ML061350033

Motion to Apply Subpart G Procedures, with Exhibits a - O; Citizens Motion to Compel Further Mandatory Disclosures; Citizens Brief in Opposition to Amergens Motion to Dismiss and to Suspend Mandatory Disclosures

ML061350033
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/05/2006
From:	Webster R AmerGen Energy Co, Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic
To:	Abramson P, Anthony Baratta, Hawkens E Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Byrdsong A T
References
50-219-LR, ASLBP 06-844-01-LR, RAS 11641
Download: ML061350033 (200)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:,-RA5 1IL4! UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges: E. Roy Hawkens, Chair Dr. Paul B. Abramson Dr. Anthony J. Baratta DOCKETED USNRC May 8, 2006 (7:39am) OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC (License Renewal for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station) ) Docket No. 50-0219-LR ) ASLB No. 06-844-01-LR ) May 5, 2006 MOTION TO APPLY SUBPART G PROCEDURES PRELIMINARY STATEMENT In this Motion, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, Inc., Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey Sierra Club, and New Jersey Environmental Federation (collectively "Citizens') show that AmerGen's credibility, and the credibility of its parent, Exelon, is in question. Citizens submit this Motion to request that the Atomic Safety Licensing Board ("ASLB" or "Board") order this proceeding to be conducted pursuant to the rules of 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G, in accordance with 10 C.F.R.§ 2.3 10(d). This Section states that a formal Subpart G proceeding will be used "where the credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue." At other plants, AmerGen/Exelon has failed to disclose critical information to regulators and has submitted false data to the NRC. With regard to Oyster Creek, AmerGen/Exelon made misleading statements about various issues to this Board, to the press, and to elected officials, has used unjustifiable excuses to conceal the 1996 UT results for as long I 1-IV71per.*ecy- 0qs ,a-jfc - ox

as possible, and has accepted and relied upon the 1996 UT results, despite obvious deficiencies in the data that were rapidly identified by Citizens' expert. Unless the ASLB grants a Subpart G hearing, Citizens will be placed in a catch-22. Under the curtailed discovery allowed by Subpart L, Citizens will not be able to tell if witnesses are telling the whole truth or if documents have been falsified. If the ASLB were to require that the credibility of each individual witness or document must be shown to be at issue before granting a Subpart G hearing and allowing full discovery, it would mean that Citizens would be deprived of the very means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and documents. AmerGen/Exelon has put its credibility and the credibility of its employees and agents at issue through its pattern of questionable conduct related to this proceeding and at other plants. Even Exelon's President has admitted that it has lost credibility. Therefore, Citizens no longer have the confidence, which is required by Subpart L proceedings, that AmerGen's employees and agents have and will conduct themselves in an appropriate manner in this proceeding and related matters. Thus, the ASLB should grant this motion, and require that this proceeding go forward under Part 2, Subpart G. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AmerGen, and its parent company Exelon, have a long history of making false or misleading statements and being less than credible to the public in general, and to Citizens. Thus, relevant information abounds. Citizens present several instances, both in general, and specific to Oyster Creek, where AmerGen exemplified its lack of credibility. Undisclosed Tritium Leaks at Exelon's Braidwood Nuclear Facility The State of Illinois filed suit on March 16, 2006 against Exelon for its failure to properly maintain its Braidwood nuclear power plant. The State of Illinois alleges that Exelon allowed its 2

power plant to repeatedly leak radioactive wastewater contaminated with tritium, in violation of the Illinois Clean Water Act, and without any authorizing permit. Ex. A at p. 2-4. The alleged leaks of contaminated wastewater began in at least 1996, and totaled at least several million gallons. Id. at 1 15-20. The contaminated water affected the surrounding groundwater. Id. at 1 12. Illinois also alleges that Exelon had knowledge of the releases, but that it failed to notify the Illinois EPA. Id. at m¶ 17, 19,

21. Exelon's violations are made even more egregious by the fact that some of the releases occurred while Exelon was undergoing a discharge permit renewal process with the Illinois EPA. Ex. B at 1.

James Glasgow, the Will County State Attorney representing Will County as a plaintiff in the litigation, characterized Exelon's handling of the spills and inadequate maintenance of its facility as stemming from a "culture of greed and deception." Ex. C at 1. Further, Citizens cannot be expected to assume the credibility of AmerGen and its documents when Exelon's own President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Mr. Christopher Crane admitted that Exelon has suffered a loss of credibility. Despite the high monetary price that Exelon will have to pay as a result of the tritium spills in Illinois, Mr. Crane stated that, "[t]he more damaging issue here is the credibility loss." Ex. D at 1. Falsification of Records at Exelon's Ouad Cities Nuclear Power Station The NRC Office of Investigations initiated an investigation on March 8, 2004, in which it determined that two Exelon technicians "deliberately falsified inspection documentation while calibrating local instrumentation." Ex. E, Synopsis. More specifically, Exelon personnel "falsified maintenance alteration logs to indicate that required concurrent or independent verifications were performed on torus temperature indicators, residual heat removal (RHR) suction and discharge pressure indicators, RHR service water pump discharge indicators, and secondary containment differential 3

pressure indicators after the alteration and restoration of these instruments." Id. at 1. The report of the NRC Office of Investigations states that the "matter was identified and immediately investigated by Exelon," and that Exelon took numerous "[clorrective actions" after uncovering the falsification. Id. While Citizens acknowledge Exelon's actions to identify and correct the falsification, this does not change the fact that Exelon employees falsified maintenance records, such as the ones upon which Citizens would be forced to rely in a Subpart L hearing. The veracity of documents submitted by AmerGen cannot be ascertained by Citizens without an opportunity to engage in full discovery, which is only afforded by a proceeding under the Part 2, Subpart G regulations. Lack of Candor at AmerGen's Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Citizens also observe that AmerGen has been untruthful on several occasions in the statements it has made regarding Oyster Creek. First, within the confines of this proceeding, AmerGen has submitted misleading information for the Board's consideration. In its Answer, AmerGen stated that it "concluded that corrosion of the drywell shell has been arrested, including in the sand bed region." Answer at 21. However, this representation was in direct conflict with the record, which clearly shows that corrosion is ongoing in the upper drywell, above the sand bed region. E.g License Renewal Application at 3.5-20 to 21. On March 23, 2006, AmerGen notified Citizens that it agreed with Citizens position that a statement in AmerGen's Answer to the initial Petition "could cause confusion" and subsequently notified the Board of the need to correct the pleading. See Ex. F. Second, AmerGen has inconsistently represented to Citizens the character of certain information. On September 6, 2005, Citizens requested copies of the 1996 inspections of the Oyster Creek drywell liner. Ex. G. On October 10, 2005, AmerGen refused Citizens' information request, claiming that the request was for "proprietary business information." Ex. H. However, on April 6, 4

2006, AmerGen submitted the averaged results of the 1996 inspections to the NRC, and did not include any claim that the information was proprietary. Ex. I. AmerGen did not make this claim to the NRC, because the information is not proprietary. AmerGen's initial claim was made as an excuse to deny Citizens' information request. While Citizens acknowledge that they now have access to some the requested information, they note that AmerGen's behavior, claiming that certain information is proprietary when Citizens have no ability to contest the claim, but then later not even attempting to make the claim when Citizens could challenge it, is one more example of its lack of credibility. Third, the 1996 Oyster Creek dry well measurements that AmerGen submitted to the NRC show a systematic bias in AmerGen's favor. Ex. J at 2. In 1994, nineteen areas in the sand bed region were measured. Id. at 1. Then, two years later in 1996, similar measurements were taken at the same locations on the dry well. Id. at 2. Incredibly, the records submitted show that while the thickness of the dry well at most measured locations decreased from 1992 to 1994, as would be anticipated if corrosion was occurring, the thickness at these locations then increased between 1994 and 1996. Id. at

2. These records are troubling for a number of reasons. First the measurements reported are "physically impossible," as "metal simply does not spontaneously get thicker." Id. at 2. Second, the deviation from the previous results exceeded AmerGen's own estimate of random error by large margins. Id.. Third, AmerGen neither noted this systematic error nor made any effort to correct it. Id.

Finally, AmerGen claims that at Oyster Creek "it is highly unlikely that the crash [of an airplane into the reactor building] would cause any significant damage to the used fuel pool," Ex. M, and that "a study... found that even if such an event [an aircraft impact] did occur... there would not be a catastrophic release of radioactivity." Ex. K at 2. In sharp contrast, the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") found that a direct hit by an aircraft on a reactor like Oyster Creek could cause "severe 5

damage of the pool wall" that "could have severe consequences," such as "2,000 to 6,000 cancer deaths." Ex. L at 2. Further, NAS cautioned that "[tierrorist attacks on spent fuel pools are... a credible threat," and fuel pools "cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists." Id. at 1. While AmerGen has asserted that they are "certainly able to defend the facility," Ex. K at 2, NAS stated "there are currently no requirements in place to defend against the kind of... attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001." Ex. L at 6. Instead of the NAS Report, AmerGen cites to a National Energy Institute and Electric Power Research Institute ("NEI-EPRI") study to support its assurances that "[t]hese structures are designed for safety with multiple barriers to protect the fuel." Ex. K at 2. Again, in direct contradiction, the NAS cautioned "the spent fuel pool [in GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactors like Oyster Creek] is located well above ground level. Most designs have thin steel superstructures. The superstructures and pools were not, however, specifically designed to resist terrorist attacks." Ex. L at 2. In another effort to downplay the significant security concerns, on April 7, 2006, AmerGen issued a public relations package to mayors in the local townships surrounding the Oyster Creek facility. Ex. M (excerpt). In it, AmerGen insists that "it is highly unlikely that [an airplane] crash would cause any significant damage to the fuel stored in the Used Fuel pool," as the "steel framing, the pool's massive concrete structure and supporting columns would protect the pool from impact damage and the contained water would provide protection to the fuel from impact and fire effects." Id. AmerGen made similar assertions based on the NEI-EPRI study stating that "[the NEI-EPRI] study... found that even if such an event [an aircraft impact] did occur... there would not be a catastrophic release of radioactivity." Ex. K at 2. However, AmerGen failed to discuss or note the 6

several serious shortcomings of this study that erode support for its claims that there would be no serious consequences. For example, the State of New Jersey stated that "the [NEI-EPRI] study does not appear to have taken into account the thermal and structural consequences and collateral damage of the explosion and resulting fire that would also occur from the impact of a commercial aircraft." Ex. N at 1. Further, "it appears that the structural models used to evaluate impact damage were based on 'representative' (not site-specific), structures, which were considered by NEI to be typical to those that exist across the nuclear power industry." Id. at 2. In addition to contradicting the NAS study, AmerGen completely disregards the study by Robert Alvarez (the "Alvarez Study") whose conclusions were supported by the NAS. Ex. 0 (providing an excerpt from the NAS Report). According to the NAS, the Alvarez Study concluded that the consequences of a fire resulting from a "loss-of-pool-coolant event that drained the spent fuel pool" would result in "long-term contamination consequences that were worse than those from the Chernobyl accident." Id. at 45. The State of New Jersey has repeatedly quoted the Alvarez Study when it expresses its concerns about Oyster Creek's vulnerability to aircraft attack. E& Ex. N at 2. ARGUMENT I. AmerGen's Credibility Is At Issue The Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations require that a formal proceeding be conducted when the credibility of a witness may reasonably expected to be at issue.1 The Part 2 rules were 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d) states, in pertinent part, that: In proceedings for the grant, renewal, licensee-initiated Amendment, or termination of licenses or permits for nuclear power reactors, where the presiding officer by order finds that resolution of the contention or contested matter necessitates resolution of issues of material fact relating to the occurrence of a past activity, where the credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue, and/or issues of motive or intent of the party or eyewitness material to the resolution of the contested matter, the hearing for resolution of that contention or contested matter will be conducted under 7

promulgated in 2004. The Board has already recognized its authority to grant motions for Subpart G hearings under the current Part 2 rules. In the Matter of Entergv Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 2005 NRC LEXIS 52 (2005). The Board also recognizes that when a party finds that its adversary is "shown to be of questionable veracity under oath," generally behaving in a way that puts its credibility at issue, such behavior poses a challenge. Id. at 3. The Board has acknowledged these challenges in the past and recently stated that, "[t]his situation demonstrates the difficulty the petitioner faces under the new rules in demonstrating, in its initial request for hearing, that a specific contention raises reasonable concerns about the credibility of an eyewitness to a material past activity. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(g) and 2.3 10(d). At this stage, the petitioners do not even know the identity of the witnesses that Entergy may call." In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee. LLC. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) 2004 NRC LEXIS 263, *31 (2004). In the present case, even Exelon's President has conceded that it has "lost credibility." Ex. D at 1. Therefore, the Board should recognize that Citizens have done more than raise a reasonable concern as to AmerGen's credibility and direct this proceeding to move forward under the procedures provided by Subpart G. The Board has also acknowledged that petitioners may rely on past experiences with the other party to form the basis for credibility concerns. 2004 NRC LEXIS 263 at *31. The Board stated, "we reject the notion that the demonstration of questions about an eyewitness's credibility cannot be historical, [as] [a]t this early juncture in the proceeding, historical information is one of the few bases upon which a petitioner can argue, and this Board assess, the credibility of a potential eyewitness" Id. at *31-2. In this case, Citizens have demonstrated that questions as to credibility arise from both subpart G of this part. (emphasis added). 8

historical information and current events. In light of AmerGen's mountain of mistakes, falsifications, and general lack of candor, the Board should find that AmerGen's credibility is at issue, and conduct a Subpart G hearing. II. Denving Citizens' Request for a Subpart G Hearing Would Impinge on Citizens Statutory Rights One of the primary purposes of the Subpart G rules is to allow full discovery when the curtailed discovery allowed under Subpart L may be insufficient. Curtailed discovery is insufficient when a party lacks credibility. A petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to properly build its case by relying solely on paper discovery from an untrustworthy source. In this case, statements of witnesses and accuracy of documents cannot be deemed presumptively true. Citizens acknowledge that the Subpart L rules, allowing reduced formality, limited discovery, and limited right to cross-examination, may be facially valid and in accordance with Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Citizens Awareness Network. Inc. v. Nuclear Regulator Commission, 391 F.3d 338, 344 (2004). Citizens are aware that these rules reflect the "NRC's commitment to expeditious adjudication," and are intended to simplify the hearing process in order to increase efficiency. Id. at 344. However, if the practical effect of the Part 2 rules is to keep every petitioning party from accessing a formal hearing, they would be invalid as applied. As the First Circuit duly noted, "[sjhould the agency's administration of the new rules contradict its present representations or otherwise flout this principle, nothing in this opinion will inoculate the rules against future challenges." Id. In this case, where AmerGen's lack of credibility is at issue, the desire for simplicity and speed afforded by Subpart L proceedings do not outweigh the need to properly adjudicate facts material to the resolution of this matter. Thus, a Subpart G hearing is required for the proceedings to meet the requirements of the APA. 9

III. AmerGen's Lack of Credibility Requires the Board to Conduct a Subpart G Hearine AmerGen's actions, both within this proceeding and in other fora, demonstrate that its credibility is at issue, thus, it is imperative that the Board grant the motion and conduct a Subpart G hearing. In the absence of cross-examination and full discovery, Citizens will be unable to discern whether AmerGen's witnesses and documents are truthful. The resolution of the issues at the core of the contention can only done under the auspices of a hearing conducted under the Subpart G rules, which "resemble those associated with judicial proceedings," including traditional rules of discovery, and the ability to cross-examine witnesses. 391 F.3d at 344 (2004). AmerGen's untruthfulness is not an isolated incident. Citizens present the Board with several instances from AmerGen's history, and the current proceeding, which together illustrate a pattern demonstrating that the credibility of eyewitnesses in this proceeding, namely AmerGen employees, "may reasonably be expected to be at issue." 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d). The Board, in light of the information provided by Citizens, must find that AmerGen's lack of credibility is sufficient to warrant that "the hearing for resolution of [this] contention or contested matter [] be conducted under subpart G." 10 C.F.R. § 2.3 10(d). CONCLUSION For all of the forgoing reasons, the ASLB should grant Citizens' motion, find AmerGen's credibility to be at issue, and order the hearing to proceed under Subpart G. Richard Webster, Esq. RUTGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC Attorneys for Citizens Dated: May 5, 2006 10

EXHIBIT A

.1 .4 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. .WILL COUNTY, ILLINOIS CHANCERY DIVISION. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois,: and ex rel. JAMES W. GLASGOW, State's Attorney for Will County, Illinois, ) ) ) ) ) )) f

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=- c .h 14fi2, S Ibb' &k f 4O= Plaifitiff, i I I.m, ) ) No. EXELON CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, an Illinois corporation and EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited 'liability

company, Defendants;.

) COMPLAINT NOW COMES the PLAINTIFF, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and ex rel. JAMES W. GLASGOW, State s Attorney for Will County, and complains of the Defendants EXELON CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY and EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC, and in support thereof states and alleges as follows.- I. VIOLATIONS BY DEFENDANTS EXELON CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND EXELON - GENERATION COMPANY, LLC RELATED TO RELEASES OF TRITIUM TO THE ENVIRONMENT. In!taI Gase management aet for U _at: 830 am At River Valley Justice Center

I COUNT I WATER POLLUTION

1.

This Count is brought on behalf of the people of the State of Illinois, by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, ard James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney for Will County, on their own motion and at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("Illinois EPA"), pursuant to the terms and provisions of Section 42(d) and (e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the "Act'), 415 ILCS 5/42(d) and (e)(2004).

2.

The Illinois EPA is an agency of the State of Illinois created by the Illinois General Assembly in Section 4 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/4 (2004), and charged, inter alia, with the duty of enforcing the Act.

3.

Defendant EXELON CORPORATION, is a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to do business in Illinois with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. Since 2000, EXELON CORPORATION has been the parent company of both COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY and EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC, and conducts its nuclear power generation business and electrical distribution business through these entities.

4.

Defendant COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ("ComEd") is an Illinois corporation with its principle place of business in Chicago, Illinois. ComEd was the owner and operator of the facility that is the subject matter of this Complaint until a precise time, better known to the Defendants, in 200O, when it became a subsidiary of EXELON CORPORATION. 2'

5.

Defendant EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC (CExelon Generation") is a Pennsylvania limited liability company-with its principle place of business in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania. Exelon Generation was formed in 2000 to conduct the power generation portion of EXELON CORPORATION'S business.

6.

Defendants owned and operated as firther described in this Complaint the Braidwood Nuclear Generating Station a nuclear power generating facility; located in Braceville, Will County, Illinois. (Hereinafter, all property owned by the Defendants in and around Braceville shall be referred to as the "Facility" and that portion of the Facility encompassing the power generation plant, including the nuclear reactors, shall be referred to as the "Station".) The Station includes, among other things, two pressurized water nuclear reactors. The Facility includes a cooling pond, as well as property for pipeline access extending to the Kankakee River. The Village of Godley, population approximately 687, is located just to the west and south of the Station. The Village of Braidwood, population approximately 5,965, is located approximately two miles to the north of the Station.

7.

Operations at the Station generate tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen.

8.

Tritiun atoms can replace the non-radioactive hydrogen atoms in ordinary water (H20) to form tritiated water (HTO). Human exposure to tritium occurs primarily. through ingestion of tritiated water. Tritiated water, when ingested, is distributed through the human body in the same manner as ordinary water.

9.

Human exposure to tritium increases the risk of developing cancer. 3

10.

At the Facility, Defendants own and operate an underground pipe that runs approximately four and one halfmiles from the'Station to theKankakee River, and is known to the Defendants as the blowdown line. The blowdown line is located on property owned by the Defendants, but runs adjacent to private and public property including a forest preserve and nature area.

11.

The blowdown line operates as a conduit, at various times, for discharges of tritiated water directly to the Kankakee River as authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). Defendant Com'Ed possesses a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES') permit applicable to the blowdown line (Permit No. EL0048321) originally issued on August 24, 1995 by Illinois EPA ("`NPDES Permit"). See Exhibit 1, attached to and hereby incorporated by reference into this Complaint. The NPDES Permit authorizes and regulates the discharge from the blowdown line of wastewater treatment plant effluent, sewage treatment plant effluent, radwaste treatmifent system effluent, and demineralizer regenerant wastes to an outfall in the Kankakee River. As of the filing of this Complaint, NPDES Permit No. 1L0048321 remains in full-force and effect. ' 12. At various times since at least 1996, tritiated water and other wastewaters have leaked and discharged from the Facility including the blowdown line, into the' groundwater beneath the Facility as well as groundwater outside the property boundary of the Facility. The release and discharge of tritiated water 'and other wastewaters to the groundwater beneath the Facility and groundwater outside the property boundaries is not authorized by Defendants' NPDES Permit or by any regulatory agency. 4.

13.

The blowdown line incorporates eleven vacuum breakers, which, in the ordinary course of operation, function to admit air into the blowdown line to prevent the formation of a vacuum within the pipe. These vacuum breakers are numbered from one to eleven, in ascending order from the Station to the Kankakee River. See vacuum breaker map, Exhibit 2, attached to and hereby'incorporited by reference into this Complaint.

14.

Due to the Defendants' inadequate maintenance and operational procedures in both maintaining the vacuum breakers and operating the blowdown line, the vacuum breakers have, at various times, failed, causing the release of liquids flowing through the blowdown pipe, including tritiated water and other contaminants. These releases have entered-the vacuum breaker housing and flowed through the unlined bottom of the housing into groundwater and have also flowed up through the manhole onto the surrounding land surface, which allowed it to percolate into the groundwater. 15.' Tritiated releases from vacuum.breakers occurred at least in 1996, 1998 -and 2000, and at other times better known to the Defendants.

16.

In 1996, a release estimated by Defendants to be at least 40,000 gallons of tritiated waste water and other contaminants occurred from vacuum breaker number 1 ("VB 1'). VB1 is located nearest to the nuclear reactor and is adjacent-to a ditch which runs along the east, north and west perimeters.of the Station. This ditch flows to the north, around the reactor facility and then south toward the town of Godley. Tritiated wastewaters and other contaminants from this release flowed around VB 1 on the surface, migrated to groundwater and also entered the ditch. Tritiated water remains in the groundwater around VB 1. 5

17.

Defendant ComEd was aware of the release described in paragraph 16 on or about the time of its occurrence, but did not notify Illinois EPA or local officials or agencies of the release at that time. Nor did ComEd undertake any measures to contain or remediate this release.

18.

In 1998 a.release of water, including tritiated water and other contaminants, estimated by Defendants to be at least 3 million gallons occurred at vacuum breaker 3 ("VB3'). This release resulted in ponded tritiated water and other contaminants on the ground near VB3, and on lands adjacent thereto. Tritiated water remains in the groundwater near this release.

19.

Defendant ComEd was aware of the release described in paragraph 18 on or about the time of its occurrence, but did not notify Illinois EPA or local officials or agencies of the release at that time. Nor did ComEd undertake any measures to contain or remediate this release.

20.

In 2000, a release estimated by Defendants to be 3 million gallons, including tritiated water and other contaminants, occurred from vacuum breaker 2 ("VB2'). Defendants recovered some of the released water, but an unknown amount soaked into the groundwater. Tritiated water remains in the groundwater near. this release.

21.

Defendants did not notify Illinois EPA or local officials or agencies of the release at that time. A citizen advised the Illinois EPA of ponded water near VB2 and the Illinois EPA notified Defendants of the release. At no time did. Defendants tell Illinois EPA that the release contained tritiated water. 6

22.

As a result of releases from VB2 and VB3, a plume of tritiated water is present near those vacuum breakers. This plume has extended through the groundwater to the north through a surface water pond, resulting in the presence of tritiated waters in the pond, and from there into groundwater to the north and west off of the Facility. This tritium groundwater contaminant plume extends under property owned by private citizens.

23.

At times better known to Defendants, four additional areas have been impacted by releases of tritium near vacuum breakers 4,6 and 7, as well as near and to the west of the Stationi. The release from vacuum breaker 4 ("VB4") has resulted in tritium contamination of the groundwater in excess of 20,000 pCi/L (picocuries per fiter) within property owned by the Will County Forest'Preserve District.

24.

The Defendants did not investigate potential groundwater impacts resulting from the -any of the releases alleged above until 2005, when requested to do so by the Illinois EPA. Illinois EPA learned of the potential groundwater impacts during the Defendants' renewal process for the NPDES permit.

25.

Sampling conducted by Defendants on or about December 12, 2005 at a location outside the property boundary of the Facility indicated elevated ievels of tritium contained in the groundwater, at the following locations that are indicated on the map attached to and hereby incorporated by reference into this Complaint as Exhibit 3: RW-2 10.5 ft. depth 58,621 pCiIL RW-2 ' 20.5 ft. depth 170,024 pCi/L RWV-2 25 ft. depth 223,888 pCi/L Detection limits = 200 pCi/L 7

26.

Sampling conducted by Defendants on or about December 6, 2005 at five locations outside the property boundary of the Facility and one (P4) within property boundaries, indicated elevated levels of tritium in the groundwater. Samples, showing the following results, were taken at the locations as indicated on Exhibit 3, as follows: VB-3-4 58,489 pCiIL VB-3-3 43,894 pCiIL VB-3-2 32,830 pCi/L VB-3-6 53,572 pCiIL PA4 33,736 pCi/L RW-2 33,736 pCi/L Detection limits =200 pCi/L

27.

As of the filing of this Complaint, at least one private well on a horse farm located to the north of the Facility boundary has been impacted by these releases. Sampling conducted by Defendants on December 6, 2005 at that well indicated an elevated level of tritium contained in the well water, measuring 1,550 pCjiL. The contamination in the private well located off site is a result of the plume of tritium extending from the 1998 release from VB3.

28.

Section 12(a) and (d) ofthe Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(a) and (d) (2004), provides as follows: No person shall: a) Cause or threaten or allow the discharge of any contaminants into the environment in any State so as to cause or tend to cause water pollution in Illinois, either alone or in combination with matter from other sources, or so as to violate regulations or standards adopted by the Pollution Control Board under this Act. 8

d) Deposit contaminants upon the land in such place or manner so as to create a water pollution hazard.

29.

Section 3.165 of the Act, 415 ELCS 5/3.165 (2004), defines 'contaminant" as follows: "(CONTAMINANT" is any solid, liquid or gaseous matter, any odor or any form of energy, from whatever source. Tritium is a "contaminant" as that term is defined in section 3.165 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/3.165 (2004).

30.

Section 3.315 of the Act, 415 HIZS 5/3.315 (2004), defines "person" as follows: "PERSON" is any individual, partnership, co-partnership, firm, company, limited liability company, corporation, association, joint stock company, trust, estate, political subdivision, state agency, or any other legal entity, or their legal representative, agent or assigns.

31.

Defendants are each a "person" as that term is defined in Section 3.315 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/3.315 (2004).

32.

Section 3.550 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/3.550 (2004), defines "waters" as follows: "WATERS" means all accumulations of water, surface and underground, natural, and artificial, public and private, or parts thereof, which are wholly or partially within, flow through, or border upon this State.

33.

The groundwater beneath the Facility, the pond, the water in the private well, and the groundwater outside the property boundary of the Facility are accumulations of waters, surface and underground, and constitute a water of the State as that term is defined in Section 3.550 of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/3.550 (2Q04).

34.

Section 3.545 of the Act, 415.LCS 5/3.545 (2004), defines "water pollution" as follows: 9

"WATER POLLUTION" is such alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological or radioactive properties of any water of the State, or such'discharge of any contaminant into any waters of the State, as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate uses,'or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, or other aquatic life.

35.

The tritium released from the Facility percolated to and entered groundwater in aquifers at and around the Facility. The tritium has moved through and will continue to move through the groundwater.

36.

Tritium entering the groundwater as alleged herein altered the radioactive and other properties of the groundwater, created a nuisance, is harmful, detrimental or injurious, to public health, safety or welfare and to the environment and thus constitutes water pollution within the meaning of Section 12(a) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(a)(2004).

37.

From on or before 1996, on dates better known to the Defendants and continuing to the date of the filing of this Complaint, the Defendants violated Section 12(a) of the Act, by causing and allowing tritium from their.operations to enter the groundwater from the time the tritium was released to the environment to the present. Furthermore, the violation of Section 12(a) will continue until such time as the tritium is removed from the groundwater.

38.

From on or before 1996, on dates better known to the Defendants and continuing to the date of the filing of this Complaint, the Defendants violated Section 12(d) of the Act by depositing contaminants upon the land in such place and manner so as to create a water pollution hazard. Furthermore, the violation of Section 12(d) will continue until such time as the contaminants are removed from the groundwater. 10

39.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue unless and until'this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial, a permanent injunction, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on this Count I: I. Finding that Defendants have violated Section 12(a) and (d) of the Act;'

2.

Enjoining Defendants from any future violations of Section 12(a) and (d) of the Act;

3.

Entering an injunction ordering the Defendants to:

a.

Cease use of the blowdown line for the discharge of tritiated water until further order of the Court; and, In accordance with a plan acceptable to the Plaintiff and this Honorable Court:

b.

Prevent further migration of the contaminants released by the Defendants present in the groundwater at and near the Facility;

c.

Implement measures to prevent the release of any contaminant from the Facility,

d.

Fully characterize the nature and extent of all soil and groundwater contamination caused by the releases, including identifying background contaminant levels and the future flow of contaminant plumes in groundwater; 11

e.

Inmediately provide at Defendant's expense a potable drinking water source to all people affected by the violations alleged herein in an amount and quality sufficient to meet the daily needs of said people; and,

f.

Eliminate any threat to the use of groundwater by citizens in the area impacted by releases from the plant.

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) against Defendants for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil-penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per day for each day of each violation;

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. COUNT II EXCEEDING GROUNDWATER STANDARDS 1-36. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs I through 36 of Count I and paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Count II. g

37. Section 620.115 of the Illinois Pollution Control Board ('Board")

Groundwater Regulations, 35 111. Adm. Code 620.115, provides as follows: No person shall cause, threaten or allow a violation of the Act, the IGPA or regulations adopted'by the Board thereunder, including but not limited to this Part.

38.. Section 620.401 ofthe Board Groundwater Regulations, 35 I. Adm.

• Code 620.401, provides as follows:

Groundwaters must meet the standards appropriate to the groundwater's class as specified in this Subpart and the nondegradation provisions of Subpart C. 12

39.

Section 620.405 of the Board Groundwater Regulations, 35 Ill. Adm.

• Code 620.405, provides as follows:

No person. shall cause, threaten or allow the release of any contaminant to groundwater so as to cause a groundwater quality standard set forth in this

• Subpart to be exceeded.
• 40.

The groundwater underneath and surrounding the Facility is a Class I Potable Resource Groundwater, subject to the standards at 35 11. Adm. Code 620.410.

41.

Section 620.410 of the Board Groundwater Regulations, 35 111. Adm. Code 620.410, which contains the Groundwater Quality Standards for Class I (Potable Resource Groundwater) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: e) Beta Particle and Photon Radioactivity

1)

Except due to natural causes, the average annual concentration of beta. particle and photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides shall not exceed a dose equivalent to the total body organ greater than 4 mrem/year in Class I groundwater. If two or. more radionuclides are preserit, the-sum of their dose equivalent to the total body, or. to any internal. organ shall not exceed 4

• mrem/year in Class I groundwater except due to natural causes.

2)

Except for.the radionuclides listed in subsection (e)(3), the concentration of man-made radionuclides causing 4 mrem total body or organ dose equivalent must be calculated.on the basis of a 2 liter per day drinking water intake using the 168-hour data in accordance with tie procedure set forth in NCRP 'Report Number 22, incorporated by reference at Section 620.125(a).

3)

Except due to natural causes, the average annual concentration assumed to produce a total body'or organ dose of 4 mrem/year of the following chemical constituents shall not be exceeded in Class I groundwater:. Critical Standard Constituent Organ (pCifL) Tritium Total body 20,000.0 13

42.

The groundwater concentrations of tritium, as alleged in paragraph 25 and paragraph 26, above, each exceeded the standard of 20,000 pCi/L for tritium as promulgated in 35 111. Adm. Code 620.410(e)(3).

43.

By causing or allowing the exceedance of the groundwater standard promulgated in 35 Ill. Adm. Code 620.410(e)(3), the Defendant violated 35 111. Adm. Code 620.115,35 11. Adm. Code 620.405, and 35 Il. Adm. Code 62.410(e)(3) and, thereby, violated Section 12(a) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5M12(a)(2004).

44.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after tral, a permanent injunction, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on this Count II:

1.

Finding that Defendants have violated Section 12(a) of theAct,35 Ill. Adm. Code 620.115,35 III. Adm. Code 620.405, and 35 111. Adm. Code 620.410(e)(3);

2.

Enjoining Defendants from any future violations of Section 12(a) of the Act, 35 mll. Adm. Code 620.115,35 111. Adm. Code 620.405, and 35 111. Adm. Code 620.410(e)(3);

3.

Entering an injunction ordering the Defendants to:

a.

Cease use of the blowdown line for the discharge of tritiated water until further order of the Court; and, 14

In accordance with a plan acceptable to the Plaintiff and this Honorable Court:

b.

Prevent further migration of the contaminants released by the Defendants present in the groundwater at and near the Facility;

c.

Implement measure$ to prevent the release of any contaminant from.the Facility,

d.

Fully characterize the nature and extent of all-soil and groundwater contamination caused by the releases, including identifying background contaminant levels and the future flow of contaminant plumes in groundwate;.

e.

Inmediately provide at Defendant's expense a potable drinking

• water source to all people affected by the violations alleged herein in an amount and quality sufficient to meet the daily needs of said people; and, f

Eliminate any threat to the use of groundwater by citizens in the area impacted by releases from the plant.

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) against Defendants for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00) per day for each day of each violation,

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 15

COUNT m VIOLATION OF NONDEGREDATION PROVISIONS 1 - 41. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 1 through 38, 40 through 42 of Count II as paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Count m.

42.

Section 620.301 of.Board Groundwater Regulations, 35 Il. Adm. Code 620.301, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: a) No person shail cause, threaten or allow the release of any contaminant to a resource groundwater such that:

1)

Treatment or additional: treatment is necessary to'continue an existing use or to assure a potential use of such groundwater; or

2)

An existing or potential use of such groundwater is precluded.

43.

Because of the entry of the tritium into groundwater and the resulting potential threat to human health and the environment, treatment is necessary to continue .the existing use of the groundwater and to assure potential use of the groundwater.

44.

Because of the entry of the tritium into the groundwater and the resulting potential threat to human health, existing uses of the groundwater and potential uses of the groundwater have been precluded.

45.

By causing or allowing the tritium to enter the groundwater so as to require treatment and impair existing and potential uses of the groundwater, the Defendants have violated 35 11. Adm. Code 620.115 and 620.301(a)(1) and (2) and, th'ereby,'also violated Section 12(a) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(a)(2004).

46.

• Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue 16

I. unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial, a permanent injunction, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on this Count m.:

1.

Finding that Defendants have violated Section 12(a) of the Act, 35 11. Adm. Code 620.115, and 35 111. Adm. Code 620.301(a)(1) and (2);

2.

Enjoining Defendants from any future violations of Section.12(a) of the Act,35 111. Adm. Code 620.115, and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 620.301(a)(1) and (2);

3.

Entering an injunction ordering the Defendants to:

a.

Cease use of the blowdown line for the discharge of tritiated water until further order of the Court; and, In accordance with a plan acceptable.to the Plaintiff and this Honorable Court:

b.

Prevent further migration of the contaminants released by the Defendants present in the groundwater at and near the Facility,

c.

Implement measures to prevent the release of any contaminant from the Facility;

d.

Fully characterize the nature and extent of all soil and groundwater contamination caused by the releases, including identifying background contaminant levels and the future flow of contaminant plumes in groundwater; 17 /

4.

e.

Immediately provide at Defendant's expense a potable drinking water source to all people affected by the violations alleged herein in an amount and quality sufficient to meet the daily needs of said people; and,

f.

Eliminate any threat to the use of groundwater by citizens in the area impacted by releases from the plant.

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) against Defendants for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars' ($10,000.00) per day for each day of each violation;

5.

'Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this court deems appropriate and just. II. VIOLATIONS BY DEFENDANTS EXELON CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC RELATED TO RELEASES OF NONRADIOACTIVE WASTES INTO THE ENVIRONMENT COUNT IV DISCHARGING WASTEWATERS WITHOUT AN NPDES PERMIT

1.

This Count is brought against Defendant' on behalf ofthe people of the State of Illinois, by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney for Will County, on their own motion, pursuant to the terms and provisions of Section 42(d) and (e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the "Act"), 415 ILCS 5/42(d) and (e)(2004). 18

• 2 - 36. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 2 through 36 of Count I as paragraphs 2 through 36 of this Count IV.

37.

Section 12(f) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(f)(2004), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: No person shall: Cause,'threaten or allow the discharge of any contaminant into the waters of the State, as defined herein, including but not limited to, waters to any sewage works, or into any well or~from any point source within the State, without an NPDES permit for point source discharges issued by the Agency-under Section 39(b) of this Act, or in violation of any term or condition imposed by such permit, or in violation of any NPDES permit filing requirement established under Section 39(b), or in violation of any regulations adopted by the Board or of any order adopted by the Board with respect to the NPDES program.

38.

Section'309.102(a) of the Board Water Pollution Control Regulations, 35 IDl. Adm. Code 309.102(a), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: a) Except as-in compliance with the provisions of the.Act, Board regulations, and the CWA, and the provisions and conditions of the NPDES permit issued to the discharger,. the discharge of any contaminant or pollutant by any person into the waters of the State from a point source or into a well shall be unlawful.

39.

In addition to the tritiated waters, the discharges from the vacuum breakers and other discharges, as alleged herein, contained wastewaters regulated by the Facility's NPDES Permit.

40.

Each discharge of wastewater from the vacuum breakers was a discharge of contaminants into waters of the State.

41.

At no time did the Illinois EPA issue any permit to any of the Defendants for any of the discharges from the vacuum breakers as alleged herein;

42.

. The discharge of wastewaters at points other than the permitted outfall in the Kankakee River was a discharge without an NPDES permit that constituted a 19

violation of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 309.102 and Section 12(f) of the Act, 415 ILCS .5/12(f)(2004), by Defendant ComEd for discharges prior to 2000 and by all Defendants in 2000.

43.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial, a permanent injunction, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on this Count IV: 1.. Finding that Defendants violated Section 12(t) of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 309.102;

2.

Enjoining Defendants from any future violations of Section 12(f) of the Act and 35 11. Adm. Code 309.102;

3. -Entering an injunction ordering Defendants to cease discharges without an NPDES permit;

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) against Defendants for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars (S 10,000,00) per day for each day of each violation;

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 20

M. VIOLATIONS BY DEFENDANT COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY RELATED TO RELEASES OF NONRADIOACTIVE WASTES INTO THE ENVIRONMENT COUNT V FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NPDES PERMIT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

1.

This Count is brought against Defendant COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY on behalfof the people of the State of Illinois, by Lisa Madigan, Attorney . General of the State of Illinois, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney for Will County, on their own motion, pursuant to the terms and provisions of Section 42(d) and (e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the "Act'), 4.15 ILCS 5/42(d) and (e)(2004); 2 -. 38. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 2 through 38 of Count IV and paragraphs 2 through 38 of this Count V.

39.

The NPDES permit applicable to the discharge from the blowdown pipe, as referenced in paragraph 11, contains Standard Conditions that provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

12.

Reporting requirements. (e).. Twenty-four hour reporting. The permittee shall report any non-compliance which may endanger health or the environment. Any information shall be provided orally within 24 hours from the time that the permitee becomes aware of the circumstances. A written submission shall also be provided within 5 days of the time the permitee becomes aware of the circumstances. The written submission shall contain a description of the non-compliance and its cause, the period of non-compliance, including exact dates and times, and if the non-compliance has not been corrected, the anticipated time it is expected to continue, and steps taken or planned to reduce, eliminate, and prevent reoccurrence of the non-compliance. The. 21

following shall be included as information which must be reported within 24 hours:

• (1)

Any unanticipated bypass which exceeds any effluent limitation in the permit; (2) Violation of a maximum daily discharge limitation for any of the pollutants listed by the Agency in the permit to be reported within 24 hours[.] (f) Other noncompliance. The permittee shall report all instances of non-compliance not reported under paragraphs 12(c),(d) or (e)at the time monitoring reports are submitted. The reports shall contain the information listed in paragraph 12(a).

40.

The NPDES permit was in full force and effect at the time of the discharges from the vacuum breakers on the blowdown line in 1996, 1998 and 2000.

41.

In addition to the tritiated waters, the discharges from the vacuum breakers, as alleged herein, contained wastewaters regulated by the Facility's NPDES Permit.

42.

The discharge of wastewaters at points other than the permitted outfall in the Kankakee River constituted non-compliance with the NPDES Permit.

43.

The NPDES Permittee, Defendant ComEd, did not make any notification to the Illinois S-PA as required under Standard Condition 12 of the.NPDES Permit.

44.

By failing to report discharges of wastewaters regulated by the NPDES Permit, Defendlant ComEd violated Standard Condition 12 of the NPDES Permit and, thereby, violated 35 1m Adm..Code 309.102 and Section 12(f) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(f)(2004).

45.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue 22

unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial,'a permanent injunction, in favour of Plaintiff and against Defendant ComEd on this Count V:

1.

Finding that Defendant CornEd violated Section 12(f) of the Act, 35 Il. Adm. Code 309.102, and Standard Condition 12 of the NPDES Permit;

2.

Enjoining Defendant ComEd from any future violations of Section 12(f) of the Act, 35.-M. Adm. Code 309.102, and Standard Condition 12 of the NDES Permit;

3.

Entering an injunction ordering Defendant ComEd to comply with the terms of its NPDES Permit;

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) against Defendant ComEd for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per day for each day of each. violation;

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendant ComEd including expert witness,. consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 23

COUNT VI FAILURE TO ENSURE PROPER OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AND FAILURE TO MITIGATE 1 - 42. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 1 through 42 of Count V as paragraphs 1 through 42 of this Count VI.

43.

Section 306.102 (Systems Reliability) of the Board Water Pollution Control Regulations; 35 Il. Adm. Code 306.102, provides as follows: a) Malfuinctions: All treatment works and associated facilities shall be so constructed and operated as to minimize violations of applicable standards during such contingencies as flooding, adverse weather, power failure, -equipment failure, or maintenance, through such measures as multiple units, holding tanks, duplicate power.sources, or such other measures as may be appropriate. b) Spills: All reasonable measures, including where appropriate the provision of catchment areas, relief vessels or entrapment dikes, shall be taken to prevent any spillage of contaminants from causing water pollution.

44.

Section 306.304 (Overflows) of the Board Water Pollution Control Regulations, 35 111. Adm. Code 306.304, provides as follows:

• Overflows from sanitary sewers are expressly prohibited.

45.

Standard condition 4 of the NPDES Permit provides as follows: Duty to mitigate. The permittee shall take all reasonable steps to minimize or prevent any discharge in violation of this permit which has a reasonable likelihood of adversely affecting human health or the environment.

• 46.

Standard condition 5 of the NPDES Permit provides as follows: Proper operation and maintenance. The permittee shall at all times properly operate and maintain all facilities and systems of treatment and control (and related appurtenances) which are installed or used by the permittee to. achieve compliance with the conditions of this permit. Proper operation and maintenance includes effective performance, adequate funding, adequate operator staffing and training, and adequate laboratory.and process controls, including appropriate 24

ancillary facilities, or similar systems only when necessary to achieve compliance with the conditions of the permit.

47.

Defendant ComEd's failure to construct and operate the blowdown line in a manner so as to minimize violations during equipment malfunctions, as alleged herein, was a violation of 35 I. Adm. Code 306.102(a).

48.

Defendant ComEd's failure to. take all reasonable measures to prevent the spillage as alleged herein; was a violation of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 306.102(b).

49.

The release of wastewaters, including sewage treatment plant effluent, from the vacuum breakers as alleged herein was a sanitary sewer overflow in violation of 35 111. Adm. Code 306.304.

50.

The Defendant ComEd's failure in 1996 and 1998 to contain and remove any of the discharged wastewaters, as alleged in paragraphs 16 and 18, above, and the failure to prevent future discharges constituted a failure to mitigate in violation of Standard Condition 4 of the NPDES Permit and, thereby, violated 35 111. Adm. Code 309.102 and Section 12(f) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(f)(2004).

51.

Defendant ComEd's failure to perform adequate operation and maintenance on the blowdown line resulted in the discharges as alleged in this Count.

52.

Defendant ComEd's failure to perform adequate operation and maintenance on the blowdown line was a violation of Standard Condition 5 of the NPDES Permit, and thereby violated 35 111. Adm. Code 309.102 and-Section 12(f) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(f)(2004).

53.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent-environmental statutes will continue 25

unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial, a permanent injunction, in favour of Plaintiff and against Defendant ComEd on this Count VI:

1.

Finding that Defendant ComEd violated Section 12(f) of the Act, 35 1. Adm; Code 309.102,35111. Adm. Code 306.102(a) and (b), 35 m. Adm. Code 306.304. and Standard Conditions 4 and 5 of the NPDES Permit;

2.

Enjoining Defendant ComEd from any future violations of Section 12(f) of the Act, 35 mll. Adm. Code 309.102, 35 m. Adm. Code 306.102(a) and (b), 35 1. Adm. Code 306.304 and Standard Conditions 4 and 5 of the NPDES Permit;

3.

Entering an injunction ordering Defendant ComEd to comply with the terms of its NPDES Permit;

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) against Defendant ComEd for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per day for each day of each violation;

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendant ComEd including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 26

IV. VIOLATIONS BY DEFENDANTS EXELON CORPORATION, AND EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC RELATED TO RELEASES OF TRITIUM TO THE ENVIRONMENT COUNT VII WATER POLLUTION HAZARD

1.

This Count is brought against Defendants, Exelon Corporation and Exelon Generation Company, LLC, on behalf of the people of the State of Illinois, by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney for Will County, on their own motion, pursuant to the terms and provisions of Section 42(d) and (e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the "Act"), 415 ILCS 5/42(d) and (e)(2004). 2 - 34. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 2 through 34 of Count I as paragraphs 2 through 34 of this Count VII.

35.

Since a specific date in November 2005 better known to the Defendants, Defendants have ceased discharging tritium through the blowdown pipe to the Kankakee River, and have instead stored tritiated water in tanks located in an area of the Station. As of March 14, 2006, Defendants are using approximately 13 tanks which are approximately 20,000 gallons each in capacity. The tanks are connected to one another,. and to the nuclear reactors, by piping and valves.. The tanks are located within a lined bermed area.

36.

The tritiated water stored within the tanks and transferred between the tanks is as high as 100,000,000 pCi/L. 27

37.

At Various times better known to the Defendants, amounts of tritiated water have been released, from the valves and pipes connecting the tanks and have discharged amounts of tritiated water into the bermed area.

38.

On or about March 13, 2006, dining a rainfall event, a portion of.the berm collapsed, allowing tritiated water mixed with rainwater to be released from the bermed area and discharged onto siurounding land.

39.

As of March 14, 2006, sampling of water inside the bermed area.indicated teitiated water of 255,000 pCi/L. As of March 14, 2006, sampling of water puddles outside of the bermed area indicated tritiated water of 183,000 pCi/L.

40.

The Defendants removed some of the ponded tritiated water outside the bermned area, but not all of the tritiated water was recovered fromrthe ground and pavement adjacent to the berms.

41.

The tritiated water outside the berned area posed and continues to pose a significant risk to impact groundwater through infiltration.

42.

The continued presence of the tritiated water outside the bermed area, poses a threat to groundwater in the area in violation of Section 12(a) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5/12(a)(2004). 43; The continued presence of the tritiated water outside the bermed area constitutes a water pollution hazard in violation of Section 12(d) of the Act, 415 ILCS 5112(d)(2004).

44.

Plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff will be' irreparably injured, and violation of the pertinent environmental statutes will continue 28

unless and until this Court grants equitable relief in the form of preliminary, and, after a trial, permanent injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order granting a preliminary injunction and, after trial, a permanent injunction, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on this Count VII:

1.

Finding that Defendants have violated Section 12(a) and (d) of the Act;

2.

Enjoining Defendants from any future violations of Section 12(a) and (d) of the Act;

3.

Entering an injunction ordering the Defendants to: In accordance with a plan acceptable to the Plaintiff and this Honorable Court:

a.

Prevent further migration of the contaminants released by the Defendants present in the groundwater at and near the Facility,

b.

Implement measures to prevent the release of any contaminant from the Facility;

c.

Fully characterize the nature and extent of all soil and groundwater contamination caused by the releases, including identifying background contaminant

• levels and the future flow of contaminant plumes in groundwater;'

d.. Immediately provide at Defendant's expense a potable drinking water source to all people affected by the violations alleged herein in an amount.and quality sufficient to meet the daily needs of said people; and,

e.

Eliminate any threat to the use of groundwater by citizens in the area impacted by releases from the plant. 29

4.

Assessing a civil penalty of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) against Defendants for each violation of the Act and Board Regulations, and an additional civil penalty of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per day for each day of each violation;

5.

Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and

6.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. V. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST EXELON CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC FOR CREATING A COMMON LAW PUBLIC NUISANCE COUNT VIII COMMON LAW PUBLIC NUISANCE

1.

This count is brought on behalf of the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS by LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois and JAMES W. GI'ASGOW, State's Attorney for Will County. The Attorney General is the chief legal officer of the State of Illinois having the powers and duties prescribed by-the law, ILL. CONST. Article V, Section 15 (1970). The Will County State's Attorney is an elected county officer having the powers and duties prescribed by the law, ILL. CONST.. Article VI, Section 19 and Article VII, Section 4 (1970). This Count is brought pursuant to the power of the Attorney General and State's Attorney to institute an action on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois to abate a public nuisance and to protect the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois. 30

• 2 - 38.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 2 through 3.8 of Count I as paragraphs 2 through 38 of this Count Vm. 39 - 45.. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 37 through 43 of Count II as paragraphs 39-through 45 of this Count Vm. 46 -49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 42 through 45 of Count m as paragraphs 46 through 49 of this Count VIII. 50 - 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 37 "through 42 of Count IV as paragraphs 50 through 55 of this Count VIII. 56 - 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 39 through 44 of Count V.as paragraphs 56 through 61 of this Count Vm. 62 - 71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 43 through 52 of Count VI as paragraphs 62 through 71 of this Count VIII. 72 -80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 35 through 43 of Count VII as paragraphs 72 through 80 of this Count VIII.

81.

From at least 1996 and continuing to the filing of thii Complaint, as alleged herein, the Defendants engaged in a course of conduct that included causing, threatening and allowing groundwater pollution from the blowdown line and the tritiated water tanks, failing to ensure adequate maintenance and operating procedures in the operation of the blowdown line and the tritiated water tanks, failing to report noncompliance pursuant to the conditions of the NPDES Permit, failing to follow operational requirements of the NPDES Permit, and discharging of wastewater without an NP1)ES Permit. 31

.82. The acts and omissions of the Defendants as alleged herein threatened adverse health effects and'inconvenience to persons in the vicinityofthe Facility, and caused damage to real and personal property.

83.

The Defendants, by their actions and omissions, prejudiced the public health and welfare and the environment.

84.

As a consequence of the foregoing, the Defendants created and maintained a public nuisance at common law.

85.

Said nuisance will continue unabated unless abated by order of this court. WHEREFORE, plaintiff, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, requests that this court grant a preliminary injunction, and after a trial, a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff and against defendants EXELON CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY and EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC:

1.

Finding that Defendants' actions alleged herein constitute a common law public nuisance;

2.

Enjoining Defendants from further acts constituting a common law public nuisance;

3.

Entering an injunction ordering the Defendants to:

a.

Cease use of the blowdown line for the discharge of tritiated water until further order of theCourt; and, In accordance with a plan acceptable to the Plaintiff and this Honorable Court:

b.

Prevent further migration of the contaminants released by the Defendants present in the groundwater at and near the Facility, .32

c.

Implement measures to prevent the release of any contaminant from the Facility;

d.

Fully characterize the nature and extent of all soil and groundwater contamination caused by the releases, including identifying background contaminant levels and the future flow of contaminant plumes in groundwater;

e.

Immediately provide at Defendant's expense a potable drinking water source to all people affected by the violations alleged herein in an amount and quality sufficient to meet the daily needs of said people; and,

f.

Eliminate any threat to the use of groundwater by citizens in the area impacted by-releases from the plant.

4.

Assessing all costs against Defendants including expert witness, consultant, and attorney fees; and 33

5.

Granting such other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and ex rel. JAMES W; GLASGOW,. State's Attorney for Will County, Illinois MATTHEW J. DUNN, Chief, Environmental Enforcement/Asbestos Litigation Division Environmental Bureau North Assistant Attorney Genea JA. S W. GLAS90W, Statqs ttomey No "ill County,?Ilinois OF COUNSEL CHRISTOPHER P. PERZAN ANN ALEXANDER Assistant Attomeys General 'Environmental Bureau 188 W. Randolph Street, 20th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 312 814-3532. 34

EXIBT a

FIHM-14-46= IJiZV I +/-L AU-L&W t'. W/i .NPDES Permit No. 1L0048321 olnos Environmental Protection Agency DVision of Water Pollution Control 1021 North Grand Avenue East PostOfflce Box 1*27-Sprlngfield, Iob -62794-9278 NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM I Expiration Date:. September 1. 2000 Name and Address of Permlttee: Comnmnwealtl Edison Company Post Office Box 767, 35 FNW Chicago. liinois 60690.0767 Discharge Number and Name: Modified (NPDES) Permit Issue Date: August 24, 995 Effecive Date: September 1.1995 Modification Date: August 28, 1997

• Facility Name and Address:

Cormonwealth Edison Company Braidwood Nuclear Power Station Rural Route A1. Box 84 Bracevie. Illinois 60407 M( County)' Recelng Waters: V

• 6 No. 001 Cooling Pond Blowdown Une No. 001(a) Wastewater Treatment Plant Effluent No. 001(b) Sewage Treatment Plant Effluent No. 001(c) Radwaste Treatment System Effluent No. 001(d) Dendneralizer Regenerant Wastes No. 001(e) Intake Screen Backwash No. 002 North Site Stormwater Runoff Basin No. 003 South Site Stormwater Runoff Basin No. 004 Switchyard Area Runoff Kankakee River Mazon River In compniance with the provisions of the Ililnois Environmental Protection Act Sutitle C. Rules and Regulations of the Olnois Pollution Control Board, and the FiPCA th above-named permittee Is hereby authoried to discharge at the above location to the abdve-nmed receiving stream In accordance with the standard conditions and attachments herein.;

Perrnltte Is not authorized to discharge after the above expiration date. -In order to receive authorization to glischarge beyond-the. ixpiration date. the permittee shall submit the proper application as required by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency OiEPA) not ater than 1 80 days prior to the expiration date. Manager. Pennit Section Division of Water Pollution Control rGM:DEU97041003.DLK EXHIBIT 1

MFJX-j4-i&WUb 1.5-414 VLU U:L*EL r.0 4/ lb Page 2 Modification Date. August 28, 1997 NPoES Penrmt No. iL4m83i1 Effluent Umitatons and Monitoring LOAD LIMITS ibs/davy C ONCENTRAMON.-. LIMffi mail PARAMErER 30 DAY AVG.

• DAILY 30 DAY MAX AVG.

DAILY MAX. SAMPLE FREQUENCY SAMPLE TYPE

1. From the effective date of his pemit until September 1. 2000, to effluent of the following discharge(s) shall be moniored gnd Imited at all Oines as follows:

iOtfafl(s): 001 Cooling Pond Blowdown Une' This disharge consists of. Approxirnate Flow

1. Coindenser cooling water

i.

H V serice water

3. Eisental service Wter

4. Cemli~erafizer regenerant waste

5. Wastewater treatment plant effluent

6. Radwaste treatment system effluent

7. House senrice water strainer backwash

8. Essential service water strainer backwash

9. Sewage treatrent plant effluent

10. Water treatment system filter backwashes

11. River intake screen badmkash

12. Coaling pond Intake screen backwash 0.-.

.1. 11.31 MGD 1.3 MGD

• , *- 3 IJGD} -

0:028 MGtl 0.079 MGD i.S. 0.032 MGD -4 0.03 MGD 0.017 MGD .0.017 MGD 0.03 MGD 0.1 12 MG0 OA MGD t s Daffy See Special Condition No. 1 Temperature See Special Conditlon No. 3 1ANeek Daily lUMonth Continuous Grab Continuous Grab" Total Residual Chlorine" 0.2 Total Residual Oxidant"

• See Speusl Condition No. 12
• See Special Condition No. 4 0.05 1Month Grab*&
• i i

MRR-14-2006 13:40 0 DLC LEGRL

11.

m/1 NPOES Pemi No. 1L048321 Effluent Lmitaions and Monitoring Modificaton Datc. Augsut 28.1897 f -.. r 1; - j .. S 2

• LOAD UMITS CONCENTRATION

_sldav LIMITS mMd 30 DAY DAILY 30 DAY DAILY E, PARAMETER AVG-. MAX AVG. MAX FREQUENCY' EI W

1. Fromthe effeivs date of tfis permnitunl September 1,2000..the effluentoffte flowing drge(s) shal be monlotoed and lmited at aD times as folows:

t Outfap(s): 001(a) Wastewater Treal Thfs disc arge cornstst ot.

1.

Turb ne building fire and on sump'

a. *urbine building floor drain tank Turbine bmilding floor drain sumps II. Essential service water drain sumps iii Condensate pit sumps

b. Tubine building equipment drain tank*

c.

Units I and 2 tendon tunnel sumps

d. Auxiary boier blowdown

e.

Units I and 2 diesil fiel. storage tank suwps £ Oi-water separator No. I effluent

g. Seconday-SIde Drain Water Waler treatment area floor and equipment drain sumps

3. Water treatment lime-softening darator blowdown Wastewater treatment system sand filter backwash

i. Condensate polisher regenerant wastes (Alternate Route)

I. Dedineralizer Regenerant Waste Dralns (Altemate Route) ,low I Mnt Plant Effluent Approximate Fow

• 0.079 MOo a

Intermittent Inteomttent 0.002 MGD Intermitent' Intermittent Daily 24 Hour Total O0tal Suspended Solids 15.0 30.0 1N~eek 24 Hour Composit il and Grease 16.0 20.0 I/Month Grab These wastestreams may be directed to the Radwaste Treatment System dependIng on the results of the process radiation montors. I I r. . I

MHK-14-`dWWb 13:40 DLC LEGAL I I S I P. 06/16 .A'gu s2.17 Modification.Date: Auguit 28.1997. Page 4 ,NPS Permi No. 11.008 Effluent Uniations end Monitort L1A UMR Ubs/day 30 DAY AVG. rS CONCeNmATiON LIMITS mal QAILY 30 DAY DAILY MAX. AVG. . MAX. PAPAMETER SAMPLE FREQUENCY SAMPLE. TYPE

1. From the effective date of tIhs pemi until September 1. 2000. the eflluent of the following discharge(s) shal be monitored and lnited at ain times as follows:

Outfall(s): 001(b)Sewage Treatment Plant iEfluent Approximate Flow 0.017 MoD (DMF 0.078 MGO) Flow pH Daily See Special Condition No. 1 1/Week Total Suspended Solids 19.5 39.0 30.0 39.0, 30.0 60.0 60.0 1Week 1/Week Continuous 0 Grab:.

• 241Hour Composite 24 Hojur e Composite Boos 19.5 Outfall(s): 001(c) Radwaste Treatment System Effluent This discharge consists of.

a Approximate Flom. 0.032 MGD

1. Steam generator condensate blowdown

2.

Cooling jacket blowdown

3. Auiliaty building and turbine bufiding floor drains

4.

Laundry waste treatment system drains

5.

Chemical and volume control system drains

6.

Boron recycle system blowdown

7.

Radwaste demineralizer regenerant wastes end fiter backwash

8.

Reactor building floor and equipment drains

9. Turbine building floor drain tank (Alternate Route)

10. Turbine building fire and oil sump (Altemate Route)

11. TuIblne building equipment drain tank (Alternate Route)

12. Evaporatorwastewater Flow Intermittent intermment Intermittent 0.001 MGD Intermittent Intermittent 0.002 MOD Intetnittent Intemittent Intermittent Intermittent Intermittent Daiy Continuous Total Suspended Sorlis.

15.0 30.0 1Neek DischaTe Tank COmposite Oil and Grease 15.0 20.0 V/Month Grab , Outf No. 001(b) Sewage Treatment Plant Effluentwill normally be discharged to the Kankakee Rivervia the cooling pond blowdown line. T7he existg outfall to the Mazon River will be maintained as an emergency backupL The pemftee shaU give notice to the Agency of any emergency discharge to the Mazon RhiPr. Applicable effluent limitations shan apply.

M1HR14-Z4-b 13:41 VLC LhUHL t,. kT(1lb

• 7 Mlodifton Data: Auut8.199?

NPDES Perfrlt No. L148321 Eflluent Umitalons and Monorn LOAD LUIMTS CONCENTRATION Ibsldav LIMITS mmll I 30 DAY DAILY 30 DAY DAILY SAMPLE SAMPLE PAMMETER AVG. MAXl AVG. MAX. fREdUENM .Y T)TE. I. From the effecve data of t pert un Septeber 1, 2000, the effluent of t following disohrge(s) hal be monitre and tmWted It all limes as follows:- Outfatl(s): 001(d) Demlneralizer Regenerant Wastes Ihis dis arge consists of Apprximate Flow

• Q

.0.028 MGD I I. Mak up delnealizer regnerant waste t m !. Con ensate polisher regenerate waste"* L. Reg nerant chemical area drains

k. PortCble Defmneralizer Regenerant Wastes lodw

• otal Suspended Solids Daily lIAeek 15.0 30.0
• Continuous 8 Hour
• Composltei "This wastestream may be alternately routed to the wastewater treatment system Oufall(s). 001(e) River Intake Screen Backwash bere shall be no discharge of collected debris.

I.. e

I-. CK -LO MAR-14-z0W6. 13:41 DLt; LtLI-Page 6 I . 100ES Prmft No. IL8321 Efftuent 1.mitations and Monrtadng Modifcation Date: August28, 199? LOAD UIMITS lbe02fday CONCENTRATION LIMITS ma/ 1l PARAMETER 30 DAY AVG. DAILY 30 DAY MAX. AVG. DAILY MAX SAMPLE ' FREQUENCY SAMPLt TYPE

1. From the effective date of this pmit unil September 1, 200, the effluent of the following discharge(s) shall be monitored and tooted at an llmes as follows:

Otfall(s): 002 North Site Stornwater Runoff Basin Thb discharge consists of. Appxnimate Fiow.

1. Parldng lot runoff Iternitent

2.

Transformer area runoff lntermttent

3.

North station area runoff Intermittent

4.

Turbine building. auxiliary building and waste Internnttent treatment building roof drains Intermittent See Special Condition No. 8 Outfall(s): 003 South Site Storrnwater Runoff Basin Approximate Rlow Intermittent See Speckll Condition No. a Outfall(s): 004 Switchyard Area Runoff Appromxmate Flow Intemnittent See Special Condition No. 8

SAL] }4 P1HK'-14-db 1J54; C JJL WULH Page 7 Modification Date: August28. 1997 NPDES Permit No. 1M 48321 SPECIAL CONDTON 1 The pH shall be In the range 6.0B oQ. SPECIAL CONDITIN 2 Samples taken In compliance with the effluent monit re shall be maen -at ipoint reprosentative-of te discharge, but priorto enby Into the receivg stream,

• SPECIAL CONOmON 3 Dladiage of wastewaterfrom this facliTi must not alone or in combin wh other sources cause the recMvig stream to violate ft rgnhg m

h1mitaftons at te edge of tie midng zone which is deid by Section 302.21 urllinois Administration Code. Title 35. Chapter 1, Subtitle C, as amended: A. laximum temperature rise above natural temerature must not exceed SF (2.8C). B. Watertemnerature at representativer location I the mm fweshall not exceed t inamum ns In the fobowing table .more than one t1) percent of tie houm in the 12month period ending with ay monh.L Moreoer, I no time shag the water te a e at such locations exceed the maximum lmifts In the fooing table by mori Oan 3'F (1.7-C). (Main ri teuperatures ar temperate of those portions of the river esentally airrlarto and following the same thermal tegime as thU temperres of the main flow of the river.) M E& Mm' AM MU JU, A& a m 2 OL tQIL

• F 60 60 60 s90 s090 90 s

s0 90

9.

so 16 16 18 32. 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 16

IALQcoN

4. Chlorine or bromine may not be discharged from each unirs main cooling condensers for more than two hour Sper day.' The reported mean concentration and rnximum concentration of Total Residual Chbonne/rotal Residual OCidant (TRC TR0) shal be based on a minimum of ivee grab samples taken at approximately five nu Intervals at Outral 001. The time

• samiles were collected. the tme and duration of oxidant dosing period plus te monthly average and daiy Maximum amount of oxld nt applied shall be reported on the Discharge Monitoring Reports. The ;4ported average cncentration of TRCITRO Is the

. avera ge of all values measured fra sampling event and the reported maximum concentration Is the highest value measured for a single grab sample. Discharge Monioring Reports shall Indicate whether bromine bdor chlorine compounds were used during the month. A discharge UrmIt, as measured at the blowdown to the Kank!ckee River. of 0.05 mg/l (nstantaneous maximuml shin be adihvad far total raital uwvAdnt ftM ri mat r hfr"tAfI raobali _i j-s h..,...?..w.. S.L-.L. ,_ a-

EXHIBIT B

Fact Sheet 1 - Exelon Braidwood Nuclear Facility Page I of 2 _ _1I J 1 Rod R. Blagojevich, Governo Community Relations - Fact Sheets Exelon Braidwood Nuclear Facility Tritium Releases and Groundwater Impacts Fact Sheet 1 February 2006 Braceville, Illinois While working with the Exelon Dresden nuclear power plant in the fall of 2004, where tritium was detected in some on-site wells, Illinois EPA became aware of the potential for tritium contamination In groundwater at this type of facility. At the same time, the Agency was Involved i in the pending renewal of the industrial discharge permit for the Braidwood fadlity. Comments S [ received from the Godley Park District alerted Illinois EPA to tritium detected In a shallow sand H point well at the Park District. In the pring of 2005, Illinois EPA contacted Exelon to Investigate the storm water ditch that carwate r to the west side of the site as a possible tritiuni source to groundwater. The shallow sand point well at the Godley Park District was sampled again in April of 2005. The result H was below the detection limit for tritium (200 picocuries per liter (pCi/L)). At the time, tritium in II I the surface water in the ditch measured about 600 pCi/L. A picocurie Is one trillionth of a curie. By comparison, 20,000 pCi/L is the maximum contaminant level that is allowed In public drinking

• View Larger Image water by federal regulations. During the summer of 2005, Illinois EPA tested four private wells in (3PG, 119K file)

Godley west of the ditch. All those results were below the detection limit for tritium.

• View Printable Map (PDF, 615K file)

In discussions with Exelon, Illinois EPA was made aware of a November 2000 release from Vacuum Breaker #2 (VB2) on the pipeline that carries process water east to the Kankakee River. In 2005, three monitoring *ells in the area of that vacuum breaker tested clean and one other tested at 400 pCi/liter. The Agency wanted to know whether this might be the source of the tritium found In the storm water ditch. We requested and received, In the fall of 2005, a work plan from Exelon for a complete Investigation to define the source of tritium in the ditch. On November 30, 2005, Exelon Informed Illinois EPA that they would be sampling private wells In the area of Vacuum Breaker #3 (VB3) on the north side of the plant, where It was disclosed that another large release occurred in 1998. On December 16, 2005, Illinois EPA issued a violation notice to Exelon for the release at VB3 where observed contamination levels that either exceeded groundwater standards in some site monitoring wells, or threatened the use of area private wells. The Agency met with representatives from Exelon on December 20th. Exelon made a presentation of the information they had developed at that time and future investigation plans to define the extent of contamination from pipeline releases. Exelon indicated that tritium has not been Introduced to the pipeline since November 23, 2005 and will not be Introduced to the line until the line has been tested for leaks. A second meeting was held between Illinois EPA and Exelon on January 23, 2006. Illinois EPA asked for Information to assess the potent al future threat to nearby wells through computer modeling. On February 2, 2006, Illinois EPA received a report from Exelon as part of the compliance commitment agreement. There will be an official compliance meeting on February 17 to evaluate the results of the investigation and decide on the appropriate course of action. Private wells sampled to date: (In most cases, Exelon split samples with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and levels of tritium were Independently confirmed by those agencies.)

1. 14 private wells tested in December north of the plant along Smiley Road: All were non-detects for tritium except one well that showed 1524 pCi/liter. This is about eight percent of U.S. EPA's comparison value for a safe level in public drinking water, which Is 20,000 pCi/liter.

2. In mid-3anuary, Exelon began contacting private well owners within 1000 feet north and south of the pipeline east to the Kankakee River to obtain access to sample their wells. To date, they have sampled 19 of 29 wells, and all results are non-detects for tritium.

ttp://www.epa.state.il.us/community-relations/fact-sheets/exelon-braidwood/exelon-braidwood-l.html 5/3/2006 h

Fact Sheet 1 - Exelon Braidwood Nuclear Facility Page 2 of 2

3.

Ditch area on the west side of the plant - Surface water samples in March, April and May 2005 showed levels of 539, 582 and 550 pCi/liter tritium, respectively. This was at the northernmost point of the ditch near a main entrance to the plant. Exelon has sampled standing water In the ditch weekly since early December 2005 - all non-detects. In addition, the Godley Park District shallow well was tested in March 2005 and four private water wells in Godley nearest the ditch were tested in June 2005 - all non-detects. The Illinois Department of Public Health has been provided with and has reviewed analytical results from private well tests near the Braldwood plant. They have not seen tritium levels in the well tests to date that pose a health hazard. Illinois EPA will continue to work with IDPH to evaluate any potential health Impacts and keep area residents informed. The Illinois EPA is committed to protecting the groundwater of the state as a future drinking water resource. To this end, the Agency will use available enforcement tools, as appropriate, to assure that non-compliance issues are resolved with this site. For more information: General questions about the site, Illinois EPA Office of Community Relations: Kurt Neibergall Mana er, OCR 217/785-3819 Carol Fuller Community Relations Coordinator 217/524-8807 Techullcal Questions: Media Inquiries: Bill BLI scher, Bureau of Water Hydrigeology and Compliance Mgr. 217/ 24-7922 Maggie Carson, Communications Manager 217/558-1536 Health-related Questions: Joe O'Connor Illinois Department of Public Health West Chicago Regional Office 245 W. Roosevelt Road 630/293-6800 Illinois EPA plans to work with the Godley Park District to establish an Information Repository for the convenience of area residents. Exelon has more Information on a web site about the tritium issue at www.BraidwoodTritium.info Copyright © 2005 Illinois EPA Agency Site Map I Privacy Information I Kids Privacy I Web Accessibility I Agency Webmaster http://www.epa.state.il.us/community-relations/fact-sheets/exelon-braidwood/exelon-braidwood-l .html5 5/3/2006

EXHIBIT C

Page I FOCUS - 2 of 3 DOCUMENTS Copyright 2006 Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune Distributed by Knight/Ridder Tribune News Service March 17, 2006 Friday SECTION: STATE AND REGIONAL NEWS ACC-NO: 200603 17-TB-0317-Exelon-Sued-Over-Leaks LENGTH: 921 words HEADLINE: Exelon sued over leaks: Will County, state allege 8 tritium spills BYLINE: Hal Dardick, Chicago Thbune BODY: Mar. 17-Radioactive tritium was released from a Will County nuclear power plant at least eight times, three more occasions than Exelon Corp. officials disclosed in recent weeks, according to a lawsuit filed Thursday. The most recent release, which occurred Monday and was disclosed the next day, pointed to the potential for a "mind-boggling" environmental disaster if a tornado hit Braidwood Generating Station, Will County State's Atty. James Glasgow said. Glasgow and Illinois Atty. Gen. Lisa Madigan filed suit in Will County Circuit Court against Exelon Corp., Commonwealth Edison and Exelon Generation Co., LLC, which comprises Exelon Nuclear. ComEd built and ran the Braidwood plant until late 2000. "Exelon has polluted the groundwater under and around the Braidwood facility in Will County," Madigan said. "Faulty maintenance led to this situation and this lawsuit.... Exelon has not been maintaining and operating this nuclear plant as it should be. "Like exposure to any radioactive material, exposure to tritium increases the risk of developing cancer and increases the risk of birth defects," she said. Tritium, a byproduct of nuclear generation, can enter the body through ingestion, absorption or inhalation. Exelon and state and federal regulatory officials have said the groundwater contamination at Braidwood poses no health threat, but critics of federal tritium standards question that blanket assessment. The suit seeks fines that could reach $36.5 million for a 1996 spill alone, Glasgow said. If fines are collected, they could be used for the very expensive process of removing water with tritium from the ground, Madigan said. Exelon Nuclear officials said in a statement that they-were reviewing the lawsuit and that the company "takes full responsibility for the low-level tritium contamination" and is working on plans to clean it up. "We have an aggressive remediation plan that the state is evaluating now," said Thomas O'Neill, the firm's vice president of regulatory and legal affairs. "We expected [the suit], and the positive aspect is that we can now focus on removing the tritiated groundwater and move on." Madigan and Glasgow tried to negotiate a settlement before the suit was filed, Glasgow said. "What I've encountered, basically, is a culture of greed and deception in my dealings with them," he said. Glasgow noted the lack of disclosures until late last year for all of the releases, except one in 2000. The recent disclosures came after the detection of groundwater contamination, after the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency told Exelon to look for it, Glasgow said. LexisNin exi s-M X LexisNexis-(S LexisNexis

Page 2 Exelon sued over leaks: Will County, state allege 8 tritium spills Chica He said Exelon thus far has failed to provide bottled water to nearby residents as promised more than two weeks ago. "It looks like until we put them against a wall in a courtroom, we are not going to get'to the truth, and we are not going to get the things done necessary for remediation that are going to protect the people in that area," he said. Exelon Nuclear spokesman Craig Nesbit disagreed. "We've been very open, very honest, worked very, very hard to over-inform people" since confirming groundwater contamination last year, he said. The bottled water will be distributed through a local store by early next week, and a machine to recycle water with tritium should be put into operation relatively soon, Nesbit said. The suit alleges ComnEd and Exelon should have reported within 24 hours to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency the spills in 1996, 1998 and 2000 from valves on an underground pipe that carries tritium 4 1/2 miles to the Kankakee River, where it is legally dumped. The pipe also carries wastewater, putting it under the purview of the state EPA. "We did not violate the letter of any regulations," Nesbit said. The suit states that elevated levels of tritium exceed state standards in groundwater at eight spots beneath the plant site, under land outside its boundaries and in a nearby pond. All of the groundwater contamination resulted from spills from valves on the pipe, particularly a 1998 spill of about 3 million gallons that was never cleaned up, Exelon officials have said. They have disclosed five spills in recent months. Glasgow said the underground pipe was built inadequately and had no alarms or detection devices built into it. The suit alleges tritium spilled at least eight times, saying three were at "unknown times" and in unknown quantities. The most recent occurred Monday, when a lined berm surrounding 13 tanks being used to temporarily store water with very high concentrations of tritium broke in high winds, releasing rainwater that had been contaminated from an apparent leak in one of the tanks. The tanks, which each hold 20,000 gallons, began to be used after Exelon last November quit sending tritium into the underground pipe while it researches alternative disposal methods. "If a tornado hits these things, it will launch them," Glasgow said. "When these things hit the ground, they will explode and send" tritium at levels 100 times the federal groundwater limit into the environment, he said. But Nesbit said the tanks weigh 24,000 pounds when empty and about 185,000 pounds when full. "There's no tornado that could pick up a 185,000-pound object," he said. " We think they are very safe." hdardick~tribune.com Copyright (c) 2006, Chicago Tribune Distributed by Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News. For information on republishing this content, contact us at (800) 661-2511 (U.S.), (213) 237-4914 (worldwide), fax (213) 237-6515, or e-mail reprints~krtinfo.com. LOAD-DATE: March 17, 2006

EXHIBIT D

Page 1 4 of 100 DOCUMENTS Copyright 2006 Chicago Tribune Company Chicago Tribune April 26, 2006 Wednesday South-Southwest Final Edition SECTION: METRO; ZONE SSW; Pg. 1 LENGTH: 684 words HEADLINE: Leaks costly, Exelon says; Tritium spills create credibility problem, leader says BYLINE: By Hal Dardick, Tribune staff reporter. BODY: Dealing with radioactive tritium spills at nuclear power plants will cost Exelon Corp. a great deal of money, but the larger loss to the firm comes in the form of public trust, a top company official said Tuesday. "By the time it's done, it's going to be tens of millions of dollars" to pay for testing, cleanups, repairs, new infrastructure, lawyers and other expenses related to the tritium spills, said Christopher Crane, president of Exelon Nuclear. 'The more damaging issue here is the credibility loss." In a meeting with the Tribune editorial board, Crane detailed Exelon's response to the spills, particularly those at Braidwood Generating Station in southwest Will County. Exelon last year found tritium, a byproduct of nuclear generation, in groundwater outside the Braidwood plant. It then disclosed tritium spilled from an underground pipe more than four times between 1996 and 2003. Area residents blasted the company for not earlier disclosing the spills, which led to four lawsuits, one filed by Illinois Atty. Gen. Lisa Madigan and Will County State's Atty. James Glasgow. Exelon launched an internal probe, discovering a new tritium leak at Dresden Generating Station in Grundy County where groundwater was contaminated from an earlier spill. It found smaller amounts of tritium had leaked at Byron Nuclear Generating Station, about 25 miles southwest of Rockford. None of the spills, according to government oversight agencies, poses a health threat. But by all accounts, they did damage Exelon's credibility. Crane said Exelon, which took over Commonwealth Edison's nuclear plants in late 2000, had worked hard to regain credibility after years of what was widely considered poor management by ComEd. "We had a terrible reputation," which Exelon did much to repair, he said. 'I was proud of the organization, proud of the work we got done. This has been one big slap, and we are trying to do everything as well as we can do, as open as we can do, to fix this, put it behind us, learn from it." Part of the problem was the industry's perception of tritium, considered one of the least harmful of radioactive substances, Crane said. "There was not, in CornEd or early on when we became Exelon, or in the industry, a large sensitivity to tritium," he said. "It's just the nature of tritium. We handle some very hazardous materials, and tritium is very low on that spectrum." David Lochbaum., director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Nuclear Safety Project, said the industry's attitude about tritium has changed in recent months, partly because Braidwood groundwater contamination migrated off site. "That basically forced the industry to deal with that in a different manner because it has not done much good for F LexisNexis-A LexisNexis-A LexisNexis-

Page 2 Leaks costly, Exelon says; Tritium spills create credibility problem, le their image," Lochbaum said. "It's come at a high price, a harder PR [public relations] lesson than Exelon would have wanted." Industry watchdogs, including Lochbaum, note that tritium leaked or spilled at no less than 10 sites across the nation, four of which are in Illinois, in the last decade. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established a task force to probe the issue. The industry trend is toward zero tolerance of spills, even small ones that are confined to plant grounds, Lochbaum said. Steve Kerekes, a spokesman for the Nuclear Energy Institute, a trade group, said chief officers from nuclear facilities across the country recently met to start considering a voluntary industry policy that would include groundwater monitoring. Exelon is sinking wells to monitor groundwater at all 10 of its nuclear stations, which comprise 17 reactors. Crane said he would be surprised if they did not find tritium leakage at another site. In addition to groundwater monitoring, Exelon plans to install monitoring equipment on underground pipe valves, like the ones that malfunctioned and caused almost all the spills and leaks at Braidwood and Byron. Exelon has pledged to help the small village of Godley, just west of the Braidwood plant, fund a public water system. Crane said tests thus far have found no tritium in the shallow wells used by Godley residents. hdardick~tribune.com GRAPHIC: PHOTO: Christopher Crane, president of Exelon Nuclear, says radioactive spills will cost firm tens of millions of dollars PHOTO LOAD-DATE: April 26, 2006

EXHIBIT E

February 28, 2005 EA-04-228 Mr. Christopher M. Crane President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT:

QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION NON-CITED VIOLATION ENRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2004-011]

Dear Mr. Crane:

This refers to information provided to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), by the staff at Exelon Generation Company's (Exelon) Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (Quad Cities). The Quad Cities staff indicated that two former instrument maintenance technicians at Quad Cities falsely documented the completion of concurrent or independent verifications while calibrating instrumentation. The matter was investigated by the NRC Office of Investigations (01). The synopsis from the 01 Report is enclosed. Based on the information developed during investigations by the Quad Cities staff and 01, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. In summary, at various times from January 28 to April 16, 2003, two instrument maintenance technicians at Quad Cities falsified maintenance alteration logs to indicate that required concurrent or independent verifications were performed on torus temperature indicators, residual heat removal (RHR) suction and discharge pressure indicators, RHR service water pump discharge indicators, and secondary containment differential pressure indicators after the alteration and restoration of these instruments. This instrumentation was used to verify the operability of equipment in accordance with technical specifications. The concurrent or independent verifications were required by the Quad Cities Procedure MA-AA-716-100, 'Maintenance Alterations Process." The actions of these two instrument maintenance technicians placed Exelon in violation of 10 CFR 50.9, 'Completeness and Accuracy of Information," and were categorized in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level IV. This matter was identified and immediately investigated by Exelon. Corrective actions taken by Exelon included, but were not limited to: (1) reviewing previous work performed by the two individuals; (2) taking disciplinary action against the two individuals; (3) conducting awareness briefings for the maintenance shop staff, departmental stand-downs, and an "All Handsu meeting concerning this event; and (4) performing an extent-of-condition review of pertinent plant documents from other departments such as operations, radiation protection, chemistry,

C. Crane engineering, and maintenance to ensure that record falsification was limited to the two individuals involved. Therefore, after considering the circumstances of this case and after consulting with the Director, Office of Enforcement, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1.d of the Enforcement Policy. Please feel free to contact Mr. Julio Lara, Chief, Electrical Engineering Branch, NRC Region IlIl office, if you have any questions. Mr. Lara can be reached at telephone number (630) 829-9731. You are not required to respond to this letter unless the description herein does not reflect your corrective actions or your position. If you contest the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator and Enforcement Officer, Region Ill, the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The response should be clearly marked as a "Reply to EA-04-228." In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and your response (should you choose to respond) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.aov/readin-l-rm/ADAMS.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. Sincerely, IRA! Cynthia D. Pederson, Director Division of Reactor Safet Docket No. 50-254: 50-265 License No. DPR-29; DRP-30

Enclosure:

01 Report Synopsis See Attached Distribution DOCUMENT NAME: ML050600140.wpd To receive a copy of this docurent, Indicate In the box: 'C

• Copy without attachnnnVenclosure 'El Copy with attachmentlenclosure N = No copy OFFICE Rill Rill Rill Ril NAME 1Pelke:tr Berson Ring O'Brien DATE 02/22/05 02/22/05 02/22/05 02/22/05 OFFICE IRill OGC I

JOE NAME Pederson I Reddick I Congel DATE 02/28/05 02/06105 02/14/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

C. Crane cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Plant Manager - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Regulatory Assurance Manager - Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Chief Operating Officer Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services Senior Vice President - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Vice President - Mid-West Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director Licensing - Mid-West Regional Operating Group Manager Licensing - Dresden and Quad Cities Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group Document Control Desk - Licensing Vice President - Law and Regulatory Affairs Mid American Energy Company Assistant Attorney General Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois State Liaison Officer, State of Iowa Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission D. Tubbs, Manager of Nuclear MidAmerican Energy Company

C. Crane Distribution ADAMS (PARS) SECY OCA L. Reyes, EDO E. Merschoff, DEDR J. Dyer, NRR R. Franovich, NRR F. Congel, OE C. Nolan, OE S. Gagner, OPA J. Piccone, OSTP J. Caldwell, Rill G. Grant, RilI R. Lickus, RilI J. Strasma, Rilt M. Satorius, Rill C. Pederson, RilI R. Caniano, RilI L. Chandler, OGC J. Moore, OGC D. Reddick, OGC G. Caputo, 01 H. Bell, OIG S. Lewis, OGC L. Trocine, OE L. Rossbach, NRR P. Pelke, Rill M. Ring, RilI R. Paul, Rill - 01 D. Holody, RI C. Evans, RlI K. O'Brien, Rill G. Sanbom, RIV K. Stoedter, SRI - Quad Cities OEMAIL OEWEB OAC3 DRSIII DRPIII RidsNrrDipmlipb P. Buckley, Rill J. Kweiser, Rill

SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region III, on March 8, 2004, to determine if Instrument Maintenance (IM) personnel deliberately falsified inspection documentation while calibrating local instrumentation and if the IM Superintendent concealed the record falsification. Based upon the evidence developed, this investigation did substantiate the allegation that two technicians deliberately falsified inspection documentation while calibrating local instrumentation. Based upon the evidence developed, this investigation did not substantiate the allegation that the former IM Superintendent concealed the record falsification. Case No. 3-2004-011 Enclosure

EXHIBIT F

From: <apoIonsky~morganIewis.com> To: <rwebsterekinoy.rutgers.edu> Date: 3/23/06 10:00AM

Subject:

Oyster Creek

Richard, You asked me whether there is a discrepancy between a 'Fact Sheet" that discusses the upper region of the drywell at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and a sentence in AmerGen's December 12, 2005, Answer to your clients' Petition.

The Fact Sheet that you faxed to me states that, '[t]here is no additional corrosion at two of the four regions in the upper region of the drywell that previously experienced corrosion. Corrosion at the other two elevations in the upper region is very minor, continues to decrease and would not impact the structural integrity of the drywell through 2029." These statements are consistent with AmerGen's License Renewal Application, which states that 'corrosion in the sand bed region has been arrested and no further loss of material is expected" (Application at 3.5-20), and 'recent UT measurements (2004) [in the upper region] confirmed that the corrosion rate continues to decline" (Application at 3.5-21). The sentence at issue is on page 21 of AmerGen's Answer. It states: "Based on these measurements and inspections, AmerGen concluded that corrosion of the drywell shell has been arrested, including in the sand bed region. Application at 3.5-20 to -21." Your concern with this sentence is that it suggests that corrosion in the upper region of the drywell has been arrested. We agree with you that the sentence in the Answer could cause confusion. The word 'including" should be deleted from the sentence at Issue. The Board, however, did not rely on the condition of the drywell shell in the upper region when it rejected that portion of the contention. See Memorandum and Order at 33 n.27 (We limit NIRS's contention to the sand bed region because, contrary to NIRS's assertion, AmerGen is performing, and will continue to perform during the renewal period, UT measurements at critical locations In the upper region of the drywell liner"). In addition, all parties had a copy of the Application which stated that corrosion in the upper region 'continues to decline." In any event, to ensure that there is no confusion in the record, we will be notifying the Board, the Commission, and the parties. We thank you for bringing this issue to our attention and hope that this clarification is helpful.

Alex S. Polonsky Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20004 Direct dial: 202.739.5830 Fax: 202.739.3001 DISCLAIMER This e-mail message is intended only for the personal use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and as such privileged and confidential. If you are not an intended recipient, you may not review, copy or distribute this message. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the original message. CC: <ksutton~morganIewis.com>, <dsilverman~morganlewis.com>, <Bradley.Fewell~exeloncorp.com>

EXHIBIT G

Original Message - From: Paul Gunter To: gburl@comcast.net Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 3:44 PM

Subject:

resend of request to AmerGen on Oyster Creek inspections TO: Jhansi Kandasamy, Oyster Creek Site Regulatory Assurance Manager FROM: Paul Gunter, Nuclear Information and Resource Service and Edith Gbur, Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch RE: Oyster Creek Drywell Liner Corrosion Monitoring Program

Dear Ms. Kandasamy:

Per request of Nuclear Information and Resource Service and Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch dated July 19, 2005 to New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner Bradley Campbell and Commissioner Campbell's reply dated August 25, 2005, we are requesting information from AmerGen with regard to the Oyster Creek Drywell Liner Corrosion Monitoring Program. Requested Documents and Related Questions:

1)

Please provide the1996, 2000, 2004 inspection results of Ultrasonic Tests (UT) at all locations on the Drywell Liner including the sand bed region.

2)

If no UT inspections were conducted at the sand bed region after 1994, how is the performance of the coating at the sand bed region determined to be effective in arresting corrosion in this region? Please provide the original documentation of this analysis.

3)

Has the base of the Drywell Liner below the sand bed region to 0 ever been inspected by UT or any other means? If so, what were the results? If not, why not?

4)

Please provide GPUN's original analysis for the revision of Technical Specification 5.2.A which reduced the Drywell Liner pressure rating from 62 psig to 44 psig and raised its temperature rating from 175

• F to 292' F.

5)

Is there any evidence of corrosive pitting in the Drywell Liner? If so, what inspection methods are being employed to assess the effects of corrosive pitting on the structural integrity of the Drywell Liner?

6)

Is there any evidence of cracking in the Drywell Liner? If so, please make all Condition Reports and/or other documents regarding any cracks in the liner available for review.

7)

If cracking has occurred, please provide the analysis of the root cause.

8)

Have welding repairs been made to the Drywell Liner for any reason? If so, please provide the results of those repairs. Thank you, Paul Gunter, Director Reactor Watchdog Project Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. 202 328 0002

EXHIBIT H

From: pete.reslereexeloncorp.com [1] Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 4:22 PM To: gburlecomcast.net; Paul Gunter Cc: CommissionerCampbell~dep.state.nj.us

Subject:

- Response to 9/6 request for information Ms. Gbur, Mr. Gunter: In response to your request for information dated Sept. 6, 2005, concerning the Oyster Creek drywell liner, AmerGen will not provide proprietary business information. The results of equipment testing, analysis and other operational and regulatory documentation are available at the station to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering for review at any time. Much of the information you have requested is available to the public in the Oyster Creek license renewal application available on the NRC web site, as well as in a summary of this issue that was provided to the NJ BNE. I have attached that document below for your information. In addition, the NRC approved the initial analysis and corrective actions taken after corrosion was discovered in 1980, as well as the ongoing inspection and evaluation program to ensure the corrective actions continue to be effective. Regular inspections and analyses of the drywell liner have confirmed that corrosion is managed effectively and that the drywell liner can perform its intended function. <<drywell corrosion issue summary.doc>> Peter C. Resler Manager, Nuclear Communications Exelon Corporation 610-765-5530 This e-mail and any of its attachments may contain Exelon Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Exelon Corporation family of Companies. This e-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this e-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this e-mail and any printout. Thank You.

EXHIBIT I

From: <George.Beck@exeloncorp.com> To: <djal @nrc.gov>, <rkm~nrc.gov> Date: 04/05/2006 5:02:53 PM

Subject:

FW: Audit 0 & A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210,356) Note: As originally transmitted this email was undeliverable to the NRC; it exceeded the size limit. It Is being retransmitted without the AMP-210.pdf. This file will be reconstituted and sent In smaller N.pdfls; the first 11 pages are attached. George > -Original Message-

• From:

Beck, George > Sent: Wednesday, April 05,2006 4:39 PM > To: Donnie Ashley (E-mail); 'Roy Mathew (E-mall) I (E-mail) > Cc: Ouaou, Ahmed; Hufnagel Jr, John G; Warfel Sr, Donald B; Polaski, Frederick W

Subject:

Audit 0 & A (Question Numbers AMP-1 41, 210, 356) > Donnie/Roy, > Attached are the responses to AMP-210 and AMP-356 in an updated version of the reports from the AMP/AMR Audit database. Also Included is a revised version of AMP-141. These answers have been reviewei and approved by Technical Lead, Don Warfel. > Regarding AMP-210, please note: > As poanted out In our response to NRC Question AMP-210, (8a)(1), "The 0.806" minimum average thickness verbally discussed with the Staff during the AMP audit was recorded In location 19A in 1994. Additional reviews after the audit noted that lower minimum average thickness values were recorded at the same location In 1991 (0.803") and In September 1992 (0.800"). However, the three values are w thin the tolerance of +/- 0.010" discussed with the Staff." > Regarding AMP-141, please note: > Our response to AMP-141 has been revised to reflect additional information developed during the ongoing preparation of RAI responses. > Please let John Hufnagel or me know if you have any questions. > George c><Pages from AMP-210.pdf>> >>>> <<AMP-141.pdf>> > ><<<A.MP-356.pdf>> i.**., This e-mail and any of its attachments may contain Exelon Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Exelon Corporation family of Companies. This e-mail is intended solely for the use of the Individual or entity to which it is addressed. If you are not the Intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution,

copying, or action taken in relation to the contents of and attachments to this El-mail Is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have receivei this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this e-mall and any printout. Thank You.

• • • • • • • • 4 ***************************************************************

CC: <ahmed.ouaou@ exeloncorp.com>, <john.hufnagellexeloncorp.com>, <donalcl.warfelexeloncorp.com>, dred.polaskiTexeloncorp.com>

Mail Envelope Properties (44343066.C5F:19: 7263)

Subject:

Creation Date: From: Created By: FW: Audit Q & A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210,356) 04/0512006 5:01:46 PM <George.Beck@exeloncorp.com> George.Beck@exeloncorp.com Recipients nrc.gov OWGWPO01.HQGWDO01 DJA.1 (D. Ashley) nrc.gov TWGWPOO1.HQGWDOO1 RKI (Roy Mathew) exeloncorp.com fred.polaski CC donald.warfel CC john.hufnagel CC ahmed.ouaou CC Post Office OWGWVPOO1.HQGWDOOI TWGWVPOO1.HQGWDOOI Files MESSAGE TEXT.htm Pages from AMP-210.pdf AMP-1 41.pdf AMP-356.pdf Mime.822 Option:; Expiration Date: Priority: Reply Requested: Return Notification: Concealed

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NRC Information Request Forml Item No Date Received: Source AMP-210 1/24/2006 AMP Audit Topic: Status: Open IWE Document R eferences: B.1.27 NRCRepres~entative Morante, Rich AmerGen (Took Issue): Hufnagel, Joh Question Pages 25 through 31 of the PBD present a discussion of the OCGS operating experience. (8a)The following statements related to drywell corrosion in the sand bed region need further explanation and clarification: As a result of the presence of water in the sand bed region, extensive UT thickness measurements (about 1000) of the drywell shell were taken to determine if degradation was occurring. These measurements corresponded to known water leaks and indicated that wall thinning had occurred in this region. Please explain the underlined statement. Were water leaks limited to only a portion of the circumference? Was wall thinning found only in these areas? After sand removal, the concrete surface below the sand was found to be unfinished with improper provisions for water drainage. Corrective actions taken in this region during 1992 included; (1) cleaning of loose rust from the drywell shell, followed by application of epoxy coating and (2) removing the loose debris from the concrete floor followed by rebuilding and reshaping the floor with epoxy to alvcow drainage of any water that may leak into the region. UT measurements taken from the outside after cleaning verified loss of material projections that had been made based on measurements taken from the Inside of the drywell. There were, however, some areas thinner than projected; but in all cases engineering analysis determined that the drywell shell thickness satisfied ASME code requirements. Please describe the concrete surface below the sand that Is discussed in paragraph above. Please provide the following information: (1) Identify the minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from the outside inspection, and the minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from the inside inspections. Is this consistent with previous information provided verbally? (.806 minimum) (2) What was the projected thickness based on measurements taken from the inside? (3) Describe the engineering analysis that determined satisfaction of ASME code requirements and Identify the minimum required thickness value. Is this consistent with previous Information provided verbally? (.733 minimum) (4) Is the minimum required thickness based on stress or buckling criteria? (5) Reconcile and compare the thickness measurements provided In (1) and (3) above with the.736 minimum corToded thickness that was used in the NUREG-1540 analysis of the degraded Oyster

NR C Information Request Forml Creek sand bed region. Evaluation of UT measurements taken from Inside the drywell, In the in the former sand bed region, In 1992, 1994, and 1996 confirmed that corrosion is mitigated. It is therefore concluded that corrosion In the sand bed region has been arrested and no further loss of material is expected. Monitoring of the coating in accordance with the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, will continue to ensure that the containment drywell shell maintains its intended function during the period of extended operation. I UREG-1540, published In April 1996, Includes the following statements related to corrosion of the Dyster Creek sand bed region: (page vii) However, to assure that these measures are effective, the Iicensee is required to perform periodic UT measurements. and (page 2) As assurance that the lorrosion rate is slower than the rate obtained from previous measurements, GPU Is committed to l ake UT measurements periodically. Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent lequirementlcommitment documented in NUREG-1540. i 8b)The following statement related to drywell corrosion above the sand bed region needs further xplanation and clarification: Corrective action for these regions involved providing a corrosion allowance by demonstrating, t hrough anaysis, that the original drywell design pressure was conservative. Amendment 165 to the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications reduced the drywell design pressure from 62 psig to 44 psig. he new design pressure coupled with measures to prevent water Intrusion into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements. Please describe the measures to prevent water Intrusion Into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements". Are these measures to prevent water intrusion credited for LR? If not, how will ASME code requirements be met during the extended period of operation? (8c)The following statements related to torus degradation need further explanation and clarification: Inspection performed in 2002 found the coating to be In good condition in the vapor area of the Torus 3 nd vent header, and in fair condition in Immersion. Coating deficiencies in Immersion include Ilistering, random and mechanical damage. Blistering occurs primarily In the shell invert but was also !ioted on the upper shell near the water line. The fractured blisters were repaired to reestablish the protective coating barrier. This is another example of objective evidence that the Oyster Creek ASME Section Xi, Subsection IWE aging management program can identify degradation and implement corrective actions to prevent the loss of the containment's intended function. While blistering is considered a deficiency, it is significant only when it Is fractured and exposes the base metal to corrosion attack. The majority of the blisters remain intact and continues to protect the base metal; consequently the corrosion rates are low. Qualitative assessment of the identified pits indicate that the measured pit depths (50 mils max) are significantly less than the criteria established

NRC Information Request Forml in Specification SP-1302-52-120 (141-261 mils, depending on diameter of the pit and spacing between pits). Please confirm or clarify (1) that only the fractured blisters found in this Inspection were repaired; (2) pits were idontified where the blisters were fractured; (3) pit depths were measured and found to f50 mils max; (4) the inspection Specification SP-1302-52-120 includes pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pitting; (5) the minimum pit depth of concern is 141 mils (.141) and pits as deep as 261 mils (.261) may be acceptable. Please also provide the following information: nominal design, as-built, and minimum measured thickness of the torus; minimum thickness required to meet ASME code acceptance criteria; the technical basis for the pitting acceptance criteria include in Specification SP-1 302-52-120 Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed

Response

(8a) Questicn: Please explain the underlined statement. Were water leaks limited to only a porticn of the circumference? Was wall thinning only in these area?

Response

This statement was not meant to Indicate that water leaks were limited to only a portion of the circumference. The statement is meant to reflect the fact that water leakage was observed coming out of certain sand bed region drains and those locations were suspect of wall thinning. No. Wall thinning was not limited to the areas where water leakage from the drains was observed. Wall thinning occurred in all areas of the sand bed region based on UT measurements and visual inspection of the area conducted after the sand was removed in 1992. However the degree of wall thinning varied from location to location. For example 60% of the measured locations in the sand bed region (bays 1,3, 5, 7, 9, and 15) indicate that the average measured drywell shell thickness Is nearly the same as the design nominal thickness and that these locations experienced negligible wall thinning; whereas bay 19A experienced approximately 30% reduction in wall thickness. Question: Please discuss the concrete surface below the sand that Is discussed in paragraph above.

Response

The concrete surface below the sand was Intended to be shaped to promote flow toward each of the five sand bed drains. However once the sand was removed it was discovered that the floor was not properly finished and shaped as required to permit proper drainage. There were low points, craters, and rough surfaces that could allow moisture to pool Instead of flowing smoothly toward the drains. These concrete surfaces were refurbished to fill low areas, smooth rough surfaces, and coat these surfaces with epoxy coating to promote improved drainage. -The drywell shell at Juncture of the concrete flocr was sealed with an elastomer to prevent water Intrusion into the embedded drywell shell. Question: Please provide the following information:

NRC Information Request Form (1) Identify the minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from the outside inspection, and the minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from the inside Inspections. Is this consistent with previous information provided verbally? (.806 minimum) (2) What was the projected thickness based on measurements taken from the inside? (3) Describe the engineering analysis that determined satisfaction of ASME code requirements and identify the minimum required thickness value. Is this consistent with previous Information provided verbally? (.733 minimum) (4) Is the minimum required thickness based on stress or buckling criteria? (5) Reconcile and compare the thickness measurements provided in (1) and (3) above with the.736 minimum corroded thickness that was used in the NUREG-1540 analysis of the degraded Oyster Creek sand bed region.

Response

1. The minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from outside inspection Is 0.618 inches.

The minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from Inside inspections is 0.603. These minimum recorded thicknesses are isolated local measurement and represent a single point UT measurement. The 0.806 inches thickness provided to the Staff verbally Is an average minimum general thickness calculated based on 49 UT measurements taken In an area that is approximately 6"x 6". Thus the two local isolated minimum recorded thicknesses cannot be compared directly to the general thickness of 0.806". The 0.806" minimum average thickness verbally discussed with the Staff during the AMP audit was recorded in location 19A In 1994. Additional reviews after the audit noted that lower minimum average thickness values were recorded at the same location In 1991 (0.803") and in September 1992 (0.800"). However, the three values are within the tolerance of +/- 0.010" discussed with the Staff.

2. The minimum projected thickness depends on whether the trended data is before or after 1992 as demonstrated by corrosion trends provided In response to NRC Question #AMP-356. For license renewal, using corrosion rate trends after 1992 is appropriate because of corrosion mitigating measures such as removal of the sand and coating of the shell. Then, using corrosion rate trends based on 192, 1994, and 1996 UT data; and the minimum average thickness measured in 1992 (0.800"), the minimum projected average thickness through 2009 and beyond remains approximately 0.800 Inches. The projected minimum thickness during and through the period of extended operation will be reevaluated after UT Inspections that will be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation, and after the periodic UT inspection every 10 years thereafter.

3.The engineering analysis that demonstrated compliance to ASME code requirements was performed In two parts, Stress and Stability Analysis with Sand, and Stress and Stability Analyses without Sand. The analyses are documented in GE Reports Index No. 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, and 9-4, were transmitted to the NRC Staff in December 1990 and in 1991 respectively. Index No. 9-3 and 9-4, were revised later to correct errors identified during an internal audit and were resubmitted to the Staff In JanLary 1992 (see attachment 1 & 2). The analyses are briefly described below. The drywell shell thickness in the sand bed region is based on Stability Analysis without Sand. As

NR C Inf ormationz Request Fr described in detail In attachment I & 2, the analysis Is based on a 36-degree section model that takes advantage of symmetry of the drywell with 10 vents. The model includes the drywell shell from the base of the sand bed region to the top of elliptical head and the vent and vent header. The torus is not included in this model because the bellows provide a very flexible connection, which does not allow significant structural interaction between the drywell and the torus. The analysis conservatively assumed that the shell thickness In the entire sand bed region has been reduced uniformly to a thickness of 0.736 inches. As discussed with the Staff during the AMP audit, the basic approach used In the buckling evaluation follows the methodology outlined In ASME Code Case N-284 revision 0 that was reconciled later with revision I o the Code Case. Following the procedure of this Code Case, the allowable compressive stress Is evaluated in three steps. In the first step, a theoretical buckling stress is determined, and secondly modified using appropriate capacity and plasticity reduction factors. In the final step, the allowable compressive stress Is obtained by dividing the buckling stress calculated in the second step by a safety factor of 2.0 for Design and Level A & B service conditions and 1.67 Level C service conditions. Using the approach described above, the analysis shows that for the most severe design basis load combinations, the limits of ASME Section 1II, Subsection NE 3213.10 are fully met. For additional details refer to Attachment 1 & 2. As described above, the buckling analysis was performed assuming a uniform general thickness of the sand bed region of 0.736 inches. However the UT measurements identified Isolated, localized areas where the drywell shell thickness is less than 0.736 Inches. Acceptance for these areas was based on engineering calculation C-1302-187-5320-024. The calculation uses a Local Wall Acceptance Criteria". This criterion can be applied to small areas (less than 12" by 12"), which are less than 0.736" thick so long as the small 12" by 12" area is at least 0.536" thick. However the calculation does not provide additional criteria as to the acceptable distance between multiple small areas. For example, the minimum required linear distances between a 12" by 12" area thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536" and another 12" by 12" area thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536" were not provided. The actual data for two bays (13 and 1) shows that there are more than one 12" by 12" areas thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536". Also the actual data for two bays shows that there are more than one 2 Wm'" diameter areas thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.490". Acceptance is based on the following evaluation. The effect of these very local wall thickness areas on the buckling of the shell requires some discussion of the buckling mechanism in a shell of revolution under an applied axial and lateral pressure load. To begin the discussion we will describe the buckling of a simply supported cylindrical shell under the Influence of lateral pressure and axial load. As described in chapter 11 of the Theory of Elastic Stability, Second Edition, by Timoshenko and Gere, thin cylindrical shells buckle in lobes In both the

INRC Information Request Forml axial and circumferential directions. These lobes are defined as half wave lengths of sinusoidal functions. The functions are governed by the radius, thickness and length of the cylinder. If we look at a specific thin walled cylindrical shell both the length and radius would be essentially constants and if the thickness was changed locally the change would have to be significant and continuous over a majority of the lobe so that the compressive stress In the lobe would exceed the critical buckling stress under the applied loads, thereby causing the shell to buckle locally. This approach can be easily extrapolated to any shell of revolution that would experience both an axial load and lateral pressure as in the case of the drywell. This local lobe buckling is demonstrated in The GE Letter eport MSandbed Local Thinning and Raising the Fixity Height Analysis3 where a 12 x 12 square Inch ection of the drywell sand bed region is reduced by 200 mils and a local buckle occurred in the finite lement elgenvalue extraction analysis of the drywell. Therefore, to Influence the buckling of a shell he very local areas of reduced thickness would have to be contiguous and of the same thickness. his Is also consistent with Code Case 284 In Section -1700 which indicates that the average stress alues In the shell should be used for calculating the buckling stress. Therefore, an acceptable istance between areas of reduced thickness is not required for an acceptable buckling analysis except that the area of reduced thickness is small enough not to Influence a buckling lobe of the shell. The very local areas of thickness are dispersed over a wide area with varying thickness and as such will have a negligible effect on the buckling response of the drywell. In addition, these very local wall areas are centered about the vents, which significantly stiffen the shell. This stiffening effect limits the shell buckling to a point in the shell sand bed region which is located at the midpoint between two vents. The acceptance criteria for the thickness of 0.49 inches confined to an area less than 242 Inches I., diameter experiencing primary membrane + bending stresses is based on ASME B&PV Code, Section ill, Subsection NE, Class MC Components, Paragraphs NE-3213.2 Gross Structural Dlscontinuity, NE-3213.10 Local Primary Membrane Stress, NE-3332.1 Openings not Requiring Reinforcement, NE-3332.2 Required Area of Reinforcement and NE-3335.1 Reinforcement of Multiple Openings. The use of Paragraph NE-3332.1 is limited by the requirements of Paragraphs NE-3213.2 and.NE-3213.10. In particular NE-3213.10 limits the meridional distance between openings without reinforcement to 2.5 x (square root of Rt). Also Paragraph NE-3335.1 only applies to openings in shells that are closer than two times their average diameter. The implications of these paragraphs are that shell failures at these locations from primary stresses produced by pressure cannot occur provided openings in shells have sufficient reinforcement The current design pressure of 44 psig for drywell requires a thickness of 0.479 inches in the sand bed region of the drywell. A review of all the UT data presented in Appendix D of the calculation indicates that all thicknesses in the drywell sand bed region exceed the required pressure thickness by a ubstantial riargin. Therefore, the requirements for pressure reinforcement specified in the previous paragraph are not required for the very local wall thickness evaluation presented in Revision 0 of Calculation C - 1302-187-5320-024. Reviewing the stability analyses provided in both the GE Report 9-4 and the GE Letter Report Sand bed Local Thinning and Raising the Fixity Height Analysis and recognizing that the plate elements in the sand bed region of the model are 3" x 3" it is clear that the circumferential buckling lobes for the

INRC Information Request Forml drywell are substantially larger than the 2 Y/2 inch diameter very local wall areas. This combined with the local reinforcement surrounding these local areas indicates that these areas will have no impact on the buckling margins In the shell. It is also clear from the GE Letter Report that a uniform reduction in thickness of 27% to 0.536* over a one square foot area would only create a 9.5% reduction in the load factor and theoretical buckling stress for the whole drywell resulting in the largest reduction possible. In addition, to the reported result for the 27% reduction in wall thickness, a second buckling analysis was performed for a wall thickness reduction of 13.5% over a one square foot area which only reduced the load factor and theoretical buckling stress by 3.5% for the whole drywell resulting in the largest reduction possible. To bring these results Into perspective a review of the NDE reports indicate there are 20 UT measured areas In the whole sand bed region that have thicknesses less than the 0.736 inch thickness used In GE Report 9-4 which cover a conservative total area of 0.68 square feet of the drywell surface with an average thickness of 0.703" or a 4.5% reduction in wall thickness. Therefore, to effectively change the buckling margins on the drywell shell in the sand bed region a reduced thickness would have to cover approximately one square foot of shell area at a location in the shell that Is most susceptible to buckling with a reduction in thickness greater than 25%. This leads to the conclusion that the buckling of the shell Is unaffected by the distance between the very local wall thicknesses, In fact these local areas could be contiguous provided their total area did not exceed one square foot and their average thickness was greater than the thickness analyzed in the GE Letter Report and provided the methodology of Code Case N284 was employed to determine the allowable buckling load for the drywell. Furthermore, all of these very local wall areas are centered about the vents, which significantly stiffen the shell. This stiffing effect limits the shell buckling to a point In the shell sand bed region, which is located at the midpoint between two vents. The minimum thickness of 0.733" is not correct. The correct minimum thickness is 0.736".

4. The minimum required thickness for the sand bed region is controlled by buckling.

5. We cannot reconcile the difference between the current (lowest measured) of 0.736" In NUREG-1540 and the minimum measured thickness of 0.806 inches we discussed with the Staff. Perhaps the value In NUREG-1540 should be labeled minimum required by the Code, as documented In several comrspondences with the Staff, Instead of lowest measured. In a letter dated September 15, 1995, GPU provided the Staff a table that lists sand bed region thicknesses. The table indicates that nominal thickness Is 1.154". the minimum measured thickness in 1994 is 0.806", and the minimum 1 hickness required by Code is 0.736". These thicknesses are consistent with those discussed with

he Staff during the AMPIAMR audit.

l uestion: NUREG-1540, published in April 1996, includes the following statements related to orrosion of the Oyster Creek sand bed region: (page vii) However, to assure that these measures re effective, the licensee Is required to perform periodic UT measurements. and (page 2) As assurance that the corrosion rate Is slower than the rate obtained from previous measurements, GPU Is committed to make UT measurements periodically. Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent requirement/commitment documented In NUREG-1540.Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent requirement/commitment documented in NUREG-1540.

INRC Information Request Form

Response

Our review of NUREG-1540, page 2 indicates that the statements appear to be based on 1991, or 1993 GPU commitment to perform periodic UT measurements. In fact UT thickness measurements were taken :n the sand bed region from inside the drywell in 1992, and 1994. The trend of the UT measurements Indicates that corrosion has been arrested. As results GPU Informed NRC in a letter dated September 15, 1995 (ref. 2) that UT measurements will be taken one more time, In 1996, and the epoxy coating will be inspected In 1996 and, as a minimum again in 2000. The UT lmeasurements were taken in 1996, per the commitment, and confirmed corrosion rate trend of 1992 and 1994. The results of 1992, 1994, and 1996 UT measurements were provided to the Staff during he AMP/ANIR audits. n response to GPU September 15, 1995 letter, NRC Staff found the proposed changes to sand bed Iegon commitments (i.e. no additional UT measurements after 1996) reasonable and acceptable. his respon:se is documented in November 1, 1995 Safety Evaluation for the Drywell Monitoring rogram. or license renewal, Oyster Creek was previously committed to perform One-Time UT Inspection of the drywell shell In the sand bed region prior to entering the period of extended operation. However, n response to NRC Question #AMP-141, Oyster Creek revised the commitment to perform UT nspections periodically. The initial inspection will be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation and additional inspections will be conducted every 10 years thereafter. The UT measuremeits will be taken from Inside the drywell at same locations as 1996 UT campaign (8b) Question: Please describe the measures to prevent water intrusion into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements. Are these measures to prevent water intrusion credited for LR? If not, how will ASME code requirements be met during the extended period of operation?

Response

The measures taken to prevent water intrusion Into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to maintain the ASME code requirements are,

1. Cleared the former sand bed region drains to Improve the drainage path.

2. Replaced reactor cavity steel trough drain gasket, which was found to be leaking.

3. Applied stainless steel type tape and strippable coating to the reactor cavity during refueling utages to seal Identified cracks In the stainless steel liner.

4. Confirmed that the reactor cavity concrete trough drains are not clogged

5. Monitored former sand bed region drains and reactor cavity concrete trough drains for leakage during refueling outages and plant operation.

Oyster Creek is committed to Implement these measures during the period of extended operation. (8c) Please confirm or clarify (1) that only the fractured blisters found in this inspection were repaired; (2) pits were identified where the blisters were fractured; (3) pit depths were measured and found to

NRC Information Request Forml 50 mils ma):; (4) the inspection Specification SP-1302-52-120 includes pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pitting; (5) the minimum pit depth of concern is 141 mils (.141) and pits as deep as 261 mils (.261) may be acceptable.

Response

(1) Specification SP-1302-52-120, Specification for Inspection and Localized Repair of the Torus and Vent System Coating, specifies repair requirements for coating defects exposing substrate and fractured blisters showing signs of corrosion. The repairs referred to In the inspection report included fractured blisters, as well as any mechanically damaged areas, which have exposed bare metal showing signs of corrosion. Therefore, only fractured blisters would be candidates for repair, not those blisters that remain intact. The number and location of repairs are tabulated in the final Inspection report prepared by Underwater Construction Corporation. I2) Coating deficiencies in the immersion region included blistering with minor mechanical damage. glistering occurred primarily in the shell invert but was also noted on the upper shell near the water line. The majority of the blisters were intact. Intact blisters were examined by removing the blister cap exposing the substrate. Corrosion attack under non-fractured blisters was minimal and was generally limited to surface discoloration. Examination of the substrate revealed slight discoloration and pitting with pit depths less than 0.001. Several blistered areas included pitting corrosion where the blisters were fractured. The substrate beneath fractured blisters generally exhibited a slightly heavier magnetite oxide layer and minor pitting (less than 0.010") of the substrate. (3) In addition to blistering, random deficiencies that exposed base metal were identified in the torus immersion region coating (e.g., minor mechanical damage) during the 19R (2002) torus coating inspections. They ranged In size from 1/16" to %2" In diameter. Pitting in these areas was qualitatively evaluated and ranged from less than 10 mils to slightly more than 40 mils in a few isolated cases. Three quantitative pit depth measurements were taken in several locations In the immersion area of Bay 1. Pit depths at these sites ranged from 0.008" to 0.042" and were judged to be representative of typical conditions found on the shell. Prior to 2002 Inspection 4 pits greater than 0.040" were Identified. The pits depth are 0.058" (1 pit in 1988), 0.05" (2 pits in 1991), and 0.0685" (1 pit in 1992). The pits were evaluated against the local pit depth acceptance criteria and found to be acceptable. (4) Specification SP-1302-52-120, Specification for Inspection and Localized Repair of the Torus and Vent System Coating, includes the pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pitting. The acceptance criteria are supported by a calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. Locations that lo not meet the pit-depth acceptance criteria are characterized based on the size of the area, center center distance between corroded areas, the maximum pit depth and location in the Torus based on major stnrctural features. These details are sent to Oyster Creek Engineering for evaluation. (5) The acceptance criteria for pit depth is as follows: -Isolated Pits of 0.125" in diameter have an allowed maximum depth of 0.261" anywhere in the shell provided the center to center distance between the subject pit and neighboring isolated pits or areas of pitting corrosion is greater than 20.0 inches. This includes old pits or old areas of pitting corrosion that have been filled and/or re-coated.

NRC Information Request Forml -Multiple Pits that can be encompassed by a 2-1/2" diameter circle shall be limited to a maximum pit depth of 0.141" provided the center to center distance between the subject pitted area and neighboring isolated pits or areas of pitting corrosion is greater than 20.0 Inches. This Includes old pits or old areas of pitting corrosion that have been filled and/or recoated. Question: Please also provide the following Information: nominal design, as-built, and minimum measured thickness of the torus; minimum thickness required to meet ASME code acceptance criteria; the technical basis for the pitting acceptance criteria include in Specification SP-1 302-52-120

Response

Submersed area: (a) The nominal Design thickness is 0.385 Inches (b) The as-built thickness is 0.385 inches (c) The minimum uniform measured thickness Is, 0.343 inches - general shell 0.345 inches - shell - ring girders 0.345 inches - shell - saddle flange 0.345 inches - shell - torus straps (d) The minimum general thickness required to meet ASME Code Acceptance Is 0.337 inches. Technical basis for pitting acceptance criteria Included in Specification SP-1302-52-120 is based on engineering calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. At the time of preparation of calculation C-1302-187-E310-038 in 2002 there were no published methods to calculate acceptance standards for locally thinned areas in ASME Section III or Section Vill Pressure Vessel codes. Therefore, the approach in Code Case N-597 was used as guidance In assessing locally thinned areas in the Torus. This is based on the similarity In approaches between Local Thinning Areas described in N597 and Local Primary Stress areas described in Paragraph NE3213.10 of the ASME B&PV Code Section III, particularly small areas of wall thinning which do not exceed 1.0 x (square root of Rt). In addition, the ASME B&P'/ Code Section III, Subsection NB, Paragraph NB-3630 allows the analysis of pipe systems In accordance with the Vessel Analysis rules described in Paragraph NB-3200 of the same Subsection as an alternate analysis approach. Therefore, the approach used in N597 for local areas of thinning vias probably developed using the rules for Local Primary Membrane Stress from paragraph NB-3200 in particular Subparagraph 3213.10. The Local Primary Stress Limits In NB-3213.10 are similar to those discussed in Subsection NE, Paragraph NE-3213.10. Since the Code Case had not yet been invoked In to the Section Xl program, the calculation provided a reconciliation of the results obtained from the code case against the ASME Section III code requirements as discussed above. This reconciliation demonstrated that the approach In N597 used on a pressure vessel such as the Torus would be acceptable since the results are conservative compared to the previous work performed in MPR-953 and Lm(a) (defined in N597 Table-3622-1) £ (Rmintmin)1/2. Currently, the maximum pit depth measured in the Torus Is a 0.0685" ( measured in 1992 in bay 2). It was evaluated as acceptable using the design calculations existing at that time and was not based on

lNRC Information RequestFom Calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. This remains the bounding wall thickness In the Torus. The criterion developed In 2002 for local thickness acceptance provides an easier method for evaluating as-found pils. The results were shown to be conservative versus the original ASME Section III and Vill Code requirements for the Torus. The Torus inspection program is being enhanced per IR 373695 to Improve the detail of the acceptance criteria and margin management requirements using the ASME Section III criteria. The approach used In C-1302-187-E310-038 will be clarified as to how it maintains the code requirements. If Code Case N-597-1 is required to develop these criteria for future inspections, NRC review and approval will be obtained. It should also be noted that the program has established corrosion rate criteria and continues to periodically monitor to verify they remain bounded. LRCR #: LRA A.5 Commitment #: Approvals: PreparedBy: Ouaou, Ahmed 415/2006 Reviewed By: Miller, Mark 415/2006 Approved By: Warfel, Don 4/ 5/2006 NRCAcceptance (Date):

NRCInformation Requestr Iten No Date Received: Source AMP-356 2/1612006 AMP Audit Topic: Status: Open IWE Document

References:

NRCRepresentafl e Morante, Rich AmerGen (Took Issue): Ouestion IWE AMP Question 4 IWE AMP Revised Feb. 17, 2006 R. Morante (AMP-356) (1) Identify the specific locations around the circumference in the former sandbed region where uT thickness readings have been and will be taken from inside containment. Confirm that all points previously recorded will be Included in future inspections. (2) Describe, the grid pattern at each location (meridional length, circumferential length, grid point spacing, total number of point readings), and graphically locate each grid pattern within the former sandbed region. (3) For eacV grid location, submit a graph of remaining thickness versus time, using the UT readings since the Initiation of the program (both prior to and following removal of the sand and application of the external coating). (4) Clearly describe the methodology and acceptance criteria that is applied to each grid of point thickness readings, including both global (entire array) evaluation and local (subregion of array) evaluation. Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed

Response

Response:

1. The circumference of the drywell is divided into 10 bays, designated as Bays 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,13, 15, 17, and 19. UT thickness readings have been taken In each bay at one or more locations. The specific locations around the circumference in the former sand bed region where UT thickness reading have been taken from Inside containment are Bay ID, 3D, 5D, 7D, 9A, 9D, I 1A, II C, 13A, 13C, 13D, 15A, 15D, 17A, 17D, 17119 Frame, 19A, 19B, and 19C. Foreach location, UT measurements were taken centered at elevation I V3fl These represent the locations where UT measurements were taken in 1992, 1994, and 1996.

INRC Information Request Forml In addition IJT measurements were taken one time inside 2 trenches excavated in drywell floor concrete. 1he purpose of these UT measurements is to determine the extent of corrosion in the lower portions of the sand bed region prior to removing the sand and making accessible for visual Inspection. Future UT thickness measurements will be taken at the same locations as those inspected in 1996 in accordance with Oyster Creek commitment documented in NRC Question #AMP-209.

2. For locations where the initial investigations found significant wall thinning (9D, 1 IA, 11C, 13A, 13D, 15D,17A, 17D, 17119 Frame, 19A, 19B, and 19C) the grid pattern consists of 7 x 7 grid centered at elevation 11 '-3 (meridian) and centered at the centerline of the tested location within each bay, which Xconsists of 6"x 6" square template. The grid spacing is 1" on center. There are 49 point readings. For graphical location of the grid, refer to attachment 1.

For locations where the initial investigations found no significant wall thinning (ID, 3D, 5D, 7D, 9A, 13C, and I 5A) the grid pattern consists of I x 7 grid centered at elevation 11 -3" (meridian) on I" centers. There are 7 point readings. For graphical location of the grid, refer to attachment 1.

3. A graph representing the remaining thickness versus time using UT reading since the Initiation of the program (both prior to and following removal of the sand and application of the external coating) for location OD, 11A, 11C, 13A, 13D,15D,17A,17D,17/19,19A, 19B, and 19C is included In the attached graph. Other locations (i.e.1 D, 3D, 5D, 7D, 9A, 13C, and 15A) are not included because wall thinning is not significant and the trend line will be essentially a straight line.

4. The methodology and acceptance criteria that is applied to each grid of point thickness readings, including both global (entire array) evaluation and local (subregion of array) is described in engineering specification IS-328227-004 and in calculation No. C-1302-187-5300-011. These documents wvere submitted to the NRC In a letter dated November 26, 1990 and provided to the Staff during the AMPJAMR audit. A brief summary of the methodology and acceptance criteria is described below.

The initial lonations where corrosion loss was most severe In 1986 and 1987 were selected for repeat inspection over time to measure corrosion rate. For location where the initial investigations found significant wall thinning UT inspection consists of 49 Individual UT data points equally spaced over a "x 6" area. Each new set of 49 values was then tested for normal distribution. The mean values of each grid were then compared to the required minimum uniform thickness lriteria of 0.736. In addition each individual reading is compared to the local minimum required criteria of 0.49. The basis for the required minimum uniform thickness criteria and the local minimum required criteria is provided In response to NRC Question #AMP-210. A decrease in the mean value over time is representative of corrosion. If corrosion does not exist, the mean value will not vary with time except for random variations in the UT measurements.

lNRC Information Request om If corrosion is continuing, the mean thickness will decrease linearly with time. Therefore the curve fit of the data is tested to determine if linear regression is appropriate, In which case the corrosion rate is equal to the slope of the line. If a slope exists, then upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of the curve fit are calculated. The lower 95% confidence Interval is then projected Into the future and compared to the required minimum uniform thickness criteria of 0.736. A similar process is applied to the thinnest Individual reading In each grid. The curve fit of the data Is tested to determine If linear regression Is appropriate. If a slope exists, then the lower 95% confidence nterval Is then projected into the future and compared to the required minimum local thickness criteria of.49. LRCR #: LRA A.5 Commitment #: IR#: pprovals: PreparedBy: Ouaou, Ahmed 4/4/2006 Reviewed By: Getz, Stu 415/2006 ApprovedBy: Warfel, Don 4/5/2006 NRCAcceptance (Date):

Oyster Ceek Drywell Vessel Corrosion Rate Trending Program Average Measured Thicknesses I.F' 1.17 t.t1 o.1n 1.021 0.86 t.13 0.l8 1X.1 o.3a I.e" 0.66 0.83 -i 1.05' 0.88 1.01 0."% 1.2 0.98 1.1A 0.15 0.W 0.0 .6 301 '5 131 131 .02 o.6 1.852. Xs" o.n 0.02 1.01 S... 6.3 033 'a 02 37 38 37 'S 8 35 653 12 80 86 33 0.6 0.W. 0.U' 1.25 1.156 0.9 0.i7! 8.17 0.8: 1. 0. 0.6 1.01 0.0 0.601 1.04 I.0 0.84 1.1 0.83 3.06 6.66 0.80 0. 0.0 w41 M. 1.04 1i54 0.8 1t. 1 .62 8.7 0.4r 8362 1.1 B.7I 0 6.0t JI} 1.32 86~l 643 Oil I I.' .63 I 36 1.6 33, 6.3 1.101 1.314 113 I'm3 63 63 3IO 3 ow 0047 O."l OR6 I83 foll =

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lNRCInformation Request Forml BIen No Date Received: Source AMP-141 101 612005 AMP Audit Topic: Status: Open IWE Document

References:

B.1.27 NRCRepresantative Morante, Rich AmerGen (Took Issue): Hufnagel, Joh OQestion AMP B.1.27 IWE

a. Visual inspection of the coatings In the former sandbed region of the drywell Is currently conducted under the applicant's protective coatings monitoring and maintenance program; only this AMP Is credited for managing loss of material due to corrosion for license renewal. Visual inspection of the containment shell conducted In accordance with the requirements of IWE is typically credited to manage loss of material due to corrosion.

The applicant Is requested to provide its technical basis for not also crediting its IWE program for managing Icss of material due to corrosion in the former sandbed region of the drywell. B. During discussions with the applicant's staff on 10/04/05 about augmented inspection conducted under IWE, the applicant presented tabulated inspection results obtained from the mid 1980s to the present, to monitor the remaining drywell wall thickness In the cylindrical and spherical regions where significant corrosion of the outside surface was previously detected. The applicant Is requested to provide (1) a copy of these tabulated inspection results, (2) a list of the nominal design thicknesses In each region of the drywell, (3) a list of the minimum required thicknesses In each region of the drywell, and (4) a list of the projected remaining wall thicknesses In each region of the drywell In the year 2029. AMP 5.1.27 IWE Question on Remaining Wall Thickness In the Former Sandbed Region of the ryweli

1. During discussions with the applicant's staff on 10105105, the applicant described the history and resolution of corrosion in the sandbed region. After discovery, thickness measurements were taken from 1986 through 1992, to monitor the progression of viall loss. Remedial actions were completed in early 1993. At that time, the remaining wall thickness exceeded the minimum required thickness. T he applicant concluded that it had completely corrected the conditions which led to the corrosion, and terminated its program to monitor the remaining wall thickness. At that time, the remaining years cf operation wras expected to be no more than 16 years (end of the current license term).

lNRC Information Request Fornel The applicant's aging management commitment for license renewals is limited to periodic inspection of the coating that was applied to the exterior surface of the drywell as part of the remedial actions. The applicant has not made a license renewal commitment to measure wall thickness in the sancibed region in order to confirm the effectiveness of the remedial actions taken. Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed

Response

a) Visual inspection of the containment drywell shell, conducted In accordance with ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE, Is credited for aging management of accessible areas of the containment drywell shell. Typically this inspection Is for internal surfaces of the drywell. The exterior surfaces of the drywell shell in the sand bed region for Mark I containment Is considered inaccessible by ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE, thus visual Inspection is not possible for a typical Mark I containment Including Oyster Creek before the sand was removed from the sand bed region In 1992. After removal of Ihe sand, an epoxy coating was applied to the exterior surfaces of the drywell shell In the sand bed region. The region was made accessible during refueling outages for periodic inspection of the coating. Subsequently Oyster Creek performed periodic visual inspection of the coating in accordance with an NRC current licensing basis commitment. This commitment was implemented prior to implementation of ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE. As a result Inspection of the coating was conducted in accordance with the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program. Our evaluation cf this aging management program concluded the program is adequate to manage aging of the drywell shell in the sand bed region during the period of extended operation consistent with the current licensing basis commitment, and that inclusion of the coating inspection under IWE Is not required. However we are amending this position and will commit to monitor the protective coating In the exterior surfaces of the drywell in the sand bed region in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE during the period of extended operation. For details related to implementation of this commitment, refer to the response to NRC AMP Question #188. b) A tabulation of ultrasonic testing (UT) thickness measurement results in monitored areas of the drywell spherical region above the sand bed region and In the cylindrical region is included In ASME Section Xi, subsection IWE Program Basis Document (PBD-AMP-B.1.27) Notebook. The tabulation contains Information requested by the Staff and is available for review during AMP audit. The tabulation is also provided in Table -1, and Table-2 below. ) In December 1992, with approval from the NRC a protective epoxy coating was applied to the outside surface of the drywell shell in the sand bed region to prevent additional corrosion In that rea. UT thickness measurements taken in 1992, and in 1994, in the sand bed region from Inside the rywell confirmed that the corrosion In the sand bed region has been arrested. Periodic Inspection of the coating indicates that the coating in that region is performing satisfactorily with no signs of deterioration such as blisters, flakes, or discoloration, etc. Additional UT measurements, taken in 1996 from inside the drywell in the sand bed region showed no ongoing corrosion and provided objective evidence that corrosion has been arrested.

JNRC Information Request Forml As a result of these UT measurements and the observed condition of the coating, we concluded that corrosion has been arrested and monitoring of the protective coating alone, without additional UT measurements, will adequately manage loss of material in the drywell shell in the sand bed region. However to provide additional assurance that the protective coating is providing adequate protection to ensure drywell integrity, Oyster Creek will perform periodic confirmatory UT inspections of the drywell shell in the sand bed region. The initial UT measurements will be taken prior to entering the period of extended operation and then every 10 years thereafter. The UT measurements will be taken from inside the drywell at the same locations where the UT measurements were taken in 1£96. This revises the license renewal commitment communicated to the NRC In a letter from C. N. Swenson Site Vice President, Oyster Creek Generating Station to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory lommission, 'Additional Commitments Associated with Application for renewed Operating License - yster Creek Generating Station", dated 12/912005. This letter commits to one-time Inspection to be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation. The revised commitment will be to Ionduct UT measurements-on a frequency of 10 years, with the first Inspection to occur prior to entering the period of extended operation. I his response was revised to incorporate additional commitments on UT examinations for the sand ed region discussed with NRC Audit team on 1/26/2006. This response was revised to reference response to NRC Question #AMP-1B8 and RAI 4.7.2-1(d). AMO 411/2006. The response was revised to add Table-1, and Table-2, and delete reference to RAI 4.7.2-1(d) AMO 41512006. ,LRCR#: 229 LRA A.5 Conwnitnent#: 27 1R#: An provals: Prepared By: Ouaou, Ahmed 4/ 5/2006 ciYinvedBy B: Getz, Stu 4/ 5/2006 Approved By: Warfel, Don 41512006 NRCAcccptance (Date):

Table -1. UT Thickness measurements ror the Upper Region of the DrYSIell Shell Average Measured Thickness I',, inches Monitored Location A1inimum Projected Lower Elevation Required 95% Confidence Thickness, 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 J. 1994 1996 2000 2004 Thickness In 2029 Inches 5 I I Elevation 0.541" 50'2" Bay 5-0.743 0.742 0.747 0.741 0.748 0.741 0.743 No Ongoing D12 0.745 0.745 0.747 Corrosion 0.746 0.748 Bay 5-5H 0.761 0.755 0.758 0.754 0.757 0.754 0.756 0.7384 0.761 0.758 0.758 0.760 Bay 5-5L 0.706 0.703 0.703 0.702 0.705 0.706 0.701 No Ongoing 0.703 0.705 0.707 Corrosion 0.706 Bay 13-0.762 0.760 0.765 0.759 0.766 0.762 0.758 No Ongoing 311H 0.779 0.758 0.763 Corrosion 0.765 Bay 13-0.687 0.689 0.685 0.683 0.690 0.682 0.693 No Ongoing 31L 0.684 0.678 0.688 Corrosion 0.688 Bay 15-0.758 0.762 0.767 0.758 0.760 0.758 0.757 0.738 23H -- 0.764 0.762 0.763 0.765 Bay 15-0.726 0.726 0.726 0.728 0.724 0.729 0.727 No Ongoing 23L 0.728 0.729 0.724 Corrosion 0.725 Elevation 0.541" 151 10"

Table-I. UT Thickness measurements for the Upper Region of the Drywell Shell Average Measured Thickness ";4, Inches Monitored Location Milnimum Projected Lower Elevation Required 95% Confidence Thickness, 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 3 1994 1996 2000 2004 Thickness in 2029 Inches 5 Bay 13-0.716 0.715 0.717 0.714 0.715 0.715 0.713 No Ongoing 32H 0.715 0.717 Corrosion I 0.719 Bay 13-0.686 0.683 0.683 0.680 0.684 0.679 0.687 No Ongoing 32L 0.683 0.676 Corrosion 0.682 Elevation 0.518" 60 10" Bay 1 1 0.693 0.711 0.692 0.689 0.689 No Ongoing 22 I I I l l l l l 8 Corrosion Elevation 0.452" 87' 5 Bay 9-20 0.619 0.622 0.619 0.620 0.614 0.629 0.613 0.613 0.604 0.612 0.604. 0.620 0.612 0.614 I l I Bay 13-0.643 0.641 0.645 0.643 0.635 0.641 0.640 0.636 0.635 0.640 No Ongoing 28 0.642 0.629 0.637 lCorrosion Bay 15-638 0.636 0.638 0.642 0.628 0.631 0.633 0.632 0.628 0.630 0.615 31 0.636 0.627 0.630 l 1 I - I I Notes:

1. The average thickness is based on 49 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) measurements performed at each location

2. Multipleinspections vereperformedintheyears 1988, 1990, 1991,and 1992.

3. The 1993 elevation 60' 10 Bay 5-22 inspection was performed on January 6, 1993. All other locations were inspected in December 1992.

4. Accuracy of Ultrasonic Testing Equipment is plus or minus 0.010 inches.

5. Reference SC-000243-002.

Table-1. UT Thickness measurements for the Upper Region of the Drywell Shell

== Conclusion:== Summary of Corrosion Rates of UT measurements taken though year 2004

• There is no ongoing corrosion at two elevations (51' 10" and 60' 10')
• Based on statistical analysis, one location at elevation 50' 2" is undergoing a minor corrosion rate of 0.0003 inches per year,
• Based on statistical analysis, tvo locations at elevation 87' 5" are undergoing minor corrosion rates of 0.0005 and 0.00075 inches per year

Table -2 UT Thickness measurements for the Sand Bed Region of the Drvwell Shell ocation ub Dec Feb Apr May Aug Sep Jul Oct Jun Sep Feb Apr Mar May Nov May Sep Sep Sep ay Location 1986 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1992 1992 1994 1996 ID 1.11. -1.0 1.151~ D 11__ _11 1.181 D 1.11 1.17 D 1.13 1.13q 1.134 A = = = =1.15 1.15_ D 1.072 1.021 1.05 1.02t 1.021 1.02 0.99 1.001 0.99 1.001 1.00 .Q99 1.001 IA 0.91S 0.90! 0.92; 0.90! 0.91 0.88i 0.881 0.89; 0.881 0.87t 0.84! 0.84 0.83 0.84: 0.82 0.821 0.831 I C otm0.917 0.9r) 0.911 0.90( 0.89 1 0.877 0.8911 0.87q 0.88P 0.855 0.88. 0.854 0.884 0.859 0.85 0.88 op 1.04( 1.10! 1.07' 1.04 1.009 1.01 1.005 0.952 0.9 0.98 1.01f 0.96 1.01 0.97C 0.98 1.04; 13A 0.91 0.90! 0.88: 0.88 0.862 0.85 0.85! 0.85: 0.841 0.865 0.851 0.821 0.84: 3C ot-om 0.90! 0.901 0.901 0.931 0.901 0.89 0.93 Top 1.072 1.04! 1.041 1.081 1.05! 1.031 1.051 13D 0.96 0.93-1.001 0.95! 0.90 ISA 1.12 1 1.11 1.12 15D 1.08 1.05 1.061 1.061 1.05 1.05 1.068 1.051 1.04 1.06 1 1.05 1.05 1.068 1 7A Bottom 0.99_ 0.95 0.968 0.95 0.954 0.951 0.93! 0.944 0.931 0.941 0.941 0.93 0.99 op 0.99! 1.13 1.13q 1.131 1.12E 1.121 1.131 1.121 1.12: 1.12! 1.12 1.121 1.14 17D 0.922 0.89! 0.891 0.895 0.871 0.86 0.8S 0.847 0.83 0.821 0.821 0.82C 0.82; 0.82: 0.81i 0.811 0.841 7/19 TOp

I_

= 0.98 1.01 1.131 0.9 0.98 0.97 0.968 0.95 0.97; 0.971 0.961 0.96 Bom t1.0 0.99 0.95 1.01 1.00 0.9 0.982l 0.9711 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.991 19A 0.88 0.87: 0.851 0.85E 0.841 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.841 0.801 0.81 0.80t 0.80 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.81f 19B Q89 089 Q 881. 085 0.82 04 08 083 85 0.841 0.84

0. Q84; 0.841 0.82 083 19C

=
_8 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.84 30.82 0.84 0.821 0.82 0.83: 0.811 0.82 0.84

EXHIBIT J

CORRO-CONSULTA 8081 Diane Drive Rudolf H. Hausler Kaufinan, TX 75142 Tel: 972 962 8287 (office) rudyhaumsn.com Fax: 972 932 3947 Tel: 972 824 5871 (mobile) MEMORANDUM MAY 3, 2006 To: Richard Webster, Esq. Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102-5695 Paul Gunter Reactor Watchdog Project Nuclear Information and Resource Service Washington, DC 10036

Subject:

Oyster Creek Dry Well Corrosion Comments regarding "Audit Q&A (Question Numbers AMP -141, 210, 356) dated 4/5/06, Ref ML060960563 I. Summary The referenced document, which is attached, makes statements with regards to future corrosion and the presence or absence of a need for future inspections of the damaged areas in the sandbed region. After having examined the data presented we find that the conclusions are at odds with good or best corrosion practice. In general, predicting future corrosion based on data collected over the past is perhaps judicious only if a) the corrosion (or deterioration) mechanism is well known, and b) if assurances can be given that the circumstances (environment) under which prior corrosion occurred can and will be maintained in the future. Neither of these two imperatives can be assured at this time. Furthermore, it would seem that for meaningful predictions, the data set, on the basis of which extrapolations are carried out, needs to be consistent. I have found serious concerns in this respect as well. I, therefore, believe that the proposed long inspection intervals are totally unjustified. II. Details Following the removal of the sand bed in September of 1992 two sets of UT measurements were recorded in September 1994 and September of 1996. For twelve locations where initial investigations found significant wall thinning, these measurements were made over a 6" x 6" grid at 1 inch spacings, hence 49 individual UT measurements were gathered over an individual grid.' Identical grids were For seven other areas only seven readings were taken at one inch intervals.

surveyed in each of the bays in the sandbed area, and in some instances more than one grid was surveyed in the same bay. The clusters of individual UT measurements were evaluated by calculating the average of the 49 measurements, and naming the resulting averages "average minimum general thickness (AMGT)". The terminology "average minimum general thickness" is misleading because another shape or size of grid could have resulted in lower results. Presumably the identical grid locations, which were surveyed in September of 1992, were again surveyed in September of 1994 and September of 1996. This generated three data points (AMGT) in each of the various bay locations as a function of time. Plots were then generated to show the AMGT as a function of time. These plots are shown in the Figure 1 below for 8 different bay locations, correlating the measurements as a function of time. Exelon drew straight horizontal lines through these points with extrapolation over the next 10 years to demonstrate the absence of continued corrosion. This procedure and the subsequent evaluation and interpretation of the data warrant a number of comments. First, it is noted that with unfailing regularity (even in the cases not shown in Figure 1 below) the AMGT for each grid decreases from 1992 to 1994,,but then increases in 1996. This is of course physically impossible; metal simply does not spontaneously get thicker. Furthermore, statistically, UT measurements in general are accurate within a standard deviation of 2% of wall thickness (modem methodologies can do better). Assuming for a moment that all 49 measurements within a grid measured the same wall thickness, then the average would have had a standard deviation of 2/7 % or about 0.3% of wall thickness which corresponds to +/- 2.5 mils or 95% confidence limits of +/- 5 mils. Since however, not all measurements within the grid were of the same wall thickness, the variability of individual measurements within the grid must have been larger than the standard deviation derived from instrument capability. Exelon assures us that "the tolerance is or the order of +/- 10 mils. As it turns out, the variability of the AMGT for the three measurements for a particular grid expressed as a standard deviation in almost all cases exceeds the +/- 10 mils by a large margin. I interpret this as a systematic error in the UT methodology employed. Moreover, the repeated trends over time observed in Fig. 1 below from high to low to high values underlines the unreliability to these UT measurements. Clearly, the methodology chosen by Exelon to monitor corrosion in the sandbed area is difficult in practice for a number of reasons. However, these difficulties do not excuse the improper extrapolation of sporadic data obtained over a four-year period to another 10 years and the untenable and irresponsible conclusion that corrosion in the sandbed area therefore is under control. There is no doubt that the application of the epoxy coating has slowed the corrosion over the four years from 1992 to 1996. However, no assurances have been given that in the following years the environmental conditions in the sand bed area remained the

same. Neither have there been any assertions that the epoxy coating did not deteriorate over time. Nor does one have any information about the rate of deterioration. It is well known that coatings (generally speaking) perform well for a period of time, but then deteriorate rapidly. In light of such knowledge, coupled with the reliability of the UT data submitted by Exelon, we find an inspection schedule stretched out over 10 years as proposed in ref document totally irresponsible. Dr. Rudolf H. Hausler (s/

Figure -1 UT Meassurments at Different Locations and Different Dates Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Plant 1.05 -- SB 9-D a) I -uSB 11-A -- SB 11I-C top j 0.95 --- SB 11-C bot ---SB 13-A 0.9 -* SB 13A top 'a -i---SB 13 A bot Ix 0.85 SB 15-D 0.8 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Date of Measurements

EXHIBIT K

i i

Ai

Page 1 1 of 100 DOCUMENTS Copyright 2006 The Christian Science Publishing Society All Rights Reserved Christian Science Monitor April 19, 2006, Wednesday SECTION: USA; Pg. 3 LENGTH: 987 words HEADLINE: Should oldest US nuke plant stay on line? BYLINE: Alexandra Marks Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor DATELINE: NEW YORK HIGHLIGHT: New Jersey says the plant is too vulnerable to terrorist attack to have its license renewed. BODY: In what could be a precedent-setting case, New Jersey and a coalition of citizens are fighting renewal of the license for the nation's oldest operating nuclear power plant. Their concern: The structural design of the 1960s-era Oyster Creek nuclear generating station is a security risk because, among other things, it stores highly radioactive spent fuel rods above ground. They argue that makes it vulnerable in the event of a terrorist attack from the air. Their contention, if proved, could lead the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to deny for the first time a nuclear generating station's request for a license renewal after its original 40-year license expires. It could also set a new standard for the NRC, which currently does not take terrorism into account when it decides whether to renew a nuclear plant's license. In fact, the NRC recently ruled the "possibility of a terrorist attack... is speculative" and therefore "beyond the scope" of relicensing proceedings. The state of New Jersey is appealing that ruling, arguing that the threat of terrorism is not speculative at all but a danger that must be addressed. Terrorism experts agree. "From a policy perspective, it's absolutely critical that the relicensing procedures take into account the vulnerability from man-made attacks," says Michael Greenberger, director of the University of Maryland's Center for Health and Homeland Security in Baltimore. "It's the height of folly... for the [NRC} to say that it's not going to consider seriously the vulnerability of the oldest plants when everybody knows these facilities are high-level targets." Oyster Creek is located in the densely populated Jersey Shore, a fast-growing area in the most densely populated state. That's one of the things that prompted Janet Thuro to join the fight to close the plant when its license expires in 2009. "It's an obsolete design," she says. "There are almost 3,000 pounds of highly radioactive rods stored 70 feet in the air in a cooling pool of water protected only by a thin metal roof. It's way too vulnerable." The owners of Oyster Creek, who have applied for a license renewal to operate another 20 years, deny the plant is obsolete and note the metal roof above the spent fuel rods is "a heavily reinforced steel structure." "Oyster Creek is required to meet every single safety standard and regulation as every plant, no matter what the age," says Oyster Creek spokesman Pete Resler. "The station has been continually upgraded: We put in the most I1) LexisNexis-Ad LexisNexis-At LexisNexism

Page 2 Should oldest US nuke plant stay on line? Christian Science Monitor Apri modem safety systems and equipment." The clash hints at the challenge of addressing electricity needs as well as environmental concerns about greenhouse gases, which nuclear power plants don't emit. It also shows the challenges faced in this post-9/11 world by the NRC, which has recently come under fire from some members of Congress for what they see as not taking the threat of terrorism seriously enough. NRC officials say they do take the threat extremely seriously and since 9/11 have taken "numerous steps" to ensure all plants are secure. It's something that is dealt with on a daily basis, they say, not in the context of whether a plant is too old to operate safely - which is what the relicensing procedure is designed to address. "The fact remains that security at a nuclear power plant is independent of the length of its license. It doesn't matter if a plant operates for five years, 15, or 20: It will have to meet the security requirements that are placed upon it by the NRC," says Scott Brunell, an NRC spokesman. "To attempt to address security for a plant that is seeking relicensing is an attempt to judge a plant on a snapshot that is not going to apply in the future one way or another." The State of New Jersey sees things very differently. It argues that Oyster Creek's age and design are the very things that present serious security risks, and that those issues can best be addressed during the relicensing process. In its appeal of the NRC ruling, New Jersey's attorney general calls the design "comparatively unreliable and vulnerable." The appeal also argues that a terrorist attack is not just speculative and that the NRC's own actions prove that. "There would be no need for the Commission to require extensive steps to guard against terrorist attack if the chances of an attack were only speculative," the appeal states. The NRC has yet to rule on the appeal. In the meantime, a coalition of citizens' groups is lending its support to the state's stand. "Security's not just a day-to-day concern. In this case, it is a structural issue as well," says Richard Webster, an attorney at the Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic in Newark, which represents the citizens' coalition. "The structure of the plant doesn't protect against this type of attack. If it was being built from scratch today, it could be designed to protect against one." Oyster Creek officials disagree, saying their plant can sustain a direct hit by an aircraft. "We're certainly able to defend the facility," says Mr. Resler. "The Electric Power Research Institute [a nonprofit company backed by the power industry] also did a study and found that even if such an event did occur, which is an extremely remote possibility, that there would not be a catastrophic release of radioactivity. These structures are designed for safety with multiple barriers to protect the fuel." But Ms. Thuro is not convinced. She points to a recent study by the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council, done at the request of Congress. It found that "successful terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools [at some nuclear power plants,] though difficult, are possible" and that "a propagating fire in a pool could release large amounts of radioactive materials." "Oyster Creek is within 10 minutes of seven airports, both local and major," she says. "This plant should be retired. Its time has come." (c) Copyright 2006. The Christian Science Monitor LOAD-DATE: April 19, 2006

EXHIBIT L

Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Public Report, National Academy of Sciences, April 2005 Report's Highlights Prepared by the Nuclear Security Coalition, April 2005 The U.S. Congress asked the National Academies to analyze the safety and security of commercial spent nuclear storage in the United States. The highlights of the report are as follows. The full report is on their website http://www.nap.edu/books/0309096472/html/ VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK & CONSEQUENCES

1. Spent fuel pools are necessary at all operating nuclear reactors to store recently discharged fuel. Freshly discharged spent fuel generates too much decay heat to be passively air cooled in casks. This fuel must be stored in a pool of cold water for at least one year before being moved to dry casks.

2. Terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools are possible -a credible threat.

"Finding 2A: Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well known public dread of radiation... The committee judges that attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate technical means are possible. "' "Terrorists view nuclear power plantfacilities as desirable targets because of the large inventories of radionuclides they contain. The committee believes that knowledgeable terrorists might choose to attack spent fuel pools because: (1) at US. commercial nuclear power plants, these pools are less well protected structurally than reactor cores; (2) they typically contain inventories of medium - and long-lived radionuclides that are several times greater than those in individual reactor cores2." "A loss-of-pool-coolant event resultingfrom damage or collapse of the pool could have severe consequences. Severe damage of the pool wall couldpotentially resultfrom several types of terrorist attacks, for instance: (1) Attacks with large civilian aircraft; (2) Attacks with high-energy weapon; Attacks with explosive charges3."

3. If a terrorist attack on the spent fuel pool leads to a zirconium cladding fire, it could result in large amounts of radioactive material spreading hundreds of miles.

"Finding 3B -... a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spentfuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium claddingfire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee's classified report." "Such (zirconium cladding) fires would create thermalplumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions.5" "The excess cancer estimates... to between 2,000 and 6,000 cancer deaths "6 1

GE BOILING WATER MARK I & MARK II UNITS -MORE VULNERABLE

4. Vulnerability to attack differs according to the plant's design; GE Boiling Water Mark I and Mark II Units are more vulnerable to attack.

"The potential vulnerabilities ofspentfuelpools to terrorist attack are plant specific... there are substantial differences in the designs of spentffuelpool that make them more or less vulnerable to certain types of attack." "The spentfuelpool, (GEMarkIBWR reactors) is located in the reactor building well above ground level. Most designs have thin steel superstructures. The superstructures and pools were not, however, specifically designed to resist terrorist attacks8. " "The vulnerability of a spent fuel pool to terrorist attack depends in part on its location with respect to ground level as well as its construction. Pools are potentially susceptible to attacks from above or the sides depending on their elevation with respect to grade and the presence of surrounding shielding structures9. "Markl and IIBWR plants are located above grade and are shielded by at least one exterior building wall. Some pools are also shielded by the reactor buildings. Some pools are also shielded by "significant" surrounding structures, and some have supplementalfloor and column supports. NAS RECOMMENDS TAKING THE FOLLOWING STEPS IMMEDIATELY

5. NAS recommends taking the following steps immediately to reduce the likelihood of zirconium cladding fire: rearranging spent fuel assemblies in the pool; limiting offloads of full reactor cores; and installing water-spray systems capable of operating when high radiation limits worker access and the pool or overlying building are damaged.

"Finding 3C: It appears to befeasible to reduce the likelihood of a zirconium firefollowing the loss-of-pool-coolant event using readily implemented measures. The following measures appear to have particular merit:

• Reconfiguring the spent fuel pools (i.e. redistribution of high decay heat assemblies so that they are surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies) to more evenly distribute decay heat loads... The potential for zirconium cladding fires can be reduced substantially by surrounding freshly discharged fuel assemblies with older spent fuel assemblies in "checkerboard "fashion. The analyses suggest that such arrangements might even be more effective for reducing the potentialfor zirconium cladding fires than removing this older spentfuelfrom the pools. However, these advantages have not been unequivocally demonstrated by modeling and experiments.
• Limiting the frequency of off oads of full reactor cores into the spentfuelpools, requiring longershut downs of the reactor before any fuel is offloaded, and providing enhanced security when such offloads must be made.
• Development of a redundant and diverse response system to mitigate loss-of-pool-coolant events. Any mitigation system, such as a spraM cooling system must be capable of operation even when the pool is drained (which would result in high radiation fields and limit worker access to the pool) and the pool or overlying building, including equipment attached to the roof or walls, are severely damaged.""

"The (spray cooling system) second measure... may not be needed at allplants, particularly in plants in which the spent fuel pools are located below grade or are protected from external line-of-sight attacks by exterior walls and other structures.'2 " 2

NAS discusses conditions that would make it difficult to take some of these mitigating steps; hence multiple, redundant and diverse measures required. Page 55 - "Of course, damage to the pool and high radiation fields could make it difficult to take some of these mitigative measures. Multiple redundant and diverse measures may be required so that more than one remedy is available to mitigate loss-of-pool-coolant event, especially when access to the pool is limited by damage or high radiationfields.'3 " DRY CASK STORAGE

6. Dry cask storage has inherent security advantages over spent fuel storage, but it can only be used to store older fuel -fuel that has cooled 3-5 years in the pool before placed in dry casks licensed today.

"Safety and Security Advantages of Dry Cask Storage Versus Wet Pool Storage -Finding 4D: Dry cask storage for older, cooler spent fuel has two inherent advantages over pool storage: (1) It is a passive system that relies on natural air circulation for cooling; and (2) it divides the inventory of that spent fuel among a large number of discrete, robust containers. These factors make it more difficult to attack a large amount of spentfuel at one time and also reduce the consequences of such attacks". "

7. There are no large security differences among different storage designs; all designs are more secure than pools but still vulnerable.

Findings 4A: "All storage casks designs are vulnerable to some types of terrorist attacks, but the quantity of radioactive material releases predicted from such attacks is relatively small. These releases are not easily dispersed in the environments'.

8. Additional steps may be taken to make dry casks less vulnerable "Finding 4B: Additional steps can be taken to make dry casks less vulnerable to potential terrorist attacks.'6" "Recommendation: "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should consider using the results of the vulnerability analyses for possible upgrades of requirements in 10 CFR 72 for dry casks, specifically to improve their resistance to terrorist attacks.'7" "In the committee's opinion, there are several, relatively simple steps that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of releases of radioactive materialfrom dry casks in the event of a terrorist attack

• Additional surveillance could be added to dry cask storage facilities to detect and thwart ground attacks.
• Certain types of cask systems could be protected against aircraft strikes by partial earthen berms.

Such berms also would deflect the blasts from vehicle bombs. Visual barriers could be placed around storage pads to prevent targeting of individual casks by aircraft or standoff weapons. These would have to be designed so that they would not trapjetfuel in the event of an aircraft attack. The spacing of vertical casks on the storage pads can be changed, or spacers (shims) can be placed between the casks, to reduce the likelihood of cask-to-cask interactions in the event of an aircraft attack.

• Relatively minor changes in the design of newly manufactured casks could be made to improve their resistance to certain types of attack scenarios.' 8 "

3

9. Based on plant-specific vulnerability analyses, NRC might determine moving spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage to reduce risk. However, NAS was not asked by Congress to recommend whether transfer of spent fuel rods from pools to a system of dry casks should be accelerated; therefore they could not provide specific recommendations on this issue.

"Finding 4E: Depending on the outcome ofplant-specific vulnerability analyses described in the committee's classified report, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission might determine that earlier movements of spentfuelfrom pools into dry cask storage would be prudent to reduce the potential consequences of terrorist attacks on pools at some commercial nuclear plants. The statement of task directs the committee to examine the risks of spent fuel storage options and alternatives for decision makers; not to recommend whether any spentfuel should be transferredfrom pool storage to cask storage. In fact, there may be some commercialplants that, because ofpool designs orfuel loadings, may require some removal of spentfuelfrom their pools. If there is a need to remove spentfuelfrom the pools it should become clearer once the vulnerability and consequence analyses described in the classified report are completed'9." NAS CALLS FOR MORE ANALYSES

10. NAS expresses concern over NRC's slow pace analyses.

"...the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's analyses of spent fuel storage vulnerabilities have notyet been completed and actions to reduce vulnerabilities...have not yet been taken. Moreover, some important additional analyses remain to be done. The slow pace in completing this work is of concern given the enormous consequences as described elsewhere in this report20"

11. Additional independent analyses are needed to understand more fully the vulnerabilities and consequences of events that could lead to propagating zirconium fires.

"Finding 2C Recommendation: "Although the committee did not specifically investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of improved surveillance and security measures for protecting stored spent fuel, an assessment of current measures should be performed by an independent organization2 '.

12. Because vulnerability is plant specifics the committee recommended that plant-by-plant vulnerability analyses be performed.

"Finding 3 D:The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attacks are plant-design specific. Therefore specific vulnerabilities can only be understood by examining the characteristics of spentfuel storage at each plant. As described in the classified report, there are substantial differences in the designs ofPWR and BWR spent fuel pools. PWR pools tend to be located near or below grade, whereas BWPR pools typically are located well above grade but are protected by exterior walls and other structures. In addition, there are plant-specific differences among B WRs and PWRs that would increase or decrease the vulnerabilities of the pools to various kinds of terrorist attacks, making generic conclusions difficult.22"

13. The report calls on the NRC to conduct additional analyses to obtain better understanding of potential risks to ensure operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce consequences of attacks.

"The analyses carried outfor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (described in the committee's classified report) do not consider maximum credible scenarios... To be judged a "credible" scenario, the terrorist must be able to carry it out as designed.2 3" 4

"Finding 3E: The NRC and independent analysts have made progress in understanding some vulnerability of spent fuel pools to certain terrorist attacks and the consequences of such attacks for releases of radioactivity to the environment. However, additional work on specific issues is needed urgently... The work to date... has not been sufficient to adequately understand the vulnerabilities and consequences. " "Recommendation: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should undertake best -estimate analyses to more fully understand the vulnerabilities and consequences of loss-of-pool-coolant events that could lead to a zirconium cladding fire. Based on these analyses, the Commission should take appropriate actions to address any significant vulnerabilities identified. The committee provides details on additional analyses that should be carried out in the classified report.2 4" Consequence analyses should address the following questions "The consequence analyses should address thefollowing questions:

• To what extent would such attacks damage the spentfuel in the pool, and what would be the thermal consequences of such damage?
• Is itfeasible to reconfigure the spentfuel within pools to prevent zirconium claddingfires given the actual characteristics (ie., heat generation) of spentfuel assemblies in the pool, even ifthe fuel were damaged in an attack? Is there enough space in the pools at all commercial reactor sites to implementfuel reconfiguration?
• In the event of a localized zirconium cladding fire, will such rearrangement prevent its spread to the rest of the pool?
• How much spray cooling is needed to prevent zirconium claddingfires and prevent propagation of such fires? Which of the different options for providing spray cooling are effective under attack and accident conditions? " 2 5 Analyses must be performed that accounts for the full range of variation in spent fuel pool designs "Sensitivity analyses should be undertaken to accountfor thefull range in variation in spentfuelpool designs (e.g., rack designs, capacities, spentffuel burn-ups and ages) at US. commercial nuclear power plants.2 6 "

NAS - SECURITY NEGATIVELY IMPACTED BY NRC'S SECRECY

14. Current classification and security practices are impeding sharing valuable information between the NRC, nuclear reactor operators and system vendors, negatively impacting constructive feedback and ultimately security.

"Finding SA: Security restrictions on sharing of information and analyses are hindering progress in addressing potential vulnerabilities of spentfuel storage to terrorist attacks." Recommendation: "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should improve the sharing of pertinent information on vulnerability and consequence analyses on spentfuel storage with nuclear power plant operators and dry cask storage system vendors on a timely basis.27"

15. More constructive interaction with the public and independent analysts would increase confidence in the NRC and industry and reduce vulnerability.

"The committee also believes that the public is an important audience for the work being carried out to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities to spentfuel storage facilities. While it is inappropriate to share all information publicly, more constructive interaction with the public 5

and independent analysts could improve the work being carried out, and also increase confidence in the nuclear regulatory Commission and industry decisions and actions to reduce the vulnerability of spentfuel storage to terrorist threats28"

16. On several important questions, NAS was unable to obtain enough information from the NRC to assess effectiveness security at commercial nuclear reactors. Therefore the committee recommended assessment of security measures is undertaken by an organization independent of the NRC and industry.

"The Commission staff declined to provide a formal briefing to the committee on the DBT for radiological sabotage, asserting that the committee did not have a need to know this information.2 9 " NRC & NUCLEAR INDUSTRY SAY THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY AGAINST TERRRORIST ATTACKS - CITIZENS ASK, WHO IS TAKING RESPONSIBILITY? "To the committee's knowledge, there are currently no requirements in place to defend against the kinds of larger-scale; premeditated, skillful attacks that were carried out on September 11, 2001, whether or not a commercial aircraft is involved. Stafffrom the NRC and representatives from the nuclear industry repeatedly told the committee that they view detecting, preventing, and thwarting such attacks as the federal government's responsibilitj0., End Notes 1 'Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Fuel Storage," National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Public Version, April, 2005, p. 4 2 NAS Ibid, p. 36 3 NAS, Ibid, p. 49 4 NAS, Ibid, p. 6 5NAS, Ibid, p.50 6 NAS, Ibid, p.45 7NAS, Ibid, p. 6 'NAS, Ibid, p. 41 9 NAS, Ibid, p. 43 '0 NAS, Ibid, p. 43 " NAS, Ibid, p.6, 57 12 NAS, Tbid, p. 59 13 NAS, Ibid, p. 55 14 NAS, Ibid, p. 8 15 NAS, Ibid, p.7 16 NAS, Tbid, p. 7 17 NASIbid, p. 7 18NAS, Ibid, p. 68 '9 NAS, Ibid, p. 8 20 NAS, Tbid, p. 75 21 NAS Ibid, p. 5, 36 22 NAS, Ibid, p. 6, 58 23 NAS, Ibid, p. 28 24 NAS, Ibid, p. 6, 58 25 NAS, Ibid, p. 59 26 NAS, Tbid, p. 59 27 NAS, Ibid, p. 8 28 NAS, Ibid, p. 9 29 NAS, Ibid, p. 31 30 NAS, Tbid, p. 47 6

EXHIBIT M

Used Fuel Security Fact Sheet Powering Our Community for Today and Tomorrow Independent Used Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Spent nuclear fuel decays over time and is less radioactive than the fuel in the reactor. The Used Fuel can be safely cooled by air circulating though their storage vaults. The radioactive material is contained in cearnic fuel pealts, which have a melting point of 5.000 degrees, and are Inside metal rods, with a melting point of 3,000 degrees. The fel assemblies are placed In thick stainless steel, leak-tight canisters that are welded shut. The loaded storage canister Is transported in a thick steel cask that Is tightly sealed and than placed Into a reinforced concrete storage vault, The vault walls are approximately three feet thick and are designed to withstand natural or man-made events, including, but not limited to, earthquekes, hurricanes, tornados and tornado generated projectiles, and floods. The ISFSI facility at Oyster Creek is protected from sabotage and Intrusion with measures that are equivalent to those for the plant itself. This 'defense in depth' system makes dry fuel storage a safe and secure way to temporarily store spent fuel. Al project planning, construction, and transportation related to Used Fuel management is designed to account for and protect against multiple disaster-level events as well as radiological sabotage. An analysis post 9/11 demonstrates the ISFSI can withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft without breaching the canister bandrer The ISFSI would not be an attractive target for terrorists. The vaults are low structures that take up very little space. The high level of security now In effect In the airspace, waterways and ground surrounding all nuclear plants today make It even more secure. The storage area Is designed to hold Used Fuel from Oyster Creek Generating Station alone. NRC regulations and township guidelines prohibit any other generating station from storing fuel at the site. Congress has mandated that the Department of Energy fInd a national Used Fuel repository. AmerGen's goal Is for Oyster Creek's waste to go to Yucca Mountain when it Is approved and constructed by the federal government. The draft schedule has the Yucca Mountain repository receiving Used Fuel In 2010 at the earliest. Used Fuel Pool The Used Fuel pool is accessed from the 1 19-foot elevation at the top of the Reactor Building at Oyster Creek The walls around this elevation are Insulated metal siding mounted to steel framing. It is misleading to consider this as a 'thin steel structure' as the steel farning Is of substantial I-Beam construction that supports the reactor building gantry crane. The pool extends down through the reactor building enclosed In massive concrete walls integrted with the reactor containment structure and supported on concrete columns. The pool Is approximately 40 feet deep providing in excess of 26 feet of water above the top of the stored fuei. The crash of an airplane into the reactor building 1 19-foot elevation would Involve damage to the reactor building gantry crane and equipment, both frorn Impact and fire, but It is highly unlikely the crash would cause any significant damage to the fuel stored In the Used Fuel pool. The steel framing, the pools massive concrete structure and supporting coltznns would protect the pool from imnpact damage and the contained water would provde protection to the fuel from impact and fire effects. oystercreek sae. Rflbet mig &NW The ft Ntaf

EXHIBIT N

Division of Environmental Safety and Health Radiation Protection and Release Prevention Element PO Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625-0415 Phone: (609) 984-5636 Fax: (609) 984-7513 July 30, 2004 Mr. Hubert Miller Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Rd. King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

Subject:

Effects of Aircraft Impact on Spent Fuel Pools in New Jersey

Dear Mr. Miller:

Since the September 11, 2001 tragedy, nuclear power generation facilities have been the subject of numerous evaluations related to the prevention of and emergency response to possible terrorist actions, including the use of aircraft as a destructive device. The State of New Jersey through our Radiation Protection and Release Prevention Element - Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) has been studying developments in this area. Recently, two technical studies related to the effects of aircraft impact on Spent Fuel Pools have been performed by private parties and were reviewed by the NRC. These two studies were the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)/Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Study: "Deterring Terrorism: Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrate Nuclear Power Plant's Structural Strength," issued March 2003 (hereafter referred to as the NEI Study) and the paper, "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States," April 21, 2003, Robert Alvarez, et al., published in Science and Global Security, Spring 2003 (hereafter referred to as the Alvarez Paper). NEI considers the details of their study, submitted to the NRC for review, to be security sensitive. Accordingly, New Jersey did not have access to the complete report and could not conduct a detailed independent review as to the study's validity for nuclear facilities located in the state. However, NEI has made public sufficient information to conclude that the study was limited to the evaluation of the impact of a Boeing 767400 airplane into containment buildings, used fuel storage pools, used fuel "Dry" storage facilities and used fuel transportation containers. The NEI Study does not appear to have taken into account the thermal and structural consequences and collateral damage of the explosion and resulting fire that would also occur from the impact of a commercial aircraft. In

addition, it appears that the structural models used to evaluate impact damage were based on "representative" (not site-specific), structures, which were considered by NEI to be typical to those that exist across the nuclear power industry. The Alvarez Paper was available to New Jersey as was the NRC staff's review and comments. This paper focused on the potential generic vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attack. The paper also details the possible public safety and environmental consequences should such attacks successfully occur. Included in this paper were conservative estimates of the radiological release should a spent fuel zircaloy cladding fire occur due to a significant breach of a spent fuel pool. The paper states, "The long-term land-contamination consequences of such an event could be significantly worse than those from Chernobyr'. The paper further states (in reference to Chernobyl), "The total area of this radiation-control zone is huge: 10,000 kin2, equal to half the area of the State of New Jersey. During the following decade, the population of this area declined by almost half because of migration to areas of lower contamination". As you are aware, New Jersey is the home to four operating nuclear power reactors located at two separate generating sites. Three power reactors, "Hope Creek", "Salem Unit 1" and "Salem 2", are located on the Delaware River at the PSE&G Artificial Island Site and the fourth reactor, "Oyster Creek", is located near Barnegat Bay and the Atlantic coastline at the AmerGen Oyster Creek Site. New Jersey is especially concerned about the vulnerability of the Oyster Creek spent fuel pool (OCSFP) to a terrorist attack using a commercial aircraft. This concern is based, in part, on the structural design of the superstructure of the building which encloses the OCSFP (metal siding, concrete roof panels, high collapse potential for this scenario), the location of the pool in the building (high elevation, near an outside wall, pool surface open to superstructure), the relatively unimpeded flight path to the fuel pool location (located on an open coastal plane with minimal surrounding obstructions to fuel pool wall), and, most importantly, the lack of a comprehensive site-specific evaluation for this terrorist aircraft impact scenario which addresses the collective consequences of impact and resulting explosion, fire (including thermal gradients through fuel pool concrete), and probable structural collapse on the OCSFP and fuel assemblies. Additionally, the site-specific radiological release (including a timeline for the expected release) resulting from this terrorist aircraft impact scenario needs to be quantified by the NRC and provided to New Jersey for emergency planning preparation to insure that the safety of the residents of New Jersey and first responders can be maintained. New Jersey requests this information be provided expediently. Since New Jersey is not aware of any site-specific evaluation of the OCSFP that addresses these issues, it is requesting that the USNRC provide detailed technical assurance documenting the basis that the above mentioned concerns have been rigorously addressed and that the safety of residents of New Jersey and the environment can be maintained should a 9-11 style terrorist attack occur at Oyster Creek.

New Jersey is also requesting that some provision be made so that authorized representatives of the State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, can be granted access to review any and all documentation which is used by the NRC as the basis for concluding that terrorist threats to nuclear power facilities do not represent a risk to New Jersey residents. If you need additional information, please contact Mr. Kent Tosch, Manager of the Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, at (609) 984-7701. Sincerely, Jill Lipoti, Ph.D., Assistant Director Radiation Protection Program and Release Prevention

EXHIBIT 0

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges: E. Roy Hawkens, Chair Dr. Paul B. Abramson Dr. Anthony J. Baratta In the Matter of ) AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC ) (License Renewal for the Oyster Creek ) Nuclear Generating Station) ) Docket No. 50-0219-LR ASLB No. 06-844-01-LR May 5, 2006 CITIZENS' MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER MANDATORY DISCLOSURES PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, Inc., Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey Sierra Club, and New Jersey Environmental Federation (collectively "Citizens") have diligently attempted to work out issues regarding mandatory disclosures with the other parties without involving this Board. Unfortunately, while many issues have been resolved, one issue has proved to be incapable of resolution through discussions between the parties. Thus, Citizens are forced to file this motion to compel disclosure of certain documents, that Citizens believe are relevant to the contention but AmerGen believes are not. In addition, Citizens are currently unable to determine whether other relevant documents have been omitted from the disclosures provided by AmerGen, and ask that the Board allow such objections to be heard until after Citizens actually get the chance 1

to review the disclosed documents and can assess whether other relevant documents have been omitted. ARGUMENT This Motion to Compel is brought pursuant~to 10 C.F.R. § 2.1204 and 10 C.F.R. § 2.323. It is timely pursuant to the ASLB order in this proceeding, which requires any Motions to Compel to be submitted by May 5, 2006. Order (Extending Time to File Motions Relating to Initial Mandatory Disclosures) (Apr. 12, 2006) (unpublished). Citizens have attempted to resolve the issue addressed by this motion through negotiation, but such resolution has proved impossible. On May 4, 2006, counsel for AmerGen confirmed in writing that it did not disclose documents relating solely to corrosion in the upper drywell on grounds of relevancy: I am confirming that AmerGen has excluded documents relating solely to inspection of, or corrosion in, the upper region of the drywell because such documents are outside the scope of the admitted contention and not relevant to the contention. However, if a document contained information about the upper region AND the sand bed region, we did not exclude or excise the information about the upper region, since the sand bed region information would be relevant. So you will likely get some of the information you seek regarding the upper region. E-mail from D. Silverman to Richard Webster, dated May 4, 2006. Attached as Exhibit MC 1. Mr. Silverman indicated at that time that AmerGen's position had been carefully formulated and AmerGen did not intend to change its position. Later, Citizens discussed the issue with AmerGen, and were advised to plan on filing this Motion unless Citizens were told otherwise. Because Citizens have heard nothing further from AmerGen, they are filing this Motion. 2

Citizens agree with AmerGen that corrosion in the upper drywell is outside the scope of the contention, but that does not make it irrelevant. In fact, information about corrosion in the upper drywell is relevant to the contention on multiple grounds. First, corrosion in the upper drywell is an indicator of whether water is present on the exterior of the drywell. In discussions, AmerGen and Citizens have agreed that documents about the presence of water anywhere on the exterior of the drywell is relevant to the contention, but AmerGen now attempts to split hairs and exclude documents about corrosion in the upper region. AmerGen's absurd approach to relevancy should be rejected by the Board, because all documents that tend to show the presence or absence of water on the exterior of the drywell are relevant. A key issue in this proceeding is whether a corrosive environment could occur in the sand bed region during any license renewal period. AmerGen has already conceded that corrosion is ongoing in the upper drywell. License Renewal Application at 3.5-21. The ongoing corrosion shows that water is present in the upper drywell. ' The presence of water in the upper drywell tends to indicate that an ongoing leak is probably occurring, because the high temperatures at that region mean that water from a past leak that has been corrected would evaporate relatively quickly, which would not cause ongoing corrosion. Any water in the upper drywell would tend to flow by gravity to the sand bed region. This means that a leak in the upper region could cause a corrosive environment at the sand bed region. Thus, because the ongoing corrosion in the upper drywell indicates that water is present in the upper drywell, it tends to show that water could move down to the sand bed region and create a corrosive environment there. For a full discussion of these arguments regarding the significance of the upper region corrosion for the sand bed region see Memorandum of Dr. R. H. Hausler, dated April 4, 2006, attached to Citizens Motion to Reconsider, dated April 6. 2006. 3

On this basis alone, information about ongoing corrosion in the upper drywell is highly relevant to the contention. Second, as explained in the Citizen's Response to AmerGen's Motion to Dismiss, also filed today, which is incorporated by reference into this Motion, another core issue in this proceeding is whether AmerGen has correctly predicted the potential for corrosion based on three rounds of limited UT testing in the sand bed region from 1992 to 1996. Dr. Hausler has identified erroneous systematic bias in AmerGen's favor in the last round of results in the sand bed region taken in 1996 and has found that the extrapolations based on that data were improper.2 Thus, at present, AmerGen's predictions are based on erroneous data and extrapolations, which need to be corrected. Documents concerning testing in the upper region, which occurred in 1996 and subsequently in 2000 and 2004, would assist the parties to analyze whether the systematic bias was caused by different testing methodologies or different testing contractors, and would allow the parties better characterize the actual random error observed in UT measurements at Oyster Creek. Third, documents about the corrosion in the upper drywell are relevant because AmerGen has had to deal with ongoing corrosion in that area. Thus, presumably AmerGen has developed a corrosion prediction model that confirms that the scope and frequency of testing in the upper drywell is adequate. Because more rounds of testing have been carried out in the upper region, this model should have been calibrated and verified. To answer the contention, AmerGen must undertake a similar task for the sand bed region. The approach used for the upper drywell will inform how predicting corrosion should be 2 Memorandum of Dr. RH. Hausler, dated May 3, 2006 at 2, filed with the accompanying Response to AmerGen's Motion to Dismiss. 4

approached in the sand bed. Therefore, documents relating to the analysis and prediction of future corrosion in the upper drywell are also relevant to the contention. In summary, because the drywell is a safety critical component that is now highly degraded, it is important that decisions about aging management of the drywell in the sand bed are based on analysis of all relevant information. Information concerning the possible presence of water at the sand bed region, about the errors associated with the UT testing methods employed at Oyster Creek, and concerning corrosion analysis and modeling methods used by AmerGen is highly relevant to the contention. Therefore, this Board should compel AmerGen to disclose all documents relating to corrosion in the upper drywell. Finally, we note that the only reason that Citizens were able identify that this dispute existed is because, when asked, AmerGen candidly informed Citizens about its approach to relevancy of documents concerning the upper drywell. To date, Citizens have not had the chance to review any of the actual records on AmerGen's disclosure list. Citizens asked AmerGen to propose a schedule for full disclosure of the actual records on April 27, 2006, but have not yet received a response to this request. Letter from Webster to Silverman, dated April 27, 2006. Thus, it is impossible to know whether other disputes regarding relevancy may emerge after Citizens review the documents. Citizens therefore request that the Board also grant permission for Citizens to file motions to compel regarding relevancy within a month of AmerGen making all its disclosable documents available for viewing by Citizens. 5

CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, the ASLB should compel AmerGen to disclose all records relating to corrosion of the upper drywell at Oyster Creek, and should grant permission for Citizens to file further motions to compel within a month of AmerGen making all its disclosable documents available for viewing by Citizens. Respectfully submitted, Richard Webster, Esq. RUTGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC Attorneys for Petitioners Dated: May 5, 2006 6

( -'t J I-Z-S /-x 6 4: I1CLf I From: <dsiverman~morganlewis.com> To: "Richard Webster" <rwebster@kinoy.rutgers.edu> Date: 5/4/06 11:39AM

Subject:

Re: Disclosure Issues Thanks for your prompt response. I am confirming that AmerGen has excluded documents relating solely to inspection of, or corrosion In, the upper region of the drywell because such documents are outside the scope of the admitted contention and not relevant to the contention. However, if a document contained information about the upper region AND the sand bed region, we did not exclude or excise the Information about the upper region, since the sand bed region information would be relevant. So you will likely get some of the information you seek regarding the upper region. Donald J. Silverman Morgan Lewis 1111 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: 202.739.3000 Fax: 202.739.3001 Direct Dial: 202.739.5502 "Richard Webster" <rwebster@kinoy. rutgers.edu> 05/04/2006 10:23 AM To dsilverman@morganlewis.com cc Subject Disclosure Issues

Don,

1) I am happy to provide you with additional affidavits regarding searches at other organizations, I will organize that next week. Previously, we discussed providing one affidavit from Paul Gunter, which we did. I assure you that we have tried to find and list all the relevant documents that we

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges: E. Roy Hawkens, Chair Dr. Paul B. Abramson Dr. Anthony J. Baratta In the Matter of ) AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC ) (License Renewal for the Oyster Creek ) Nuclear Generating Station) ) Docket No. 50-0219-LR ASLB No. 06-844-01-LR May 5,2006 CITIZENS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO AMERGEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO SUSPEND MANDATORY DISCLOSURES PRELIMINARY STATEMENT After Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, Inc., Grandmothers, Mothers and More for Energy Safety, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey Sierra Club, and New Jersey Environmental Federation (collectively "Citizens') had their contention admitted, AmerGen decided to do two or three rounds of additional testing of metal thickness in the sand bed region of the drywell liner. However, AmerGen has failed to show that the proposed additional rounds of testing would be sufficient to maintain margins of safety during any extended licensing period. In contrast, in this response Citizens present expert analysis of AmerGen's recent submission to the NRC on drywell corrosion. This analysis shows that the proposed inspection frequency of once every 10 years intervals between tests is "totally irresponsible" because it is based on a fundamentally flawed extrapolation of questionable data. Thus, the commitment to monitor the 1

drywell once every ten years completely fails to ensure that the current razor-thin safety margins will be maintained, and therefore fails to render Citizens' contention moot. Because the contention is not moot, there is no reason to curtail discovery at this early stage. In any event, suspending discovery would only cause needless delay, which AmerGen can ill-afford, because this license renewal is on a very tight schedule.1 ARGUMENT I. The Contention Requires Safety Margins To Be Maintained The admitted contention states: AmerGen's License Renewal Application fails to establish an adequate aging management plan for the sand bed region of the drywell liner, because its corrosion management program fails to include periodic UT [ultrasonic] measurements in that region throughout the period of extended operation and, thus, will not enable AmerGen to determine the amount of corrosion in that region and thereby maintain the safety margins during the term of the extended license. ASLB Decision Granting Citizens' Petition, LBP-06-7 (April 19, 2006) (emphasis added). In its initial argument, AmerGen wrongly suggests that any periodic UT monitoring in the sand bed region would render the contention moot. AmerGen Mootness Motion at 4. This characterization of the contention overlooks the critical caveat that the UIT monitoring regime must enable AmerGen to maintain safety margins during the entirety any extended licensing term. Under AmerGen's absurd approach, a single measurement in the sand bed region once every twenty years would be periodic, and thus would render the contention moot, irrespective of the inability of such a measurement to ensure that safety is maintained throughout the entire relicensing period. 1t See http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operatingflicensing/renewal/a plications/ovstercreek.html 2

In fact, to render the contention moot, AmerGen would have to demonstrate that its proposed measurement regime will allow safety margins to be maintained throughout the entire relicensing period. Recognizing this requirement, AmerGen admits that Citizens petitioned for "an adequate number of confirmatory UT measurements," but argues that the ad-hoc measurement regime it has proposed in response to NRC audit questions is now adequate. AmerGen Mootness Motion at 7-8. Strangely however, AmerGen fails to present any technical opinion or scientific information to back up the assertions of its legal team. While AmerGen's lawyers may be extremely learned, the assessment of whether the proposed measurement regime is adequate is an analysis that must be done by scientists, not lawyers. Thus, there is not a shred of evidence to support AmerGen's Mootness Motion. Indeed in its response to AmerGen's Mootness Motion, the NRC staff acknowledged that "Staff has yet to determine the adequacy of these commitments as part of the applicant's corrosion management program." NRC Staff Response to AmerGen's Mootness Motion at 5. II. The Mootness Motion Is Inadequate On Its Face As movant, AmerGen initially carries the burden of going forward. If that burden is met and contrary facts are presented, the movant also ultimately bears the burden of proof to establish the facts asserted in its motion. Here, AmerGen has completely failed to meet its initial burden, because it has presented no evidence whatsoever on the issue of the adequacy of the proposed monitoring regime. Arguments of counsel are not evidence and cannot substitute for the opinions of experts who are properly qualified to make such assessments. Thus, AmerGen's motion is inadequate on its face and must be rejected by the ASLB. 3

M. Scientific Analysis Shows That The Proposed Monitoring Is Inadequate Even though AmerGen has not even attempted to meet its burden of going forward and Citizens, as respondents, have no burden to respond with any evidence, Citizens have obtained another memorandum from corrosion expert Dr. Hausler analyzing AmerGen's latest monitoring proposal. This memorandum is attached as Citizens' Exhibit RM 1. Dr. Hausler finds that the proposal to monitor once every ten years is based on such flimsy evidence that it is "at odds with good or best corrosion practice" and "totally irresponsible." Ex. RM 1 at 1, 3. Dr. Hausler based these strongly worded conclusions on his analysis of AmerGen's audit response that exposes further deficiencies in AmerGen's monitoring and analysis. Most glaringly, AmerGen failed to even find the obvious systematic error2 in the 1996 results, even though the results showed the physically impossible, that metal was spontaneously healing, and the deviation from the previous results exceeded AmerGen's own estimate of random error by large margins. Ex. RM 1 at 2. Second, AmerGen assumed that the conditions in the drywell from 1992 to 1996 would continue throughout any extended license renewal period, even through AmerGen knew that the protective epoxy coating applied in 1992 would deteriorate over time and corrosion is ongoing in the upper drywell, indicating the likely presence of a corrosive environment at the exterior of the drywell. I. at 2-3; see also Memorandum of Dr. R. H. Hausler, dated April 4, 2006, attached to Citizens Motion to Reconsider, dated April 6, 2006. The graphs presented in AmerGen's audit response make it plain that there is no model of the worst case for potential corrosion in the sand bed region of the drywell. Based on measurements taken in 1992, 1994, and 1996, AmerGen simply assumed that the corrosion rate was zero and that there was no potential for future corrosion and therefore that no further UT 2 Systematic error refers to an error which biases the results in one direction, in contrast to random errors, which introduce random fluctuations around a mean value. 4

measurements were required. Dr. Hausler finds this irresponsible because, as he has previously stated, the visual inspections alone are not adequate to detect corrosion in the sand bed.3 Furthermore, AmerGen made no effort to find what the worst case could be. The appropriate monitoring frequency can only be determined by statistically analyzing periodic UT results, assessing what the worse case corrosion could be under adverse conditions, and then seeing how soon safety margins could be compromised. The next monitoring interval must occur before there is any possibility that safety margins could be compromised. In its reformulation of the contention, the ASLB properly recognized the need for the scope and frequency of UT monitoring to ensure that safety margins are maintained, but AmerGen attempts to ignore this requirement, once again illustrating its worrying disregard of safety considerations. It is highly debatable whether it was advisable to allow AmerGen to cease UT monitoring of the sand bed in 1996, when the license still had 13 years to run. However, by agreeing to monitor every ten years starting before any license renewal, AmerGen, prompted by NRC audit comments, has implicitly recognized that its conclusion about the lack of corrosion in the sand bed rested too heavily on potentially flawed assumptions. The proposal to actually do some measurements has injected a small dose of reality into the aging management of the safety-critical drywell liner. While Citizens welcome AmerGen's movement towards a more evidence-based approach, AmerGen has not gone nearly far enough to moot the contention and maintain safety during any license renewal period. To moot the contention and maintain safety, AmerGen would have to correct the 1996 results for systematic error, take a new round of valid measurements with sufficient coverage, statistically analyze the UT results placing most weight on the extreme results, produce a justifiable corrosion model that estimates what the worst case corrosion could be in the interval 3 Memorandum of Dr. RH. Hausler dated November 10, 2005, attached to Petition. S

between monitoring, and show that the worst case corrosion would not violate rigorous conservative acceptance criteria. The audit response attached to Dr. Hausler's latest memo shows that as recently as a month ago, AmerGen had not even realized that the 1996 results are flawed, or that its analysis is invalid. Ex. RMl at 2; see also AmerGen Audit Response dated April 5, 2006 (accession number ML060960563), attached to Ex. RM I ("Audit Response"). Thus, dismissing the contention as moot would be grossly premature, at best. The audit response by AmerGen raises many other concerns. For example, it acknowledges that the minimum thickness recorded in the sand bed region ten or more years ago was 0.603 inches, which is 0.133 inches thinner than the initial acceptance criterion of 0.736 inches derived from structural modeling of a uniform sandbed region. Audit Response at 7, 10. The response also confirms that there are "more than one 12" by 12" areas thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536"," but acknowledges that "the calculation does not provide additional criteria as to the acceptable distance between multiple small areas." Id. at 8. These statements reveal that AmerGen has failed to rigorously derive the most critical acceptance criterion, and has not adjusted the scope of UT monitoring to allow valid comparison of the results to the acceptance criterion. For example, the choice of a 12" by 12" geometry is not justified, and is questionable, because the corrosion occurred in a "bath tub ring" around the sphere at the level of the sand bed region. Furthermore, because the monitoring areas were only 6" by 6", Ex. RM 1 at 1, AmerGen could not tell whether the areas that were below 0.736" on average are greater than 12" by 12". Thus, even if the 12" by 12" acceptance criterion were the most critical, the scope of the monitoring is insufficient to compare against that criterion. Because these issues will be dealt with at the hearing after discovery is complete, Citizens have not presented expert evidence at this stage on the structural issues, but look forward to doing so 6

in the future. Citizens present this preliminary preview of these issues in this response to further illustrate to the ASLB that resolution of the contention will be complex and technical, not simplistic and legalistic, as AmerGen seems to imagine. IV. The Legal Authorities Cited by AmerGen Are Inapposite AmerGen cites authorities concerning mootness of what it terms "contentions of omission." AmerGen Mootness Motion at 5 and FN 7. All the decisions cited by AmerGen deal with situations where existing information was not incorporated into an application, or an analysis was alleged to be missing. The decisions held that when an applicant remedies such problems by subsequently incorporating the missing information or analysis into the application documents, the contentions may became moot. However, in this case, AmerGen cannot merely supply a commitment to generate information in the future through further testing; it must instead justify why the additional testing it has proposed is sufficient to maintain safety margins. Contentions may challenge an application's adequacy by alleging that the information in the application is invalid, or that some information has been omitted, or a combination of both. Private Fuel Storage (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), 54 NRC, 163, 170-71 (2001). Further, to determine which of these three forms is involved in any contention, the Board should look first to the language of the contention. Id. at 171. If that proves unavailing, the language of the bases provided to support the contention may be examined to discern the sponsor's intent relative to the contention's scope and meaning. Id. Here the language of the contention and the Petition show that Citizens' challenge is to the validity of the information and conclusions in the Application. The Application asserted that safety would have been maintained with only visual monitoring of the sand bed region, whereas the Petition alleged that periodic UT monitoring of sufficient scope was needed to maintain 7

safety. In part, Citizens are challenging the validity of the statement in the license application that "[t]he inspections [in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004] showed no coating failure or signs of deterioration. It is therefore concluded that corrosion in the sand bed region has been arrested, and no further loss of material is expected." License Renewal Application at 3.5-20. Thus, the contention is not based on the lack of information or analysis, it is based on an incorrect conclusion contained in the Application. AmerGen is therefore incorrect when it asserts that Citizens' contention is a contention of omission. The decisions that AmerGen presented in its Motion are therefore irrelevant. Moreover, even if the contention were a contention of omission, AmerGen has not yet supplied any information or analysis to render the contention moot, it has merely supplied a commitment to generate information in the future through further testing. Because the Contention questions the validity of the conclusion that "corrosion in the sand bed region has been arrested," AmerGen's lack of quantitative monitoring for potential corrosion to ensure safety margins are met also becomes an issue. Thus, the contention is not about information omitted from the Application, it is about AmerGen's erroneous conclusion about the potential for ongoing corrosion and its omission of any proposal to monitor the thickness of the drywell at the sand bed region in a way that ensures safety-margins are met. As discussed above, if AmerGen had indeed carried out a rigorous and complete analysis of all the issues raised by the contention, it could, in theory, become moot. However, for AmerGen to simply propose a monitoring regime based on an arbitrary testing interval and scope without analysis of whether this is sufficient to maintain margins of safety is totally insufficient to moot the contention. 8

V. There Is No Reason To Suspend Mandatory Disclosures The filing of a motion to dismiss that does not even meet the required burden of going forward can hardly provide sufficient grounds to suspend mandatory disclosures. AmerGen complains that the disclosure process is burdensome, but fails to note that if it had properly dealt with the drywell corrosion issue in its Application, it would not have to produce documents to Citizens. AmerGen has only itself to blame for its need to spend time and money on document disclosure. The timing of AmerGen's motion is also notable. It was filed just as Citizens are about to obtain disclosure of actual documents from AmerGen. Fortuitously, Citizens have been able to locate a publicly available document that has enabled them to show that the proposed monitoring is not properly designed to maintain safety margins and raises many issues that related to the contention. Further discovery will no doubt increase Citizens' understanding and knowledge of the issues underlying the contention. The Board should not deny Citizens the right to fully develop its arguments by curtailing discovery at this stage. Furthermore, the burdens of discovery on AmerGen must be placed in the context of operating a 600 MW nuclear power station at a time when fossil prices are close to an all time high. Because its fuel costs have not risen in the same way as those of its competitors, and AmerGen is operating a merchant power plant, it has the opportunity to make substantial windfall profits from the current high energy prices. It is therefore in an extremely good position to bear the burden of document discovery and eventually reap the benefits of any extended licensing period. Moreover, AmerGen has expressed the desire to attempt to hold the hearing on the contention in August 2006. Given the volume of document discovery to review, and the dispute about the scope of the discovery, that is an extremely ambitious target even without any delay in 9

discovery. If discovery is suspended, it will become even more difficult to complete discovery in time to make an expedited hearing possible. CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, the ASLB should reject AmerGen's Motion to Dismiss and its Motion to Suspend Mandatory Disclosures. Respectfully submitted 4(1 4 / Richard Webster, Esq RUTGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC Attorneys for Petitioners Dated: May 5,2006 10

CORRO-CONSULTA 8081 Diane Drive Rudolf H. Hausler Kaufman, TX 75142 Tel: 972 962 8287 (office) rudyhau@msn.com Fax: 972 932 3947 Tel: 972 824 5871 (mobile) MEMORANDUM MAY 3,2006 To: Richard Webster, Esq. Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic 123 Washington Street Newark, NJ 07102-5695 Paul Gunter Reactor Watchdog Project Nuclear Information and Resource Service Washington, DC 10036

Subject:

Oyster Creek Dry Well Corrosion Comments regarding "Audit Q&A (Question Numbers AMP -141, 210, 356) dated 4/5/06, Ref. ML060960563 I. Summary The referenced document, which is attached, makes statements with regards to future corrosion and the presence or absence of a need for future inspections of the damaged areas in the sandbed region. After having examined the data presented we find that the conclusions are at odds with good or best corrosion practice. In general, predicting future corrosion based on data collected over the past is perhaps judicious only if a) the corrosion (or deterioration) mechanism is well known, and b) if assurances can be given that the circumstances (environment) under which prior corrosion occurred can and will be maintained in the future. Neither of these two imperatives can be assured at this time. Furthermore, it would seem that for meaningful predictions, the data set, on the basis of which extrapolations are carried out, needs to be consistent. I have found serious concerns in this respect as well. I, therefore, believe that the proposed long inspection intervals are totally unjustified. HI. Details Following the removal of the sand bed in September of 1992 two sets of UT measurements were recorded in September 1994 and September of 1996. For twelve locations where initial investigations found significant wall thinning, these measurements were made over a 6" x 6" grid at 1 inch spacings, hence 49 individual UT measurements were gathered over an individual grid.' Identical grids were I For seven other areas only seven readings were taken at one inch intervals.

surveyed in each of the bays in the sandbed area, and in some instances more than one grid was surveyed in the same bay. The clusters of individual UT measurements were evaluated by calculating the average of the 49 measurements, and naming the resulting averages "average minimum general thickness (AMGT)". The terminology "average minimum general thickness" is misleading because another shape or size of grid could have resulted in lower results. Presumably the identical grid locations, which were surveyed in September of 1992, were again surveyed in September of 1994 and September of 1996. This generated three data points (AMGT) in each of the various bay locations as a function of time. Plots were then generated to show the AMGT as a function of time. These plots are shown in the Figure 1 below for 8 different bay locations, correlating the measurements as a function of time. Exelon drew straight horizontal lines through these points with extrapolation over the next 10 years to demonstrate the absence of continued corrosion. This procedure and the subsequent evaluation and interpretation of the data warrant a number of comments. First, it is noted that with unfailing regularity (even in the cases not shown in Figure 1 below) the AMGT for each grid decreases from 1992 to 1994, but then increases in 1996. This is of course physically impossible; metal simply does not spontaneously get thicker. Furthermore, statistically, UT measurements in general are accurate within a standard deviation of 2% of wall thickness (modem methodologies can do better). Assuming for a moment that all 49 measurements within a grid measured the same wall thickness, then the average would have had a standard deviation of 2/7 % or about 0.3% of wall thickness which corresponds to +/- 2.5 mils or 95% confidence limits of +- 5 mils. Since however, not all measurements within the grid were of the same wall thickness, the variability of individual measurements within the grid must have been larger than the standard deviation derived from instrument capability. Exelon assures us that "the tolerance is or the order of +/- 10 mils. As it turns out, the variability of the AMGT for the three measurements for a particular grid expressed as a standard deviation in almost all cases exceeds the +/- 10 mils by a large margin. I interpret this as a systematic error in the UT methodology employed. Moreover, the repeated trends over time observed in Fig. 1 below from high to low to high values underlines the unreliability to these UT measurements. Clearly, the methodology chosen by Exelon to monitor corrosion in the sandbed area is difficult in practice for a number of reasons. However, these difficulties do not excuse the improper extrapolation of sporadic data obtained over a four-year period to another 10 years and the untenable and irresponsible conclusion that corrosion in the sandbed area therefore is under control. There is no doubt that the application of the epoxy coating has slowed the corrosion over the four years from 1992 to 1996. However, no assurances have been given that in the following years the environmental conditions in the sand bed area remained the

same. Neither have there been any assertions that the epoxy coating did not deteriorate over time. Nor does one have any information about the rate of deterioration. It is well known that coatings (generally speaking) perform well for a period of time, but then deteriorate rapidly. In light of such knowledge, coupled with the reliability of the UT data submitted by Exelon, we find an inspection schedule stretched out over 10 years as proposed in ref. document totally irresponsible. Dr. Rudolf H. Hausler C.

I Figure 1 UT Meassurments at Different Locations and Different Dates Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Plant X 1.05 - oSB 9-D I -u-SB 11-A SB 11-C top 0.95 -- SB 11-C bot SB 13-A X 0.9 -SB 13 A top E SB 13 A bot

0.85 -

-SB 15-D 0.8 I Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Date of Measurements

D. Ashley - FW: Audit 0 & A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210 356)P Pagel1 From: <George.Becktexeloncorp.com> To: <djal @nrc.gov>, crkmanrc.gov> Date: 04/0512006 5:02:53 PM

Subject:

FW: Audit Q & A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210,356) Note: As originally transmitted this email was undeliverable to the NRC; it exceeded the size limit. It Is being retransmitted without the AMP-210.pdf. This file will be reconstituted and sent In smaller U.pdfs; the first 11 pages are attached. George

• -Criginal Message-

> From: Beck, George > Sent: Wednesday, April 05,2006 4:39 PM

• To:

Donnie Ashley (E-mail); 'Roy Mathew (E-mall) '(E-mail) > Cc: Ouaou, Ahmed; Hufnagel Jr, John G; Warfel Sr, Donald B; Polaski, Frederick W

• Sublect:

Audit 0 & A (Question Numbers AMP-1 41, 210,356) > Donnle/Roy, > Attached are the responses to AMP-21 0 and AMP-356 in an updated version of the reports from the AMP/AMR Audit database. Also included Is a revised version of AMP-141. These answers have been reviewed and approved by Technical Lead, Don Warfel.

• Regarding AMP-210, please note:
• As po nted out In our response to NRC Question AMP-210, (8a)(1), "The 0.806" minimum average thickness verbally discussed with the Staff during the AMIP audit was recorded In location 19A In 1994.

Additional reviews after the audit noted that lower minimum average thickness values were recorded at the same location In 1991 (0.803") and In September 1992 (0.800"). However, the three values are wthin the tolerance of +/- 0.010" discussed with the Staff." > Regarding AMP-141, please note: > Our response to AMP-141 has been revised to reflect additional Information developed during the ongoing preparation of RAI responses. > Pleaso let John Hufnagel or me know if you have any questions. > George > > c<Pages from AMP-210.pdf>> > > c<AMP-141.pdf> > ><<AdMP-356.pdf>>

• ~****4***************.***I.**t*

This e-mall and any of Its attachments may contain Exelon Corporation proprietary Information, which is privileged, confidential, or subject to copyright belonging to the Exelon Corporation family of Companies. This e-mail is Intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which It is addressed. If you are not the Intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution,

D. Ashley -FW: AuditQ& A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210, 356) Page 2 copying, or action taken In relation to the contents of and attachments to this e-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have receive i this e-mail in error, please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this e-mail and any printout. Thank You.

• • .*...~

CC: <ahmed.ouaou~exeloncorp.com>, <John.hufnagelexeloncorp.com>, <donalcI.warfelexeloncorp.com>, <fred.poIasklexeloncorp.com>

I c.VemPGW)0000I.TMP Page 1 - I c:MemiAGW)OOOO1.ThIP Page 1 Mail Envelope Properties (44343066.C5F: 19 : 7263)

Subject:

Creation Date: From: Created By: FW: Audit Q & A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210, 356) 04/05/2006 5:01:.46 PM <George.Beck~exeloncorp.com> George.Beck~exeloncorp-com Recipients nrc.gov 0WGWPO01l.HQGWD00I DM1I (D. Ashley) nrc.gov TWGWPOO0l.HQGWD00I RYKM (Roy Mathew) exeloncorp.corn fred-polaski CC donald.warfel CC john-hufnagel CC ahmed.ouaou CC Post Office 0WGIVP00IHQGWD00I TWGIVPOO1I.HQGWDOOI Files MESSAGE TEXT.htm Pages from AMP-210.pdf AMP-I 41.pdf AMP--'56.pdf Mirne.822 Option:; Expiration Date: Priority: Reply Requested: Return Notification: Concealed

Subject:

Securily: Route nrc.gov nrc.gov exeloncorp.com Size 2679 5457 64593 47353 71556 262768 Date & Time 05 April, 2006 5:01:46 PM None Standard No None No Standard

JNRC Information Request Forml Item No Date Received: Source AMP-210 1/24/2006 AMP Audit Topic: Status: Open IWE Document

References:

6.1.27 NRCRepres.wntative Morante, Rich AmerGen (Took Issue): Hufnagel, Joh Question Pages 25 through 31 of the PBD present a discussion of the OCGS operating experience. (8a)The following statements related to drywell corrosion In the sand bed region need further explanation and clarification: As a result of the presence of water In the sand bed region, extensive UT thickness measurements (about 1000) of the drywell shell were taken to determine If degradation was occurring. These measurements corresponded t6 known water leaks and Indicated that wall thinning had occurred In this region. Please explain the underlined statement. Were water leaks limited to only a portion of the circumference? Was wall thinning found only in these areas? After sand removal, the concrete surface below the sand was found to be unfinished with Improper provisions for water drainage. Corrective actions taken In this region during 1992 included; (1) cleaning of loose rust from the drywell shell, followed by application of epoxy coating and (2) removing the loose debris from the concrete floor followed by rebuilding and reshaping the floor with epoxy to allow drainage of any water that may leak Into the region. UT measurements taken from the outside after cleaning verified loss of material projections that had been made based on measurements taken from the Inside of the dywell. There were, however, some areas thinner than projected; but In all cases engineering analysis determined that the drywell shell thickness satisfied ASME code requirements. Please describe the concrete surface below the sand that Is discussed In paragraph above. Please provide the following Information: (1) Identify the minimum recorded thickness In the sand bed region from the outside inspection, and the minimum recorded thickness In the sand bed region from the inside Inspections. Is this consistent with previous Information provided verbally? (.806 minimum) (2) What was the projected thickness based on measurements taken from the Inside? (3) Describe the engineering analysis that determined satisfaction of ASME code requirements and identify the minimum required thickness value. Is this consistent with previous Information provided verbally? (.733 minimum) (4) Is the minimum required thickness based on stress or buckling criteria? (5) ReconcilE and compare the thickness measurements provided In (1) and (3) above with the.736 minimum cotToded thickness that was used In the NUREG-1540 analysis of the degraded Oyster

INRCInformation Request oz Creek sand bed region. Evaluation of UT measurements taken from Inside the drywell, in the in the former sand bed region, in 1992, 1994, and 1996 confirmed that corrosion is mitigated. It Is therefore concluded that corrosion In the sand bed region has been arrested and no further loss of material is expected. Monitoring of the coating in accordance with the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program, will continue to ensure that the containment drywell shell maintains its intended function during the period of extended operation. NUREG-1540, published In April 1996, Includes the following statements related to corrosion of the Oyster Creek sand bed region: (page vii) However, to assure that these measures are effective, the licensee Is required to perform periodic UT measurements. and (page 2) As assurance that the corrosion rate is slower than the rate obtained from previous measurements, GPU is committed to make UT measurements periodically. Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT Inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent requirement/commitment documented In NUREG-1540. (8b)The following statement related to drywell corrosion above the sand bed region needs further explanation and clarification: Corrective action for these regions Involved providing a corrosion allowance by demonstrating, through ana ysis, that the original drywell design pressure was conservative. Amendment 165 to the Oyster Creek Technical Specifications reduced the drywell design pressure from 62 psig to 44 psig. The new design pressure coupled with measures to prevent water Intrusion Into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements. Please describe the measures to prevent water Intrusion into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements. Are these measures to prevent water Intrusion credited for LR? If not, how will ASME code requirements be met during the extended period of operation? (8c)The following statements related to torus degradation need further explanation and clarification: Inspection performed In 2002 found the coating to be In good condition in the vapor area of the Torus and vent header, and In fair condition in immersion. Coating deficiencies in Immersion include blistering, random and mechanical damage. Blistering occurs primarily In the shell Invert but was also noted on the upper shell near the water line. The fractured blisters were repaired to reestablish the protective coating barrier. This Is another example of objective evidence that the Oyster Creek ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE aging management program can identify degradation and implement corrective actions to prevent the loss of the containment's Intended function. While blistering Is considered a deficiency, It is significant only when It Is fractured and exposes the base metal to corrosion attack. The majority of the blisters remain Intact and continues to protect the base metal; consequently the corrosion rates are low. Qualitative assessment of the Identified pits Indicate that the measured pit depths (50 mils max) are significantly less than the criteria established

INRCInformation Request Forml In Specification SP-1 302-52-120 (141-261 mils, depending on diameter of the pit and spacing between pit-;). Please confirm or clarify (1) that only the fractured blisters found In this Inspection were repaired; (2) pits were identified where the blisters were fractured; (3) pit depths were measured and found to 50 mils max; (4) the Inspection Specification SP-1302-52-120 Includes pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pitting; (5) the minimum pit depth of concern is 141 mils (.141) and pits as deep as 261 mils (.261) may be acceptable. Please also provide the following Information: nominal design, as-built, and minimum measured thickness of the torus; minimum thickness required to meet ASME code acceptance criteria; the technical basis for the pitting acceptance criteria Include In Specification SP-1302-52-120 Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed

Response

(8a) Questicn: Please explain the underlined statement. Were water leaks limited to only a porticn of the circumference? Was wall thinning only In these area?

Response

This statement was not meant to Indicate that water leaks were limited to only a portion of the circumference. The statement Is meant to reflect the fact that water leakage was observed coming out of certain sand bed region drains and those locations were suspect of wall thinning. No. Wall thinning was not limited to the areas where water leakage from the drains was observed. Wall thinning occurred In all areas of the sand bed region based on UT measurements and visual inspection of the area conducted after the sand was removed in 1992. However the degree of wall thinning varied from location to location. For example 60% of the measured locations in the sand bed region (bays 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 15) Indicate that the average measured drywell shell thickness Is nearly the same as the design nominal thickness and that these locations experienced negligible wall thinning; whereas bay 19A experienced approximately 30% reduction In wall thickness. Question: Please discuss the concrete surface below the sand that Is discussed In paragraph above.

Response

The concrete surface below the sand was Intended to be shaped to promote flow toward each of the five sand bed drains. However once the sand was removed It was discovered that the floor was not properly finished and shaped as required to permit proper drainage. Therevwere low' points, craters, and rough surfaces that could allow moisture to pool instead of flowing smoothly toward the drains. These concrete surfaces were refurbished to fill low areas, smooth rough surfaces, argi coat these surfaces with epoxy coating to promote Improved drainage. The drywell shell at juncture of the concrete flocr was sealed with an elastomer to prevent water intrusion into the embedded drywell shell. Question: Please provide the following Information:

INRCInformation Request Form (1) Identify the minimum recorded thickness In the sand bed region from the outside inspection, End the minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from the inside inspections. Is this consistent with previous Information provided verbally? (.806 minimum) (2) What was the projected thickness based on measurements taken from the inside? (3) Describo the engineering analysis that determined satisfaction of ASME code requirements and Identify the minimum required thickness value. Is this consistent with previous information provided verbally? (.733 minimum) (4) Is the minimum required thickness based on stress or buckling criteria? (5) Reconcile and compare the thickness measurements provided in (1) and (3) above with the.736 minimum corroded thickness that was used In the NUREG-1540 analysis of the degraded Oyster Creek sand bed region.

Response

1. The minimum recorded thickness In the sand bed region from outside Inspection is 0.618 inches.

The minimum recorded thickness in the sand bed region from inside Inspections is 0.603. These minimum recorded thicknesses are isolated local measurement and represent a single point UT measurement. The 0.806 inches thickness provided to the Staff verbally is an average minimum general thickness calculated based on 49 UT measurements taken in an area that is approximately 6"x 6". Thus the two local Isolated minimum recorded thicknesses cannot be compared directly to the general thickness of 0.806". The 0.806" minimum average thickness verbally discussed with the Staff during the AMP audit was recorded in location 19A in 1994. Additional reviews after the audit noted that lower minimum average thickness values were recorded at the same location in 1991 (0.803") and in September 1992 (0.800"). However, the three values are within the tolerance of +/- 0.010" discussed with the Staff.

2. The minimum projected thickness depends on whether the trended data is before or after 1992 as demonstrated by corrosion trends provided in response to NRC Question #AMP-356. For license renewal, using corrosion rate trends after 1992 Is appropriate because of corrosion mitigating measures such as removal of the sand and coating of the shell. Then, using corrosion rate trends based on 1E92. 1994. and 1996 UT data; and the minimum average thickness measured In 1992 (0.800"), the minimum projected average thickness through 2009 and beyond remains approximately 0.800 Inches. The projected minimum thickness during and through the period of extended operation will be reevaluated after UT Inspections that will be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation, and after the periodic UT Inspection every 10 years thereafter.

3.The engineering analysis that demonstrated compliance to ASME code requirements was performed In two parts, Stress and Stability Analysis with Sand, and Stress and Stability Analyses without Sand. The analyses are documented In GE Reports Index No. 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, and 9-4, were transmitted to the NRC Staff in December 1990 and In 1991 respectively. Index No. 9-3 and 9-4, were revised later to correct errors Identified during an Internal audit and were resubmitted to the Staff in JanLary 1992 (see attachment I & 2). The analyses are briefly described below. The drywell shell thickness In the sand bed region is based on Stability Analysis without Sand. As

NRC Information Request Form 3 described In detail in attachment I & 2, the analysis is based on a 36-degree section model that takes advantage of symmetry of the drywell with 10 vents. The model Includes the drywell shell from the base of the sand bed region to the top of elliptical head and the vent and vent header. The torus is not Included in this model because the bellows provide a very flexible connection, which does not allow significant structural interaction between the drywall and the torus. The analysis conservatively assumed that the shell thickness In the entire sand bed region has been reduced uniformly to a thickness of 0.736 Inches. As discussed with the Staff during the AMP audit, the basic approach used In the buckling evaluation follows the methodology outlined In ASME Code Case N-284 revision 0 that was reconciled later with revision I o4 the Code Case. Following the procedure of this Code Case, the allowable compressive stress Is evaluated In three steps. In the first step, a theoretical buckling stress is determined, and secondly modified using appropriate capacity and plasticity reduction factors. In the final step, the allowable compressive stress is obtained by dividing the buckling stress calculated In the second step by a safety factor of 2.0 for Design and Level A & B service conditions and 1.67 Level C service conditions. Using the approach described above, the analysis shows that for the most severe design basis load combinations, the limits of ASME Section 111, Subsection NE 3213.10 are fully met. For additional details refer to Attachment I & 2. As described above, the buckling analysis was performed assuming a uniform general thickness of the sand bed region of 0.736 Inches. However the UT measurements Identified Isolated, localized areas where the drywell shell thickness is less than 0.736 inches. Acceptance for these areas was based on erngineering calculation C-1302-187-5320-024. The calculation uses a Local Wall Acceptance Criteria'. This criterion can be applied to small areas (less than 12" by 12"), which are less than 0.736" thick so long as the small 12" by 12" area Is at least 0.536" thick. However the calculation does not provide additional criteria as to the acceptable distance between multiple small areas. For example, the minimum required linear distances between a 12" by 12" area thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536" and another 12" by 12" area thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536" were not provided. The actual data for two bays (13 and 1) shows that there are more than one 121 by 12" areas thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.536". Also the actual data for two bays shows that there are more than one 2 'Wu diameter areas thinner than 0.736" but thicker than 0.490". Acceptance Is based on the following evaluation. The effect of these very local wall thickness areas on the buckling of the shell requires some discussion of the buckling mechanism in a shell of revolution under an applied axial and lateral pressure load. To begin the discussion we will describe the buckling of a simply supported cylindrical shell under the Influence of lateral pressure and axial load. As described in chapter 11 of the Theory of Elastic Stability. Second Edition, by Timoshenko and Gere, thin cylindrical shells buckle in lobes in both the

INRC Information Request Forin axial and circumferential directions. These lobes are defined as half wave lengths of sinusoidal functions. The functions are governed by the radius, thickness and length of the cylinder. If we look at a specific thin walled cylindrical shell both the length and radius would be essentially constants and if the thickness was changed locally the change would have to be significant and continuous over a majority of the lobe so that the compressive stress In the lobe would exceed the critical buckling stress under the applied loads, thereby causing the shell to buckle locally. This approach can be easily extrapolated to any shell of revolution that would experience both an axial load and lateral pressure as In the case of the drywell. This local lobe buckling Is demonstrated In The GE Letter Report "Sandbed Local Thinning and Raising the Fixity Height Analysism where a 12 x 12 square inch section of the drywell sand bed region Is reduced by 200 mils and a local buckle occurred In the finite element elgenvalue extraction analysis of the drywell. Therefore, to Influence the buckling of a shell the very loc1l areas of reduced thickness would have to be contiguous and of the same thickness. This is also consistent with Code Case 284 In Section -1700 which Indicates that the average stress values In the shell should be used for calculating the buckling stress. Therefore, an acceptable distance between areas of reduced thickness is not required for an acceptable buckling analysis except that the area of reduced thickness Is small enough not to Influence a buckling lobe of the shell. The very local areas of thickness are dispersed over a wide area with varying thickness and as such will have a negligible effect on the buckling response of the drywell. In addition, these very local wall areas are centered about the vents, which significantly stiffen the shell. This stiffening effect limits the shell buckling to a point in the shell sand bed region which Is located at the midpoint between two vents. The acceptance criteria for the thickness of 0.49 Inches confined to an area less than 2X2 Inches in diameter experiencing primary membrane + bending stresses Is based on ASME B&PV Code, Section III, subsection NE, Class MC Components, Paragraphs NE-3213.2 Gross Structural Discontinuity, NE-3213.10 Local Primary Membrane Stress, NE-3332.1 Openings not Requiring Reinforcement, NE-3332.2 Required Area of Reinforcement and NE-3335.1 Reinforcement of Multiple Openings. The use of Paragraph NE-3332.1 Is limited by the requirements of Paragraphs NE-3213.2 and.NE-3213.10. In particular NE-3213.10 limits the meridional distance between openings without reinforcement to 2.5 x (square root of Rt). Also Paragraph NE-3335.1 only applies to openings In shells that are closer than two times their average diameter. The Implications of these paragraphs are that shell failures at these locations from primary stresses produced by pressure cannot occur provided openings In shells have sufficient reinforcement. The current design pressure of 44 psig for drywell requires a thickness of 0.479 Inches In the sand bed region of the drywell. A review of all the UT data presented in Appendix D of the calculation Indicates that all thicknesses In the drywell sand bed region exceed the required pressure thickness by a substantial rnargin. Therefore, the requirements for pressure reinforcement specified In the previous paragraph are not required for the very local wall thickness evaluation presented In Revision 0 of Calculation C-1302-187-5320-024. Reviewing the stability analyses provided In both the GE Report 9-4 and the GE Letter Report Sand bed Local Thinning and Raising the Fixity Height Analysis and recognizing that the plate elements In the sand bed region of the model are 3" x 3" It is clear that the circumferential buckling lobes for the

NRC Information st Form drywell are substantially larger than the 2 % Inch diameter very local wall areas. This combined with the local reinforcement surrounding these local areas indicates that these areas will have no Impact on the buckling margins In the shell. It is also clear from the GE Letter Report that a uniform reduction In thickness of 27% to 0.536" over a one square foot area would only create a 9.5% reduction In the load factor and theoretical buckling stress for the whole drywell resulting In the largest reduction possible. In addition, to the reported result for the 27% reduction In wall thickness, a second buckling analysis was performed for a wall thickness. reduction of 13.5% over a one square foot area which only reduced the load factor and theoretical buckling stress by 3.5% for the whole drywell resulting In the largest reduction possible. To bring these results Into perspective a review of the NDE reports Indicate there are 20 UT measured areas in the whole sand bed region that have thicknesses less than the 0.736 Inch thickness used In GE Report 9-4 which cover a conservative total area of 0.68 square feet of the drywell surface with an average thickness of 0.703" or a 4.5% reduction in wall thickness. Therefore, to effectively change the buckling margins on the drywell shell in the sand bed region a reduced thickness would have to cover approximately one square foot of shell area at a location In the shell that is most susceptible to buckling with a reduction in thickness greater than 25%. This leads to the conclusion that the buckling of the shell Is unaffected by the distance between the very local wall thicknesses, In fact these local areas could be contiguous provided their total area did not exceed one square foot and their average thickness was greater than the thickness analyzed In the GE Letter Report and provided the methodology of Code Case N284 was employed to determine the allowable buckling load for the drywell. Furthermore, all of these very local wall areas are centered about the vents, which significantly stiffen the shell. This stiffing effect limits the shell buckling to a point In the shell sand bed regiori, which is located at the midpoint between two vents. The minimumr thickness of 0.733" is not correct. The correct minimum thickness Is 0.736".

4. The minimum required thickness for the sand bed region Is controlled by buckling.

5. We cannot reconcile the difference between the current (lowest measured) of 0.736" In NUREG-1540 and tha minimum measured thickness of 0.806 Inches we discussed with the Staff. Perhaps the value in NUREG-1540 should be labeled minimum required by the Code, as documented In several correspondences with the Staff, instead of lowest measured. In a letter dated September 15, 1895, GPU provided the Staff a table that lists sand bed region thicknesses. The table Indicates that nominal thickness Is 1.154". the minimum measured thickness In 1994 is 0.806", and the minimumn thickness required by Code is 0.736". These thicknesses are consistent with those discussed with the Staff during the AMP/AMR audit.

Question: NUREG-1540, published In April 1996, Includes the following statements related to corrosion of the Oyster Creek sand bed region: (page vii) However, to assure that these measures are effective, the licensee Is required to perform periodic UT measurements. and (page 2) As assurance that the corrosion rate Is slower than the rate obtained from previous measurements, GPU is committed to make UT measurements periodically. Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT Inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent requirement commitment documented In NUREG-1540.Please reconcile the aging management commitment (one-time UT inspection and monitoring of the condition of the coating) with the apparent requirement commitment documented In NUREG-1 540.

lNRC Information Request Forme

Response

Our review of NUREG-1540, page 2 Indicates that the statements appear to be based on 1991, or 1993 GPU commitment to perform periodic UT measurements. In fact UT thickness measurements were taken :n the sand bed region from Inside the drywell In 1992, and 1994. The trend of the UT measurements indicates that corrosion has been arrested. As results GPU Informed NRC in a letter dated September 15, 1995 (ref. 2) that UT measurements will be taken one more time, In 1996, and the epoxy orating will be Inspected in 1996 and, as a minimum again In 2000. The UT measurements were taken In 1996, per the commitment, and confirmed corrosion rate trend of 1992 and 1994. The results of 1992, 1994, and 1996 UT measurements were provided to the Staff during the AMP/AUIR audits. In response to GPU September 15, 1995 letter, NRC Staff found the proposed changes to sand bed region commitments (i.e. no additional UT measurements after 1996) reasonable and acceptable. This response Is documented in November 1, 1995 Safety Evaluation for the Drywell Monitoring Program. For license renewal, Oyster Creek was previously committed to perform One-Time UT Inspection of the drywell shell in the sand bed region prior to entering the period of extended operation. However, In response to NRC Question #AMP-141, Oyster Creek revised the commitment to perform UT Inspections ?eriodically. The initial inspection will be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation and additional inspections will be conducted every 10 years thereafter. The UT measurements will be taken from Inside the drywell at same locations as 1996 UT campaign (8b) Question: Please describe the measures to prevent water intrusion Into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to meet ASME code requirements. Are these measures to prevent water Intrusion credited for LR? If not, how will ASME code requirements be met during the extended period of operation?

Response

The measures taken to prevent water Intrusion Into the gap between the drywell shell and the concrete that will allow the upper portion of the drywell to maintain the ASME code requirements are,

1. Cleared the former sand bed region drains to Improve the drainage path.

2. Replaced reactor cavity steel trough drain gasket, which was found to be leaking.

3. Applied stainless steel type tape and strippable coating to the reactor cavity during refueling outages to seal Identified cracks In the stainless steel liner.

4. Confirmed that the reactor cavity concrete trough drains are not clogged S. Monitored former sand bed region drains and reactor cavity concrete trough drains for leakage during refueling outages and plant operation.

Oyster Creek Is committed to Implement these measures during the period of extended operation. (8c) Please confirm or clarify (1) that only the fractured blisters found In this Inspection were repaired; (2) pits were identified where the blisters were fractured; (3) pit depths were measured and found to

fNRCInfornation Requestm 50 mils ma):; (4) the Inspection Specification SP-1302-52-120 Includes pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pItting; (5) the minimum pit depth of concern Is 141 mils (.141) and pits as deep as 261 mils (.261) may be acceptable.

Response

(1) Specification SP-1302-52-120, Specification for Inspection and Localized Repair of the Torus and Vent System Coating, specifies repair requirements for coating defects exposing substrate and fractured blisters showing signs of corrosion. The repairs referred to In the Inspection report Included fractured blisters, as well as any mechanically damaged areas, which have exposed bare metal showing signs of corrosion. Therefore, only fractured blisters would be candidates for repair, not those blisters that remain Intact. The number and location of repairs are tabulated in the final Inspection report prepared by Underwater Construction Corporation. (2) Coating deficiencies In the immersion region included blistering with minor mechanical damage. Blistering occurred primarily In the shell Invert but was also noted on the upper shell near the water line. The majority of the blisters were Intact. Intact blisters were examined by removing the blister cap exposing the substrate. Corrosion attack under non-fractured blisters was minimal and was generally limited to surface discoloration. Examination of the substrate revealed slight discoloration and pitting vith pit depths less than 0.001. Several blistered areas included pitting corrosion where the blisters were fractured. The substrate beneath fractured blisters generally exhibited a slightly heavier magnetite oxide layer and minor pitting (less than 0.010") of the substrate. (3) In addition to blistering, random deficiencies that exposed base metal were identified in the torus Immersion region coating (e.g., minor mechanical damage) during the 19R (2002) torus coating inspections. They ranged in size from 1116" to Y/2" In diameter. Pitting In these areas was qualitatively evaluated and ranged from less than 10 mils to slightly more than 40 mils in a few isolated cases. Three quanlitative pit depth measurements were taken In several locations In the immersion area of Bay 1. Pit depths at these sites ranged from 0.008" to 0.042" and were judged to be representative of typical conditions found on the shell. Prior to 200:2 Inspection 4 pits greater than 0.040" were Identified. The pits depth are 0.058" (1 pit in 1988), 0.05' (2 pits In 1991), and 0.0685" (1 pit in 1992). The pits were evaluated against the local pit depth acceptance criteria and found to be acceptable. (4) Specification SP-1302-52-120, Specification for Inspection and Localized Repair of the Torus and Vent System Coating, includes the pit-depth acceptance criteria for rapid evaluation of observed pitting. The acceptance criteria are supported by a calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. Locations that do not meet the pit-depth acceptance criteria are characterized based on the size of the area, center to center distance between corroded areas, the maximum pit depth and location in the Torus based on major stnrctural features. These details are sent to Oyster Creek Engineering for evaluation. (5) The acceptance criteria for pit depth is as follows: -isolated Pit:; of 0.125" In diameter have an allowed maximum depth of 0.261" anywhere In the shell provided the center to center distance between the subject pit and neighboring Isolated pits or areas of pitting corrosion is greater than 20.0 Inches. This Includes old pits or old areas of pitting corrosion that have been filled and/or re-coated.

N]RC Informato Request om -Multiple Pits that can be encompassed by a 2-1/2" diameter circle shall be limited to a maximum pit depth of 0.141" provided the center to center distance between the subject pitted area and neighboring Isolated pits or areas of pitting corrosion is greater than 20.0 inches. This includes old pits or old areas of pitting corrosion that have been filled and/or recoated. Question: Please also provide the following Information: nominal design, as-built, and minimum measured thickness of the torus; minimum thickness required to meet ASME code acceptance criteria; the technical basis for the pitting acceptance criteria include in Specification SP-1302-52-120

Response

Submersed area: (a) The nominal Design thickness is 0.385 Inches (b) The as-built thickness Is 0.385 inches (c) The minimum uniform measured thickness Is, 0.343 inches - general shell 0.345 inches - shell - ring girders 0.345 inches - shell - saddle flange 0.345 inches - shell - torus straps (d) The minimum general thickness required to meet ASME Code Acceptance Is 0.337 Inches. Technical basis for pitting acceptance criteria included in Specification SP-1302-52-120 is based on engineering calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. At the time of preparation of calculation C-1302-187-E310-038 In 2002 there were no published methods to calculate acceptance standards for locally thinned areas in ASME Section III or Section Vill Pressure Vessel codes. Therefore, the approach in Code Case N-597 was used as guidance In assessing locally thinned areas In the Torus. This Is based on the similarity in approaches between Local Thinning Areas described In N597 and Local Primary Stress areas described in Paragraph NE3213.10 of the ASME B&PV Code Section iii, particularly small areas of wall thinning which do not exceed 1.0 x (square root of Rt). In addition, the ASME B&PA/ Code Section III, Subsection NB, Paragraph NB-3630 allows the analysis of pipe systems In accordance with the Vessel Analysis rules described in Paragraph NB-3200 of the same Subsection as an alternate analysis approach. Therefore, the approach used in N597 for local areas of thinning v/as probably developed using the rules for Local Primary Membrane Stress from paragraph NB-3200 in particular Subparagraph 3213.10. The Local Primary Stress Umits In NB-3213.10 are similar to those discussed In Subsection NE, Paragraph NE-3213.10. Since the Code Case had not yet been Invoked In to the Section Xl program, the calculation provided a reconciliation of the results obtained from the code case against the ASME Section III code requirements as discussed above. This reconciliation demonstrated that the approach in N597 used on a pressure vessel such as the Torus would be acceptable since the results are conservative compared to the previous work performed In MPR-953 and Lm(a) (defined in N597 Table-3622-1) £ (Rmintmin)1/2. Currently, the maximum pit depth measured in the Torus Is a 0.0685' ( measured in 1992 in bay 2). It was evaluated as acceptable using the design calculations existing at that time and was not based on

JNRC Information Request Forml Calculation C-1302-187-E310-038. This remains the bounding wall thickness In the Torus. The criterion developed In 2002 for local thickness acceptance provides an easier method for evaluating as-found pils. The results were shown to be conservative versus the original ASME Section III and Vill Code requirements for the Torus. The Torus Inspection program Is being enhanced per IR 373695 to Improve the detail of the acceptance criteria and margin management requirements using the ASME Section III criteria. The approach used in C-1302-187-E310-038 will be clarified as to how it maintains the code requirements. If Code Case N-597-1 is required to develop these criteria for future Inspections, NRC review and approval will be obtained. It should also be noted that the program has established corrosion rate criteria and continues to periodically monitor to verify they remain bounded. LRCR #: LRA 4.S Commitment #: IR#: Approvals: Prepared By: Ouaou, Ahmed 4/ 5/2006 Reviewed By: Miller, Mark 4/ 5/2006 ApprovedBy: Warfel, Don 4/5/2006 NRCAcceptance (Date):

INRC Information Request Forml Itent No DateReceived: Source AMP-356 2/16/2006 AMP Audit TopIc: Status: Open IWE Document

References:

NRCRepresentativc Morante, Rich AmerGen (Took Issue): Ouestion IWE AMP Question 4 IWE AMP Revised Feb. 17,2006 R. Morante (AMP-356) (1) Identify the specific locations around the circumference in the former sandbed region where ur thickness readings have been and will be taken from Inside containment. Confirm that all points previously nrcorded will be Included in future Inspections. (2) Describe the grid pattern at each location (meridional length, circumferential length, grid point spacing, total number of point readings), and graphically locate each grid pattern within the former sandbed region. (3) For eaci grid location, submit a graph of remaining thickness versus time, using the UT readings since the initiation of the program (both prior to and following removal of the sand and application of the external coating). (4) Clearly describe the methodology and acceptance criteria that Is applied to each grid of point thickness readings, Including both global (entire array) evaluation and local (subregion of array) evaluation. Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed

Response

Response:

1. The circumference of the drywell Is divided Into 10 bays, designated as Bays 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,13, 15, 17, and 19. UT thickness readings have been taken In each bay at one or more locations. The specific locations around the circumference In the former sand bed region where UT thickness reading have been taken from Inside containment are Bay ID, 3D, 5D, 7D, 9A, 9D, 11A, IIC, 13A, 13C, 13D, 15A, 15D, 17A, 17D, 17119 Frame, 19A, 19B, and 19C. For each location, UT measurements were taken centered at elevation 11 V-30. These represent the locations where UT measurements were taken In 1992, 1994, and 1996.

INRC Information Request Form l In addition IJT measurements were taken one time Inside 2 trenches excavated In drywell floor concrete. The purpose of these UT measurements Is to determine the extent of corrosion In the lower portions of the sand bed region prior to removing the sand and making accessible for visual Inspection. Future UT thickness measurements will be taken at the same locations as those inspected In 1996 In accordance with Oyster Creek commitment documented In NRC Question #AMP-209.

2. For locations where the Initial investigations found significant wall thinning (9D, I IA, II C, 13A, 13D, 15D, 17A, 17D, 17/19 Frame, 19A, 193, and 19C) the grid pattern consists of 7 x 7 grid centered at elevation 1 '-3 (meridian) and centered at the centerline of the tested location within each bay, which consists of 6"x 6" square template. The grid spacing is 1" on center. There are 49 point readings. For graphical location of the grid, refer to attachment 1.

For locations where the Initial Investigations found no significant wall thinning (1D, 3D, SD, 7D, 9A, 13C, and ISA) the grid pattern consists of I x 7 grid centered at elevation 11'-3" (meridian) on 1" centers. There are 7 point readings. For graphical location of the grid, refer to attachment 1.

3. A graph representing the remaining thickness versus time using UT reading since the Initiation of the program (both prior to and following removal of the sand and application of the external coating) forlocation gD, 1A, IIC, 13A, 13D,15D,17A,17D,17/19,19A,19B, and 19C is included in the attached graph. Other locations (i.e.1 D, 3D, SD, 7D, 9A, 13C, and 15A) are not Included because wall thinning Is not significant and the trend line will be essentially a straight line.

4. The methodology and acceptance criteria that is applied to each grid of point thickness readings, Including both global (entire array) evaluation and local (subregion of array) is described in engineering specification IS-328227-004 and In calculation No. C-1302-187-5300-011. These documents ivere submitted to the NRC In a letter dated November 26, 1990 and provided to the Staff during the AMPIAMR audit. A brief summary of the methodology and acceptance criteria Is described below.

The Initial locations where corrosion loss was most severe In 1986 and 1987 were selected for repeat Inspection over time to measure corrosion rate. For location where the initial investigations found significant wall thinning UT inspection consists of 49 Individual UT data points equally spaced over a 6'x 6' area. Each new set of 49 values was then tested for normal distribution. The mean values of each grid were then compared to the required minimum uniform thickness criteria of 0.,'36. In addition each Individual reading Is compared to the local minimum required criteria of 0.49. The basis for the required minimum uniform thickness criteria and the local minimum required critoria is provided in response to NRC Question #AMP-210. A decrease In the mean value over time Is representative of corrosion. If corrosion does not exist, the mean value will not vary with time except for random variations In the UT measurements.

INC Information Request om If corrosion is continuing, the mean thickness will decrease linearly with time. Therefore the curve fit of the data Is tested to determine if linear regression is appropriate, in which case the corrosion rate Is equal to the slope of the line. If a slope exists, then upper and lower 95% confidence intervals of the curve fit are calculated. The lower 95% confidence interval Is then projected Into the future and compared to the required minimum uniform thickness criteria of 0.736. A similar process Is applied to the thinnest individual reading in each grid. The curve fit of the data Is tested to determine If linear regression Is appropriate. If a slope exists, then the lower 95% confidence nterval Is then projected Into the future and compared to the required minimum local thickness criteria of.49. LRCR #: LRA A.S Conmnitment #: IR#: Approvals: Prepared By: Ouaou, Ahmed 414/2006 Rcviewcd By: Getz, Stu 415/2006 ApprovedBy: Warfel, Don 415/2006 NRCAcceptance (Date):

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fNRCInforation Request Forin Itet No Date Received: Source AMP-141 10/612005 AMP Audit Topic: Status: Open IWE Document

References:

B.1.27 NRCRepres.antatdve Morante, Rich AmerGen (Teok Issue): Hufnagel, Joh Question AMP 8.1.27 IWE

a. Visual Inspection of the coatings in the former sandbed region of the drywell Is currently conducted under the applicant's protective coatings monitoring and maintenance program; only this AMP Is credited for managing loss of material due to corrosion for license renewal. Visual Inspection of the containment shell conducted In accordance with the requirements of IWE Is typically credited to manage loss of material due to corrosion.

The applicant is requested to provide its technical basis for not also crediting its IWE program for managing Icss of material due to corrosion in the former sandbed region of the drywell. B. During discussions with the applicant's staff on 10104/05 about augmented inspection conducted under IWE, the applicant presented tabulated inspection results obtained from the mid 1980s to the present, to monitor the remaining drywell wall thickness in the cylindrical and spherical regions where significant corrosion of the outside surface was previously detected. The applicant Is requested to provide (1) a copy of these tabulated Inspection results, (2) a list of the nominal design thicknesses In each region of the drywell, (3) a list of the minimum required thicknesses In each region of the drywell, and (4) a list of the projected remaining wall thicknesses In each region of the drywell In the year 2029. AMP B.1.27 IWE Question on Remaining Wall Thickness In the Former Sandbed Region of the Drywell

c. During discussions with the applicant's staff on 10/05/05, the applicant described the history and resolution of corrosion In the sandbed region. After discovery, thickness measurements were taken from 1986 ti-rough 1992, to monitor the progression of vwall loss. Remedial actions were completed in early 1993. At that time, the remaining wall thickness exceeded the minimum required thickness. The applicant concluded that it had completely corrected the conditions which led to the corrosion, and terminated its program to monitor the remaining wall thickness. At that time, the remaining years of operation was expected to be no more than 16 years (end of the current license term).

lRInformation Request Forml The applicant's aging management commitment for license renewals is limited to periodic Inspection of the coating that was applied to the exterior surface of the drywell as part of the remedial actions. The applicant has not made a license renewal commitment to measure wall thickness In the sandbed region In order to confirm the effectiveness of the remedial actions taken. Assigned To: Ouaou, Ahmed Jesfonse.: a) Visual Inspection of the containment drywell shell, conducted In accordance with ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE, Is credited for aging management of accessible areas of the containment drywell shell. Typically this Inspection is for Internal surfaces of the drywell. The exterior surfaces of the drywell shell In the sand bed region for Mark I containment is considered Inaccessible by ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE, thus visual Inspection Is not possible for a typical Mark I containment Including Oyster Creek before the sand was removed from the sand bed region In 1992. After removal of Ihe sand, an epoxy coating was applied to the exterior surfaces of the drywell shell in the sand bed region. The region was made accessible during refueling outages for periodic Inspection of the coating. Subsequently Oyster Creek performed periodic visual Inspection of the coating In accordance with an NRC current licensing basis commitment. This commitment was Implemented prior to implementation of ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE. As a result Inspection of the coating was conducted In accordance with the Protective Coating Monitoring and Maintenance Program. Our evaluation of this aging management program concluded the program is adequate to manage aging of the drywall shell In the sand bed region during the period of extended operation consistent with the current licensing basis commitment, and that Inclusion of the coating Inspection under IWE Is not required. However we are amending this position and will commit to monitor the protective coating In the exterior surfaces of the drywell In the sand bed region In accordance with the requirements of ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWE during the period of extended operation. For details related to Implementation of this commitment, refer to the response to NRC AMP Question #188. b) A tabulation of ultrasonic testing (UT) thickness measurement results In monitored areas of the drywell spherical region above the sand bed region and In the cylindrical region Is Included In ASNIE Section Xl, Subsection IWE Program Basis Document (PBD-AMP-B.1.27) Notebook. The tabulation contains information requested by the Staff and Is available for review during AMP audit The tabulation Is also provided In Table -1, and Table-2 below. c) In December 1992, with approval from the NRC a protective epoxy coating was applied to the outside surface of the drywell shell In the sand bed region to prevent additional corrosion In that area. UT thickness measurements taken In 1992, and in 1994, In the sand bed region from Inside the drywell confirmed that the corrosion In the sand bed region has been arrested. Periodic Inspection of the coating indicates that the coating In that region Is performing satisfactorily with no signs of deterioration such as blisters, flakes, or discoloration, etc. Additional UT measurements, taken In 1996 from Inside the drywell In the sand bed region showed no ongoing corrosion and provided objective evidence that corrosion has been arrested.

fNRCInformation Rues Form As a result of these UT measurements and the observed condition of the coating, we concluded that corrosion has been arrested and monitoring of the protective coating alone, without additional UT measurements, will adequately manage loss of material in the drywell shell In the sand bed region. However to provide additional assurance that the protective coating Is providing adequate protection to ensure drywell Integrity, Oyster Creek will perform periodic confirmatory UT Inspections of the drywell shell In the sand bed region. The initial UT measurements will be taken prior to entering the period of extended operation and then every 10 years thereafter. The UT measurements wiU be taken from inside the drywell at the same locations where the UT measurements were taken In 1896. This revises the license renewal commitment communicated to the NRC in a letter from C. N. Swenson Site Vice President, Oyster Creek Generating Station to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 'Additional Commitments Associated with Application for renewed Operating Ucense - Oyster Creek Generating Station", dated 12/912005. This letter commits to one-time Inspection to be conducted prior to entering the period of extended operation. The revised commitment will be to conduct UT measurements on a frequency of 10 years, with the first Inspection to occur prior to entering the period of extended operation. This response was revised to incorporate additional commitments on UT examinations for the sand bed region discussed with NRC Audit team on 1/26/2006. This response was revised to reference response to NRC Question #AMP-188 and RAI 4.7.2-1(d). AMO 411/2006. The response was revised to add Table-1, and Table-2, and delete reference to RAI 4.7.2-1 (d) AMO 4/5/2006. LRCR #: 229 LRA A.S Co'rnmtment #: 27 RU#: Apnrovals: Prepared By: Ouaou, Ahmed 4/5/2006 Revyeoved Bay Getz, Stu 41512006 Approved By: Warfel, Don 41512006 NRCAcccptzonce (Date):

• I'

Table-11. UT Thickness measurements for the Upper Region of the Dryvell Shell Average Measured Thickness '". Inches Monitored Location Mlinimum Projected Lower Elevatlon Required 395%/ Confidencee Thickness 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 2000 2004 Thickness In 2029 inches Elevation 0.541" S0'o2, Bay 5-0.743 0.742 0.747 0.741 0.748 0.741 0.743 No Ongoing D12 0.745 0.745 0.747 Corrosion 0.746 0.748 Bay S-SH 0.761 0.755 0.758 0.754 0.757 0.754 0.756 0.7384 0.761 0.758 0.758 0.760 Bay 5-5L 0.706 0.703 0.703 0.702 0.705 0.706 0.701 No Ongoing 0.703 0.705 0.707 Corrosion 0.706 Bay 13-0.762 0.760 0.765 0.759 0.766 0.762 0.758 No Ongoing 31FH 0.779 0.758 0.763 Corrosion 0.765 Bay 13-0.687 0.689 0.685 0.683 0.690 0.682 0.693 No Ongoing 31L 0.684 0.678 0.688 Corrosion Bay 15-0.758 0.762 0.767 0.758 0.760 0.758 0.757 0.738 23H 0.764 0.762 0.763 0.765 Bay 05-0.726 0.726 0.726 0.728 0.724 0.729 0.727 No Ongoing 23 0.728 0.729 0.724 Corrosion 0.725 Elevation 0.541" Sl' 10"

Table -1. UT Thickness measurements for the Upper Region of the Drywell Shell Average Measured Thickness , Inches Monitored Location Minimum ProJected Lower Elevation Required 91 19 93' 19 96 95% Confidence Thickness, 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 2000 2004 Thickness in 2029 Inches5 Bay 13-0.716 0.715 0.717 0.714 0.715 0.715 0.713 No Ongoing 32H 0.715 0.717 Conrosion 0.719 Bay 13-0.686 0.683 0.683 0.680 0.684 0.679 0.687 No Ongoing 32L 0.683 0.676 Corosion Elevation 0.518" 60' 10" Ba 1 0.693 l 0.711 1 0.692 l 0.689 0.689 l No Ongoing 122 Corrosion Elevation 0.452" 87TS" Bay9-20 0.619 0.622 0.619 0.620 0.614 0.629 0.613 0.613 0.604 0.612 0.604. 0.620 0.612 0.614 Day 13-0.643 0.641 0.645 0.643 0.635 0.641 0.640 0.636 0.635 0.640 No Ongoing 28 0.642 0.629 0.637 Conosion Bay 15-0.638 0.636 0.638 0.642 0.628 0.631 0.633 0.632 0.628 0.630 0.615 31 0.636 0.627 0.630 Notes: I. The average thickness is based on 49 Ultrasonic Testing (UT) measurements performed at each location

2. Multiple nspections vere perfonned in the yems 1988, 1990, 1991, and l992.

3. The 1993 elevation 60' 10" BayS-22 inspection wasperformed on January 6, 1993. All other locations were inspected in December1992.

4. Accuracy of Ultrasonic Testing Equipment is plus or minus 0.010 inches.

5. Reference SE-000243.002.

Table -1. UT Thickness measurements for the Upper Region of the Dryiell Shell

== Conclusion:== Summary of Corrosion Rates of UT measurements taken through year 2004

• There is no ongoing corrosion at two elevations(51' 10" and 60' 10")

e Based on statistical analysis, one location at elevation 5O'2" is undergoing a minor corrosion rate of 0.0003 inches per year,

• Based on statistical analysis, tvo locations at elevation 87'5" are undergoing minorcorrosion rates of O.0005 and 0.00075 inches peryear

Table -2 UT Thickness measurements for the Sand Bed Region of the DryvwelI Shell ocatlon ub Dec Feb Apr May Aug Sep Jul Oct Jun Sep Feb Apr Mar May Nov May Sep Sep Sep Bay ocation 1986 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1988 1988 1989 1989 1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1992 1992 1994 1996 D .1..0 1.1 51. D 1.17 1.18 1.17 D 1.13 1.13 1.13 A1.154 0.9 1.15 1.15 D 1.0Z 1.021 1.0 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.99-1.00 0.99 1.00( 1.0 0.99 1.00 1 IA 0.91 ' 0.9'

0.

0Q90! 0.91 0.88 0.881 0.8 0.8881 0.87( 0.84 0.8 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.Q82 0.83 1C Btom -o0.91 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.891 0.8T 0.89 0.87o 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.85f 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.88: - op 1.04= 1.1 1.07' 1.04 1.00! 1.01( 1.00 0.95' 0.97 0.98' 1.011 0.96 1.011 0.97i 0.98 1.04: 13A 0.91! 0.90! 0.88 0.88 08 085 0.855f 0.85 084 0.86 085 0.821 0.84: 13C ottom = = 0.901 0.901 0.901 0.931

0.

0.89 0.93: - Op 1.07' 1.04 1.041 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.05 13D 0.9f 0.93 1.0011 0.95 0.9 iSA 1.12 1.11I 1.12 15D = 1.06_ 1.081 1.05S 1.0ff 1.06 1.05 1.045 1.06 1.05 1.05S 1.08 17A 30Kom

0.

7 09

0.

0.9Q O 0.9511 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.941 0.93 0.99 op 0.99! 1.13' 1.131 1.131 1.121 1.12 1.131 1.1Z 1.12 1.12! 1.12! 1.12 1.1 17D

0.

0.89, 0.891 0.895 0.87F 0.86 0.85 0.84' 0.831 0.82 0.821 0.821 0.8Z 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.84 17/19 op 0.98: 1.010 1.13 0.99 0.980 0.97! 0.9 0 0.97A o.97g 0.96: .96 90K___o.om =. 099! 0.95 1.011 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.971 0.991 0.9S! 0.97! 0.991 19A 0.8 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.841 0.83 0.821 0.82 0.841 0.801 0.81 0.80: 0.80: 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.81 19B 0.89 0.8 0.88E 0.86 0.85 0.821 0.84 0.81: 0.83' 0.85 0.84 0.841 0.8 0.84 0.82 0.83P 19C 0.90 0.88 0.88E 0.87 0.851 0.84 0.84 0.831 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.8 0.83: 0.81! 0.82 0.84

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY In the Matter of ) ) AMERGEN ENERGY COMPANY, LLC ) ) (License Renewal for the Oyster Creek ) Nuclear Generating Station) ) ) Docket No. 50-0219-LR ASLB No. 06-844-01-LR May 5, 2006 CERTIFICATION OF RICHARD WEBSTER IN SUPPORT OF CITIZENS' RESPONSE TO AMERGENS' MOTION TO DISMISS, CITIZENS' MOTION TO APPLY SUBPART G PROCEDURES. AND CITIZENS' MOTION TO COMPEL I Richard Webster, Esq., being of full age, hereby certify that:

1.

I represent a coalition of Citizens' groups in this proceeding. I have consulted with AmerGen and NRC Staff in an attempt to avoid the need to file the accompanying motions. AmerGen objects to both Motions. NRC Staff has not yet taken a position on the Motion to compel, but does not support the Motion for Subpart G procedures and intends to file a written response to that Motion.

2.

The document attached as Exhibit A to the Motion for Subpart G procedures ("Subpart G Motion"), Complaint in State of Illinois v. Exelon Corp.. Docket No. 06 MR 248 (III.,12th Cir. Mar. 16, 2006), is a true and correct copy.

3.

The document attached as Exhibit B to the Subpart G Motion, Illinois EPA, uExelon Braidwood Nuclear Facility Tritium Releases and Groundwater Impacts," Fact Sheet 1 (Feb. 2006), is a true and correct copy.

4.

The document attached as Exhibit C to the Subpart G Motion, Hal Dardick, t Exelon Sued Over Leaks: Will County, State Allege 8 Tritium Spills," Chicago Tribune (Mar. 17, 2006), is a true and correct copy.

5.

The document attached as Exhibit D to the Subpart G Motion, Hal Dardick, 'Leaks Costly, Exelon Says: Tritium Spills Create Credibility Problem, Leader Says," Chicago Tribune (April 26, 2006), is a true and correct copy

6.

The document attached as Exhibit E to the Subpart G Motion, Letter from Cynthia D. Pederson, NRC, to Christopher Crane, Exelon, dated Feb. 28, 2005, 'Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Non-Cited Violation [NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 3-2004-01 1]," is a true and correct copy.

7.

The document attached as Exhibit F to the Subpart G Motion, Electronic Mail from Alex Polonsky to Richard Webster, UOyster Creek," Mar. 23, 2006, is a true and correct copy.

8.

The document attached as Exhibit G to the Subpart G Motion, Electronic Mail from Paul Gunther to Jhansi Kandasamy, "Oyster Creek Drywell Liner Corrosion Monitoring Program," Sept. 6, 2005, is a true and correct copy.

9.

The document attached as Exhibit H to the Subpart G Motion, Electronic Mail from Peter C. Resler to Paul Gunther, 'Response to 9/6 Request for Information," Oct. 10, 2005, is a true and correct copy.

10.

The document attached as Exhibit I to the Subpart G Motion, Electronic Mail from George Beck to Donnie Ashley, et al., "Audit Q&A (Question Numbers AMP-141, 210, 356)," Apr. 5, 2006, is a true and correct copy.

11.

The document attached as Exhibit J to the Subpart G Motion, and Exhibit RM 1 to the Response to Amergen's Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum by Rudolf H. Hausler, "Oyster Creek Dry Well Corrosion - Comments Regarding 'Audit Q & A (Question Numbers AMP - 141, 210, 356) dated 4/1506, Ref. ML060960563," May 3, 2006, is a true and correct copy. In addition, the attachment to Dr. Hausler's memorandum, provided in Exhibit RM 1, is a true and correct copy of Amergen's response to NRC audit questions, dated April 5, 2005, ADAMS accession number ML060960563.

12.

The document attached as Exhibit K to the Subpart G Motion, Alexandra Marks, "Should Oldest US Nuke Plant Stay On Line?," Christian Science Monitor. (Apr. 19, 2006), is a true and correct copy.

13.

The document attached as Exhibit L to the Subpart G Motion, Nuclear Security Coalition, 'Report's Highlights: Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Public Report," National Academy of Sciences, Apr. 2005, is a true and correct copy.

14.

The document attached as Exhibit M to the Subpart G Motion, Oyster Creek Public Relations Document, "Used Fuel Security Fact Sheet," is a true and correct copy.

15.

The document attached as Exhibit N to the Subpart G Motion, Letter from Jill Lipoti, Ph.D. State of New Jersey Division of Environmental Safety and Health, to Hubert Miller, NRC "Effects of Aircraft Impact on Spent Fuel Pools in New Jersey," July 30, 2004, is a true and correct copy.

16.

The document attached as Exhibit 0 to the Subpart G Motion is a true and correct copy of an excerpt of Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Public Report," National Academy of Sciences, Apr. 2005.

17.

I caused to be sent the foregoing motions, response, and exhibits this 5th day of May, 2006 via email and U.S. Postal Service, as designated below, to each of the following: Secretary of the Commission (Email and original and 2 copies via U.S Postal Service) United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Email: HEARINGDOCKET(aNRC.GOV Administrative Judge E. Roy Hawkens, Chair (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email: erhenrc.gov Administrative Judge Dr. Paul B. Abramson (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email: pba(lnrc.gov Administrative Judge Dr. Anthony J. Baratta (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email: ajb5ainrc.gov Law Clerk Debra Wolf (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 DAWlanrc.gov Office of General Counsel (Email and U.S. Postal Service) United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Email: OGCMAILCENTER(i),N.R.C..GOV Ann P. Hodgdon (Email and U.S. Postal Service)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: 0-15 D21 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: aphgnrc.gov Alex S. Polonsky, Esq. (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 Email: apolonskyemorganlewis.com Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq. (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 Email: ksutton(amorganlewis.com Donald Silverman, Esq. (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. Washington, DC 20004 Email: dsilverman(morganlewis.com J. Bradley Fewell (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Exelon Corporation 200 Exelon Way, Suite 200 Kennett Square, PA 19348 bradley.fewelleexeloncorp.com John Covino, DAG (Email and U.S. Postal Service) State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety Office of the Attorney General Hughes Justice Complex 25 West Market Street P.O. Box 093 Trenton, NJ 08625 E-mail: john.corvinoldol.lps.state.nj.us Paul Gunter (Email and U.S. Postal Service) Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th St. NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 Email: pgunterinirs.org Edith Gbur (Email)

Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch, Inc. 364 Costa Mesa Drive. Toms River, New Jersey 08757 Email: gburl @comcast.net Paula Gotsch (Email) GRAMMIES 205 6th Avenue Normandy Beach, New Jersey 08723 paulagotscheverizon.net Kelly McNicholas (Email) New Jersey Sierra Club 139 West Hanover Street Trenton New Jersey 08618 Email: Kellv.McNicholas(sierraclub.or2 Suzanne Leta (Email) New Jersey Public Interest Research Group 11 N. Willow St, Trenton, NJ 08608. Email:- sleta(i2njpirg.org Peggy Sturmfels (Email) New Jersey Environmental Federation 1002 Ocean Avenue Belmar, New Jersey 073 19 Email: pstunnfels()cleanwater.org Signed: /i4 I (VIA Richard Webster Dated: May 5, 2006}}