ML051470087
| ML051470087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CAP055366, FOIA/PA-2004-0282, RIII-2004-A-0047 | |
| Download: ML051470087 (20) | |
Text
Rzui-dw6?4- '4 - 49o47 Informabon in this record was deleted in accordance WAh the Freedom of InformmaDon Al -1 /.
, - Nuclear Management Company
.itate Change History Initiate 0
by SHANNON, DAN AR Pre-Screen 41512004 11:01:04 PM Owner (None)
'P.
Submit to Screening Team 0
by HARPER, RON
.4 AR Screening Que 4/5/2004 11:37:05 PM
- Owner PBNP CAP Admin Page I of ?
B.C 04 iing AR Screening Que ate 4/7/2004'12:40:56 PM Owner SENNETT.
JULIE KEVIN
- S 1
Screer Upda 0
by KREIL, E Section 1 Activity Request Id:
CAP055366 Activity Type:
CAP Submit Date:
4/5/2004 11:01:04 PM
? One Line
Description:
Worker Received Electronic Dosimeter Dose Alarm I; Detailed
Description:
4/5/2004 11:01:04 PM - SHANNON, DAN:
While working in the Unit one containment building during U1 R28, a worker exceeded his electronic dosimeter dose alarm setpoint and received a dose alarm. The ED dose alarm level was set at 50 mrem and the worker received 51 mrem. The worker, along with two other workers, were working in containment on the wrong RWP. They were working on RWP 04-161, which is forwork in the PAB, and set the ED dose alarm level at 50 mrem. The correct RWP that they should have used is RWP 04-139. for their work in containment, which set the ED dose alarm at 80 mrem. The other two workers did not receive a dose alarm.
Initiator:
SHANNON, DAN Initiator Department:
PR Radiation Protection
&3
\\
PB 12 Date/Time of Discovery: 4/5/2004 10:26:32 PM Date/Time of Occurrence:
4/5/2004 10:26:32 PM Identified By:
Site-identified System:
XX PB Equipment # (1st):
(None)
Equipment Type (1st):
(None)
Equipment # (2nd):
(None)
Equipment Type (2nd):
(None)
Equipment # (3rd):
(None)
Equipment Type (3rd):
(None)
Site/Unit:
Point Beach - Unit 1 Why did this occur?:
4/5/2004 11:01:04 PM -SHANNON, DAN:
Workers used the wrong RWP to perform work in the containment building Immediate Action Taken: 4/5/2004 11:01:04 PM - SHANNON, DAN:
Suspended RCA access for all three workers involved per NP 4.1.2, Response To Radialion Protection Work Practice Violation. Notified RPM, Shift Outage Manager, and the workers' supervisor.
Recommendations:
4/5/2004 11:01:04 PM - SHANNON, DAN:
- 1. Workgroup supervisor complete Human Performance Investigation Tool for this event.
- 2. Workgroup supervisor coach/counsel workers Involved Involved In this event and make recommendation to RPM regarding restoration of access to the RCA.
4 Notify Me During Eval?: N 43 SRO Review Required?:
N 83 Section 2 Operability Status:
NA b Compensatory Actions:
N Basis for Operability:
4/5/2004 11:37:05 PM -HARPER. RON:
Not an equipment operability Issue.
, Unplanned TSAC Entry: N i External Notification:
N 8 Section 3 Screened?:
Y i Significance Level: B INPO OE Reqd?:
N Potential MRFF?:
N
?i QA/Nuclear Oversight?: N 6 Licensing Review?: N Good Catch/Well Doc'd?: NA E Section 4 Inappropriate Action:
http://enwsO2/tmtrLickltmtraick.dll ?[ssuePage&Template=viewbody&recordid=593276&ta...
4/11/2004
Process:
(None)
Activity:
(None)
,Kuman Error Type:
(None)
Human Pert Fall Mode: (None)
Equip Failure Mode:
(None)
Process Fall Mode:
(None)
Org/Mgt Failure Mode: (None)
.@ Group Causing Prob: (None)
Hot Buttons:
PB - Human Performance Clock Reset 13 Section 5 CAP Admin:
I BENNETT, KEVIN Prescreener.
(None)
O Prolect:
Corrective Actn Program (CAP) AR 4 State:
AR Screening Cue t) Activelinactive:
Active H Submitter:
SHANNON, DAN i Owner.
BENNETT, KEVIN a Last Modified Date:
41712004 12:41:56 PM i) Last Modifier:
KREIL, JULIE iD Last State Change Date: 415/2004 11:37:05 PM i Last State Changer:-
HARPER, RON E Close Date:
NUTRK ID:
- of Children:
0
References:
Update:
Prescreen Comments:
Import Memo Field:
OPR Completed?:
N OLD-ACTIONNUM:
sub_tsid:
0 original-projectld:
32 originaUssue_Id:
- 055366 Site:
Point Beach Cartridge and Frame:
S Attachments and Parent/Child Links 1
Human Performance Event Investigation Tool CAP 055366 (307712 bytes) by BECKA, JIM (4/6/2004 4:49:28 AM)
HP Invest Tool CAP 055366 Additional Into (375808 bytes) by BECKA, JIM (4/612004 5:24:30 AM)
Principal to ACE001 666: Worker Received Electronic Dosimeter Dose Alarm by KREIL, JULIE (417/2004 12:41:56 PM)
B Change History 41712004 12:40:56 PM by KREIL, JULIE i CAP Admin Changed From PBNP CAP Admin To BENNETT. KEVIN Owner Changed From PBNP CAP Admin To BENNETT. KEVIN Last Modified Date Changed From 4/6/2004 5:24:31 AM To 4/712004 12:40:56 PM Last Modifier Changed From BECKA. JIM To KREIL. JULIE 41712004 12:41:02 PM byKREIL,JUUE origInaIlssuejd ChangedFromr -To '055366' Last Modified Date Changed From 4/7/2004 12:40:56 PM To 417/2004 12:41:02 PM orIgInal-prolectljd Changed From 0 To 32 41712004 12:41:56 PM by KREIL, JULIE Last Modified Date Chang'M From 4/7/2004 12:41:02 PM To 4/7/2004 12:41:56 PM Attachment Added: Principal to ACE001666: Worker Received.Electronic Dosimeter Dose Alarm http://enwsO2/tm track/tmtrack.dli?ssLiePaee&Trnin-i tt-.=vi#e.whnrdvA rfprnrrl~tI-A;Q 11AR Al tl A/Ii/-) rinnn
Human Performance Event Investigation Tool Step 1 - Initiate the investigation.
Evaluation should begin as soon as possible.
The department manager or designee should ensure that the event is captured in an AR (see NP 5.3.1), and assign a lead person, normally the supervisor of the individual involved in the event, to conduct the investigation/evaluation.
The Department Manager should ensure that the plant manager and the department human performance liaison are aware of the potential human performance event as soon as possible.
The lead person should obtain resources as needed from other areas to conduct the investigation. The human performance coordinator should assist with the investigation when, in the judgment of the lead person, this special expertise is needed to fully understand the event.
Step 2 - Collect Data.
The goal is to assemble the facts in a timely fashion in order to provide sufficient information so that the event can be properly evaluated.
Contact the individual(s) involved in the event.
Focus on the human performance issues.
If more than one person was involved in the event, distribute a copy of the Event Investigation Personnel Statement to each person to complete. Often individuals involved on the fringes of an event have key information. The statement should be completed as shortly after the event as possible. 'The individual who will prepare the Event Investigation Report should read each statement, confirm understanding with the originator, and clarify any questions they may have.
Collect information about the human performance event using the following questions, as applicable.
- What were the conditions before, during, and after the event?
- Is this an initial or recurring event?
Have there been any recent program, procedure, or equipment changes that contributed to this event?
Who was involved and what actions were taken during the event?
What environmental factors or circumstances contributed to the event? To the extent practical, walk through the event at the location where the event occurred. Have the individual re-enact the event to gain a better understanding of how the physical layout and environmental conditions may have contributed to the issue.
Was a conscious decision made or not made by the individuals involved?
a Was mental or physical state a factor?
- Is there any physical evidence, recorded information, or plant documentation that would assist in the event investigation/evaluation? (See NMC RCE Manual for examples) a Which of the following Error Likely Situations were present:
-Peer Pressure
-Vague or Incorrect Guidance
-Ineffective Communication
-Overconfidence
-Distractions/Interruptions
-Body Rhythm
-Stress (Work or Home)
-Physical Environment
-Multiple Tasks
-Unfamiliar Task
-Task/Scope Change
-Time/Sch Time/Schedule Pressure
- Which of the following Error Reduction Tools were not used or not used effectively (A description of the Individual and Leadership tools are found in Attachment C.)
Individual Tools
-STAR
-Placekeeping
-Procedure Use and Adherence
-Verbal Communications
-"Are You Ready?" Checklist
-Stop When Unsure
-Co-Worker Coaching
-Peer Checking
-Challenging Information Leadership Tools
-Standards and Expectations
-Observations
-Pre-Job Brief
-Post-Job Critique
-TWIN Analysis
- Which of the previously listed error reduction tools could have been used to prevent this event from happening?
Step 3 - Evaluate the data and report the results of the investigation/evaluation.
The lead person for the investigation/evaluation should use the Event Investigation Report of this attachment to report the results. This report in its entirety should be attached to the action request unless it contains sensitive personnel information.
Provide a copy of the completed report to the department CAP liaison so that he/she can code the event.
Step 4 - Provide feedback.
- Provide timely feedback to individuals during the course of reconciling issues. As a rule, do not go longer than one week without contact unless previously agreed upon.
- Generally, respond verbally to verbal issues, in writing to issues raised in writing.
- Express appreciation to all individuals involved in the investigation.
Event Investigation Report Complete the evaluation of the human performance event using the following, as applicable:
- 1. Date and Time of the event: (35 APR 2004 / 221)0
- 2. Personnel Involved:
71 NDE techmnicians employed by Larnbert, MOCill, and TJ
).Us (LMT. (Nole:
SupCerised on night shift during LIR28 b L also of LNIT)_
- 3. Department/Group Involved: Indirectly: Prograus Engineering / NDE. Directly:
Contract NDE personnel.
- 4. Program/Work Process/Activity Involved: Non-Destructive Evalunation (NDE) of Chartgin and Spray lines in L I containment under WOs 0303882 and 0303887.
tjic
- 5. Unit: PBNP Unit 0 PBNP Unit 1
- 6. Mode/Power Level: _Mode 5 - Cold Shutdown PBNP Unit 2
-7. Describe the inappropriate action and conditions that led up to the event. Consider the following in this description:
- a.
Was a conscious decision made or not made by the individual(s) involved?
- b.
Was the event a result of rule non-compliance, misapplication of a rule, or applying an incorrect rule?
- c.
Was the individual fully trained/knowledgeable bf the task?
- d.
Did the individual make an error in judgment?
- e.
Was an intended action not performed-due to shortcuts taken or inadequate tracking?
- f.
Was the individual overconfident or was their mental/physical state a factor?
- g.
Did the supervisor not identify error likely situations and error precursors?.
- h.
Was there a process or organizational failure that led to this error (see table on next page)?
As stated in the written statement attached to this cvaluation. the three individuals cited above were nssigncd work in I mnit I Containment at upproximately 1830 on 05 APR 2004. WOs 03038S2 and (3303887 specified UT and VT ISI examinations of Charging and Containment Spray lines on the 26 level of Unit I containment. In preparation for this job, the individuals needed to proceed to ile calibration cagm in tlie PAB 66' fan room to calibrate equipment needed. All ildlividlials signed onto RWP 04-161. coering w ork in the PAB. RW.P 04-161,
,'PAB NDE & ISI ACTIVITIES," has the Following limits: Stop Work. I R/hr:
Dose Rate Alrmn: 200 mR/; IDose Alarm: 50 mR. None o* the individuals recall the conversdtion Withthe"RP jcchnici:niis at the RI' station upon entering the RCA al the turnstiles.
_ _D^,
[)uring the course of th cealibration work, one of the work}er{c J
Tc needed lo exit the RCA to retrieve documentation needlcd for calibration w%*ork.
Upon re-entering the RCA at the turnstiles. an RP tech at the RP station (uiestioSied where he was voina. He stated lie was headina to [he 66' fall roomtl and then into containment. The RP tech questioned which R\\VP he xps on -Ne stated "161" (PAB). Thle RP tech acknlowledged this with a nod. nild C A proceeded back to the faln room.
I At approximately 2030, the three techs proceeded into Unit I containment at the 66' level, proceeded to the 26' level, identified components, reeeived a brief from a fenmale RP technician (recalled namel land began the job..Note tha7t entry 1
into containment for work entails entry ontt different RWP, RWP 04-139.
THIS WAS THE FIRST INAPROPRIATE ACTION - ENTRY INTO A WORK IREA ON THE WRONG RWP. Applicable linits for RWP 04-139. "CTVMT NDE & ISI ACTIVITIES." are as follows: Stop Work, 1 Rlir; Dose Rate Alarm:
700 mR/hr, Dose Alarni: 80 R. The inspections entailed work atop teinporaty scaffolcling. They worked in the area for approximately 1.5 hrs.
The workers recall that they were very conscious of.their accumulating dose during the-course of the workl. and their (perceived) close limit of 50 mR. (NOTE:
I ad they b on the appropriate RWP, their dose limit WOUld have been S0 mR).
prc 2 as tracking the highest accumulated dose of the three inrldLuals as7 7
d, and as work wvas wrapping up at approximately 1200,L I alarmed at thc 50 mR set point.
J r-and the others were aware tha dose was tracking close to the r-mit as work was finishing up. However.- R.eausoned, in the interest of ALARA, that it was better to stay in the area an inish.the job, than exil early and have to come back later to retrieve equipment. He made the conscious decision to risk; receiving& the dose alarm on the reasoning that less overall dose
-'f.would be accumDulated through this action than if he exited in anticipation of
.receiviig tlie alarin. THIS WAS THE SECOND INAPPROPRIATE ACTION. J After receiving the dose alarm, ft Ul containment at the-26' 7
elevation and repozted to the R station. t-i other two workers securedc equipment and exited containment thrmough the 66' elevation. also reporting to the RP station. RP management questioned the three individuals, initiited CAP 055366, and requested that INDE supervision and tlhe Programs Engincering Supervisor, ninht shift, conduct a stand-down and brief all NDE technicians on thle event, as wvell as conduct a Human Performance Event Investigation Tool synopsis of the event (.iaw NP 1.1.1 0, "Human Performance Pro-rami"). RP
-inllanaement restricted RCA access for the three individuals pending completioni of these actions.
the Progranms Engineering Supervisor. ngliht shift, an(7 the NDE supervikor. night shift, conducted the stand-dvin brief at approximaiely
-2300. (Note: The following individuals were briefed: L H
The Proaramns Enaineering Supervisor. night shift, thcn interviewed the
thiee ihidividuIals LISillg the guilatnce of thIe Hunan Performnancc Event Invcstigation Tool.
LastIv. after a fimnlIl1ciing Lei %veen the threc individuals, their supervisor, tile Prolrams Enaineering Supervisor. and 'Dan Shannon7RP General Supervisor.
Radiation Support. the three iiidividuals swere re-a1tLioiized for RCA 'work at approximately 0045. 06 APR 2004.
J 7.a. Was a conscious decision made or not made by the individual(s) involved?
First Inappropriatc Action: No.
Second Inappropriate Action: Ycs. for reasons described in thle narrative ahove.
7.b. Was the event a result of rule non-compliance, misapplicat;nn of a rule, o^
applying an incorrect rule?
First Inappropriate Action: No.
Second Inappropriate Action: Yes - rule non-compliance. for reasons (tescribed in the narrative above.
7.c. Was the individual fully trained/knowledgeable of the task?
First Inappropriate Action: Yes. All individuals were aware that there were two different RWPs for the different areas of the plant. They travel to many different plants to work. and experience sinmlar RP practices and administration at other sites. Howvcver. a otlher sites, tley have also experienced physical, or personnel)
(posted RP tech) - typc barriers, which act as a second check to an individual's/
personal responsibility to be on the proper RWP.
Second Inappropriate Action: Yes, through the Radiation Worker portion of General Access Training (GAT).
7.d. Did the individual make an error in judgpieat?
First Inappropriate Action: No..
Second Inappropriate Action: Yes. for reasons described in the narrative above.
7.e. Was an intended action not performed due to shortcuts taken or inadequate tracking?
First Inappropriate Action: No.
Second Inappropriate Action: No.
7.f. Was the individual overconfident or was their mental/physical state a factor?
First Inappropriate Action: Yes. Alt individuals were very experienced in die-type of work thcy were performing during this shilf. They adnit to sonic overconfidence in doing this job, and a factor of repetition enters as thev have conducted these types of exams thousands of times. Nonetheless, they also state that they were very focuscl onl the job, and getting it done, pcrhaps to tihe exclusion oF focus on administmative issues also rcquired for proper job completion. Muntal state doesn't appear to me to he a factor based on my questioning of themi - all individiuals are very professional. want to rio a good job.
are soinewhat emnharralscd bV this event, canrt recall the host time any of theni mcoll a mistake of tIis natlure. andl ire genuiinc conitrite in their speech and
{
actions. Physical state nmay lie a ninor factor -J the least experienced :
of the three indlivid uall, is on his second night shift, and staoes feeling sonie minor fatigue. The other two individuals are on their third night shift. and don't believe fatigue was a factor.
Second Inappropriatc Action: No.
7.g. Did the supervisor not identify error likely situations and error precursors?
First Inappropriate Action: No. During supervisory pre-job briefings the "Are You Ready?" checklist is utili7ed, anihong other discussions. The applicable RWNP for the iob location is emphasized, not the areas that workers may need to be in prior to the going to the work site. According to the supervisor, he has never briefed a job as requiring two RWPs to be completed - that just is not done at PB NP. Focus is always on the job site. as wsas the case with this issue.
Second Inappropriate Action: Not covered during pre-job brief. This was covered during initial brief of tlte'crew conling on site for outage 4ork1, conducted by Patrick Turner of the PBNP NDE Group.
7.h.
Was there a process or organizational failure that led to this error (see table on next page)?
First Inappropriate Action: Possibly. The interviews reveled that there were two opportunities for human intervention on the part of questioning at the RP station upon entering the RCA. The individuals cannot recall what was stated at the first opportunity, when all three individuals first entered the RCA. The second opportunity, after one or the workers exited and then re-entered the RCA, offered a good chance for RP to intercede - but it was nmissed.
Additionally, there were no physical or human barriers present at the entrance to either the 26' or 66' containment airlocks to prevent entrance on the wrong RWP.
or to remind personnel to be signed into the CTMT RWP vice the PAB RWP.
Second Inappropriate Action: No. Radiation worker training emphasizes proper management of dose e.xposure, and conseivative decision-maLking in real time with regard lo dose received.
- 8. Summarize the inappropriate action in one sentence as follows:
did instead of (WHO)
(WHAT)
(THE REQUIREMENT) as found in
'because (Where the Requirement is found)
(WHY if known)
First Inappropriate Action: Three contract N DE lechnicians conducted radiation work in the Unit I containmnent during U IR2S uinlerthe RWP for PAB work instead of the RWP for Containment wvork. as required by NP'4.2.19, "General Rules bfr
ad IWork In a Ra.diolmicalv ('ontrolled Area." Section 4.3I RadIationi Work Perinits iRN WP.>;
Second Inappropriate Action: A contract NDE technician intentionluly allowed his raldiation dose to approach anid cxcccd the (perccived. although wrong) dose limit for the RWVP under which he was working in the Unit I containnient during U! I R28.
instead oln exiting at an earlier opportunity, as required by NP 4.2.27. -'Personnel Exposure Mlonitoring Device Mininmtum Requirements and General Use7. Step 3.7.1 states that the wvorker is to ensure that the exposure accumulation does not exceed that aMithorized by the RWP. In this case the RWP (althoiigh thie wrong one) limit was 50 nwemn (per entry).
- 9. Based on what you have learned, describe the error likely situations that were present at the time of the event.
- 1. Overconfidence.
- 2. Multi-tasking
- a. What Error Reduction Tools were not used or not used effectively? What Error Reduction Tools could have been used to prevent this event? Clearly state which is the one tool, which if used, would have had the greatest chance of being successful.
- 1. STAR
- 2. Peer Checking
- b. Are these Error Reduction Tools going to provide the barriers to prevent recurrence? Where else should these barriers be applied?
Yes -however. other barriers may want to be considered by management, as employed at other nuclear sites Human Performance Failure Modes (From the NMC Trend Code Manual)
- Inattention T
- Distracted & Interrupted 1
- Time & Schedule Pressure 4
- Spatial Disorientation 1 Inadequate Motivation 4
- Unfamiliar or Infrequent Task 1
- Inadequate Knowledge of Standards 1
- Inadequate Knowledge of Fundamentals
- Inadequate Verification t
- Bored I
-Multi-Tasking I
- Fear of Failure 1
- Mindset/Preconceived Idea
- Shortcuts Taken I
- Misdiagnosis 4
- Flawed Analytical Process or Model I
- Over Confident I
- Cognitive Overload I
- Inadequate Tracking (Place Keeping) 4 a Habit/Reflex t
- Imprecise Communication x
- Work Around x a Tired & Fatigued T
- Lapse of Memory t
- Wrong Assumptions I Tunnel Vision I Process Failure Modes (From the NMC Trend Code Manual) a Critical Actions Not Verified t
- Excessive Verifications a
- No Process Monitoring a
- Only Monitoring Problems 0
Person Specified Not Able to Perform Task.
More Than One Person Specified to Perform Task No One Specified to Perform Task No Acceptance Criteria Organizational Failure Modes (From the NMC Trend Code Manual)
- Inadequate Prioritization
- Inadequate Trust
- Inadequate Self Assessment
- Inadequate Planning
- Inadequate Teamwork
- Inadequate Program Management
- Inadequate Span of Control
- Inadequate Communication among Organizations
- Inadequate Communication within an Organization
- Lack of Commitment
- Inadequate Knowledge
- Inadequate Emerging Issues Management
- Insufficient Staffing
- Inadequate Levels in Organization
Event Investigation Personnel Statement Name:
Position:
Event Date:
Handwritten statements are acceptable. Include the plant conditions prior to the event, your indications that a problem existed, your action as a result of those indications, noted equipment malfunctions or inadequacies, and any identified procedure deficiencies.
Also, include any information you consider important to the review of this event and actions that may prevent recurrence. Use additional paper as necessary.
1.C:
Z YSty
- ..brrA 4%..
.4
- +.
,.
j 4
I*
.5
- I
- . 5.
5 5
- 5
.55 l.. if *
- V.s jZrt C.
5
'5*
5
55,
- 5 45 5
.. 4t
1 55;*f j55
.5
5*
55 45*
5*'
5 A
.*
- 4.
- 1 ad, 54 555*.
LI.
- poll All o
n7_
. 2
- J7~~
Hand~iittcnst~cm'cnts are acccp&= Dciade the plun.corlons~prior o th evcntg, you idi a
it yourac ii ultofthoscitionq; ntd j
qwpiat*i'cuo~ni oricquicics,'an4*y dintificd proctduXc dcfincicnics.
A~oiildesy~iiiforltoi ju onadr En~ioto the revlcs' of this ccnt and.
- - etio ii hatlpmycn;-,cigoayU~
~ ~
ce~
y csa I
I...
11 :
v.
I.
X I.
I
fo 4Z Z6d YeAN e-q 4
ff
@/4.V 6
(
o f-&1
- v0..3 6 glt 0-3v O-
?
°*
Z4J.ZL. ;Ja *
'.X e._,..
>;§ 7 CŽ o4,o4'z.
c e..ue#
c..4@ e4'.=ii f,,
We0U o/..7!b..
(
5@M4/
.6
-zl.AV iY)4d / 7h?.'
y eLv~...
- J_.DCL 0d.7.>.r w4L~eszd zcPg.
aM,~p ov 4to o
.J
.po.
8.#f 2*o:.
- 6.
Wc*LL
- 5.
-f4~fi6fi
.t.L b=
.6..
.A~~~
4,--.§° k
gi.
</
R f.*
t.2S.
A./i..
ell_9~
1-2&A~d.~7 ca
.f z
D m
v:
r-.
- ~~~~~
.4g _0sv.Jr, -.-,
.;=z~
- .1
ACS Entry By Task/RWP Start Interval: 04/05/2004 00:00 End Interval: 04/0512004 23:59 Task4: 04161-1 Task Description.: NDE & ISI ACTIVITiES RWP #: 04161 RWP
Description:
PAB NDE & ISI ACTIVITIES Max Rate Dose Neution (mremlhr) (mrem) (mre
_)
Name Entry Time Exit Time Time In RCA 0410512004 04/05/2004 04/05/2004 04105/2004 04/0512004 04/0512004 04/0512004 0410512004 04/0512004 01:35:29 01:37:29 18:54:10 01:36:12 01:36:34 18:54:37 02:23:27 23:54:06 18:54:34 04/05/2004 01:36:30 04/0512004 02:06:39 0410512004 22:04:00 04/0512004 02:06:50 04/0512004 02:07:18 04/05/2004 22:08:43 04/0512004 02:32:35 04/0612004 00:01:37 04/0512004 22:08:50 0:01 0:29 3:09 0:30 0:30 3:14 0:09 0:07 3:14 0
0 108 0
0 11l 0
0 72 0
0 0
51 0
0 0
4 3 43 0
0 O
0 0
20 0
A
'7 J
Total For Taqk (mrem): 114 0
O Grand Total ForTask (mrere): 114 I
POINT BEACIT
'I "I..AR PLANT RADIOLO2
' 21=VEYS LOCATION:
ONTARQENT, EL66, Ii
, 'i, INSTRUMENT TYPE WAeLr- / 9 M.1-PURPOSE:
C&Daily Survey 0
CPre-RWP O RWP #
D_____
REVIEWED BY: -
PBF4021 Revision 0 01101/93 HP 1.9 Notes:
- 1) All readings in xnrem/hr
- 2) *Designates hot spots
- 3) Designates routinely updated posting
- 4) 'Potential Hazards" identified are indicated on map
11
.
I lo, POINT BEACF'
- 'EPAR PLANT RADIOLOL.
. '1J1VEYS LOCATION:W.
tUNIT1' CO TN'INME-NTT;' ELMS,66'i.X,;
I I
tI.
PBF-4021 Revision 0 01/01/93 HiP 1.9 Notes:
I) All readings in rnreni/hr
- 2) *Designates hot spots
- 3) Designates routinely updated posting
- 4) 'Potential Hazards' identified are indicated on map
POINT BEACH
'CLEAR PLANT RADIOLOG~I..L SURVEYS L...N L
U t.:
LOCA77ON: \\i 1llUSl~{
,I I
Pre-RWP
% I iC3 rnmw-40? 1 Revision I n o0 I I).
III, 1.9 Notes:
- 1) All readings in mren/llr
- 2) *Designates hot spots
- 3) IDcsignates routinely updated posting
- 4) 'Potential Hazards" identified are indicated on mnap