ML061780509
| ML061780509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2003 |
| From: | NRC/OI |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1267 | |
| Download: ML061780509 (153) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION au C)'~
Title:
Interview of W*-
Docket Number:
Location:
1-2003-051 F
)4 alem, New Jersey L~.I '
Date:
Wednesday, December 31, 2003 W6rk OrderNo.:
NRC-1267' Pages 1-151 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 miormation in llis record was ot,*o in accordance with the Freedom of Inlormation Act, exemptions FOIA-
/
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
++
++
+
4 OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATOR GENERAL 5
INTERVIEW
x 7
IN THE MATTER OF:
8 INTERVIEW OF Docket No.
9 1-2003-051F 10 (CLOSED) 11----------------------------------- x 12 Wednesday, December 31, 2003 13
(
14 15 The above-entitled interview was conducted 16 at 9:14 a.m.
17 18 BEFORE:
19 Special Agent EILEEN NEFF, NRC/RI/OI 20 Senior Special Agent JEFF
- TEATOR, 21 NRC/RI/OI 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2
9:14 a.m.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Today's date is 4
December 31, 2003.
The time is approximately 9:14 5
a.m.
Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC 6
Region 1, Office of Investigations.
Also present is 7
Senior Special Agent Jeff Teator from U.S. NRC Region 8
1, Office of Investigations.
This interview is being 9
conducted with
- spelled, who 10 currently is employed as a-iat th 11 A
The subject of the interview concerns the 12 safety conscious work environment at Salem and Hope 13
- Creek, the focus being your experiences at Salem.
(
14 We'll be discussing Salem today.
15 As I explained to you prior to going on 16 the record, you're being approached as a witness to 17 the inquiry.
You're not being approached as the 18 subject of any investigation. Also, you had indicated 19 you had no objection to swearing to the. information 20 that you're about to provide.
If you would raise your 21 right hand please.
22 Do you swear that the testimony you're.
23 about to provide is the truth, the whole truth.and 24 nothing but the truth, so help you God?
25do NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
For the
- record, would you give me some date of birth and social security number information.
SOkay.
I was born Social security number is SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
And education history?
i: Let's see, I have a
- _rom the.in..'..
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
What year?
Around --
I finished in SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Anything
(.
further?
employment 31n No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So then your history.
I was in the I
was employed by at i
I started as an" I1there as SPECIAL 'AGENT NEFF:
In what year was that?
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some I believe, is when i
- ias a Mt In f
M I started witI at went.-to*
got myMY served as af
,until I was promoted to my current position in Ofljime frame of 6g" SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: L
" hen.L1 That's correct.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
When did you become at falem.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
About a year after you got on board there.
.11-I W5 Right.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did you immediately go into1 license class pretty much?
_M j
Yes.
There was a short-end indoctrination period, between'six land nine months; and then I went into!license class.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
s foral&64S SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So in, let's
- say, from when you were \\
what was your NEAL R. GROSS "QQ COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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management structure there with your,,
there, who were you working with?
- See, when I waspromote,*to e nift no, when I
./I sorry, for the delay, I'm trying to --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That's okay.
........... I'm trying to remember who was the - -
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, and there' s been some changes, so you have to think back.
Let's see, I can just I
don't know the exact years SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
off the top of my head, but since I've been employed there in let's
- see, (phonetic) was the 1141
"*MMOAM when I was initially hired.
He wsonly for a short time and he was promoteQ An individual named. -
(phonetic) km Z-3 became thea.M He lastedisix monthsl Thn (phonetic) who had been a was promoted to I
as probablythree years or so.
When left t
(phonetic) was hired from outside the Company as thel NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So this would be somewhere around. 2001 then?
Yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
jW1.11 Ift about a year, maybe a little over a year was the' (phonetic) was thenf for a little over a year.
And presently the 1--*,....
.. is SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR':
Spell his name.
And he's been with. the Company for a short time, since September or October,.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
Where did he come from, do you know?
A plant in)l' SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
And which one's down there?
It's not/urreJphonetic),
ey' syn *irgini.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is itybkoneer It's the one that had th6 4hot lead cracking issue SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay. I SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Before that I believe he was 3
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
'Florida NEA:A.
id 4
So s been here a short 5
time.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
Is that 7
who you report to now?
8 There is an 9
between me and the I
.0"let's
- see, it ranged from 11 M-
.(phonetic),
.phonetic),
and 12 it's currently '.
(phonetic) 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How long ha 14 Meen in place?
15 my Mhe '--1--m M
16 I'm terrible with dates, I'm sorry.
A couple years, 17 probably.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Has he been theC 0 19 since you've been a 20No 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You were also under 22 o
23 Im not sure if A 24
, I know under Possibly a short time 25 under Actually, yes.
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when I was o0 when I was 2
promoted.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
4
- Then, then*
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So I guess 7
we'll look at in terms of when you were (Promotedj to 8
-11 10 n the time frame, 9
at that point, if your is and then 10 your --
was ito 12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
13
- Okay, in that time frame.
In your observance of the 14 safety culture or anything you noted about the safety 15 culture at that time, and that being what I explained 16 being pretty broad, employees raising concerns, what 17 are the kinds -of concerns that get raised, their 18 comfort level with doing that, and how are they 19 handled, and in addition to that, the decision making 20 that goes into the operations and the production of 21 the plant, there's-a lot there.
22 Right.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
But if maybe we break 24 it down a little bit.
Why don't we look at the kind 25 of things that people raise, and have you seen changes NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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in the issues that are brought to you for handling or 2
frequency or number of issues or anything like that?
3 Aw I've never noted a reluctance 4
of employees to raise concerns, safety concerns, 5
either industrial, nuclear, radiological.
I've never 6
noted any retaliation against employees for raising 7
such concerns.
As for the number and types of 8
concerns, generally they haven't changed.
They're the 9
typical concerns)f6perators ave.
Most of the concerns 10 I hear are from the equipment operators' who ork for 11 meyor the reactor operators* or senior reactor 12 operators, 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It's been pretty 14 consistent?
You hear the same kinds of things?
Are 15 you aware of any event or any reason why anyone would 16 hesitate to raise concerns on site?
17 No, not at all.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Not just people 19 derneath you but you and/or your contemporaries at 20 the phift manager levels also.
We're really 21 interested in because you.'re seeing it
- all, and 22 you're :operating the Plant when you're on shift.
23 You're getting things' fed up. to you 1from the shift, 24 and you have to deal with management above you in 25 that.
So we're interested in those interactions also.
/
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Yes.
I've never noted a
reluctance on any of myfLeers"Jin raising safety concerns.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How about yourself?
)
No.
I've definitely never had a reluctance to bring up safety concerns.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What about in terms of how the concerns or the issues are received?
Has there been a period where you've noticed a difference in terms of how your concerns are responded to?
As you can tell from the list of operations \\managers' there, I guess I've been employed there it will be.
in[
and this is the sixth operations manager 'I've worked for.
So, obviously, there's a difference in everyone's approach in how they address safety issues, but never have I
observed anything I
perceived as being inappropriate.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
In terms of how they responded to your issues.
My issues or issues I presented that were presented to me from other individuals.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Well, while we're on that, is there some reason for such a high NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS C--
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rate of turnover in that position?
Is there something 2
you attribute that to?
3 I could only guess as to why 4
the
- Company, Public
- Service, and its board of 5
directors would wish to operate a nuclear plant like 6
that.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
With that much 8
turnover?
Is that what you mean by "like that?"
9 Yes.
- Well, obviously, it's 10 very difficult to maintain any long-term course of 11 action because everyone who comes in has a I mean 12 overall the message has been the same.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Which is what?
14 Safety first.
That's never 15 changed.
Obviously, though, the approach and how 16 that's implemenited has changed, and it's unavoidable 17 when you bring in that many different people who are 18 driving the ship, so to speak.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How does the approach 20
- differ, though?
Can you think of something that 21 exhibits that?
22 I
mean just the general 23 individual management techniques of each of these 24 operations
- managers.
- Now, above the. Operations 25 Manager the senior leadership team has changed often NEALR.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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also.
I mean it's just a difference in management 2
styles which are unavoidable when you bring in 3
different people.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Different 5
personalities.
6 Right.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What about with the 8
change in the senior management does that have an 9
effect on what the message is, safety first, or has 10 that been consistent?
11 A That has been consistent.
I 12 think it's prevalent throughout the industry, right?
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That might be 14 the message,
- though, that you're getting, but in 15 reality is that what was really going on?
That's the 16 issue.
Everybody has their corporate --
17 Right.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
-- information 19 they put out, but the issue is what really happens at 20 the plant?
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What's the practice?
22 With the current 23 specifically, with the current, I'll call it, regime 24 25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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coming back?
3 4
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
6 7
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
8 It's the same message, safety, 9
reliability, costs, those things, but now the message 10 is more of it's a balance, all right?
It's a balance 11 between those individual aspects of operating the 12 Plant.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Which is what 14 it should be.
There should be a balance.
15 i
I don't disagree.
.16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
If it was out of 17 balance before, where was it out of balance?
18
- Well, I think what maybe has 19 caused a perception that maybe could have resulted in 20 this investigation you're conducting is how the 21 message is presented, right, and that's what you're 22 alluding to.
The message has always been safety over 23 production, those type things, but the bottom line of 24 the business is we're there to produce.
If we don't 25 produce, we don't operate safely or unsafely.
So it's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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.13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14 more, like you said, more of a balance.
You've got to produce safely.
So how the message has been put out in the past has led to the perception of not really walking the walk from senior management and even my level and maybe right above my level on up is that we say one thing and do another.
That's the perception at the Plant from individuals below me, the equipment operator, the technicians, the union personnel, that senior management just gives lip service to safety because of the way bperations,are conducted, that people don't understand the decisions that are made.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And you're saying that that's from not atl your level but from below your level, at the operator level, is the perception or does that exist at your level too, or formally?
UAt my level, I don't think any of my peers, believe)'SalemŽ'is being operated unsafely.
I mean that's our charter.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes, it is.
Mdoesn't operate the Plant.
- none of thos I just listed or the Isenior license holders on shift-,
that operate the Plant.
If that Plant was being operated unsafely, it wouldn't be s fault or fault; it would be-my fault.
That's NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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what I'mýicens to do.
And never have I felt that 2
I was being coerced or directed to'ýoperate the Plant 3
in what I thought was an unsafe mannerI.
I mean there 4
are decisions that are made that some could perceive 5
as production over safety, I guess.
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Or non-7 conservative.
8 Or non-conservative.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Can you give us 10 an example?
11 I
I mean just equipment 12 reliability issues that go unresolved.
The Corrective 13 Action Program at Salem is in need of improvement, and 14 it has been since I've been there, and it continues to 15 be a sore spot with me, and that's what led to the 16 perception in the, I'll say, the overall culture there 17 is that we don't operate the Plant safely because of 18 the ineffectiveness of the Corrective Action Program 19 in resolving long-term issues.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is that also the use 21 of -- extensive use of temporary logs and that type of 22 thing?
23 M
Yes.
All of those are 24 indicators of equipment reliability issues that Salem 25 struggles with.
I wish I had the answer.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
- Well, we're 2
looking to you to give the Commission some answers,
.-=[
3 frankly, about what is going on down there.
And this 4
is I mean the safety conscious work environment is 5
not a black and white issue.
We're trying to -- well, 6
we've talked to a number of people.
I don't know if 7
you know that or not, but I would think you probably 8
do.
We've talked to people at different levels at 9
both sides, Hope Creek and Salem, to try and get our 10 arms around this to see if there is a problem where 11 the balance was out of whack.
12 No decision is black and white, 13 and some of the --
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Incidents?
15 Well, given certain equipment 16 failures or things of that nature, the decision
.17 whether it's
- operable, inoperable, you continue to 18 operate, you shut down the Plant, do you defer to the 19 next outage, do you look at this outage, none of that 20 is black and white.
21 SR. SPECIAL. AGENT TEATOR:
But there are 22 certain areas where you're supposed to operate in 23 which I
guess generally across the industry are 24 considered regulatory.
25 Right.
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SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And there's also general safe practice in operating nuclear power plants.
Okay.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I'm talking about some things that maybe were not where they should have been in those areas.
-Maybe it would help if you have I mean if you have specific incidents that may job my memory or specific --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Yes.
Speaking in general terms is hard, because SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Can we take a short break off the rebord?
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Sure.
It's approximately 9:34.
(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 9:34 a.m. and went back on the record at 9:39 a.m.)
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
We're back on the record.
It's about 9:.39 a.m.
What we were talking about from where you stand have you observed situations where managers:at your level have had to question upper level management, direction coming from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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upper level management, either question it or resist 2
it, things along those lines?
3 Certainly.
Almost on a daily 4
basis do we question things.
I think that's part of 5
the job.
There have been cases where I may have 6
disagreed personally with management decisions.
I can 7
think of a couple incidents since my just ovez'-hr 9 4 8
years as a I can think of --
there was 9
a I think this was when was the 10 and we had a)\\ ak,,5number 12 11 service water nuclear header?.
It was an/ndergroun.4 -/
12 aneaidhereoenr 12 5eakýwhere the iping heade>ran from th ervice 13 water structure by the river into the Planl It was
- 14 an
.derground leal It was my opinion that we 15
ýSXationalized operation\\with that
~eak-.1ar too long.
16 We eventually did shut down and repairv-fhe},leak)!
I 17 think we waited a little bit too long.
I thought it 18 should have been addressed much sooner.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How long was the 20 wait?
21
,N m
It pretty much as
ýbe.leak?,.
22 continued to worsen, I'm not sure as a duration but we 23 waited until e leak)(frced us.
Instead of being 24 proactive and taking action to repairel e leak'iat an C:
25 earlier time, we waited until-e lea"<4got to such a leakýgo t o
uc NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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magnitude that we had no choice.
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Were you in an 3
action statement situation with that?
4 No.
I guess viaypiping system 5
flow analysis.they determined a maximum amount of 6
<leakag" e 7
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
8 But you're trying to estimate 9 ;leakage coming t from the groun 10 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
13 w
As far as operability was never 12 I believe there wiay have been an operability 13 determination per 9118 where it's declared operable 14 but degraded, but --
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
When was this?
16 When was this around?
A tenure was there 17 about a year.
Early in his tenure or late in his 18 tenure?
19
.It may have --
I remember it 20 was during this time of year.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
22 I think it may have been right 23 before Christmas or right before New Year's that we --
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
25 did addressl*e leak.(
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1 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How many days 2
are we talking about?
Is it a week?
3 Weeks.
Then we actually --
it 4
got to the point where we built & structure ove*-Lhe 5
- leak butsider d had perators,,stationed monitoring 6
this\\,Aeakage from the ground)
It was --
if it wasn't 7
my first year, which would have --
my first-hristmaX*
8 would have beenXeptembe3X-- I'started as a 9
It may very well have been 10 that first it was either Pecember 200 0.r/&ecember 11 200)11 12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
At what 13 point during this duration --
14 Probably.'2001.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
December 20011.
17 I believe.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Under, you thought 19 i W
was there, right?
20 AlmmA 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That puts him in that 22 time frame too.
23 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
At what point 24 in this duration did you think that they should have J.i 25 declared it inoperable?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 I don't know the exact 2
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Around.
Early 3
into it or near the end?
4 I came on shift one night for 5
a night shift and I walked up, after turnover I walked 6
down the condition, went out and sat in the yard area 7
and I walked back and called n
I said, 8
"I'm uncomfortable with this." This is I mean it's 9
similar to the analogy of a frog in a boiling pot of 10 water.
If you toss the frog right in the boiling pot 11 of water, he's going to jump right out, right, and 12 survive.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
14 If you put him in the cold 15 water and slowly heat it up, the frog will sit there 16 until he's dead.
So I thought that was the case here.
17 We had slowly le'EFthis lea ýget worse and worse and 18 worse, and it was to the point where we needed to do
.19 something about it.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
Did they 21 have to shut the Plant down to fix this?
22 No.
I believe we managed to 23 effect the repair with a contractor, an internalp-pe 24 repairL-ý
(
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Really?
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going in got a special 2
name to this..sea they go in and repair it.
3 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
It's a
4 specialty firm that does -- that can do that kind of 5
repair?
6 Yes.
It's a large1ýdiameter 7
pipe \\ere individuals can actually access it 8
ý'ýinternall and put a temporary or repair it.
9 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
What was the, 10 I'm going to say, reluctance.
If it could be fixed 11 while the Plant's on line, why not go in and do it 12 earlier?
13 I don't know.
I don't know 14 whether it was because around theyiolidays:, but we 15 ended up having to do it during theholidays.
16 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
17 Sometimes it seems like at the 18 Plant we're slow to come to develop and formulate a 19 plan for making some of these repairs.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
21 TheBFlg9*issue, you probably 22 heard someone talk about that.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Recently.
24 That's a recent issue.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
.'Octoberor so?
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 23 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Let's finish with this one, then we'll go to tfle4BFlg /
I don't know if you've heard of the-Njervice wate one but it was probably the most troubling SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
C i'.: - - -
incident with SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
- Well, we're hearing stuff like this from a lot of people we talk to.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Now, you're saying that it was it ultimately declared inoperable or was it i
Correct.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
did it remain operable but degraded?
wI It was ultimately declared inoperable, I believe.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
- Now, who did that?
Who was the shift manager who made that call, do you know?
It was probably declared inoperable as a result of removing it from service and isolating'*he lea<
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
But it doesn't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1
2 3
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8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 lead to any kind of a tech spec shutdown or --
No.
It's a 72-hour LCO, so it would declaring that service water header inoperable results in a 72-hour shutdown LCO, repaired in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Or else.
-- shut down.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
They were able to do that?
I believe so.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Wow.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Would this have been also categorized as an RWST Week?
Could that be the same thing?
different iW~on and you respond to
~No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Those are two issues then.
~Right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
When you called the phone that night after walking down the said you were juncomfortable with continuing
~Right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
-- how did he that?
He's the boss for both units at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
I-- -....
25 1
that time, right?
2 Right.
- Well, it's the 3
rationalization that Engineering has looked at it and 4
has evaluated it.
We can have X amount of \\,1eakagq"*
5 before it's technically inoperable and we don't have 6
that amount ofy eakage4et, so it's still operable.
7 It was that type of rationalization.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did he give you 9
any indication at all that he was getting direction 10 from above him to --
11 No.
12 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
tow that 13 line, to push that?
(
14 No.
No.
No indication at all 15 of that.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How long after 17 that do you think they were forced to declare it 18 inoperable?
19 Maybe a week.
20 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Another week?
21 Yes.
22 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Wow.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And that was based on 24 the amount of""the leak4 the increase in leakage.P 25 y
Correct.
It had worsened to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 the point where it wasieroding the ground around the pipa--I e pipe ;was buriedt Like I said, it was an I u I nderground pipEý<an&>watere 4 as coming up2*
-A 1
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did you attend any of these operability meetings regarding what we're going to do wit this pipel how we're going to address it?
Do you recall attending them?
I remember discussions concerning it and the repair options.
I think for a long time it was pretty much thought it was absolutely we had to shut down to make the repair --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
until this contract company was located that could make this type of Lnterna'I.
repair. And the internal"frepair was eventually made and then a permanent repair done in the outage.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
During the outage.
- \\ But it also has impact not only from tech spec but from probablistic safety analysis where we normally don't take a*ervice water nuclear header but of service online.
It results in what we called a d PSA risk condition for increasing core damage frequency as unacceptable and we don't do that online.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
27 1
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
2 Unless something breaks and we 3
have to do it, then we have to do it in management, 4
but we don't routinely take out equipment that results 5
in that increase in core damage frequency.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
But you didn't 7
take out until you had to and then they were able to 8
fix it during this 72-hour window.
9 M
Correct.
10 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Who was --
I 11 mean we're going to talk camps here.
12 Okay.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
Who 14 was in the group that resisting making the operability 15 call earlier?
Someone must have been on that side of 16 the equation.
17 I think pretty much --
I won't 18 speak for every 9 at that time, but I 19 think the majority of my peers thought we should have 20 addressed e leak'earlier.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
22
- And, obviously, from --
it's 23 almost always like this but from my position down we 24 thought the general consensus was that the condition 25 should have been addressed earlier.
I mean picture NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
28 1 tis:You\\,'-
ic 1
this:
rervice water system-is your ultimate heat 2
seek for the Plant.
3 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
4 a
Right?
And you've got a 5
makeshift structuretibilt out in your yard areilth 6
<,operator4assigned 24-7 to sit out there and monitor 7
.-- the leakagd',iand keep this, because they partially 8
.- 1_excavated4the area, to keep thi'sarea pumped out with 9
temporary pumps, It's just indicative of living with 10 a problem too long.
But from my position down the 11 consensus was we need to fix this, let's do it 12 whatever it takes, whether it's shut down, cool down, 13 go to Mode 5 where you only need onernuclear header 14 operable 15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
16 Or if you can fix it
- online, 17 fix it online, but let's fix it.
It's sat out there 18 and festered for --
19 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
20 until it became of such a 21 magnitude that 'maybe from engineering perspective and 22 whateve lowoey do on the system it was rnmodelingj týe 23 operable, okay, operable, bu>' water was gushing up out 24 of the ground off your nuclear heade/-- So the 25 perception there is the message that gets sent.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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AA A
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SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
2 A
Everybody's saying this is 3
crazy.
4 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Even to the 5
operators.
6
- Whether it's operable or not is 7
a moot point.
The point is senior management, safety 8
over production, and then this.
9 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
There's the 10 message.
11 You see, what message does that 12 send?
So that's why I'm saying sometimes it I said 13 earlier it isn't perceived as though senior management 14 really practices what they preach.
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
You 16 talked about
!a little bit on this.
Who else 17
-- so--
18 1:1 I believe-00AW*was the 19 the time.
20 Was he on your guise?
21 I believe he was on the camp of 22 it needs to be addressed before it came to the point 23 where 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
He would have fixed 25 it quicker?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
.ý 0 Y e s.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So from 1 eleve1 down then you're on the same page.
I believe.
I hate to speak for something that'ls..htree years..go and speak for other
-- S*o-l~'hree yearsa<o and speak for other people, but, yes, WMIas generally of the mind that we need to address those type issues.
And that's just one issue that lead or had led and repeatedly over times led to the question concerning the safety conscious work environment.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
There we go.
1Now, whether I believe it was ever unsafe --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Well, did you think it was unsafe?
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You indicated this was a big one for you.
I guess in a way, yes.
I personally, thought it was unsafe.
I wouldn't have called my boss in the middle of the night and said, "tHey,'.
this has gone too far."
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Sounds like it.
But-was there --
were the people above-an't speak-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHING*TON f Cn 9rlnnf.*7n (202) 234-4433
~ý,
I-
31 1
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Do you know?
2 I can't speak to that.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
We're talking about 4
senior management with just sort of broadly, but was 5
there -- do you associate one individual with the hold 6
up on this or was there 7
Yes.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In these meetings, in 9
the operability meetings, there was 10 I don't think there was any 11 malicious intent in any of these.
I think it's an 12 issue of organizational inability to address these 13 issues.
Does that make sense?
There's no like, 14 "Well, we know what to do with this issue.
Let's go 15 let's just not do it right now because we don't 16 want to do it because we want to produce electricity."
17 We just seem to be organizationally inept at dealing 18 with these issues, and maybe that's why they fester 19 for so long.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In this situation, 21 where's the breakdown?
Why couldn't they get it 22 together to fix that quicker?
23 2.-
I don't know.
24 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was there a 25 plant manager at each of the units then?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
i.~rfl
~~A AAJ!~
ACAUlirl( MtM& r% r-
~
-lc I fll*l.......
32 1
No.
I don't believe the 2
organizational structure at that time I believe 3
.may have been the and 4
the reorganization resulted in elimination of that 5
position, -and we had a --
we may have had what they 6
called a"Director of Operations who is now a Salem-7 Hope Creek.
Before that there was Plant Managet,,
8 Salem, Plant Manager; Hope Creek, which is now back to 9
the way the current structure is, but at that time 10 there was a VP. Operations.,
11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Who was who 12 then?
13 W.1 (phonetic)
I 14 believe.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And who was the 16 jfor Salem, do you remember?
Would it 17 have been'.Would he have been the--
18 No.
Jwas the 19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Probably 21
"(phonetic).
22
.M I think!
ay have been the 23 only individual ever in that position.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The one thaltovered 25 both sideQ.-J-'
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 33
- Right, the *.----*-
M SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
as thi SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
So whose call was that then, ultimately?
Where did the decision-making authority sit with this issue then?
I have to say with the SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
(phonetic)?
~Sure.
He's -
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
That's fine.
AThat's what I would think.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
Did you participate in any meetings where you heard him discuss his position on this particular issue?
No, not to my recollection.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
All right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Anything further?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Anything more on that?
'7 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANECRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19.
20 21 22 23 24 25 34 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
When they went in to fix it, did they discover then that theleal. was more than what Engineering had analyzed in their"'-f lo -r"
>.nalysi No.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was it worse than they thought once they got in there?
Do you remember, do you know?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
No, you don't
- remember, no --
I don't remember.
No, I don't believe it was any worse but it was definitely a degradation in the type of structural joint between the *Jping headevin the buildings where it occurred right outside the building where the*ipiný 4.eade Y'was joined, where it penetrated the building into the main ipipin*.header that went out.
It was definitely adegraded se4<obviously.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
And like I said, they went internal to 4e.pipf.id a, I think it's a called, a
-*.*recko sealr nternally and then during the outage they repaired it permanently from the outside of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
35 headei*..
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Any more 3
problems with thatVpipe"A*.ce then that you're aware 4
of?
5 No.
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Now, this incident, 8
December of 2001, and you've been on sincei 0
9 is this the first incident that you see that 10 creates where that perception's coming from?
11 No.
Actually, just recently 12 the BF19, which is a--
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And I understood you 14 had a recent but prior to December 2001 'had you seen 15 anything else that you thought could have been handled 16 better? You're about a year and. three months into it, 17 right?
18 I can't think of anything 19 specifically, no.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How about the 21 grassing and the circulators in *spring 2001,
- 2002, 22 2003?
23 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You're 24 laughing.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Going back into the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
36 1
spring of 2001.
2 Well, let's see, in the*pring 3
of 2003Q I'li go back, during then it was from the 4
March time frame, we ha heavy gras heavier than 5
I think ever, ever recorded.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
This is this year.
17 s"Thisp'ast sprin4 8
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
This)Last sprinc 9
Correct.
Environmental 10 Licensing they do samples in the river to determine 11 the amount of, we call it,-ff etritus grasmfa d'other 12 stuff in the river, Btritus loading.
But in March-rmy(
13
,crew was on where we actually tripped, manually 14 tripped Salem Unit 2
in response toy egrading 15 conditions at circ waterI4."- There was no reluctance 16 whatsoever on our part to do so.
The same night Salem 17 Unit 1, which was already operating at reduced power 18 levels because of previoustrassingssues, power was 19 reduced further on Unit I that same night.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Any reluctance 21 to do that?
22 No.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What was the response 24 to it when you did it?
Was there any pushback, any 25 questions?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1,47 RH~nF ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 37 No.
!Me /and Vy crew Pere I'w
!-my applauded and recognized for taking appropriate SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: tyou made that calli
-That was on your\\Chif to do both of those things?
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
It got done.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:,So you got a pat on the back for taking it down.
Got a trip to the Blue Rocks game *r something for the-whole crew; something like that.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Really?
Yes.
We got from SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Are you aware of any other issues on some of the calls that were made with the number o' rculators that were in use or --
-W.
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
for somebody else another, shift at that time, that there was some questioned use of how many tirculators' you had and how many you should have? Were you aware of anything like that?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4,jn~
rmjiIý It'& ALor% A110 LIMtA
38 1
S No.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was there anything 3
that you had any firsthand experience with, like if 4
you wanted to have six or five, were you ever directed 5
that you could -- you know, you can and.procedurally 6
you can use less and you should do so?
7 No.
I remember some --
maybe 8
I wasn't on for it, but maybe during the start-up.
9 Every spring we've had issues, so if I get them mixed 10 up, I'm sorry, but let's say in the spring of 2002 we 11 also I was on for that.
We shut nit Idown in 12 response to degrading conditions at circ water That 13 wasn't as pretty because of the fact that it wasn't a C
14
-- we were in a condition where the&)Qnfiguration of 15 the circ water pumps rr'uired not a unit trip but a 16 unit to be removed from service,
- right, a normal 17 shutdown, remove the turbine from service, you don't 18 have enough pumps supplying cooling water to your 19 condenser.
And we commenced the shutdown and there 20 was ongoing maintenance on one of the circulators, and 21 during the shutdown I
received calls from I
22 remember talking with' I remember one of 23 the maintenance managers coming in the control room 24
- saying, "Hey, you've got 13 Bravo, you can have it 25 back.
Thirteen Bravo's good."
It wasn't.
There was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4V)'2 Du*f^rM I AIlIt AIC Il tAI
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 2 3 24 25 39 a lot of misinformation.
A
-never -- right on the phone he never questioned the decision tha t/
had made to remove the unit from service..
I think that spring we ended up with both units!shut down)or at least (nit 1 shu own doing major work atl Irc wat er3 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You mentioned Itphone call.
Why did you mention that?
Well, it's just to show that "M '_Palled and he said he supported removing the --
he called while the unit was being removed from
- service, shut down in accordance with abnormal operating procedures where it was in progress.
He called and offered any assistance and:said that he supported the decision, don't hesitate.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Why would he have to call to say something --
e wouldn't have to.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right, but do you know why he did?
I support --
you know, you're using words that --
do you understand?
I mean you're why is he calling?
Do you know why he's calling you and telling you that --
could there have been occasions where he would have called and not supported the decision --
I C>
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1V..
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F IMI AND AVE.. N.W.
40 1No 2
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
to do what 3
should be done?
4 OW No.
I think --
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I'm looking at 6
it from the flip side of that.
7 The only timer gave me 8
feedback on maybe he didn't agree with a decision was an erability calon.rvice wateŽ'once again.
But 10 the tr-assing issue 11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right, let's 12 finish with that.
13 I mean we're dealing with 14 that right now.
Right now lem Unit I<is a 3
15 percent power,-'
one of the Nirculators/'is out of 16
- service, its adjacent one is out, we're at reduced 17 power levels, heavy grassing'right now.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Really?
19 So it obviously raises the 20 question of why haven't we resolved this after 20 21 years of operation?
22 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
Maybe 23 they didn't want to spend the money, I don't know.
Is 24 that what it is?
Is it a money issue to do the 25 permanent fix?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
41 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 cntsay.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is it possible that ould have called you in that time frame because you might have been getting a different message from somebody else in management?
Well, I think the maintenance manager who was on shift --
we had around the clock maintenance management onsite because of the ongoing delayed return of one of the circulators which was necessitating the entire driving the whole issue, same as right now, same pumps out of service right now driving the problems we're having right now.
So based on the information that I had gotten during the, rapid load reduction,. that maintenance manager came into the
- control room, -,said, "Work's complete on 13 Bravo.
We're returning the pump to operations."
If that had been accurate and'I could have gotten that pump back,ý I could have halted the power reduction and not taken the unit of fline.; Well, it turned out -- so that was affecting my decision making...
was getting incorrect information..
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
On the input from the From theA SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Who?
(--,I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS t*9"Z 01t"1"1::
1Akn
~
tj
- W
42 1
Pardon?
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Who was that?
3 His name is 4
(phonetic).
5 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: '.Why would he 6
tell you that?*
I mean if he's the 7
he should know if that pump's ready to go.
8
- 1.
I know.
Well, it turned out 9
the pump wasn't ready to go.
I don't know why h 4 told 10 me thaor what information he had, but the pump in no II way was ready to be returned.
It wasn't returned for 12 days after that.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
JWhat were your 14 actions based on what he told you then._(
15 Well, based on what he told me, 16 then a call to I think --
17 (END TAPE 1, SIDE A) 18 (BEGIN TAPE 1, SIDE B) 19 So based on that,'
had put out 20 the information that this pump was coming back and I 21 could halt the power reductionI Well, I guess once 22 that, iickled upto 0,
M just wanted to call --
23
)WA must have felt he wanted to call me and say, 24 "Hey',
fully support you taking the unit offline if 25 that's what's required' So he must have seen from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ior)na P i~m:I Amn AVF= NW
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 43 that communication -- because the first communication we were taking the 4runit offlin%"
Then the communication, "Hey, we may not have to because 13 Bravo circulator is coming back," may have led to have thought there was a reluctance?( our pa to take the unit offline, so he was just reinforcing his expectation that he didn't care i4-we took the unit of flinei f that was the right thing to do.
So that's what I think --
that's why I think(
alled.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Would you say that was typical for INFORM Was that typically the way he approached the decisions?
Yes, for I mean I'm sure you've probably heard of the>MS4 -1*I believe it's S44, main steam lea onb3lem Unit 2J was on for tha But during that event he vocally supported removing the Plant from service if that was the right thing to do.
So he just wanting to make sure there wasn't a reluctanc 1on my part o remove the Plant from service if that was the correct thing to do.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
When was this
>'MS44rmain steam lea.__,?
I don't remember the date.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Year?
You got id1A J '\\._.
a year?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
-i~rr mufnfl: miI amn AVSP I~J WA
44 1
Maybe.
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The'..
S44.-
4 I don't know if that's'-he 5
right valve.
It was a-main steam leakk--
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A.<ain steam 7
leak, Salem 2,Y.
8 7.,6A Salem Unit 2.1e 9
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is this with the 20, 11 25-foot plume, rather large steam leak-?---
12
- Correct.
That was ultimately i3 4solated by the
""1101 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay. \\,eptember 15 2002 a
nd there?
16 Mabe don't know.,
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I think it's pretty 18 close to in that time frame.
Before we get there, 19
- though, let me just ask you some questions about --
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And I've got an 21 issue too when you~re done with this.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you have a follow-23 up on that last one, because I'm going to that time 24 frame?
25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I've got an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
45 1
earlier one.
2 But you can see why the 3
assing s a big issue.
I'm. going to be dealing with 4
that tonight.N 5
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Recurring, yes.
6 It's a recurring problem, so 7
anyone could --
it would leave any person to question 8
Salem's ability to operate if we continue to have 9
recurring problems.
10 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You have to 11 keep dealing with that same issue.
P 121 12
- Right.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And how it 14 affects the Plant, yes.
15 M
And you can question, well, it f
16 is an economic reason we don't resolve it?
I don't 17 know.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In ring 2Uri in 19 this time frame, and I can't do better than that with.
20 a month but it goes along with an outage, and I think 21 this is an outage on the Salem 1 side, at a point in 22 time do you recall if while the)3 6ndenser steam L
23 pumps were under manual contro?4 there was a push to 24 conduct someLower power physics testing.'
This is at 25 the point where you' re ready to start up or near ready NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
46 1
to start up, but you don't have normal conditions.
2 1 Okay.
i this when we wrapped 3
the turbine glan~dsli 4
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Yes.
They were 5
packed.
To create the vacuum?
6 Correct.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
At that point, 8
around this start-up, do you recall I mean what the 9
circumstances were and anything unusual?
10 No.
I thought that was part of 11 the plan, and I don't think we're the first plant to 12 have done that.
I don't recall anything unusual about 13 that.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you recall --
I 15 mean as we understand it, this push for the low power 16 testing did not occur and that it was resisted by 17 shift management.
18 The actual going critical, yes, 19 we did draw vacuum and did --
which allowed us to use 20 the steam dumps to the condenser to heat the Plant up 21 22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
23 and remain in Mode 3. Okay, 24 now I
remember.
I do remember there was some 25 suggestions to, well, why can't --
we can just go NEAL R.TGROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS var u~nn mc~ amf ZA~IF ti w
47 1
ahead and do low power physics testing which means go 2
critical with what we considered was a degraded heat 3
sync, which our condenser was the heat sync at that 4
- time, and we considered it degraded because of the 5
fact that we didn't have normal glands sealing steai 6
we had th&-glands seals wrap.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
That's out 8
understanding too.
- 9.
Right.
And there was some 10
- push, I'll call it a push, that 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Suggestion?
Push?
12 Right.
There was 13 recommendations or consideration given to going ahead 14 and doing low power physics testing, which would mean 15 to make the reactor critical and that was resisted and 16 it wasn't performed, if I remember right. !We did not 17 go critical with thd:condensefin that condition.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And that's my 19 understanding as well.
But the pressure and the push 20 where was that coming from?
21 The outage, outage management.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
At that time, 23 it would have beený (phonetic).
24 Okay.
But I believe it was --
25 1 mea asn't all those people that come in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 that shor don't hav believe t the start with-oper want to d 48 t time frame they're not technically -- they e the technical knowledge of the Plant.
I his came from (phonetic).
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The suggestion to do
-up that way?
- Right.
Maybe ort
,is in the outage organization ations experience at Salem.
He's now the SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Why would he o it?
I mean what was the benefit?
0 w
Outage duration.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Shorten the outage.
Correct.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
By days, hours?
Couple days maybe.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you remember if ad any input or any influence on that?
No.
I remember was a
strong advocate of not doing it, and he supported the
.Ibecause we weren't comfortable with doing it.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Including yourself?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
49 1
iCorrect.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
3 the push was more from the outag 4
correct.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
6 have been on that side at that p 7
management?
But you think that e management team.
oint, working outage 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 is 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
~Yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
An41 Right.
It was his suggestion, and a lot of timesM oes that.
a very technically competent individual.
He thinks outside the
- box, so to speak.
He's made a
lot of recommendations like that.
Sometimes what he -- many times what he recommends is a smart way to do it.
In this case, we weren't comfortable with it and didn't proceed.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
So who shut down that suggestion?
Who made -- was it1 I think so.
I believe it was UM stand on it'.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What about because you were kind of saying that in some cases the lack of the technical experience with the unit contributes to a push for something.
What about NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
50
)
how do you rate him?
2 Hee' s an 3
so he's very technical.
4 He's on the technical side, so he knows the Plant 5
technically.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
What about 7
overall?
I mean in terms of --
I mean was this a 8
great debate?
Was this a half-hour discussion?
How 9
long did this carry on?
10 I don't really recall.
I don't 11 recall it being too contentious of an issue to be 12 honest with you.
I do remember it being discussed.
.13 I remember I opinion that it was not the correct 14 thing to do, and then I. remember it not being done.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It didn't go that 16 way.
17 There are things like that that 18 happen all the time.
I mean this past outage the 19 outage -- any time the outage duration starts to slip 20 you get the smart people together who try to pull the 21 outage back into its scheduled duration.
How can they 22 do that?
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The "think outside 24 the box" people?
25 Right.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4,ow,%, 6irM%r-.c si1 jkl' kin 1*
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And then come up with 2
suggestions that may or may not fly?
3 Right.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Have you ever seen it 5
go in a direction that you really didn't care for, 6
that you were not comfortable with?
In this case 7
you're saying it didn't go that way.
8 No, but I'll continue to think 9
about it.
10 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You look like 11 you thought about something.
12
- Well, I was just trying to --
13 I
can't remember anything specifically where a
14 decision during an outage to shorten duration.
15 There's always a debate, there's always weight the 16 pros and cons.
I think we as operators are kind of 17 set in our ways and we're used to doing things, and if 18 somebody suggest a new or better way of doing it, 19 we're going to --
it's our nature to-question it and 20 whether we agree or disagree we'll go from there, but 21 I can't remember any specific case.
22 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Where you 23 disagreed.
24 Where I disagreed and went 25 forward.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21.
22 23 24 25 52 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you think that's a strength that works onsite that, I'll call it, a
line of defense, whether the suggestions are being made or fronted, the4shift managers are fairly good at questioning?
Absolutely.
And we geta --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Analyzing that?
We're not on an island by ourselves either.
We have some very experienced senior reactor operators that work for us who keep us in line, so to speak.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
- So you have a lot of input.
very competent crew experience.
Absolutely.
with years I have a very, and years of SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Who's the Amý on your crew ight now?
1 4"
I havem (phonetic) who's been there V" plus years; (phonetic),
the same;
, who's been there maybe MO
,N..
he 's an and I have a~ew upgraaK,, it's been about Ai He was an for many years.
Now he's a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A'ibt itur~r%r U'S A&tsr A~fir t%$%At
53 1
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So you have a lot of 2
experience.
3 Yes.
I have a very good'crew.
4 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
It's nice to 5
have a.good crew, isn't it?
6 MOM 7
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In this time frame, 8
spring 2002,' on this incident that we were discussing 9
regarding start up after the outage, do you recall 10 having a meeting specifically called by the i1 at Salem'with 12 I don't recall anything.
If 13 you could --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It's a reportedly 15 unique situation in which thedshift managerskýat Salem 16 got together and said, "We don't agree with the 17 direction that we're getting.from senior management, 18 and we want to meet with to discuss this 19 further."
And it was in the spring of 2002, and as I 20 understand it, it was tagged to the kinds of things 21 that you're describing, the December 2001, issue with 22 the decision making.
Our understanding is that 23 perability decisior wseere questioned in terms of 24 length of how long you were taking to make them.
25 This is when I was --
I had NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
54 1
mentioned previously where, seemed to give me, 2
I'll say, negative feedback on a decision I made one 3
night on shift when a piece of equipment fell during 4
surveillance testing.,
It resulted in my declaring a 5
service water nuclear header inoperable based on 6
failure of the surveillance.
It was an indication of 7
check valve back leakage' on one of the diesel 8
generators.
And me and Iiiiy crew e felt the procedure 9
and the actions were conservative, appropriate, but it 10 resulted in entering into a 72-hour shutdown LCO, 11 middle of the night, and so the organization had to 12 respond and get this condition fixed, and it was a 13
>dective check va e
14 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was this a 15 consequence of'Ithat leaking?:
16 No.
Completely separate from 17 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Separate?
19 Completely different.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was it before or 21 after theDecember 2001?
22 After.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
24 So in that case, 25 and the organization at his level, I guess, didn't NEAL R. GROSS 4
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55 1
agree with me calling it inoperable, and he kind of --
2 I think he put out to everyone that in cases like that 3
we need to fully understand and comprehend the issue 4
and get licensing and get everyone on board and then 5
make the call of operable or inoperable.
Well, that's 6
not the way it works.
Only licensed operators, 7
determine operability, and it's not operability by 8
consensus, and that's what the ýshift managers,!
9 disagreed with.
! We ?are the icensed operatorZ at 10 Salem, it's our license duty to determine operability 11 to the best of our ability.
In this case, procedural 12 compliance dictated it.
It was pretty clear in the 13 procedure, if this is failed, then this is inoperable.
C 14 To us on', shift: it wasn't a --
- now, whether that 15 procedure was right or wrong, whether Licensing might 16 be able to analyze and pencil whip that, who knew, but 17 it was pretty clear cut.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It was the procedure 19 that governed your call.
20 Right.
It was the.*surveillance 21 testcnýthese; heck valves hndbervice wate-ŽýSo that 22 coupled with some other things that I don't recall led 23 to us have thi s'1nýetin, if I recall correctly.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So when did this 25 incident happen with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4n'%
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IC Id MA
56 1
I don't remember a date, I'm 2
sorry.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And what's the 4
piece of equipment again?
5 Ite'so...ice water to diesel 6
generators.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
If the meeting 8
occurred reportedly in spring 2002, you're somewhere 9
after the 12-2001 incident.
10 Right.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So you're January, 12 February, March, in there, does that sound accurate?
13 I
can't recall.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I guess it could have 15 gone from January to May, in that time frame.
Okay.
16 You're just not sure.
You think it was 2002?i 17 Yes.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFFas th 20 Yes.
21 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
So his 22 disagreeing with that call and him putting out to the 23 shift that this is how we need to --
we need to more 24 fully understand operation by committee kind of thing, 25 that in itself caused this meeting with 6f NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
57 1
I i don't think that was all of 2
it.
3 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was that the 4
straw that --
5 I think that was one of the 6
major things.
7 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
broke the 8
camel's back kind of -- or no?
9 I believe so.
10 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
11 I believe that was it.
And 12 was an hen.
- And, see, what was 13 unique--
well, not unique but what happened there S14 that was crew',
ast night on shift.
It was two or 15 three o'clock in the morning when the surveillance 16 failed.
We didn't immediately call it inoperable.
It 17 was --
because of the piping configuration, it was 18 kind of a complicated technical issue at the time.
In 19 the middle of the night and me andI8' 20 and who is my 21 engineering person on shift, said, "It's inoperable."
22' But now that resulted in what we call a 72-hour 23 shutdown LCO.
So we had called to 24 explain it to him.
It's not an easy thing to explain, 25 so that was my line or my chain of command.
I call NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
58 2
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
3 who was the at the time.
4 cwompletely backed the decision, and he initiated 5
what we call a TRT at that time, a transient response 6
- team, and they came and dealt with it.
- Well, they 7
dealt with it on the days I'm off now, I'm on my days 8
off.
But I kept in touch with what was going on, and
.9 I guess a lot of feedback to "is back at 10 the Plant as a but he got a 11 lot of negative feedback, I believe, from his bosses, 12 from Licensing that they really didn't have to declare 13 that inoperable, that kind of thing, C
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did you have to enter 15 did you shut down on that?
16 j No.
They repaired it.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So they 18 repaired it within the 72-hour --
19 Correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
time frame.
It 21 was just --
22 Replaced a check valve.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
But the 24 declaration is what the scramble.
k-25 Not too difficult, I think, to
.1 NEAL R. GROSS
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
(*
25 repair.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did tell you who he was getting this feedback from?
You said Licensing, senior management?
- I think Licensing was --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That's wasn't it,
- at that time?
- It was at that time.
I think gone now.
But I'm sure it was from --
I can only believe it was froM O
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You said something when you were talking about that based on the information that you had this is the direction that you went, and that if Licensing had looked at it, they may have, I think your words were, pencil whipped it..
Have you experienced that, do they get around these procedures --
C, Sure.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
on a regular basis, legitimately?
My background and my -- from 0as you took the stance when it came to operability pretty much the old saying there was when in doubt call it out.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS F"
60 1
conservative.
2 Yes.
If you've got a doubt on 3
its operability, call it inoperable and then allow 4
your processes and your support organizations who 5
aren't there around the clock to come in and they 6
perfectly can justify operability.
But at that point 7
in time' it's inoperable, and then you prove it 8
It's not the reverse, right?
It's not it's 9
operable until somebody proves it inoperable.
That's 10 not conservative.
And here it seems to have been that 11 way.
I don't think it's as bad now, but during that Z
12 time frame it was that type mentality that got the 13 shift managers and operators:kind of upset, so to 14 speak.
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was there a 16 change in senior leadership where after that person 17 got into his position you started to see more of that?
18 I think during th 19 (phonetic), when he was the*
and 20 with that group there.
21 Now it's going back the other way.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Balance, right?
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What about for 24 position on this that caused the: shift V
25 managers to say, "We want to make the call based on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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61 1
what we're looking at at the time."
Had you heard 2
something like this from him before or was this a 3
change for him?
Was this the first instance where 4
you're seeing this, "Hey, I need you to delay your 5
discovery phase."
6 I can't recall whether there 7
were other incidents.
For me it was the first.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In this part of 2002.
9 Correct.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It seems like it's 11 early 2002.
12 You know, it might be very, 13 very close to the same time that Salem Unit 1 and 2 we 14 had a loss of th4portion of the switchyard, 500 KV 15 hhyard at resulted in a loss of alf the 16 circulators'>n both units.
Unit 1 had o Qirculator 17 out of service)-at the time.
So we were down to two 18
>Iir-culatorNsa. Unit 1, three on Unit 2.
That gave --
19 I guess. training-wise we would have been expected 20 probably to trip Salem Unit 1. It had, o circulators 21 in.servicefat 100 percent power.
- However, I was the 22 and th
'. ruring 23 the transient, he had started a rapid load reduction, 24 turned around to me and he said, "Hey, we've got two 25 Ncirculatorsunning.
Should we trip the Plant And NEALR. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANCCRIBERS
62 1
I told him, I said, "No.
The procedure requires 2
tripping the Plant based on certain parameters of 3
-2condenser back pressureX condenser Delta T, and we 4
had not exceeded any of those limits.
So I said, "No, 5
don't trip the Plant.
Follow the procedure, continue 6
the rapid load reduction and trip based on the 7
parameters."
8 Unit 2 was down to three circulators so it 9
was not quite as bad but Unit 2 reduced power rapidly 10 also.
Now, that decision was questioned by Training.
11 There was obviously a big team brought in after that 12 transient, but 13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Questioning --
14 Why I didn't trip it."
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
that you 16 weren't conservative enough.
17
.::'Why didn't you trip Unit I?
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And that came from 20 Training.
21 That came from Training.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So who was that, the 23 training manager or --
24
- Well, ho---one' 25 of the NEAL R. GROSS q
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4"-3c~urflcmIIA~ina m~~
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
2 was part of the TRT team 3
that came in after that.
They really questioned that.
4 "Why didn't you trip that?i 'You would have done that 5
in the simulator."
I said, "No."
Simulator scenarios 6
are normally the grassing scenarios where if you lose 7
- one, two, three conditions are degrading, it's an 8
environmental condition over which you have no 9
controlAhen you trip the plant-Y Conditions are 10 degrading.
In this case, you hav" loss of electrical, 11 three pumps go away just like that, one's already out 12 for maintenance.
Nothing's degrading any further.
13 The procedure allowed it, it's a parameter-based trip 14 at that.point.
So I thought it was different.
15 But that decision was questioned by 16 Training; it was pretty much applauded by senior 17 management.
Unfortunately, that was the first of 18 switchyard station power transformer failureý We 19 experienced two others.
was on for the 20 last one where they did have to trip the Plant.
21 Conditions were degrading at circ water and I don't 22 know if you -- you probably spoke to' but I think 23
~eceived some pretty negative feedback because 24 conditions were different then and he had lost a unit.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Time frame for that?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 C'*..I 1
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "I'm sorry, I'm bad with times.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Just recently?
46109 No.
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Couple months ago or longer?
A year.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Over a year ago.
Yes.
But that was -- the first one happened when my crew was on that I spoke to.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
That was the loss oý'rNumber 2 station power transformerj And once again you have to question corrective action because it happened a
second time.
The crew responded -- because you lose certain equipment that if river conditions aren't benevolent or benign at the time, the grassing levels can cause you to lose all your circulators.
So the second time we lost it we stayed online.
The third time when was on Salem Unit 1 had to trip.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right.
Now, just so I don't I don't want to get confused but the time frame for the first one was when? :The first one that you handled.,
Sometime early June, July of --
I don't recall, I'm sorry.
I mean I can get back to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
65 1
you with dates on this stuff, but I don't want to --
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Specific dates and 3
times are --
4 I don't want to under oath give 5
you a date--
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
No, and I understand 7
8 0
because I'm not really good 9
on the dates.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I understand your 11 hesitancy to be specific about it, but if you look at 12 the one --
the most recent one that(&x was 13 involved with, was there a year between the other two 14 in that one or two years or --
15 Probably all happened within 16 about six-to nine-month time frame.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
They're fairly close 18 together then?
19 Correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Now, are you 21 and you think the last one was about a year ago.
22 Maybe a year and a half ago.
.23 I think it might have been in the summer of --
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Two thousand two.
ý.r 25 2002.
And the one that I NEAL R. GROSS Q.
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7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 66 spoke of when I was on where it didn't trip the units, that happened around the same time the decision on the service water inoperability that got questioned that led to the meeting.
Because I remember hearingMN1
".17 speak of both of those, quote, "decisions," together, the decision to call it inoperable, the decision to stay online.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
He's comparing the two or bringing --
Yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What was he saying about them?
Where one decision was supported, positive feedback, where I didn't trip the Plant.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
By Right.
And one was negative where I declared the service water header inoperable in the middle of the night.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So he brought them up as examples of one being a good decision and one being a bad decision.
Correct.
On 'trip decisionJ (I
/
making.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I see.
The second
/
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transformer loss, who was on for that?.
2 I don't recall.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was that a decision 4
where you stayed online \\or just reduced --
5 In that
- case, it wasn't 6
complicated by the fact that anotherl circulator was 7
already out of service.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You had one out for 9
maintenance in the first incident.
10 Right.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
But that was 12 a remain online......
13 Correct.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And was that 15 supported by senior management?
16 Yes.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So there was 18 no negative reaction to that.
19 Correct.
But it was a
20 reoccurrence of --
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Of the same issue, 22 the same problem.
23 Correct.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So now in this third 25 incident, is there anything different?
Is it the same NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
68 1
thing happening again, same circumstances?
2 What's different is th'e-tiver 3
conditions*'jS*cause the same electrical loss of some 4
of the equipment you lose, in this case he lost all 5
the traveling screen Although you only lose three 6
--,fpumpýyou lose the'-raveling screensA which are the 7
big conveyor belt type [screens -"rd front of the 8
circulators that filter the grass from the rive!'$.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
10 You lose power to all six of 11 them onz'6nit i!*
his case.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So his is more 13 dramatic.
14 All of them you lose all the 15 screens in one-of the units, but what's different in 16 a
,case was that at that time the
-ass was heavier 17 in the river and he couldn't withstand a loss of power 18 to those screers.1Thoseiscreens stopped turni~i ne 19 hundred eighty thousand gallons a minute of. water was 20 being drawn through the three that remained onlii%
21 Those-pumps still running and the grass builds up on 22 those screens.ff my case, I was very lucky because 23 the screens didn't foul.-j*-Te rive2as --
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
They were still 2
25 functioning.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS a
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flowing at the time.
In 2
- case, the screens J.*
foulJ so was 3
questioned severely. "I guess from talking to he 4
was really given negative feedback on the time it 5
required him to cross connect power supplies, get 6
power back to those screens so that he didn't have to 7
trip the unit.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
But he tripped.
9 1
Correct.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And I guess to get 11 this, what you're portraying here, to be accurate, is 12 that in the first incident you took some criticism 13 from the TRT team for not tripping.;
14 From Training.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
From Training who was 16 a part of the TRT team --
17
" ICorrect.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
was what I was 19 understanding.
So Training had some questions there 20 on why wouldn't you have tripped because this is what 21 we train for, this is the way we go.
But you had a 22 reason why you made your decision.
By the time he's 23 in his third scenario here six to eight months later, 24 he's dealing with conditions that are worse than what 25 you were dealing with.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701
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Correct 2
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Significantly or I 3
mean how do you compare them?
4
[Significantly different because 5
of the er grass..r-f*
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So his are 7
significantly worse conditions and he does trip and 8
gets criticism for it.
9
- Correct.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Now there's a mixed 11 message.
12 1W E
Righ 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Because I mean any 14 other
\\would have seen what you went 15 through in your first one, I don't know who was on for 16 the second transformer loss --
17 I don't recall.
It might have 18 been *(phonetic) but I
don't recall 19 specifically.
But that's the point I'm trying to make 20 is that it's my opinion that if a shift manager or a 21 crew under those type of stressful conditions, 22 degrading conditions, that senior management should 23 never publicly criticize their decision to trip the 24 Plant.
It brings into question the safety culture, 25 the whole thing you're talking about, right?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
Does it also 2
do you see if having any effect on future decisions 3
that you make?
4 t, Well-,
sure it would, right?
5 Sure it would.
It would have the potential to affect 6
your decision making in other events.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
To sway you to be 8
less conservative.
9
- Correct.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I don't want to put 11 words in your mouth, but that's I think what we're 12 saying is that it would have an adverse effect on 13
- decision making "
14 Correct.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
and that you're 16 not making conservative decisions because this is the 17 back of your mind.
18 Right.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
But let me ask you 20 this:
Have you seen situations onsite in this same 21 time frame, we'll just look at the 2002 year for now, 22 have you seen under that senior management situations 23 where i-y ou took a more aggressive approach and they 24 took a more conservative approach?
25 1
I No.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And you're laughing.
2 That doesn't pick up for the record all the time, but 3
you kind of chuckled at that.
And your response was 4
pretty quick.
5 Obviously, I've discussed -- I 6
haven't really discussed this investigation much with 7
my peers I know you've interviewed, but.obviously I'm 8
good friends with some of my the 9
nd we've discussed this kind of thing.
10 nd I both came froLi i
and it 11 was just the opposite type there where I wasn't a 12
-there but that. equivalent position there 13 was-more of the position that said, "Well, let's do 14 this, let's try this," where senior management and 15 senior management was, "No, let's do the conservative 16 more conservative."
Obviously, there are degrees 17 of conservatism but it was the'. shift manager -level 18 being the guys outside the box and recommending or 19 wanting to be more aggressive, and senior management 20
- saying, "No, no.
It's all right.
Conservative, 21 conservative."
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
They would temper 23 that.
24 I
o And here, just like you just --
25 your question was had there been incidents where our NEAL R. GROSS A
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3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 1-2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 73 recommendations or decisions have been the aggressive and senior management said, "More conservative?"
It's just the opposite of that at Salem.
7eel like we're having to be the ones who say, "No, no, let's be more conservative."
Do you see what I'm saying, the difference there?
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In the face of a less conservative push.
Right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And, granted, a lot of ;:your decision making. goes on in what can be termed, I guess, a gray area.
Right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And if you're over here on the right
- side, you're saying senior management will come in over on the less conservative left side of that.
~Right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you have any other examples of that, any other instances?
We talked about a couple and I know we didn't get to the>Fl.9 yet.
ow I can't think of anything off the top of my head specifically, but almost in every
-- that's what
', and I have discussed.
Almost in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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74 1
every decision, major, minor, some of these may not be 2
- major, Earth-shattering decisions, but were very 3
contentious, highly contentious dedisions, you know, 4
where there's a lot of debate about it, but the 5
reduction in the margins of safety comes from above my 6
position instead of from my position.and below, which 7
is different than the philosophy I was used to at 8
It was the,, perator.s1 wanting to be and 9
when we say less conservative or more conservative, 10 please understand that being less conservative is not 11 always wrong provided you maintain an adequate margin 12 of safety.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
14 1 That's what you were saying 15 about this gray area there.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
17 Being less and more 18 conservative is not synonymous with good or bad, but 19 like I said, at it was at theishift manager 20 level and below, that would make the recommendations to 21 maybe operate more efficiently but reduce the margin 22 of safety, whereas at Salem it seems to be the 23 opposite.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Comes from the 25 opposite direction.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Have you seen 2
a change at Salem since the new senior management team 3
has come in, the the 4
coming back?
Have you seen a shift in that?
5 It's too soon to say, but once 6
the last organization changed occurred in September, 7
late September, right after that we went right into an 8
outage and so we were in an outage.
Now, we finished 9
the outage in late November, so it's really too soon 10 to tell.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
For normal operating 12 conditions you haven't got that much experience under 13 the new so-called regime, I guess.
C 14 Correct.
in the 15 reorganization went from oto the 16 newly recreatedv position.
.17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
18 So the --
he's pretty much 19 still the same.
He's now the driver at Salem, 20 He's theWW He reports t*
21
-ho is Salem-Hope Creek, right, but I think 22 is the focal decision maker at Salem right now, 23 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Before we move (2_&
25 on, I don't know if we finished with the shift NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
76 1
managers' meeting with.
Did we finish with 2
that, what happened during the meeting?
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
No.
We got to the 4
point where we understand why it came about, but I 5
think we can go a little further on the results of 6
that, I mean specifically what he wanted versus what 7
the shift managers wanted.
8 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And what 9
happened during the meeting?
10 I think the meeting was not 11 effective.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Were you there?
13 J
I don't think he got the 14 message.
Yes.
i5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Who else was there?
16 Sorry?
Can you recall anybody else who was there?
Or 17 who were your peers at that point-in time?
18 19 d"
20I'm sorry, I don't recall which ones were 21 there.
I believe the majority of them were there.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And was 23 there.
24 25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISI ANn AVF N W
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Anyone else from W
level?
2 I believe there was.
I don't 3
recall specifically, though.
I just recall --
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Wa here?
5 Yes.
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Licensing, 7
there 8
No.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:'.
10 I don't believe 11 there.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
13 I
believe he was the..
14 t that time 15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
But you're 16 saying you didn't think the meeting was effective or 17
-he didn't understand your message.
18 He didn't get the message.
19 SPECIAL-AGENT NEFF:
So what was the 20 result of that then?
I mean what--
21 The:shift managersl pretty much 22 just collective said, okay, we understand what he 23 wants but we understand what Lere licensed to do, 24 and we continued to operate as we had 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did that cause a
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
78 1
problem for anybody?
2 No.
It wasn't something we 3
just --
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
- Now, I understand 5
it's not --
6 We didn't go right to M
and 7
say, "Oh, W we're not about to do what you said.,"
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
No.
It wouldn't be 9
as blatant as that.
10 We pretty much just said, okay, ii we think we understand --
we understand whatdi9 12
- saying, we don't agree with it.
It's completely 13 against our training and everything we know as
(-
14 operators,' dealing with pperability calls :and things 15 like that.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Right.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
What did he say 18 that you guys disagreed with in that area?
19 M
Just what we talked about 20 earlier that when situations arise like that where 21 there's a question on operability, you maintain it 22 operable until you can get the right people together 23 to determine that it's inoperable.
That's contrary to 24 what we thought was the appropriate conservative.
If 25 we have a question on operability, a clear question --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
Right.
in this case it was a iled surveillance test In the case I spoke about it was a-pailed surveillance test.' 2ýurveillance tests kre tech spec, licensed driven estin to determine
,Qperability*
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
aifailed surveillance*
black and white, the x;quipmen0 is (inoperable2\\
- Now, if Engineering and somebody else wants to come back and make a case for perability they did so, but a ailed surveillanc automatically made the~quipment inoperableK SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
hift'l call to do that.
I I mean it wasn't a question.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
And here it was.
1 1
Here a failed surveillance test,,
well, you know, you might --
this was at Salem.
S,,
opinion and the message he was sending to us was we consider the !equipment operableland then follow up with an investigation.'
That's not the way you should do it, we thought.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And this was the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
80 1
decision he held up as a
negative example of 2
,operabilityIdecisions.
3 Correct.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
This is the one he 5
didn't like.
6 This is the o I made that he 7
didn't likeY I completei7Thsagree with tha$
8 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Have you seen 9
that attitude under the new management?
I know you 10 said that it's too soon to tell, but have you seen --
12 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
evidence of 13 that?
14 P
No.
15 SR.'
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Evidence 16 contrary to that, that maybe we're going to go back 17 towards if there's a question, we'll call it
- inop, 18 bring the experts in and see what happens?
19 We never stopped doing that.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You guys never 21 did.
22 Yes.
23 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I'm talking 24 about direction from above.
25 We've gotten no direction from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 81 above contrary to our -- with the current leadership team, we've gotten no direction contrary to our belief on c lling a piece of equipment inoperabl luntil you can rove it operable ot operable but degradedi whatever.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Has the change in management led to any change in the behavior of your immediate management?
Mr.
been in place as rnow, as Do you see any differences in the way he's dealing with you and your peers?
Different than the previous?
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Yes.
Any changes in him.
He would be at the level between you and senior management.
There's yet another level --
Correct.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
a Do you see any effect on him and his decision making, his interactions with you?
He's --
yes, as far as --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
If you do, just describe what you see.
.1I believe now with -- even when
,yas a he was promoted to still under theI WM "w0 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4 -
"10 (t'6, A& IM~ A%1 I~
%At 4
6.,
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 82 and at this point, 0
moved from W
W.....
took over at some time., i ias th
_.J..*1
'-li I really can't recall a lot during his time frame where he was it seems like under that regime the which my previous experience he was pretty much a head decision maker on a site.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Your previous experience at W
la es.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
And from my knowledge of the industry, right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Here even all the way up through when
- wasm, it's a
pretty ineffective
- position, which is disheartening because that's in my belief, that's where the decision should be made.
And I think that type of management style was the 1 nanagement style.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
rke-for at that point.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
(
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You're shaking 2
your head.
3 He was worthless.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Why?
5 Technically, leadership?
6 It was a position that didn't 7
need to exist.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It was --
was he the 9
-. or was somebody else the 10 11 He was thne.*T...*_,
12but you could have eliminated him and just 13 let Mr.
tell us what he wanted us to do.
14 There wasn't any reason to have a MW 15 16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
had that 17 kind of direct input.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
-NOW 190 That's what we all
- believed, yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did you experience that yourself, personally?
We talked a little bit about SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR With SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
With Mr.t.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Did I experience --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Direc
- tdirectly.
tion from I mean vi b u t I
mean SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
That's what I
was saying,
[§might as well --
I mean it wag --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
He was a conduit for
- 'then?
la Yes.
(END TAPE 1, SIDE B)
(BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE A)
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
We're back on.
It's approximately 11:00 a.m.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Mr.r a
couple things I wanted to just go over with you.
Prior to the interview today, were you spoken to by corporate counsel?
- No.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How about your management, do they know you're meeting with us today?
Did you tell your boss that you were being interviewed by 01 today?
No.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
85 1
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
Were you 2
in any way prepped or counseled on how you should 3
respond to questions that you might be asked today?
4 OUR No.
The only individual who 5
knows I'm here is 6
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
I mean 7
this is a voluntary interview, I know you understand 8
- that, but I
just wanted to emphasize this is 9
voluntary.
We do appreciate you meeting with us and 10 spending the time with us.
11 I wanted to go back to go over one thing 12 and then we'll move forward.
We were talking about 13 some specific issues.
This is an issue I wanted to 14 ask you some questions about.
Maybe you'll have some 15 knowledge of it, maybe you won't.
But talking about 16 dates here, coming out of the 6alem 1 spring 2001 17 outage, spring 2001.,
18 0 ay.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay?
From my 20 understanding, the unit was at full power for a very 21 short time and there was ajgenerator trip....
rbine 22 tri
.nd.[eactor tri 4 because there was an issue with, 23 let's see here, theyýouidn't bring steam into the 24 turbine building.
It was an '4ectrical issuýf> from my 25 understanding, that caused this to happen.
Do you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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86 1
remember that particular issue?
I don't have a lot 2
more on that, but --
3 Yes.
I remember I was on shift 4
and it was' aenerator protection trip.
5 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
6 We had just reached 100 percent 7
power that evening after the outage, so we were at 100 8
percent power for only a few hours and we received a 9
Cnerator protection tri utomatic reactor trid 10 yes.
Pt was right at the end of my shif 11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: V'LAnd did you 12 have to take actions to shut the Plant down or did the 13 Plant shut itself down?<
14 was an automatic reactor 15 trip.~
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
And did 17 you were yown shift the next day too or do you 18 remember if you were going on leave or going back out 19 into requal--
20 I don't recall.
21 SR..SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
Do 22 you remember the follow-up of that issue or how it was 23
- handled, how long it took to get the Plant back to 24 where it needed to be before it could turn on?$
25 Don't remember anything NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS iv pweA1; Itzi Atin AvIc mi w
87 1
specific about that, Jeff, sorry.
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
You've 3
heard the questions we've asked today and the 4
discussion we've had regarding other issues.
Did you 5
note or see any problem or disagreement with the way 6
that issue was resolvedtvn how the Plant was brought 7
back up to power or when it was brought back up to 8
power?3\\
9 I don't recall any issues with 10 that.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Do you know who 12 might be able to provide some more information, who 13 was more directly involved in that particular issue?
14 1*
I don't recall.
Sorry.
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
16 That's about what I had, the couple areas I wanted to 17 go over.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
I just wanted 19 to go back just a little bit on some of your comments 20 regarding the differences you noted.
You particularly 21 note differences, obviously, with where you, worked 22 before 41 Do you have any basis to 23 compare other stations?
Do you have discussions with 24
'at other stations in terms of what 25 you've noticed at Salem being different in terms of NEAL R. GROSS c
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who's taking the aggressive approach on conservative 2
decision making?
Do you have those discussions with 3
people that are located elsewhere?
4 No.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So you don't have any 6
basis to compare how --
7 Other than what I read in the 8
industry via INPO.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
10 The sharing of information 11 there.
I don't actively now discuss or talk to any 12 other at other stations.
I did for a 13 while but nothing along these lines.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
What about --
15 just briefly when we were taking a break there, you 16 made a comment about you deal with more equipment 17 failure problems at Salem on a routine basis at Salem 18 than you did at, n about a year is I think the 19 way you put it, and maybe you could say it more 20 accurately because I don't want to put words in your 21 mouth.
22 The number of equipment issues, 23 unplanned tech spec entries, load reductions caused by 24 equipment problems, those type things happen way more 25 frequently at Salem than happened at NEALR. GROSS flu COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1.23 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 89 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What do you think, what's causing that?
Equipment reliability issues caused by ineffective maintenance.
That's it, equipment reliability, ineffective maintenance and engineering resolution of previously identified --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Corrective action process?
%MMOM-Corrective actions, back to that, right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is that a problem in knowledge, in how to fix something?
Is that a problem in resources, having the people and the money to fix something, or is it a combination of things?
I think it's a combination.
From the rapid turnover of people at Qlekthat contributes to it, because some of these issues are difficult issues that require long-term resolutions, and we don't seem to be able to really achieve those long-term solutions because people aren't in place, senior management's not in place long enough to maintain a focus on that.
So each new senior leadership team or team that comes in there will have their own priorities and they'll change, will start over in some, you know what I mean?
I mean if you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1i2, RHwn IRI Arj AI%/ N tw
90 1
were to look back during I remember 2
reading a
200-page engineering document from a
3 contract company o
c water i-*and their 4
recommendations.
And was that followed up on?
No.
5 So now another team comes in and it's it's 6
continuity and focus, remaining focused on those key 7
areas.
It all stems -- the Corrective Action Program, 8
like I said before, is in need of improvement, and 9
it's one of the focus areas of the new leadership team 10 that's there now.
I think and:O 11 ifully realize that unless we get an 12 effective Corrective Action Program we're going to 13 continue to struggle.
('
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
If you have no 15 follow-up on that Jeff --
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
No.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
-- I had an issue I'd 18 like to discuss.
You had pretty much started talking 19 about th*rs BF19 \\ssue that was a irecent outage iss e' 20 October, I think it was, 2003?'
- 21.
Yes.
That just occurred.
I 22 came int(on night shift for that% The previous-ight 23 shift sometime /ound hree or so in the morning here 24 was an identified problem with, I believe it was ati-L3 25 BF19,.Jone of the rofur feed reg valves. k It brought NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1*73 RHODF ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
91 1
into question whether the valve would go cloge 1 or not 2
and the*p.lve *g required to g osed 'n an accident.
3
?tomatic closure of this valve occurs during an 4
accident.
So there was a question as to whether to do 5
that.
6 At approximately.(4hree o'clock in the 7
afternoon, -which is probably maybei,12 to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 8
after originally identified7 the ZY4ve was declared 9
inoperab-ý-
With the7alve inoperabl put the 10 Plant in a
condition outside of technical 11 specifications which required a shutdown.-7 Aii I came 12 on and performed the shutdown that nightW 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was that -- between 14 the recognition of where this incident started and the 15 declaration that it was inoperable --
16 Yes.
That time frame there has 17 been scrutinized as being inappropriately long-"and I
/
18 agree.-.
And I believe there were several things that 19 contributed to that.
Number one, it happened at a bad 20 time.
You don't have the full force of your 21 engineering and support organizations aUtwo or three 22 in the morning--)
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
24
'1 So it's identified and there 25 were, Žnmy estima, maybe three possible causes, one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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92 1
of which *lve 2
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
For the delay?
3 No.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
For the problem 5
itself.
6 For the problem. J$Valve 7
mechanically st1I~-is the one that would render the 8
IVvalre inoperable, incapable of performing its safety 9
function.
The others, whether it's acontroll.r, or a 10 itioner something in theýcontrol syste would 11 not necessarily prevent th~ealve from going close.i-12 So the crew'identified it and there was delay from the 13 middle of Iearly that morning where people got there at 14
'seven o'clock.
Then the engineering expertise L.-
15 involved wasn't the best, so the troubleshooting that 16 led to final determination, we ruled out the 17 positioner, the controller, the I to P converter, we 18 ruled everything out.
It has to be :mechanically 19 stuck, valve inoperable.
It was caused by just delays 20 and inherent delays built into the process, some of 21 them unavoidable but some of them in this case were 22 avoidable or maybe could have been done better.
23 If things were happening in parallel, if 24 th valve is stuc it's a very difficult thing to do
(-*
25 to shut the Plant down in controlled fashion when that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1171 PHflnB= I.I AWf AVP N W
93 1
výTe is stuck op__
So during that time they were 2
doing the troubleshooting to determine the problem, 3
operators were sent out to the simulator to practice 4
the shutdown if that became necessary, as it did, with 5
Ythat valve stuck.
And that helped tremendously when 6
it came time.
It was a very difficult shutdown 7
because thee alve was indeed stuck.-Goald it have 8
been more timely, yes.
Was that, in my eyes, a big 9
issue, no.
It was a pretty big thing to do to take 10 the time to properly train it, properly discuss 11 contingencies.
Did they take a little bit too long, 12 yes, but that's just an efficiency issue.
I don't 13 think that was a safety issue or reluctance on anyone 14 to 4 all. that valve inoperable.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Did you become 16 aware of anything that indicated there was pressure to 17 slow down the decision making in that case?
18 wasn't on for the decision4 19 When I <ame in at six o'clock that evenin' t 4-eI -v1ve 20 was declared inoperabl'e
,We were starting to shut 21 down and take the unit offline.
But in looking back 22 at what happened and because of all the questions that 23 have been brought up by operators that were on, "Oh, 24 it was\\6obviously stuck."'
It wasn't obvious.
It was 25 the appropriate thing to do to troubleshoot-,the valvej NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBER3 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
94 1
to take the time to train the shutdown.
I think that 2
was handled well.
Were there areas to improve in the 3
efficiency of our ability to troubleshoot and get at 4
the cause, yes.
You always have the Monday morning 5
quarterbacks who come in and want to question.
In 6
that case, I think things were handled fairly well.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Anything else on 8
that? There is an issue.
I wanted to go back and I'm 9
going back to this meeting in theJPs d*n of 20
-0.
10 There was some information that was reported along the 11 way indicating that during this meeting --
I know you 12 said you described the meeting as it was 13 ineffective and that didn't understand what 14 you were trying to tell him, what the) 15 were communicating.
At some point in that meeting did 16 you feel --
were you upset and agitated enough that 17 you left the meeting?
18 I'm not sure if that was the 19 onel.. left or not 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is there another one?
- 21.
.\\
I have been known to leave 22 meetings if I
think I'm about to say something 23 inappropriate.)\\I don't know if I left that meeting or 24
- not, I can't recall, but I do recall that I have 25 gotten up and left meetings..-,
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND IRANSCRIBERS
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you remember what 2
the cause of that would have been? And, specifically, 3
what we're looking at is discussions with senior 4
management, shift management and enough of a
5 discrepancy that you felt strongly enough that you 6
were just going to get out.
7 So your questionlis why did I 8
get up and leave?
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Can you remember what 10 would have caused you to do that if it wasn't this 11 meeting or it was another?
12 Not specifically.
I don't do 13 it a lot,
- but, no, I really other than just 14 disagreement with the decisions that are being made.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It seems like 16 frustration is what --
17 Right.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
we were getting 19 the picture of.
You don't recall it specifically to 20 that meeting.
21
- No.
Sorry, I do not.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Can you recall 23 a meeting where you did do that and can you tell us 24 the reason?
Can you recall one of them, one of the 25 specifics?
You said it doesn't happen that often, so NEAL R. GROSS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
96 1
do you think you remember something about it?
2
- Not specifically. One's coming 3
to mind but it seems like the direction that was being 4
given -- well, it was once again back along the lines 5
\\of the operability,thow to determine operability was 6
just contrary to everything I thought was appropriate.;
7 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:o Who was 8
providing that --
9 in that case, in 10 this meeting.
This wasn't the one that you're talking 11 about in the 1spring of 2002.
I don't really remember 12 this one.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What was the issue, C
14 do you recall?
15 That's what I was trying to 16 think.
That's why I was hesitant to even mention it, 17 because I don't remember the specifics.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Can you place who was 19 there?
20 21 some of my fellowship managers" I'm not sure if this 22 had to do with anything along these lines of safety or 23 anything.
It may have just been the more mechanics of 24 how we do business on shift, things like that, nothing 25 along the lines of operabilityf So I don't really NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 C
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
- y.
25 recall.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Nothing jumps back?
No.
Just frustration with the decisions that were being made, and I don't remember the specifics.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And it might not have been --
j It might not have been--
Z/
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
related tdsafety decision operability?Y Right.
I'm thinking now it was more like more of unrelated stuff withl'shift mechanics, of operating the crews/decisions that were being made.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did it have to do with discipline actions or --
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
-- grievances?
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Nothing like that?
- But, yes, I have left meetings.
If someone told you that, I wouldn't dis ute it, but meetong."
h-I don't recall that meeting,,-he 20p 1you re talking about with i
r NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4,*,a DU
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4 5
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1"7 18 19 20 21 2t 23 24 25 98 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The spring 2002 Right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
in that time frame?
What about lately?
Are you experiencing that level of frustration in recent months?
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Do you have anything else, Jeff?
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
On that particular issue?
And I think we've covered theF 19f issue too.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I have one more before I have something.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF.:
I have one more too then.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
About two years ago do you recall there being an issue with tlhiSJ check, valves 4 and 5 and 12 and 13 leaking"' those lves leaking?".
/
I remember that,
$t I was not on shift for that. V I remember -there being some questions as to the Ivperability3 SR.
Some people wanted *'eak testing 'one then and there to determine if there was a problem.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12021 7AA44~ATA
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W"M.
Right.
I was -- that must have 2
been days off.
I remember that happening, but I was 3
not involved directly at all.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did you hear about 5
that from your peers?
6 I don't know if I heard 7
anything from my peers.
I mean I heard stuff that was 8
put out at the Plant, but I don't recall anything 9
controversial maybe that came out of that.
I remember 10 there was a big training thing put out on it 11 afterwards.
Some of the--
just the technical 12 functions of thes lvrIesbut.nothing during that 13 decision-making prgcess ofV'e leak rate was excessive 14 on these valgT 15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did you have 16 any first hand involvement with that issue while you 17 were on shift?i 18 No.
19 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
From 20 what we understand, the issue was, quote, "engineered 21 away,"
unquote.
Something was done to-.[ut those 22 valvesp I mean I'm not talking physically cut but 23 t!ýba those valves out of being of the importanca.,hey 24 used to be.
- Maybe, maybe not?
25
\\
Yes, I don't recall.
I know NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
100 1
we've changed the system design since that time.
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
3 Because there a valvý.in 4
series with them that thos
"[v sed to~maiiitainedl 5
)^op~njall.the time.
Now they're aintained closE'*
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
7 We changed the system design.
8 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
9 But I don't remember anything 10 specific on that.
11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did anyone --
12 do you recall anyone expressing to you frustration 13 they had with how that issue was handled?
If so --
14 It seems like maybe or 15 or may have 16 indicated a lot of pressure came from, I'd say, from 17
- and that, but it was just heresy, so. I 18 don't and I don't know the specifics, but, yes, I 19 did hear that there was pressure to make inappropriate 20 decisions and it came from that level, from.;ý 21 and that type.
So I know there was some 22 controversy involved with that happened there, but I 23 don't know any of the specifics.
24 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Anything more 25 on that?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
101 2
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
3 That's it on that issue.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
We touched on 5
it earlier, this_4`Eeam val think it's t*elMS42ý 6
1ýý-two, yeý,..
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
In theq:ptember 2002 8
time frame41-i 9
Okay.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Our understanding is 11 you're th rwhen the steam leak occurred!
12 Can you just sort of walk us through the sequence of 13 events on that?
What part of the shift did it occur C
14 in and what happened?
15 It was the night shift again.
16 We had a planned power reduction on Salem Unit 2 that 17 evening for turbine valve testing where we have to 18 come down to 45 percent power.
It's a routine --
not 19
- routine, but it's an evolution we perform per 20 schedule, per procedures to come down and do this 21 test..,-.,
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It was totally 23 unrelated to th te am valv_?W'_
24 25 Tot ally unrelated to the steam valve.
So that was the conditions at the night were.,
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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t= ' a,
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 102 we knew we had a planned power reduction for turbine valve testing to 45 to 50 percent power.
was on that night as like senior operations.
Sometimes when we do a down power like that or maneuver the Plant, the planned evolution, we'll have management oversight, and was there for that, serving that function that night, and he was also SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That's not uncommon then, if you're doing that kind of power SY, movement.
If you know you're going to do it, preplanned, to have someone in management there, correct.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
So during the load reduction, I guess as you reduce load some of the pressures felt on the secondary systems increase, increase in steam pressures.
We had a-couple of previously identified leaks and we were monitoring those as we came down.
As part of our.pre-planning for this evolution, w want to keep an eye on this and this and this.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You had been at full power?
NEAL R. GROSS
-COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
103 1
SPEC B<AIGENT NEFF:
Okay.
2 So we wanted,to keep an eye on 3
these couple of known leaks out in the Plant, make 4
sure they don't worsen and stuff.
This MS valve was 5
not one of those, not a known previous leak.
As we 6
came down, a leak on 22 heater drain pump which had 7
been previously identified got really bad.
This is a
8 pump that's a high energy, high pressure pump in the 9
secondary plant.
It had to be --
so during the load 10 reduction, the first thing we had to do -- this pump, 11 basically, was just blowing steam and water out of its 12 mechanical seal and we took the pump out of service 13 based on that.
14 I was out in the Plant )observing the 15 amount of leakage from that pump and I was coming back 16 to the control room when I noticed just a slight drip 17 from this main steam valve which feeds one of the 18 steam generator feed pumps.
I'm not sure what power 19 level we were at at the time.
So I'm like, oh, 20 another steam leak, so I went in his 21 office, which is across the turbine building, so I 22 walked across the turbine building, went to 23 office, spoke to him for a moment and said, "You want 24 to come out and look at this?
This is another steam 25 leak developing."
So then we walked from his office*J:dl NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4*V~ DUrC ICS ANIn A'*
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 104 ck out to the turbine building and in that short time the leak had went from just a small wisp of steam drops of water to a full blown blowing steam out, probably five-to ten-foot plume at that ti-ff. e AL AGENT NEFF:
So how much time was that.\\
(7
)yy short tifle<
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:kJuft minutes?
.i~~~&in ten minute "SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Yes.
To walk across the building, talk to for a minute and go back out.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
So we looked at the leak, I went back to the control room.
That power reduction was already in progress.
went to get, I think, Maintenance to look.
We had the crew implement' a procedure for a
steam leak.
It's an abnormal operating procedure.
They briefed it.
The leak continued to worsen.
I think I must have gone back down a couple times and looked at it.
It was --
at that point, in my estimate, you couldn't get to it to isolate it.*
In the first, from Maintenance, it came back --
where it was located on the valve we posed a question to Maintenance, if we could shut the valve,
/
,f NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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would it isolate the leak because it was on that 2"'
valve?
And Maintenance at first said no.
Even if you 3
could get to it, shutting the valve wouldn't stop the 4
leak.
So at that point we were kind of like there's 5
no even need to consider trying to get to the valve, 6
we've got to shut down and perform the actions of the 7
procedure, which would have made us take the Plant all 8
the way offline, shut the main steam isolation valves 9
to divorce the secondary plant to isolate the leak.
10 And it would have required steaming out the, what we 11 call the MSl0s or the atmospheric steam dumps blowing 12 steam out to the environment, non-radioactive.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Loud, though, 14 isn't it?
15 Loud.
It's not something we do 16 routinely at all anymore.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Manual dump like 18 that.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Who were you dealing with with Maintenance?
When.you say they first said they --
it sounds like that changes.
(
0 I forget who the supervisor was, but a 12-hour maintenance crew is always there around the clock.
I forget who was on that evening.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A.1 RHfnISrIR ANI AVi:
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-Ut then I guess they looked at -- Maintenance looked 2
at this point, we're continuing the load reduction, 3
that's what's required, briefing what we're going to 4
do as we go further down in power.
Maintenance, I
5 guess, is continuing to look at this.
They've gotten 6
the Engineering duty guy on shift to look at it, and 7
they come in and say, "Yes, if it's if it's on the 8
bottom of this valve, shutting it will isolate the 9
leak."
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:. Okay.
So now it's a
11 different thing.
12 Right.
So now shutting it will 13 isolate the leak, but at that point based on an C:
14 assessment of the leak, the valve's up in the overhead 15 but there is a platform built to it.
I was like 16 there's no way anybody can get to it.,
The operators 17 had looked at it obviously at the Plant and nobody was 18 saying, "Oh, I'll go shut that valve."
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
No volunteers?
20 No volunteers.
There were 21 phone calls made because the Plant's during the load 22 reduction and that was mentioned previously.
I don't 23 know if I mentioned this phone call or not, but there 24 were phone calls made, and the decision to shut the 25 Plant down was not questioned.
It was the rightý NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 decision.
107 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You were moving down that road.
Yes.
Upper management during the phone conversations --
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
With?
wit3 mean WMit?
i SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
a conference call from my office - -
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
With who?
-- 'with the control room fully supported removing the unit from line.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Who was that?
Fully supported removing--
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Both of them were on the phone?
Sknow
)was.
Yes, I belev..a e-ev*'*_i
-ir-*
- was i then?
I can't remember.
I forget who th was.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
telling them how you're proceeding --
)What we're doing, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS v22 n~nnj-~j~fJJIh~A I/1j tj w You were right.--
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108 1
i SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
and they're 2
supporting it.
3 Yes.
Because at that point 4
there was even after we had been given the 5
information that shutting the valve would isolate the 6
leak--
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
8 O
at that point, in my mind, 9
there was no way we were going to get to the valve.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Personal safety 11 12 Right.
Personal safety.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
issue at 14 that point.
15 0
So we were actually out in the 16 I was out in the control room.
At that point, the 17 phone call's over, we're out, the crew is holding a 18 brief on the actions of the abnormal operating 19 procedure and where that procedure will lead them.
20 I'm standing behind the control room panels.
iw 21 had been out of the control room and he had 22 come back in and he came to me and he said, I
23 think I can isolate the leak.
I'm going to go get 24 A
was the*
"I'm going to 25 go get, and go down and look at it."*
-i
(
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND 1 RANSCRIBERS flLPI 3U 6 AI I ALI*
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LSR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
2 7
(phonetic), he was 3
th So right in the middle I'm 4
thinking, gee, you know, what's meaning, but I 5
stayed in the control room at that point.
Then I 6
remember another phone call coming in at that point 7
also that at Unit CR4took the call and it was 8
And I talked to %
for a minute and then 9
I toldq
'_I have to go.
Plant conditions are 10 degrading, I need to get off the phone."
Got off the 11 phone and then I left the control room.
That was 12 probably a bad decision on my part, but I didn't know 13 what eally meant.
14 SPECIAL-AGENT NEFF:
Is there where you 15 went?
16 That's where I went.
I went 17 down to the location of the leak, and I get down there 18 and the valve is shut and the leak's isolated.
19 up --
(at the bottom of the ladder being 20 a safety watch or whatever.
up on the ladder, 21 away from the platform, he's accessed, and the valve 22 is closed and he's got a wrench on it and he's 23 tightening it down.
So the valve is shut.
I'm like 24 talking for a minute, then I go back to the control 25 room.
So at that point that whole --
actions (
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
110 1
were questioned.
None of the operators thought it was 2
appropriate what he did.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I have a couple 4
questions on that.
You just said you probably 5
shoiildn't have --
it was a bad move to leave the 6
control room.
Why do you say that?
7 Well, my place in a -- picture 8
it this way:
I wasn't sure when said, "Hey, I
9 think I can isolate the leak, I'm going to get nd 10 go down," just on the lower level, he was going to go 11 down to the leak, I wasn't sure if he said he was 12 going to go isolate the leak, he was going to up there 13 I thought maybe he was just going to go down there 14 and look at it with and assess it, then come back 15 and make a decision.
I'm down there and he's closing 16 the valve.
If4 17 are all down there and we all get taken out by this 18 steam leak, if it really let's go all together, well, 19 20 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Understood.
22
-- are just gone.
But I didn't 23 know he was going down I suspected..-
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
- Well, what could he C*
25 do to isolate the leak?
What would his options have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
ill 1
been?
If he says, "I think I can,"
what comes to
/2 mind?
3 I wasn't sure if he was going 4
- ..to get, and go down and just assess it with 6 5
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Like what he was 6
saying with you.
7 Say, "Hey, see, I think I can 8
put this ladder up here and I can get to it on the 9
other side of this platform and the plume's going out 10 like this."
As the leak got worse, the area around 11 the valve was actually improving because the steam was 12 blowing so far out.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
More 14 pressure.
15
£According to what AI said.
16 Now, I didn't gowas assessing it on location 17 a lot more often than I was.
-I was in the control 18 room.
What
)aid is as this thing continued to 19 get worse, the area accessible to get to the hand 20 wheel of this valve, which the hand wheel's about this 21 big, to get to it was actually being cleared as the 22 steam blew out further.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Narrowed it down.
24 And it kind of cleared the area 25 from the hand wheel.
So when he said it was going NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 112 RHflflF ISI AND AVE.. N.W.
112 1
he said, "Continue the brief.
I think I can isolate 2
it,"
Went and go and when I got down there it 3
was isolated.
I'm like, okay.
But that was 4
questioned by the operators.
- And, you know, to be 5
honest with you, both --
the union took major issue 6
with that, and I think it was because the union just 7
doesn't like 8
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It was because he did 9
it.
10 Yes.
A lot of times like that 11 personal safety in that case was a choice.
- and 12 I talk about it a lot.
It could have been handled 13 better.
He's 14 not going to put himself in harm's way ridiculously, 15 he's not that kind of guy.
But(U Jtried to 16 implement some stuff that the union doesn't like,, and 17 so the union took issue with it and made a big deal 18 about it.
But either scenario, whether went up 19 on that and shut the valve, isolated the leak, or he 20 didn't, either scenario could be what if to death and 21 core destruction either way.
And that's what they did 22 afterwards -- well, what if(
't what if this?
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was he a part of the 24 phone call that you.had wit 01 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS mn..n ~ ~ ~
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Yes, he was there.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
He was present for 3
that?
4
- He was present on that.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And then this second 6
call that came in from you said it 7
lasted about a minute.
8 Yes.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What was the point of 10 that?
11 He was asking, trying to 12 understand, asking specifics, and I was trying to 13 listen in on the brief that the control room 14 supervisor was conducting. )
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
They were briefing to 16 shut down.
17
- They were briefing the actions 18 of the abnormal operating procedure that included 19 shutting
- down, right.
So I
was was a
20 distraction at that point.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
22
/ As he was most of the time he 23 called in to the control room.)
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
But he was trying to 25 get a better understanding about the leak itsel j> /.-*
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
114 1
z Yes.
Right.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
After this other 3
phone call.
4 Correct.
5' SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Now, you're 6
saying during that phone call the decision was you 7
were going to shut down and that was supported.
8 Correct.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:,You were supported in 10 that you were going to have to shut down because it 11 was now a personal safety issue with regard to the 12 leak..Even though it could isolate, it wasn't a --
13 M
Correct.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You couldn't have 15 done it without shutting down.> Okay.
So somewhere in 16 between there and your phone call with 17 then that's whe414* "makes the decision he's 18 going to try and isolate this himself.
19 Correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was this --
you've 21 said you had conversations with him.
Was this 22 decision made on his own?
Did he have some sort of 23 input to that?
I-T 24 See, that's why I said earlier CI.
25 that I thought it could have been done --
handle NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVF NW
115 1
Cbetter b
- 3but, yes, he made it by himself, and 2*
that was what was inappropriate.
I think he could 3
have gotten we do have a fully staffed fire 4
department, fire and safety people there around the 5
clock.
He could have gotten their assessment, he 6
could have maybe gotten some type of personal 7
protective gear, he could have gotten the operators to 8
help him, but he didn't do any of those things.
He 9
just made the decision on his own from the field.
10 Like I said, what he told me afterwards,)as the leak 11 actually worsened, the area right around the valve 12 hand wheel became accessible.
So, yes, that's why I 13 say it could have been handled a little better by C
14 And, also, he kind of --
he, I'll say, kind of 15 removed my authority as a that night, 16 and that wasn't his function for being there.
He was 17 onsite to be management oversight.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And you had made the 19 call at this point.
20 Yes.
2i SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You were going to 22 shut the unit down.. And he knew that.
23 0
Oh, yes.
24 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Can I ask you 25 a question on this?
When he went and closed the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4b' flý uPtric sai Akin M~r I~ M~INC~
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valve, had you'already entered the abnormal operating 2
procedure?
3 7*Yes, well before that.
Right 4
when we got from initial identification after --
the 5
abnormal operating procedure was entered.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
Did that 7
-- entering that AOP --
8 We call them an AB, but, yes.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
AB, all right.
10 Did that allow for anyone to go do what 11 did at that point?
12 a
Yes.
I mean there are steps, 13 conditional steps within the AB, that if you can 14 isolate the leak, you isolate the leak.
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Were those 16 steps followed in how he did what he did?
17 Yes.
Yes.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How?
19 I mean if because all it 20 says is that.
21 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Is what?
I 22 don't know what it says.
23 Isolate the leak.
It doesn't 24 get into -- the procedure is not specific on those --
25 on details of how to isolate it or what precautions to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
117 7
1 take or anything like that.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Let me ask it 3
this way:
Did that procedure not allow him to do what 4
he did?
5 0.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did it prohibit 7
him from doing what he did?
8 No.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Him doing what 10 he did, did the procedure require that that be 11 reviewed and approved by anyone in the Plant?
12 No.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
14 No.
15 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
I want to 16 explore this some.
There is the procedure.
In the 17 procedure, from what you told me, there are provisions 18 allowing someone to go physically close the valve.
19 Correct.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Manually close 21 it, right?
22 Correct.
23 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
But before 24 someone can do that, are there other procedures that 25 would need to be followed, steps that would need to be \\.
NEAL R. GROSS.'.,
L COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
118 1 11 Y taken?
=?.2 2Those steps were taken when he (i
3 isolated --
by the time he isolated you mean 4
preceding steps in the procedure?
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
6 Yes, they were done.
7 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did he follow 8
all the steps he had to follow in that procedure to do 9
what he did?
10 In that procedure, yes.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did he violate 12 any procedure in doing what he did?
13 Well, sure.
I mean it's not C
14 normal for.management individualsito operate equipment 15 in the Plant.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
So what did he 17 violate procedurally?
I'm asking you.
18 mean he probably violated the 19 collective bargaining agreement with the union, but 20 this was an emergency condition which probably didn't 21 even violate that.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about control of 23 Ops?
24 There may have been some 25 conduct of operations standards that weren't adhered NEAL R. GROSS COURr REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
119 1
to just on the fact that he didn't communicate what he (was doing well to anyone, you know what I mean?
He 3
didn't --
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Not well, he just --
right.
Just went out and did it.
He may have thought he communicated it;to me but I did not
- -I mean our normal method of communication wasn't used, and I was in serious question.
That's why I went down there.
The union didn't like the fact that I went down there, but I didn't go down there to help him close it, I went down there to see what he was doing. 2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And did you authorize his isolationý,of the valve in that manner?
S)
No. That's why I say he kind of diluted my authority as the' that night because that authority should have come from me and didn't it,1 not whatsoever.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Did that AB require that authorization before someone could go and close the valve?
Sure.
I mean that's inherent in anything in the procedure.
- was not a member of the crew.D NEAL R. *3ROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBE 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
p.l~
.~
120 1
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
2 Within normal he had no 3
right to be touching anything or directing anything or 4
doing anything.
He was there for management oversight 5
for the load reduction schedule that night, nothing 6
else.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Can you tell us 8
specifically what he violated then when he did what he 9
did?
Can you point to a procedure?
Can you point to 10 a step?
11 79No. Like I said, I don't think 12 there's anything in any of the implementing 13 procedures.
It would be more of a standards thing in
(
14 accordance with conduct of operations, which is an 15 administrative procedure.
16 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Well, you're 17 supposed to follow them.
Those are supposed to be 18 followed also.
19 Absolutely. Absolutely.
Those 20 are probably more important.
They govern how we use 21 the implementing procedures.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Who was 23 Did you have one or more than one?
24 HM 25 In Unit 1 at --
sorry, on Unit 2 during:
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
121 1
that time.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
The 4
Correct.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How did he take it?
6 How did he respond to this?
7 Everyone in the control room) at 8
the time was very glad the leak was isolated.
As the 9
leak worsened and moisture accumulated down on some 10 switch gear in the vicinity of the leak, we were 11 receiving alarms in the control room which indicated 12 possible inability to transfer when we --
if we had to 13 shut the unit down, no longer would the unit be 14 supplying its power, it's electrical power.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You were getting 16 shorts or something in the --
17 We were getting ground alarms, 18 and we were getting'-- it's called a transfer inhibit 19 alarm saying the group buses wouldn't transfer to 20 offsite power once we tripped.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
22 A
Or potentially.
The control 23 room crew was very relieved and very glad did 24 what he did.
From the control room supervisor to the 25 reactor operators, they were like, "Whew."
Because NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS vv wni-I~r A~nf AVF N.W.
122 1
where we were headed -- any my operators told me this.
2 obviously, I've discussed this whole thingth my crew, my crew was on kThey said, "Well, the Plant's 4
designed for natural circulation cooldown if we had 5
lost all power of the diesels to run."
- Sure, it's 6
designed for that and we practiced for it in the 7
simulator,i and that's the only place I ever hope to do 8
it is in the simulator.
9 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
That's not where you 11 want to be.
12 LM That's not where you want to 13 be.
That's why I said either scenario, ' had not 14 isolated the leak andrye continued, who knows what.we 15 would have run into., You could --
what if that whole 16 scenario, because we would have been shutting down the 17 Plant very abnormal condition.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How long would it 19 take?
How quickly were you going to be shut down?
20 You were already down powering for this pre-planned, 21 but where were you and how long was it going to be 22 before you were down?
23
- Well, we were going dowjn)I 24 think at that point at one percent a minute.
So you 25 figure it's not going to take long to get down becaus NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
123 1
we need to get the Plant offline so that we can close 2
the main steam isolation valves, because that's the 3
way the leak is isolated.
At that point, though, the 4
cooling of the reactor in the core and the potential 5
that there's no non-vital power all could complicate 6
that, could complicate the actual reactor plant.
The 7
secondary plant, once we shut down and shut the main 8
steam isolation valve, it's gone.
9 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was the --
10 The crew was very --
at the 11 moment, the crew was very relieved.
- Now, j
12 had the same concerns as we discussed here on" 13 failure to properly communicate what he was doing and
(
14 all of that, all those issues.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did he have 16 conversations wit1"Ww b Over the direction you 17 and he were going to take the Plant?
18 No.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was there anything 20 between 21No 22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
in terms of 23 authorizations or understandings about what he was 24 going to do?
25 id not communica e NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
124 I
.. tat all.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
- Was, 3
licensed then, do you know?
4 Yes.
5 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
He was?
6 Yes.
7 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So in terms of the 9
situation you were left to deal with then, it's sort 10 of mixed.
iur cre s appreciative because they 11 didn't have to shut down under those conditions --
12 My control room crew.
3 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
1Y*our control room 14 crew, but your control room supervisor 15 My equipment operators were all 16 17 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
The union guys 18 weren't happy with it.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Well, the --
20 The reactor operators are 21 union.
22 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
23 And the individuals in the 24 control room that wo ld have been faced w-th actual 25 mechanics of doing this shutdown-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
125 The control room 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 crew.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
were very relieved.
The equipment operators made a big issue of the whole thing, went to Employee Concerns -- well, actually, I think 101at the time, because of the concern expressed by the operators went to the Employees Concerns group and had an investigation done.
But I honestly believe this was a case of where the union saw that Whad done some things that weren't strictly by the book in isolating this leak, and they went for --
made a big issue out of it.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Because it was him.
Because it was him, yes.
And it's a big problem, union-management relations, very big problem in Salem.
SR...SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
But at your level, you said it was inappropriate also for one reason because he removed your authority as aQ W
'in doing what he did.
)
I said there were areas for improvement and that was one of them, right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And saw it the same way.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS I~ -
Sffl -f A
-f A I~ M' aL9 (f
126 1
Overall I was relieved also 2
that isolated the leak.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
An _aw it 4
the same way that you saw it, in that the authority 5
was removed when he acted that way?
6 11 0:Y t
-es.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What were the other 8
areas for improvement on that one?
9 (END TAPE 2, SIDE A) 10 (BEGIN TAPE 2, SIDE B) 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
We were talking about 12 other areas to improve on the handling of that issue 13 byone being that the authority wasn't 14 communicated and yours and the CRS' was apparently 15 removed by his actions. >
16 Right 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What other areas were 18 there?
19 He could have had -- he should 20 have had the situation independently assessed, right, 21 before he unilaterally made the decision, right, to --
22 we do have people -- like I said, we do have people 23 onsite who were Fire and Safety Department who could 24 have helped him assess the condition locally at the 25 valve.
He could have gotten equipment operator NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4* ýf*
UfM 101 A KIM AII Kl WA I (t',
ý,
127 1
involvement instead of Work Control Center supervisor 2
involvement.
I think after the event and after the 3
concerns were raised, I think Operations Management 4
handled it appropriately.
Like I said, they initiated 5
an Employees Concerns investigation to determine the 6
appropriateness of ga actions.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What was the outcome 8
of that? Or how much of that was communicated to you?
9
- 1) A lot was communicated, and I 10 think most of those things we're discussing here were 11 communicated -- were put out following that.
In other 12
- words, the actions overall were necessary for the 13 conditions at the time; however, there'were areas for 14 improvement, as we've talked about.
Almost every 15 transient condition in the Plant you look back on and 16 you say, "Well, we did good in these areas, but we've 17 could.have done better in these and we move forward 18 and learn from them" In this case, I don't think 19 there was anything safety, other thane own 20 personal safety, which he chose to -- he determined 21 not to be in jeopardy when he shut the valve.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Would there be some 23 reason he would select Work Management to go with him 24 on that -- Work Control to go with him to look at that 25 as opposed to what you're saying he should have done; NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
- was°128 1
was an equipment operator?
2/
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Or the Fire and 3
Safety people.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
He had 5
6 7
who was on shift 8
-106WIIhat night, which is right outside the control 9
room.
And I have no idea why
)lg would have had him 10 go versus getting an operator, an equipment operator.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Are you aware of any 12 senior management influence on t that 13 time that influenced his actions that night?
14 No, I am not.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did he say anything 16 to you--
17No 18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
about specifically 19 why he did what he did?
20 Oh, yes.
He told me as
- 21.
previously talked about, on the conference with senior 22 management, it was fully supported to shut down the 23 Plant.
I think after this
- happened, in 24 discussing it with(
9did it because, like I 25 said, once the leak worsened, the area around the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
1 valve hand wheel he thought became more accessible and 2
he was able to do it.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How much time was 4
there between that conference call that you had and 5
when he actually went and --
6 It seemed like the whole event 7
maybe lasted three o four hours that evening, from 8
initial identification to isolation.
It wasn't a --
9 didn't take long.
But from the phone call to when 10 Went out maybe a half hour, 45 minutes or so.
11 Because after the phone call I was out in the control 12
- room, we were continuing to shut down) and or 13 continuing the load reduction.
went back out in 14 the field and that's when he assessed the situation as 15 being able to close the valve.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did his doing that, 17 his manipulating the valve and his removal of your 18 authority cause you a great deal of angst over the 19 situation?
20 Yes.
I had a hard time with 21 that whole evening after in hindsight because --
like 22 I said, I was relieved that we did not have to proceed 23 with this shutdown because it was not a good spot to 24 be in, but I felt like I failed as a 25 that evening because when he came to me, when I was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
130 1
6sitting there during that brief, and he said what he 2
told me, "I think I can isolate the leak.
I'm going 3
to go getf and go down," I should have stopped him 4
right there.
And that's where I failed.
I should 5
have said, "Wait, W'
If I had any question in my 6
mind, what's he mean by what he's telling me, I should 7
have stopped him, but I didn't.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Because you had 9
enough to question to follow, 10BuIdint 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Shortly after you 12 followed him down to see what he was doing.
So you're 13 thinking that you made a mistake for not pushing him 14 on what he meant by that.)
15
- Right.
Because had it beenq 16 al.ho came to me, I would have.
I didn't stop 17 him because he was my boss, and that's where I failed.
18 That's why I had a hard time with that whole event.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How much of a hard 20 time did you have?
Were you thinking of leaving?
21 Leaving?
22 (Laughter.)
23
- Sorry, I'm laughing on the 24 tape.
I'm always thinking of leaving.
As a result of 25 that, yes, I thought of leaving
-. I thought more NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1*9v gQHwr I1Q ANf A\\IF MW
131 1
of leaving, either leaving the position or leaving the 2
Company.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
That was a pretty 4
significant event then.
5 For me.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Had that ever 7
happened to you before?
.8 No.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Since?
10 No No.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Was there any kind of 12 direction that came out to address what he did that 13 that's going to ensure that you're not faced with that C
14 again, this conduct of Ops breach?
15 11There was a --
like I said, 16 there were lessons learned put out after the post-17 event investigation that covered most of these things, 18 yes.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That said, basically, 20 that he did what he did, it could have been handled 21 better, but we don't see a real --
22 Correct.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
-- problem there.
24 Right.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I'm going to take a' NEAL R. GROSS 7
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
132 1
uick miftute a look at my notes, okay, Jeff?
Unless 2
you have something immediately.
3 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
I'll 4
continue on.
i 5
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Go ahead.
6 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Switching a 7
little bit here, a couple more general kind of 8
questions.
Have there been occasions where 9
individuals have brought safety concerns to you 10 because they didn't want to raise them themselves, 11 safety concerns, operability concerns --
12 No.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
decision-14 making concerns to you because they were afraid to 15 bring it up themselves?
16 No.
17 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Has that 18 happened?
19 No.
20 SR. SPECIAL GENT TEATOR:
No?
21 n my position, thought, that's i22.
why my people-are supposed to do, bring them to m, 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
24 Right.
25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
So do NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
C. -.".,
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 133 people bring them to you, those types of concerns?
Sure.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
And do you then raise them up and If appropriate, if I
can't address them and resolve them myself.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
So either you would address and resolve it and if you couldn't, you would raise it up the chain of command?
Correct.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Have you ever been reluctant to raise an issue up the chain of command?
No.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Excuse me?
~Me
?
No.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That wasn't a real strong no at first.
I didn't know if you --
No.
On the contrary, I don't have any problem with voicing my opinion.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
You don't have any problem.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
All right.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Have you ever gotten NEAL R. GROSS r
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
0-N
134 1
in any trouble for expressing concerns that have been 2
brought to you, particularly by, we'll break it.down, 3
by the union?\\ That's a --
4 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Negative 5
feedback, counseling, coaching?
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Pushback?
7
- (have a vocal crew 8
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
9
'And maybe that's a reflection 10 of me, it probably is.
But.I-would say I probably 11 have received negative appraisals, performance 12 appraisals as a result of the way I vocalize concerns.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And the way you 14 vocalize concerns 15
- Not that I raise those concerns 16 but the way I raise them.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Can you made 18 that -- can you define that distinction there? You're 19 saying it's not that you brought the issues forward, 20 it's the way you did it.
21 Yes.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What did you do that 23 was inappropriate?
24 pl'.I get real emotional or --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Can you give an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
It I
C 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 135 example?
I mean what are you talking about?
Aunion issue kind of thing, a safety issue?
What would the issue be?
I mean is it overtime;,
is it something else?
Any--
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Anything?
- kI All of the above, yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Whether it's a..union issue personnel issue, a plant issue.
Sometimes I don't agree.
Sometimes throughout -- obviously, throughout this time period there have been many decisions I don't agree with.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So it's your passion for the issue that gets you in trouble?
Yes, exactly.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Can you think of one where it's shown up in your appraisal?
I don't think specific ones show up in my appraisal.
I think just the general tone is there..
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
They're criticizing your demeanor?
I think I'm a decent'*
V yappraisals don't reflect it.
For the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS "AWAV PJnnr: IMI ANfl AVF N W
136 1
most part, they haven't.
2 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How have you 3
been rated, I mean unsat, meets, exceeds?
4
,1 mean my performance appraisal 5
last year led to pretty much a 1for the 6
year.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Why is that?
Was 8
your performance different?
9 y crew ad --
I think*9 10 crew's erformance was outstanding in light of the 11 events they encountered.
+Not a
single human 12 performance event, not a single --
any of the metrics 13 by which my performance and the site's performance is 14 measured; zero tagging events, zero OSHA recordables, 15 zero unplanned power reductions caused by personal 16 error;.any of those type areas that are in my 17 appraisal are performance things.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Who wrote the 19 appraisal?
20 21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you challenge 22 that?
23 It's kind of a catch-22.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
25
- Do you understand?
If it says
(-
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND "RANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
137 1
right in your appraisal that you.don't agree and that 2
you're argumentative 3
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: tou're contentious 4
and you can't be contentious about your performance 5
appraisal?"*j 6
Guess not.
It's a catch-22.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So does that mean 8
that you didn't argue it?
9 9
011014 1 No, I did.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You did?
11 I mildly vocalized my 12 disappointment and went on.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Is he going to 14 write your appraisal for the calendar yea*, '03?t 15 Ys 16 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Have you got 17 any indication on how it's 18 I think he's working on it now.
19 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Do you get --
20 think I don't think all 21 his comments are unjustified.
Maybe I could handle 22 things better.
No, don't get me wrong.
We all can, 23 right, but I don't think my andfmnAcrew's rrformance 24 warranted that.
That's just one area, sure.
I can do 25 better in this but it shouldn't override the whole NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
- .ljl-...........
138 1
overall performance appraisal.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And result in f
3 Ajust this one communications area.
4 Yes.
That's my opinion.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
What about the 6
year before that, did you get a raise the year.before 7
that at the level of people at your position?
8 we 9
as theIWMthe turnover rate of 10 the whole turnover rate at Salem in the 11 management '.ranks was atrocious.
We couldn't keep 12 enough licensed operators.
So during tenure 13 everybody received substantial pay raises, but it was C
14 in an effort to keep people.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
It costs a lot 16 of money to train SROs."
17 So it's hard to judge because 18 that year everybody got !large pay raises) for that 19 reason.
20
'SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
It' s interesting that 21
'.2002 is the year that you have a number of incidents 22 that lead you to question Mr.
decision 23 making and go into a meeting with him and then you 24 have this incident in September that you object to and 25 this is
- 2002 as well, that you reacted to pretty NEAL R. GROSS 1~
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139 1
strongly on actions.
Is the connection 2
in these issues or is it more than that, your 3
contentiousness?
4 I'm not sure I understand.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What do you attribute 6
it to overall?
Is the fact that in the same year you 7
had to call a meeting with--1 and you've 8
questioned yourý decision within that last three 9
months of the year, in September, the actions there on 10 the steam valve leak?ý.
Is that what led to the --
11 you're saying it may be fair, that the way they rated 12 you may be somewhat accurate but maybe not overall it 13 should result in what your end result is.
Is there (1
14 more to what goes on in the year?
I mean what other 15 issues are you getting -.- what other issues are you 16 raising and being seen as contentious over?
17 1 don't know.
I'm sure there 18 were others that are maybe outside the realm of just 19 safety conscious work environment, but maybe they do 20 fall in that, how we conduct business in Operations,:
21 things that I-don't necessarily agree with the way the
-22 Department and the plants are operating.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Are you raising 24
- 25)
I've tried that.
I've tried to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 140 improve but I don't hesitate to bring them up.
I try to do it a different way, but I mean I won't --
I was disappointed with last year's performanae'.-
And I'm pretty self-critical, so --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Are you making a discrimination complaint against the Company?
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
In how they rated you?
a o No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
How about are you how your peers are evaluated, especially for C
aware of 112002?
anything i
No.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You don't know about how they get their raises We don't talk about it.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
their performance appraisals.
We don't talk about it.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So you have no comparison from yours versus somebody else who may or may not raise issues or anything like that.
Correct.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Anything else?
I S.NEALR. GROSS CO.URT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
141 1
just have to check one area that I.wanted to go back 2
to, unless you have anything to add on that.
°3 I've got a question while 4
you're looking.
Have you ever seen an incident where 5
corporate management in Newark provided direction and 6
supervision decision involving plant operability or 7
plant safety?
8 No.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Plant shutdown?
10 No.
11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
No?
12 No.
From corporate?
No.
13 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
- Right, from 14 corporate.
Do you believe your management is 15 supportive of a healthy or good safety conscious work 16 environment, your current management?
17 Yes.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
How about the 19 prior management, the I
guess 20 e's no longer there anymore either, right?
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
No.
22 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
That crew.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
As of September, I
24 think.
25 I think they believe they were.
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 142 Does that make sense?
But I don't believe they were.
I think they believed they were.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
What were they measuring themselves by? What would make them believe that?
That --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
That they believed they were effective?
Safety conscious work environment, right?
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Fostering a safety conscious work environment.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Do you know what they may have been basing their opinion on, survey results, things like that?
I don't know.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Don't know?
MOM We did a hell of a lot of surveys and that kind of stuff.
We didn't get many results from them.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You had the surveys but no results?
Mm A lot of times, yes.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
The annual surveys, quarterly survey?
.1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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These were like the big --
what i2 2
company?
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Oh, Gallop survey?
4 Gallop.
They had Gallop once.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So they would do a 6
survey but you didn't get a result.
7 They didn't follow through on 8
it, yes.
Once they did and once they didn't.
It was 9
a big survey.
His days may have been numbered at that 10 point.
11 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Whose?
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Oh,/
14 okay.
15 So no, done a survey.
We 16 just did another big survey.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Oh, okay.
Did you 18 see results from that?
19 Not yet.
We should.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Too soon?
21 Too soon, yes.
Just finished.
2.SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I don't mean for 23 there to be dead space.
Do you want to just take a 24 minute on here?
K 25 SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Yes.
/
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SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
I'll go off the 2
record.
It's about 12:07.
3 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 4
the record at 12:07 p.m. and went back on 5
the record at 12:08 p.m.)
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
We're back on 7
about a minute later, 12:08.
Do you have any 8
knowledge of a situation involving 9
(phonetic),
is he on our shift 10 was onof t
forfsome 11 period of time. He's currently off shif in a position 12 in*
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you have any 14 knowledge or recollection of a situation where he NA'd 15 a step, I believe it was in a start-up procedure, took 16 some criticism for that?.
There was a step that was 17 NA'd.
Do you recall anything about that?
18 I remember A'inga step in 19 a;Isurveillance procedure. on a service water pumpi I
20 believe.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
That could be my 227ý mistake.
23 And let me see if I
can 24 remember --
it was actually during an INPO evaluation, 25 so he was being observed.
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- Ooh, that was p'.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 significant then.
And he NA'd a step --
if this is what you're referring to, he inappropriately NA'd a step in a procedure, didn't follow the administrator guidance for how to do that.
If you NA a step in a
procedure that's not a conditional step, there's some requirements for independent reviews of that NA by another licensed individual, things like that.
And like I say, he did that during observation during an INPO evaluation and, yes, SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Did you ever learn of any reason for why he justified NA'ing the step, was there some reason for it?
Was there something to be gained by it or something he expressed?
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was it in training or was it actually No, it was in the Plant.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
In the Plant, SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
C okay.
(Laughter.)
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
You're laughing.
I'm laughing because of the whole procedure had been modified to compensate for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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.15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 146 peIiipment deficiency with a leakage past certain valves in the service water systemVnd needless to say from all the discussion on the\\service water}4e service water systemV an important system but it is a poorly performing system, and the procedure had been modified t 1accommodate leakage past some valveski<
the system so it would still allow the performance of thi performance test*. And I think if he had not NA'd the procedure, he would have had to terminate the procedure and could not have performed it.
What would that have meant?
We would just have had to investigate and see why.
I don't think there were any, from a safety perspective, no consequences of his NA' ing the step.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Was the procedure just not correct?
',\\He didn't wait long enough to observe *)eakage past this valv-SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
And I think the>erators involved who were actual.quipment operators\\*n the field ahd in th ontrol room.questioned-
"You can't NA that.
Well, we need to either do the formal process of doing an on-the-spot change to the procedure or we need to stop and get it resolve.
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.17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 147 can't just NA that step."
An*
kind of overlooked their concerns and proceeded.
So I
think actions were inappropriate, and I think he was --
I'm not sure of the details as to his"
_-"..lut he was--
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Is this a situation wher*
Yes.
He had to --
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
an explanation of it?
SPECIAL AGENT-NEFF:
So that was part of the apparently.
I'm sure it was.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Do you know why he's no longer on ur'shift? `s this --
- -~fo.,
- ,t.
No.
He/otated of.kto a--
he still maintains his SRO license" I think the latter part of this year he's scheduled toOtate back onto my crew'.*
It's a
rotational assignment in
.SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you have any concerns about that?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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About No.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
So other than this, 3
do you have any reason to question his abilities, his 4
decision making?
5 6
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
This incident.
.No.
I think it was an honest 1Oro 8
mistake, not a malicious mistake, which makes all the 9
difference.
I think he honestly learned from it.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
1i Is he the top performing 12 No.
He's got some performance issues.
No one's 13 perfect.
But he is a fe operatorl I think so.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
I'm pretty 15 much I think we've covered the incidents that we 16 wanted to talk to you about, and pretty much what I'd 17 like to know is you see the direction that we're going 18 here, you see the concerns that we're exploring.
Is 19 there something that we're-missing asking about that's 20 of concern to you in terms of the safe operation of 21 the Plant?
Is there anything we haven't covered?
22 No.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Are there any 24 outstanding issues there that just aren't being 25 addressed that you think should be?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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No.
I think you can obviously
- c.
2 discern from this whole conversation there are long-3 standing equipment reliability issues that are yet to 4
be resolved.
I will go into work this evening and be 5
dealing with issues at circ water, just as I did last 6
year and the year before.
Whether this management 7
team is going to resolve it or not is yet to be seen, 8
but obviously a plant that has chosen to manage itself 9
by turning over senior leadership teams frequently and 10 key positions frequently it's hard to maintain that 11 long-term focus.
So that's why we continue to have 12 trouble in the continuity required for an effective 13 Corrective Action Program.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Do you have anything 15 else you'd like to add at this point?
I'm about to 16 wrap it up.
17 10NMý_NO.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Jeff?
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
The only thing
- 20.
I'm going to ask is that you not discuss the specifics 21 of what we talked about today with your 22
-contemporaries, with your management, because we need 23 to talk to a number of people and we want to get their 24 own individual recollections.
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-22 23 24 25 150 area, but we're going to ask that you don't.
So when we go talk to people we get their honest recollections of what they remember, what they heard, what they saw and not getting a group think thing going on.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
More
- prepared, rehearsed responses.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Right.
So I'd ask that you not going into specifics of what we talked about.
WI have no desire to discuss this conversation with anyone.
I can assure you of that.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Anything else?
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
No, I have nothing else.
So thank you.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Have I or any other NRC representative offered you any promises of reward or threatened you in any manner in exchange for your
,::information today?.
No, they haven't.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
And we covered that you don't have anything further to add to the record.
And Jeff asked you earlier you understood you were here voluntarily.
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....... 22 23 24 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
We asked for your cooperation and you agreed to meet with us, and I thank you for that, and I thank you for the large chunk of time you gave us today to help us through this.
k Okay.
If you have any questions in the future, I mean I can --
some of it's sketchy because it's so much over the past three
- years, but if there's any I
mean I
can find specifics.
I apologize, I wasn't prepared to give them today, but if you have any --
if you need to know more specifically or things like that, it's a matter of public record, I can get it.
SR.
SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
Okay.
We appreciate that.
SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:
Okay.
Thank you.
I appreciate it.
And we'll do that if we have any further, you know,. any follow-up issues on that.
But at this point we can conclude the interview.
It's
- 17 '.m..
(Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m.,
the Interview off-was concluded.)
1?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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'CIt:;-
CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
Name of Proceeding: Interview of Docket Number:
1-2003-051F Location:
Salem, New Jersey PS rtlC..J?)
~
~
~
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.
Mia Thorpe Official Transcriber Neal R. Gross & Co.,
Inc.
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.neairgross.com (202) 234-4433