ML051450499

Condition Report CR-04-02514

ML051450499
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/08/2004
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0208 CR-04-02514
Download: ML051450499 (5)

Text

,

1-S October 8, 2004 13:26:3 Millstone Condition Report CR-04-02514 Page 1 TRENDING CR FOR MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE OPENING AF TER REACTOR TRIP AT MILLSTONE UNIT 2.

Significance: 2 Process: TRACKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Status: OPEN Discoverd: Wednesday, March 17,2004 CRED Req.: NO Initiated: Wednesday, March 17,2004 Reportable: No Screened: Wednesday, March 17,2004 Unit: 02 Processed by CA: Thursday, March 18, 2004

'CR Owner: MGRNUCFUEL MANAGER NUCLEAR FUEL Document Notes INITIATOR REQUESTS FOLLOWUP => NO Trend Issue 001 Category Attr Description WHATHAP CFMT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT DEGRADATION SELFIDENT YES CR WAS SELF IDENTIFIED BY THE PROCESS I TEAM SAFDEVPRECUR RVLF RELIEF VALVE LIFT INPOPOC CM.3 DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS INITIALCODE ICNF CONFIGURATION CONTROL (PAPERWORK, DRAWING & DESIGN CONTROL)

HOWDISCOVR SELF SELF IDENTIFIED CATEGORY ENGR ENGINEERING ISSUES Document Notes

• • • CONDITION DESCRIPTION ISSUE DESCRIPTION:

IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CAPACITY AND RESPONSE TIME SUCH THAT FOR A ROUTINE REACTOR TRIP, THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES WOULD NOT OPEN.

CONTRARY TO THIS EXPECTATION, THE LAST THREE REACTOR TRIPS AT FULL POWER FOR MILLSTONE UNIT 2 HAVE RESULTED IN MOMENTARY OPENING OF AT LEAST ONE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE.

WHILE A NUMBER OF EVALUATIONS AND DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SAFETY VALVE OPENING, THE RECENT TRIPS HAVE DEMONSTRATED

!THATlFfRSOSETV TIONDITNONS--SAFETY-VALVE-OPENING--

WILL STILL OCCUR.

AT THE REQUEST OF MANAGEMENT, THIS TRENDING CR IS BEING WRITTEN TO INITIATE AN INTEGRATED EVALUATION OF THIS ISSUE TO DETERMINE IF ANY ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE-ACTIONS -ARE-APPROPRIATE. -THE -INTEGRATED EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE A REVIEW OF DESIGN BASIS AND LICENSING BASIS REQUIREMENTS, OPERATING EXPERIENCE FROM OTHER CE NSSS PLANTS AND THE MP2 PAST HISTORY.

THE EVALUATION WILL DETERMINE IF THE OPENING OF THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN THE PREVIOUS EVENTS AND DETERMINE IF ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGES SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED.

IMMEDIATE ACTION(S) TAKEN:

FOR EACH TRIP, THE OPERATORS TOOK THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PLANT. AN EVENT EVALUATION TEAM HAS BEEN FORMED TO EVALUATE THE PLANT RESPONSE AND DETERMINE IF ANY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NEEDED.

NO OTHER IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ARE NEEDED.

RECOMMENDED ACTION(S):

NUCLEAR FUELS ENGINEERING SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD FOR THE EVALUATION, WITH ASSISTANCE FROM SITE ENGINEERING AND DESIGN ENGINEERING.

SCREENING -

DOES THE REPORTED ISSUE IMPACT:

PERSONNEL SAFETY => NO PLANT SAFETY => NO SEE 'IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN' AND 'SCREENER COMMENTS'..

AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FOR PLANT OPERATIONS => NO OPERABILITY => NO REPORTABILITY => NO REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT => NO ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, ETC => NO PLANT OR EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY => YES SCREENER COMMENTS:

CONCUR WITH PRE SCREENING -

CR FOR TRENDING ONLY CRED REQUIRED => NO COMPENSATORY ACTIONS => NO ROOT CAUSE/EVENT REVIEW TEAM REQUIRED?

NO OPERATING EXPERIENCE => YES SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION REQUIRED?

NO REWORK => NO CONDITION REVIEW TEAM COMMENTS:

SDP.

?MRT?

INITIATING PROCESS ALERT GROUP:

MGRNUCFUEL INITIATOR:

MICHAEL

KAI, EXT. 0215 Trend Issue 002 Category Attr Description RESPDEPT EQCAUDES ENUC NUCLEAR ENGINEERING EQBX OTHER

-EQCAUCAT-EQA-ENGINEERING/DESIGN COMPTYPE RLFV VALVE RELIEF CAUSECODES 1304 ORIGINAL PROBLEM NOT RESOLVED BY DESIGN CHANGE

'CAUSALFACTOR CF13 DESIGN-CONFIGURATION-&-ANALYSIS

Notes THE ISSUE OF MSSV OPENING FOLLOWING ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS WAS APPARENTLY CLOSED BASED UPON THE RISKS AND RESOURCES NEEDED FOR TESTING.

THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE WAS BASED UPON THE IMPACT ON SGTR RATHER THAN THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON MSSV RELIABILITY AND CONSEQUENTLY AFW RELIABILITY.

Document References Ref Fac. Type Sub Document No.

Sheet Revision Type MP RPT ACR CR-04.02543 CR ISSUED FOR TRENDING THE LIFTING OF SIG SAFETY VALVES 2-MS-252 AND 2-MS-242 FOLLOWING U2 REACTOR T RIP ON 3115104 MP RPT ACR CR-04-02760 MANUAL REACTOR TRIPPING CAUSES SG SAFETY VALVES TO LIFT CR System References Fac Unit Sys Loc Sys Description MP NA NA NA NO SYSTEM REFERENCE

October B. 2004 13:26:3 Millstone Condition Report CR-04-02514 Page 2 Action Request: 04001714 Type:

Status:

Status Date Due Date:

Subject:

CAQ (CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY (SIGNIF LVWS 1 & 2))

APPROVED Thursday, March 18,2004 Sunday, August 07, 2005 CR-04-02514 TRENDING CR FOR MAIN STEAM

• SAFETY VALVE OPENING MGRNUCFUEL (MANAGER NUCLEAR FUEL)

Owed To:

Description

'MIS A/R COORDINATES THE ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBZJECT CR.

October 8, 2004 13:26:3 Millstone Condition Report CR-04-02514 Page 3

. Assignment: 04001714-01 Assignment Closure Notes DEPARTMENT

MGRNUCFUEL Type:

Due Date:

Status:

Resp. Group Organization Status Date:

Subject:

Schedule Ref:

Mode:

Affected Unit:

Affected System CATI (CR INVESTIGATION ASSIGNMENT)

Wednesday, April 07, 2004 COMPLETE MGRNUCFUEL (MANAGER NUCLEAR FUEL) 85H Tuesday, April 06, 2004 CR-04-02514 LEAD: TRENDING CR FOR MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE OP NA NA (ASSIGN'MT IS NOT RELATED TO A PLANT MODE CHNG BWR PWR) 02 NA (NO SYSTEM REFERENCE)

PROBLEM STATEMENT THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM AND NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN OPTIMIZED TO PREVENT OPENING MSSVS ON ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS AT MP2.

EVENT TREND OBSERVED OF OPENING MSSVS FOLLOWING MP2 REACTOR TRIPS ON 3/7/03, 3/6/04 AND 3/15/04.

INVESTIGATION THE MSSVS ON MP2 HAVE OPENED FOLLOWING THE LAST THREE REACTOR TRIPS AT MP2.

DURING THE REACTOR TRIP ON 3/7/03, THE QUICK OPEN FEATURE OF THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS FAILED TO INITIATE.

WITH THIS TYPE OF FAILURE, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE MSSVS WOULD OPEN. FOR REACTOR TRIPS ON 3/6/04 AND 3/15/04, THE QUICK OPEN FEATURE APPARENTLY OPERATED AS REQUIRED.

HOWEVER, SAFETY VALVES WERE ACTUATED ON THESE TRIPS AS WELL.

AS A RESULT OF THIS TREND, MANAGEMENT HAS REQUESTED THE INITIATION OF CR TO INVESTIGATE THIS TREND AND DETERMINE IF ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE Assignment Text CR-04-02514, SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL: 2 INITIATED BY:

MICHAEL

RAI, PHONE:

0215 INITIATOR FEEDBACK REQUESTED:

NO USE OF THE ELECTRONIC CR INVESTIGATION DATABASE IS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS ASSIGNMENT.

I l WARRANTED.

i -PROVIDE APPARENT CAUSE DETERMINATION AND PROVIDE A CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN. --

-INVESTIGATOR MUST BE TRAINED PER REQUIREMENTS OF DNAP 1604.

-CRT REVIEW DETERMINED THIS EVENT/ISSUE MAY NEED TO BE COMMUNICATED VIA OE.

SEE RELATED OE ASSIGNMENT.

CONDITION REVIEW TEAM COMMENTS:

SDP. ?MRT?

ISSUE DETAIL:

IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT CAPACITY AND RESPONSE TIME SUCH THAT FOR A ROUTINE REACTOR TRIP, THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES WOULD NOT OPEN.

CONTRARY TO THIS EXPECTATION, THE LAST THREE REACTOR TRIPS AT FULL POWER FOR MILLSTONE UNIT 2 HAVE RESULTED IN MOMENTARY OPENING OF AT LEAST ONE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE.

WHILE A NUMBER OF EVALUATIONS AND DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF SAFETY VALVE OPENING, THE RECENT TRIPS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT FOR SOME SET OF CONDITIONS, SAFETY VALVE OPENING WILL STILL OCCUR.

AT THE REQUEST OF MANAGEMENT, THIS TRENDING CR IS BEING WRITTEN TO INITIATE AN INTEGRATED EVALUATION OF THIS ISSUE TO DETERMINE IF ANY ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE.

THE INTEGRATED EVALUATION SHOULD INCLUDE A REVIEW OF DESIGN BASIS AND LICENSING BASIS REQUIREMENTS, OPERATING EXPERIENCE FROM OTHER CE NSSS PLANTS AND THE MP2 PAST HISTORY.

THE EVALUATION WILL DETERMINE IF THE OPENING OF THE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN THE PREVIOUS EVENTS AND DETERMINE IF ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGES SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED.

IN MP2 FSAR SECTION 7.4.5.1.1, IT IS STATES:

THE STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER, STEAM DUMP TO ATMOSPHERE, AND BYPASS SYSTEMS COMBINED PROVIDE A MEANS OF DISSIPATING EXCESS NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS)

STORED ENERGY AND SENSIBLE HEAT FOLLOWING A SIMULTANEOUS REACTOR AND TURBINE TRIP FROM FULL-LOAD WITHOUT LIFTING THE SECONDARY SAFETY VALVES.

THIS REQUIREMENT IS AN ORIGINAL DESIGN REQUIREMENT.

THIS REQUIREMENT WILL ASSURE THAT THE MSSV RELIABILITY WILL BE MAINTAINED AS DESIGNED.

AS DESCRIBED IN A 1976 REPORT, PROBLEMS. WITH THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING THE INITIAL HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING.

DURING PRE-CORE HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING UNACCEPTABLE VALVE OSCILLATIONS WERE OBSERVED WHEN THE VALVES WERE USED FOR STEAM FLOW CONTROL.

DURING POST CORE HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE VALVES WOULD NOT OPEN MORE THAN 80% UNDER LOAD.

HYDRAULIC DAMPENERS WERE INSTALLED TO SLOW DOWN THE OSCILLATIONS, BUT THE VALVES STILL ONLY OPENED TO 80%.

A MODIFICATION TO THE PLUGS WAS MADE TO TRY TO SOLVE THE CAPACITY PROBLEM BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

INSTALLATION OF THE HYDRAULIC DAMPENERS APPARENTLY ALSO RESULTED IN EXTENDING THE QUICK OPENING TIME BEYOND 3 SECONDS CAUSING THE SAFETIES TO LIFT DURING REACTOR TRIPS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY TESTING. PROJECTION ASSIGNMENT 76-618 WAS INITIATED TO CORRECT THE EXTENDED DELAY TIME.

COPES-VULCAN MODIFIED THE VALVES SO THAT THE QUICK OPENING WAS RESTORED TO LESS THAN 3 SECONDS.

THESE MODIFICATIONS INCLUDED INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE SOLENOID VALVE AND SUPPLY LINE TO THE AIR OPERATORS AND THE USE OF LESS STIFF SPRINGS.

COPES-VULCAN ALSO ADDED MORE RESTRICTIVE VALVE TRIMS TO OBTAIN BETTER FLOW CONTROL CAPABILITY TO THE CONDENSER.

THE CAPACITY ISSUE WAS ADDRESSED BY ADDING THE QUICK OPEN FEATURE TO THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES (PA 79-2560).

THE WORK DONE IN 1976 APPEARS TO HAVE RESOLVED THE QUICK OPENING RESPONSE TIME, BUT NOT THE CAPACITY Assianment Svstem References Fac Unit Sys Loc Sys Description MP NA NA NA NO SYSTEM REFERENCE Assignment Closure Notes CONDITION REPORT

SUMMARY

, 04/06/2004 6:30:57 AM CR NUMBER CR-04-02514 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 2

INVESTIGATION COMPLETED 03/24/2004 INVESTGATOR M. KAI

October 8, 2004 13:26:3 Millstone Condition Report CR-04-02514 Page 4 Assignment Closure Notes ISSUE.

HOWEVER, APPARENTLY THIS WAS SUFFICIENT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF SAFETY VALVES OPENING FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP.

WHEN MP2 IMPLEMENTED STRETCH POWER, THE ISSUE OF OPENING MSSVS POST TRIP RECURRED.

IN JUNE 1982, CE SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO PERFORM A STUDY TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM CONTROL SYSTEM CHANGES THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE ACTUATION OF THE MSSVS FOLLOWING ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS.

CE HAD PERFORMED A SIMILAR STUDY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STRETCH POWER AT ST.

LUCIE 1.

A LOWER OPERATING SG PRESSURE WAS SELECTED THAT ELIMINATED THE POTENTIAL FOR MSSV ACTUATION FOLLOWING ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS.

AS A RESULT OF THE PROPOSAL, PROJECT ASSIGNMENT 83-039 WAS INITIATED.

THE CE PROPOSAL CONSISTED OF THREE PHASES.

THE FIRST PHASE INVOLVED DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPUTER CODE MODEL TO IDENTIFY ANY DEFICIENCIES OR CHANGES NEEDED I TMHEU CrNT1ROL YCVFMVM TTr r~T~T Assignment Closure Notes AS A RESULT, IT APPEARS THAT THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ONE OR TWO SAFETY VALVES OPENING UPON REACTOR TRIP WAS ACCEPTED AND THE POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE DUMP CAPACITY WAS ACCEPTED AS-IS.

SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRING ISSUES RAISED ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE STEAM DUMP VALVES AND THE DESIGN BASIS.

THE ISSUE OF THE DISCREPANCY OF THE DUMP CAPACITY WAS RAISED AS AN ISSUE DURING RECOVERY AND DOCUMENTED IN DBDP DISCREPANCY MP2-MS-08.

THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION WAS TO REVISE THE FSAR TO REFLECT A LOWER DESIGN CAPACITY.

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF CR'S ASSOCIATED WITH THE TURBINE DUMP SYSTEM AND THE QUICK OPEN FEATURE.

IN 2002 7-MMODM2-99057-A-SECOND SOLENOID VALVE IN PARALLEL I

l T TTfI8TT mu And he

-h THE SETPOINTS OF THE CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT, 7A-SECOND-STUDY WOULD BE PERFORMEDE-TO DETERMINE-THE-OPTIMUM-OPERATING-CONDITIONS-THAT WOULD PREVENT THE SAFETY VALVES FROM ACTUATING FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP.

THIS STUDY IS THE ONE THAT RESULTED IN THE SELECTION OF THE LOWER OPERATING SG PRESSURE FOR ST. LUCIE.

THE THIRD PHASE WOULD INVESTIGATE MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM TO ALLOW OPERATION AT A HIGHER STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE.

INSTEAD OF CONTRACTING WITH CE, IT WAS DECIDED TO DO PHASE 1 IN-HOUSE.

THE SAFETY ANALYSIS SECTION USED RETRAN TO MODEL THE CURRENT SITUATION AND EVALUATE POTENTIAL CHANGES.

THE RETRAN ANALYSIS STARTING POINT ASSUMED THAT TWO SAFETY VALVES WERE LIFTING FOLLOWING THE REACTOR TRIP.

WITH THIS ASSUMPTION, VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR CONTROL SYSTEM CHANGES WERE EVALUATED.

BASED ON THE STUDY, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN SECONDARY SIDE RELIEF RATE WAS NEEDED.

INCREASING THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE CAPACITY WAS NOT A PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION PROPOSED WAS TO DELAY TURBINE TRIP BY 3 OR 4 SECONDS.

APPARENTLY, THE OPTION OF REDUCING SG PRESSURE WAS NOT EVALUATED.

IN 1984, IT WAS DECIDED THAT CONFIRMATION OF THE SAFETY VALVE LIFT ASSUMPTION IN THE RETRAN STUDY WAS NEEDED BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ANY DESIGN CHANGES.

IT WAS DECIDED THAT A ONE YEAR PERIOD OF DATA COLLECTION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

IF AT THE END OF THAT ONE YEAR PERIOD, THE DATA COLLECTED WAS NOT ADEQUATE TO CONFIRM THE

MODELING, THE PROJECT WOULD BE CLOSED.

THE TESTING PLAN WAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY PORC.

THE PROJECT WAS CLOSED IN 1987 BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING:

THE RISK AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TESTING DID NOT JUSTIFY ADDITIONAL TESTING AND THE LIFTING OF SAFETY VALVES FOLLOWING A SGTR HAD BEEN EVALUATED TO NOT RESULT IN A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION PROVIDED TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.

4h

,i~l ll, EXI3TING-3 O

vVL wAu JJurJl 4u r+/-uv.Lv SUFFICIENT AIR SUPPLY TO OPEN-THE SALVES-IN-LESS-THAN-THREE-SECONDS.

CR-03 11377-AND CR. 3w1T4S2DOCUDEN4T`_

SURVEILLANCE FAILURES FOR THE QUICK OPEN RESPONSE TIME.

AS A RESULT OF SOER 02-4 RECOMMENDATION 3 ISSUE #57, A REA WAS INITIATED FOR EVALUATION OF THE REPLACEMENT OF THE STEAM DUMP VALVES.

CR-03-11804 WAS INITIATED TO RE-OPEN THE ISSUE OF THE POTENTIALLY DEGRADED CAPACITY OF THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM.

FOLLOWING THE 3/7/03 TRIP, A REVIEW OF THE REACTOR TRIPS DATING BACK TO 1999 WAS PERFORMED.

OF THE FOUR TRIPS FROM 100% POWER, THE MSSVS WERE CONFIRMED TO HAVE OPENED FOR TWO OF THE TRIPS (5/25/99 AND 1/27/001.

FOR THE 2/11/00 TRIP DUE TO DROPPED CONTROL RODS, THE MSSVS DID NOT OPEN. NOTE THAT IN A DROPPED ROD, THE REACTOR POWER WILL DECREASE SINCE MP2 RUNS WITH THE CONTROL RODS IN MANUAL CONTROL.

FOR THE 4/19/02 TRIP, THERE IS NO SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DATA AVAILABLE FROM THE PROCESS COMPUTER. THUS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SAFETY VALVES OPENED FOR THIS TRIP.

FOR ALL OF THE TRIPS THAT OCCURRED WHEN POWER WAS LESS THAN 100%,

NONE OF THE MSSVS OPENED.

THIS INCLUDES TRIPS AT 97% AND 98% POWER.

ON MARCH 20, 2004 CALVERT CLIFFS 1 HAD A REACTOR TRIP THAT WAS DUE TO VERY SIMILAR FEEDWATER PROBLEMS AS THE 3/7/04 AND 3/14/04 TRIPS AT MP2.

MIKE GAHAN OF CALVERT CLIFFS CONFIRMED THAT THE MSSVS DID NOT OPEN DURING THIS REACTOR TRIP.

HE CONFIRMED THAT FOR CALVERT

CLIFFS, THE MSSVS DO NOT ROUTINELY OPEN FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIPS.

HE STATED THAT THE NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS FOR CALVERT CLIFFS IS 2700 MWT, T-COLD 549 DEGREES F AND SG PRESSURE OF 850 PSIG.

THE SG PRESSURE IS APPROXIMATELY 25 TO 30 PSI LOWER THAN THE NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE FOR MP2.

THIS TENDS TO SUPPORT THE ORIGINAL CE PROPOSAL FOR REDUCING SG PRESSURE.

A QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF OPENING SAFETY VALVES FOLLOWING ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS WAS REQUESTED FROM THE PRA SECTION.

STEAM LINE BREAKS ARE A CONTRIBUTOR TO I

October 8, 2004 13:26:3 Millstone Condition Report CR-04-02514 Page 6 Assignment Closure Notes APPEARS THE MP2 IS AN OUTLIER.

INITIATOR FEEDBACK INITIATOR HAS PERFORMED THE INVESTIGATION.

CAUSE 11 -

ORIGINAL PROBLEM NOT RESOLVED BY DESIGN CHANGE THE ISSUE OF MSSV OPENING FOLLOWING ROUTINE REACTOR TRIPS WAS APPARENTLY CLOSED BASED UPON THE RISKS AND RESOURCES NEEDED FOR TESTING.

THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE WAS BASED UPON THE IMPACT ON SGTR RATHER THAN THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON MSSV RELIABILITY AND CONSEQUENTLY AFW RELIABILITY.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR CAUSE 1 1

1.

GENERATED ACTION TO:

PERFORM A CONTROL SYSTEM STUDY THAT WILL DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM COMBINATION OF STEAM DUMP SYSTEM CHANGES AND CHANGES IN NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS THAT WILL ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL FOR OPENING MSSVS FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP.

THE STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE A SURVEY OF PLANTS SIMILAR TO THE DESIGN OF MP2.

THIS ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY CLINT GLADDING.

ACTION OWNER:

MGRDESENG :

DUE DATE: 06/07/2004 PRIORITY: PMED

SCHEDULE

REFERENCE:

NA ; MODE:

NA ; UNIT: 02 ND-STEH NA / NA; ASSIGNMENT TYPE:

CACA

2. GENERATED ACTION TO:

INITIATE REA TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDED CONTROL SYSTEM AND/OR OPERATING CONDITION CHANGES.

THIS ASSIGNMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED BY CLINT CLADDING.

ACTION OWNER:

MGRDESENG ;

DUE DATE: 08/07/2004 ;

PRIORITY: PMED

SCHEDULE

REFERENCE:

NA ; MODE: NA ; UNIT:

02 AND SYSTEM: NA / NA; ASSIGNMENT TYPE:

CACA I

Assignment:

04001714-02 Type:

Due Date:

Status:

Resp. Group Organization Status Date:

Subject:

Schedule Ref:

Mode:

Affected Unit:

Affected System CATT (CATEGORY T -TRACKING COMMITMENT (NOT C, M, P. S OR X))

Wednesday, April 28, 2004 COMPLETE MGRNUCFUEL (MANAGER NUCLEAR FUEL) 85H Wednesday. April 14, 2004 CR-04-02514 SITE MRT PRESENTATION:TRENDING CR FOR MAIN STEAM NA NA (ASSIGN'MT IS NOT RELATED TO A PLANT MODE CHNG BWR PWR) 02 NA (NO SYSTEM REFERENCE)

Assignment Text CR-04-02514, SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL: 2 INITIATED BY: MICHAEL KAI, PHONE:

0215

-PRESENT RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN TO SITE MRT.

-CONTACT MEDORA DALLY,

X2454, TO SCHEDULE.

CONDITION REVIEW TEAM COMMENTS:

SDP.

?MRT?

Assignment System References Fac Unit Sys Loc Sys Description MP NA NA NA NO SYSTEM REFERENCE Assignment Closure Notes CR investigation was presented MRT on 3/14/04.

MRT approved the investigation and corrective actions with comments. The corrective action A/Rs have been revised to reflect MRT comments.

Thus, this assignment is complete.

M. Kai Ext. 0215