ML052700349

Response to Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 05000133-05-002: EA-05-166

ML052700349
Person / Time
Site:	Humboldt Bay
Issue date:	09/19/2005
From:	Jacobs D Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/FSME
References
EA-05-166, OP-DPR-07 IR-05-002
Download: ML052700349 (9)

Text

Pacific Gas and Electric Company' Donna Jacobs Diablo Canyon Power Plant Vice President P. 0. Box 56 Nuclear Services Avila Beach. CA 93424 September 19, 2005 805.545.4600 Fax: 805.545.4234 PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-133, OP-DPR-7 Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 Response to Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 050-00133/05-002; EA-05-166

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

On August 19, 2005, the NRC issued Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002 regarding the special nuclear material (SNM) control and accountability program at Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3. In this report, the NRC identified three apparent violations of NRC requirements. The NRC provided PG&E the opportunity to either request a pre-decisional enforcement conference or respond to the apparent violations within 30 days. PG&E verbally informed the NRC on August 25, 2005, of its intent to submit a 30-day response to the apparent violations.

PG&E has reviewed the 3 apparent violations, as well as other NRC statements in the Special Inspection Final Report and in NRC Special Inspection Interim Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005. In addition, PG&E reviewed NRC guidance in NUREG-1600, "NRC Enforcement Policy," as published in the Federal Register on March 16, 2005. As a result of these reviews, PG&E concurs with the apparent violations, and believes there were mitigating circumstances that contributed to the cause and continuation of the apparent violations. PG&E's response to the apparent violations is contained in the enclosure to this letter.

If you have any questions about the enclosed information, please contact me at (805) 545-4600, or David Sokolsky at (707) 444-0801.

Sincerely, Donna co s Enclosure cc/enc:

Emilio Garcia John B. Hickman Bruce S. Mallett PG Fossil Gen HBPP Humboldt Distribution

Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY RESPONSE TO NRC APPARENT VIOLATIONS NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, contains three apparent violations, identified as APV 50-133/0501-03, -04, and -05. The apparent violations and the PG&E responses to the violations appear below. In addition, the NRC Special Inspection Final Report discusses four significant missed opportunities. PG&E's comments on these missed opportunities appear at the end of this enclosure.

APV 50-133/0501-03:

"Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 74.19(a)(1), formerly 10 CFR 70.51(a)(1), from August 6,1969, (date when assembly A-49 was shipped off site) to July 16, 2004 (date when PG&E determined that the segments were missing), PG&E failed to keep records showing the inventory, transfer or disposal of three approximately 18-inch segments of irradiated fuel containing approximately 22.5 grams of SNM. From June 25, 1973, to February 4, 2005, the licensee also failed to keep records including location and unique identity showing the inventory, transfer or disposal of one complete and three partial incore detectors containing a total of approximately 0.035 grams of SNM."

PG&E Response:

PG&E agrees with the apparent violation. PG&E was unable to determine the reason why plant staff failed to keep records since the 1960s regarding the disposition of the three approximately 18-inch fuel rod segments, and since the 1980s for the one complete and three partial incore detectors. (Causes for the missing fuel rod segments and incore detectors are identified in Section 6.0 of the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) special nuclear material (SNM) Control and Accountability Project Final Report, submitted to the NRC in HBPP Letter HBL-05-017 on May 27, 2005.) However, PG&E self-identified the loss of the three approximately 18-inch fuel rod segments and the one complete and three partial incore detectors, promptly notified the NRC upon discovery of each loss, and has taken comprehensive corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Full compliance with 10 CFR 74.19(a)(1) was achieved on March 17, 2005, with the submittal of the revised Annual Material Status Report for the Period Ending September 30, 2004 (PG&E Letter HBL-05-007, dated March 17, 2005).

Mitigating circumstances related to the issue should be taken into consideration by the NRC in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1600, "NRC Enforcement Policy," as published in the Federal Register on March 16, 2005. Specifically, the guidance in NUREG-1600,Section VI.C.2, allows the NRC to credit licensees for the following factors: (a) No previous escalated enforcement action, (b) self-identification of the problem, and (c) corrective actions taken. PG&E believes it should be allowed credit for these factors, as explained in the following:

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Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016

1. PG&E self-identified the missing fuel rod segments and incore detectors. Once PG&E recognized that the SNM was likely missing, PG&E promptly notified the NRC and initiated a search for the missing SNM and any other SNM fragments.

(

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 9.2)

2. PG&E took complete and comprehensive corrective actions. (

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 9.2)

• PG&E established a SNM Control and Accountability Project that was complete and thorough in its search and investigation of the missing SNM.

(

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 2.3)

• HBPP procedures have been revised for handling, controlling and accounting of SNM as SNM items are identified in the spent fuel pool (SFP). (

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-019, dated June 10, 2005, submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-001-01)

• A full cataloging and characterization of the SFP contents was performed to ensure a complete and accurate accounting of all SNM in PG&E's possession at HBPP, down to the fuel fragment level. (

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-017 submitting HBPP SNM Project Final Report, dated May 27, 2005, section 3.7)

3. Problems associated with the missing fuel rod segments stemmed from activities that had occurred at least two decades ago. No discrepancies were found in documentation of the current SFP inventory. (

Reference:

NRC Special Interim Inspection Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005, Section 3.3)

PG&E's material control and accountability (MC&A) plan clearly defines roles and responsibilities. MC&A activities are well documented by PG&E. Current programs and procedures to control and account for all SNM are adequate.

(

Reference:

NRC Special Interim Inspection Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005, Section 4.2.a)

• Current PG&E practice has been to clearly document physical movements of spent fuel or other components within or outside the SFP. The responsibility for documenting discrete activities within the SFP has been clearly assigned.

Written procedures have been issued to document and govern movement of all items of spent fuel, including pieces of rods. (

Reference:

NRC Special Interim Inspection Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005, Section 4.2.d)

4. Although lapses in accounting and control have occurred in the past, PG&E's existing program for accounting for and controlling SNM meets regulatory 2 of 8

Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 requirements. (

Reference:

NRC Special Interim Inspection Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005, Section 4.3; NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 3.3)

5. There have been no previous escalated enforcement actions at HBPP.

6. The NRC has concluded that the overall risk to the health and safety of the public, workers, or the environment due to the missing SNM is minimal. (

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 10.3) 3 of 8

Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 APV 50-13310501-04:

"Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 74.19(b), formerly 10 CFR 70.51(b), from June 4, 1971 (date when last Type 1 fuel assembly was shipped off site), to July 16, 2004 (date when PG&E determined that the segments were missing), PG&E, a licensee authorized by NRC License DPR-7 to possess SNM in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram, failed to establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures sufficient to enable PG&E to account for the SNM in its possession under license DPR-7.

Specifically, PG&E failed to account for SNM in a quantity of 111 grams of uranium-235, 27 grams of plutonium contained in remnants from Type 1 damaged fuel assemblies (fuel fragments and SNM waste), and incore detectors."

PG&E Response:

PG&E agrees with the apparent violation. PG&E was unable to determine the reason why plant staff since the 1970s failed to establish, maintain, and follow written MC&A procedures sufficient to enable PG&E to account for the SNM in its possession under license DPR-7.

(Causes for the missing fuel rod segments and incore detectors are identified in Section 6.0 of the HBPP SNM Control and Accountability Project Final Report, submitted to the NRC in HBPP Letter HBL-05-017 dated May 27, 2005.) However, NRC and industry guidance was different at the time the problem first arose than today. In addition, PG&E has taken comprehensive corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Full compliance with 10 CFR 74.19(b) was achieved on June 10, 2005, when appropriate plant procedures were revised.

Mitigating circumstances related to this issue and the mitigating actions taken by PG&E should be taken into consideration by the NRC in accordance with the guidance of "NRC Enforcement Policy," as published in Federal Register on March 16, 2005. Specifically, the guidance in NUREG-1600,Section VI.C.2, which allows the NRC to credit licensees for the following factors: (a) No previous enforcement action, and (b) corrective actions taken.

PG&E believes it should be allowed credit for these factors, as explained below.

1. As the NRC pointed out in the Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 3.2, NRC MC&A regulations have been applicable for all SNM. However, industry and NRC guidance on SNM control and accountability during the 1970s was based on control of fuel assemblies and fuel rods, not fragments. This is reflected in the following sections in ANSI N15.8-1974, "American National Standard Nuclear Material Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 22, 1974, that was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 5.29, "Nuclear Material Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,"

Revision 1, dated June 1975.

Section 2 contains definitions for "fuel assembly" (a grouping of fuel elements) and "fuel element" (a fuel rod or fuel pin), and does not define anything smaller (i.e., fuel fragments). A fuel element is defined as, uThe smallest structurally discrete part of a fuel assembly that contains nuclear materials, such as a fuel rod or pin."

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Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016

• Section 6.1, Unit of Control, states "The basic unit of control for nuclear material shall be the nuclear fuel assembly...Nuclear material contained in fuel elements, not part of an assembly, shall be separately identified on all material control records." No control or accountability requirements are mentioned for SNM smaller than a fuel element.

• Section 8.1, Storage and Shipment, states "Procedures shall be established to provide for: (1) Recording of the identity of each fuel assembly or fuel element and its location in the irradiated fuel areas." No storage or shipping requirements are mentioned for SNM smaller than a fuel element.

Thus, during the 1970s, guidance for the control of SNM was directed at fuel assemblies and fuel elements, not fuel fragments. The definitions in the ANSI Standard, endorsed by the Regulatory Guide, did not consider situations where a fuel rod or pin was broken or divided into smaller segments or fragments, such as at HBPP.

2. PG&E has taken complete and comprehensive corrective actions. (

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 9.2)

• At the earliest opportunity, PG&E reported the quantity of SNM contained in all known fuel fragments in the Annual Material Status Report for the Period Ending September 30, 2004, that was submitted to the NRC on November 30, 2004.

(

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-04-027, dated November 30, 2004)

• The Annual Material Status Report for the Period Ending September 30, 2004 was further revised upon completion of the SFP search for fuel fragments.

(

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-007, dated March 17, 2005)

• A full cataloging and characterization of the SFP contents was performed to ensure a complete and accurate accounting of all SNM in PG&E's possession at HBPP, down to the fragment level. (

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-017 submitting the HBPP SNM Project Final Report, dated May 27, 2005, section 3.7)

HBPP procedures have been revised for handling, controlling and accounting of SNM as SNM items are identified in the SFP. (

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-019, dated June 10, 2005, submitting LER 2005-001-01,Section V.A)

3. PG&E's MC&A plan clearly defines roles and responsibilities. MC&A activities are well documented by PG&E. Current programs and procedures to control and account for all SNM are adequate. (

Reference:

NRC Special Interim Inspection Report 050-00133/05-001, dated April 6, 2005, section 4.2.a; NRC Special Final Inspection Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, section 3.3)

4. There have been no previous escalated enforcement actions at HBPP.

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Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 APV 50-13310501-05:

"Contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 74.19(c), formerly 10 CFR 70.51(c), Pacific Gas and Electric Company failed to conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Specifically, inventories performed by PG&E from June 4, 1971 (date when last Type 1 fuel assembly was shipped off site), to February 4, 2005, with the exception of periods when the sealed SFP cover was in place, did not include fuel fragments and other SNM remnants from Type 1 damaged fuel assemblies and all incore detectors."

PG&E Response:

PG&E agrees with the apparent violation. PG&E was unable to determine the reason why inventories performed by plant staff from June 4, 1971 (date when last Type 1 fuel assembly was shipped off site), to February 4, 2005, with the exception of periods when the sealed SFP cover was in place, did not include fuel fragments and other SNM remnants from Type 1 damaged fuel assemblies and all incore detectors. (Causes for the missing fuel rod segments and incore detectors are identified in Section 6.0 of the HBPP SNM Control and Accountability Project Final Report, submitted to the NRC in HBPP Letter HBL-05-017, dated May 27, 2005.)

However, NRC and industry guidance was different at the time the problem first arose than today. In addition, PG&E has taken comprehensive corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

Full compliance with 10 CFR 74.19(c) was achieved on May 19, 2005, when PG&E conducted a physical inventory at HBPP that accounted for all SNM in its possession.

Mitigating circumstances related to this issue and the mitigating actions taken by PG&E should be taken into consideration by the NRC in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1600, TNRC Enforcement Policy," as published in the Federal Register on March 16, 2005.

Specifically, the guidance in NUREG-1600,Section VI.C.2, allows the NRC to credit licensees for the following factors: (a) No previous enforcement action, and (b) corrective actions taken.

PG&E believes it should be allowed credit for these factors, as explained below.

1. As discussed above in the PG&E response to APV 50-133/0501-04, NRC and industry guidance to clarify SNM control and accountability during the 1970s was based on control of fuel assemblies and fuel elements, not fuel fragments.

2. PG&E has taken complete and comprehensive corrective actions. (

Reference:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133/05-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 9.2)

HBPP procedures HBAP D-7 "Control and Accountability of SNM and Waste Shipments" and STP 3.6.6 USNM Inventory" have been revised to address the issue of the physical inventory of SNM in the SFP. Accounting and inventories now include incore detectors in the SFP as well as fuel fragments. Inventory is now accomplished by comparing physical inventory to book inventory, and vice versa. (

Reference:

PG&E Letter HBL-05-019, dated June 10, 2005, submitting LER 2005-001-01,Section V.A)

3. There have been no previous escalated enforcement actions at HBPP.

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Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 PG&E Comments on Missed Opportunities:

NRC Special Inspection Final Report 050-00133105-002, dated August 19, 2005, Section 9.2 describes four significant missed opportunities (identified as items 6, 7, 8, and 9) for PG&E to address the SNM problems identified in the three apparent violations.

NRC practice has been to deny licensees credit for self-identification if prior opportunities to identify a problem existed. PG&E believes credit for self-identification of the apparent violations is warranted, based upon the following:

PG&E Comments on Item 6: PG&E understands how the August 3, 1966, internal memorandum could be considered a missed opportunity because it contains the most compelling information to require the licensee to keep track of all SNM, including fuel fragments. PG&E was unable to determine why action was not taken in response to this memorandum. However, it should be noted that in 1966, neither NRC nor industry guidance existed regarding control and accountability of SNM. Furthermore, when guidance was promulgated in 1974, the guidance did not consider situations where a fuel rod or pin was broken or divided into smaller segments or fragments, such as at HBPP.

PG&E Comments on Item 7: The NRC quotes from ANSI Standard N15.8-1974, Section 6.1, that describes the basic unit of control of SNM as the fuel assembly, and that "nuclear material contained in fuel elements, not part of an assembly, shall be separately identified on all material control records." The NRC states that PG&E did not follow this guidance and failed to account for fuel separated from its assembly. As described in the PG&E response to APV 05-133/0501-04, ANSI Standard N15.8-1974, Sections 2 and 8.1, in addition to Section 6.1, include fuel assemblies and fuel rods (or elements) in the definitions and applications of SNM. The definitions in the ANSI Standard, endorsed by Regulatory Guide 5.29, did not consider situations where a fuel rod or pin was broken or divided into smaller segments or fragments, such as at HBPP.

The United States Government Accountability Office report to Congressional Requesters, "NRC Needs to Do More to Ensure that Power Plants Are Effectively Controlling Spent Nuclear Fuel," dated April 2005, page 27, recommended that the NRC establish specific requirements for the control and accounting of loose rod segments.

PG&E Comments on Item 8: The NRC states that PG&E discovered a fuel fragment on November 12, 2003, and should have included that information in the November 14, 2003, response to NRC Bulletin 2003-004. PG&E's response to NRC Bulletin 2003-004 was based on the most recent inventory that was conducted in September 2003. NRC Bulletin 2003-004 requested licensees to report SNM in their possession, and "typically such listings may be the result of the most recent physical inventory or book values." Therefore, in compliance with NRC Bulletin 2003-004 guidance, PG&E used the information in the September 2003 inventory.

The NRC states in their description of the missed opportunity, that "No action was taken by the licensee to adjust their accounting records to account for the found fragment or other fragments that existed in the spent fuel pool." However, as a result of finding the fuel fragment on November 12, 2003, PG&E embarked on the search and investigation that 7 of 8

Enclosure PG&E Letter HBL-05-016 ultimately resulted in the quantification of all SNM in HBPP's possession. PG&E included the fragments in the SNM accounting after carefully emptying and inspecting the containers in the SFP and measuring all fragments found. This was an intensive effort, and could not have been accomplished prior to the 90-day response date for the Bulletin. PG&E used the November 12, 2003, discovery as an opportunity to correct the SNM control and accountability at HBPP.

PG&E Comments on Item 9: The NRC states that the HBPP annual physical inventories from 1971 through 2003 did not include fuel fragments. As stated in the PG&E response to APV 05-133/0501-05, the annual inventories conducted at HBPP during the 1970s were consistent with the guidance provided in ANSI Standard N15.8-1974 in that the Standard did not include controls for items smaller than a fuel rod.

It should also be noted that NRC inspections in the 1970s consistently concluded that HBPP had conducted adequate physical inventories and was in compliance with the regulations at that time in 10 CFR 70.51 that are now incorporated in 10 CFR 74.19(c). This is evidenced in the following NRC Inspection Reports:

• "The inspection revealed that PG&E has met the following requirements:

Physical inventories have been conducted as required by 10 CR 70.51 (b)(2)."

(

Reference:

NRC Inspection Report dated December 5, 1972, for the June 14-16,1972, inspection.)

• "The inspection revealed that PG&E has met the following requirements:

Physical inventories have been conducted as required by 10 CR 70.51(d). The licensee has taken physical inventories at the required frequency." (

Reference:

NRC Inspection Report dated September 10,1975, for the August 27-29, 1975, inspection.)

• "The SNM inventory at Humboldt Bay consisted of 184 fuel assemblies in the reactor core, 206 fuel assemblies in the cooling pool, 13 separate fuel rods in the storage vault, a single Pu-Be neutron source (stored in a locked shield in a locked room,), and four fission chambers in storage (21 fission chambers in core.)...No defects were encountered in physical inventory verification."

(

Reference:

NRC Inspection Report dated September 10, 1975, for the August 27-29,1975, inspection.)

Summary of PG&E Comments on Items 6-9: Based upon the comments provided, PG&E believes credit for self identification of the apparent violations is warranted.

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