ML051300380

Report of Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 for May 18, 2003 - December 31, 2004

ML051300380
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/09/2005
From:	Corlett D Progress Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
H N P-05-064
Download: ML051300380 (2)

Text

Progress Energy SERIAL: HNP-05-064 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MAY 9 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 Report of Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), Carolina Power & Light Company (doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.) submits the attached report for the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP).

The report provides a brief description of changes to the facility and a summary of the evaluations required per 10CFR50.59 for those items, regardless of implementation status, between May 18,2003 and December 31,2004.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this submittal at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely, D. H. Corlett Supervisor, LicensinglRegulatory Programs Harris Nuclear Plant DHC/rgh C: Mr. R. A. Musser, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. C. P. Patel, NRC Project Manager Dr. W. D. Travers, NRC Regional Administrator Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.

Harris Nuclear Plant P 0 Box165 New Hill, NC, NC 27562

Document Control Desk HNP-05-064/ Attachment 1, Page 1 of 1 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Report of Changes, Tests or Experiments Log Number / Description of Change Evaluation Summary Implementing Document 04-0601 During reevaluation of the Safe There are no safe shutdown conditions that EC 55938 Shutdown Analysis, HNP identified require either of these dampers to be in a position that control of both Reactor Auxiliary other than open. The modification enhanced safe Building (RAB) Electrical Equipment shutdown capability by eliminating the requirement Protection Room ventilation system for local manual actions to open the dampers. In recirculation dampers could be lost addition, reliability of the system was improved by during a postulated fire in certain installing a control switch in the main control room fire areas. The dampers would fail to isolate the control power to one of the dampers shut upon loss of power preventing to provide an alternate means of opening the them from allowing recirculation of damper to prevent spurious operations from hot the air in the room. This shorts. This activity does not increase the modification changed these frequency, likelihood of occurrence or recirculation dampers failure modes consequences of an accident or a malfunction of upon loss of power from shut to an SSC important to safety, does not create a open. Additionally, circuit changes possibility for an accident of a different type or a were made to satisfy the objectives malfunction with a different result, does not result for post-fire safe shutdown in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, contained in General Design Criteria and does not depart from a method of evaluation.

3, Fire Protection, that are concerned with preventing spurious operation from hot shorts and other affects of thermal and smoke damage.

04-0628 One detector of one of the Fuel The function of this ARM is to generate an AP-557 Handling Building (FHB) Area isolation signal for the FHB normal ventilation and (RM-1FR- Radiation Monitors (ARM) was out initiate emergency ventilation in the event of a fuel 3566ASA) of service for more than thirty-days handling accident. Technical Specifications state until maintenance was performed. that a channel is operable when one or more detectors are operable. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.

04-1 152 Two FHB radiation monitor The function of these radiation monitors is to AP-557 detectors failed check source generate an isolation signal for the FHB normal (RM-1FR- testing and the associated FHB ventilation and initiate emergency ventilation in the 3564BSB & radiation monitors were declared event of a fuel handling accident. One monitor RM-1FR- inoperable for a period of greater was inoperable in the FHB North area and one in than 30 days until maintenance was the South area. Technical Specifications state that 3567BSB) performed. a channel is operable when one or more detectors are operable. This activity does not increase the frequency, likelihood of occurrence or consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an SSC important to safety, does not create a possibility for an accident of a different type or a malfunction with a different result, does not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered, and does not depart from a method of evaluation.