ML050250180
| ML050250180 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/2005 |
| From: | Gordon Peterson Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML050250180 (4) | |
Text
Duke GARY R. PETERSON
- i Powere Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station A Duke Energy Company Duke Power MGOI VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy.com January 18, 2005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk
Subject:
Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-369 and 50-370 License Amendment Request for Technical Specification 3.6.14, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS, Divider Barrier Integrity - Response to Request for Additional Information In a previous letterl to the NRC, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for the McGuire Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications (TS).
This LAR proposed changes to TS 3.6.14 to allow a pressurizer hatch to be open for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, an increase from the present 1-hour allowance.
In a letter2 to Duke, the NRC sent a Request for Additional Information (RAI) on this LAR.
Duke subsequently responded to the NRC's RAI.'
4 Based on further discussion with the
'Letter, D. M. Jamil, Duke Energy Corporation, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTENTION: Document Control Desk,
SUBJECT:
McGuire Nuclear Station. License Amendment Request for Technical Specification 3.6.14, Containment Systems, Divider Barrier Integrity, Dated June 3, 2003.
2 Letter, J. J. Shea, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to G. R. Peterson, Duke Energy Corporation,
SUBJECT:
McGuire Nuclear Station. License Amendment Request for Technical Specification 3.6.14, Containment Systems, Divider Barrier Integrity, Request for Additional Information, Dated July 2, 2004.
3Letter, H. B. Barron, Duke Energy Corporation, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTENTION: Document Control Desk,
SUBJECT:
McGuire Nuclear Station. License Amendment Request for Technical Specification 3.6.14, Containment Systems, Divider Barrier Integrity - Response to Request for Additional Information, Dated July 29, 2004.
4Letter, G. R. Peterson, Duke Energy Corporation, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTENTION: Document Control Desk,
SUBJECT:
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units I and 2. License Amendment Request for Technical Specification 3.6.14, Containment Systems, Divider Barrier Integrity -
Response to Request for Additional Information, Dated December 7, 2004.
www. duke-energy. corn
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 18, 2005 Page 2 NRC Project Manager for McGuire, this letter provides additional information on this matter that is specifically applicable to the McGuire polar crane "dead man" switch. provides this additional information. contains a restatement of the NRC question followed by the Duke response.
Inquiries on this matter should be directed to J. S. Warren at (704) 875-5171.
Very truly yours, G. R. Peterson xc w/Attachments:
W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. J. Shea (Addressee Only)
NRC Project Manager (MNS)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 H12 Washington, DC 20555-0001 J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector (MNS)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Site Beverly 0. Hall, Section Chief Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645
e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission January 18, 2005 Page 3 G. R. Peterson, affirms that he is the person who subscribed his name to the foregoing statement, and that all the matters and facts set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
G. R. Peterson, Site Vice President Subscribed and sworn to me:
// 9/0 5 Date
& >< 6(
,Notary Public My commission expires:
__//
/__
/Date SEAL....-.-.
ATTACHMENT 1 This information is provided in response to an NRC question regarding a runaway lift on the McGuire Nuclear Station polar crane and the operator's ability to respond to such an event.
Duke Energy Corporation's (Duke) December 7, 2004 RAI response on this issue stated that the operator can stop unexpected movement of the crane by several means, including: reversing the controls, hitting the emergency stop button, or releasing the "dead man" foot switch.
Based on a phone mail message from J. J. Shea, NRC Project Manager for McGuire, the NRC has a question regarding the function of the "dead man" switch as it relates to removing power from the crane.
The following question was transcribed from the referenced phone mail message Question: "Is there a compensatory measure, or is this "dead man" switch an independent circuit such that when it is released it is not just a relay, but actually kills the power to the crane and therefore stops the load?"
Response
The dead man foot switch when released, removes power from the crane via the motor contactors. The dead man switch powers the motor contactor coil which must remain energized to maintain power to the crane.
There are relay contacts in this circuit along with a reset button and other electrical devices.
Upon release of the dead man foot switch, all crane motions are suspended.
Depressing the reset button is required before power can be restored via the dead man foot switch.
Independent of the dead man switch circuitry, the emergency stop button removes power from the crane via shunt trip of the main circuit breaker.
The dead man foot switch and emergency stop button are functionally verified during pre-operational inspections as part of Duke administrative procedures for operation of the polar crane.
The inspections of these items are classified as "operational issues" and if they do not function as designed, the crane cannot be operated.
Therefore, the answer to the question is yes, the dead man switch circuitry is independent of the emergency stop button circuitry in that each removes power from the crane at different points, with both suspending load movement.