ML051650505
| ML051650505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Humboldt Bay |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2005 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML051650505 (25) | |
Text
NRC/PG&E Meeting Humboldt Bay Power Plant Special Nuclear Material Control & Accountability Project June 13, 2005 1
Agenda
- Overview of SNM Project Bruce Norton e Overview of Results Bruce Norton & Roy Willis
- Health and Safety Greg Rueger
- Cause Analyses & Corrective Bruce Norton & Roy Willis Actions n Oversight Review Team Richard Vollmer X Overall Conclusions Greg Rueger X Additional Submittals David Sokolsky 2
Overview Of SNM roect Thoroughness of Investigation
- Document Searches
- Interviews
- Physical Inspections u Videos
- Scenarios
- Oversight Review Team:
- Richard Vollmer O Dennis Kirsch 3
Overview Of Results n SNM Material Control & Accountability o Fragments
- 175 Total, 139 Unclad (all from CSC)
- 36 Clad -21 from CSC, 5- FFC#1, 8- UD6N, 2-floor
- Currently inventoried and in containers with TIDs
- Three A-49 segments Ei Fuel Pellets/Vacuum Bag-1976 one pellet n Vacuum bags - "Fleas"/SNM waste
- "Serpa" bags vacuumed a decade later
- Other SNM
- Incores, Sources and Fission Chambers
- Fuel Assemblies
Overview Of Results
- Incore Detectors Control and Accountability o One complete and three partial incore detectors believed to have been stored in the SFP from 1985 through early 2005 were not appropriately controlled and accounted for.
- The missing incore detectors were most likely shipped with non-detector-containing sections of incore strings to a LLRW site in 1985/6 as irradiated hardware.
- The amount of SNM in the incore detectors is believed to be less than one-tenth gram.
- The final location of the missing incore detectors is most likely to be in a facility licensed to receive such material.
5
Overview Of Results
. Scenario Probabilities for the A-49 Fuel Segments o Implausible El "Highly Unlikely" - very improbable
- Theft or Diversion
- Intact in SFP or Balance of Plant
- Beatty Nevada LLRW Facility o "Possible, But Not Likely" - low pro bability of occurrence Is NFS (West Valley) a Barnwell
- Hanford U "Reasonably Possible" - may have occurred
- SFP in altered form (fragments) a LLRW to Barnwell and Hanford when considered together with reprocessing to NFS - becomes "Reasonably Possible" that segments could have been shipped to one of these facilities 6
II g
l X
- A-49 Tube 1 side section 111 9171(
7
FF026 Photo Showing Evidence of Cut End Meeting All Criteria Utilized by ATI 8
FF01 3 Photo of Fuel Fragment Showing Evidence of a Partial Cut
-p
~~I:;: a: r 9
FF021 Showing Folded Back Cross Section
- Condition as Found in Central Stor Container 10
Overview Of Results i Reasonably Possible o In one of these shipments i Fifteen shipments for reprocessing to NFS o 1969-1971 i Four LLRW shipments to Barnwell o 3 in 1983 o 1 in 1985 M Five LLRW shipments to Hanford o 1986 o In SFP in altered form (fragments) 11
Health And Safety Unaccounted for Cut Fuel Rod Segments
- PG&E performed a Health and Safety Assessment assuming that the three fuel rod segments are at either Barnwell or Hanford.
- Conclusions of the Assessment:
o The overall risk is minimal to the past, present, and future workers and generations of the public.
o There is a very low probability of LLRW facility inadvertent intruder scenarios resulting in doses in excess of regulatory limits.
o Retrieval of the material from LLRW burial would not be justified by arguments concerning public health and safety as a result of the very low risk that the material poses.
12
Health And Safety Incore Detectors Inadvertently Shipped to an LLRW Facility There is no adverse impact to the public Health and Safety if the one complete and three partial incore detectors-are buried at a LLRW facility.
o The LLRW facilities (Hanford and Barnwell) are licensed to receive this material.
o The total SNM from the missing incore detectors is believed to be less than one-tenth of a gram.
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Discovery of Fuel Fragments
- 1960s o Fuel Fragments Generated o Central Storage Container - Reprocessing o A-49 o Personnel
- 1970s o Reprocessing o 1976 Vacuuming - Fragments/Fleas
- 1980s o Preparation for SAFSTOR - Fragments o UD6N
- 1987- 2003 o Little to no pool activity - pool cover o 2003 Identification of Fuel Fragments in Central Storage Container 14
15 A
I
17 13 INCH FRAGMENT (FF002)
FOUND IN 1976 18
Cause Analysis Fuel Fraqments/Seqments m Causes O Plant management did not require development of procedures for control and accountability of fuel fragments and fuel rod segments.
o Plant culture in the 1960s and early 1970s encouraged individual problem solving, rather than development and use of procedures for non-complex evolutions.
o The SNM Custodians were not adequately trained on control and accountability of SNM.
o There was no specific regulatory or industry guidance for the control and accountability of fuel fragments.
O There was no specific experience or standards for control and accountability of fuel fragments.
19
Cause Analysis Incore Detectors
- Causes o An inadequate procedure was used to determine the location of detectors during cutting operations of incore strings.
o The SNM Custodians were not adequately trained on control and accountability of SNM.
o A personnel error - cognitive, for failure to follow the SNM control and accountability procedure for incore detectors.
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Corrective Actions
- Revised procedures to address the issue of the physical inventory of non-fuel SNM in the pool.
- Developed procedures that measure and quantify SNM waste and fuel fragments, resulting in corrections to the SNM inventory.
m Revise procedures to insure that future work in areas where SNM may be located shall include provisions for control and accountability of fuel fragments and non-fuel SNM.
21
Oversight Review Team P Reported bimonthly to HBPP plant manager Independent review of project procedures and implementation
- Review of project documents and reports
- Observation of SFP activities, document reviews, nterviews
- Observation of scenario development and decision-making process
- Conclusions 22
Overall Conclusions
- It is reasonably possible that the three A-49 fuel rod segments are still in the SFP.
- It is reasonably possible, in the aggregate, that the three fuel rod segments were shipped to NFS for reprocessing or to either Barnwell or Hanford as LLRW.
- All other possibilities have been dispositioned as either implausible or highly unlikely.
X The one complete and three partial incore detectors were most likely shipped to an LLRW facility licensed for their receipt.
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Overall Conclusions X The public health and safety was not adversely impacted either as a result of the three A-49 fuel rod segments or the incore detectors.
- HBPP has developed corrective actions to prevent recurrence of SNM control & accountability issues.
24
Other Submittals MLER Revisions o Missing fuel rod segments o Missing incore detectors
- Response to Bulletin 2005-01 m Response to Apparent Violations 25