ML061790189
| ML061790189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend (NPF-047) |
| Issue date: | 06/22/2006 |
| From: | Howell A NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Hinnenkamp P Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EA-06-154, IR-05-005 | |
| Download: ML061790189 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000458/2005005
Text
June 22, 2006
Paul D. Hinnenkamp
Vice President - Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT:
NRC RESPONSE TO ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. DENIAL OF NONCITED
VIOLATION 05000458/2005005-02
Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:
On February 13, 2006, the NRC issued NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2005005
documenting the results of NRC inspection activities for the period October 1 through
December 31, 2005. During this inspection, as documented in the report, the NRC identified a
noncited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.1.A for the failure of River Bend Station
personnel to shut down one reactor recirculation loop within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of determining that the
recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch was greater than 5 percent while operating at greater
than 70 percent of rated core flow. In a letter dated March 24, 2006, you informed the NRC that
Entergy Operations, Inc. was contesting this violation. Entergys position was that River Bend
Station complied with the requirements of TS 3.4.1; therefore, a violation did not occur. The
NRC reviewed your letter dated March 24, 2006, and determined that Noncited Violation
05000458/2005005-02 was appropriate in that on October 31, 2005, a violation of TS 3.4.1,
Condition A, did occur. This letter documents our basis for this decision.
On October 31, 2005, the Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve B hydraulic power unit
tripped due to a blown control power fuse, causing Flow Control Valve B to drift open.
Operators throttled closed Flow Control Valve A to maintain reactor power at 100 percent,
resulting in a recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch of approximately 8.2 percent. The
operators entered TS 3.4.1, Condition A, because the reactor recirculation loop jet pump flow
mismatch exceeded 5 percent with the plant operating at greater than 70 percent rated core
flow. Two hours later, operators exited TS 3.4.1, Condition A, and entered TS 3.4.1,
Condition D, which required that the reactor be placed in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The flow
mismatch existed for 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> before repairs were completed and recirculation loop jet pump
flow was restored to normal.
In your March 24, 2006, letter, you requested that the NRC reconsider our conclusion and find
that a violation of TS 3.4.1 did not occur. Your letter indicated that the basis for contesting the
violation was that the NRC Enforcement Manual and previous enforcement precedence
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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concludes that no violation of TS exists unless all actions are not completed within all applicable
completion times. You stated that, in this instance, River Bend Station met the Limiting
Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements prior to the required completion time of Action D.
Entergy agreed that the operators had an alternative to restore recirculation flow mismatch
within limits or shut down a recirculation loop to satisfy TS 3.4.1.A, Condition A, Required
Action A.1; however, Entergy did not believe this was the most prudent course of action allowed
by the River Bend Station TS, citing operator training to not make decisions in haste that may
lead to nonconservative actions. The NRC agrees that operators should operate the nuclear
plant in a deliberate and conservative manner. However, TS are required to be followed and
licensees do have the option to request enforcement discretion if compliance with TS would
involve an unnecessary plant transient.
Upon receipt of your letter, NRC staff, including members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation and the Office of Enforcement, initiated a review of the circumstances and
documents related to this issue, including your bases for concluding that a violation did not
occur. Based on this review, the NRC concluded that the violation, as documented in NRC
Integrated Inspection Report 05000458/2005005, occurred as described.
Your basis for contesting the violation was primarily based on the premise that the NRC
Enforcement Manual and previous enforcement precedence indicate that a TS violation does
not exist unless all actions are not completed within all applicable completion times. Our review
found that the NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 8.1.1.b, provides guidance on how to cite a
violation for equipment inoperability. The guidance assumes that a licensee, upon entering an
LCO required action, takes the necessary steps to complete the required TS action within the
allotted completion time. If, for some reason (e.g., equipment malfunction or inaccessible
equipment), a licensee attempts, but is unable, to complete the required action in the allotted
completion time, the licensee would then enter the next appropriate TS required action.
However, in response to the flow mismatch, River Bend Station personnel made a conscious
decision not to take action to shut down one recirculation loop within the 2-hour completion time
but, instead, at the end of the 2-hour period, entered Required Action D in lieu of completing
Required Action A.1. The guidance in the Enforcement Manual was not intended to apply to a
situation in which the licensee chooses not to meet the required action in the required
completion time.
With respect to previous enforcement precedence, you cited an apparent violation documented
in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/96-12 associated with an emergency diesel generator being
inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this example, a diesel generator was restored to
service 83 hours9.606481e-4 days <br />0.0231 hours <br />1.372354e-4 weeks <br />3.15815e-5 months <br /> after it was declared inoperable. This exceeded the 72-hour action time
allowed by TS. You stated that the NRC, in a letter dated October 11, 1996, reconsidered its
position on this violation stating that the apparent violation was withdrawn as the NRC agreed
with Entergys position that the TS, in this case, allowed a total of 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> to place the plant in
Mode 3 and that a violation did not occur.
In the above scenario, River Bend Station personnel, upon discovery of the condition, took
actions to repair the emergency diesel generator and restore it to an operable status prior to
entering Mode 3. The NRC appropriately agreed with the licensees determination that a total
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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of 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> was allowed by TS to place the plant in Mode 3 and that a violation did not occur.
The current disputed noncited violation differs from this example in that River Bend Station
personnel made no attempt to correct the flow mismatch or shut down one recirculation loop
during the 2-hour completion time, despite the fact that it was within their capability to do so.
Two hours after entering Required Action A.1, the flow balance was not restored and operators
chose to enter Condition D. Personnel elected not to take the actions described in Required
Action A.1, as opposed to the above scenario in which the licensee was unable to restore
operability of the emergency diesel generator within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
In your letter, you cited TS 1.3 as providing guidance for the use of completion times in the
action section of individual LCOs and that the basis for the NRC noncited violation seemed to
be in conflict with TS Section 1.3, Example 1.3-6. Based on the NRCs review, we determined
that Example 1.3-6 clearly states that entry into Condition A offers a choice between Required
Action A.1 or A.2. If Required Action A.1 is followed and the action is not met within the
completion time (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), Condition B is entered. If Required
Action A.2 is followed and the completion time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is not met, Condition B is entered. If
after entry into Condition B, Required Action A.1 or A.2 is met, Condition B is exited and
operation may then continue in Condition A. There is no implication that a choice exists to
move from Condition A to Condition B. TS actions which offer a choice are designated by an
or statement. In this example, the actions listed in Condition A.1 or Condition A.2 are required
to be completed. If they cannot be completed, then the actions of Condition B must be
completed. The noncited violation concerns LCO 3.4.1 required actions in Conditions A and D.
Unlike Example 1.3-6, there is no or connecter in LCO 3.4.1. Upon discovery that a specified
condition exists, required actions must be completed. In this case, operators were required to
take the actions required by TS 3.4.1.A.1 to shut down one recirculation loop within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
The bases section of the RBS TS emphasizes this requirement and provides the following
basis: With both recirculation loops operating but the flows not matched, the recirculation
loops must be restored to operation with matched flows within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. If the flow mismatch
cannot be restored to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, one recirculation loop must be shutdown.
The bases section further states that: The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is based on the low
probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete
the required action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in
core flow conditions to be quickly detected. The required action for Condition A should have
been completed within the 2-hour completion time to avoid operating the plant in an unanalyzed
condition as defined in the bases of TS 3.4.1. An additional action available to the operators
was to restore the flow balance between the recirculation loops.
You stated that LCO 3.0.2 provides the applicability rules related to application of LCO required
actions when an LCO is not met. You described your response to the flow mismatch as being
supported by LCO 3.0.2. Based on the NRCs review, we determined that the bases for
LCO 3.0.2 establish that, upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated actions
shall be met. The completion time of each required action for an action condition is applicable
from the point in time that an action condition is entered. The required actions establish those
remedial measures that must be taken within specified completion times when the requirements
of an LCO are not met. The Bases for LCO 3.0.2 states that the reasons for intentionally
relying on the actions include, but are not limited to, performance of surveillances, preventive
maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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actions for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety. On
October 31, 2005, Condition A was entered at 3:06 p.m. The operating log indicates that the
operators did not attempt to shut down one recirculation loop within the 2-hour completion time,
thus allowing the plant to enter into an unanalyzed condition as defined in the Bases of
TS 3.4.1. At 5:06 p.m., Condition D was entered. Because the required actions of Condition A
had not been met in the required completion time, the plant remained in an unanalyzed
condition for another 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> until the recirculation flows were matched within TS limits.
You stated that Entergys overarching concern is the potential for precedence setting if the NRC
upholds this violation in that licensees would not be able to follow time tested principles used to
implement TS actions and that upholding the violation would be a significant shift in industry
and regulatory practice. As discussed above, proper implementation of TS requires licensees
to implement the required actions when LCOs are not satisfied. This is a fundamental concept
of TS implementation and compliance. In addition, a licensee has the option to request an
exigent TS change or enforcement discretion if compliance with TS would involve an
unnecessary plant transient. In this case, TS 3.4.1, Required Action A.1, was required to be
completed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the flow mismatch. The bases for this action, and the 2-hour
completion time, were described in the Bases for TS 3.4.1. Required Action A.1 was an action
that was within the operators ability to complete within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Additionally, operators could
have taken actions to restore the recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch within TS limits and
restore compliance with TS 3.4.1.A. In this case, operators incorrectly determined that these
actions were not required. The NRCs position is that upholding the violation is consistent with
the principles and precedence regarding the proper implementation of TS.
You characterized the action required by Required Action A.1 as a compensatory action.
Actions required to be implemented when LCOs are not satisfied are required actions that must
be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the specific TS.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and
your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ by AVegel
Arthur T. Howell III, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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cc:
Senior Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President
Operations Support
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
General Manager
Plant Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Director - Nuclear Safety
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway
P.O. Box 651
Jackson, MS 39205
Winston & Strawn LLP
1700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-3817
Manager - Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.
Attorney General
Department of Justice
State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 6 -
H. Anne Plettinger
3456 Villa Rose Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Bert Babers, President
West Feliciana Parish Police Jury
P.O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Richard Penrod, Senior Environmental
Scientist
Office of Environmental Services
Northwestern State University
Russell Hall, Room 201
Natchitoches, LA 71497
Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P.O. Box 13326
1701 North Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78711-3326
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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Electronic distribution by RIV:
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OE:EA File (RidsOeMailCenter)
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SUNSI Review Completed: __kmk___
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R:\\_REACTORS\\_RBS\\2005\\RB2005-05 Denial Response.wpd
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ACES
D:DRP
KMKennedy;df
GMVasquez
ATHowell III
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/ by AVegel*
6/21/06
6/21/06
6/22/06
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
- Note: Response discussed with B. Mallett on 6/22/06