

13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A contemporary, 14 shift manager --

15 I could see myself 16 discussing incidents like the one with.,

17 you know, separated from the incident with a peer of 18 mine saying, you know, hey, it's our license on the 19 line.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

21 We need to be -- if we're 22 going to -- if these decisions are going to be made, 23 we need to either be making them or be, you know, in 24 complete agreement with them. I could see myself 25 saying something like that, yes. Would I -- have I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

137 1 said that to a manager? I don't think -- I don't 2 think I've said that, you know, hey, it's my license, 3 not yours.

4 I did have a discussion along those lines jfollowing

.5....

.. the SJ valve issue, 6 saying, "You know, I'm not sure it's appropriate 7 that is making this decision when you're the 8 senior license holder." And I said, "I don't know 9 where the lines -- you know, the decisionmaking, you 10 know, drops, you know, whose desk it actually" --

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who is 12 responsible.

13 -- responsible --

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

15 -- but it seemed to me like 16 this a senior license -- a senior license's decision, 17 which was at that time>

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And he had a 19 facility license,

did?

20 HHe wasthe ,which 21 is typically the senior facility license, yeah. So I 22 said -- and I don't -- I still don't know exactly who 23 -- when it gets up into that realm, who was the 24 decisionmaker. I'm think it was' n that case.

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

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138 1 M-----*And I talked to him about 2 that, and I said it seems to me like he should have a candid discussion wit~ and I think he did, about 4 how those decisions get made.

5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said you 6 could see yourself making a statement similar to that 7 effect.

8 Yeah. Yeah. I certainly 9 had discussions along those lines with other people 10 that -- one thing I --

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: About one of 12 the incidents we've talked about?

13 iM Yeah. I -- to be honest 14 with you, the one about the SJ valves, I at that point 15 kind of changed my mind and said, you know, sometimes 16 I'm going to have to be able to go into these just --

17 these meetings and be willing to say, you know what, 18 put my foot down and say, you know, this meeting is 19 over, and I'm 7-20 We're going to come -- come up with a decision I'm 21 going to be able to live with, or we're going to have 22 -- we're going to keep talking.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who would you 24 have had that --

25 Well, I was -- when I had NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

139 1 discussions along those lines witho it 2 was about,*

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About that SJ valve 5 incident?

6 Yeah. I mean, I didn't 7 like the position it put me in. It put me in the 8 position -- granted, I wasn't the decisionmaker at 9 that point. I wasn't on shift. I wasn't the guy --

10 but I was, I felt, one of the guys that should have 11 had significant input into this.

12 And like I said, I was mostly taken aback.

13 I wasn't ready -- I didn't go to that meeting, you 14 know, thinking, okay, got my dukes up, I'm ready --

15 ready to put, you know, put my license on the line 16 here, because I didn't think that was in the cards.

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They blind-18 sided you.

19 Right.

20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would that 21 be --

22 4 Effectively, yes. And I 23 learned something from it. I -- and that's why, when 24 I had the subsequent conversation about circ water, it 25 was like, hey, I'm digging my heels in and I -- you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

140 1 know, and I -- I -- at that point I didn't give in.

2 The decision wasn't mine to make anyway, but --

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No. That was onW.

4 right?

5

Right. Right. But, you 6 know, I -- it changed -- it changed my thinking 7 slightly, not that I didn't think I would be heard, 8 but I would have to work harder. And I would have to 9 be willing to use tools that I had previously not 10 thought necessary.

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you think 12 today with the change of management you still feel 13 that way? Or do you --

14 1 don't.

15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- (inaudible) 16 like you have to do that.

17 I don't think so. I think 18 we' re moving the fi1'*= L.---- 1JF but the 19 position. I don't think the position had much value, 20 personally. I've had no -- no problems withL% ,

21 thus far. And Mgt&

22 have always -- always been supportive along those 23 lines.

24 So, you know, I've certainly never been 25 pressured by either one of them, althougha m ,

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141 1 ill be accused by different people of, you 2 know, being production-oriented. And, you know, he 3 is. But he also -- he also would not sacrifice 4 safety.

S He might just have a different threshold.

6 He has never -- he has never forced his will on me.

7 He certainly expressed -- expressed his -- you know, 8 he's a very persuasive guy. He's a very smart guy.

9 And he can be very persuasive. But he has never, you 10 know, strong-armed me. So --

11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The work 12 environment -- we've talked about it the whole 13 morning, the safety conscious work environment. Do 14 you believe it's a healthy one down there at 15 Artificial Island?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well --

17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or at Salem.

18 You can speak to Salem.

19 You know what? I think we 20 have a ways to go on it. I think it's mostly because 21 of the union-management relationship.

22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because it 23 started out --

24 Because we're at odds with 25 each other. And until -- until we're both pulling the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

142 1 rope in the same direction, we're both looking at each 2 other's actions in the light of, okay, how is he 3 trying to screw me?

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (Inaudible.)

5 Yeah, exactly. And it's 6 not -- it's not -- it's not fair on either side.

7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.

8 . You know, that we -- the 9 union guys -- you know, you're trying to take money 10 away from them. I wouldn't expect them to be, you 11 know, saying, "Okay. Yeah, sure. Bring it on. We're 12 all for saving money at my expense." And the 13 management guy shouldn't every time somebody brings up 14 a safety concern think that they can -- this guy is 15 trying to make me look bad, you know. And it just 16 leads to -- that, as far as I'm concerned, is the 17 biggest risk we're running.

18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

19 . If one of my -- one of my 20 supervisors -- of these supervisors or one of the 21 superintendents, you know, colors a good concern in 22 light of -- in light of the relationship we now have 23 between union and management, I think that's really 24 the risk. Not the --

25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's something NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

143 1 you need to keep your eyes on, then.

2 Yeah. It's something we 3 need to focus on. I'm worried about it. And when 4 things like *grievance come up, I mean, 5 it -- I try to get as much input and as much help as 6 I can to make sure I handle it correctly. I -- and I 7 try to make sure I communicate with my guys, like, 8 hey, we still need to address every issue like it's 9 new and --

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Don't shoot the 11 messenger; address the issue.

12 Right. Don't throw out the 13 baby with the bath water. The notification might be 14 written with the intent to make you angry. Don't get 15 angry. Look at -- look at what is underneath that.

16 Maybe there is something in there...

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You see that as a 18 concern. Do you think your senior management has the 19 same understanding? Are they -- are they moving in a 20 direction to help correct that situation? -

21 (End of Tape 2, Side A. Beginning of Tape 2, Side B.)

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're on 23 Side B. It's approximately 12:11 p.m. We were asking 24 if you're seeing the concern of -- in management 25 looking at the union's issues as maybe not valid, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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144 1 the union looking at management as you don't want to 2 do that because you want to save money. And there is 3 this --

4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's a power 5 struggle.

6 7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- starting between 8 them.

9 l Right.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The question is:

11 you're seeing that as an issue. Does senior 12 management see it as an issue?

13 I think.so. I think.

1"sees it as -- as probably one of the major 15 issues.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of 17 anything that's being done to address it?

18 I know that they are --

19 yeah, I believe is trying to get people in -- you 20 know, critical people in small space at the same time 21 and force them to talk it out. I mean, really, what 22 it comes down to is, you know, we fired a guy and that 23 guy is very influential in the union. And the guy 24 that fired -- the guys that fired him are now theV(i 25 who was the same position as he was, and the NEAL R. GROSS ., .-*

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1 II 145 2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this 4

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

7 gone.

8 . *Well, he's the 9

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

11 So, I mean, he's gone -- he 12 might be out of the reach ofj 13 is certainly not. And, I mean, I've had 14 discussions with the union guys, and a number of them 15 come up and say, "Well, as long as , is in 16 position, I don't see things getting better." You 17 know, bottom line is they're not -- they're going to 18 keep, you know --

19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Making the 20 issue 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

22 Right. Because it--

23 because they -- I think they consider it a win. You 24 know, not only did _*get all of his back 25 pay, but, look, we got the guy fired that fired him.

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146 1 So as long as that kind of environment is in there, I 2 think --

3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It poisons the 4 well, right?

5 Yeah, it poisons the well.

6 I'm -- my fear is not so much, you know, hey, go 7 ahead, have your sour grapes, but I'm worried about my 8 people, the guys that handle those concerns 9 mishandling one, because of --

10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

11 -- and I have frequent 12 conversations about it. But I'll tell you, you know, 13 emotions get involved, and it's a potential.

14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

15 NOW' And I'm worried -- and 16 that's my major concern.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have 18 anything else you'd like to add to that?

19 No, I think I've talked for 20 a while.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, we took quite 22 a bit of your time.

23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you've 24 got our cards, if you --

25 Yes.

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147 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- if something 2 comes up along the lines of what we talked about, an 3 issue where you --

4 ..... lil: .-- Do I have your card?

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I did not give you 6 mine.

7 Okay.

8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An issue you 9 felt that was -- that you need to talk to us about 10 something where it was a non-conservative --

11 Certainly.

12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- please give 13 us a call.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: If you want to add or 15 clarify anything, and also if you wanted to reach me 16 for the purpose of transcript review, you could do 17 that.

18 I just have some closing questions for 19 you. Have I or any other NRC representative offered 20 you any promises of reward or threatened you in any 21 manner in exchange for your information today?

22 No 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you met with us 24 freely and voluntarily?

25 g Yes.

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148 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you don't 2 have anything to add at this point?

3 No, not unless you have 4 more questions.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. No, but I 6 thank you for your time. And we took an extensive bit 7 of your time. Thanks very much for that.

8 You're very welcome.

9 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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MI')%l~A -AAAA %A/AQW1K11f-TfNI nf ' -DAnA(,.7nl1nI.n-

It*

CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

Name of Proceeding: Interview of Docket Number: 1-2003-051F Location:

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.

Lisa'Scriber Official Transcriber Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.

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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nea1rrns% cnm

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