ML053180141

Federal Respondents' Fourth Filing Under Frap 28J, Dated 11/9/05

ML053180141
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	11/09/2005
From:	Mullins C NRC/OGC
To:	Catterson C US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit
Mullins C
References
03-74628, 10 CFR Part 73, RIN 3150-AH60
Download: ML053180141 (10)

Text

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opR REQ& UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 t ~ November 9, 2005 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 95 Seventh Street San Francisco, California 94103-1526 RE: San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, et al. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No.

03-74628

Dear Ms. Catterson:

The Federal Respondents file this letter under Rule 28(j) to inform the Court of action taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since this Court held oral argument in this case. Oral argument was held in this case on October 17; accordingly, please distribute this letter to the panel immediately.

In their Brief, Petitioners state that "[t]o date, the Commission has not instituted a single rulemaking to establish changes in the design basis threat and other security-related measures for the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant or the ISFSI." Petitioners' Brief at 54. The Commission has now issued a Proposed Rule amending the Design Basis Threat at all nuclear facilities, including ISFSI's. 70 Fed. Reg. 67380 (Nov. 7, 2005). This Proposed Rule was, in part, the subject of a Petition for Rulemaking that was published for comment in the Federal Register in 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 64690 (Nov. 8, 2004). I have enclosed a copy of the Federal Register Notice containing the new Proposed Rule. Petitioners still have a separate rulemaking request pending before the Commission and a decision is expected on that request in the near future.

In addition, at oral argument I stated that the Commission had issued a Federal Register Notice seeking public comment on the NEPA/Terrorism issue (now before this Court) when the matter arose before the agency. I was mistaken. To obtain as wide a range of views as possible, the Commission took simultaneous review of four separate cases raising this same issue in a variety of contexts. The Commission took this step "to ensure that all interested parties are afforded an opportunity to provide their views to the Commission . .." Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.

(Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-3, 55 NRC 155,157 (2002). The Commission also accepted briefs from amidi. See, e.g., Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-24, 56 NRC 335, 338 n.13 (2002). However, the Commission did not issue a Federal Register Notice asking for public comments; instead, it only issued separate orders Iach case. I apologize for the mistake.

Sirnery Charles E M ins Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel cc: Service List

.4 67380 Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules previously approved by OMB and Dated: November 2. 2005. will be considered if it is practical to do assigned OMB Number 0581-0177. Lloyd C. Day, so, but the Commission is able to ensure Reporting and recordkeeping burdens Administrator,AgriculturalMarketing consideration only for comments are necessary for compliance purposes Service. received on or before this date.

and for developing statistical data for [FR Doc. 05-22115 Filed 21-4-05; 8:45 am] ADDRESSES: You may submit comments maintenance of the program. The forms BILUNG CODE 3410-02-P by any one of the following methods.

require information which is readily Please include the following number available from handler records and RIN 3150-AH60 in the subject line of which can be provided without data NUCLEAR REGULATORY your comments. Comments on processing equipment or trained COMMISSION rulemakings submitted in writing or in statistical staff. As with other, similar electronic form will be made available marketing order programs, reports and 10 CFR Part 73 for public inspection. Because your forms are periodically studied to reduce RIN 3150-AH60 comments will not be edited to remove or eliminate duplicate information any identifying or contact information, collection burdens by industry and Design Basis Threat the NRC cautions you against including public sector agencies. This rule does any information in your submission that not change those requirements. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory you do not want to be publicly AMS is committed to compliance Commission. disclosed.

with the Government Paperwork ACTION: Proposed rule. Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S.

Elimination Act (GPEA), which requires Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Government agencies in general to

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN:

provide the public the option of Commission (NRC) is proposing to Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.

submitting information or transacting amend its regulations that govern the E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If business electronically to the maximum requirements pertaining to design basis you do not receive a reply e-mail extent possible. threat (DBT). The proposed rule would confirming that we have received your A 30-day comment period is provided amend the Commission's regulations to, comments, contact us directly at (301) to allow interested persons to respond among other things, make generically 415-1966. You may also submit to this proposal. Thirty days is deemed applicable the security requirements comments via the NRC's rulemaking appropriate because this rule would previously imposed by the Web site at http.//ruleforum.i1nl.gov.

need to be in place as soon as possible Commission's April 29, 2003 DBT Address questions about our rulemaking since handlers are already shipping tart orders, which applied to existing Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-cherries from the 2005-2006 crop. All licensees, and redefine the level of 5905; e-mail cag(nrc.gov. Comments written comments timely received will security requirements necessary to can also be submitted via the Federal-be considered before a final ensure that the public health and safety eRulemaking Portal http.//

determination is made on this matter. and common defense and security are www.regulations.gov.

adequately protected. The proposed rule Hand delivercomments to: 11555 List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 930 would revise the DBT requirements for Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland Marketing agreements, Reporting and radiological sabotage (applied to power 20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm recordkeeping requirements, Tart reactors and Category I fuel cycle Federal workdays. (Telephone (301) cherries. facilities), and theft or diversion of NRC- 415-1966).

licensed Strategic Special Nuclear Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S.

For the reasons set forth in the Material (SSNM) (applied to Category I preamble, 7 CFR part 930 is proposed to Nuclear Regulatory Commission at (301) fuel cycle facilities). The NRC has 415-1101.

be amended as follows: developed draft Regulatory Guides You may submit comments on the PART 930-TART CHERRIES GROWN (RGs) that provide guidance to licensees information collections by the methods IN THE STATES OF MICHIGAN, NEW concerning the DBT for radiological indicated in the Paperwork Reduction YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, OREGON, sabotage and theft and diversion. These Act Statement.

UTAH, WASHINGTON, AND draft RGs have limited distribution Publicly available documents related WISCONSIN because they contain either safeguards to this rulemaking may be viewed or classified information. The specific electronically on the public computers

1. The authority citation for 7 CFR details related to the threat, which located at the NRC's Public Document part 930 continues to read as follows: contain both safeguards information Room (PDR), 01 F21, One White Flint Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601-674. (SGI) and classified information, are North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, contained in adversary characteristics Maryland. The PDR reproduction

2. Section 930.254 is added to read as documents (ACDs) that are not publicly contractor will copy documents for a follows: available. These documents include fee. Selected documents, including Note: This section will not appear in the specific details of the attributes of the comments, may be viewed and annual Code of Federal Regulations. threat consistent with the requirements downloaded electronically via the NRC imposed in the April 29, 2003, DBT rulemaking Web site at http://

§930.254 Final free and restricted orders. Additionally, a Petition for ruleforum.llnl.gov.

percentages for the 2005-2006 crop year. Rulemaking (PRM-73-12), filed by the Publicly available documents created The final percentages for tart cherries Committee to Bridge the Gap, was or received at the NRC after November handled by handlers during the crop considered as part of this proposed 1, 1999, are available electronically at year beginning on July 1, 2005, which rulemaking; the NRC's disposition of the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at shall be free and restricted, respectively, this petition is contained in this http://wwv.nrc.gov/reading-rmf are designated as follows: Free document. adams.html. From this site, the public percentage, 58 percent and restricted DATES: Submit comments by January 23, can gain entry into the NRC's percentage, 42 percent. 2006. Comments received after this date Agencywide Document Access and

Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules 67381 Management System (ADAMS), which the domestic threat level. After including expanded, expedited, and provides text and image files of NRC's soliciting and receiving comments from more thorough initial and follow-on public documents. If you do not have Federal, State, local agencies, and screening of temporary and permanent access to ADAMS or if there are industry stakeholders, the NRC imposed workers. The NRC has reviewed and problems in accessing the documents by order supplemental DBT approved the revised security plans that located in ADAMS, contact the NRC requirements that contained additional were developed and submitted by Public Document Room (PDR) Reference detailed adversary characteristics. The power reactor and Category I fuel staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 Commission deliberated on the facility licensees in response to the or by e-mail to pdrznrc.gov. responsibilities of the local, State, and April 29, 2003 orders.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Federal governments to protect the nation, and the responsibility of the II. Rulemaking Initiation Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory licensees to protect individual nuclear On July 19, 2004, the staff issued a Commission, Washington, DC 20555- facilities, before reaching consensus on memorandum entitled "Status of 0001; telephone (301) 415-1462; e-mail: a reasonable approach to security in the Security-Related Rulemaking" to inform tar'nrc.govor Mr. Richard Rasmussen, April 29, 2003 DBT orders. After gaining the Commission of plans to close two Office of Nuclear Security and Incident experience under these brders over the longstanding security-related actions Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory past two years, the Commission believes and replace them with a comprehensive Commission, Washington, DC 20555- that the attributes of the orders should rulemaking plan to modify physical 0001; telephone (301) 415-8380; e-mail: be generically imposed on certain protection requirements for power rarenrc.gov. classes of licensees. reactors. This memorandum described SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission's decision was based rulemaking efforts that were preempted on the analysis of intelligence by the terrorist activities of September Table of Contents information regarding the trends and 11, 2001, and summarized the security-I. Background. capabilities of the potential adversaries related actions taken following the II. Rulemaking Initiation. and discussions with Federal, law attack. In response to this 1II. Proposed Regulations. enforcement, and intelligence memorandum, the Commission directed IV.Section-by-Section Analysis. community agencies. These enhanced V.Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-73-12). the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff VI. Guidance. adversary characteristics are reflective Requirements Memorandum (SRM), to VII. Criminal Penalties. of the new threat environment. In forego the development of a rulemaking Vill. Compatibility of Agreement State general terms, DBTs are comprised of plan and provide a schedule for the Regulations. attributes selected from the overall completion of 10 CFR 73.1, 73.55, and IX.Availability of Documents. threat environment. The ACDs set forth Part 73 Appendix B rulemakings. The X.Plain Language. the specific details of the attributes of requested schedule was provided to the XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards. the DBTs. The DBT technical basis XII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Commission by memorandum dated document contains a basis for the November 16, 2004.

Impact: Environmental Assessment: specific adversary characteristics. These Availability. III. Proposed Regulations XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement. supplemental documents contain XIV. Regulatory Analysis. safeguards and classified information The principal objectives of the XV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification. that is distributed only to persons with proposed rule are, among other things, XVI. Backfit Analysis. authorized access and on a need-to- to make generically applicable the I. Background know basis. The NRC's DBT takes into security requirements previously consideration actual demonstrated imposed by the Commission's April 29.

The DBT requirements in 10 CFR adversary characteristics as well as 2003 DBT orders, and to define in NRC 73.1(a) describe general adversary pertinent intelligence information regulations the level of security characteristics that designated licensees applicable to domestic threats and a necessary to ensure adequate protection must defend against with high determination as to those characteristics of the public health and safety and assurance. These NRC requirements against which a private security force common defense and security.

include protection against radiological could reasonably be expected to provide The Commission continues to sabotage (generally applied to power protection. consider many factors in developing the reactors and Category I fuel cycle The April 29, 2003 DBT orders proposed DBT and other security facilities) and theft or diversion of NRC- required nuclear power reactors and requirements. As directed by Congress licensed SSNM (generally applied to Category I fuel cycle licensees to revise under section 651(a) of the recently Category I fuel cycle facilities). The their physical security plans, security enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005, the DBTs are used by these licensees to personnel training and qualification NRC is giving consideration to the form the basis for site-specific defensive plans, and safeguards contingency plans following 12 factors as part of this strategies implemented through security to defend against the supplemental DBT rulemaking to revise the design basis plans, safeguards contingency plans, requirements. The orders required threats:

and guard training and qualification licensees to make security 1. The events of September 11, 2001-plans. enhancements such as increased patrols; 2. An assessment of physical, cyber, Following the terrorist attacks on augmented security forces and biochemical, and other terrorist threats; September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted capabilities; additional security posts; 3. The potential for attack on facilities a thorough review of security to ensure additional physical barriers; vehicle by multiple coordinated teams of a large that nuclear power plants and other checks at greater standoff distances; number of individuals; licensed facilities continued to have better coordination with law 4. The potential for assistance in an effective security measures in place for enforcement and military authorities; attack from several persons employed at the changing threat environment. In so augmented security and emergency the facility; doing, the NRC recognized that some response training, equipment, and 5. The potential for suicide attacks; elements of the DBTs required communication; and more restrictive 6. The potential for water-based and enhancement due to the escalation of site access controls for personnel, air-based threats;

67382 Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules

7. The potential use of explosive has determined, however, that due to attributes of the DBT presented in the devices of considerable size and other the current threat environment certain proposed rule. More specific details modem weaponry; licensees subject to § 73.20 (Category I (e.g., specific weapons, ammunition,

8. The potential for attacks by persons fuel cycle facilities) need to protect etc.) are consolidated in ACDs, which with a sophisticated knowledge of against such threats, so the exemption contain classified or safeguards facility operations; must be amended accordingly. The information. The technical bases for the

9. Tie potential for fires, especially amended exempti6n would continue for ACDs are derived largely from fires of long duration; other licensees described in 10 CFR intelligence information, and also

10. The potential for attacks on spent 73.20 (e.g., fuel reprocessing plants contain classified and safeguards fuel shipments by multiple coordinated licensed under Part 50). information that cannot be publicly teams of a large number of individuals;" The approach proposed in this

11. The adequacy of planning to disclosed. These documents must be rulemaking maintains a level of detail in protect the public health and safety at the § 73.1(a) rule language'that is withheld from public disclosure and and around nuclear facilities, as generally comparable to the current made available only on a need-to-know appropriate, in the event of a terrorist regulation, while updating'the general basis to those who otherwise qualify for attack against a nuclear facility; and DBT attributes in a manner consistent access.

12. The potential for theft and with the insights gained from the The ACDs may be updated from time diversion of nuclear material from such application of supplemental security to time as a result of the NRC's periodic facilities. requirements imposed by the April 29, threat reviews, which NRC has been A number of these factors' are already 2003, DBT orders; The result is a conducting since 1979. Those threat reflected in the text of the proposed proposed rule with a level of detail that assessments are performed in rule. For example, the proposed rule reflects all major features of the DBTs, conjunction with the intelligence and would require protection against yet avoids compromising licensee law enforcement communities to suicidal attackers, insiders, and security by not publishing the specific identify changes in the threat waterborne threats. Some of these tactical and operational capabilities of environment which may in turn require factors are not included in the proposed the DBT adversaries. The goal of this adjustment of NRC security rule. For example, there is no provision approach is to provide sufficient public in the proposed DBT rule for an requirements. Future revisions to the notice of the upgrades to the DBTs, ACDs would not require changes to the attribute of air-based threats. The including the new modes of attack that Commission invites and looks forward DBT regulations in § 73.1, provided the facilities must be prepared to defend to public comment on the proposed rule against, so that meaningful public input changes remain within the scope of the provisions, as well as whether or how is possible regarding the proposed rule's rule text.

the 12 factors should be addressed in scope and content. The NRC consulted with Federal, the DBT rule. The Commission will The NRC recognizes that some State, and local agencies, and with further consider and resolve any stakeholders may expect more detail industry stakeholders in developing the comments received in the final rule. than is set forth in the current or updated DBTs. This consultation The proposed rule would also revise proposed DBT regulations. However, the involved analysis of intelligence certain exemptions for independent more detail that is made publicly information regarding the trends and spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). available about the specific capabilities capabilities of potential adversaries, and The current DBT rule exempts ISFSIs of the DBT adversaries, the greater the 'discussion with Federal, law from the land vehicle transport and land chance that potential adversaries could enforcement, and intelligence vehicle bomb threats contained in exploit that information. The disclosure community agencies. Public comments

§§ 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (a)(1)(iii), of such details as the specific weapons, and suggestions received in response to respectively. These exemptions should force size, ammunition, vehicles, and PRM-73-12, also informed the NRC's no longer be retained because the bomb sizes that licensees must be Commission issued orders to ISFSIs on development of this proposed rule. The prepared to defend against could resolution of PRM-73-12, which is October 16, 2002, requiring ISFS~s to substantially assist an adversary in protect against these threats. The NRC planning an attack. being granted in part through this evaluated the need to apply waterborne On the other hand, it is important for rulemaking, is more fully discussed in requirements to lSFSIs and concluded the public to be informed'of the types Section V of this notice.

that other means in the proposed rule of attacks against which nuclear power The Commission concludes that the were sufficiently protective to preclude plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities proposed amendments to § 73.1 will the need for specific requirements are required to defend. The public has continue to ensure adequate protection regarding waterbome threats. a vital stake in the security of these of public health and safety and the Consequently, an exemption from the facilities, as well as the right to common defense and security by waterborne threat has been added for meaningful comment when NRC requiring the secure use and ISFSIs in this proposed rule. proposes to amend its regulations. management of radioactive materials.

The proposed rule would also amend Understanding the general scope of the The revised DBTs represent the largest the exemption in the current § 73.1(a) proposed DBT rule is necessary if the threats against which private sector for licensees subject to the provisions of public is to exercise its right to facilities must be able to defend with

§ 73.20. The current rule exempts these meaningful comment and oversight of high assurance. The proposed licensees from the requirements to NRC regulations. amendments to § 73.1 reflect protect against vehicles transporting After carefully balancing these adversary personnel and equipment and competing interests, the NRC arrived at requirements currently in place under the land vehicle bomb. The Commission the level of detail regarding the existing NRC regulations and orders.

ITransportation of spent nuclear fuel is subject to separate regulatory requirements and public comments will be considered.

Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules 67383 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis The following table provides a comparison between the proposed rule text and the current rule text.

Old New Change (a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements (a) Purpose. This part prescribes require- The proposed paragraph Is modified to clarify for the establishment and maintenance of a ments for the establishment and mainte- that the DBTs are designed to protect physical protection system which will have nance of a physical protection system against diversion In addition to theft of spe-capabilities for the protection of special nu- which will have capabilites for the protec- cial nuclear material.

clear material at fixed sites and in transit and tion of special nuclear material at fixed sites The proposed exemptions would be updated of.plants In which special nuclear materials and In transit and of plants In which special based on the order requirements and con-used. The following design basis threats, nuclear material Is used. The following de- forming changes to other paragraphs of this where referenced In ensuing sections ofthis sign basis threats, where referenced In en- part.

part, shall be used to design safeguards sys- suing sections of this part, shall be used to tems to protect against acts of radiological design safeguards systems to protect sabotage and .to prevent the theft of special against acts of radiological sabotage and to nuclear material. Licensees subject to the prevent the theft or diversion of special nu-provision of §72.182, §72212, §72.20, clear material. Ucensees subject to the pro-

§73.50, and § 73.60 are exempt from visions of §7320 (except for fuel cycle li-

§73.1(a)(1)(1)(E) and §73.1(a)(1)(iii). censees authorized under part 70 of this chapter to received, acquire, possess, transfer, use, or deliver for transportation formula quantities of strategic special nu-clear material), §73.50, and §73.60 are ex-empt from §73.1(a)(1)(i)(E), §73.1(a)(1)(iii),

§73.11(a)(1)(tv), §73.1(a)(2)(iii) and

§73.1(a)(2}(iv). Ucensees subject to the provisions of §72212, are exempt from

§ 73.1 (a)(1)(iv).

(1) Radiological sabotage. (i) A determined vio- (1) Radioloigcal sabotage. (i) A determined vi- The proposed paragraph adds new capabili-lent external assault, attack by stealth, or de- olence external assault, attack by stealth, or ties to the DBT Including operation as one ceptive actions, of several persons with the deceptive actions, Including diversionary ac- or more teams and attack from multiple following attributes, assistance and equip- tions, by an adversary force capable of op- entry points.

ment: erating as one or more teams, attacking from one or more entry points, with the fol-lowing attributes, assistance and equip-ment:

(1)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military training (1)(i)(A) Well-trained (including military train- The proposed paragraph would add to the and skills) and dedicated individuals, ing and skills) and dedicated Individuals, DBT adversaries who are willing to kill or willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient be killed and are knowledgeable about spe-knowledge to identify specific equipment or cific target selection.

locations necessary for a successful attack, (1)(i)(B) Inside assistance which may include a (1)(i)(B) active (e.g., facilitate entrance and knowledgeable Individual who attempts to exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in a passive role (e.g., provide In- participate In violent attack) or passive formation), an active role (e.g., facilitate en- (e.g., provide information), or both, knowl-trance and exit, disable alarms and commu- edgeable Inside assistance. The reference nications, participate In violent attack), or to an individual would be removed and the both, paragraph reworded to provide flexibility In defining the scope of the inside threat.

(1)(i)(C) suitable weapons, up to and Including (1)(i)(C) suitable weapons, including hand- The phrase "up to and including" was hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with held automatic weapons, equipped with si- changed to "including" to provide flexibility silencers and having effective long range ac- lencers and having effective long range ac- in defining the range of weapons licensees curacy, curacy, must be able to defend against.

(1)(i)(D) hand-carrded equipment, including Inca- (1)(i)(D) hand-carried equipment, including In- This description Is not revised by the pro-pacitating agents and explosives for use as capacitating agents and explosives for use posed rule.

tools of entry or for otherwise destroying re- as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying actor, facility, transporter, or container Integ- reactor, facility, transporter, or container in-rity or features of the safeguards systems, tegrity or features of the safeguards sys-and tems, and (1)(i)(E) a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for (1)(i)(E) land and water vehicles, which could The scope of vehicles licensees must defend transporting personnel and their hand-carried be used for transporting personnel and their against would be expanded to include water equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vehicles and a range of land vehicles be-vital areas, and yond four-wheel drive vehicles.

(1)(ii) An internal threat of an insider, Including (1)(ii) An internal threat, and ............................ The current rule describes the internal threat an employee (in any position), and as a threat posed by an Individual. The lan-guage would be revised to provide flexibility In defining the scope of the Internal threat without adding details that may be useful to an adversary.

67384 Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules Old New Change (1)(ii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb. (1)(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, which The proposed paragraph would be updated to may be coordinated with an external as- reflect that licensees are required to protect sault, and against a wide range of land vehicles. A new mode of attack not previously part of the DBT would be added Indicating that ad-versaries may coordinate a vehicle bomb assault with another external assault.

None . (1)Civ) A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, The proposed paragraph would add a .new which may be coordinated with an external mode of attack not previously part of the assault. DBT, that being a waterbome vehicle bomb assault. This paragraph also adds a coordi-nated attack concept.

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of (2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of The proposed paragraph would add new ad-strategic special nuclear material. (i) A deter- strategic special nuclear material. (i) A de- versary capabilities to the DBT Including mined, violent, external assault, attack by termined violent external assault, attack by operation as one or more teams and attack stealth, or deceptive actions by a small group stealth, or deceptive actions, Including di- from multiple entry points.

with the following attributes, assistance, and versionary actions, by an adversary force equipment: capable of operating as one or more teams, attacking from one or more entry points, with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:

(2)(1)(A) Well-trained (including military training (2)(1)(A) Well-trained (including military train- The proposed paragraph would add to the and skills) and dedicated Individuals; ing and skills) and dedicated individuals, DBT adversaries who are willing to kill or willing to kill or be killed, with sufficient be killed and are knowledgeable about spe-knowledge to Identify specific equipment or cific target selection.

locations necessary for a successful attack; (2)(i)(B) Inside assistance that may Include a (2)(i)(B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and The reference to an Individual would be re-knowledgeable Individual who attempts to exit, disable alarms and communications, moved and the paragraph reworded to pro-participate In a passive role (e.g., provide In- participate in violent attack) or passive vide flexibility In defining the scope of the formation), an active role (e.g., facilitate en- (e.g., provide Information), or both, knowl- inside threat.

trance and exit, disable alarms and commu- edgeable Inside assistance, nications, participate In violent attack), or both; (2)(i)(C) Suitable weapons, up to and Including (2)(i)(C) Suitable weapons, Including hand- The phrase "up to and Including" was hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with held automatic weapons, equipped with si- changed to "Including" to provide flexibility silencers and having effective long-range ac- lencers and having effective long-range ac- In defining the range of weapons licensees curacy-, curacy; must be able to defend against.

(2)(i)(D) Hand-carried -equipment, Including In- (2)(i)(D) Hand-carried equipment, Including In- This description Is not revised by the pro-capacitating agents and explosives for use as capacitating agents and explosives for use posed rule.

tools of entry or for otherwise destroying re- as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying actor, facility, transporter, or container Integ- reactor, facility, transporter, or container In-rity or features of the safeguards system; tegrity or features of the safeguards sys-tem; (2)(i)(E) Land vehicles used for transporting (2)(i)(E) Land and water vehicles, which could The scope of vehicles licensees must defend personnel and their hand-carried equipment; be used for transporting personnel and their against would be expanded to Include water and hand-carried equipment; and vehicles and a range of land vehicles be-yond four-wheel drive vehicles.

(2)(i)(F) the ability to operate as two or more Deleted ............................................................ This requirement would be Included In teams. §73-11(a)(2)CO.

(2)(ii) An Individual, Including an employee (in (2)(ii) An Internal threat, and ............................ The current rule describes the internal threat any position), and as a threat posed by an Individual. The ian-(2)(iii) A conspiracy between individuals In any guage would be revised to provide flexibility position who may have: In defining the scope of the Internal threat (A) Access to and detailed knowledge of nu- without adding details that may be useful to clear power plants or the facilities referred to an adversary.

In § 7320(a), or (B) hems that could facilitate theft of special nu-clear material (e.g., small tools, substitute material, false documents, etc.), or both.

None . (2)(ill) A land vehicle bomb assault, which The proposed paragraph would be updated to may be coordinated with an external as- reflect that licensees are required to protect sault, and against a wide range of land vehicles. A new mode of attack not previously part of the DBT would be added Indicating that ad-versaries may coordinate a vehicle bomb assault with another external assault.

None . (2)(iv) A waterbome vehicle bomb assault, The proposed paragraph would add a new which may be coordinated with an external mode of attack not previously part of the assault. DBT, that being a waterborne vehicle bomb assault. This coordinated attack concept is another upgrade to the current regulation.

Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules ~67385

• Additional guidance concerning the Based on a review of PRM-73-12 identify potential aircraft-related threats adversary characteristics is located in public comments, the NRC staff before they can be carried out. Such the corresponding draft regulatory prepared a summary of those comments improvements have already been guides (radiological sabotage in DG- in the PRM-73-12 comment summary exercised by the Department of Defense 5017 and theft and diversion in DG- table (ML053040061). The table does and the Federal Aviation 5018). These draft RGs contain either not list each iridividual comment. The Administration through responses to safeguards or classified information and staff has grouped the comments by topic airspace violations near nuclear power are not publicly available. and provided the NRC's response. A plants that were subsequently review of the table shows that although determined not to be threats. These and V. Petition for Rulemaking (PRM there were a large number of comments,

12) other government-wide efforts have the comments fell into a relatively small improved protection against air attacks As discussed above in this notice, the number of topics. on all industrial facilities, both nuclear NRC staff reviewed PRM-73-12 to The table contains the NRC's and non-nuclear.

determine whether the regulations in responses to the issues raised by public Following the September 11, 2001, Part 73 regarding the DBT should be comments,.but the responses to attacks in New York, the Pentagon, and amended in response to requests in comments do not include a detailed Pennsylvania, the NRC conducted PRM-73-12 and public comments comparison of the differences between assessments of the potential for and received on the petition. PRM-73-12 the current DBT requirements (as consequences of terrorists targeting a was filed by the Committee to Bridge imposed by the April 29, 2003 orders). nuclear power plant for aircraft attack, the Gap on July 23, 2004. The petition and the requests in PRM-73-12. Such a the physical effects of such a strike, and requests that the NRC amend its comparison could compromise security. compounding factors such as regulations to revise the DBT The NRC's post-September 11, 2001, meteorology that would affect the regulations (in terms of the numbers, review of security requirements impact of potential radioactive releases.

teams, capabilities, planning, encompassed all the issues raised by the Furthermore, the NRC required existing willingness to die and other petitioner, and a number of the nuclear power plant licensees to characteristics of adversaries) to a level petitioner's requested changes to the that encompasses, with a sufficient develop and implement strategies to DBT have been incorporated into the mitigate potential consequences in the margin of safety, the terrorist proposed DBT amendments as capabilities evidenced by the attacks of unlikely event of an attack, including an discussed below. aircraft crash into a nuclear power September 11, 2001. The petition also The NRC is partially granting PRM-requests that security plans, systems, 73-12 by conducting this proposed plant. For new nuclear power plants, inspections, and force-on-force exercises rulemaking to revise the DBT the opportunity exists to develop be revised in accordance with the requirements in § 73.1(a). Some of the designs that provide for enhanced amended DBT. Finally, the petition requested changes in PRM-73-12 are protection against potential threats. The requests a requirement be added to Part reflected in the proposed rule text. NRC staff will continue to review 73 to construct shields against air attack These changes include the proposed intelligence and threat reporting to (the shields are referred to as requirements in §§ 73.1(a)(1)(i) and recommend any appropriate "beamhenge") which the petition (a)(2)(i) that licensees be required to modifications to the DBT or NRC asserts would enable nuclear power protect against one or more teams of requirements to mitigate air attacks.

plants to withstand an air attack from a adversaries operating from multiple PRM-73-12 also requests that nuclear jumbo jet. entry points. PRM-73-12 also requested power plants be required to defend PRM-73-12 was published for public that the DBT regulation make clear that against more than the number of comment in the Federal Register on adversaries are willing to kill and be attackers that carried out the September November 8, 2004 (69 FR 64690). The killed. This change is reflected in 11, 2001 attacks, and identifies specific public comment period expired on proposed §§ 73.1(a)(1)(i)(A) and weapons that nuclear power plants January 24, 2005. There were 845 (a)(2)(i)(A). The proposed rule would should be able to defend against. The comments submitted on PRM-73-12, of also require licensees to protect against Commission cannot comment publicly which 528 were form letters. Many of waterborne threats, a wider range of on the precise numbers of attackers or the comments were submitted after the land vehicles, and coordinated attacks. types of weapons that nuclear power comment period expired; however, the All of these features of the proposed plants are required to defend against staff reviewed and considered all of the rule grant requests made in PRM-73-12. under the proposed DBTs and ACDs for comments. Comments were received The NRC intends to defer action on reasons stated earlier in this notice.

from nine state attorneys general, the other requests in PRM-73-12, However, the Commission has approximately 20 public interest groups, specifically those aspects of PRM 73-12 conducted a thorough review of security a U.S. Congressman from which deal with the defense of nuclear to continue to ensure that nuclear power Massachusetts, and six industry groups power plants against aircraft, and to plants and other licensed facilities have and licensees. In addition, two U.S. address those issues as part of the final effective defensive capabilities and Senators and a U.S. Representative (all action on this proposed rule. security measures in place given the from New Jersey) requested an Federal and other governmental changing threat environment. An extension to the comment period. The efforts to protect the nation from important part of this review was the bulk of the comments either supported terrorist attacks by air have increased consideration of a terrorist attack similar the petition, requested a stronger DBT, substantially since September 11, 2001. to that which occurred on September or requested that NRC give Those efforts already include a variety 11, 2001. However, the DBT is based consideration to the petition. All the of measures such as enhanced airline upon review and analysis of actual comments from industry and licensees passenger and baggage screening, demonstrated adversary characteristics opposed the petition and indicated that strengthened cockpit doors, and the in a range of terrorist attacks, and a the supplemental DBT requirements federal Air Marshals program. Federal determination as to the attacks against imposed (by order) to date were law enforcement and intelligence which a private security force could adequate. agencies have increased efforts to reasonably be expected to defend.

67386 Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules In summary, the NRC grants PRM Threat (Safeguards)." This regulatory rule is classified as compatibility 12 in part by conducting this proposed guide will provide guidance to the "NRC." Compatibility is not required for rulemaking to revise the DBT industry on the radiological sabotage Category "NRC" regulations. The NRC requirements in § 73.1(a) to reflect DBT. DG-5017 contains safeguards program elements in this category are certain specific requested changes information and, therefore, is being those that relate directly to areas of contained in PRM-73-12 in the withheld from public disclosure and regulation reserved to the NRC by the proposed rule text, and is deferring distributed on a need-to-know basis to AEA or the provisions of Title 10 of the action on other requests in PRM-73-12, those who otherwise qualify for access. Code of Federal Regulations, and specifically those'aspects of PRM-73-12 2. Draft Regulatory Guide (DG-5018), although an Agreement State may not which deal with air-based attacks. "Guidance for the Implementation of adopt program elements reserved to the Theft and Diversion Design-Basis NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees VI. Guidance Threat (Classified)." This regulatory of certain requirements via a mechanism The NRC staff is preparing new guide will provide guidance to the that is consistent with the particular regulatory guides, as listed below, to industry on the theft or diversion DBT. State's administrative procedure laws, provide detailed guidance on the DG-5018 contains classified but does not confer regulatory authority revised DBT requirements in proposed information and, therefore, is withheld on the State.

§ 73.1. These guides are intended to from public disclosure and distributed assist current licensees in ensuring that only on a need to know basis to those IX. Availability of Documents their security plans meet requirements who otherwise qualify for access. Some documents discussed in this in the proposed rule, as well as future rule are not available to the public. The license applicants in the development of VII. Criminal Penalties following table indicates which their security programs and plans. The For the purposes of Section 223 of the documents are available to the public new guidance incorporates the insights Atomic Energy Act, as amended, the and how they may be obtained.

gained from applying the earlier Commission is issuing the proposed guidance that was used to develop, rule to revise § 73.1 under one or more PublicDocument Room (PDR). The review, and approve the site security sections of 161 of the Atomic Energy NRC Public Document Room is located plans that licensees put in place in Act of 1954 (AEA). Criminal penalties, at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, response to the April 2003 orders. As as they apply to regulations in Part 73 Maryland 20852.

such, this regulatory guidance is are discussed in § 73.81. Rulemaking Web site (Web). The expected to be consistent with revised NRC's interactive rulemaking Web site VIII. Compatibility of Agreement State is located at http:/Iruleforum.llnl.gov.

security measures at current licensees.

The publication of the regulatory guides Regulations These documents may be viewed and is planned to coincide with the Under the "Policy Statement on downloaded electronically via this Web publication of the final rule. The guides Adequacy and Compatibility of site.

are described below. Agreement States Programs," approved NRC's ElectronicReading Room

1. Draft Regulatory Guide (DG-5017), by the Commission on June 20, 1997, (ERR). The NRC's electronic reading "Guidance for the Implementation of and published in the Federal Register room is located at http.:Aw1w.nrc.govf the Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this reading-rm.html.

Document PDR Web ERR Environmental Assessment .................................................................. X X ML053040039 Regulatory Analysis ................................................................. X X ML053040013 Public Comments on PRM-73-12 ................................................................. X X ML053040061 Radiological Sabotage Adversary Characteristics document .................................................................. no no no Theft and Diversion Adversary Characteristics document ................................................................. no no no Technical Basis Document .............................. :n ...... no no no Draft RG DG-5017 on Radiological Sabotage ................... .............................................. no no no Draft RG DG-5018 on Theft or Diversion ......................... .. ..... no no no Memorandum: Status of Security-Related Rulemaking ..................................... ............................ X X ML041180532 Commission SRM dated August 23, 2004 ................................................................. X X ML042360548 Memorandum: Schedule for Part 73 Rulemakings ...............................  : X X ML043060572 Letter to Petitioner ......... ....................................... X X ML052920150 Commission SRM dated October 27, 2005.X X ML053000448 X. Plain Language XI. Voluntary Consensus Standards will consider using a voluntary consensus standard if an appropriate The Presidential memorandum dated The National Technology Transfer standard is identified.

June 1, 1998, entitled "Plain Language and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L.

in Government Writing," published on 104-113, requires that Federal agencies XII. Finding of No Significant June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883) directed use technical standards that are Environmental Impact: Environmental that the Government's documents be in developed or adopted by voluntary Assessment: Availability plain, clear, and accessible language. consensus standards bodies unless The Commission has determined The NRC requests comments on the using such a standard is inconsistent under the National Environmental proposed rule specifically with respect with applicable law or is otherwise Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the to the clarity and effectiveness of the impractical. The NRC is not aware of Commission's regulations in Subpart A language used. Comments should be any voluntary consensus standard that of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if sent to the NRC as explained in the could be used instead of the proposed adopted, would not be a major Federal ADDRESSES caption of this notice. Government-unique standards. The NRC action significantly affecting the quality

P Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules ;67387 of the human environment and. standards established by the NRC (10 Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, therefore, an environmental impact CFR 2.810). as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C.

statement is not required. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, XVI. Backfit Analysis 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, The determination of this 106 Stat. 2951,2952.2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, environmental assessment is that there The NRC has determined, pursuant to 5844, 22971); sec. 1704,112 Stat. 2750 (44 will be no significant offsite impact to the exception in 10 CFR U.S.C. 3504 note). Section 73.1 also Issued the public from this action. However, 50.109(a)(4iii), that a backfit analysis is under secs. 135,141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat.

the general public should note that the unnecessary for this proposed rule. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section NRC is seeking public participation; Section 50.109 states in pertinent part 73.37(o) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.

availability of the environmental that a backfit analysis is not required if 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

assessment is provided in Section IX. the Commission finds and declares with Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub.

Comments on any aspect of the appropriate documented evaluation for L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

environmental assessment may be its finding that a "regulatory action 2. In § 73.1, paragraph (a) is revised to submitted to the NRC as indicated involves defining or redefining what read as follows:

under the ADDRESSES heading level of protection to the public health The NRC has sent a copy of the and safety or common defense and §73.1 Purpose and scope.

environmental assessment and this security should be regarded as (a) Purpose. This part prescribes proposed rule to every State Liaison adequate." The proposed rule would requirements for the establishment and Officer and requested their comments increase the security requirements maintenance of a physical protection on the environmental assessment. currently prescribed in NRC regulations, system which will have capabilities for and is necessary to protect nuclear the protection of special nuclear XIII. Paperwork Reduction Act material at fixed sites and in transit and Statement facilities against potential terrorists.

When the Commission imposed security of plants in which special nuclear This proposed rule does not contain enhancements by order in April 2003, it material is used. The following design new or amended information collection did so in response to an escalated basis threats, where referenced in requirements subject to the Paperwork domestic threat level. Since that time, ensuing sections of this part, shall be Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 the Commission has continued to used to design safeguards systems to et seq.). Existing requirements were monitor intelligence reports regarding protect against acts of radiological approved by the Office of Management plausible threats from terrorists sabotage and to prevent the theft or and Budget, approval number 3150- currently facing the U.S. The diversion of special nuclear material.

0002. Commission has also gained experience Licensees subject to the provisions of from implementing the order § 73.20 (except for fuel cycle licensees PublicProtection Notification authorized under Part 70 of this chapter requirements and reviewing revised The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, licensee security plans. The to receive, acquire, possess, transfer, and a person is not required to respond Commission has considered all of this use, or deliver for transportation to, a request for information or an information and finds that the security formula quantities of strategic special information collection requirement requirements previously imposed by nuclear material), § 73.50, and § 73.60 unless the requesting document DBT orders, which applied only to are exempt from § 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E),

displays a currently valid OMB control existing licensees, should be made § 73.1(a)(1)(iii), § 73.1(a)(1)(iv),

number. generically applicable. The Commission § 73.1(a)(2)(iii), and § 73.1(a)(2)(iv).

XIV. Regulatory Analysis further finds that the proposed rule Licensees subject to the provisions of would redefine the security § 72.212 are exempt from The Commission has prepared a draft § 73.1 (a)(1)(iv).

requirements stated in existing NRC regulatory analysis on this proposed (1) Radiologicalsabotage. (i) A regulation. The analysis examines the regulations, and is necessary to ensure that the public health and safety and determined violent external assault, costs and benefits of the alternatives attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, considered by the Commission. The common defense and security are adequately protected in the current, including diversionary actions, by an Commission requests public comment post-September 11, 2001, environment. adversary force capable of operating as on the draft regulatory analysis. one or more teams, attacking from one Availability of the regulatory analysis is List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 or more entry points, with the following provided in Section IX. Comments on Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous attributes, assistance and equipment:

the draft analysis may be submitted to materials transportation, Import, (A) Well-trained (including military the NRC as indicated under the Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants training and skills) and dedicated ADDRESSES heading. and reactors, Reporting and individuals, -willingto kill or be killed, XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification recordkeeping requirements, Security with sufficient knowledge to identify measures. specific equipment or locations In accordance with the Regulatory necessary for a successful attack, Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the (B)Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and Commission certifies that this rule will exit, disable alarms and not, if promulgated, have a significant Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, communications, participate in violent economic impact on a substantial attack) or passive (e.g., provide number of small entities. This proposed as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following information), or both, knowledgeable rule affects only the licensing and inside assistance, operation of nuclear power plants and amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

(C) Suitable weapons, including hand-Category I fuel cycle facilities. The PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF held automatic weapons, equipped with companies that own these plants do not PLANTS AND MATERIALS silencers and having effective long range fall within the scope of the definition of accuracy, "small entities" set forth in the

- 1. The authority citation for part 73 (D) Hand-carried equipment, Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size continues to read as follows: including incapacitating agents and

67388 Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 214/Monday, November 7, 2005/Proposed Rules .

explosives for use as tools of entry or for DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION information you provide. For more otherwise destroying reactor, facility, information, see the Privacy Act transporter, or container integrity or Federal Aviation Administration discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY features of the safeguards system, and INFORMATION section of this document.

(E) Land and wvater vehicles, which 14 CFR Part 93 Docket: To read background could be used for transporting personnel [Docket No. FAA-2004-17005; Notice No. documents or comments received, go to and their hand-carried equipment to the 05-121 http.//dms.dot.gov at any time or to proximity of vital areas, and Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the RIN 2120-AI17 Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, (ii) An internal threat, and SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m.

(iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area; Reopening and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, which may be coordinated with an except Federal holidays.

external assault, and of Comment Period and Intent To Hold Public Meeting FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb Ellen Crum, Airspace and Rules, Office assault, which may be coordinated with AGENCY: Federal Aviation of System Operations and Safety, an external assault. Administration (FAA), DOT. Federal Aviation Administration, 800 (2) Theft or diversion offornnula ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking Independence Avenue, SW.,

quantitiesof strategicspecialn uclear (NPRM); reopening of comment period. Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) material. (i) A determined violent 267-8783.

external assault, attack by stealth, or

SUMMARY

In this action, the FAA SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

deceptive actions, including reopens the comment period and diversionary actions, by an adversary announces its intention to hold a public Comments Invited force capable of operating as one or meeting concerning the "Washington,

• The FAA invites interested persons to more teams, attacking from one or more DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight participate in this rulemaking by entry points, with the following Rules Area" NPRM that was published submitting written comments, data, or attributes, assistance and equipment: August 4, 2005. In that document, the views. We also invite comments relating FAA proposed to codify current flight to the economic, environmental, energy, (A) Well-trained (including military restrictions for certain aircraft training and skills) and dedicated or federalism impacts that might result operations in the Washington, DC from adopting the proposals in this individuals, willing to kill or be killed, Metropolitan Area. This reopening is in with sufficient knowledge to identify document. The most helpful comments response to requests from Members of reference a specific portion of the specific equipment or locations Congress and industry associations.

necessary for a successful attack; proposal, explain the reason for any DATES: The comment period for the recommended change, and include (B) Active (e.g., facilitate entrance and proposed rule published on August 4, supporting data. We ask that you send exit, disable alarms and . 2005 (70 FR 45250) closed November 2, us two copies of written comments.

communications, participate in violent 2005 and is reopened until February 6, We will file in the docket all attack) or passive (e.g., provide 2006. The date for the public meeting comments we receive, as well as a information), or both, knowledgeable will be announced in a future report summarizing each substantive inside assistance, document. public contact with FAA personnel (C) Suitable weapons, including hand- ADDRESSES: You may send comments, concerning this proposed rulemaking.

held automatic weapons, equipped with identified by docket number, using any The docket is available for public silencers and having effective long- of the following methods: inspection before and after the comment range accuracy; . DOT Docket Web site: Go to closing date. If you wish to review the (D) Hand-carried equipment, http.//dms.dot.gov and follow the docket in person, go to the address in including incapacitating agents and instructions for sending your comments the ADDRESSES section of this preamble explosives for use as tools of entry or for electronically. between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday otherwise destroying reactor, facility,

• Government-wide rulemaking Web through Friday, except Federal holidays.

transporter, or container integrity or site: Go to http.//www.regulations.gov You may also review the docket using features of the safe-guards system; and follow the instructions for sending the Internet at the Web address in the your comments electronically. ADDRESSES section.

(E) Land and water vehicles, which PrivacyAct:Using the search function could be used for transporting personnel . Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 of our docket web site, anyone can find and their hand-carried equipment; and Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, and read the comments received into (ii) An internal threat, and Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590- any of our dockets, including the name (iii) A land vehicle bomb assault, 0001. of the individual sending the comment which may be coordinated with an

• Fax: 1-202-493-2251. (or signing the comment on behalf of an external assault, and

• Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on association, business, labor union, etc.).

(iv) A waterborne vehicle bomb the plaza level of the Nassif Building, You may review DOT's complete assault, which may be coordinated with 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, Privacy Act Statement in the Federal an external assault. DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday Register published on April 11, 2000 through Friday, except Federal holidays. (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 2nd day For more information on the http.//dms.dot.gov.

of November, 2005. Before acting on this proposal, we rulemaking process, see the For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of will consider all comments we receive Annette L.Vietti-Cook, this document. on or before the closing date for Secretazy of the Commission. Privacy:We will post all comments comments. We will consider comments

[FR Doc. 05-22200 Filed 11-4-05; 8:45 am] we receive, without change, to http.// filed late if it is possible to do so BILUNG CODE 7590-01-P dms.dot.gov, including any personal without incurring expense or delay. We