ML050540501
| ML050540501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/2003 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0277, IR-03-006 | |
| Download: ML050540501 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000321/2003006
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 0 00032-1I2003-I1QQ5g 366/2003-006, E. l. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2;
-11/2003 and 7/21-25/200 Triennial Fire Protection
IThe
report covered a o-week period of inspection by three regional inspectors and a
{:etra from Brookhaven National Laboratory. Three Green non-cited violations (NCVs) and
three unresolved items with potential safety significance greater than Green were identified.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
1MD0609, 'Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not
apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3 d ul 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Z4J' 't'
Comerstone: Mitigating Systemsy
- -- 'URI. The team identified an unresolved item in that a local manual operator action, to
prevent spurious opening of all eleven safety relief valves (SRVs) during a fire event,
5$,,&e > would not be performed in sufficient time to be effective. Also, licensee reliance on this
manual action for hot shutdown during a fire, instead of physically protecting cables from
fire damage, had not been approved by the NRC.
This finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination. The
finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating system cornerstone. Also,
the finding has potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance
because failure to prevent spurious operation of the SRVs could result in the'pening Wducrl
certain fire scenarios, thereby complicating the post-fire recovery actions. (Section
1R05.0
o URI The team identified Ivunresol"eitem in that a fire in Fire Area 2104 could cause
,-~a Meiven SRVs to op he-ition team was concerned that the licensee's action
to preclude this soe e not consistent with the current licensing basis of the
plant. Inaddition objective evidence exi de'onstrate that the post-fire safe
shutdown equipment was adequate to mitigate eleven SRVs opening. Finally the team
noted that if the Group A SRVs were to spuriously actuate as a result of fireiamage,
they could not be manually controlled by the operator as part of the licensee's fire
,P mitigation strategy
Y This finding is idenifie-as unresolved pending NRC review of the concerns associated nl
with the potential opening of SRVs. This finding was determined to have potential C
a
safety significance greater than very low significance because of the concerns
associated with potential opening of the SRVs and the limited set of equipment that
could be available for safe shutdown under these conditions. (Section 1R.05.03.b)
e Saw,~k~l /
identified an unresolved item in connection with the implementation of
design change request (DCR)/1-1 34, SRV Backup Actuation via Pressure Transmitter
Signals. The installed plant modification failed to implemenj the one-out-of-two taken
twice logic that was specified as design input requirementyin the design change
2
package. Additionally, implementation of a two-out-of-two coincident takn twice logic
has introduced a potential common cause failure of all eleven SRVsb ef fire-
induced damage to two instrumentation circuit cables in close proximity to each other.
This finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination. Thin
finding is greater than minor because it impacts the mitigating system cornerstone. This
finding has the potential for defeating manual control of Group "A" SRVs that are
required for ensuring that the suppression pool temperature will not exceed the heat
capacity temperature limit*(HOth44o- -L(SectionI R21.01.b)
- Green. The team identified a findingwirthr; low safety-sieane hat a local
manual operator action to operate safe shutdown equipment was too difficult and was
~o lM . also unsafe. The licensee had relied on this action instead of providing physical
protection of cables from fire damage or preplanning cold shutdown repairs. However,
5 the team* ged that some operat6rs would not be able to perform the action.
Quaso,. c .ef4 Aem ,
i f 10 CFR 50. Appendix R Section III.G.1
aechnical Specification 5.4. The finding is greater than minor because itafected the
av/a tyand reliability objectives and the equipment performance --
mitigating systems comerstone. to develop and
implement cold shutdown repairs to fa'ilitate accomplishment of the action, thif g
yter-tha
(Section 1R05.04/.05.b.2) - clAJ e
- Green. The team identified a finding with very low safe significance an v oudtK
licensee relied on some manual operator actions to operate safe shutdown equipme r
instead of providing the required physical protection of cables from fire damage, and
without NRC approval.
This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The finding
is greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability objectives and the
equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since the
actions could reasonably be accomplished by operators in a timely manner, this finding
did not have potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance.
(Section 1R05.04/.05.b.3)
\ * Green. The team identified a finding with very low safety significance in that emergency
lighting was not adequate for some manual operator actions that were needed to
support post-fire operation of safe shutdown equipment.
This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. The finding is
greater than minor because it affected the reliability objective and the equipment
performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone. Since operators would be
able to accomplish the actions with the use of flashlights, this finding did not have
potential safety significance greater than very low safety significance. (Section
1R05.07.b)
3
3. Licensee-Identified Violations
None