ML060250077
| ML060250077 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/2006 |
| From: | Denneen B - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | NRC/SECY |
| Ngbea E S | |
| References | |
| 70FR67380 00052, PR-73, RIN 3150-AH60 | |
| Download: ML060250077 (2) | |
Text
I SECY-DIABLO id PagI From:
Bill Denneen <bdenneen kcbx.net> (1 C (1 380)
To:
<SECY@nrc.gov>
Date:
Mon, Jan 23, 2006 12:05 AM
Subject:
DIABLO Letter to NRC <<mailto:SECY @nrc.gov>SECY@nrc.gov>
RE: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC's") proposed rule entitled "Design Basis Threat" ("DBTn).(70 Fed. Reg. 67,380).
COMMENT: I find the proposed rule unacceptable, and support the more precise comments submitted by the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and the Union of Concerned Scientists.
The proposed rule is the first NRC security-related rulemaking since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and I find it grossly deficient. The Commission promised the public a complete re-evaluation of its security regulations over four years ago, the belated proposal is unclear, incomplete, and dishonest.
The NRC has failed to meet the challenges of the post-9/1 1 environment, for the revised DBT excludes the crucial adversary characteristics of the 9/11 attackers: the ability to operate as more than two teams or the capacity to carry out an airborne attack. By failing to include any proposal for protecting nuclear facilities from these characteristics, the NRC makes it clear that it has no plans to ensure that the public will be protected from a 9/11 -style terrorist attack. Moreover, despite its claims to have "enhanced" the "adversary characteristics of the pre-9/11 DBT, the NRC has actually weakened the standard for protection of strategic special nuclear material against theft by reducing the maximum number of hypothetical adversary teams from three to two.
The NRC appears to have relied on unlawful cost considerations to limit the scope of the DBT by stating that a licensee should only have to defend against a DBT "which a private security force could reasonably be expected to defend." NRC safety and security regulations must be based on a determination of what is necessary to protect public health and safety, not a judgment of what is affordable to the licensee. And if the NRC has relied on some considerations other than costs, it has failed to explain its rationale, which constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Furthermore, it appears that the NRC's limitations on the scope of the DBT are based on secret comments from the nuclear industry which the NRC has not summarized for the general public. This is also a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
William Denneen, Biologist, 1040 Cielo Lane, Nipomo,CA. 93444 PS I live downwind to Diablo Nuclear Power Plant.
Nuclear Waste should NOT be stored at Diablo..
DOCKETED USNRC January 23, 2006 (2:25pm)
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DIABLO Mon, Jan 23, 2006 12:01 AM Bill Denneen <bdenneen~kcbx.net>
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