ML060830182

License Amendment, Removal of Temp Note to Loss of Power

ML060830182
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/17/2006
From:	Bhalchandra Vaidya Plant Licensing Branch III-2
To:	Hinnenkamp P Entergy Operations
vaidya B, NRR/DLPM, 415-3308
Shared Package
ML060830194	List: ML060830182 ML061380236
References
TAC MC9274
Download: ML060830182 (14)

Text

May 17, 2006 Mr. Paul D. Hinnenkamp Vice President - Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:

REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY NOTE TO LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TAC NO. MC9274)

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 151 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 19, 2005.

The amendment revises the TSs to make the temporary changes to TS Table 3.3.8.1-1, previously approved by Amendment No. 147, permanent. TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 is revised to delete the temporary note, to correct the number of Required Channels per Division for the Loss of Power (LOP) time delay functions, and to delete the requirement to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.3.8.1.2, the monthly Channel Functional Test, on certain LOP time delay functions.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Bhalchandra Vaidya, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 151 to NPF-47

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page

May 17, 2006 Mr. Paul D. Hinnenkamp Vice President - Operations Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N St. Francisville, LA 70775

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:

REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY NOTE TO LOSS OF POWER INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TAC NO. MC9274)

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 151 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 for the River Bend Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 19, 2005.

The amendment revises the TSs to make the temporary changes to TS Table 3.3.8.1-1, previously approved by Amendment No. 147, permanent. TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 is revised to delete the temporary note, to correct the number of Required Channels per Division for the Loss of Power (LOP) time delay functions, and to delete the requirement to perform Surveillance Requirement 3.3.8.1.2, the monthly Channel Functional Test, on certain LOP time delay functions.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Bhalchandra Vaidya, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-458

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 151 to NPF-47

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPLIV Reading RidsRgn4MailCenter (KKennedy) RidsNrrDorlDpr RidsNrrDorlLplg RidsOgcRp RidsNrrDirsItsb RidsNrrPMBVaidya RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter GHill(2) RidsNrrLADJohnson KCorp Package Accession No.: ML060830194 TS Pages Accession No.

Document Accession No. : ML060830182

• No substantial change from SEInput OFFICE LPL4/PM LPL4/LA EEEB/BC(A)* OGC LPL4/BC NAME BVaidya DJohnson EBrown APH DTerao DATE 04/17/2006 04/17/2006 03/23/2006 04/25 /2006 04/26/2006 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

ENTERGY GULF STATES, INC. **

AND ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-458 RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 151 License No. NPF-47

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Entergy Gulf States, Inc.* (the licensee) dated December 19, 2005, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

• Entergy Operations, Inc. is authorized to act as agent for Entergy Gulf States, Inc., and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

• • Entergy Gulf States, Inc., has merged with a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation.

Entergy Gulf States, Inc., was the surviving company in the merger.

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-47 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 151 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to expiration of the temporary change on June 1, 2006, provided by Amendment No. 147.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

David Terao, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 26, 2006

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 151 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 DOCKET NO. 50-458 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating License Remove Insert Page 3 Page 3 Appendix A Technical Specifications Remove Insert 3.3-74 3.3-74

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 151 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-458

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 19, 2005 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML053610181), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS).

The proposed changes would revise the TSs to make the temporary changes to TS Table 3.3.8.1-1, previously approved by Amendment No. 147, permanent. TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 is revised to delete the temporary note, correct the number of Required Channels per Division for the Loss of Power (LOP) time delay functions, and delete the requirement to perform Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.8.1.2, the monthly Channel Functional Test (CFT), for certain LOP time delay functions.

By letter dated August 31, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052450192), the licensee proposed an exigent amendment to the RBS TSs to revise certain requirements for the LOP instrumentation listed in TS Table 3.3.8.1-1. During its review, the NRC staff determined that additional information was needed, but the review could not be completed as requested on an exigent basis. However, it was also concluded that sufficient information was available to review the proposed changes for a limited application during the remaining operating cycle.

The NRC staff approved the temporary change as Amendment No. 147 in a letter dated September 15, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052730189).

The licensee identified the NRC staffs previous approval of the changes to TS requirements for the LOP instrumentation listed in TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 on a temporary basis in Amendment No. 147 (ADAMS Accession No. ML052730189) as a precedent.

The information provided in Entergy's December 19, 2005, application includes much of the information previously provided in the August 31, 2005, letter, but has been modified to provide clarification and additional information. The proposed changes are described below.

TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 lists the LOP Instrument functions required to be OPERABLE by Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.8.1, LOP Instrumentation. The Table also includes the required number of channels per division for each function, the SRs, and Allowable Values for each instrument function.

Item 1 of Table 3.3.8.1-1 pertains to the requirements for Division 1 and Division 2 emergency bus undervoltage protection functions. There are three time delay functions included as follows:

Function Required Channels Surveillance Requirements per Division

b. Loss of Voltage - 3 SR 3.3.8.1.2 Time Delay SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4

d. Degraded Voltage - 3 SR 3.3.8.1.2 Time Delay, No Loss- SR 3.3.8.1.3 of-Coolant Accident SR 3.3.8.1.4 (LOCA)

e. Degraded Voltage - 3 SR 3.3.8.1.2 Time Delay, LOCA SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 The required number of channels for these functions is incorrect. While the Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage functions consist of three channels per division, the circuitry is designed such that all three channels for each function send signals to a single time delay relay in each division. Thus, the required channels for the above time delay functions should be changed from three per division to one per division to be consistent with the current RBS design.

In addition, the SRs for the time delay functions include a CFT, SR 3.3.8.1.2, to be performed at least once every 31 days. While this SR is applicable to the Loss of Voltage and Degraded Voltage channel functions, it should not have been applied to the time delay functions because the time delay relay is not part of a channel (i.e., the channels lose their identity upstream of the time delay relays). This amendment request proposes to permanently delete the requirement to perform SR 3.3.8.1.2 for Functions 1.b, 1.d, and I.e.

Item 2 of Table 3.3.8.1-1 pertains to similar requirements for the Division 3 emergency bus undervoltage protection functions. Similar to Divisions 1 and 2, there are three time delay functions included as follows:

Function Required Channels Surveillance Requirements per Division

b. Loss of Voltage - 2 SR 3.3.8.1.3 Time Delay SR 3.3.8.1.4

d. Degraded Voltage - 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 Time Delay, No SR 3.3.8.1.3 LOCA SR 3.3.8.1.4

e. Degraded Voltage - 2 SR 3.3.8.1.2 Time Delay, LOCA SR 3.3.8.1.3 SR 3.3.8.1.4 The above Division 3 table is correct except for the requirement to perform SR 3.3.8.1.2 for Function 2.d. Function 2.e, the Division 3 Degraded Voltage Time Delay, LOCA, should continue to be tested per the CFT requirements of TS 3.3.8.1.2 but Function 2.d, the Division 3 Degraded Voltage Time Delay, No LOCA, should not.

The Degraded Voltage Time Delay, LOCA (Function 2.e) instrumentation logic uses time delays that are an integral part of each of the two monitoring channels. Both time delay devices must actuate to provide the LOP trip function. Therefore, these time delays may be tested one at a time as part of the CFT without causing the LOP trip to occur.

The Degraded Voltage Time Delay, No LOCA (Function 2.d) instrumentation logic uses two time delays. One is an integral part of each of the two monitoring channels (same monitoring channel used in the Degraded Voltage Time Delay, LOCA function). The other is a separate relay actuated by both monitoring channels. There are two sets of this logic and either set will cause the LOP trip function to occur. Therefore, while the monitoring channels may be tested one at a time without causing the LOP trip, the separate No LOCA time delays cannot be tested without taking special measures to prevent an actuation of the LOP trip function. Preventing the LOP trip would involve the temporary lifting of circuit leads that creates the potential for an inadvertent transient.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The LOP instrumentation is installed to monitor the normal power supply to the 4.16 kV emergency buses. Successful operation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems is dependent upon the availability of adequate power sources. Offsite power is the preferred source of power for the 4.16kV emergency buses. If the monitors determine that sufficient power is not available, the busses are disconnected from the offsite power sources and connected to the onsite diesel generator power sources. Each 4.16 kV emergency bus has its own independent LOP instrumentation and associated trip logic. The voltage on each bus is monitored at two undervoltage protections levels: loss of voltage and degraded voltage.

The following NRC requirements and guidance documents are applicable to the NRC staffs review of the RBS license amendment request:

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36 sets forth the regulatory requirements for the content of the TS. This regulation requires, in part, that the TS contain LCOs. Within 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), there are four criteria to be used in determining whether an LCO is required to be included in the TS for a particular item. The third criterion is that a structure, system, or component (SSC) that is part of the primary success path and functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier is required to be included in TS.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) states:

Surveillance requirements are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.

General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, Electric Power Systems, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, requires that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of SSCs that are important safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. The offsite power system must be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of LOP from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies.

GDC 18, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, requires that electric power systems that are important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of such systems for operability and functional performance.

Standard Review Plan Section 8, Appendix A, Branch Technical Position (BTP) PSB-1, Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages, was written to maintain adequate voltage protection against the effects of sustained low grid voltage conditions.

The RBS LOP circuitry logic design and on-line test capability was previously reviewed by the NRC staff as documented in NUREG-0989, RBS Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated May 1984, Section 8.4.1.

Excluding the time delay functions from the CFT is consistent with the standards of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 279-1971, which was endorsed by 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2).

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The proposed revision to TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 would delete the temporary note, correct the number of Required Channels per Division for the LOP time delay functions, and delete the requirement to perform SR 3.3.8.1.2, the monthly CFT, for certain LOP time delay functions.

Since 1994, only one failure and one mis-calibration of the RBS LOP time delay relays have been identified in RBSs testing and maintenance history. During a refueling outage in 1997,

the contacts of the Division 1, Degraded Voltage - LOCA time delay failed during testing. With the failed short time delay, the long time delay circuitry would have separated the bus from the normal power supply and connected the diesel generator (DG) to the bus after approximately 60 seconds if operators had not taken manual action sooner. The time delay relay was replaced. During the same 1997 refueling outage, the Division 2, Degraded Voltage - No LOCA time delay relay was found to be out of calibration tolerances, but would still have performed its degraded voltage equipment protection function. The as-found value was 66.7 seconds and the TS Allowable value is # 66.6 seconds. In addition, there have only been four challenges to the LOP instrument functions within the last five years as documented in Licensee Event Reports 50-458/01-004, 50-458/04-002, 50-458/04-003, and 50-458/04-004. For each event, the LOP instrumentation responded as designed by automatically restoring power to the bus with its respective emergency DG.

3.1 Correct the Number of Required Channels In its request, the licensee indicated that the time delay functions were listed as separate functions as a result of the RBS TS conversion to the Improved TS (ITS) format by Amendment 81 dated July 20, 1995. NUREG-1434, Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6, included the LOP time delays as separate functions in Table 3.3.8.1-1, Loss of Power Instrumentation. Previous to Amendment 81, the RBS TS only listed trip function (1.a) 4.16 kV Sustained Undervoltage and (1.b) 4.16 kV Degraded Voltage for Divisions 1 and 2. In the NRC staffs safety evaluation (SE) dated July 20, 1995, all LOP instrumentation requirements specified in existing TS 3/4.3.3 were provided as separate items in ITS 3.3.8.1 for presentation preference only and was found acceptable since the requirements were unchanged due to this separation. The licensee indicated that the ITS submittal incorrectly listed the time delay functions for Divisions 1 and 2 as having three channels per division when the design uses only one single relay for each function in each division. The trip signal from the three channel trip logic is combined prior to the common time delay relay. The licensees submittal seeks to correct this error by identifying that the time delay functions are only one channel per division.

The NRC staff finds that the proposed amendment should not change or alter the design of the LOP instrumentation or its physical configuration; nor does the amendment change or alter the operation or manner of control of the LOP instrumentation. This change only corrects an administrative mistake made by the licensee during the conversion to ITS format. Additionally, it is noted that the required number of voltage sensors per division and associated channel components that monitor voltage conditions and provide the 4.16 kV bus undervoltage protection are unchanged from previous NRC staff review of the LOP circuitry logic design in the RBS SER, NUREG-0989, dated May 1984, Section 8.4.1 and in accordance with BTP PSB-1.

3.2 Deletion of LOP Time Delay Functions - Divisions 1 and 2 The licensee also indicated that the ITS submittal included SRs 3.3.8.1.2, 3.3.8.1.3, and 3.3.8.1.4 for Divisions 1 and 2 time delay functions. Again, in the staffs SE dated July 20, 1995, all LOP instrumentation requirements specified in existing TS 3/4.3.3 are provided as separate items in ITS 3.3.8.1 for presentation preference only, and were found acceptable since the requirements are unchanged due to this separation. The licensee incorrectly listed the SR for the time delay functions to include SR 3.3.8.1.2, a CFT to be performed at least once

every 31 days. The licensees submittal seeks to correct this error by deleting SR 3.3.1.2 for LOP time delay functions for Divisions 1 and 2.

The NRC staff found that the licensee misapplied the ITS to include the requirements of SR 3.3.8.1.2 to the LOP time delay functions in Divisions 1 and 2. NUREG-1434, Revision 0, states in the bases for LOP Instrumentation (B 3.3.8.1) that a CFT is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. This SR should not have been applied to the time delay functions because the time delay relay is not part of a single channel. As stated above, the trip signals from the three channel trip logic is combined to provide a single action signal to a single time delay relay and, therefore, the channels lose their identity upstream of the time delay relay. Section 50.55a(h)(2) of 10 CFR, endorses the IEEE Standard 279-1971 definition of a Channel which states that a channel loses its identity where single action signals are combined. Section 50.55a(h)(2) of 10 CFR further states that the CFT must test to the point where single-action signals are combined. In order to perform a function test of the common time delay relay, a loss of function for that division would result. The tests could also create the potential for an unintended plant transient. When converting to the ITS format, the licensee should not have included the time delay functions in the monthly CFT since the channels lose their identity upstream of the time delay relay.

The TSs are required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) to include SRs relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met. The NRC staff found that the three channels of Divisions 1 and 2 functions (1.a) Loss of Voltage and (1.c) Degraded Voltage will continue to perform a CFT, every 31 days. These are the sensor channels that input signals to the time delays. The LOP time delay functions will continue to be functionally tested and calibrated every 18 months as required by SR 3.3.8.1.3, Channel Calibration, and SR 3.3.8.1.4, Logic System Functional Test. The 18-month LOP instrument calibration and logic system functional tests are consistent with the RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 3.1.2.18, which notes that the transfer of power between the offsite power system and the onsite power system can be demonstrated during refueling outages.

The licensee also states that SR 3.3.8.1.2, the monthly CFT, was bracketed in the ITS NUREG-1434, Revision 0, as it applied to the time delay functions and that use of brackets for SRs indicates that the SRs are optional. The NRC staff notes that items that are bracketed in the NUREG indicate an item or value that should be determined on a plant specific basis.

3.3 Deletion of LOP Time Delay Functions - Division 3 Similar requirements are also outlined by the licensee for Division 3, emergency bus undervoltage protection functions of the LOP Instrumentation. Like Divisions 1 and 2, there are three time delay functions included in Amendment 81. In addition to listing the time delays separately, Amendment 81 also included SRs 3.3.8.1.2, 3.3.8.1.3, and 3.3.8.1.4 for the Division 3 time delay functions. Again, in the NRC staffs SE dated July 20, 1995, all LOP instrumentation requirements specified in existing TS 3/4.3.3 were provided as separate items in ITS 3.3.8.1 for presentation preference only and were found acceptable since the requirements are unchanged due to this separation. The licensee incorrectly listed the SR for the Degraded Voltage Time Delay, no LOCA (function 2.d) to include a CFT to be performed at least once every 31 days. The licensees submittal seeks to correct this error by deleting SR 3.3.1.2 for function 2.d.

Function 2.d instrumentation logic uses two time delays. The NRC staff found that, unlike the Degraded Voltage Time Delay, LOCA (function 2.e) instrumentation with two-out-of-two logic where both delays are an integral part of each of the required channels, only one of the time delays for function 2.d is an integral part of each of the two required channels. The other time delay is a separate relay actuated by both the required channels. Thus, unlike function 2.e where the time delays may be tested one at a time as part of the CFT without causing the LOP trip to occur, there are two sets of this logic for function 2.d and either set will cause the LOP trip function to occur because the relays are redundant. Therefore, the No LOCA time delays cannot be tested without taking special measures to prevent an actuation of the LOP trip function. Preventing the LOP trip would involve the temporary lifting of circuit leads, which would create the potential for an inadvertent transient.

As with Divisions 1 and 2, Division 3 is also required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) to include SRs relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the LCOs will be met. The NRC staff found that each of the two channels of Division 3 function 2.c, Degraded Voltage, will continue to be functionally tested every 31 days. These are the sensor channels that input signals to the time delays of function 2.d and, as stated above, function 2.e will also continue to have SR 3.3.8.1.2. The LOP Time Delay Function 2.d will continue to be functionally tested and calibrated every 18 months as required by SR 3.3.8.1.3, Channel Calibration, and SR 3.3.8.1.4, Logic System Functional Test. The 18-month LOP instrument calibration and logic system functional tests are consistent with the RBS USAR Section 3.1.2.18, which notes that the transfer of power between the offsite power system and the onsite power system can be demonstrated during refueling outages.

Based on the design of the LOP instrumentation, the above regulatory position, and the testing and maintenance history for the LOP time delay relays, the deletion of the temporary note to change TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 is acceptable to the NRC staff.

3.4 Conclusion - Technical Evaluation Based on the information provided by the licensee, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.8.1-1 to delete the temporary note, correct the number of required channels per division for the LOP time delay functions from three channels to a single channel, and delete the requirement to perform SR 3.3.8.1.2 for LOP time delay functions 1.b, 1.d, 1.e, and 2.d are acceptable. The proposed changes to the LOP Instrument functions should correct the errors made from converting the TS to ITS format in Amendment 81. The proposed changes do not alter the instrumentation design or their physical configuration, nor should it affect their operation or manner of control.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published on March 14, 2006 (71 FR 13173). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: K. Corp Date: April 26, 2006

River Bend Station cc:

Winston & Strawn General Manager - Plant Operations 1700 K Street, N.W. Entergy Operations, Inc.

Washington, DC 20006-3817 River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N Manager - Licensing St. Francisville, LA 70775 Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station Director - Nuclear Safety 5485 US Highway 61N Entergy Operations, Inc.

St. Francisville, LA 70775 River Bend Station 5485 US Highway 61N Senior Resident Inspector St. Francisville, LA 70775 P. O. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775 Vice President - Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

President of West Feliciana P. O. Box 31995 Police Jury Jackson, MS 39286-1995 P. O. Box 1921 St. Francisville, LA 70775 Attorney General State of Louisiana Regional Administrator, Region IV P. O. Box 94095 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9095 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission Ms. H. Anne Plettinger William B. Travis Building 3456 Villa Rose Drive P. O. Box 13326 Baton Rouge, LA 70806 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, Texas 78701-3326 Mr. Michael E. Henry, State Liaison Officer Department of Environmental Quality Permits Division P.O. Box 4313 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-4313 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205 Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 May 2005