ML060860175

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Draft - Outlines (Facility Letters Dtd 03/08/06 & 01/04/06) (Folder 2)
ML060860175
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/08/2006
From: Scace S
Dominion, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To: Conte R
NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
05-904C
Download: ML060860175 (19)
v • d • e


Text

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone Poller Station Dominion-Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 MAR 8 2%6 Mr. Richard J. Conte, Chief Serial No. 05-904C Operational Safety Branch, Region 1 MPS Lic/BAK RO U S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50-336 475 Allendale Road License No. DPR-65 King of Prussia, PA 19406 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 REACTOR OPERATOR RETAKE EXAMINATION - EXAMINATION MATERIALS In a letter dated December 21, 2005,() the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. submit the written examination and examination reference materials for the Reactor Operator Retake Examination -

Millstone Power Station Unit 2, in advance of the examination originally scheduled for the week of February 6, 2006. Having worked closely with the NRC Chief Examiner, Mr. Gil Johnson, who is currently on site, the examination will be administered after March 9,2006. , Written Examination and Examination Reference Material, is being submitted to the NRC for review and approval. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.40(b)(3), an authorized representative of the facility has approved the complete and ready-to-use examination contained in Attachment 1.

Consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1021 Examiners Standard (ES) 201, , Examination Security and Integrity Consideration, the examination outline contained in Attachment 1 to this letter should be withheld from public disclosure until after the examination has been completed. No redacted versions are being supplied. *-

rcJ E3 Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Jeff Spence at (860) 437-2540. s 73 st)=

m1+1 1 ocom Very truly yours, 0-

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Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing (I) Richard J. Conte letter from U.S. NRC, to David A. Christian, Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station, Unit 2,dated December 21, 2005.

Serial No. 05-904C Reactor Operator Retake Examination -

Examination Materials Page 2 of 2 Attachments: None Commitments made in this letter: None.

cc: (w/o attachments)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. V. Nerses Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8C2 Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. S. M. Schneider NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station

Serial No. 05-904C Docket No. 50-336 Attachment 1 Written Examination and Examination Reference Materials Millstone Power Station Unit 2 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC)

OPERATIONS ENGINEER Mr. Richard Conte U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 475 ALLENDALE ROAD REGION 1 OPERATIONAL SAFETY BRANCH KING OF PRUSSIA PA 19406-1431 Mr. Richard Conte FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY Please note: All applicable reference material has already been sent electronically to King of Prussia, Region One office. Also, as Lead Examiner is presently the Millstone Unit Two Resident Inspector, exam reference material has been made available to him on an as needed basis.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Millstone Power Station Dominion Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. Richard J. Conte, Chief Serial No.05-904 Operational Safety Branch, Region 1 MPS Lic/BAK RO U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50-336 475 Allendale Road License No. DPR-65 King of Prussia, PA 19406 DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 2 REACTOR OPERATOR RETAKE EXAMINATION OUTLINE -

In a letter dated December 21, 2005,() the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested that Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, lnc. submit the examination outline for the Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station Unit 2, by January 6,2006.

Attachment 1, Examination Outline, is being submitted to the NRC for review and approval. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.40(b)(3), an authorized representative of the facility has approved the complete and ready-to-use examination outline contained in .

Consistent with the guidance contained in NUREG-1021 Examiners Standard (ES) 201, , Examination Security and Integrity Consideration, the examination outline contained in Attachment 1 to this letter should be withheld from public disclosure until after the examination has been completed. No redacted versions are being supplied.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Jeff Spence at (860) 437-2540.

Very truly yours, Price

@ice President - Millstone

() Richard J. Conte letter from U.S. NRC, to David A. Christian, Reactor Operator Retake Examination - Millstone Power Station, Unit 2, dated December 21, 2005.

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Millstone Unit 2 Date of Exam:

1 lm II Tier Group

1. 1 5 1 2 Emergency

& 2 2 2 2 Abnormal Tier 7 3 4 Plant Totals Evolutions Plant Systems

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 10 7 Note:
1. Ensure that at least two topics from every WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO outline (i.e., the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two). Refer to Section D.l .c for additional guidance regarding SRO sampling.
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 21 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Select topics from many systems and evolutions; avoid selecting more than two WA topics from a given system or evolution unless they relate to plant-specific priorities.
4. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline.
5. The shaded areas are not applicable to the categoryhier.

6.* The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA

'n Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. The SRO WAS must also be linked to 10 CFR 55.43 or an SRO-level learning objective.

7. On the following pages, enter the WA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; summarize all the SRO-only knowledge and non-A2 applicable categories in the columns labeled " K and "A". Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
8. For Tier 3, enter the WA numbers, descriptions, importance ratings, and point totals on Form ES-401-3.
9. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance

- regarding

- - the elimination of inappropriate WA statements.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions -Tier l/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

UAPE#/Name/SafetyFunction K K K A A G WA Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CWE02) Reactor X EK3.2: Knowledge of the reasons for normal, abnormal and 2.8 1 Trip Stabilization - Recovery / 1 emergemy operating procedures associated with Reactor Trip 3.5 Recovery as they apply to the Reactor Trip Recovery.

000008 PressurizerVapor Space X AK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implicationsof the 3.1 1 Accident / 3 following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space 3.7 Accident: Change in leak rate with change in pressure 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 3.5 1 following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA: 4.2 Use of steam tables 000011 Large Break LOCA I 3 X EA2.03: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they 3.7 1 apply to a Large Break LOCA: Consequences of managing 4.2 LOCA with loss of CCW 000015/17 RCP MalfunctionsI 4 X G2.2.23: Ability to track limiting conditions for operations. 2.6 1 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X AK1.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 2.8 1 System Malfunction/ 3 following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure 3.1 Control Malfunctions: Expansionof liquids as temperature increases 000029 ATWS I 1 X EK1.03: Knowledge of the operational implications of the 3.6 1 following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: Effects of 3.8 boron on reactivity 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 X G2.3.2: Knowledge of facility ALARA program. 2.5 1 2.9 000040 (BWIEO5; COE05; WIE12)

Steam Line Rupture Excessive Heat LOIT2K5-ES-401-2.do~ NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

E/APE#/Name/SafetyFunction K K K A A G WA Topic(s) IR #

I WA Category Totals I 5 I 1I2I 3 I 3 I 4 I Group Point Total:

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

1 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 LOIT~K~-ES-~O~-~.~OC NUREG 1021, Draft Revision9

Operations as they apply to the Natural Circulation CE/All; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X AA2.2: Ability to determine and interpret adherence to 3.0 1 appropriate proceduresand operation within the 3.4 limitations in the facility's license and amendments as they apply to the RCS Overcooling.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED- Note 4 0

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED- Note 4 0 WA Category Point Totals: 2 2 2 0 2 1 Group Point Total: 9 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier ZGroup 1 (RO/SRO)

System#/Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G KIA Topic@) IR #

003 Reactor Coolant X K6.04 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.8 1 Pump malfunctionon the following will have on the 3.1

  • RCPS: Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation
  • .. p a - 0

+=

Note 3 level, 004 Chemical and x3 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 2.7 1 Volume Control following malfunctionsor operations on the 2.7 CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, Note 3 use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctionsor operations: Excessive letdownflow, pressure, and temperatures on ion'exchange resins (also causes) 004 Chemical and I X' ' A1.lO: Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.7 1 Volume Control changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 3.9 design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: Reactor power 005 Residual Heat X K5.09: Knowledge of the operational 3.2 1 Removal implications of the following concepts as they 3.4 apply the RHRS: Dilution and boration considerations.

- 0 29 Note 3 006 Emergency x3 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in 4.0 1 Core Cooling the control room: Valves 3.8 Note 3 007 Pressurizer X K5.02: Knowledge of the operational 3.1 1 Relief/QuenchTank implications of the following concepts as the 3.4 apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR.

008 Component X K4.02 Knowledge of CCWS design feature@) 2.9 1 Cooling Water and/or interlock(s) which providefor the 2.7 following: Operation of the surge tank, including the associated valves and controls.

310 Pressuriteu X A3.01: Ability to monitor automatic operation 3.0 1 Pressure Control of the PZR PCS, including: PRT temperature 3.2 and pressure during PORV testing.

M-zh&w- t s o 44 Note 3 112 Reactor X K3.01: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 3.9 1

'rotection malfunction of the RPS will have dn the 4.0 following: CRDS

)13 Engineered X K2.61: Knowledge of bus power supplies to 3.6 1 Safety Features the following: ESFAWsafeguards equipment 3.8 4ctuation control.

122 Containment X' A1.02 Ability to predict andlor monitor 3.6 1 holing changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 3.8 design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: Containment pressure.

LOIT2K5-ES-40 1-2.dOC NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 PWR ExaminationOutline Form ES-401-2 System #/Name 022 Containment 1 K1 1 (RO/SRO)

G X

WA Topic(s)

G2.3.1: Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related

- IR 2.6 3.0 026 Containment spray I x' K1.01: Knowledge of the physicalconnections andlor cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: ECCS.

4.2 4.2 026 Containment K3.02: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 4.2 Spray malfunction of the CSS will have on the 4.3 following: Recirculationspray system. -

039 Main and K5.08: Knowledge of the operational 3.6 Reheat Steam implications of the following concepts as the 3.6 apply to the MRSS: Effect of steam removal

- on reactivity.

056 Condensate X Kl.03: Knowledgeof the physical connections 2.6 1 and/or cause-effect relationships between the 2.6 Condensatesystem and the following systems: MFW.

059 Main Feedwater A1.OR Ability to predict and/or monitor 2.5 1 changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 2.6 design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including: Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICs. --

061 K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 4.2 1 Auxiliary/Emergency malfunction of the AFW will have on the 4.4 Feedwater following: S/G. --

061 K6.02: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.6 1 Auxiliary/Emergency malfunction of the following will have on the 2.7 Feedwater AFW components: Pumps. --

062 AC Electrical A I .03: Ability to predict and/or monitor 2.5 1 Distribution changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 2.8 design limits) associated with operating the ac distributionsystem controls including: Effect on instrumentationand controls of switching power supplies.

0 Note 3 --

062 AC Electrical Al.01: Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.4 1 Distribution changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 3.8 design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including:

Significance of D/G load limits K2.01: Knowledge of bus power supplies to 2.9 1 the following: Major DC loads. 3.1 063 DC Electrical A1.01: Ability to predict andlor monitor 2.5 1 Distribution changes in parameters associatedwith 3.3 operating the DC electrical system controls including: Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate. -

064 Emergency A2.05: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 3.1 1 Diesel Generator following malfunctionsor operations on the 3.2 ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctionsor operations: Loading the I ED/G.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

~

System#/Name 073Process

' Radiation Monitoring K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G X

WA Topic(s)

G2.1.7: "Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operationaljudgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation."

q-+

I 4.4 076 Service Water X A3.02: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Em,ergency heat loads.

Q 078 Instrument Air X2* Kl.03: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Containment air.

103 Containment x2 A1.O1: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding 4.1 design limits) associatedwith operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.

WA Category Point 3 2 3 1 3 2 6 2 3 1 2 Group Point Total:

Totals: I NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

11 ES-401 PWR ExaminationOutline Form ES-4014 YS RO)

A3 I A4 I G I WA Topic@)

K5.95: Knowledge of the following operational implications as they apply to the CRDS: Effect of reactor power changes on RCS temperature.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED Note 4-K6.04: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the PZR LCS:

Operation of PZR level controllers.

K4.06: Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Individualand group misalignment.

K2.01: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: NIS channels, components, and interconnections.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED Note 4-

- RANDOMLY K1.01: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the HRPS and the following systems:

Containment annulus ventilation system (including pressure limits).

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED Note 4-

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 K5.08: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the SDS: Effect of power change on fuel cladding.

I A4.01: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the

' control room: Turbine valve indicators (throttle, governor, control, stop, intercept),

alarms, and annunciators.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 PWR ExaminationOutline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systi IS - Tier 2/Gro[ 2 (RO/SRO)

K2 K3 K4 A2 A3 A4 WA Topic@)

055 Condenser Air Removal K1.06: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems: PRM system.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED Note 4 071 Waste Gas Disposal X K4.03: Knowledge of design 2.5 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 2.6 which provide for the following: Tank loop seals.

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4

- RANDOMLY DESELECTED - Note 4 086 Fire Protection X. A1.05: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: FPS lineups.

WA Category Point Totals: 2 Group Point Total:

Note 1 - Randomly selected to be duplicatedto achieve required count for Tier and Group.

Note 2 - Randomly reselected due to no WA with an IR >/= 2.5 existing in the initial category.

Note 3 - Randomly redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or WAS.

Note 4 - Randomly deselected to achieve the required item count per the applicable Tier and Group.

NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Mills me Unit 2 Date of Exam:

Category KIA ## Topic f -SRC Only

- IR -# - IR #

1. 2.1.2 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of 3.0 1 plant operation.

Conduct of 2.1.3 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of 3.0 1 Operations plant operation.

2.1.20 Ability to execute procedure steps. -4.3 - 1 Subtotal -3

2. Note 1 Equipment Control 2.2.1 2 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. 3.0 1 2.2.1 3 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. -3.6 - 1 2.2.30 "Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel 3.5 1 handling such as alarms from fuel handling area, communication with fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation."

Subtotal -3

3. 2.3.1 1 I Ability to control radiation releases. 2.7 1 Radiation 2.3.1 0 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of 1 Note 2 Control radiation and guard against personnel exposure. -

Subtot: -2 n

2.4.23 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure 1 4.

implementation during emergency operations.

Emergency Note 1 Procedures 1 I Plan 3.3 1 Note 2 2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

Subtotal Tier 3 Target Point Total -

Note 1: Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments.

Note 2: Randomly reselected, per NRC Examiner, to meet category number requirement.

All WAS were randomly selected using the guidance provided in NUREG 1021, ES-401,Attachment 1 NUREG 1021, Draft Revision 9

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected WA 1/I 2.2.23 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the lack of system concepts that would meet the KIA and still distinguish between a competent and non-competent Operator.

Randomly reselected K/A AK3.04: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Sequence of events for manually tripping reactor and RCP as a result of an RCP malfunction 1/ I 2. I.24 000054 (CE/EO6) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the original WA testing a concept that is meant to be evaluated in a JPM (open reference) format.

Randomly reselected K/A A A I .02: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Manual startup of electric and steam-driven AFW DumDs.

1/ I EK3.01 000055 Station Blackout / 6; Redrawn, with the approval of the Lead Examiner, due to the similarity with the K/A drawn for question #50.

Randomly reselected K/A EK3.02: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Station Blackout: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite Dower.

112 AA2.14 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2; Reselected, with Lead Examiner approval, due to WA concept not existing in a C.E. plant.

Randomly reselected WA AA2. I O : Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Whether the automatic mode for PZR level control is functioning improperly, necessity of shift to manual modes.

LOIT2006-ES-401-4 ES401-4, Page 1 of 3

Tier / Random ly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/2 2.1 .I 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7: Redrawn based on feedback from Lead Examiner. Original WA did not distinguish between competent and non-competent operator.

Randomly reselected WA AK2.01: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation and the following: Power supplies, including proper switch positions.

~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~

2/1 A I .05 004 Chemical and Volume Control: Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected WA A2.21: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Excessive letdown flow, pressure, and temperatures on ion exchange resins (also causes) 2/1 2.2.33 006 Emergency Core Cooling; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of WA not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or KlAs.

Randomly reselected WA A4.02: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Valves 2/1 K3.04 012 Reactor Protection; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of K/A not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected K/A K3.01: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following:

CRDS 2/1 2.3.1 022 Containment Cooling; K/A redrawn by instruction from Lead Examiner due to over-sampling of ALARA concept.

Randomly reselected WA 2.4.5: Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions LOIT2006-ES-401-4 ES401-4, Page 1 of 3

Tier / Random ly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 2/1 2.3.9 062 AC Electrical Distribution; Redrawn based on Lead Examiners initial comment of WA not fitting system interrelations of MP2 and to ensure required distribution or K/As.

Randomly reselected WA A I .01: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: Significance of D/G load limits 2/2 K5.06 041 Steam Dumpmurbine Bypass Control; Redrawn based on Lead Examiner feedback, due to original concept not distinguishing between a competent and non-competent RO.

Randomly reselected K/A K5.02: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SDS: Use of steam tables for saturation temperature and pressure.

2/2 K4.03 071 Waste Gas Disposal; Randomly redrawn due to original WA not fitting system design of MP2.

Randomly reselected WA K4.05: Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Point of Release.

3 2.2.4 (multi-unit) Ability to explain the variations in control board layouts, systems, instrumentation and procedural actions between units at a facility. Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments. (Unit 2 is a CE unit, Unit 3 is a Westinghouse unit)

Randomly reselected WA 2.3.10: Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

3 2.4.26 Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.

Deselected per NRC Examiner initial comments. (Licensed operators are not necessarily qualified as Fire Brigade members.)

Randomly reselected WA 2.4.50: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

LOIT2006-ES-40 1-4 ES401-4, Page 1 of 3

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